NTIA Technical Report TR-08-454 

Assessment of the Effects of Wind 

Turbines on Air Traffic Control Radars 

John J. Lemmon 

John E. Carroll 

Frank H. Sanders 

Doris Turner 

NTIA Technical Report TR-08-454 

Assessment of the Effects of Wind 

Turbines on Air Traffic Control Radars 

John J. Lemmon 

John E. Carroll 

Frank H. Sanders 

Doris Turner 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary 

Meredith A. Baker, Acting Assistant Secretary 

for Communications and Information 

July 2008 

iii 

DISCLAIMER 

Certain commercial equipment, instruments, or materials are identified in this report to specify 

the technical aspects of the reported results. In no case does such identification imply 

recommendation or endorsement by the National Telecommunications and Information 

Administration, nor does it imply that the material or equipment identified is necessarily the best 

available for the purpose. 

v 

CONTENTS 

Page 

FIGURES................................................................................................................................. vi 

ACRONYMS........................................................................................................................... vi 

1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 

2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON WIND TURBINE EFFECTS ON ATC RADARS............ 3 

3 PROCESS FOR ANALYZING WIND TURBINE AND RADAR ELECTROMAGNETIC 

COMPATIBILITY ................................................................................................................... 5 

3.1 Line-of-Sight Distance between Wind Turbines and Radar............................................ 5 

3.2 Terrain Shadowing........................................................................................................... 7 

3.3 Methodology for Assessing the Effects of Wind Turbine Clutter Returns on Radar 

Performance ..................................................................................................................... 9 

3.4 Effects of Shadowing on Detection of Desired Targets................................................. 11 

3.5 Consideration of Wind Turbine Aggregate Effects ....................................................... 13 

4 POTENTIAL FOR DESIRED TARGETS TO BE LOST IN AZIMUTHS OTHER THAN 

THOSE OF WIND TURBINE FARMS................................................................................. 14 

5 CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECTS OF WIND TURBINES ON SECONDARY 

RADAR (ATCBI) PERFORMANCE .................................................................................... 15 

6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................... 16 

7 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 19 
vi 

FIGURES 

Page 

Figure 1. Flow chart to determine if a radar will be affected by a nearby wind farm.................. 5 

Figure 2. Schematic geometry between a wind farm and a radar at the edge of the LOS. .......... 6 

Figure 3. Illustration of first Fresnel zone blockage. ................................................................... 8 

ACRONYMS 

ATC air traffic control 

ATCBI air traffic control beacon interrogator 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

I/N interference-to-noise ratio 

LOS line-of-sight 

MTI moving target indicator 

NF noise figure 

PSR primary surveillance radar 

RCS radar cross section 

SSR secondary surveillance radar
ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF WIND TURBINES ON AIR TRAFFIC 

CONTROL RADARS 

John J. Lemmon, John E. Carroll, Frank H. Sanders, Doris Turner1

This technical report describes the results of a study exploring the effects of 

power-producing wind turbines on Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air 

traffic control (ATC) radars. The study was performed to identify the extent to 

which these effects exist, and to identify mitigation techniques and parameters for 

such effects. The topics addressed in this report are: review of the current state of 

the literature on wind turbine effects on ATC radar performance; determination of 

criteria for recommended no-interference radii between ATC radars and wind 

turbines; determination of methodology for assessing effects of wind turbines on 

radars that are within no-interference radii; analysis of the potential for desired 

targets to be lost in azimuths other than those of wind turbine farms; and 

consideration of the effects of wind turbines on secondary radar (i.e., ATC beacon 

interrogator, or ATCBI) performance. The study results indicate that documented 

cases of deleterious effects from wind turbines do exist and are numerous. Due to 

the large number of parameters that enter the analysis, a simple, universally 

applicable set of guidelines for siting of wind turbines near radars is not feasible. 

However, this study shows that, by making nominal assumptions about turbine 

characteristics and siting parameters such as local topography, it is possible to 

develop a universally applicable methodology for assessing potential interference 

between wind farms and ATC radars. 

Key words: air traffic control (ATC) radar; ATC beacon interrogator (ATCBI) performance; 

wind farm clutter effects; wind turbine clutter effects; wind turbine radar 

interference effects 

1 INTRODUCTION 

The advent of large (250-foot-tall and greater) wind turbines for power production (on the order 

of 1.5 MW) has raised the issue of possible effects on the performance of air traffic control 

(ATC) radars. Turbines with heights up to 700 feet above ground level have been (or are being) 

proposed. In particular, the possibility has been raised that wind turbine structures, if positioned 

with certain geometries and distances relative to ATC radars, might cause those radars to fail to 

detect desired targets with adverse implications for safety-of-life and national security. Possible 

mechanisms for target loss might include electromagnetic shadowing, clutter effects, and effects 

on Doppler (moving target indicator, or MTI, processing) due to turbine blade motion. 

