The Defense Acquisition 

University: Training 

Professionals for the 

Acquisition Workforce

1992—2003

Evelyn Layton
ii

DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY PRESS

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

January 2007

Throughout this history, the terms USD(A&T) and USD(AT&L) are used 

interchangeably. Established by law in 1986 as the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition) and by Defense Directive 5134.1, February 10, 1987, 

this position derived from the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and 

Engineering) established in 1977. The title changed to Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition and Technology) in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994, PL 103-160, November 10, 1993. The National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (PL 106-65) redesignated the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) as the Under Secretary 

of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)). 

DISCLAIMER

The photographs and art in this book are used with permission. Some of the photos were 

obtained from Department of Defense or Defense Acquisition University archives and are in 

the public domain. However, for all practical purposes, no photos or art in this book should 

be used without prior permission.

Statements of fact or opinion appearing in this book are endorsed by the Department of Defense and the Defense Acquisition University as a true, authoritative, and heavily researched 

history of events that transpired to establish today’s Defense Acquisition University and the 

Department of Defense professional Acquisition Corps.

Defense Acquisition University

ISBN: 0-16-077295-8

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2006937962

First Edition, 2007

All Rights Reserved

Printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
iii

FOREWORD

In August 1992 DAU consisted of 20 people occupying a small rented office space. They 

were charged with creating a university out of a 12-school consortium with each member 

reporting through their own chain of command. Within a decade, DAU had become a 

premier best-in-class corporate university winning coveted awards in competition with 

the best training organizations from government and industry.

I wanted the history of the events and people who propelled this extraordinary 

accomplishment to be captured at this time for two reasons. First, many of those involved 

in founding the university are still readily available to provide first-hand information 

and insights. Through their accounts and documents from the university’s early years 

this history may prove useful to those who want a fuller understanding of the DAU of 

today. Second, the history may also be valuable to those in government considering a 

similar undertaking. 

I appreciate the hard work of Evelyn Layton who volunteered to write DAU’s story. 

Evelyn was one of the original staff at DAU. Through her research, she located more 

than 300 pertinent documents, many of which are directly linked to, and can be readily 

accessed from, the online version of this history. She has also compiled a readily 

searchable online repository of these documents that will facilitate further research. 

A successful DAU was the shared vision of Congress and Department of Defense 

leadership since 1990. The journey from passage of the Defense Acquisition Workforce 

Improvement Act in that year to the fully realized Defense Acquisition University stands 

as a tribute to Congress, civilian and military leaders in the Department, and most 

important, the dedication, talent, and inspired efforts of DAU’s staff and faculty, who 

have done a superb job developing the training institution required by our professional 

acquisition corps. I hope the reader will find it both informative and useful to reflect on 

our journey as we continue to even greater accomplishments.

Frank J. Anderson, Jr.

President, Defense Acquisition University
iv

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Evelyn Layton accepted an appointment to the Defense 

Acquisition University in December 1993 when the 

university was in its first year of operation. Her duties 

included responsibility for developing and maintaining the 

contracting curricula required for certification of DoD’s 

acquisition workforce. In 2000, Ms. Layton was assigned as 

the DAU Liaison Officer for Accreditation and led the effort 

for the university’s initial accreditation in 2003. 

Prior to joining the DAU staff, Ms. Layton was Director 

of Procurement Policy at the Naval Surface Warfare Center 

(Carderock, Maryland). She also served as a contracting 

professional at the Naval Surface Warfare Divisions located 

in New London, Connecticut, and Annapolis, Maryland. In that capacity, she was 

principally involved in contracting for research and development support services and 

supplies. Ms. Layton was also directly involved as a contracting officer in the Naval Sea 

Systems Command’s ACAT I program supporting a major submarine program.

Ms. Layton is a member of the Defense Acquisition Corps and is Level III certified in the 

contracting career field. She received her bachelor’s degree from Connecticut College, 

graduating Phi Beta Kappa. She retired from government service in January 2006 after 

12 years with the Defense Acquisition University.

Evelyn Layton, Author
v

PREFACE

Defense historian William Gregory described the defense acquisition system of the late 

eighties as one that had been managed and over-reformed into impotence with volumes 

of oversight regulations. He observed that Congress had been pursuing an impossible 

dream by trying to legislate perfection when, in his opinion, “no regulation could create 

good management or top-notch people.”i

Problems with military procurement were hardly a new phenomenon. Inefficiency, waste, 

and profiteering had been major issues in virtually every war the United States had fought. 

In each case, Congress reacted to the problem by increasing laws and regulations. 

During World War II and into the Cold War, a fundamental change in the nature of 

weapons emerged, and the relationship between government and industry was redefined. 

The government could no longer rely on its own arsenals and shipyards to meet the 

needs of the warfighter because the implements of war were no longer simply weapons; 

they had become complex weapon systems. Each sub-system was typically developed 

and produced by a different defense contractor. The government’s role was to put this 

all together. The government was now a program manager. Its new task was to manage 

teams of contractors, a role requiring new skills. Unfortunately, these teams were not 

fully prepared for their new duties. 

Major cost overruns, schedule slippages, and performance shortfalls made headlines. 

In 1988, a scandal known as Operation Ill Wind triggered the largest investigation of 

federal acquisition in history. The FBI searched a number of defense contractor facilities 

and investigated several high-ranking DoD officials based on allegations of fraud and 

bribery. More than 60 convictions resulted from these investigations.

While less dramatic than the failures in managing major weapon systems, significant 

problems in procuring routine and less complex items garnered daily publicity. 

Overpriced wrenches, electrical cables, and lamp sockets made headlines. An 18-page 

military specification detailed exactly what ingredients constituted a DoD fruitcake. 

The results were excessive costs, an inability to rapidly obtain state-of–the-art technology, 

and in some cases, a refusal by commercial vendors to do business with the government. 

The public, as a result, lost confidence in government procurement. Jacques Gansler, 

who served as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

(1997–2000) described this distrust:ii

People somehow thought it was probably too much to pay a billion dollars 

each for a new bomber, but they didn’t know exactly what one should cost. 

By contrast, they knew they could buy a hammer at the store for a few dollars 

and that when the government was paying $400 for a hammer something was 

clearly wrong.ii
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

vi

This was certainly not a new problem. In 1970 Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard 

had made the following statement to an industry group about a “real mess” in Defense 

procurement:ii

Frankly, gentlemen, in defense procurement, we have a real mess on 

our hands, and the question you and I have to face up to is what we are 

going to do to clean it up. The most serious deficiencies create damaging 

newspaper headlines and demands for investigation.iii

A period of acquisition reform extended through the decade of the nineties. Virtually 

every aspect of the defense acquisition process was studied and major changes made. One 

of the most fundamental changes was in the professional development of the workforce 

charged with managing the acquisition programs. 

There were over 100,000 government employees dedicated to acquisition management, 

and it had become evident that they were not being adequately prepared for their task. 

Their career paths were ill-defined, with the standard civil service classification system, 

rather than their organizational mission, identifying their jobs. Training and career 

management were largely inadequate. 

To address this issue, acquisition reformers called for the creation of a professional 

acquisition corps. As with other professions, this corps would have specific standards 

for education, training, and experience. The education-standard requirement would be 

met by requiring undergraduate degrees combined with a specific number of credits in 

business-related subjects. The experience requirement would be met by an improved 

personnel management system that would carefully track career assignments and their 

relevancy to acquisition. 

But the training requirement was particularly challenging. Government training was 

decentralized, fragmented, and often of poor quality. An institution was needed to focus 

on preparing acquisition professionals. A Defense Acquisition University would be 

established.
vii

Endnotes

i. William H. Gregory, The Defense Procurement Mess (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Health and Co., 1989): 

p. xii.

ii. Jacques S. Gansler, “A Vision of the Government as a World-Class Buyer: Major Procurement Issues 

for the Coming Decade,” The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business of Government, 

New Ways to Manage Series (January 2002): p. 14. <http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/

GanslerReport.pdf>

iii. Addressing an industry group at the Defense Systems Management College in 1970. 
viii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the course of researching and writing this history over the past 3 years, I am grateful to 

Joseph Johnson, Director, Planning, Policy, and Leadership Support, Defense Acquisition 

University (DAU), who as my supervisor, had unwavering confidence in my ability to 

write DAU’s history. I am indebted to Gerald Keightley, a past president of DAU, who 

was responsible for standing up the Defense Acquisition University and spent untold 

hours helping me to organize the facts and build transitions. I am also grateful for the 

encouragement I received from retired Army Brigadier General Edward Hirsch, who was 

instrumental in DAU’s evolution from idea to bricks and mortar fully a decade before the 

university became a reality. Finally, Philip Shiman, Ph.D., of the Defense Acquisition 

History Project, in sharing with me his work on the post-Cold War Era, taught me how 

a truly professional writer and gifted historian writes history.

I benefited greatly from the guidance and creative assistance of professionals associated 

with the Defense Acquisition University Press: Collie Johnson, Editor in Chief, Defense 

AT&L Magazine; Technical Sergeant Scott A Miller, USAF, Multimedia Illustrator; Kay 

Sondheimer, Cover Designer and Desktop Publisher; and Frances Battle, Production 

Specialist and Liaison to the Government Printing Office.

Finally, I thank my family for their patience and for understanding that I needed to be 

uninterrupted to finish the daunting task for which I had volunteered. 
ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ............................................................................................................iii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR........................................................................................... iv

PREFACE ................................................................................................................... v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.......................................................................................viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... ix

CHAPTER 1: THE MOVEMENT TO CREATE A PROFESSIONAL 

 ACQUISITION COMMUNITY: A BRIEF HISTORY

Chapter 1 Overview............................................................................................. 2

Introduction......................................................................................................... 3

Early Efforts at Career Management................................................................... 4

Reports Lead to Landmark Legislation............................................................. 10

CHAPTER 2: CONGRESS DIRECTS ESTABLISHING A DEFENSE 

 ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY STRUCTURE

Chapter 2 Overview........................................................................................... 16

Introduction....................................................................................................... 17

Management Structure and Regulations ........................................................... 17

Career Development Program........................................................................... 18

Defense Acquisition University......................................................................... 20

 Groundwork....................................................................................... 21

 Staff.................................................................................................... 22

CHAPTER 3: THE UNIVERSITY’S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 

 RELATIONSHIPS

Chapter 3 Overview........................................................................................... 26

Introduction....................................................................................................... 27

Internal Relationships........................................................................................ 27

 Consortium........................................................................................ 27

 Office of the President ....................................................................... 30

External Relationships ...................................................................................... 32

 Chain of Command ........................................................................... 32

 Functional Experts............................................................................ 33

 Directors of Acquisition Career Management .................................. 34

Advisory Boards................................................................................................ 35

CHAPTER 4: EARLY CHALLENGES FOR THE UNIVERSITY

Chapter 4 Overview........................................................................................... 38

Introduction....................................................................................................... 39

Policies and a Strategic Plan ............................................................................. 39

Courses and Curricula ....................................................................................... 41
x

Training Demand............................................................................................... 46

 Fulfillment ......................................................................................... 46

 Technology......................................................................................... 47

Research ........................................................................................................... 50

CHAPTER 5: ACQUISITION REFORM GAINS MOMENTUM

Chapter 5 Overview........................................................................................... 56

Introduction....................................................................................................... 57

Reform Principles.............................................................................................. 57

Acquisition Reformers...................................................................................... 60

CHAPTER 6: THE UNIVERSITY—A LEADER IN ACQUISITION REFORM

Chapter 6 Overview........................................................................................... 70

Introduction....................................................................................................... 71

Reform Message................................................................................................ 72

Revising the Curricula....................................................................................... 74

CHAPTER 7: DOD INITIATIVES LEAD TO CHANGES IN LEARNING AND 

 DAU’S ORGANIZATION

Chapter 7 Overview........................................................................................... 82

Introduction....................................................................................................... 83

Section 912c—Workforce Vision...................................................................... 85

 Continuous Learning......................................................................... 85

 Services Contracting ......................................................................... 87

 Commercial Environment.................................................................. 88

Defense Reform Initiative ................................................................................. 88

 Chancellor......................................................................................... 89

 Unified Structure ............................................................................... 89

DoD’s Education and Training PAT.................................................................. 91

 Customer Relationships .................................................................... 92

 Preeminent Faculty............................................................................ 93

CHAPTER 8: FROM UNIFIED STRUCTURE TO CORPORATE 

 UNIVERSITY

Chapter 8 Overview........................................................................................... 98

Introduction....................................................................................................... 99

Corporate Plan................................................................................................. 101

Knowledge Management................................................................................. 102

Partnerships..................................................................................................... 103

CHAPTER 9: THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY MATURES

Chapter 9 Overview......................................................................................... 108

Introduction..................................................................................................... 109

Performance Learning Model ......................................................................... 111

Learning Beyond the Course........................................................................... 112

Customer Focus............................................................................................... 114

Business Processes for Results........................................................................ 116

Revitalize Quality and Morale ........................................................................ 118
xi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 DAU Consortium Members in 1992 ................................................. 28

Figure 2 Command Chart for Consortium Schools......................................... 29

Figure 3 DAU Organization Chart, 1992......................................................... 31

Figure 4 DAU’s Collaborative Relationship with DACMs and

 Functional Boards ............................................................................. 32

Figure 5 Functional Boards Collaborative Relationship with DAU ................ 34

Figure 6 Bloom’s Taxonomy and DAWIA Courses ........................................ 42

Figure 7 DAWIA Checklist in 1994 DAU Catalog.......................................... 45

Figure 8 DAU Unified Organization 2000....................................................... 90

Figure 9 DAWIA Checklist in 1994 DAU Catalog.......................................... 92

Figure 10 DAU Corporate University Road Map............................................ 100

Figure 11 Goals from Smart Business 20/20................................................... 101

Figure 12 Knowledge Management Road Map............................................... 102

Figure 13 DAU Learning Construct: Modernizing Acquisition Training—

 Performance Learning Model (PLM) (2001).................................. 111

Figure 14 Program Management Career Track ............................................... 113

Figure 15 DAU Organization Chart 2003........................................................ 115

Figure 16 The DAU Strategic Planning Process Relationship ........................ 117
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

xii

APPENDICES

Appendix A Under Secretaries of Defense (Acquisition) ................................... 121

Appendix B Acquisition Workforce Training Laws Issued From

1984–1986....................................................................................... 125

Appendix C DoD Regulations Issued Before Implementation of the

1990 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 

(DAWIA)......................................................................................... 129

Appendix D Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act

(DAWIA) Collaborative Organizational Framework ...................... 133

Appendix E Comparison Between Position Categories in Defense

Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)

And DODM 5000.52-M.................................................................. 137

Appendix F Summary of Regulations Implementing Six Elements

Required by the 1990 Defense Acquisition Workforce

Improvement Act (DAWIA)............................................................ 141

Appendix G Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act

(DAWIA) Personnel Data from FY 1993–2003.............................. 145

Appendix H Defense Acquisition University Policy Memoranda

(Issued Before September 2000)..................................................... 149

Appendix I DAU Courses Offered by Career Field in 1991 .............................. 153
1

The Movement 

to Create a 

Professional 

Acquisition 

Community: 

A Brief History

I

The single most 

likely way to produce further waste 

in DoD—and further procurement 

scandals—was to 

continue the pattern 

of failing to improve 

the quality of the 

career civilian managers and appointing 

to important positions those who had 

little knowledge of 

acquisition.”

—Jimmy Carter, 

Gerald Ford

American Agenda: Report 

to the Forty-First President 

of the United States of 

America, 1989, p. 115
2

The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

This Chapter offers a brief background of events 

leading to the formation of the Defense Acquisition University, including DoD’s recognition of 

a need to improve the acquisition workforce, 

authorization of a vast array of government 

studies, implementation of workforce reform, 

and the creation of experience and training 

requirements for various acquisition management positions.

Chapter 

I OVERVIEW
3

Chapter 1: The Movement to Create a Professional Acquisition Community: A Brief History

Introduction

A properly functioning acquisition system requires an appropriate balance of three 

distinct but interrelated elements: (1) the policy, procedures, and processes that govern 

the system; (2) the organization that executes the policies and procedures; and (3) the 

personnel that make the system work.1

The vast majority of efforts to improve the acquisition system during the Cold War 

focused on the first element. The result was a staggering array of laws and regulations 

that hampered rather than improved the acquisition process. 

Other efforts were made to improve the organizational structure—the second element 

of the acquisition system. Responding to allegations that internal government conflicts 

tended to benefit industry, DoD made a significant organizational change in 1986 when 

it established the position of Under Secretary for Acquisition, or USD(A), to oversee 

the acquisition process. 

The USD(A), sometimes referred to as the acquisition czar, was the third-highest ranking civilian in DoD. The position was established to bring discipline to the acquisition 

process. Besides being given broad authority to execute acquisition system policy, the 

new position was responsible for centralizing and executing policy for the training and 

career development of acquisition personnel. The Department had finally recognized a 

leader was needed for this important role. Appendix A is a history of the position and 

the eight officials who held it from 1986 to 2003.2

The third element of the acquisition system—the people who manage acquisition—initially drew the least attention. Although some efforts to improve their ability to manage 

in a new environment had been made, these proved largely ineffective. The reasons for 

this are complex and involve the relative autonomy of each Service, the lack of support 

by military organizations for training a primarily civilian business corps, the competition 

for resources between military requirements and training, and congressional reluctance 

to write legislation creating a professional acquisition community.

