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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

S. PRT. 

2011

112–5 

WILL RUSSIA END EASTERN EUROPE’S 

LAST FROZEN CONFLICT? 

A REPORT 

TO THE MEMBERS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 8, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpo.gov/sfsys 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ........................................................................................... v 

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 

Background ........................................................................................................... 2 

U.S. Interests ........................................................................................................ 3 

Transnistria and Russia .................................................................................. 3 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ........................................................... 4 

Trafficking in Uranium, Arms, and Persons .................................................. 5 

5 + 2 Status Talks ............................................................................................ 6 

Supporting Moldova’s Pro-Western Government ........................................... 7 

Recommendations ................................................................................................ 7 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, February 8, 2011. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: In August 2010, I directed my Senate Foreign Relations Committee professional staff member for European 

Affairs, Marik String, to conduct a review of U.S. policy in Moldova 

and, in particular, Transnistria, a disputed territory within the 

Republic of Moldova controlled by Russian-supported separatists. 

Among the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union, Transnistria is unique in having experienced no significant political violence since a brief separatist war with Moldovan forces in 1992. 

Since then, Russian forces have served in Transnistria, ostensibly 

as peacekeepers and protectors of an estimated 20,000 tons of arms 

and ammunition left behind by the Soviet 14th Army, despite Russia’s 1999 pledge to remove all equipment by 2002 and Moldova’s 

strong advocacy for a transition of the current Russian-led military 

peacekeeping force into an international civilian mission. 

Recent events should provide the United States with an opportunity to renew high-level engagement in support of forging a solution to this conflict. In 2009, a reform-minded, Western-oriented 

government was swept to power in Moldova. However, its efforts at 

reform and European integration continue to be saddled by the unresolved status of Transnistria. While status negotiations under 

the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE) have dragged on since 1993, senior European 

Union officials, including the German Chancellor and French President, have publicly pressed the Russian Federation over the last 

year to cooperate constructively in resolving the conflict as a condition for deeper EU-Russian security dialogue. 

The United States should strongly support European efforts to 

resolve the conflict and thereby assist Moldova in advancing its 

Euro-Atlantic aspirations. A resolute U.S. commitment to this 

cause will ensure that we do not cede influence in a region of paramount importance to U.S. foreign policy. 

A solution would also bring greater pressure against reported 

human rights and trafficking abuses in Transnistria. It would 

strengthen export controls that have enabled illicit trade, which 

threatens U.S. and allied interests, including illegal trafficking of 

proliferation-sensitive conventional and nuclear items. For instance, $11 million worth of uranium-238, which could be used in 

a dirty bomb or in a nuclear weapon program, was seized in 

Moldova in 2010. 

(V) 

vi 

Given the lack of military tensions and relatively amicable relations between the residents of Transnistria and Moldova proper, 

the outlines of a civilian-led peacekeeping mission in Moldova 

under the OSCE or European Union are readily envisioned. A past 

U.S. proposal to broker a solution under the auspices of the NATORussia Council may also deserve reconsideration and could demonstrate that recent developments in NATO’s relationship with 

Russia can redound to Eastern Europe’s security. 

In the United States Congress, we have an opportunity to provide important support for Moldova’s Western ambitions by graduating Moldova from Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. 

This staff report presents the background of the dispute in 

Transnistria and tangible recommendations for advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives in this important region. I welcome any comments you may have. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Ranking Member. 

(1) 

1 Based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the OSCE is a European security 

organization with 56 participating states stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE 

maintains a Secretariat in Vienna and a network of field missions throughout Europe and Eurasia. Its work focuses on early warning, conflict prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation, conventional arms control and military transparency, human rights, democratization, and other issues. 

WILL RUSSIA END EASTERN EUROPE’S 

LAST FROZEN CONFLICT? 