 

1 Authors Lemmon, Carroll, and Sanders are with the Institute for Telecommunication Sciences, National 

Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Boulder, CO. 

Author Turner is with the Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C.
2

The Institute for Telecommunication Sciences (ITS) has been tasked by the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) to assess the impact of wind turbines on ATC radars. If it is determined 

that wind turbines pose a threat to the performance of these radars, the FAA has also charged ITS 

with developing a set of building guidelines to ensure that ATC radars are adequately protected 

from interference from wind turbines. To this end, a literature search was conducted to determine 

whether effects on radars from wind turbines have been reported, and, if so, to identify the tools 

necessary to analyze and assess these effects. The goal of the work is to develop guidelines for 

safe locations of wind farms in the proximity of ATC radars. 
3

2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON WIND TURBINE EFFECTS ON ATC RADARS 

Documents [1] and [2] contain no information concerning the actual effects of wind farms on 

radars. Reports [3], [4], and [5] document numerous cases of the deleterious effects of wind 

farms on ATC radars observed by British researchers. These reports make it clear that wind 

farms can indeed pose a threat to radar performance. Similarly, the report [6] by the U.S. 

Department of Defense contains numerous examples of the effects of wind farms on radars, 

including ATC radars. Reports [7] and [8] are particularly informative, because they not only 

document examples of the effects of wind farms on radars, but also provide numerous references 

to tools necessary to analyze these effects. These references include web sites from which one 

can download computer codes to model the radar cross sections (RCS) of wind turbines as well 

as propagation effects and shadowing of radar signals from wind turbines. They also contain 

tables of simple rules-of-thumb for estimating wind turbine RCSs, assessment methodologies, 

and recommended mitigation measures. These reports appear to be based on solid physical 

principles. Chapter 9 of [9] is devoted to modeling and measurements of electromagnetic 

interference from wind turbines, but is concerned with interference to television signals (as 

opposed to radar) and was not particularly useful for this study. 

From reports [6], [7], and [8], it appears that although researchers in both the U.S. and U.K. have 

identified interference to ATC radars from wind farms, U.K. researchers have investigated these 

effects more comprehensively than U.S. researchers. Moreover, the reports are not consistent in 

their assessment of the effects of wind farms on radars. For example, it is stated in [6] that “as 

the U.K. flight trials demonstrate, the presence of a wind farm does not appear to significantly 

affect the performance of SSR (secondary surveillance radar) systems...the U.K. flight trials 

relied on SSR returns to document actual aircraft positions during the tests.” On the other hand, 

[7] states unequivocally that wind farms can affect the performance of SSR systems and that, 

“Ghost targets are the most common and noticeable effect on SSR systems.” The report also 

discusses various causes and mitigation measures. 

In conclusion, these reports make it clear that the necessary tools for analyzing and assessing the 

impact of wind turbines on ATC radars exist and are available. They are also clear that the 

precise impact on radar performance can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. This is 

because of the many parameters that enter the analysis, including the size and structure of the 

wind turbines, blade rotation rates, pitch and yaw of the blades, the radar absorbing properties of 

different materials used in wind turbine construction, the number of wind turbines in a farm, and 

the spacing of wind turbines, all of which affect the wind farm RCS. In addition, local terrain, 

radar antenna patterns, and sensitivity thresholds vary on a case-by-case basis. Thus, it is not 

possible to develop universal guidelines that can be applicable in all scenarios for prescribing a 

minimum separation between wind farms and ATC radars. However, it is possible to establish 

conservative estimates on minimum separation between wind farms and ATC radars based on 

nominal assumptions about the wind turbine RCS, radar transmit power and sensitivity to 

interference, and propagation conditions. 

Taking into consideration the information derived from the literature review, this study begins by 

determining the line-of-sight (LOS) distance between a proposed wind farm and the radar. The 

LOS distance is the most conservative estimate of the minimum separation necessary between 
4

the wind farm and radar, where radar performance degradation is not expected under ordinary 

circumstances. Additionally, this LOS conservative estimate can be further reduced by taking 

into account other mitigating factors such as terrain shadowing, blockages, the impact of radar 

processing algorithms, and the strength of wind turbine clutter returns. Recommended 

procedures for dealing with these various factors are discussed in this report. 
5

3 PROCESS FOR ANALYZING WIND TURBINE AND RADAR 

ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY 

The flow chart of Figure 1 outlines the recommended process for determining if a radar may be 

affected by a nearby wind farm. The process consists of a series of decision-point checks: 

Figure 1. Flow chart to determine if a radar will be affected by a nearby wind farm. 

3.1 Line-of-Sight Distance between Wind Turbines and Radar 

Due to the numerous different constructions, materials, and individual site circumstances, it is 

not possible to determine a universally accurate minimum distance where interactions between a 
6

turbine and a radar would occur. It is, however, possible to determine a minimum distance where 

effects from wind turbines would not be anticipated. 