Another factor that contributed to the lack of progress was the failure to clearly differentiate between acquisition and procurement. During the years of the Cold War, the 

term acquisition was used interchangeably with procurement. But a general recognition 

that acquisition was a much broader process than procurement was developing, and the 

functional components of this process had not been clearly defined. As a result, with 

the exception of a few occupations such as the contracting career field, no professional 

community, trained and dedicated to acquisition, had ever been formed.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

4

EARLY EFFORTS AT CAREER MANAGEMENT

Beginning after World War II, six important studies were commissioned by Congress 

or the President to resolve acquisition problems. Five of these recognized the need for 

competent, trained, and educated civilian and military acquisition personnel. 

For the most part, these studies focused on procurement because the concept of acquisition as an integrated process of many disciplines was not appreciated and, therefore, not 

adequately addressed. Professionalizing the workforce was always discussed although 

the emphasis and purpose changed with each study.

The report of the first Hoover Commission in 1949 did not address acquisition or 

procurement personnel, but a second Hoover Commission published its report in 1955 

urging that career paths be established in procurement. The third report made by the 

Fitzhugh Commission was issued in 1970. Although a key determinant of a responsive 

and effective defense procurement process was procurement personnel, the Commission 

found this had not been appropriately reflected in the recruitment, career development, 

training, and management of the procurement workforce.

Two years later, the fourth report by the Commission on Government Procurement was 

issued. The report called attention to the problems facing procurement officials stating, 

“A typical contracting officer in DoD had to consult over five linear feet of procurement 

regulations to guide and constrict daily activities.” Importantly, the report also recognized a university structure was needed to oversee the acquisition career management 

program. 

By the early eighties the political pressure from the acquisition scandals intensified, and 

the issue of inadequate training of the procurement workforce came to the fore. Congress 

and the President moved deliberately to regain public confidence. 

On the executive side, a first in the history of workforce improvement came in 1982 

when President Reagan issued an Executive Order focusing solely on reforming federal 

procurement workers by mandating that each department establish a career management 

program. The Reagan administration believed the root cause of costly procurement 

deficiencies was inadequate training of procurement personnel.

The fifth of the studies, the Grace Commission Report, was issued during the Reagan 

Administration. The DoD section of the report examined the regulatory environment in 

which the procurement process took place. The Grace Commission, like the Commission on Government Procurement a decade earlier, strongly criticized the excessively 

complex set of regulations that had sprung up around the acquisition process.
5

Chapter 1: The Movement to Create a Professional Acquisition Community: A Brief History

In the mid-eighties, the Reagan Administration established the Packard Commission 

to provide answers to an irritated Congress and a skeptical public about the continuing 

acquisition horror stories. This led to the sixth in the series of reports. Led by David 

Packard, the co-founder of the electronics firm Hewlett-Packard and a former Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, the report found that DoD’s acquisition workforce was undertrained, underpaid, and inexperienced, stating that their training was incomplete, leading 

to an adverse impact on their performance. 

This high-powered group’s research, conclusions, and findings issued in 1986 recommended changes that influenced 

reform efforts for the next decade. Packard’s philosophy for 

the acquisition workforce focused on small, high-quality 

staffs consisting of well-trained and highly motivated professionals. This philosophy became the lynchpin for workforce 

reform legislation in 1990.

As a result of these studies and investigations, Congress 

passed several laws from 1984 through 1986 to address workforce reform. In general, these laws attempted to establish 

experience and training requirements for various acquisition 

management positions. Unfortunately, there was no effective 

mechanism for implementing them and they remained dormant. These laws are summarized at Appendix B.3

Former Presidents Carter and Ford also recognized that the quality of the workforce 

needed to be improved. In their publication, American Agenda: Report to the Forty-First 

President of the United States of America, they told the first Bush administration: 

The single most likely way to produce further waste in DoD—and further 

procurement scandals—was to continue the pattern of failing to improve the 

quality of the career civilian managers and appointing to important positions 

those who had little knowledge of acquisition.4

While Congress and the Executive Branch were commissioning studies that looked at 

workforce reform, DoD was also taking action. Between 1952 and 1990 the Department 

issued several directives addressing the training of acquisition personnel as shown at 

Appendix C.5

The first directive, issued in 1952, required each Service to establish a recruiting and 

training program for civilian and military contracting personnel. Ten years later, a new 

directive identified 13 contracting courses to be offered. Then in 1966 a manual described 

the minimum skills and knowledge required by civilian contracting personnel through 

mandatory courses, passing an equivalency test, or demonstrating required competencies through qualifying experience. 

David Packard, former 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

and founder of the Defense 

Systems Management School
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

6

After the career program for contracting was issued in 1966 and one for program management in 1974, no further directives were issued for acquisition training until 1986. 

The 1986 directive added two new occupations—quality assurance, and business and 

financial management personnel—to the existing 

contracting and program management areas.6

Program management had been recognized as a 

critical skill for some time, but mandatory training was slow in coming. In the early sixties, the 

discipline of program management was beginning to show promise as an effective way of concentrating resources and management attention 

to solve complex technological problems and 

integrate the planning and execution of systems’ 

development efforts. But it was an area in which 

training was virtually nonexistent.

In April 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. 

McNamara prepared guidance recognizing that 

the skills necessary for successful project management were identical regardless of Service 

affiliation. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell 

L. Gilpatric directed that the Defense Weapons 

Systems Management Center (DWSMC) be established as a project management educational and training institution.7

 This Center reported directly to the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense to ensure it was independent of parochial Service influences.

James N. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Weapons Acquisition and Industrial 

Readiness, assumed leadership for organizing DWSMC to meet McNamara and Gilpatric’s initiative. The Center was officially established on October 26, 1964, and located 

President Lyndon Johnson (right) greets 

Roswell L. Gilpatric, who served as Deputy 

Secretary of Defense 1961–1964.

Three DWSMC Goals

(1) Standardize vocabulary, practices, problems, and solutions so graduates could ask the right questions 

to make good decisions and learn to communicate 

effectively in the acquisition community.

(2) Orient students to the philosophy of complex 

systems acquisition by focusing on the interrelationship of the many elements of a system.

(3) Stay current with practices in the military services 

and industry so the center could be a clearinghouse 

for identifying and explaining new practices.

Entrance to the Defense Weapons Systems Management Center, located in Dayton, Ohio (1964)
7

Chapter 1: The Movement to Create a Professional Acquisition Community: A Brief History

at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) in Dayton, 

Ohio. Students from each Service were nominated from officers and civilians appearing to be promising candidates for 

senior positions in program management. A 10-week Project 

Management Course was developed using case material from 

applied research in the weapon systems acquisition process. 

This course would prove to be the foundation of program 

management education that continues to this day.

After 22 offerings of the Project Management Course, Deputy 

Secretary of Defense David Packard disestablished DWSMC 

on June 30, 1971. Concurrently, the Defense Systems Management School (DSMS) was established at Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia. The first DSMS Commandant, BG Winfield S. Scott 

III, USA, presided at opening ceremonies on August 3, 1971. 

At the ceremony Packard spoke about an Academy of Management of “high distinction” 

where the best of modern management practices would be taught.

The mission of the new school was formed from three major elements: (1) conduct 

advanced courses of study to prepare selected military officers and civilians for assignments in program management, (2) perform research in the defense acquisition process, 

and (3) assemble and 

disseminate information about new program management 

concepts. The new 

school of high distinction, as Packard 

saw it, would differ 

sharply from its predecessor.

The differing philosophies of Davis and 

Packard were most 

evident in the mission of the school that 

each had founded. In founding DWSMC, Davis believed that graduates should not be 

considered professional practitioners. In his view, students should only be provided a 

familiarity with acquisition issues and terms so they could have informed discussions 

with others in the acquisition community. In contrast, DSMS reflected Packard’s belief 

that program managers required an in-depth knowledge of acquisition processes and 

required training to support this.

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard announces the selection of 

BG Winfield S. Scott III, USA, as the first Defense Systems Management 

School Commandant effective February 1, 1971. 

James N. Davis, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of 

Weapons Acquisition and 

Industrial Readiness
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

8

Their contrasting views were also evident in their beliefs about the leadership roles of 

program managers. Davis believed DWSMC‘s role should focus on general practitioners 

rather than leaders. Packard believed they should be leaders capable of directing programs. As a result, Packard recommended the 10-week course at DWSMC be replaced 

at DSMS with a 5-month graduate-level course. Subsequently, the Defense Procurement Improvement Act (DPIA) required managers of major programs to complete this 

course.8

Six years after the founding of DSMS, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., recognizing the high level of instruction, the student and instructor quality, 

and the demonstrated excellence of DSMS graduates, decided the school should be 

a college. Therefore, on July 16, 1976, the Defense Systems Management College 

(DSMC) was founded.

Defense Systems Management School staff and faculty photo taken in front of Building 202 at the Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia, campus (1974) 
9

Chapter 1: The Movement to Create a Professional Acquisition Community: A Brief History

While establishing a college and issuing directives 

made significant improvements to acquisition workforce training and career development, much still 

remained to be done. In December 1985, Deputy 

Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV, recognizing 

the continuing need to improve DoD-wide training 

of the entire acquisition workforce, established the 

Acquisition Career Enhancement (ACE) program 

office at DSMC. This office was to study the current 

state of the acquisition workforce and make recommendations for improvement. The ACE Report was 

completed in December 1986.9

The report presented an alarming statistic. DoD had 

mandated training throughout the acquisition community but had failed to provide the resources to 

support it. As a result, if all the training that DoD mandated was to be delivered, there 

would be a deficit of 2 million student-days by 1987.

The report also found that the current training programs were fragmented among DoD 

Components resulting in a segmented and ineffective training management structure. To 

remedy this problem, the report proposed a university structure to manage current and 

future acquisition education and training activities 

throughout DoD. The ACE proposal for a DoD university was not adopted by the USD(A), but it sowed 

the seeds for the founding of the Defense Acquisition 

University 6 years later. 

In parallel with the efforts within DoD, Congress 

adopted the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act 

(DAIA) in November 1986. This Act required the 

Secretary of Defense to submit a plan to Congress for 

coordinating DoD’s education programs for acquisition personnel.10

On March 2, 1988, DoD submitted the plan expanding DSMC’s mission to direct, support, and coordinate the education and training of all career fields in 

the acquisition workforce.11 Prior to this, DSMC provided training and education only 

for program managers. The ACE Program Action Group at the college was now designated as the executive agent to manage the training for acquisition personnel outside 

the program management functional area.

Defense Systems Management College 

buildings as they appeared in 1976

ACE Program Report, Volume 1, 

December 1986
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

10

The plan further called for streamlining and consolidating existing directives, instructions, and manuals on acquisition education and training. Congress approved the recommendations in the plan to expand DSMC’s mission, and the consolidation of regulations 

resulted in two DoD directives issued in August 1988. 

First, DoD Directive 5160.55 expanded the college’s mission to manage the career 

training for the acquisition workforce.12 Second, 5000.52 consolidated all directives, 

instructions, and manuals on acquisition education and training into a single manual 

(5000.52M).

The manual identified a total of 12 career fields for inclusion in the acquisition workforce. This was a significant expansion over previous definitions. It also set standards 

for entry, intermediate, and senior levels in each career field. At this point, virtually all 

career fields that comprised the acquisition workforce had been recognized. 

But in spite of these efforts by Congress and DoD, the quality of the acquisition workforce still fell short of the professional standards necessary to effectively manage the 

increasingly complex acquisition process. A large portion of the acquisition workforce 

continued to be undertrained, and career management remained minimal. As a result, 

both Congress and DoD called for further action.

REPORTS LEAD TO LANDMARK LEGISLATION

In 1989 two studies were published that had far-reaching significance for the future 

of the acquisition workforce. The first, the Defense Management Report (DMR), was 

issued in July 1989 by the Department.13 The second, the Quality and Professionalism 

of the Acquisition Workforce, was issued in May 1990 by the House Armed Services 

Committee.14

The DMR was part of the Defense Management Review initiated by the first President 

Bush to improve the procurement process. In the opinion of John Betti, who came to 

office as the third USD(A) in August 1989, previous reform efforts were unsuccessful 

because most were imposed by Congress responding to recommendations from commissions and studies outside DoD. He believed that although some changes would require 

congressional action, the DMR would be successful because the Department would be 

implementing its own improvements and be accountable for their success.

The DMR was implemented through Service task forces chartered to make recommendations in a number of areas. One focused on professionalizing the acquisition workforce. 

The resulting individual Service recommendations, while presenting well-structured 

plans for career development of their acquisition employees, still differed significantly 
11

Chapter 1: The Movement to Create a Professional Acquisition Community: A Brief History

from each other. For example, the required training and experience continued to vary greatly among the Services. 

Simultaneously with the DMR, Congress was conducting a 

study of its own. Unconvinced that DoD had done enough, 

it tasked the House Committee on Armed Services to study 

the acquisition workforce and analyze the training, education, and experience qualifications of acquisition personnel. 

A 776-page report, The Quality and Professionalism of the 

Acquisition Workforce, resulted.

Among the key contributors to the report were DSMC personnel who had been involved in managing the training of the 

acquisition workforce under the ACE Program Office. The 

House Committee’s report determined that DoD had been 

deficient in developing a high-quality, professional workforce. Statistics presented in the 

House Committee Report supported this conclusion.

Only 29 percent of Navy program managers and 48 percent from Air Force were in compliance with the 1984 

DPIA legislation that required attendance at the DSMC 

Program Management Course.15 Additionally, despite 

adoption of a mandatory 4-year minimum assignment for program managers, tenure rates had actually 

declined from an average of 24.5 months to 21.

The record for contracting personnel was also 

problematic. The House Committee Report stated that 

the educational requirement for DoD contracting personnel had no requirement for college degrees.

Requiring college degrees for contracting personnel 

had been a contentious issue beginning in the fifties. 

Opposition came from two directions. First, government unions saw this recommendation as limiting 

career opportunities for its employees. Second, OPM 

regulations classified contracting officers as “administrative” rather than “professional.” 

College degrees were not required for administrative personnel.16

But the lack of a college degree was not the only problem the committee found. DoD’s 

contracting community, it determined, was not meeting mandatory training requirements. 

Like college degrees, this too had been a concern for some time.

The Quality and Professionalism 

of the Acquisition Workforce, 101st 

Congress, 2nd session, No. 10, 

May 8, 1990 

John Betti, Under Secretary 

of Defense (Acquisition), 

August 11, 1989 – December 

31, 1990
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

12

As early as 1984, a DoD Inspector General (IG) report, Audit of Department of Defense 

Procurement Training, cited the weaknesses in contract training. The IG evaluated 24 

DoD activities to determine if intermediate- and senior-level civilian contracting personnel were receiving mandatory training. In reviewing 1,551 individual training records 

of four occupational series, 67 percent had not completed their mandatory training. 

The deficiencies of DoD acquisition training found by the House Committee were 

compounded when they reported that DSMC—previously 

appointed executive agent for the education and training of 

the acquisition workforce by statute and implemented by a 

DoD directive—was unsuccessful in meeting the needs of 

DoD acquisition personnel because the college lacked the 

authority, resources, and support of the Defense Components. 

BG Edward Hirsch, USA (Ret.), who chaired the ACE Program Office, retrospectively wrote about the problems:

It became clear that despite the cooperative environment prevailing among centers of learning, the 

DSMC Commandant had no directive authority and 

little leverage to accomplish anything, absent total 

consensus among the parties. Elimination of classes 

or courses, or reallocation of responsibility for conducting or sponsoring courses was action that could not be accomplished if 

turf issues were perceived paramount.17

The House Committee understood that acquisition is a complex process, and professional skills and attributes were essential for people performing acquisition functions. 

Finding that DoD Components were inconsistent in following the laws and directives 

passed in the eighties, they were adamant that a comprehensive program, based in 

statute, was essential.

Representative Nicholas Mavroules, Chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee of 

the House Armed Services Committee, introduced the Defense Acquisition Workforce 

Improvement Act (DAWIA). Initially Betti asked that the DMR recommendations be 

given a chance before Congress went forward with its own legislation. In his testimony 

before the House Armed Services Committee, Mavroules responded: 

I know that there is a little reluctance perhaps for any additional legislation, but 

I think that you need legislation, and let me tell you why. Because tomorrow you 

and I may not be here. All I am trying to do is set up a process for the future and 

work with you on legislation, perhaps not total legislation, but in areas where 

I can force your hand to do your job, and then all of your successors down the 

line and my successors down the line.18

Retired BG Edward Hirsch, 

USA, Chair, ACE Program 

Office
13

Chapter 1: The Movement to Create a Professional Acquisition Community: A Brief History

The bill passed the House by a vote of 413 to 1.The Senate passed a similar version, 

and the compromise bill was signed into law on November 5, 1990, in the Defense 

Authorization Act of FY 1991.19 The requirement to establish a Defense Acquisition 

University was one of the most important provisions of this Act.

The legislation that had directed the establishment of the university also provided guidance about its structure and mission. But this guidance was general and a more detailed 

framework would be required. Creating this framework was the next step toward making 

the university operational. 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

14

endnotes

1. House Armed Services Committee’s Print No. 10, The Quality and Professionalism of the Acquisition 

Workforce (May 8, 1990), p. 61.