At the direction of Senator Richard Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff undertook a review of U.S. and 

international efforts to broker a settlement for the protracted conflict in Transnistria, a separatist region of Moldova. In addition to 

briefings in Washington, staff travelled to Moldova and to the Secretariat of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE) in Vienna, Austria.1 The purpose of this study was to: 

• Evaluate international efforts to resolve the status of 

Transnistria through the ‘‘Five plus Two’’ talks held under the 

auspices of the OSCE; 

• Assess U.S., European, and OSCE confidence- and securitybuilding measures (CSBMs) between residents of Transnistria 

and Moldova proper; 

• Recommend to members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and United States Government steps to advance U.S. 

foreign policy objectives in Moldova. 

INTRODUCTION

Situated between the European Union’s easternmost border and 

Ukraine, Moldova represents a frontier of the West. Throughout 

much of its independence, gained from the Soviet Union in 1991, 

Moldova’s European prospects were dimmed by ineffectual public 

institutions dominated for many years by Communist Party officials, a moribund economy, constraints on civil society, and a series 

of separatist movements, including in Moldova’s eastern region of 

Transnistria. 

Transnistrian separatists, armed and financed by Moscow and 

remnants of the Soviet 14th Army, fought a brief war with 

Moldovan forces in 1992, and a contingent of approximately 1,500 

Russian soldiers continues to serve in Transnistria, ostensibly as 

peacekeepers and guardians of an estimated 20,000 tons of Sovietera weapons and ammunition. In 1999, Russia pledged to remove 

this equipment, but withdrawals ceased in 2004. Although tensions 

remain, little political violence has ensued since the conflict, and 

residents of Transnistria and Moldova proper experience relative 

ethnic homogeneity and regularized contact compared to other Eurasian frozen conflicts. Nonetheless, Transnistria overtly seeks inteVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:18 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\63345.TXT MIKE
2 

gration with Russia, and formal status negotiations (the ‘‘Five plus 

Two’’ talks) held under the auspices of the OSCE have been stalled 

since 2006. 

In 2009, Moldovan voters dismissed the Communist Party from 

office amid unrest known as the ‘‘Twitter revolution,’’ which swept 

to power the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), a coalition of 

reform-minded, Europe-oriented politicians. This is a notable development in light of the flagging democratic reform movements within other post-Soviet states. Although AEI has pushed through important economic, rule-of-law, and civil society reforms, its lack of 

the requisite supermajority in parliament to elect a President has 

resulted in political uncertainty (Moldova has experienced eight national elections or referenda since April 2009), which is routinely 

cited by Transnistrian and Russian officials as a pretext for spurning status talks. 

Given the European Union’s strict border control and visa regime 

requirements, the lack of uniform Moldovan control over the 

Transnistrian region hampers Moldova’s Western aspirations. 

Moreover, the current situation in Transnistria has allowed its 

leadership to escape sustained pressure for shortcomings in the 

realm of civil, political, and media freedoms and has left its residents isolated from their European peers. 

Despite important border control assistance provided by the European Union, the status quo has also enabled illicit commerce that 

could threaten U.S. interests, including trafficking in persons, 

drugs, weapons (past sales of anti-tank grenade launchers without 

serial numbers have been reported), and sensitive materials with 

applications for nuclear weapons. In 2010, Moldovan authorities 

seized $11 million worth of uranium-238, which could be converted 

to plutonium-239 (fissile material for nuclear weapons) or a dirty 

bomb, from a criminal enterprise with reported links to 

Transnistria. 

Since June 2010, senior European leaders, including German 

Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, 

have brought high-level visibility to the situation in Transnistria 

by personally raising with Russian President Medvedev the need 

for Russia to fulfill its 1999 pledge to withdraw its military equipment from Moldova and to coax its partners in Transnistria back 

to the negotiating table as a test case for broader EU-Russia security cooperation. The United States should seize this opportunity to 

bring similar attention to recommencing negotiations over Transnistria and building support for Moldova’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. 