The first check proposed (Figure 1) is to examine the distance between the wind turbine location 

and the potentially affected radar. If the distance is greater than the LOS distance, one would not 

anticipate any effects from the physical structure or from Doppler-shifted radar returns from the 

spinning turbine blades. 

Below is a schematic illustration of the geometry between a wind farm and an ATC radar at the 

outer-most edge of the LOS. 

Figure 2. Schematic geometry between a wind farm and a radar at the edge of the LOS. 

Using the Pythagorean Theorem, 

( )2 2 2 D R h R Rh ii i = + −≈ (1) 

for hi << R, where: 

Di is the distance of the object from the local horizon of a smooth, round earth; 

R is the mean radius of the earth (6380 km = 3959 miles); 

hi is the height of the object above mean sea level. 

The refractivity of the atmosphere causes bending of radio waves. This effect can be taken into 

account by replacing the true earth radius by an effective earth radius. Atmospheric refraction 

varies widely, depending on the local climate. However, an effective earth radius of 4/3 times the 

true earth radius is representative of the effect of atmospheric refraction under normal conditions. 
7

Using the 4/3 earth model for atmospheric refraction and equation (1): 

4

3

4 8

3 3 2 (3959) ii i

R R

D Rh h

→

= ⋅ ⋅=

1.41 miles (ft) D h i i = . (2) 

The total LOS between the turbine and radar is then 

 

DD D h h =+ = + 1 2 1.41 miles ( t r (ft) (ft) ) . (3) 

For example, the height of the radar above mean sea level is 50 feet and the height of the wind 

turbine is 300 feet. Therefore, the total LOS distance between the two is (using equation (3)): 

D = += 1.41 50 300 34.4 miles ( ) . 

In other words, if the proposed wind turbine farm is greater than 34.4 miles from the radar, no 

adverse effects on the radar would be anticipated. 

In summary, we present here a methodology that can be used to determine whether a proposed 

wind farm will present the potential for degradation of radar system performance due to 

insufficient spatial separation between the farm and a radar station. The most conservative 

criterion that can be used is one in which the wind farm is located at a separation distance that 

exceeds 4/3 smooth, round earth, with no terrain effects considered. 

3.2 Terrain Shadowing 

The first LOS distance check (Section 3.1) assumes a smooth, round earth without the inclusion 

of terrain considerations. The second proposed check is to examine the terrain surrounding the 

radar for potential shadowing effects mitigating any effect of the turbines on the radar. If it is 

determined (e.g., by using a terrain database) that the local terrain will shadow the turbines from 

the radar, no adverse effects on the radar are expected. It should be pointed out that due to 

diffraction of radio waves around the terrain blockage, the effective height of the blockage is 

reduced from the actual height by the radius RF of the first Fresnel zone, which is 

RF = Dλ , (4) 

where λ is the wavelength of the radio waves, 1/D = 1/d1 + 1/d2, d1 is the distance from the radar 

to the blockage, and d2 is the distance from the blockage to the turbine. 
8

Figure 3. Illustration of first Fresnel zone blockage. 

Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 3. The solid line shows the optical shielding point. 

This is the blocking of the turbine that would be apparent by eye (no significant diffraction). At 

radar frequencies, however, the dotted lines show the shielding point based on total obstruction 

of the first Fresnel zone. This radar shielding point can be calculated by subtracting the radius RF

of the Fresnel zone from the height of the obscuring object, and then calculating the optical 

shielding point using this reduced height for the obscuring object [7]. 
9

3.3 Methodology for Assessing the Effects of Wind Turbine Clutter Returns on 

Radar Performance 

If a radar station falls within the 4/3 smooth-round-earth or non-terrain-shadowed radii described 

in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, then it is possible that scattered energy from the wind farm could 

adversely affect the performance of the radar receiver by increasing its effective noise floor 

level. The occurrence of such increased noise could cause desired targets to be lost [11], or could 

possibly even cause false targets to be generated. The criteria that can be used to assess a 

threshold for this effect are given in [11]. These are: a power level of scattered energy that is less 

than -9 dB relative to the radar’s noise floor (an interference-to-noise, or I/N, level that is equal 

to or less than -9 dB—see equation (7) below) will not cause adverse effects, and an I/N level 

that is less than or equal to -6 dB will cause few effects. Levels higher than -6 dB may cause 

measurable losses in desired targets and could cause the generation of some false targets. The 

following equations can be used to assess whether a wind farm will be expected to exceed these 

-9 dB (ultra-conservative) and -6 dB (conservative) thresholds. 

