COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

ANN M. HAYES 

v. Record No. 2386-94-4 OPINION BY 

 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

DOUGLAS M. HAYES JANUARY 11, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CULPEPER COUNTY 

Jay T. Swett, Judge 

 Ann M. Callaway (Ann M. Callaway, P.C., on 

brief) for appellant. 

 Jeffrey B. Rice for appellee. 

 Ann M. Hayes appeals the trial court's equitable 

distribution decree, in which the trial court ruled that it 

lacked authority to order Douglas Hayes, appellee, to pay to Ann 

M. Hayes loans made by her to him. The trial court reasoned that 

the loans, made for the benefit of the husband's separate 

property, were separate as opposed to marital debts. The judge 

construed Code § 20-107.3(C) as not allowing the court to order 

repayment of non-marital debts of the parties. Because we hold 

that Code § 20-107.3(C) authorizes the court to order such 

payments, we reverse. 

 Code § 20-107.3(C) provides in part: 

 The court shall also have the authority to apportion 

and order the payment of the debts of the parties, or 

either of them, that are incurred prior to the 

dissolution of the marriage, based upon the factors 

listed in subsection E. 

(Emphasis added). 

 
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 Code § 20-107.3(E) provides: 

 The amount of any division or transfer of jointly owned 

 marital property, and the amount of any monetary 

award, the apportionment of marital debts, and the 

method of payment shall be determined by the court 

after consideration of the following factors: 

 1. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of 

each party to the well-being of the family; 

 2. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of 

each party in the acquisition and care and maintenance 

of such marital property of the parties; 

 3. The duration of the marriage; 

 4. The ages and physical and mental condition of the 

parties; 

 5. The circumstances and factors which contributed to 

the dissolution of the marriage, specifically including 

any ground for divorce under the provisions of 

subdivisions (1), (3), or (6) of § 20-91 or § 20-95; 

 6. How and when specific items of such marital 

property were acquired; 

 7. The debts and liabilities of each spouse, the basis 

for such debts and liabilities, and the property which 

may serve as security for such debts and liabilities; 

 8. The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital 

property; 

 9. The tax consequences to each party; and 

 10. Such other factors as the court deems necessary or 

appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair 

and equitable monetary award. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 The trial court construed the phrase "debts of the parties" 

as used in Code § 20-107.3(C) to mean "marital debt," as used in 

§ 20-107.3(E), and defined "marital debt" as "that debt incurred 

for the joint benefit of the parties during the marriage, rather 
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than a loan benefiting just one party's separate property." 

 The language of Code § 20-107.3(C), and its command to 

consider the factors listed in Code § 20-107.3(E), does not 

restrict the judge's discretion to order payment of the parties' 

non-marital debts to each other. The first paragraph of 

subsection E states that it is limited to the apportionment of 

marital debt. However, § 20-107.3(C) does not invoke the first 

paragraph of Code § 20-107.3(E). The only part of subsection (E) 

that is invoked in Code § 20-107.3(C) is the list of the ten 

factors. Nothing in that list restricts the trial court's 

authority to order payment of non-marital debts between the 

parties as permitted in Code § 20-107.3(C).1

 The language of the statute is unambiguous: "The court 

shall also have the authority to apportion and order the payment 

of the debts of the parties, or either of them." The term "debt" 

is not limited. The authority to order payment of non-marital 

debt is only limited to the extent that the court must consider 

the factors in Code § 20-109.3(E) before ordering payment. 

 Furthermore, we conclude that the General Assembly intended 

that to the greatest extent possible, matters affecting the 

parties' estate be resolved in the divorce action. This is 

evidenced by the General Assembly's decision to amend Code 

 

 1 We are not addressing payment of a non-marital debt owed 

to a non-party. See Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 341, 349 

S.E.2d 422, 425 (1986)(holding that the court is not authorized 

to make an equitable distribution of marital property to a nonparty). 
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§ 20-107.3(C) to permit partition of marital property and to 

allow allocation of debt to the parties. Consistent with the 

General Assembly's intent, we interpret Code § 20-107.3(C) to 

authorize the court to require payment of non-marital debt owed 

by one party to the other. 

 Here, it was necessary for the trial court to determine the 

parties' separate property. See Code § 20-107.3(A). The court 

could not make that determination without first determining 

whether Mr. Hayes owed Mrs. Hayes the amount Mrs. Hayes claimed. 

 Because evidence showed that Mr. Hayes borrowed the money from 

Mrs. Hayes to pay child support to his former spouse and to 

improve his separate property, the trial judge's finding that the 

debt was separate debt was not plainly wrong. Once it so found, 

the trial court should have decided whether to order Mr. Hayes to 

pay the debt, taking into consideration the factors specified in 

Code § 20-107.3(E). 

 Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to 

the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.