BACKGROUND

Located within historical Bessarabia, Moldova has spent the last 

centuries under the tutelage of the Mongols, Ottomans, Romanians, 

and Soviets. Transnistria, present day Moldova’s easternmost region on the east bank of the Dniestr River, has experienced considerable autonomy since 1924, when it constituted part of the 

Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) within 

the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. After the dislocations of 

World War II, the Transnistrian part of the MASSR was ceded to 

the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) and its capital of 

3 

2Due to ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, elements in both Romania and Moldova have historically sought integration of the two countries. 3 An estimated 120,000 of the 555,000 residents of Transnistria are reportedly Russian citizens. 

Chisinau, a political entity approximating the borders of present 

day Moldova. 

Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the MSSR was 

succeeded by the independent Republic of Moldova. However, 

Transnistria, emboldened by Russian nationalists and those fearing 

annexation by Romania,2 declared itself the ‘‘Transniester 

Moldovan Republic,’’ a move that led to a 4-month conflict between 

Moldovan forces and separatists backed by the Soviet 14th Army 

that claimed an estimated 1,000 lives. The 1992 ceasefire agreement created the Joint Control Commission (JCC), under which 

1,500 Russian, de facto Transnistrian, and Moldovan forces continue to serve ostensibly as peacekeepers in Transnistria in roughly 

equal proportion. 

U.S. INTERESTS

TRANSNISTRIA AND RUSSIA

The destination for an estimated 300,000 ethnic Russians under 

Soviet resettlement policies and host of key Soviet-era military-industrial enterprises, Transnistria still enjoys privileged relations 

with and access to Moscow. The main thoroughfare of Tiraspol, 

Transnistria’s ‘‘capital,’’ is adorned with placards of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and polls indicate that the most popular 

politician among Transnistrians is Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Although Transnistria is wedged between Moldova proper and Ukraine, both of which openly seek European Union accession, Transnistrian authorities look east, seeking assimilation with 

Russia; with the nearest Russian border over 350 miles away, 

Transnistria would become another Russian exclave similar to 

Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast. In addition to 500 Russian peacekeepers under the JCC who guard Transnistria’s boundaries, 

bridges, and strategic assets, 700–1,000 additional Russian forces 

guard ammunition depots left behind by the Soviet 14th Army. 

After U.S. missile defense plans were unveiled for Romania in 

2010, Transnistrian ‘‘President’’ Igor Smirnov offered to host an 

emplacement of Russian Iskander missiles; Russia declined. 

Transnistrian politics and economics remain heavily influenced 

by Russia. Its parallel administrative structures include a ‘‘parliament’’ called the Supreme Soviet; its currency, along with only 

Belarus and Russia, is called the ruble; and its citizens and industry rely on substantial energy and economic subsidies (and passports) 3 from Moscow. Russian-owned Gazprom possesses a controlling stake in Moldovagaz, which offers Transnistria subsidized energy purchases, while holding the Moldovan Government in 

Chisinau responsible for Transnistria’s mounting energy debt, now 

over $2.1 billion. Moreover, Transnistria has marginalized the 

Moldovan/Romanian language in Latin script that is used in the 

rest of Moldova in favor of Russian in Cyrillic script. Civil society 

and free media have also been heavily restricted, and human rights 

abuses, including torture and arbitrary detention, are regularly reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:18 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\63345.TXT MIKE
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4Despite Transnistrian fealty towards Moscow, the dispute is not based predominantly on ethnicity, unlike other frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union. The ethnic composition of 

Transnistria is comprised of ethnic Moldovans/Romanians (40 percent), Ukrainians (28 percent), 

and Russians (23 percent). The ethnic composition of the rest of Moldova consists of Moldovans/ 

Romanians (83 percent), Ukrainians (7 percent), and Russians (1.7 percent). 5 In addition to Russian troops and equipment, Transnistria itself maintains an estimated 