The strength of the clutter returns is given by: 

( )2 2

2

4

4

tx tx rx

rx

Pg g

P

d

λ

π σ

π

⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅ = , 

which simplifies to 

2

3 4 64

tx tx rx

rx

Pg g P

d

σ λ

π

⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅ = , (5) 

where: 

Prx is the received power in watts; 

Ptx is the transmitted power in watts;2

gtx is the transmitter antenna gain in dBi;3

grx is the receiver antenna gain in dBi; 

σ is the radar cross section (RCS) of the turbine in square meters; 

λ is the wavelength of the operating frequency in meters; 

d is the distance between the radar and the turbine in meters. 

 

2 For radars using pulse compression, such as the ARSR-4 or ASR-11, the equation input for Ptx should be the 

radar’s actual Ptx multiplied by the pulse compression ratio. For example, if the uncompressed pulse width is 100 μs, 

the compressed pulse width is 1 μs, and the actual peak transmitter power is 10 kW, then the value used for Ptx in the 

equation should be [(10 kW)*(100 μs /1 μs)] = 1000 kW = 1 MW. 

3 For ATC radars, gtx = grx. If a turbine is in the near-field of a radar antenna, the turbine effectively acts as part of 

the antenna, which could possibly alter the antenna’s radiation pattern and hence the gain. However, this is only of 

academic interest because this would require siting of the turbine within tens of meters of the radar antenna, and it is 

also ruled out by the other criteria discussed in this report. 
10

The calculation of the radar receiver’s sensitivity is given by: 

noise floor(dBm) 174 10 log =− + ⋅ + (Bradar ) NF , (6) 

where: 

Bradar is the IF bandwidth of the radar in Hz; 

NF is the noise figure in dB. 

As documented in [11], the highest I/N ratio permissible before radar performance degradation 

occurs is -9 dB. An I/N higher than -9 dB may begin to adversely affect radar performance and 

cause loss of desired targets. 

 

P noise floor (dBm) 9 thresh = − (7) 

 

For example, if the IF bandwidth of a given radar is 1 MHz and the noise figure (NF) is 5 dB, 

then the noise floor is (using equation (6)): 

noise floor (dBm) = 174 60 5 109 dBm − + + =− . 

The level (Pthresh) at which loss of targets will begin to occur is (using equation (7)): 

P 109 9 118 dBm 148 dBW thresh = − − =− =− . 

For example, what would be the distance (d) at which energy above the -9 dB I/N threshold 

could enter the radar receiver via a sidelobe at 0 dBi gain for a radar with a transmit power of 

1 MW and operating at 2.7 GHz? To solve this, the calculation below is performed in MKS units 

using equation (5). (With respect to the appropriate value of the parameter σ, wind turbine cross 

sections are discussed in [7] and [12].) 

6

15

8

1

9

1 MW 10 W

Set P 148 dBW 1.6 10 W

0 dBi 1

3 10 m/s 1.1 10 m

2.7 10 /s

tx

thresh rx

tx rx

radar

P

P

g g

c

f

λ

−

−

= =

= =− = ×

== =

×

= = =×

×

 3 2 For a typical wind turbine, 30 dBsm 10 m σ = =
11

2 63 2

4 4

3 3 15

7

4 17 4 4

12

10 1 1 10 1.2 10

m

64 2.0 10 1.6 10

1.2 10 = m 37.5 10 m 4.4 10 m

3.2 10

44.0 km = 27.3 mi

tx tx rx

rx

Pg g d

P

σ λ

π

−

−

−

⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ × = = ⋅ × ⋅×

×

= × =×

×

=

It might be argued that the radar’s MTI processing will remove the display of effects due to 

scattered energy from a wind turbine farm. But here we are not considering the problem of 

displaying false targets generated by scattered energy from a turbine farm. Rather, we are 

considering the problem that energy scattered from a turbine farm will increase the effective 

noise floor of the radar receiver and hence cause desired targets to be lost. This effect cannot be 

mitigated by MTI processing. 

Although the MTI processing will not eliminate effects that raise the noise floor of the radar, it 

will mitigate the display of false targets generated by scattered energy from a wind farm. 

However, it is possible that the radar’s MTI threshold will be exceeded by the Doppler shift from 

the spinning turbine blades. This will be the case if the maximum expected speed of the turbine 

blade tips exceeds the threshold speed of the MTI processing. Since the maximum blade tip 

speeds of 1-MW scale turbines are approximately 100 to 200 mph [10], this could occur in 

situations in which desired target speeds are on the order of or less than 200 mph. If such an 

MTI-exceedance occurrence is possible for the tip speeds of a proposed wind turbine farm, and 

the farm does not fall outside the LOS of the radar station, the display of false targets may not be 

eliminated by the MTI processing. 