2. Appendix A: Under Secretaries of Defense (Acquisition), a history of those holding the position from 

1986–2003.

3. Appendix B: Acquisition Workforce Training Laws Issued From 1984–1986.

4. Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, American Agenda: Report to the Forty-First President of the United 

States of America (Camp Hill, PA: Book of the Month Club; 1st Edition, 1989), p. 115.

5. Appendix C: DoD Regulations Issued Before Implementation of the 1990 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Appendix2.pdf>

6. Department of Defense Directive 5000.48, Experience, Education, and Training Requirements for 

Personnel Assigned to Acquisition, August 22, 1986, established experience, education, and training 

requirements for military and civilian personnel assigned to contracting, quality assurance, and business 

and financial management positions. Prior to this directive, there had been no DoD mandatory training 

for military contracting personnel since the early sixties. Instead, each Service was allowed to train its 

military within Service guidelines.

7. The term project management changed to program management by 1976.

8. P.L. 99-145, Sec. 924, Defense Procurement Improvement Act, 1985, required a person appointed as 

Program Manager of a major defense acquisition program have specific experience and complete the Program Management Course at the Defense Systems Management College or a “comparable course.”

9. Edward Hirsch, The Acquisition Enhancement (ACE) Program Report II (December 1986). <http://

www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/APPENDIX%20B.pdf>

10. P.L. 99-661, Title IX, Sec. 932 and 934, Defense Acquisition Improvement Act, November 1986, 

required the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to enhance the professionalism and career opportunities available to acquisition personnel in terms of examination, appointments, classification, training, 

and assignments, and examine the feasibility of designating professional positions.

11. Grant S. Green, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) to Congress 

(March 2, 1988) as required by P.L. 99-661, Title IX, Sec. 932 and 934, Defense Acquisition Workforce 

Improvement Act, 1996. <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/APPENDIX%20D.pdf>

12. Department of Defense Directive 5160.55, Defense Systems Management College (August 22, 1988). 

<http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/d516055p.pdf>

13. Dick Cheney, Defense Management: Report to the President (July 1989) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Department of Defense). 

14. Department of Defense Directive 5000.52, “Defense Acquisition Education Program” (August 22, 

1988), and 5000.52-M, “Career Development Program for Acquisition Personnel Manual” (April 

1989) are contained in House Armed Services Committee Report, The Quality and Professionalism 

of the Acquisition Workforce (May 8, 1990), Appendix I-3. 

15. House Armed Services Committee’s Print No. 10, The Quality and Professionalism of the Acquisition 

Workforce (May 8, 1990).

16. P.L. 99-661, Title IX, Sec. 932 and 934, Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, 1996, 

required the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to enhance the professionalism and career opportunities available to acquisition personnel in terms of examination, appointments, classification, training, 

and assignments, and examine the feasibility of designating professional positions.

17. Edward Hirsch, “Defense Systems Management College—A DoD Agent for Change,” Program Manager 

(July-August 1992): p. 48.

18. Acquisition Workforce: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee 

on Commerce, 101st Congress: p. 53 (1990) (testimony of Rep. Nicholas Mavroules, Subcommittee 

Chairman) : pp. 52-53. < http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Endnote%2016%20%20Betti

%20and%20Mavroules.pdf>

19. P.L. 101-510, Ch. 87, Title XII, Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, 1990.
15

2

We need to train them 

better. We need to pay 

more attention to 

their career paths. We 

need to prepare them 

as professionals.

—Rep. Nicholas Mavroules

U.S. House of 

Representatives

1979–1993

Congress Directs 

Establishing 

a Defense 

Acquisition 

University 

Structure
16

The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

This Chapter focuses on the redesign of the 

defense acquisition community. It discusses the 

transition from programs that are centered on 

processes and management-structure redesign 

to those designed to properly train and align the 

acquisition workforce into professional career 

paths. In addition, it describes how this new 

focus led to acquisition career development 

programs, certification standards, and research 

and publication capabilities.

Chapter 

2 OVERVIEW
17

Chapter 2: Congress Directs Establishing a Defense Acquisition University Structure

Introduction

Representative Mavroules’ support of DAWIA came from his belief that the time had 

come to address the needs of the people behind the acquisition process. He had confidence that qualified people would reduce the volume of acquisition scandals and improve 

the defense acquisition system.

For over half a century, Congress had called for profound change but focused mainly 

on the process and the structure. A career management program, Mavroules claimed, 

was the essential framework needed to pay attention to acquisition people: “We need 

to train them better. We need to pay more attention to their career paths. We need to 

prepare them as professionals.”1

To meet his objective, Mavroules was mindful that three essential elements were critical 

for the career development program: (1) a management structure and regulations for 

implementing the act’s provisions; (2) a career development program with certification 

standards leading to an elite acquisition corps; and (3) an acquisition university to be 

the training center for the acquisition community.

management structure and regulations

The Secretary of Defense was given overall authority for implementing DAWIA, a 

role delegated to the USD(A). While certain organizational changes were set in the 

act, the overarching architecture for acquisition management remained unchanged. For 

example, the Acquisition Executives for the Military Departments and the DoD Agencies—referred to as the Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs)—already existed 

and had management responsibility for the acquisition workforce. 

To assist the CAEs, DAWIA created Directors of Acquisition Career Management 

(DACMs) in each Military Department. DACMs were responsible for ensuring that 

workforce personnel were trained to qualify for their current assignments, prepared for 

more responsible jobs, and cross-trained for assignments in other acquisition fields. 

They were also responsible for identifying individuals at a specific career level in a 

career field.

The most difficult prob­lem for DACMs was estimating workforce members. A September 1990 Wall Street Journal article announcing DAWIA reported: “Rep. Mavroules (D., 

Mass.), the principal sponsor of the amendment, said it would affect as many as 240,000 

Penta­­gon civilians and uniformed personnel engaged in various aspects of defense 

procurement.”2 Identifying the workforce was a monumental undertaking, but other 

equally challenging issues surfaced. Documenting personnel records was especially 

troublesome since, in the past, the Components had no uniform standard for maintaining records of civilian training.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

18

A Director of Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development (AET&CD) 

was established to set policy and coordinate the overall management of the Department’s 

career development programs. The Director, AET&CD, was dual-hatted as the DACM 

for the Components outside the Military Departments. DAWIA’s collaborative framework is shown at Appendix D.3

As the focal point within DoD for providing guidance on workforce issues, the Director, AET&CD, was responsible for establishing courses required for certification as 

well as the education, training, and experience standards for each acquisition position 

based on the level of complexity of duties carried out in that position. These standards 

were issued in DoD Manual 5000.52-M, Career Development Program for Acquisition 

Personnel—a companion document to the DoD Directive 5000.52 that implemented 

the Department’s training and education program published in 1991.4 The manual and 

its implementing directive were to be the sole regulatory authority for mandatory DoD 

acquisition training. While certification in at least one career field was required, individuals could be certified in other fields as well. 

The 5000.52M specified the education, training, and experience standards for each 

career field, expanded the number of career fields prescribed in DAWIA, and grouped 

them into seven functional areas. This integrated all the elements of a previously fragmented, scattered, and diffused training system. Appendix E5 compares the career fields 

mandated by DAWIA with those in the 5000.52M and illustrates how the Department 

implemented the legislation.

career development program

DAWIA directed the USD(A) to ensure that comprehensive career programs were 

established for civilian and military members of the acquisition workforce. The career 

programs were to include the elements of accession, education, training, experience, 

assignment, promotion, and retention. 
19

Chapter 2: Congress Directs Establishing a Defense Acquisition University Structure

Certification Elements

1. Training: three levels progressing from basic through intermediate to 

senior were set.

2. Education: gained importance and DAWIA provided for educational 

assistance programs to include scholarship, tuition assistance, internship, cooperative education, and student loan repayment. For employees 

who went to school on their own time, their expenses would be reimbursed.

3. Experience: standards were set to address the problem that too many 

people, especially in the senior ranks, lacked sufficient acquisition experience to be effective stewards of the billions being spent for defense.

Certification was a key element of career development, and standards were set for training, education, and experience that would be approved annually by the USD(A). At the 

more senior levels of the acquisition workforce, GS-13 for civilians and O-4 level for 

military, an elite “acquisition corps” comprising both military and civilian personnel 

was required for the new professionalism. This corps represented the highest level of 

achievement, and members were eligible to fill the most senior acquisition management 

positions.

Each of the Services had its own 

corps, and there was one for the 

Defense Components. Standards for membership were the 

same for all four. For example 

an individual was required to 

have at least 4 years’ experience in an acquisition position, 

a bachelor’s degree (or be certified to have significant potential 

for advancement to levels of 

greater responsibility), and have 

at least 24 semester credit hours 

(or their equivalent) in businessrelated disciplines.

Under these rules, entry into the corps could be problematic for some because only 

three career fields—Test and Evaluation; Systems Planning, Research, Development, 

From left: James S. McMichael, DoD; RADM William 

Hauenstein, USN (Ret.); Blaise Durante, Air Force; Bennie 

Pinckley, Director, Acquisition Career Management, Army; 

and Herbert Cowles, OSD and DoD Agencies.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

20

and Engineering; and Auditing—had required a bachelor’s degree when the law 

passed. So as not to penalize individuals who lacked college degrees, DAWIA included 

“­grandfathering” provisions. For example, employees who on October 1, 1991, had 

at least 10 years’ experience in an acquisition position were not required to meet the 

education standards for admission to the corps. 

At the apex of the pyramid, the most important positions were designated as critical acquisition positions that, by 1993, were to be filled only by members of the 

corps. These senior positions carried significant supervisory or management duties 

and were designated by the Secretary of Defense based on the recommendations of 

the CAEs.6

DAWIA laid the groundwork for professionalizing the acquisition workforce though 

its full effect would not be realized for years. The initial reaction of the acquisition 

workforce was “extremely positive” according to the House Armed Services Committee 

report attached to the Defense Authorization Act of FY 1993:

Workforce personnel were encouraged by the recognition that they are professionals; there was a renewed interest in obtaining college degrees and additional 

training; they like the assurance that acquisition positions would not be open 

to unqualified people; and the fact that career programs will be developed for 

civilians.7

defense acquisition university 

An acquisition university legislated by DAWIA was a clear victory for reformers. For 

more than 20 years, a university to centrally manage acquisition training had been 

repeatedly recommended. But all efforts failed, and perhaps lack of funding was a key 

reason. 

As a result of DAWIA, however, funding for training the acquisition workforce was 

specifically identified in each organization’s budget. Individual course assignments 

and student travel remained with the DoD Components, but these projections were 

incorporated into DAU’s budget. 

Donald Yockey, Principal Deputy USD(A), was given responsibility for implementing 

DAWIA and the new university. Confirmed as the fourth USD(A) in June 1991, Yockey 

came to that office with two DAWIA mandates. First, an implementation plan for the 

new university’s structure was to be submitted to Congress no later than October 1, 

1991. Second, the university had to be fully operational by August 1, 1992.8
21

Chapter 2: Congress Directs Establishing a Defense Acquisition University Structure

Groundwork

Yockey formed an implementation board and two subcommittees to develop the implementation plan. The Board’s 

Defense Acquisition University Planning Subcommittee was 

tasked to address the six elements required by Congress: (1) 

charter, (2) mission, (3) lines of authority, (4) framework for 

education, (5) creation of a policy guidance council, and (6) 

a mechanism for resource allocation and control.9 To comply 

with DAWIA, the Department issued authorizing regulations 

for each element summarized at Appendix F.10

Chartering the university, DoD Directive 5000.57 established 

the broad outlines of how it would function and the responsibilities of DoD principals involved.11 The directive’s mission 

stated the university was to provide for “the professional educational development and training of the acquisition workforce and perform research and publication capabilities in the area of acquisition.”

In structuring the new university, Congress set two conditions—that it be centrally managed and the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) be part of the organization. 

Virtually everything else was open to discussion. Between February and June 1991 the 

subcommittee’s working group met 18 times and examined 13 options for structuring 

the university and 18 options for the senior capstone course required by DAWIA. By 

July, the subcommittee was ready to present its plan to Yockey. 

After weighing the pros and cons of many structures, the subcommittee recommended 

forming a consortium among existing DoD institutions. The consortium structure, in line 

with an academic philosophy, would be comparable to that of a typical state university 

with a number of campuses and a variety of colleges specializing in certain disciplines.

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), part of National Defense University, 

was selected to offer the senior course. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff had responsibility for ICAF, the Chairman granted the USD(A) oversight of the 

acquisition content of this curriculum. 

On October 1, 1991, the Department sent Congress its implementation plan for DAU.12

Before the university could open its doors on August 1, 1992, and meet a second congressional deadline, more remained to be done.

Donald Yockey, Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense (Acquisition) 

(1991–1994)
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

22

Staff

After submitting the implementation plan to Congress in October, Yockey issued a 

memorandum setting additional policy for DAU in July.13 Key decisions, such as criteria for the university’s leadership, the size of its staff, and the location of its headquarters, 

were addressed. The university was to be under the direction, authority, and control of 

the USD(A) to whom the chief executive officer or president would report.

According to Yockey’s memorandum: “The president would 

be a civilian like most of the acquisition workforce, serve in 

a Senior Executive Service position, and have a small staff.” 

DSMC offered Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as the facility for DAU, 

but Yockey’s decision memorandum stated that the office of 

the university president should not be collocated in any of 

the providing member institutions.

James S. McMichael was appointed as the Director, Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development in April 

1990 and was subsequently given the additional duty of President, DAU, by Yockey. In July 1992, a small staff moved 

into the new DAU facility—a 6,000-square-foot office leased 

from the Institute for Defense Analyses on North Beauregard 

Street in Alexandria, Virginia.

By August 1, 1992, Yockey met his 

second deadline when consortium 

members signed Memoranda of 

Agreement to work together as the 

DAU. A ceremony was held at the 

Beauregard facility to mark this 

event. For the first time all consortium members were brought 

together. In his welcoming speech, 

Yockey announced:

Each DAU consortium member will perform a distinctive 

role and contribute a special 

expertise to the university 

mission, thereby resulting in 

an organization that is far 

greater than the sum of its 

parts.

James S. McMichael, 

Director, Acquisition 

Education, Training and 

Career Development 

Donald Yockey, Principal Deputy USD(A) (1991–1994) 
23

Chapter 2: Congress Directs Establishing a Defense Acquisition University Structure

Yockey was successful in meeting the two congressionally 

mandated deadlines largely because of his extensive experience with military and Defense acquisition. His predecessors, 

Richard Godwin, Robert Costello, and John Betti had, in 

varying degrees, relied on consensus and cooperation among 

the Services. However, in matters that required a joint rather 

than individual Service approach, meaningful consensus was 

hard to achieve. 

Despite the magnitude of the tasks and short timeframe, all 

projected milestones to create the university were met.14 In 

the foreword of DAU’s first catalog, Yockey expressed his 

pride: 

I am proud to have played a leadership role in 

establishing the Defense Acquisition University 

and am proud to introduce the first catalog of the 

DAU’s acquisition education and training courses. 

The DAU is a unique organization, one that has no 

equivalent in the Department of Defense.

The new Defense Acquisition University had met the milestones for its first year. It was a great accomplishment but 

only the first step on the journey. Its success would depend 

on its relationship with a host of others players in the world 

of acquisition. Senior officials in DoD, leaders of the functional areas that comprised acquisition, the schools in the 

consortium, the acquisition managers in the military departments, representatives of the defense industries, and most 

important, the members of the acquisition workforce—all of these and more had a stake 

in improving acquisition management. DAU would have to manage these relationships 

with great skill. 

Richard Goodwin, Under 

Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition), 1986-1987

Robert Costello, Under 

Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition), 1987-1989
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

24

Endnotes

1. Nicholas Mavroules, “Creating a Professional Acquisition Workforce,” National Contract Management 

Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1991): p. 15.

2. Wall Street Journal, “Bill to Boost Level of Pentagon Buyers Approved by House” (September 12, 

1990).

3. Appendix D: DAWIA Collaborative Organizational Framework. <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/

DAU_History/Appendix3.pdf>

4. Department of Defense Directive 5000.52, Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career 

Development Program (October 21, 1991). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/d500052p.

pdf>

5. Appendix E: Comparison Between Position Categories in DAWIA and DoDM 5000.52-M (1991). 

<http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Appendix5.pdf>

6. For civilians GS/GM-14 level or above; military grade 05 or above. Additionally, all Program Executive 

Officers, Deputy Program Executive Officers, Program Managers, and Deputy Program Managers for 

major defense acquisition programs, as well as Program Managers of significant non-major programs, 

were designated as critical acquisition positions.

7. House Armed Services Committee Report No. 102-52 (1992), p. 2.

8. Defense Authorization Act of FY 1991, Section 1205 (a) and (b). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/

DAU_History/ENDNOTE%2019-20.pdf>

9. Ibid., Section 1205 (a)(1)-(6). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/ENDNOTE%2019

20.pdf>

10. Appendix F: Summary of Regulations Implementing Six Elements Required by DAWIA. <http://www.

dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/appendix6%20and%207.pdf>

11. DoD Directive 5000.57, Defense Acquisition University (October 21, 1991). <http://www.dau.mil/

about-dau/DAU_History/d500057p.pdf>

12. Department of Defense Implementation Plan to Congress for or the Defense Acqui­si­tion University (1991), 

preparead for the Committees of Armed Services­, United States Congress (October 1991).<http://www.

dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/APPENDIX%207.pdf>

13. Memorandum, Donald Yockey, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), to Secretaries of the Military 

Departments et al., Decision for Defense Acquisition University and Senior Course (July 1, 1991). 