2,000–4,000 indigenous troops under arms consisting of a T-34 tank battalion, an anti-aircraft 

regiment, and motorized rifle brigades; Transnistrian authorities also maintain an internal security contingent of an estimated 2,000 troops and Black Sea Cossack militiamen. Analysts view 

this force capacity to far surpass Moldova’s own: Moldova maintains only 5,000 troops, no tanks, 

and a deteriorating air force consisting of 8–10 MIG jets. 6Limits are included for Tanks (20,000 units), Armored Carrier Vehicles (30,000), Artillery 

(20,000), Combat Aircraft (6,800), and Attack Helicopters (2,000). 7The CFE Treaty also includes limits on individual state TLE holdings; geographical limits 

to prevent a destabilizing concentration of conventional forces along the primary military approaches through Central Europe, where a Soviet-led attack was seen most likely; and ‘‘flank’’ 

limits in northern Europe, southern Europe, and the Caucasus, where NATO was adjacent to 

the Warsaw Pact. 

ported. Still, no nation, including Russia, has recognized Transnistria’s independence. 

Transnistrian and Russian authorities contend that the Russianled peacekeeping force has been a nearly unqualified success, pointing to the lack of political violence since 1992. However, relative 

tranquility between Transnistria and Moldova proper has benefited 

equally from relative ethnic homogeneity; 4 sustained people-to-people contacts; and the near complete lack of any offensive military 

capacity in Moldova.5 Moreover, Transnistria’s status has allowed 

its leadership to escape sustained pressure for its significant shortcomings in the realm of civil and political freedoms and has left its 

residents isolated from their European peers. 

Moldovan officials remain hopeful that the Russian-led peacekeeping forces can be transitioned into a truly international civilian force but remain prepared to consider a continued Russian civilian role in any future mission. Transnistrian ‘‘President’’ Igor 

Smirnov, however, has warned that replacement of Russian peacekeepers with an international contingent will lead to ‘‘new bloodshed.’’ 

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

For the past decade, U.S. policy in Moldova has focused largely 

on issues relating to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

(CFE) Treaty. The CFE Treaty was signed in 1990 among 22 states 

and placed limits on five categories of treaty-limited equipment 

(TLE)6 between two Groups of States, 16 NATO members and 

6 former Warsaw Pact countries.7 Moldova was not an original signatory to the Treaty but acceded in 1992 following the Tashkent 

Agreement that divided erstwhile Soviet TLE among its successor 

republics. During this process, Transnistria became a repository for 

over 40,000 tons of weapons and ammunition left by the Soviet 

14th Army at the Colbasna depot and Tiraspol airfield. Since 1992, 

Russia has also reportedly transferred approximately 18 T-64 tanks 

to Transnistrian authorities, as well as BM-21 GRAD rocket systems. 

In Moldova, the CFE Treaty has served predominantly as a vehicle for advancing the notion of ‘‘host nation consent,’’ the modest 

but fundamental concept that military forces should not be stationed on an independent nation’s soil without that nation’s conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:18 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\63345.TXT MIKE
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8These revisions resulted in the Adapted CFE Treaty, which was ratified by Russia in 2004 

but has not been ratified by any member of NATO. 9Specifically, Russia committed ‘‘to complete withdrawal of [all] Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002.’’ Moldova also renounced ‘‘the right to receive a temporary 

deployment on its territory due to its Constitutional provisions which control and prohibit any 

presence of foreign military forces on the territory of Moldova.’’ 10The United States Senate’s 1997 Resolution of Advice and Consent to the CFE Flank Document included a condition for ratification that ‘‘Nothing in the CFE Flank Document shall be 

construed as altering the policy of the United States to achieve the immediate and complete 

withdrawal of any armed forces and military equipment under the control of the Russian Federation that are deployed on the territories of the independent states of the former Soviet Union 

. . . without the full and complete agreement of those states.’’ 11Some international officials suggest that Russia impedes greater international access partly 

because it would be embarrassed by the condition of the equipment. 