Nevertheless, the scattered energy that exceeds the MTI threshold is only a fraction of the total 

scattered energy (most of the energy is scattered from the stationary parts of the turbine and its 

supporting structure). If this fraction of the energy exceeds the radar noise floor and generates a 

false target, the total scattered energy is well above the -6 dB (or -9 dB) I/N thresholds discussed 

above. Thus, the criterion that no false targets be generated is much weaker than the criterion for 

no lost targets and will automatically be satisfied by the requirement for no lost targets. That is, 

if a wind turbine is close enough to a radar to produce a false target above the MTI threshold, 

then it is already close enough to exceed the radar’s I/N threshold for target loss, and hence is 

close enough to have caused the radar to have lost targets. 

3.4 Effects of Shadowing on Detection of Desired Targets 

When a radar beam is pointing in the direction of a wind turbine, the resulting blockage of the 

radar signal creates a shadow behind the turbine. The possibility therefore exists that desired 

targets in the shadow zone could be lost due to the reduction in field strength of the radar signal. 

Simulations of wind turbine shadows indicate that the general shape of the shadow is a 

three-dimensional wedge whose angular extent is of the order 2 degrees or less. The impact on 

the one-way transmission of field strength from a transmitter to a point p in the shadow depends 

on the distances between the transmitter, the turbine, and the point p, and can be shown to be [7] 
12

 

2

Relative field strength inside shadow zone 1 tp

tw wp

D S

D D λ = − , (8) 

where: 

Dtp is the distance from the transmitter to a point, p; 

Dtw is the distance from the transmitter to the wind turbine; 

Dwp is the distance from the wind turbine to a point p; 

S is the typical width of the wind turbine. 

The possibility of lost targets exists if this reduction in field strength reduces the strength of a 

radar return to a level below the noise floor (or sensitivity) of the radar. This can be assessed by 

using the methodology of the previous subsection, taking this reduction in field strength into 

account. 

For a primary radar, the effect of shadowing needs to be taken into account for the two-way 

transmission of the radar signal (thus resulting in a square of equation (8)). Thus, for a target at 

the point p, the decibel reduction in the power of the radar return is: 

 

2

Reduction in Power (dB) 40log 1 tp

tw wp

D S

D D λ

⎛ ⎞

= − ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠. (9) 

For example (using equation (9)), an ATC radar operating at 2.8 GHz is located 5 kilometers 

from a wind turbine with a typical (tower) width of 3 meters. A target is located 15 kilometers 

from the turbine and is in the shadow zone behind the turbine. 

8

1

9

3

4

4

3 10 m/s 1.07 10

2.8 10 /s

5 10 m

1.5 10 m

D 2.0 10 m

radar

tw

wp

tp wt wp

c

m

f

D

D

D D

λ × − = = =×

×

= ×

= ×

= + =×

( )

4

34 1

2

2.0 10 9 Power reduction of radar return 40log 1 dB 5 10 1.5 10 1.07 10

40log 1 2.24 10 dB

Power reduction of radar return 2.8 dB

−

−

⎛ ⎞ × ⋅ = − ⎜ ⎟

× ⋅× ⋅ × ⎝ ⎠

= −×

= −
13

3.5 Consideration of Wind Turbine Aggregate Effects 

Although existing tools enable one to analyze the impact of a single wind turbine on radar 

performance, less is known about the collective effects of multiple turbines in a wind farm. ATC 

radar coverage is normally segmented into spatial cells called “resolution cells”. Each cell 

represents a discrete target processing opportunity. If only a single wind turbine is located in a 

radar resolution cell, then the forgoing analysis remains valid. 

If, however, the spacing and geometry of the turbines are such that there is more than one turbine 

in each of a radar’s resolution cells, one cannot presumably treat the impact of the turbines on an 

individual basis. For denser turbine-to-turbine spacings, the combined effects of multiple 

turbines on RCS and shadowing need to be taken into account. As a first approximation, the 

effects from individual turbines could be combined in a linear fashion. However, interactions 

among the turbines could complicate the situation, and this is an area worthy of further 

investigation. 
14

4 POTENTIAL FOR DESIRED TARGETS TO BE LOST IN AZIMUTHS OTHER 

THAN THOSE OF WIND TURBINE FARMS 

If one or more wind turbines do not cause degradation of radar performance due to interaction 

with the radar antenna’s main beam, then no degradation should result from interactions between 

the same wind turbines and any of the radar antenna sidelobes. If, however, wind turbines should 

happen to be positioned in such a way that the interaction with the radar main beam does cause 

degradation to the radar performance, then radar energy transmitted in its sidelobes will also be 

reflected from the wind turbines and returned as echoes into those same sidelobes. This 

transmitted and reflected energy in the sidelobes would constitute clutter returns. If the turbines 

did not have moving parts, the effect of such returns would be equivalent to any other sort of 

static clutter. This is not an effect that can be suppressed by MTI processing, inasmuch as the 

issue here is whether the clutter-return energy raises the noise floor of the radar receiver and 

hence causes some desired targets to be lost. Since the radar main beam is directed on an azimuth 

that is, by definition, not that of the wind turbine farm when the effect would occur in the 

antenna sidelobes, this clutter effect could in principle cause targets to be lost in directions other 

than that of the wind farm itself. The problem considered in this section is, in the event that radar 

performance might be degraded when the main beam is directed toward a wind turbine farm 

(acknowledged to in itself be an undesirable situation), to what extent might desired targets also 

be lost on azimuths other than that of the wind turbine farm, due to sidelobe interactions with the 

turbines? 