<http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2056.pdf>

14. Department of Defense Implementation Plan to Congress for the Defense Acquisition University (1991): 

Appendix C, “Implementation Milestones,” preparead for the Committees of Armed Services, United 

States Congress (October 1991). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/APPENDIX%207.

pdf>
25

The University’s 

Internal and 

External 

Relationships 

3

A consortium would 

capitalize upon the 

strengths of existing 

schools and provide 

both strong central 

control as well as 

the flexibility necessary to accommodate 

changes to meet new 

or specialized needs 

of acquisition professionals as requirements changed.

—Donald Yockey, Principal 

Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition), July 1, 1991
26

The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

This Chapter describes DAU’s internal and 

external relationships with Defense offices; and 

recounts the university’s subsequent efforts to 

cultivate the management strategies, organizational oversight, cooperation, and support that 

would be essential to delivering training courses 

quickly to the acquisition community

Chapter 

3 OVERVIEW
27

Chapter 3: The University’s Internal and External Relationships

Introduction

When DAU opened in 1992, the outline of its internal and external relationships had 

been generally defined. Internal relationships that included the roles and responsibilities 

of a consortium and headquarters staff had been addressed in Department policy.

External relationships with Defense offices were established in DAWIA. Nonetheless, 

a considerable amount of cooperation and support was essential to deliver the training 

courses quickly to the acquisition community. Under the improved acquisition career 

management program, four key players emerged:

1. The Director, Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development 

(AET&CD) established the policy standards regarding the education, training, and experience requirements for each career field. 

2. Functional boards with expertise in each functional area determined the 

knowledge and competencies to be taught. 

3. The Directors of Acquisition Career Management (DACMs) in each Service 

determined who received training and when they received it.

4. DAU developed the curricula and delivered the courses. 

Advisory Boards were also required by DAWIA, specifying that a Board of Visitors and 

a Policy Council be formed.

INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS 

In implementing DAWIA, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) Yockey made the 

decision that DAU would (1) be a consortium and (2) be led by a civilian executive.

CONSORTIUM

The DAU Planning Subcommittee formed by Yockey in 1991 was tasked to recommend 

the most effective structure for the new university. After lengthy deliberations, it made 

a unanimous recommendation for a consortium and Yockey agreed: 

A consortium would capitalize upon the strengths of existing schools and provide both strong central control as well as the flexibility necessary to accommodate changes to meet new or specialized needs of acquisition professionals 

as requirements changed.1

The obvious advantage of the consortium was its ability to use DoD’s existing training 

programs managed by the Acquisition Career Enhancement (ACE) Program Office created in 1985 and subsequently named as the executive agent for managing and delivering 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

28

training for acquisition personnel. This office had created a program that incorporated 

many features of the new university structure.

Under the ACE Program, Components of 12 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Agency 

schools delivered 24 mandatory courses for personnel performing acquisition functions 

limited to procurement and program management. Principal among these schools was the 

Defense Systems Management School (DSMC), which delivered the 20-week Program 

Management Course required by statute.2 The 15 training organizations shown below 

joined DAU when it opened:

The formal relationships between DAU and consortium members were established by 

Memoranda of Agreement.3 Broad in scope, the agreements required consortium members to support DAU’s President in the full range of university responsibilities. These 

included processes such as programming and budgeting, managing quotas, developing 

and delivering curricula, setting quality and performance standards for courses and 

instructors, conducting research, and issuing publications.

Initially the number of acquisition students taught by the consortium members varied 

widely. For example, only 3 percent of the students at the Naval Postgraduate School 

were training for the acquisition workforce while the comparable number at DSMC 

was 99 percent. This disparity directly affected the budget allocated to the consortium 

members—some received a very small portion of their budget while DSMC received 

its entire budget from DAU. 

Given the large number of schools in the consortium and each school’s natural desire to 

maximize the funds they received from DAU headquarters, a carefully structured process 

was necessary to ensure equitable treatment. The collegial nature of DAU required that 

every participant clearly understood the process for assigning course responsibilities 

since these assignments could have a major impact on a school’s future. 

1. air force institute of technology 

2. army logistics management College 

3. army management engineering College 

4. Defense Contract audit institute 

5. Defense logistics Civilian Personnel support 

office 

6. Defense systems management College 

7. european Command Contracting training 

office

8. information resources management College 

 9. lowry technical training Center 

10. naval Postgraduate school 

11. naval supply systems Command regional 

 Contracting Centers 

12. naval facilities Contracts training Center 

13. naval Warfare assessment Center 

14. navy acquisition management training 

office 

15. assistant secretary of the navy 

 (research, Development and acquisition)

DAU Consortium Members 1992

Figure 1. DAU Consortium Members in 1992
29

Chapter 3: The University’s Internal and External Relationships

The management structure selected in assigning the responsibilities for developing, 

maintaining, and delivering courses designated a consortium member as a course sponsor, a course offeror, or both. 

• A sponsor, who could be one or more consortium members, had overall 

responsibility for developing and delivering a specific course or academic 

program, maintaining and updating courses, conducting course reviews, 

and assessing learning objectives.

• An offeror was a consortium school, or team of schools, that DAU determined had sufficient certified instructors to teach a particular course. The 

sponsor conducted training to offeror instructors and recommended to 

DAU whether they be certified.

The process of selecting a school as course sponsor was similar to awarding a contract. 

Each school proposed the courses for which it felt qualified to have sponsorship, presenting in its proposal course materials a record of past performance and proposed cost. 

After discussions and reviewing submissions, DAU’s President made a decision and 

assigned each course to a sponsor.

The consortium structure was unquestionably an efficient solution to establish DAU 

within the time frame mandated by Congress while meeting its most urgent mission—

training the acquisition workforce. In both regards it was successful and continued for 

7 years without fundamental change. But the very structure that proved effective in the 

short run was inherently limited from the start. 

Although the consortium structure enabled a quick start and 

avoided potentially divisive issues 

of control, it severely limited the 

authority of DAU’s President. The 

“power of the purse” provided 

enormous control, but in the long 

run even that was not sufficient 

to create the university envisioned 

by Congress and demanded by 

the acquisition community.

Perhaps the single most limiting 

factor was the lack of an organizational line of authority between 

DAU and consortium members as 

each continued to report through 

its Service or Defense Agency chain of command. 

Figure 2. Command Chart for Consortium Schools
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

30

These different chains of command and the very strong Service identity of the schools 

caused a multitude of problems. DAU was unable to set standards for faculty members since each Service had its own. Schools had little incentive to shorten courses or 

find more efficient delivery methods since this would reduce their funding. The course 

development process was layered, time-consuming, and caused courses to lag far behind 

policy changes. Moreover, ill-defined lines of authority contributed to a lack of standardized formats for evaluation, no central repository of assessment information, and little 

feedback to the customer.4

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

In setting up DAU’s headquarters, Yockey directed that the new university president 

be a civilian, unrelated to any existing institution within the consortium, and report 

directly to him. Furthermore, he stated, “The president will have the authority to act 

decisively on my behalf in the best interests of all elements of the acquisition education 

and training community.”5

Knowing it might take a year or longer to select a president, 

Yockey appointed Gerald E. Keightley as DAU’s Executive 

Director at the beginning of 1992. Keightley was a Senior 

Executive in the Department of the Navy with extensive 

experience in acquisition management. During the Defense 

Management Review, he led the acquisition workforce task 

force for the Navy. Prior to DAWIA, he had been appointed 

as the Navy’s Director of Acquisition Workforce Policy, a 

position that became the DACM under DAWIA. By May 

1992, Keightley had been assigned the tasks necessary to 

meet the target for beginning operations.6

Tasks Assigned to DAU

• Selecting course providers and certifying curricula

• Establishing performance standards for curriculum content and 

delivery

• Managing scholarship program

• Publishing an annual catalog

• Maintaining student records

• Encouraging research, including symposia and conferences, and developing and maintaining publication capabilities

• Developing and recommending to the USD(A) resourcing for the Future 

Years Defense Plan

Gerald Keightley, DAU 

Executive Director, 1992
31

Chapter 3: The University’s Internal and External Relationships

To accomplish these tasks, Keightley established three directorates: Academic Affairs, 

Operations, and Resource Management. The total staff numbered about 20, consistent 

with Yockey’s direction that the number of DAU staff members be small. The organization structure of the new university is shown above. 

The Academic Affairs Directorate was at the heart of the university as it had overall 

responsibility for DAU’s product—designing, developing, maintaining, and evaluating 

courses and certifying they were educationally sound.

The Operations Directorate 

managed strategic planning and 

maintained the management 

information system used to analyze workforce composition. 

It was also responsible for the 

scholarship program established 

under DAWIA to qualify personnel for acquisition positions.7

The Resources Management 

Directorate had responsibility 

for developing the DAU financial 

plan, and managing it from the 

approval process through execution. It was also responsible for management and distribution of the resource most 

valuable to the acquisition workforce—seats in the classrooms. 

Under Secretary of

Defense (Acquisition)

Oversight Boards:

• Board of Visitors

• Program Review 

 Board 

President, DAU

Director

Academic Affairs

Director

Operations

Director

Resources Management

15 Consortium Members

 (Reporting to DoD 

Commands)

Figure 3. DAU Organization Chart, 1992

DAU Senior Staff (from left): James McMichael, Interim 

President; Lenore Sack, Director for Academic Affairs; Linda 

Furiga, Director for Resources Management; and Frank 

Sobiezczyk, Director for University Operations
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

32

EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS

DAU was established to meet the needs of the DoD Components. Recognizing the 

importance for continuous communications between DAU and these customers, Congress defined certain relationships in DAWIA and others evolved. The illustration below 

shows DAU’s collaborative relationship with DACMs and Functional Boards: 

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Congress delegated the responsibility for the new university to the USD(A) through the 

Secretary of Defense, underscoring the importance placed on this institution. Since the 

USD(A) had responsibility for the Department’s acquisition programs and the resources 

associated with them, there was no more important resource than the people who made 

the acquisition system work. 

In the ensuing years, the titles of the Under Secretaries 

were modified to reflect global and military influences. For 

example, John M. Deutch replaced Yockey in April 1994 and 

came to office with a new title prescribed by the Defense 

Authorization Act of FY 1994 adding “technology” to the 

position title—USD(A&T). Jacques S. Gansler was given 

a new title prescribed by the Defense Authorization Act of 

FY 2000, which added “logistics” to the position title—

USD(AT&L).

The President of DAU—as did the Commandant of DSMC 

and the Director, AET&CD—reported directly to the USD(A) 

when the university was first established. However, as the 

momentum of reforming acquisition grew, a new position—Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition Reform, DUSD(AR)—was created.8 In June 1993, Colleen 

Preston was appointed to lead the new reform office; and the President of DAU, the 

John M. Deutch, USD(A&T), 

(1993-1994)

DACMs

provided 

students 

for DaU

Functional

Boards certified

DaU courses as

functionally sound

DAU negotiated

quotas with DaCms

and worked with 

functional Boards to

develop curricula

Figure 4. DAU’s Collaborative Relationship with 

DACMs and Functional Boards
33

Chapter 3: The University’s Internal and External Relationships

Commandant of DSMC, and the Director, AET&CD, were realigned to report directly 

to Preston instead of the USD(A).

A lingering issue in the new structure was the reporting alignment of DAU and DSMC. 

Although DSMC was a DAU consortium member, both DSMC and DAU reported 

directly to the Acquisition Reform Office. The result was confusion in roles and tension between the two organizations. In February 1997, USD(A&T) Paul G. Kaminski 

issued a memorandum stating that lack of cooperation between the two was a critical 

factor affecting the acquisition education and training program.9 Six months later, the 

Commandant of DSMC was officially realigned to report to DAU’s President.10

FUNCTIONAL EXPERTS

At DAU’s founding in 1992, there were 12 acquisition career fields. To provide the 

functional expertise necessary to develop the courses for functional areas, functional 

boards were formed for each field. These functional boards represented the students 

and acquisition organizations, or the customer, and were composed of senior officials 

appointed by the secretaries of each Service and heads of DoD agencies.

According to DoDI 5000.58,11 each board was to be chartered, headed by a functional 

advisor, and meet at least annually before the training budget for the fiscal year was 

submitted. Board responsibilities included:

• Ensuring each career field was properly developed and implemented

• Establishing the education, training, and experience standards for career 

paths

• Making recommendations to establish or disestablish mandatory 

courses 

• Certifying annually to the USD(A) that the curriculum content and quality 

of each training course were current and complete 

The Functional Advisors formed working groups to work directly with DAU in course 

development. Typically, each group had an executive secretary to oversee coordination. 

The working groups worked with course directors in establishing course learning objectives, providing functional course content, and ensuring courses were current for annual 

certification to the USD(A). DAU was responsible for the development and delivery of 

curricula and certifying that each course was educationally sound. This relationship is 

shown in Figure 5.

Prior to DAWIA, functional communities were not well developed. The exception was 

the Contracting Career Management Board that had published the Contract Specialist 

Workbook with the Federal Acquisition Institute in 1991. The workbook was a matrix 

that identified the levels of learning to be attained for over 80 duties. These duties became 

the learning objectives for the DAWIA mandatory contracting courses.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

34

For the other functional boards, developing competencies and learning the instructional 

design process took time. It was not uncommon for a board to take several months to 

identify competencies that could number a hundred or more. Completed in October 

1994, the Advanced Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering Course, 

for example, was based on over 400 competencies that took the board almost a year to 

develop.

DIRECTORS OF ACQUISITION CAREER MANAGEMENT (DACMs)

The USD(A) had passed responsibility for developing and managing the acquisition 

workforce to Component Acquisition Executives. However, the management of the 

careers of tens of thousands of people required a dedicated office with the authority to 

make the detailed decisions such a task entailed. This was the role of the DACM. 

The DACMs were the career managers for the acquisition workforce. They tracked and 

maintained the records of professional qualifications, obtained the quotas for the required 

courses, managed the distribution of the quotas to the various commands, ensured that 

only qualified individuals were assigned to acquisition positions, and participated in the 

selection of senior members of the acquisition corps for major program assignments. 

Appendix G provides DAWIA workforce statistics from FY 1993–2003.12

Since the DACMs worked closely with DAU’s Resource Directorate, identifying the 

roles and responsibilities of each was critical. In 1995, the Directorate issued a 66-page 

Resource Management Guide that established processes including identifying training 

capacity of consortium members; developing the annual schedule and loading it into 

the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS); tracking changes 

and utilization rates for reporting requirements; and analyzing finances and resources. 

The guide also provided essential information for DACMs in assisting DAU to compile 

its Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission as required by DoD, and the 

preparation and presentation of justification materials for the President’s Budget.13

Identify

Learning

Outcomes

Defense Acquisition 

University Consortium

Develops

Curriculum

Delivers

Course

Evaluates

Learning

FUNCTIONAL BOARDS

FOR PROGRAM AREAS

acquisition management

Business financial management

Contracting management

technical scientific & management

auditing*

*Defense Contract audit agency, not DaU,

 delivers auditing courses

Figure 5. Functional Boards’ Collaborative Relationship with DAU
35

Chapter 3: The University’s Internal and External Relationships

DACMs were the voice of the customer. They were quick to press for and adopt more 

efficient methods of course delivery. This close relationship between provider and user 

made a major contribution to DAU’s success.

ADVISORY BOARDS

Primary responsibility for oversight was vested in a Board of Visitors (BoV). The 

BoV’s composition and responsibility were prescribed by DAWIA. Members were to 

be selected for their preeminence in academia, business, or industry and were to serve 

as advisors to the USD(A) and DAU’s President on matters relating to organizational 

management, curricula, methods of instruction, and facilities. 

The BoV was chartered in February 1994 and held its first meeting in November 1995.14

The first Chair was Dr. Jacques Gansler. This nomination brought together a serious 

student of DoD acquisition with strong academic credentials and a newly formed university that needed a vision for its future. Under his leadership the Board helped to form 

the academic foundation of a new profession. Gansler became USD(A&T) in 1997 and 

was a strong advocate for DAU.

DAWIA also required that the university have a policy council composed of senior 

Department officials. In setting up the new university, DAU had been working closely 

with the most senior officials in DoD as policy was being established. For this reason, 

the formation of a separate policy council was deferred. But as the university became 

established and was functioning with relative independence, a Defense Acquisition 

University Program Review Board consisting of senior Department executives was 

chartered in 1997.15 Its task was to review DAU plans, operations, budgets, and program 

initiatives. 

DAU had proven very effective in organizing its internal structure and establishing close 

working relationships with external stakeholders. These were critical steps in building 

the university. But the value of these relationships would ultimately depend on the ability 

of DAU to fulfill its primary mission: the development of DAWIA certification courses 

and their delivery to a large and diverse acquisition workforce. This was certainly its 

most challenging and important task. 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

36

Endnotes

1. Memorandum, Donald Yockey, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., Decision Memorandum for the Defense Acquisition University and Senior Course (July 1, 1991): 

p. 1. <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2056.pdf>

2. P.L. 99-145, Sec 924, Defense Procurement Improvement Act, 1985, required a person appointed as Program Manager of a major defense acquisition program have specific experience and complete the Program 

Management Course at the Defense Systems Management College or a “comparable course.”