sent. In 1999, simultaneous to revisions to the CFE Treaty,8 Moscow made a series of agreements, known today as the ‘‘Istanbul 

Commitments,’’ pledging to remove CFE TLE from within 

Moldova’s internationally recognized borders by 2001 and all equipment by 2002.9

The 2001 TLE deadline was met by Russia, but its pledge to fully 

withdraw has not been fulfilled. Half of the arms at Colbasna had 

been removed or destroyed under OSCE monitoring by 2004, but 

since then, removal has ceased. In response to Russian claims that 

it could not afford further removal, the OSCE continues to make 

available a $5.5 million voluntary fund to fully finance the destruction of the remaining armaments. Consistent with the U.S. Senate’s Resolution of Advice and Consent to the CFE Flank Document 

in 1997,10 the United States and NATO allies have insisted since 

2002 that ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty would not be 

sought until the Russian Federation fulfilled its commitment to 

withdraw remaining forces from Georgia and Moldova. 

Moldovan and international officials do not view the equipment 

as a military threat as such but report that the ammunition is held 

under dangerous conditions, posing a threat to civilians.11 Although Transnistrian authorities claim inheritance of the equipment under the Tashkent Agreement, international officials do 

not believe that Moscow would agree to this reasoning but suggest 

that it acquiesces because it serves Russia’s interest in maintaining 

sway with Transnistrian authorities and preserving a cordon sanitaire against NATO expansion. 

Amid growing distrust in NATO-Russia relations and Russia’s revisionist posture towards a raft of agreements, Russia announced 

‘‘suspension’’ of its implementation of the CFE Treaty on July 14, 

2007, an action of dubious legality under the terms of the treaty 

and under customary international law. Russia specifically cited its 

frustration with NATO’s reluctance to ratify the 1999 Adapted CFE 

Treaty until Russia fulfilled its pledges to Moldova and Georgia, to 

which a similar commitment was made. CFE Treaty discussions remain at an impasse, and Russia appears disinclined to fulfill its 

1999 pledge. 

TRAFFICKING IN URANIUM, ARMS, AND PERSONS

Corruption within Transnistria’s law enforcement institutions 

and its absence of civil society watchdog groups have allowed 

Transnistria to fester as a source of trafficking in persons, arms, 

and other illicit goods. In 2010, Moldovan authorities broke up a 

criminal ring in Chisinau with reported ties to Transnistria that 

6 

12The Kiev Document of 2002 envisioned a federal state built on a ‘‘contractual basis’’; 

Moldova rejected this plan, in part due to its purported conferral to Transnistria of equal status 

under international law. The 2003 Constitutional Initiative, presented by then Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, invited Transnistria to co-author a new Constitution for the Republic 

of Moldova based on a federal structure but faltered due to Transnistria’s preference for a confederation or contractual arrangement between two equal political units that would lack a 

strong central authority. The Kozak Memorandum, negotiated mostly in secret by Russian presidential advisor Dmitry Kozak with Transnistrian and Moldovan authorities in 2003 without 

input from OSCE mediators, envisioned an asymmetric federation granting Transnistria expansive powers, which, analysts contend, would have nearly enshrined the status quo. Upon discovery of the document, the OSCE, EU, and United States intervened and noted that the arrangement would be detrimental to Moldova’s relationship with Europe, and Moldova ultimately 

rejected the memorandum as unconstitutional. 13The talks between Moldovan and de facto Transnistrian authorities are mediated by Russia, 

Ukraine, and the OSCE (the ‘‘5’’), with the European Union and the United States serving as 

observers since 2005 (the ‘‘2’’). In practice, however, officials report that the roles of mediators 

and observers are indistinguishable. 

attempted to sell four pounds of uranium-238, reportedly worth $11 

million on the black market, that could be converted to plutonium239 (fissile material for nuclear weapons) or a dirty bomb. In the 

past, authorities have seized weapons, including anti-tank grenade 

launchers without serial numbers (ideal for trafficking) that were 

reportedly manufactured in Transnistria. 