The problem of target loss due to increases in radar receiver noise floor has already been studied 

and analyzed in detail in an existing NTIA Technical Report [11]. The threshold criterion for no 

target losses is an I/N level of -9 dB or lower. Thus, the problem that we are addressing here 

reduces to the issue of determining whether sidelobe clutter from wind turbine structures will 

cause coupling at an I/N level that exceeds -9 dB. 

The methodology for analyzing the I/N level scattered from a wind turbine farm is given in 

Section 3.4. This methodology is applicable for analysis of this problem as well. If the analysis 

shows that there is not enough scattered energy from the radar main beam to cause an I/N 

increase of -9 dB or more when the beam is directed toward the wind farm, then the radar 

sidelobe scattering will presumably not present a problem either. If, on the other hand, an 

analysis of the main beam scattering using the methodology of Section 3.4 shows that such 

scattering can cause an I/N exceedance of more than -9 dB, then additional analysis should be 

performed to determine whether such exceedance will also occur in the radar’s sidelobes. If such 

exceedance is found to be present for the sidelobes as well as the main beam, then the proposed 

wind turbine farm will potentially cause target losses to occur in directions other than that of the 

main beam. Those additional lost-azimuth returns could occur in directions that are even more 

critical than that of the wind turbine farm itself. 
15

5 CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECTS OF WIND TURBINES ON SECONDARY 

RADAR (ATCBI) PERFORMANCE 

As mentioned in Section 2, there are conflicting reports in the literature regarding the effects of 

wind turbines on SSR performance. Whereas it is stated in [6] that SSR performance does not 

appear to be affected, [7] states that impacts have been reported. It appears that although 

impairments of SSR performance can occur, they are much less likely than the impacts on 

primary surveillance radar, or PSR, performance. 

Impacts due to shadowing and signal corruption have not been reported. Possible impacts that 

need to be considered include: errors in bearing and target splits and jumps, collectively referred 

to here as ghost targets. Errors in bearing have been reported, but are generally less than 

2 degrees. Ghost targets caused by multipath from the turbine on the SSR uplink are the most 

common impairment. This possibility can be assessed by using the methodology in Section 3.4 to 

calculate the strength of the “false interrogation” reflected from the turbine, and comparing this 

to the sensitivity of the transponder on the target. Report [7] also presents calculated SSR nobuild radii rule-of-thumb values. These values are based on the same methodology as described 

in Section 3.4 to calculate the strength of the “false interrogation” reflected from the turbine and 

targets. RCS and transmitter powers also play a role in calculating the no-build radii rule-ofthumb values. 

Fundamentally, the effects of wind turbine farms on SSR performance would not be expected to 

differ from those of static structures, given that SSRs do not employ any processing technique 

analogous to MTI; in other words, the movement of wind turbine blades should not affect SSR 

performance per se. The FAA can presumably treat wind turbine farms in the same manner as it 

treats static structures concerning SSR effects. 
16

6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 

This technical memorandum describes the results of a study exploring the effects of powerproducing wind turbines on FAA ATC radars. The study was performed to identify the extent to 

which these effects exist, and to identify mitigation techniques and parameters for such effects. 

The topics that are addressed in this report are: review of the current state of the literature 

concerning wind turbine effects on ATC radar performance; determination of criteria for 

recommended no-interference radii between ATC radars and wind turbines; determination of 

methodology for assessing effects of wind turbines on radars that are within no-interference 

radii; analysis of the potential for desired targets to be lost in azimuths other than those of wind 

turbine farms; and consideration of the effects of wind turbines on secondary radar (ATCBI) 

performance. The study results indicate that documented cases of deleterious effects from wind 

turbines do exist and are numerous. Due to the large number of parameters that enter the 

analysis, a simple, universally applicable set of guidelines for siting of wind turbines near radars 

is not feasible. However, this study shows that by making nominal assumptions about turbine 

characteristics and siting parameters such as local topography, it is possible to develop a 

universally applicable methodology for assessing potential interference between wind farms and 

ATC radars. 

Regarding the state of existing literature, studies by both British researchers and the U.S. 