3. Memorandum of Agreement between the Defense Acquisition University and Service Schools/DoD 

Agencies (October 7, 1992). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2054.pdf>

4. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Final Report of the Process Action Team on “Acquisition Education and Training Structure and Process” (August, 1997). 

<http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Final%20PAT%20Report.pdf>

5. Memorandum, Donald Yockey, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), to Secretaries of the Military 

Departments et al., Decision Memorandum for the Defense Acquisition University and Senior Course. 

(July 1, 1991): p. 2. <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2056.pdf>

6. Memorandum, James McMichael, Director Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development, 

to Executive Director, Defense Acquisition University, Tasking (May 15, 1992). <http://www.dau.

mil/about-dau/DAU_History/ENDNOTE%2024.pdf>

7. DAU funded scholarships for 4 years from FY 93–96. The amount for FY 93 was $.8 million; for 

FY 94 was $.9 million; for FY 95 was $.665 million; for FY 96 was $ .738 million. By FY 97 each 

Component managed its own program. A total of 28 graduated during the 4 years.

8. Memorandum, John Deutch, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) to Director, Administration and 

Management, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), Establish Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition Reform (May 14, 1993). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%209.

pdf>

9. Memorandum, Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Defense 

Acquisition Career Development Council Actions (February 27, 1997). Among the issues addressed 

in the memorandum was to improve the cooperation between DAU and DSMC. 

10. Memorandum, R. Noel Longuemare, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & 

Technology), Realignment of the Defense Systems Management College (August 28, 1997).

11. DoD Instruction 5000.58, Defense Acquisition Workforce, p. 14 (January 1992). <http://www.dau.

mil/about-dau/DAU_History/i500058p.pdf>

12. Appendix G: DAWIA Personnel Data from 1993–2003.

13. Defense Acquisition University, Resource Management Guide, ADS-95-01-GD (1995). <http://

www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2024.pdf> 

14. Memorandum, John Deutch, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Defense 

Acquisition University Board of Visitors (February 8, 1994). <http://www.dau.mil/aboutdau/DAU_History/Layton%208.pdf> 

Memorandum, Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) to Director 

of Administration and Management, Renewal of the Defense Acquisition University Board of Visitors 

Charter (March 4, 1996).

15. Defense Acquisition Career Development Council Charter (March 19, 1997). Section 1746 of DAWIA 

mandated a policy council be instituted to formulate policy for the education, training, and career 

development of the acquisition workforce. DoD Instruction 5000.58, Defense Acquisition Workforce (January 14, 1992), authorized the Council. <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/

Layton%2011.pdf>
37

Early Challenges 

for the University

4

To maximize the value 

of limited DAU class 

time and resources, 

the President, DAU, 

is delegated the 

authority to establish 

and enforce academic 

prerequisites for DAU 

courses ... including 

denying enrollment 

to a student who 

lacks courses that 

are prerequisites or is 

unable, through testing, to demonstrate 

the required knowledge and skills in the 

prerequisite.

—Dave Oliver, Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense (Acquisition & 

Technology), June 17, 1999
38

The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

Chapter 

4 OVERVIEW

This Chapter offers a brief background of DAU’s 

efforts to develop policies, processes, courses, 

and a coherent strategic plan; explains how 

DAU developed and implemented Information Age course-delivery techniques to meet 

the accelerating demand for acquisition education and training; and relates how DAU’s role in 

acquisition-related research evolved from faculty-initiated to customer-initiated.
39

Chapter 4: Early Challenges for the University

INTRODUCTION

When the Defense Acquisition University was formally established in August 1992, it 

existed primarily on paper. There were offices, a small staff, and general direction on 

the mission and structure of the new school. But the policies and processes necessary to 

create an operational university had yet to be established. In forming the new university, 

there were numerous challenges. Four were critical to its success:

1. Policies and a strategic plan needed to be issued. 

2. Courses and curriculum had to be designed. 

3. The capability to meet the accelerating demand for training had to be developed.

4. DAU’s role in research had to be defined.

POLICIES AND A STRATEGIC PLAN

As DAU evolved, policies were issued and strategic plans developed to serve many 

purposes. 

Between 1994 and 2000, 11 policies (listed at Appendix H) were issued.1 Some show routine operating procedures to ensure the consortium functioned seamlessly. Furthermore, 

since each member school operated autonomously, the standardization they brought 

served to quell the frustration among various functional board members, students, and 

the organizations to which the students belonged. Issues such as differing course development processes, dismissing students who missed too many classes or did not meet 

prerequisites, and grading were some of the issues that needed to be addressed. 

Prerequisites became problematic, and according to the Board of Visitors (BoV) an 

astounding 66 percent of students came unprepared for classes. With pressures on the 

Services to fill courses without considering qualification, the BoV concluded the faculty had two choices: fail students or lower standards.2 This problem was solved by the 

unprecedented intervention of the USD(A&T) in 1999:

To maximize the value of limited DAU class time and resources, the President, 

DAU is delegated the authority to establish and enforce academic prerequisites 

for DAU courses ... including denying enrollment to a student who lacks courses 

that are prerequisites or is unable, through testing, to demonstrate the required 

knowledge and skills in the prerequisite.3

Later policies show the university responding to the needs of the workforce for an everincreasing demand for training. These included equivalency procedures; qualifying 

private, public, and academic institutions to deliver DAU-equivalent courses; processes 

for awarding continuing education units to DAU courses; and technology delivery to 

reach more students. 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

40

Concerned that no formal vision for the university had been published by 1995, the BoV 

encouraged the creation of a strategic plan. The University’s Enterprise Strategy was 

subsequently issued, and it set a mission and vision that the consortium would follow 

to achieve four goals.4 These goals, according to the strategy, would position DAU to 

be the benchmark acquisition educational system for the 21st century, providing stateof-the-art content, methods, and research to the defense acquisition community.

The mission in the Enterprise Strategy stated DAU was to provide, as an academic 

enterprise, effective and efficient acquisition education, training, research, and associated academic activities as an integral part of acquisition support to DoD. 

The mission in this early strategy emphasizes an academic direction for DAU contrasting 

with DAU’s strategic plan, Smart Business 20/20, published 5 years later. The framers 

of DAWIA intended that the new university be modeled as an “academic” institution. 

Representative Mavroules explained his philosophy for the new university in 1991 as 

an “intellectual centerpiece”:

The university could be the intellectual centerpiece of the entire acquisition 

system; a place where seminars and thought-provoking meetings—intellectual 

ferment—can help to change the mindset, to bring about a lasting cultural 

change throughout the acquisition system.5

A decade later, the acquisition community knew it wanted not “academic training” but 

“practitioner training” to make smart business decisions and deliver timely and affordable capabilities to the warfighter:

Enterprise Strategy, 1995 DAU 

Strategic Plan 

Goal l:

Educate and train DoD acquisition professionals and 

other participants in the DoD acquisition process 

Goal 2:

Use available acquisition education and training resources 

efficiently and effectively

Goal 3:

Develop acquisition education, training, research, and 

publication capabilities

Goal 4:

Use technology and innovative teaching methods
41

Chapter 4: Early Challenges for the University

They want learning offered in ways that are distributed, low cost, low impact 

on current infrastructure, readily available, adaptable, and easy to use. Finally 

they want training, consulting, and research that is [sic] tailored to their precise 

needs and delivered where and when it is [sic] needed.6

COURSES AND CURRICULA

Reporting to Congress on DAU’s first fully operational year, the Department reported 

that dramatic strides had been made toward enhancing the quality of acquisition professionals. More than 24,000 had graduated from 60 mandatory courses and 37 from the 

Senior Acquisition Course sponsored by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. 

The net result of this achievement, according to the report, “is a much more qualified, 

higher quality, professional workforce.”7 The 60 courses are listed at Appendix I.8

But in the interests of establishing curricula quickly, DAU had been forced to adopt 

courses that already existed at the consortium schools. These met many immediate 

needs but fell short of the permanent curricula necessary for a professional acquisition 

corps.

The existing courses retained the particular Service focus of the school offering the 

course. In most cases their design failed to meet current standards for effective adult 

education, and their structure lacked the discipline of instructional system design. Redesigning this curriculum was an immediate task for the Academic Affairs Directorate, 

and its program directors were assigned to manage the course development process for 

each functional area.

While the 5000.52M9 contained the only standards that were to be used for certification 

and specified what courses had to be developed, DAU’s responsibility was to determine 

how they would be designed to ensure maximum educational effectiveness. Professor 

Robert L. Hawkins, Director of Curriculum Development at DAU, summarized the 

situation:

The pure-and-simple politics of acquisition education is that many have viewed 

it as a deficient system that has failed to make clear what all students need 

to learn and whether, in fact, they have learned it ....The most fundamental 

problem is our schools are accountable only for educational processes, not 

educational outcomes.10

Finally, guidance published by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy provided 

direction to DAU curricula developers with Policy Letter 92-3. Issued on June 24, 

1992, the policy required federal departments to establish competency-based mandatory training.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

42

Competency-based training requires that learners master the knowledge, skills, and abilities that emphasize application and use of what has been learned. It clearly defines what 

students are expected to know and be able to demonstrate in applying that knowledge. 

Mastery is determined through testing. Three levels of certification were established by 

5000.52M with mandatory courses required for each level. For DAU, the competency 

solution was an ideal match as a structure for developing certification courses.

Supplementing the certification courses, assignment-specific courses were developed to 

support employees performing functions specific to their particular positions.11

Under the competency-based 

learning model, the curriculum 

provides progressive learning 

as the student advances through 

the three certification levels. 

DAU chose Bloom’s taxonomy 

to provide a framework for the 

course development. 

The taxonomy shown below 

describes, from simplest to complex, six degrees to which content is taught and can be learned: knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, 

synthesis, and evaluation. The relationship of the taxonomy to the various course levels 

is also shown.

DAWIA COURSE LEVELS

• Level I courses establish fundamental knowledge. 

• Level II courses build on the knowledge gained at Level I 

through practical applications and are amenable to small 

group problem-solving and application scenarios. 

• Level III courses represent the pinnacle of achievement in 

the curricula. Students learn to synthesize knowledge and 

apply it critically in practical situations preparing them to 

make sound judgments in unpredictable situations. For this 

reason, Level III courses move the specialist to the generalist and develop creative problem solvers.

Figure 6. Bloom’s Taxonomy and DAWIA Courses

Cognitive Taxonomy, Thinking and 

Levels of DAU Courses

300 and 400 Level Courses

*Five “Ps”— Process Projects Products Problems Problems

 100 Level

Courses 

analysis

application

Comprehension

Knowledge

Process Skills*

200 

Level

Courses 

Evaluation Synthesis

Content Skills

Critical Thinking

Creative Thinking
43

Chapter 4: Early Challenges for the University

Shown below is an overview of the instructional systems design at the core of DAU’s 

course development process structured around Bloom’s taxonomy.

DAU’s FOUR-Step Course Design Process

Analysis

Competencies are created in this phase and converted to learning outcomes 

according to the six levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy. This is a collaborative effort 

by the functional community and DAU. Once developed, the competencies are 

used to develop new courses, new curricula, or matrixed against existing course 

materials to determine gaps or repetition.

Design

A blueprint of the training program is developed in this phase. Design determines 

the instructional strategies as well as delivery methods. Strategies for delivery 

include lecture, demonstration, discussion, independent study, computer-based 

training, simulation, case studies, practical exercises, reading assignments, and 

combinations thereof.

Development 

This phase is highly dependent upon strategies selected during the design phase. 

For example, in classroom instruction, the Lesson Plans, which ultimately result 

in the Instructor Guide, are the essential products for effective instructional 

delivery.

Evaluation

Curriculum under DAU must have criterion-referenced assessment, and each test 

or assessment item must be directly referenced to a specific performance or competency created in the analysis phase. Strategies for evaluating achievement are: 

multiple-choice, true-false, matching, essay, case study, critical incident, practical 

exercise, simulation, and role play. Because a case study can be either complex 

or simple, it has potential for the full range of Bloom’s cognitive levels.

Before DAWIA, most courses were lecture-based. Now DAU began to employ interactive processes of discovery through experiential exercises, case studies, and simulations. 

One course was almost 80 percent computer-based, and “universities were taking note 

of DAU as a leader in providing hands-on learning.”12 The following excerpts from 

Program Manager magazine articles report how DAU was successfully carrying out 

DAWIA in 1994 and 1995:
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

44

Competency-Based Design for DAWIA Training

Test and Evaluation

Before DAWIA, only a 1-week course existed. By FY 1995 DAU was ready with 

three new T&E courses for Levels I, II, and III certification. The Level I course 

was developed as a one-week introduction to the fundamentals of DoD test and 

evaluation management. The Level II course was a 2-week intensive look at the 

technical and management tools required to plan, conduct, and report on a T&E 

program. The Level III course covered top-level T&E management issues in a 

2-week workshop of lectures and case studies.13

Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering

Added a 2-week Level III course for senior personnel in the Systems Engineering 

field for personnel who completed the 3-week intermediate course. Based on over 

400 competencies, the instruction used simulation exercises and case studies to 

ensure that students do integrated technical decision making and problem solving through the course.14

Business Cost and Financial Management

Developed new Level I and II courses. Level I began with a lecture-exercise 

approach. Level II, which was developed as a 2-week simulation of a real world 

program, moved to case studies and simulations in a program office environment.15

Advanced Product and Quality Management 

Developed a new Level III course using statistical planning tools and hands-on 

learning. Students launched catapults to learn about Design of Experiments and 

moved poker chips to understand Theory of Constraints. Lessons on capturing 

customer requirements required building a “House of Quality” and a “World 

Class Cup of Coffee” to get hands-on experience with Quality Function Deployment. Building “Little Red Wagons” helped students learn about bottlenecks as 

they modeled their factory floor in a simulation exercise.16

The competency-based approach also placed demands on the faculty. Instructors had 

to be preeminent in their field with demonstrated competency in both subject-matter 

expertise and teaching capability. In addition they had to possess the practical experience 

to bring the real world into the classroom. This was particularly true at the higher levels 

of learning, in which the teacher is a facilitator enabling a learner-centered environment. 

In this environment, the teacher serves as a coach leading students through practical 

exercises followed by immediate analysis and feedback. 
45

Chapter 4: Early Challenges for the University

Although DAU published an annual catalog listing the courses it offered, confusion 

regarding certification requirements was common among the more than 100,000 military 

and civilian workforce members spread across hundreds of DoD organizations. Since 

it was impractical to update the 5000.52 annually, DAU began publishing certification 

checklists in its annual catalog in 1994 so that acquisition workforce members would 

clearly understand what was expected in terms of training, education, and experience. 

The checklist shown below appeared in the DAU 1994 Catalog and applied to a workforce member in the program management career field. Given the wide distribution of 

the catalog, these guides were invaluable in assisting personnel to manage their career 

development. 

Figure 7. DAWIA Checklist in 1994 DAU Catalog
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

46

TRAINING DEMAND

A major challenge in implementing DAWIA was the overwhelming backlog of training 

requirements it had created. The number of people attempting to sign up for required 

courses and for newly created courses threatened to overwhelm DAU’s capability. It 

was a question of too many students and too few seats.

The Department addressed the backlog with a two-pronged approach. First, it issued 

policy that allowed some students to meet their training requirements by receiving credit 

for previous experience through “fulfillment.” Second, DAU was directed to develop 

technology-based course delivery as the longer-term solution. Technology would allow 

students to receive training at reduced cost and with minimum interference with their 

work schedules.

FULFILLMENT

DAWIA made no distinction between newly hired or promoted employees and those with 

years of experience. It was a one-size-fits-all approach. As a result, a large number of 

the most senior personnel were applying for training when their prior work experience 

made such training superfluous.

To remedy the problem, Congress required the Department to develop a “fulfillment 

plan.”17 Fulfillment would enable senior acquisition workforce members to fulfill their 

mandatory training requirements based on previous experience and education, thus alleviating the training backlog problem. DAU instituted alternatives for the workforce to 

achieve certification and save valuable classroom seats. The process was comparatively 

simple. A supervisor would review an individual’s experience and training, compare 

them with the learning objectives for a particular course, and grant “fulfillment” if the 

objectives had been covered. 

This presumed that the learning objectives for the courses had already been identified. 

In fact, at the time the fulfillment policy was instituted, these objectives were still in the 

process of development for the 60 courses that DAU offered. Although this added to the 

pressure for course development, DAU met the challenge, and the fulfillment program 

proceeded on schedule. As a result, the backlog for courses was significantly reduced. 

A description of the alternatives to classroom training follows.
47

Chapter 4: Early Challenges for the University

Fulfillment and Alternative Training and

Education

Fulfillment

DoD Manual 5000.52, Career Development Program for Acquisition Personnel, issued November 1991, allowed a supervisor to certify that the individual 

had obtained the skills and knowledge provided by a mandatory course through 

experience, education, an equivalency test, or alternate training.

The Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support 

(DANTES)

DoD Instruction 5000.58, Defense Acquisition Workforce, issued January 1992, 

established the DANTES policy. By passing college course equivalency examinations considered to demonstrate knowledge comparable to accredited courses in 

required subjects, employees could meet the new educational standards required 

by DAWIA. 