In 2005, the European Union Border Assistance Mission 

(EUBAM) partnered with the Governments of Ukraine and 

Moldova to address border control challenges through seven offices 

in Ukraine and Moldova. EUBAM does not monitor in Transnistria 

itself but has built indigenous customs and border patrol capacity 

along the border with Ukraine to intercept and deter illicit trade. 

EUBAM also facilitates enforcement of a common registration 

system, whereby exporters of goods from Transnistria must obtain 

Moldovan export certification. Although some exporters continue to 

operate outside the system, this arrangement promotes Moldovan 

sovereignty, prevents importers from circumventing Moldovan customs and excise duties, and confers to legitimate Transnistrian exporters the trade preferences associated with Moldova’s status as 

a member of the World Trade Organization. 

5 + 2 STATUS TALKS

In talks over the past 17 years to reintegrate Transnistria with 

the rest of Moldova, several federalist structures have been explored, but none has received sufficient traction.12 Prompted by 

Transnistria’s alleged failure to bargain in good faith, the European Union and United States implemented travel sanctions 

against senior officials in Tiraspol in 2003. The international status 

of Transnistria is currently being addressed through the ‘‘Five plus 

Two’’ talks under the auspices of the OSCE, to which the United 

States is observer.13 The last official ‘‘Five plus Two’’ meeting occurred in 2006, but informal meetings occur four to six times annually at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, where 33 discrete issues 

focused predominantly on access and confidence-building measures 

with Transnistria are discussed. 

In June 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel provided impetus for renewed settlement talks by challenging Russian President 

Medvedev that Transnistria would be used as a test case for deeper 

EU-Russia security cooperation. In exchange for restarting the negotiations within the ‘‘Five plus Two’’ format and for Russia’s fulfillment of its 1999 pledge to withdraw its troops and materiel from 

7 

14These elements were enshrined in the June 2010 Merkel-Medvedev ‘‘Meseberg Memorandum,’’ which envisaged a committee that could be charged to cooperate ‘‘towards a resolution 

of the Transnistria conflict with a view to achieve tangible progress within the established 5 

+ 2 format.’’ 

Moldova, Chancellor Merkel agreed to explore the creation of an 

EU-Russia political and security committee, a forum long coveted 

by Moscow.14 The proposal was again tabled at the German-Russian-French Summit at Deauville in October 2010. 

SUPPORTING MOLDOVA’S PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENT

Since independence, Moldova has struggled to implement reforms 

due to ineffective public institutions, a moribund economy, and political capital spent dealing with the separatist conflict in 

Transnistria. From 2001 to 2009, Moldova was governed by leaders 

from the Party of Communists, until their plurality victory in April 

2009 parliamentary elections sparked civil unrest and a subsequent 

crackdown by government forces. Known today as the ‘‘Twitter revolution,’’ the Government’s violence provoked a backlash in the 

subsequent snap election as voters sent to power a coalition of reform-minded politicians, the Alliance for European Integration, 

who were strongly oriented towards the European Union. Its parliamentary majority was re-affirmed in November 2010 elections, 

but AEI has lacked the supermajority required to elect a President, 

a conundrum that could result in new parliamentary elections and 

further political uncertainty (Moldova has experienced three national parliamentary elections, four unsuccessful parliamentary 

votes to elect a president, and a nationwide referendum since April 

2009). Russian and Transnistrian authorities have used this uncertainty as a pretext for spurning formal status discussions. 

Nonetheless, the AEI coalition has expressed an unequivocal ambition for Moldova to join the European Union, which would be a 

milestone as the first member of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of 

Independent States to achieve such status. AEI has pushed 

through important institutional and market-oriented reforms and 

has exhibited a respect for civil society and media freedoms that 

its Communist predecessors lacked, although execution of such reforms remains a substantial challenge. 