Department of Defense have concluded that wind farms can indeed pose a threat to radar 

performance. The studies have gone beyond theoretical considerations—both groups have 

documented numerous instances of adverse performance effects of wind farms on radars, 

including ATC radars. Necessary tools for analyzing and assessing the impact of wind turbines 

on ATC radars are available, see [7] and [8]. These techniques have been summarized in this 

report. 

Although existing tools enable one to analyze the impact of a single wind turbine on radar 

performance, less is known about the collective effects of multiple turbines in a wind farm. If the 

spacing and geometry of the turbines are such that there is no more than one turbine in each of a 

radar’s resolution cells, one can presumably treat the impact of the turbines on an individual 

basis. For denser turbine-to-turbine spacings, however, the combined effects of multiple turbines 

on RCS and shadowing need to be taken into account. As a first approximation, the effects from 

individual turbines could be combined in a linear fashion. However, interactions among the 

turbines could complicate the situation, and this is an area worthy of further investigation. 

Given that wind farms can cause degradation in the performance of nearby radar stations, we 

have developed in this report a methodology for analyzing the potential impact of proposed wind 

turbine farms on existing radar stations. The flow of this methodology is given in Figure 1. This 

methodology is as follows. 

The first step is the determination of whether the farm falls outside an absolute no-interference 

radius. The methodology presented in Section 3.1 can be used to determine whether a proposed 

wind farm will present the potential for degradation of radar system performance due to 

insufficient spatial separation between the farm and a radar station. This is the most conservative 

criterion that can be used, in which the wind farm is located at a separation distance that exceeds 
17

4/3 smooth, round earth, with no terrain effects considered. This is the approach that can be used 

to determine absolute, no-interference radii between radars and wind farms. 

For radars that fall within the no-interference radius that is determined from the 4/3 smoothround-earth analysis of Section 3.1, supplemental analysis needs to be performed in which the 

effects of terrain are taken into account. The proposed check is to examine the terrain 

surrounding the radar for potential shadowing effects mitigating any effect of the turbines on the 

radar. If it is determined (e.g., by using a terrain database) that the local terrain will shadow a 

wind farm from the radar, no adverse effects on the radar are expected. It should be pointed out 

that due to diffraction of radio waves around terrain blockage, the effective height of the 

blockage is reduced from the actual height by the radius RF of the first Fresnel zone, as described 

in Section 3.2. 

If a radar station falls within the 4/3 smooth-round-earth or non-terrain-shadowed radii described 

in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, then it is possible that scattered energy from the wind farm could 

adversely affect the performance of the radar receiver by increasing its effective noise floor 

level. The occurrence of such increased noise could cause desired targets to be lost [11], or could 

possibly even cause false targets to be generated. The criteria that can be used to assess a 

threshold for this effect are given in [11]. An I/N level of less than -9 dB will not cause adverse 

effects; an I/N level that is less than or equal to -6 dB will cause few effects. I/N levels higher 

than -6 dB may, however, begin to cause measurable losses in desired targets and could cause the 

generation of some false targets. Equations that can be used to assess whether a wind farm will 

be expected to exceed these -9 dB (ultra-conservative) and -6 dB (conservative) thresholds are 

provided in Section 3.3. A methodology is also provided in Section 3.4 for the determination of 

whether a wind farm can potentially cause the loss of desired targets due to shadowing effects. 

Radar energy transmitted from a sidelobe could be reflected from a wind turbine back into the 

sidelobe and cause a loss of desired targets on an azimuth other than that of the wind farm. This 

issue is considered in Section 4. The mechanism of target loss would be an increase in the radar 

receiver’s noise floor due to the sidelobe energy. If an analysis of the main-beam scattering using 

the methodology of Section 3.4 shows that such scattering can cause an I/N exceedance of more 

than −9 dB, then additional analysis should be performed to determine whether such exceedance 

will also occur in the radar’s sidelobes. If such exceedance is found to be present for the 

sidelobes as well as the main beam, then the proposed wind turbine farm will potentially cause 

target losses to occur in directions other than that of the main beam, and additional lost-azimuth 

returns could occur in directions that are even more critical than that of the wind turbine farm 

itself. 

Finally, the potential effects of a wind farm on a radar station’s SSR functionality is considered 

in Section 5. These effects are not expected to differ from those of static structures on SSR 

performance. The FAA can presumably treat wind turbine farms in the same manner as it treats 

static structures concerning SSR effects. 

In conclusion, there is no universally applicable methodology or criterion to establish the total 

lack of adverse effects from a wind turbine farm on a radar station, other than to restrict wind 

farm locations to radii that exceed LOS (including 4/3 smooth-round-earth refraction effects). If 
18

closer radii are to be considered as possibilities, then the methodologies and analysis approaches 

provided in this report need to be used on a case-by-case basis to assess potential impacts. Such 

analyses will need to take into account the specific operating characteristics of proposed wind 

turbine farms, such as detailed information about design, materials, and expected blade 

movement characteristics (e.g., pitch angles and rotational speeds). 
19

7 REFERENCES 

[1] K. Johnson, J. Blazyk, L. Chen, and S. Odunaiya, “Data collection plans for investigating 

the effect of wind farms on Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control radar 

installations,” Technical Memorandum OU/AEC 05-19TM 00012/4-1, Avionics Engineering 

Center, Ohio University, Athens, OH, January 2006. 