College Equivalency Courses

DAU certified courses offered by private and public institutions of higher education as equivalent to its mandatory acquisition courses. DAU’s catalog listed the 

courses and institutions.

DAU Equivalency Test Program (Course Credit by Examination)

The DAU Equivalency Test Program (Course Credit by Examination) provided 

an opportunity for employees to take a comprehensive test in lieu of attending a 

mandatory course. The tests were designed and administered by the consortium 

member responsible for sponsoring the mandatory course.

TECHNOLOGY

A survey of graduates and their supervisors conducted by DAU in 1995 made the need 

for computer-based training very clear.18 This feedback rated the classroom courses 

as outstanding but asked that they be made more readily available. Responding to the 

survey, students said they encountered difficulties in finding seats in classrooms at times 

compatible with their work schedules; supervisors identified excessive workloads, course 

scheduling, and the travel requirements as major obstacles.

Adopting technology-based course delivery as a major component of DAU’s training 

program seemed a logical solution. Technologically the time was right. Accelerating 

technological change, especially in information technology, was transforming the lives 

and activities of civilians, warfighters, and the acquisition workforce alike. Emerging 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

48

technology was at a point where the delivery of courses over the Internet or in a standalone mode using a CD-ROM was readily available

In April 1995, the Department completed a study reviewing the benefit of an automated 

system that would enable the acquisition workforce to share information and receive 

training. The concept was to organize information into an Acquisition Deskbook that 

would segregate mandatory and discretionary practices, sending a clear message that 

the use of judgment was a mainstream element of business processes.19 It would also 

have an “Ask the Professor” component where practitioners could contact DAU faculty 

about their questions electronically. 

The Deskbook was to be more than a source of information that could be accessed 

quickly. It was the key to the most important part of acquisition reform—cultural change. 

One of the barriers to changing the acquisition process had been difficulty in getting the 

message of acquisition reform to the workforce. By being an impetus for a reexamination of the current regulations, by allowing insight across the acquisition community, 

and providing direct, unfiltered information to the entire workforce at the same time, the 

Deskbook contributed to the cultural change. It was to do this by giving each member 

Dr. Paul G. Kaminski (second from right), Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), 

reviews a prototype of the Acquisition Deskbook, which was on display in the Pentagon Courtyard 

as part of Acquisition Reform Acceleration Day activities, May 31, 1996. From left: LTC Michael 

B. Monaghan, USA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and 

Acquisition; Maj Randy Hildebrandt, USAF, Air Systems Command; Kaminski; and CMDR Eric C. 

Smith, USN, Commander, Computer Engineering Center, Naval Facilities Engineering Command.
49

Chapter 4: Early Challenges for the University

of the acquisition workforce the knowledge 

to do a better job and the freedom to ask 

questions and challenge assumptions.20

But two issues would have to be addressed 

before technology-based training could 

make a major contribution. First, a significant portion of the workforce did not have 

the technology to use such training. Second, the university had not yet developed 

technology-based capabilities to deliver 

courses.

The first issue was of concern to far more 

than DAU. The lack of DoD-wide availability of the technology essential to communications affected the entire Department. 

When the Department released the first part of the Deskbook in 1995, this issue struck 

home—it was not accessible to the community at large. For example, in managing the 

“Ask the Professor” portion of the Deskbook that connected practitioners to DAU faculty, 

it became evident that while DAU could transmit, a large number of its audience could 

not receive. They simply did not have the electronic tools required. 

Recognizing this, USD(A&T) Kaminski issued a memorandum in early 1996 to the 

Component Acquisition Executives directing them to bring the acquisition workforce 

online immediately as success in acquisition depended heavily on a well-informed and 

fully trained workforce. The memorandum stipulated the minimum hardware requirements for installing the Deskbook.21

The second issue regarding DAU’s need to deliver courses using technology was 

addressed when Kaminski issued another memorandum in 1997. He directed DAU’s 

President to transition from traditional classroom delivery to information-age technologies for course delivery. Furthermore, the 

memorandum stated that information-age 

technologies were to be used whenever 

possible and directed DAU to create an 

implementation plan.22

In May 1997, DAU published a Technology-Based Education and Training Concept Plan to expand its distance learning 

capabilities with the goal of incorporating 

information technology in all courses by 

the end of FY 2000.23

According to 

the plan, from 

the outset, new 

courses were to 

be designed for 

delivery using 

technology 

unless there 

were compelling 

reasons for using 

the classroom 

approach.

The Defense Acquisition Deskbook “Ask a 

Professor” Program was instituted in 1996 as part 

of the Defense Acquisition Deskbook Web site.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

50

DAU delivered its first interactive Web-based course, Simplified Acquisition Process, in 

1997. The infrastructure to support the course included student self-registration, online 

testing, faculty administration through e-mail, and online conference rooms with course 

resources that linked to other electronic documents. By 1998 DAU offered eight distance 

learning courses with 15,750 hours of e-learning.

RESEARCH

Although DAWIA also prescribed a research mission for DAU, as the university examined its research role there was much discussion as to what research should encompass.

Minutes covering several years of Board of Visitors meetings report members debating the form research should take. For example, some of the BoV thought it should be 

focused on the “internal,” that is, ensuring that faculty were proficient in research and 

had the time to carry it out; others thought it should be “extramural,” ensuring DAU was 

involved in developing regulations and laws through a formal process.

Another dilemma was the source of research topics. Should they originate with the 

faculty, functional boards, senior Department policy makers, or academia? Perhaps the 

most frequent point of discussion was who should perform research.

In reality, research was constrained by the effects of decreasing budgets. Since DAU’s 

primary responsibility was for developing and delivering DAWIA courses, the research 

mission was regarded as an additional activity. Consequently, research was not widely 

done, nor did the Department or industry place much demand that DAU do it. Furthermore, there was no central mechanism to fund or manage a consortium-wide research 

program until 1997.

Some research capability did exist within the consortium.24 For example, the Naval 

Postgraduate School had a well-developed research program, and Defense Systems 

Management College (DSMC) sponsored and DAU funded a Research, Consulting and 

Information Division (RCID) that was responsible for managing the program of applied 

acquisition research at the College. Conducted by faculty, students, and occasionally 

outside professionals, the research generated was primarily focused on reducing and 

controlling acquisition costs. DSMC also sponsored a Fellowship Program that produced 

research reports upon completion of the fellowship. But this existing research program 

fell short of the broader vision of DAWIA. 

The first DAU efforts toward expanding their research mission came in 1994 when the 

Acquisition Research Coordinating Committee (ARCC) was established. The committee 

was composed of deans, administrators, and faculty from the consortium who decided 
51

Chapter 4: Early Challenges for the University

its initial task was publication of a scholarly, peer-reviewed journal to bridge the gap 

between those who studied acquisition management and those who practiced it. The 

first edition of Acquisition Review Quarterly was issued in 1994.25

In 1997, the External Acquisition Research Program (EARP), managed at the Naval 

Postgraduate School, was formed to replace the ARCC and received $400,000 for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 (individual recipients were awarded $50,000). The EARP was 

created to build a community of scholars at universities and other institutions actively 

engaged in research related to the challenges of acquisition. A summary of topics for 

200026 and 200127 shows the nature of the research performed under the EARP. 

By 2000, DAU discontinued this program, reversing the decision that research be performed by academia. The new direction was that faculty should be pivotal in defining 

best practices in fields of acquisition.28 At the same time, a Research Core Team with a 

Director of Research was established as part of DAU to support a variety of researchrelated activities.

In 2002, DAU took a transformational step to revitalize its research program making it 

more responsive to customers. Historically, faculty interest, not customer needs, drove 

DAU’s research efforts. In keeping with DAU’s goal to better serve the customer, it 

established a Research Planning Board. The membership consisted of DoD, industry, 

academia, the Services, and DAU senior representatives. The Board would seek out 

job-relevant research areas from the acquisition community, prioritize the topics, and 

present them to DAU faculty interested in conducting research. Through this process, 

DAU faculty could provide job-targeted and usable research on problems, issues, and 

concerns identified by the acquisition workforce itself.

DAWIA was a significant event shaping the changing horizons of acquisition, and the 

new training was having a desired impact on the workforce. The improvements in 

program management, for example, became evident when an increasing number of 

program offices were staffed and supported by program managers achieving at least 

Level I certification: 

Program offices have increased their effectiveness and eased the issue of training. Subsequently, PMs can leave many of the less-significant issues behind and 

move forward and upward to new, higher planes of achievement.29

DAU had fully implemented the provisions of DAWIA and institutionalized programs 

to guarantee the continued development of a highly qualified pool of acquisition professionals. DAWIA courses using sound instructional design principles had been developed 

for each career field; student backlog was addressed; strategic plans were published; 

academic policies were developed; a research program was defined; financial procedures 

were established; an online registration system was in place; a management informa-
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

52

tion system was formed; and the flow of information among stakeholders was moving 

smoothly.

The university was positioned and prepared to spearhead the message of acquisition 

reform, which would have a profound effect on the institution.
53

Chapter 4: Early Challenges for the University

Endnotes

1. Appendix H: DAU Policy Memoranda (Issued Before September 2000) <http://www.dau.mil/aboutdau/DAU_History/DAU%20policy.pdf>

2. Defense Acquisition University, Board of Visitor Minutes, September 16, 1998.

3. Memorandum, Dave Oliver, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., Setting Defense Acquisition University Course 

Prerequisites (June 17, 1999). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2055.pdf>

4. Defense Acquisition University, Strategic Plan, Enterprise Strategy (December 1995). <http://www.

dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_history/Enterprise_Strategy.pdf>

5. Nicholas Mavroules, “Creating a Professional Acquisition Workforce,” National Contract Management 

Journal, Volume 24, No. 2 (1991): pp. 19-20. 

6. Defense Acquisition University, Business Plan 2001: Smart Business 20/20 (July 2000): p. 10. <http://

www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/SB2020.pdf>

7. DoD Annual Report to Congress FY 1994.

8. Appendix I: DAU Courses Offered by Career Field in 1991. <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Appendix8.pdf - Not Yet Available>

9. DoD Manual 5000.52-M, Acquisition Career Development Program, November 1995, issued under 

DoD Directive 5000.52, Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development Program

(October 25, 1991). 

10. Robert L. Hawkins, Ed.D, and Linda Granzo, “Department of Defense Instructional Systems Design 

for the Acquisition/Contracting Workforce: A View from the Inside,” National Contract Management 

Journal, Volume 24, No. 1 (1997): p. 2. 

11. Policy (Final Draft), Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Assignment-Specific 

Training (May 1, 1997). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2021.pdf>

12. James A. Rego, Jr., Lt. Col. (Sel.), USAF, “The Face of Training Changing at DSMC,” Program 

Manager (July-August 1995): p. 16.

13. Lawrence M. Damman, Lt. Col., USAF, “TEMC Kickoff, A New Course Fulfills DAWIA Requirements,“ Program Manager (March-April 1994): p. 11. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf94/damman.pdf >

14. William Lankford, Cmdr., USN, and Dr. Robert A. Warren, “College Introduces New Systems Engineering Course,” Program Manager (November-December 1994): p. 39.

15. James A. Rego, Jr., Lt. Col. (Sel.), USAF, “The Face of Training Changing at DSMC: Education—an 

Interactive Process of Discovery,” Program Manager (July-August 1995): p. 16. 

16. George A. Noyes III, Lt. Col., USAF, “College Expands Curriculum,” Program Manager (JanuaryFebruary 1995): p. 9. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf95/noyes.pdf>

17. According to the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, fulfillment was to last until October 

1, 1997; however, the Defense Appropriations Act of FY 1999 reinstated fulfillment indefinitely.

18. Defense Acquisition University, Graduate and Supervisor Survey Results, Two Volumes (October 3, 

1996). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%204.pdf >

19. Department of Defense Automated Acquisition Information Process Action Briefing to Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Recommendations to Develop a DoD 

Acquisition Deskbook and Automated Program Status Reporting System (April 17, 1995).

20. Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1997, summarizes Defense Acquisition Deskbook <http://

www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr97/chap12.html#top>

21. Memorandum, Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) to Component Acquisition Executives, Electronic Access to Acquisition Reform Information and Training 

Materials (December 14, 1996). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2022.pdf>

22. Memorandum, Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) to Defense 

Acquisition Career Development Council (February 27, 1997). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_

History/Layton%2010.pdf>
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

54

23. Defense Acquisition University, Technology-Based Education and Training Concept Plan (May 5, 

1997). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/DAU%20Technology%20Plan%205May1997.

pdf>

24. Joan L. Sable, “DSMC Hosts Acquisition Research Forum,” Program Manager (January-February 

1994): pp. 38-39. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf94/sable.pdf>

25. In 2003, there were 12,000 subscribers to Acquisition Review Quarterly.

26. Naval Postgraduate School, FY 2000 External Acquisition Research Project Awards. <http://www.

dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/EARP%20Awards%202000.pdf> 

27. Naval Postgraduate School, FY 2001 EARP Awards. <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/

EARP%20Awards%202001.pdf>

28. Memorandum, Jacques Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), 

to President, Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition University Civilian Faculty Plan 

(November 13, 1999). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/docs/DAU%20Civilian%20Faculty%20Plan.

doc>

29. Robert L. Tate, “Executive Courses Reflect Impact of Acquisition Changes: Gaining New Insight 

into our Environment,” Program Manager (March-April 1994): p. 40. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/

pmpdf94/tate.pdf>
55

Acquisition 

Reform Gains 

Momentum

The world in which 

DoD must operate has 

changed beyond the 

limits of the existing 

acquisition system’s 

ability to adjust or 

evolve, and it must be 

totally reengineered.

—William Perry

Secretary of Defense

“Acquisition Reform: A

Mandate for Change,”

February 1994

5
56

The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

This Chapter explains the events that led to the 

acquisition reform movement throughout DoD, 

which gained momentum in 1996 and sought 

to make the acquisition process more effective, 

efficient, productive, and less bureaucratic. It 

aimed to reduce overhead costs, streamline 

requirements, accelerate processes, cut paperwork, and move the Department of Defense 

toward leveraging defense industry best business practices and management concepts.

Chapter 

5 OVERVIEW
57

Chapter 5: Acquisition Reform Gains Momentum

Introduction

While DAU was in its formative stages, the movement for acquisition reform was 

gathering momentum. Moving from a general concept to practical actions, acquisition 

reformers were overhauling the acquisition system. Rules and regulations that restricted 

professional judgment, organizational structures that impeded rapid decision making, 

selection of senior leaders committed to reform, and lessons to be learned from the private sector had all been identified as areas for action. In the words of Colleen Preston, 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform: “The revolution has truly 

begun.”1

REFORM PRINCIPLES 

The acquisition reform movement sought to make the acquisition process more effective, efficient, and productive. To lessen bureaucracy, it aimed to reduce overhead costs, 

streamline requirements, accelerate processes, and cut paperwork. It moved toward 

introducing commercial practices in the public sector and borrowing management concepts from them. 

Interagency groups of experts and practitioners called Process Action Teams (PATs) 

were chartered to identify problems, recommend solutions, and develop implementation plans. The concept of an acquisition system that capitalizes on the strengths of the 

participants to develop programs with the highest opportunity of success was essential 

to showing that the Department was committed to change.2 DoD working hand-in-hand 

with its industry counterparts to satisfy mutual interests was a first.

The Clinton Administration was fully committed to reforming the defense acquisition 

system. He had been elected on a pledge to reduce Bush’s last budget for DoD by $60 

billion, a budget that had already been in decline for several 

years. Overall, procurement had fallen almost 70 percent 

since the eighties.

On March 3, 1993, the President tasked Vice President Al 

Gore to recommend the best way to reinvent government. In 

response, Gore completed a National Performance Review 

(NPR) in 6 months. One chapter of the NPR dealt with the 

way the government’s acquisition system responded to its 

internal customers. Targeting bureaucracy and a costly, antiquated procurement system, the report found DoD’s acquisition system to be a rules-laden system that stifles, rather 

than encourages, risk management. Not only was the cost of 

the bureaucracy itself excessive, but manufacturers built the 

U.S. Vice President Al Gore 

(1993–2001)
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

58

cost of dealing with this bureaucracy into their prices. “Our 

goal,” President Bill Clinton said, “is to make the entire 

Federal Government less expensive and more efficient, and 

to change the culture of our national bureaucracy away from 

complacency and entitlement toward initiative and empowerment.” 

One of reinvention’s immediate initiatives was to make 

maximum use of technology to enable reengineering of the 

acquisition process. In August 1993, a PAT was chartered to 

develop a plan for implementing the use of Electronic Commerce (EC)/Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) in acquiring 

small purchases. The initiative was to provide “one face to 

industry,” using commercially available software for processing contract actions under the small-purchase threshold. 

Vendors would be able to connect to commercial networks capable of accessing the entire 

DoD system and receive data on all planned purchases. The vendor would then be able to 

provide a quote electronically and the government to make an award electronically.3

The “reinventing government” 

philosophy was based not only on 

embracing information technology 

but also on empowering the federal 

workforce through deregulation, 

decentralization, and the encouragement of innovation. This second 

objective was a decided change to 

the congressionally driven reform 

movement of the 1980s, which 

emphasized heavy regulation of the 

workforce on the theory that it could 

not be trusted.4

John M. Deutch, who succeeded 

Donald Yockey as the fifth USD(A), 

came to office in April 1993 when 

Gore’s reinvention was just gaining momentum. As DoD pursued 

advanced technologies, the Defense 

Authorization Act of FY 1994 

added the word “technology” to the 

title, and Deutch became the first 

John M. Deutch, first Under Secretary of Defense for USD(A&T). 