Boundary and access issues with Transnistria continue to saddle 

Moldova’s path towards Western institutions, especially with regard to visa policy. While firmer boundary controls with 

Transnistria could propel Moldova’s EU ambitions, such an eventuality would also favor separatists by creating greater political separation between Transnistria and Moldova proper. Consequently, 

broader progress on Transnistrian status issues will be essential 

for moving Moldova and the entire region closer to Western institutions. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recent political developments in Moldova and the high-level 

attention paid by allied leaders to the situation in Transnistria 

offer the United States an opportunity to enlist similar attention 

to resume negotiations over Transnistria and build support for 

8 

Moldova’s Western aspirations. Specifically, the United States Government should: 

• Devote high-level diplomatic attention to restarting status 

talks over Transnistria to build on similar efforts launched by 

the German and French Governments. Decades of experience 

suggest that U.S. leadership on issues of European security remains indispensible. A durable settlement would advance political stability and economic growth in all of Moldova; assist in 

moving the region towards Western institutions; curtail trafficking in illicit goods and persons and marginalize those who 

prosper from such trade; and enhance the protections of individual rights and freedoms in Transnistria. 

• Advocate transitioning the Russia-led peacekeeping arrangement into an international civilian force. Military tensions between the parties to the 1992 conflict have been all but eliminated, and the remaining arms depots and military peacekeeping forces have become anachronistic. A past U.S. proposal 

that merits reconsideration is the deployment of an international fact-finding mission to establish baseline transparency, which could serve as an initial step towards the deployment of a truly international civilian or police mission 

under the aegis of the EU, OSCE, or NATO-Russia Council. 

• Emphasize to the Russian Federation that its assistance in 

brokering a settlement in Transnistria, and other conflict regions in Eurasia, would serve as an illustration that developments in NATO-Russia relations can tangibly advance Eastern 

European security and that relationships in the post-Soviet 

sphere are not ‘‘zero sum.’’ 

• Consider utilizing, if an arrangement is reached for the complete withdrawal of Russian military equipment from Moldova, 

authority under the Conventional Arms Disarmament Act (Section 11 of Public Law 109–472) to provide additional funding 

to safeguard and eliminate small arms, light weapons, stockpiled munitions, abandoned ordnance, and other conventional 

weapons systems left in the region. 

• Continue to affirm that discussions concerning conventional 

arms control in Europe will be guided by the need for progress 

on the principle of host nation consent for the stationing of foreign military forces, reflected in the Senate’s 1997 Resolution 

of Advice and Consent to the CFE Flank Document, which 

stated that ‘‘Nothing . . . shall be construed as altering the policy of the United States to achieve the immediate and complete 

withdrawal of any armed forces and military equipment under 

the control of the Russian Federation that are deployed on the 

territories of the independent states of the former Soviet Union 

. . . without the full and complete agreement of those states.’’ 

• Work to repeal Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions on Moldova, 

which would serve as a basis for improving bilateral trade relations between the United States and Moldova. Moldova has 

been found to be in compliance with Jackson-Vanik-related 

concerns and is already a member of the World Trade Organization. A bill to extend permanent normal trade relations 

treatment to the products of Moldova (S. 334) was introduced 

9 

by Senator Lugar in the 111th Congress and will be reintroduced in the 112th Congress. 

• Explore the development of a U.S.-Moldovan partnership charter to institutionalize cooperation across the bilateral agenda. 

• Provide technical assistance to the Government of Moldova in 

the realm of institutional reform and economic growth, which 

will enable more foreign investment to Moldova. Although the 

World Bank placed Moldova among the top 10 Most Improved 

Business Reformers in 2010, it still ranks 19th out of 25 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in its 2011 Ease of 

Doing Business report, behind many of its peers in Eastern 

Europe, including Romania, Belarus, and Bulgaria. 

• Offer regular briefings to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the status of negotiations over Transnistria and 

other protracted conflicts. 

Æ