[2] Federal Aviation Administration and 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, “Federal Aviation 

Administration and United States Air Force baseline evaluation of the ARSR-2 radar at Tyler, 

Minnesota (QJC) - 6 through 21 April 2004,” Technical Report BR-2002014, September 2004. 

[3] Sustainable Energy Ireland, “Investigation of the impact of wind turbines on the MSSR 

installations at Dooncarton, Mt Gabriel and Woodcock Hill, Ireland,” Final Report, September 

2004. 

[4] QinetiQ Ltd, “Wind farms impact on radar aviation interests,” Report 

W/14/00614/00/REP, September 2003. 

[5] Alenia Marconi Systems Ltd, “Feasibility of mitigating the effects of wind farms on 

primary radar,” Report W/14/00623/REP, June 2003. 

[6] Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, “The effect of windmill 

farms on military readiness,” Report to the Congressional Defense Committees, U.S. Department 

of Defense, 2006. 

[7] European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, “Wind farm impact assessment 

techniques and mitigation measures,” May 2007. 

[8] European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, “Assessment methodology to 

determine the impact of wind turbines on ATC surveillance systems,” May 2007. 

[9] D. A. Spera, Ed., Wind Turbine Technology, Ch. 9, New York: The American Society of 

Mechanical Engineers, 1998. 

[10] D. A. Spera, Ed., Op. cit., Ch. 6. 

[11] F. H. Sanders, R. L. Sole, B. L. Bedford, D. Franc, and T. Pawlowitz, “Effects of RF 

interference on radar receivers,” NTIA Report TR-06-444, September 2006. 

[12] B. M. Kent et al., “Dynamic radar cross section and radar Doppler measurements of 

commercial General Electric windmill power turbines Part 1: Predicted and measured radar 

signatures,” IEEE Antennas and Propagation Magazine, Vol. 50, No. 2, Apr. 2008, p. 211-219.

FORM NTIA-29 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

(4-80) NAT’L. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET 

1. PUBLICATION NO. 

TR-08-454 

2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient’s Accession No. 

5. Publication Date 

July 2008 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 

Assessment of the Effects of Wind Turbines on Air Traffic Control Radars 

6. Performing Organization 

Code 

7. AUTHOR(S) 

John J. Lemmon, John E. Carroll, Frank H. Sanders, and Doris Turner 

9. Project/Task/Work Unit No. 

6625000-300 

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 

Institute for Telecommunication Sciences 

National Telecommunications & Information Administration 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

325 Broadway 

Boulder, CO 80305 

10. Contract/Grant No. 

11. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address 

National Telecommunications & Information Administration 

Herbert C. Hoover Building 

14th & Constitution Ave., NW 

Washington, DC 20230 

12. Type of Report and Period 

Covered 

14. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

15. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of most significant information. If document includes a 

significant bibliography or literature survey, mention it here.) 

This technical report describes the results of a study exploring the effects of power-producing wind turbines on 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) radars. The study was performed to identify the 

extent to which these effects exist, and to identify mitigation techniques and parameters for such effects. The topics 

addressed in this report are: review of the current state of the literature on wind turbine effects on ATC radar 

performance; determination of criteria for recommended no-interference radii between ATC radars and wind 

turbines; determination of methodology for assessing effects of wind turbines on radars that are within nointerference radii; analysis of the potential for desired targets to be lost in azimuths other than those of wind turbine 

farms; and consideration of the effects of wind turbines on secondary radar (i.e., ATC beacon interrogator, or 

ATCBI) performance. The study results indicate that documented cases of deleterious effects from wind turbines do 

exist and are numerous. Due to the large number of parameters that enter the analysis, a simple, universally 

applicable set of guidelines for siting of wind turbines near radars is not feasible. However, this study shows that, by 

making nominal assumptions about turbine characteristics and siting parameters such as local topography, it is 

possible to develop a universally applicable methodology for assessing potential interference between wind farms 

and ATC radars. 

16. Key Words (Alphabetical order, separated by semicolons) 

air traffic control (ATC) radar; ATC beacon interrogator (ATCBI) performance; wind farm clutter effects; wind 

turbine clutter effects; wind turbine radar interference effects 

18. Security Class. (This report) 

Unclassified 

20. Number of pages 

19 

17. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 

 F UNLIMITED. 19. Security Class. (This page) 

Unclassified 

21. Price: 

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