Acquisition and Technology 

Creating a Government that 

Works Better & Costs Less, 

DoD, Accompanying Report of 

the NPR, Vice President Gore
59

Chapter 5: Acquisition Reform Gains Momentum

Deutch’s successors, Paul G. Kaminski and Jacques S. Gansler, continued the drive for 

workforce reform. Gansler folded logistics into acquisition reform, and the Defense 

Authorization Act of FY 2000 added the word “logistics” to the position title. Gansler 

became the first USD(AT&L).

In 1990, after Desert Storm, the lessons of that conflict led to a new military strategy: 

the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).5 Mobilization of mass armies was to be 

replaced with small, light, lethal forces using new technologies for greater speed and 

effectiveness.

Another reversal in culture would be influenced by the high prices paid for defensespecific­ technologies. The Department would have to reverse its past arms-length practice of dealing with private industry. Now industry would be considered a partner, and 

collaborative relationships between government and industry would prevail.

Gore’s reinvention strategy targeted the size of the civilian workforce with a goal to 

reduce it by 12 percent over 5 years. The reduction was aimed at eliminating overcontrol and micromanagement. Cuts were to be accomplished through attrition, early 

retirement, and cash incentives. 

Between 1989 and 2000, the number of civilians in DoD dropped by 37 percent. The 

civilian acquisition workforce declined even further creating what observers called 

a “ticking human capital time bomb.” A DoD report published in 2000, Shaping the 

Civilian Acquisition Workforce of the Future, disclosed an alarming statistic that losses 

approaching 50 percent would be realized in some key acquisition occupations primarily due to retirement.6

For many years, DoD suggested that congressionally imposed government-unique 

requirements made it impossible for DoD to make any significant headway in streamlining the acquisition system. Congress responded in the 

Defense Authorization Act of FY 1991 by directing DoD to 

organize a panel from government, industry, and academia 

to study the laws impacting acquisitions and make recommendations about those statutes. The Section 800 Panel, 

as it was called, reviewed almost 600 laws pertaining to 

acquisition and procurement, and half were recommended 

for repeal or amendment.7 DoD submitted the panel’s report 

to Congress in January 1993.

Based on the recommendations of the Section 800 Panel and 

the NPR, DoD developed a strategic plan to ensure reform 

measures were institutionalized and would last beyond the 

tenure of the Clinton Administration. The recommendations 

Streamlining Defense 

Acquisition Laws, Executive 

Summary, Report of the DoD 

Acquisition Law Advisory Panel
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

60

of the Section 800 Panel and the Secretary’s Bottom-Up Review were converted into a 

DoD legislative proposal that was codified under the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 

Act.8

ACQUISITION REFORMERS 

In March 1994, immediately after taking office, Deutch announced a major restructuring 

of DoD’s acquisition management organization and changed its mission to strengthen 

acquisition reform, environmental security, advanced technology demonstration management, logistics, and economic security.

The organizational change that most directly affected DAU was creation of a full-time, 

senior executive presidential appointee position. This position would serve as the focal 

point for developing a practical step-by-step plan for reengineering the acquisition 

process. Colleen Preston was named the new Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform), or DUSD(AR). 

A lawyer and long-time congressional staff member, Preston had 

worked on the major procurement 

reform legislation of the eighties 

and then on DAWIA and the Section 800 legislation that followed. 

She saw the new university with 

a purpose beyond delivering certification training. Convinced that 

training was a driving force in 

communicating her reform initiatives, she turned to DAU to carry 

her reform message and change the 

workforce culture.

The President of DAU, the Director 

of Acquisition Education, Training 

and Career Development, and the 

Commandant of the Defense Systems Management College would 

now report directly to Preston. She 

began working immediately with 

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry to develop a vision for 

acquisition reform. 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform 

Colleen A. Preston presides at the dedication of the David 

Packard Executive Conference Center. The Packard Conference Center is located at the DAU main campus at Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia. The ceremony was timed to coincide with 

DSMC’s 25th Anniversary Celebration, held on June 25, 1996.
61

Chapter 5: Acquisition Reform Gains Momentum

In February 1994 Perry, who succeeded Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense, issued a 

paper, Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change. This 18-page paper stated why DoD 

had to reform as it faced unprecedented challenges in preserving force effectiveness in 

light of a radically changed threat, substantially declining defense budgets, and rapidly 

changing technology:

The world in which DoD must operate has changed beyond the limits of the 

existing acquisition system’s ability to adjust or evolve, and it must be totally 

reengineered. The problem is DoD’s acquisition system is a complex web of 

laws, regulations, and policies adopted for good reasons over many years. 

While each rule individually has (or had) a purpose for its adoption, and may 

be important to the process as a whole, it often adds no value to the product 

itself, and when combined, contributes to an overloaded system that is often 

paralyzed and ineffectual, and at best cumbersome and complex.9

In October 1994, when Deutch left, Secretary Perry selected Paul G. Kaminski who came 

to office the same month. Together, their leadership proved formidable in establishing 

goals to implement the Department’s strategic plan to fulfill its acquisition reform vision. 

Kaminski had learned 

first-hand in his own 

extensive career as a 

program manager in 

the Air Force about 

the risk aversion that 

stymied innovative 

thinking on the part of 

acquisition officials.

Aware that the Department was plagued with 

tremendous budgetary 

pressures, he knew 

DoD had to change 

the way it operated to 

become a smart buyer. 

Kaminski said the 

Department, “needed 

to do business more 

like commercial industry—and do more business with commercial industry.” Kaminski strongly believed 

that commercial business, not the government, was becoming the driver behind many 

of DoD’s high-technology industries. Statistics proved his point. In the sixties DoD 

bought two-thirds of all domestic computers; by the time Kaminski took office, DoD 

bought less than 5 percent.

Secretary of Defense William Perry (left) is introduced by Dr. Paul G. 

Kaminiski, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), at the 

Pentagon DoD 5000 Series Roll-Out on May 3, 1996.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

62

Key to every reform initiative was the Department’s adoption of the best practices of 

world-class customers and suppliers. Maximizing technology, streamlining processes, 

and acquiring items commercially were crucial initiatives.

Military specifications (MILSPECs) were identified as a major hindrance between 

Defense and industry. The detailed manner in which DoD specified its requirement for 

production often forced companies to create separate production lines for Defense work 

when commercial facilities already existed with equivalent capabilities. This discouraged many potential suppliers, especially small businesses, from vying for government 

contracts, thus preventing the government full access to the cost savings derived from 

an openly competing marketplace. The process was estimated to add 30 to 40 percent 

to DoD acquisition costs. 

In 1994 when Perry signed his memorandum, Specifications and Standards—A New 

Way of Doing Business, a major reengineering of the way DoD would communicate its 

requirements was under way.10 In executing Perry’s vision, the Department reviewed 

over 28,000 military specifications, enlisting the help of the private sector to decide 

whether to cancel a military specification or standard, retain it, or convert it to a commercially acceptable requirement.

Perhaps core to the reform movement was lifting the regulatory burden that had been levied on acquisition and procurement officials. The 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining 

Act (FASA) substantially overhauled federal procurement 

law and alerted acquisition officials that they now had the 

full support of Congress in making independent decisions.

Procurement officials were permitted to use different parts 

of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to construct 

the best business deal rather than be restricted to a process or procedure due to dollar values or other factors. The 

FAR implementation team took a clean-slate approach to 

contracting with new sections addressing market research, 

describing agency needs, and the acquisition of commercial 

items. The FAR also implemented the FASA provision that created the simplified acquisition threshold. This meant that all purchases of a value of $100,000 or less could be 

accomplished with less regulatory bureaucracy.

The FASA also minimized mandatory direction for program managers “freeing” them 

to exercise sound judgment. This approach was achieved by revising the 5000 series 

documents (DoD Directive 5000.1 and its companion Instruction, 5000.2).11

MILSPEC REFORM—Results 

of the First Two Years, DoD, 

OUSD(A&T), Acquisition 

Practices, June 1996
63

Chapter 5: Acquisition Reform Gains Momentum

The rewrite of the 5000 series documents 

to implement FASA represented a dramatic change in almost every major aspect 

of the way DoD had done business for 20 

years, encouraging innovative, non-traditional approaches. The previous 1,000-

page version promoted a centralization of 

policy control and procedural specificity; 

the new 160-page version separated mandatory policies from guiding principles.

Contracting officers and program managers 

were the main targets of this new empowerment. The rules-laden acquisition system 

was to be replaced by an entrepreneurial 

spirit. The reformers recognized, however, 

that cultural change was essential to their 

effort.

In the program management arena, program 

managers had been given full congressional 

support to manage programs to the best of 

their abilities within approved resources. 

The conclusions of an 8-month study requested by the Department to examine problems pertaining to roles and responsibilities of program managers found this was not 

happening. The report published in 1995 revealed that program managers were strongly 

dissatisfied: 

There is a mismatch between the requirements placed on program managers to 

report realistic program status, on the one hand, and doing whatever is necessary to keep a program funded and moving through the acquisition process on 

the other.12

When performance specifications became the preferred method for identifying requirements, signaling a complete reversal of the current practice that gave a contractor detailed 

design and production specifications, some voiced their opinion that the judgment of 

the program manager should be carefully weighed:

The DoD policy change to reprioritize using commercial standards, procedures, and specifications ahead of military standards and specifications is wise. 

President Bill Clinton signs the FY96 National 

Defense Authorization Act into law on February 

10, 1996. 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

64

However, those responsible for implementing this policy must ensure the program 

manager is given maximum flexibility to trade off the type of specifications and 

standards used to optimize the program.13

At a conference in July 1995, Kaminski emphasized the Department’s leadership responsibility to create a climate for reasoned risk-taking by program managers. He insisted 

that a “Program Manager’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities” certificate be issued to 

every program manager. Contents of the certificate explicitly laid out what program 

managers could expect from their acquisition chain, not so much for the benefit of 

the individual program manager—but for the benefit of the functional staff and other 

oversight agencies.14

After FASA other major victories in the acquisition reform movement took hold on 

Capitol Hill. Recognizing the importance of information technology for effective 

government, Congress enacted the Information Technology Management Reform 

Act (ITMRA) and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA). These two acts, 

together known as the Clinger-Cohen Act, required heads of federal agencies to link 

Information Technology (IT) investments to agency accomplishments. The ClingerCohen Act, which took effect in 1996, also required that agency heads establish a process 

to select, manage, and control IT investments. 

In July 1995, Dr. Paul G. Kaminski, then Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), 

directed that all program managers receive the Program Managers Bill of Rights and Responsibilities 

certificate.
65

Chapter 5: Acquisition Reform Gains Momentum

Clinger-Cohen replaced a cumbersome bureaucracy that 

often impeded the quick, efficient purchase of IT, and meant 

that many DoD computers were obsolete by the time they 

were delivered. The act also provided a number of significant opportunities for DoD to further streamline and 

reduce nonvalue-added steps in the acquisition process. 

Among the most significant changes was a test of the use 

of the simplified acquisition procedures for commercial 

items between the threshold of $100,000 and $5 million. 

With an increased threshold, the government would be 

able to buy most commercial items just like any other 

customer without imposing government-unique specifications and standards. 

Reform of the acquisition process was making itself felt 

throughout DoD. Strong leadership, a clear vision, and targeted changes were having their effect. But, in the words of Colleen Preston, “the most 

critical factor that faces us is completing the process of cultural change.”15

DAU was uniquely qualified for an important role in meeting this challenge. The university touched virtually everyone in the acquisition community.

Representative William 

Clinger, Jr. (R-PA), Ranking 

Minority Member of the 

Government Operations 

Committee of the House of 

Representatives 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform Colleen Preston is interviewed for Program 

Manager magazine on August 22, 1996, by DSMC Commandant, BG Richard Black, USA.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

66

DEFENSE SECRETARY AND HEROES OF REINVENTION

Secretary Perry, in one of his concluding actions as Secretary of Defense, gave the National Performance 

Review Hero of Reinvention Hammer Awards to more than 500 federal employees and military person­nel.

Perry said the award “recognizes outstanding, ground-breaking work on an issue of vital importance: our 

future ability to supply the best value goods and services to our forces with the most efficient use of our 

resources.”

The Secretary offered this assessment on September 20, 1996, at an awards ceremony at Fort Myer, 

Virginia, where DAU staff and faculty were recognized.

The awards presented were established under the National Performance Review in early 1993, headed 

by Vice President Al Gore. (The author of this history, Evelyn Layton, appears in the front row, second 

from left.)
67

Chapter 5: Acquisition Reform Gains Momentum

Endnotes

1. Lyn Dellinger, “DAU Training and Education Conference, Acquisition Reform Remains at the Forefront,” Program Manager (November-December 1994): p. 21.

2. Joe Ferrara and Collie Johnson, “Institutionalizing Integrated Product Teams: DoD’s Commitment 

to Change,” Program Manager (November-December 1995): p. 3. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/

pmpdf95/offsite1.pdf>

3. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense William Perry, to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., 

Acquisition Reform (March 15, 1994): p. 17. <http://akss.dau.mil/docs/Acquistion%20Reform%20a

%20Mandate%20for%20Change.pdf>

4. Al Gore, “From Red Tape to Results: Creating Government that Works Better and Costs Less,” Report 

of the National Performance Review (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).

5. Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: “What can the history of revolutions 

in military affairs tell us about transforming the U.S. Military?” Rand Research Report MR-1029-

DARPA (1999). <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1029/>

6. Department of Defense Report, Shaping the Civilian Acquisition Workforce of the Future (October 

2000). <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap_archive/Docs/report1000.pdf>

7. Report of the DoD Acquisition Law Advisory Panel, Streamlining Defense Acquisition Laws “Executive Summary: Report of the DoD Acquisition Law Advisory Panel” (January 1993). <http://www.dau.

mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2020.pdf>

8. P.L. 103-355, Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, 1994.

9. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense William Perry to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., 

Acquisition Reform (March 15, 1994): p. 6. <http://akss.dau.mil/docs/Acquistion%20Reform%20a%

20Mandate%20for%20Change.pdf>

10. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense Perry, Specifications and Standards—A New Way of Doing Business (June 29, 1994). 

11. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Major/Non-Major Defense Systems; DoD Instruction 5000.2, 

Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures.

12. J. Ronald Fox, Edward Hirsch, and George Krikorian, “Unreasonable Pressures on Defense Program 

Managers,” Program Manager (July-August 1995): p. 2. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf95/

krikoria.pdf>

13. Henry I. Jehan, Jr., “Mil-Specs and Mil-Stds No More? DoD Changes Prioritizing Policy,” Program 

Manager (July-August 1994): p. 10. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf94/jehan.pdf >

14. Joe Ferrara and Collie Johnson, “Institutionalizing Integrated Product Teams: DoD’s Commitment 

to Change,” Program Manager (November-December 1995): p. 5. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/

pmpdf95/offsite1.pdf>

15. BG Richard A Black, USA, “Colleen Preston on Acquisition Reform: The Most Critical Factor That 

Faces Us—Completing that Process of Cultural Change,” Program Manager (January-February 1997): 

p. 22. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf97/preston.pdf>
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

68
69

The University—

a Leader in 

Acquisition 

Reform

6

DAU must continue 

its significant role 

in changing the way 

the Department does 

business as it becomes 

a world-class customer, reduces acquisition costs, fosters 

the development of 

a national industrial 

base to compete in a 

global marketplace, 

and maintains its technological superiority.

—DoD Annual 

Defense Report 

September 1995
70

The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

This chapter discusses the Pentagon acquisition 

reformers and their attempts to overhaul the 

policy, procedures, directives, and laws governing the defense systems acquisition process. A 

history behind the establishment of the Office 

of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition Reform) is also included, along 

with the communications and outreach efforts 

that proved vital to changing the acquisition 

culture itself.

Chapter 6 OVERVIEW
71

Chapter 6: The University—a Leader in Acquisition Reform

Introduction

The strategy of Pentagon reformers was to overhaul every process involved in the system’s acquisition processes. Without a change in the culture of the acquisition workforce, 

however, there would be little chance for the reform edicts to take hold. Leaders such 

as Secretary of Defense William Perry; Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 

and Technology Paul Kaminski; and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense of the newly 

established Acquisition Reform Office, Colleen Preston, tirelessly promoted reform. 

The reformers issued memoranda, letters, and directives; gave frequent speeches and 

interviews; held symposia and conferences devoted to reform; conducted press conferences; published reform newsletters and reform-oriented articles; and held acquisition 

reform days and weeks reaching out to the entire acquisition workforce. They believed 

training was essential to promote acquisition reform, and DAU—now aligned under the 

new Acquisition Reform Office—was to play a pivotal role.

Key DoD Administrative Reformers: Paul Kaminski, William Perry, and Colleen Preston.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

72

REFORM MESSAGE

Senior Pentagon officials met with DAU faculty to reinforce the importance of the 

university’s role to carry the message. In his keynote address at a DAU conference 10 

days after taking the position of USD(A&T), Kaminski acknowledged that overcoming 

long-held, widespread practices through the large and disparate acquisition community 

would be a serious undertaking. In his address he asked DAU’s faculty and staff to 

ensure the acquisition workforce received the training needed so that acquisition reform 

could be realized. 

At the same conference, Preston, in her capstone speech, discussed her major goals for 

making acquisition reform a success. While discussing a key goal, Change the Culture, 

she stated that her office had given over 200 speeches or seminars on the vision and goals 

of acquisition reform. Preston challenged DAU’s faculty to accept the responsibility 

for changing the culture by conducting acquisition reform seminars, establishing new 

courses, and revising curricula. In that challenge she said: 

You are in the forefront and are going to have to bring the Acquisition Reform 

message to the workforce, and we have to find innovative ways to communicate 

this message because we are on a fast race—the revolution has truly begun!1

One of DAU’s first efforts was to organize a group of faculty who became knowledgeable about reform initiatives and kept other faculty members informed of changes. By 

integrating the acquisition reform message into their existing courses, 30,000 students 

each year would become part of the reform movement, spread the word, and perhaps 

fulfill the key objective of the reformers: change the culture. 

On November 21, 1994, Kaminski who had just become 

USD(A&T) a month before, appointed Thomas Crean as 

DAU’s first, full-time President. Crean had previously served 

as Commandant of the Army Judge Advocate School and 

Dean for Administrative and Civil Law, and had experience 

as a military lawyer involved with the legal issues of procurement.2 He would report directly to the new Acquisition 

Reform Office under Preston.

Acquisition reform was an effort with an ambitious goal of 

reengineering every acquisition process. The ability to disseminate information to the rank and file about the changes 

being implemented was a major concern. The acquisition workforce needed just-in-time training about the new 

Thomas M. Crean, 

First full-time DAU President, 

November 21, 1994
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Chapter 6: The University—a Leader in Acquisition Reform

changes. To remedy the situation Kaminski issued a memorandum in May 1995 authorizing the establishment of the Acquisition Reform Communications Center (ARCC) 

to be part of DAU.3 The ARCC was tasked with coordinating the development and 

delivery of reform training. Each Component Acquisition Executive was asked to assign 

a representative to the ARCC to support its mission. 

Within two weeks of Kaminski’s memorandum, DAU’s President appointed a director 

to oversee the ARCC. The ARCC took immediate action to disseminate information to 

the workforce as reforms were implemented. A toll free hotline was activated to provide 

assistance, and training materials were made available.

Reforms were coming at such a rapid pace that a fast and efficient information delivery 

method was critical. By 1996, the ARCC had hosted nine satellite broadcasts addressing a variety of reform topics. The broadcasts provided real-time opportunities for the 

workforce to ask specific questions of senior DoD officials on implementing new legislation, policy, and procedures. Videotapes of these broadcasts were also made available 

to the workforce for use in local training programs. Using the most current computer 

technology, the ARCC made training available on CD-ROM and information was posted 

on the Internet. The ARCC’s home page offered reference materials, points of contact, 

links to other sources of reform information, availability of training opportunities, and 

announcements of upcoming events.4

The Acquisition Reform Communications Center (ARCC) broadcasts its first program via satellite on 

June 28, 1995, from the Army Logistics Management College at Fort Lee, Virginia. 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

74

ARCC was a success story. An article in the Acquisition Reform Today Newsletter 

described one member’s reaction to a satellite broadcast:

The faces in the Naval Sea Systems Command auditorium were both curious 

and expectant as they peered towards the large television screen. These people 

were not disappointed. Produced and acted by professionals, the broadcast 

proved both informative and entertaining. It was really an effective training 

program. Not only did the critical information get well communicated, but the 

broadcasts forced us to think through the acquisition process with case studies 

as we absorbed the impact of these changes. The follow-on discussion with 

critical members of the FASA implementation team gave a face to these gigantic 

changes ... it made the whole experience so real.5

REVISING THE CURRICULA

Although the ARCC was effective in familiarizing the workforce with reform initiatives, 

a complete overhaul of DAU’s curricula was necessary to incorporate the changes. The 

functional boards would have to develop new learning objectives. DAU had just completed redesigning the curricula to meet the DAWIA standards and now would start the 

process again for the second time in 2 years. 

The 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act had changed almost 70 percent of the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation affecting the entire contracting curricula. The Military 

Standards/Military Specifications (MILSTD/MILSPEC) reform, along with the rewrite 

of the DoD 5000 series, brought far-reaching changes to almost every aspect of DoD’s 

traditional business processes. Nearly all of DAU’s curricula needed revising.

Innovation, creativity, and empowerment of the acquisition workforce were key to 

reform, but the overwhelming majority of the workforce had long labored under a 

system of strict rules and oversight. To teach and encourage workers to use their own 

judgment in devising plans and making decisions would be difficult after the long years 

of frequent audits, persistent investigations, and well-publicized scandals. In an effort 

to reinforce this notion, Kaminski issued a memorandum, Good Judgment in the Competitive Procurement Process.6

In his role as DAU’s Board of Visitors Chair, Gansler consistently pressed for learnercentered training where he insisted there must be a culture change, and DAU must meet 

its responsibility in creating quality education by delivering case studies. As a result, 

DAU course developers accelerated efforts to incorporate case studies and simulation 

exercises into the new courses allowing students to develop decision-making skills.

In the contracting career fields, courses that had previously been designed around tasks 

were now to be designed around key decision points. Making the courses current also 
75

Chapter 6: The University—a Leader in Acquisition Reform

meant reinforcing cultural change. Words and terms like “innovation,” “sound business 

judgment,” and “professional” were emphasized. The contracting person who was once 

told, “Here is the requirement, here is the FAR,” now needed skills in breaking down 

complex information, applying sound business principles, and developing original solutions.

Preston personally interceded in reengineering the 20-week Program Management 

Course, the flagship course for program managers. By reducing it to 14 weeks, she 

demonstrated that streamlining, a hallmark of acquisition reform, should be considered 

in DAU’s new course design process. Downsizing had significantly reduced the size of 

the acquisition workforce, and reducing the hours of training in the classroom meant 

fewer hours away from the job. 

Cross training was another key goal of acquisition reform. By training a person in a 

variety of functions, reassigning an existing workforce member rather than hiring a new 

one made good sense. Breaking down the “stovepipes” inherent in the civil service personnel system could help mitigate the effects of the ongoing workforce downsizing.

Flexibility was an important characteristic of the acquisition manager of the future. For 

example, the newly designed program management curriculum had an entry and intermediate acquisition course that integrated learning objectives from every acquisition 

functional area. In an unprecedented effort, functional boards representing each functional area joined to create competencies for these prerequisite courses—Fundamentals 

of Acquisition and Intermediate Systems Acquisition. 

In May 1995, Perry issued a memorandum addressing the use of Integrated Product 

and Process Development (IPPD).7 Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) consisting of all 

acquisition process stakeholders were to develop affordable program plans and identify and resolve problems early. This direction was a fundamental shift in practice 

from conducting after-the-fact reviews and considered a giant leap in changing DoD’s 

acquisition culture.

Responding to the emphasis on IPPDs and IPTs, functioning as a team became integral 

to DAU’s instructional methodology. In the classroom, students would assume various 

functional roles to better perform in the complex acquisition environment. By using the 

team-based approach to learning, the concept was that students could carry this skill 

back to their jobs. 

In redesigning its courses, DAU recognized the need for a broader base of skills and 

knowledge for acquisition managers especially as downsizing escalated. For example, 

the contracting career field had separate curricula for three areas: base operations, major 

weapon systems, and facilities engineering. Acquisition reform generated a “generalist” 

concept so that graduates could perform a fuller range of duties. Similarly, topics that 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

76

I direct an immediate and fundamental change in the 

role of the OSD and Component staff organizations 

currently performing oversight and review of acquisition programs. In the future these staff organizations 

shall participate as members of integrated product 

team or teams, which are committed to program success. Rather than checking the work of the program 

office beginning 6 months prior to a milestone decision point, as is often the case today, the OSD and 

Component staffs shall participate early and on an on-going basis with 

the program office teams, resolving issues as they arise, rather than 

during the final decision review ...

—Hon. Paul G. Kaminski, USD(A&T)

“Reengineering the Acquisition Oversight and Review Process”

April 28, 1995

DR. KAMINSKI ON THE IPT CONCEPT...

“We’ve convened this offsite to develop a common understanding within 

the Department on how we will implement the IPT concept.”

“...being part of an IPT does not compromise a functional member’s 

independent assessment role. I will continue to hold team members 

accountable of ensuring each program has a workable approach—we 

are not getting rid of the independent assessment function.”

“The two most important characteristics of IPTs are empowerment and 

cooperation—trust and teamwork by another name.”

“As we institutionalize IPTs, we should remember that we’re implementing a process to secure early insight—not event-driven oversight.”

DR. KAMINSKI ON THE PROGRAM MANAGER’S BILL OF 

RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES...

“...explicitly lays out what program managers can expect from their 

acquisition chain of command as well as what we expect from them.”

“Actions speak louder than words—each program manager can expect 

that my actions will track the words in the bill of rights.”

“I believe it’s important to put this in writing—not so much for the 

benefit of the individual program manager—but for the benefit of the 

functional staffs and other oversight agencies.”
77

Chapter 6: The University—a Leader in Acquisition Reform

once warranted separate courses, such as cost and price analysis, were integrated into 

the basic curricula.

To support Kaminski’s belief that “DoD needs to do business more like business,” management topics became as important as technical ones in the newly designed courses. 

Commercial practices, once omitted from course instruction, were strongly emphasized. 

Additionally, industry students who had not been permitted to take DAU courses in the 

past were welcomed. An article in Program Manager describes the new mix of government and industry involved in learner-centered education:

Walking into a class at DSMC to see Pentagon acquisition professionals and industry managers building toy pup tents makes one wonder how effectively public 

money is being spent. Seeing acquisition managers sitting around a table rolling 

dice and moving poker chips from one place to another also may raise eyebrows. 

There is a method to this madness. Professors blend hands-on activities with 

lessons on manufacturing principles and management philosophies.8

Just as Representative Mavroules believed that people were at the core of acquisition 

reform when he crafted DAWIA, future reformers embraced this conviction. Preston 

said that both she and Perry had a clear understanding that people were not the problem. 

They believed that the Department had one of the best acquisition workforces in the 

world, but the system of rules and regulations precluded them from doing their best. 

Perry said, “What we need to do is to unshackle people, to let them do their jobs in a 

way that makes the most sense.”9 DAU’s new courses set about doing just that.

In May 1997, after serving as USD(A&T) for 2-1⁄2 years, Kaminski stepped down. At a 

press conference before leaving, Kaminski praised DAU for its contribution to improving the acquisition process saying, “I believe DAU is now really making fundamental 

changes to the environment and the culture.” Kaminski also singled out the people in 

the acquisition workforce that he affirmed “were the strength of our organization.”10

The new courses DAU was designing for these people allowed them to perform to their 

potential.

The Kaminski years brought technological advances, the requirement for different forms 

of training, i.e., continuous learning, and a need to reach a broader acquisition workforce 

than originally envisioned. Between 1994 and 1997, DAU developed 15 courses applying 

competency-based education principles and, by 1997, offered 57 certification and 23 

assignment-specific courses to an average of 33,000 students annually. Eight of these 

courses were technology-based. The courses not only used sound instructional design 

principles but also learner-centered teaching methods such as case studies, experiential 

learning, and simulation. They aggressively promoted teaming.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

78

The Department reported DAU’s accomplishments during these early years to Congress 

stating:

DAU must continue its significant role in changing the way the Department 

does business as it becomes a world-class customer, reduces acquisition costs, 

fosters the development of a national industrial base to compete in a global 

marketplace, and maintains its technological superiority.11

Acquisition reform maintained momentum as the second Clinton Administration began, 

and officials such as Secretary of Defense William Cohen and USD(A&T) Jacques 

Gansler turned to DAU to play an active role in the movement.
79

Chapter 6: The University—a Leader in Acquisition Reform

Endnotes

1. Lyn Dellinger, “DAU Training and Education Conference, Acquisition Reform Remains at the Forefront,” Program Manager (November-December 1994).

2. Biography of Thomas Crean: “Secretary Kaminski Appoints Thomas M. Crean New DAU President,” 

Program Manager (November-December 1994): p. 18. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf94/garcia.

pdf>

3. Memorandum, Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Acquisition 

Reform Communications Center, May 4, 1995.

4. Further information on ARCC accomplishments is found in Defense Annual Report for FY 1996 and 

Defense Annual Report for 1997.

5. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, Acquisition Reform Today, 

Vol. 1, No. 2 (1996).

6. Memorandum, Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Good 

Judgment in the Competitive Procurement Process (June 28, 1995).

7. Memorandum, William Perry, Secretary of Defense, Use of Integrated Product and Process Development and Integrated Product Teams in DoD (May 10, 1995).

8. Vincent P. Grimes, “Us Versus Them Spirit Changes After Course,” Program Manager (January-February 1995): p. 25. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf95/grimes.pdf>

9. BG Richard A. Black, USA, “Colleen Preston on Acquisition Reform: The Most Critical Factor That 

Faces Us–Completing that Process of Cultural Change,” Program Manager (January-February 1997): 

p. 24. <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf97/preston.pdf>

10. Department of Defense Press Conference, “Program Management” (May-June 1997).

11. Department of Defense, Defense Annual Report, September 1995.
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81

DoD Initiatives 

Lead to Changes 

in Learning 

and DAU’s 

Organization

7

We have to commit 

more time and more 

resources for training in order to build 

a very solid cadre 

of people who know 

and understand the 

new systems we’re 

building.

—William S. Cohen

Secretary of Defense
82

The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

This Chapter recounts the dismantling of DAU’s 

consortium structure and reemergence as a corporate enterprise. It also relates DAU’s efforts 

to establish a solid foundation of learning with 

well-defined administrative procedures; welldeveloped curricula; and measurable progress 

toward meeting DAWIA-directed certification 

and accreditation standards in support of the 

DoD acquisition workforce.

Chapter 

7 OVERVIEW
83

Chapter 7: DoD Initiatives Lead to Changes in Learning and DAU’s Organization

INTRODUCTION

In its first 5 years, DAU established a solid foundation. By 1997 its administrative 

procedures were well-defined, its curriculum well-developed, and it was providing the 

certification training to support the professional acquisition workforce envisioned by 

the framers of DAWIA. The Department reported to Congress that in 1997 DAU had 

established 81 courses with over 1,200 offerings and was training approximately 35,000 

workforce members per year.

Reforming acquisition management continued to be a priority over the next 3 years. Dissatisfaction with the Department’s ability to respond to rapid change and the unpredictability of the current world situation led Congress to direct the Department to streamline 

acquisition organizations, the workforce, and infrastructure. 

This direction was included in Section 912c of the Defense Authorization Act of FY 

1998. Secretary of Defense William Cohen responded to Section 912c with an implementation plan, Actions to Accelerate the Movement to the New Workforce Vision.

1

While Cohen’s Workforce Vision was being drafted, he 

announced the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) in November 

1997.2 This initiative sought to accomplish a Revolution of 

Business Affairs fundamentally changing the way the Pentagon operated by streamlining DoD functions, adopting the 

best business practices of the private sector, consolidating 

redundant organizations, outsourcing as many activities as 

possible, allowing industry to compete with government, and 

eliminating excess infrastructure.

The DRI’s focus on organizational structures directly affected 

DAU. For example, the Director, Acquisition Education, 

Training, and Career Development, who had previously 

reported to the Acquisition Reform Office, was now to report 

to DAU.3 More dramatically, DAU’s consortium structure 

would be dissolved and replaced with a more effective organization. 

In addition to the Workforce Vision and the DRI, other studies and reports addressed the 

issue of defense readiness and came to similar conclusions that impacted DAU. On the 

subject of professional development, there was general consensus that greater emphasis 

needed to be placed on training to reflect the issues of the real world, on continuous learning, and improving DAU’s overall effectiveness. The Department took action in May 

1997 by chartering a Process Action Team (PAT) on Acquisition Education and Training 

William S. Cohen

Secretary of Defense

1997 – 2001
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

84

Structure and Process to review its process for educating and training the acquisition 

workforce. The final report of this PAT had far-reaching effects on the University. 

Yet no assessment of the Department’s training was more revealing than the General 

Accounting Office (GAO) investigation requested by Congress to assess DoD’s training of the acquisition workforce. While the 1999 report, DoD Can Do More To Help 

Weapon System Programs Implement Best Practices, acknowledged the extensive efforts 

of the Department in reviewing its acquisition training processes, the report’s message 

was clear: “DoD training either did not reach the right people when it was needed or 

did not reach them at all.” 4

Jacques S. Gansler became the seventh USD(AT&L) in November 1997. His new Deputy 

for Acquisition Reform, to whom DAU’s President reported, would be Stan Soloway, 

a consultant and lobbyist who had been an active member of the Acquisition Reform 

Working Group, an industry organization. 

Gansler, a well-known defense intellectual and one of the leading practitioners in the 

field of defense acquisition, had participated in several acquisition reform studies and 

brought to the job a distinguished background as a businessman, academic, and published 

“I am firmly convinced this [acquisition reform] is absolutely critical to our maintaining a strong military 

into the 21st Century. We have an obligation to pursue it aggressively because the public deserves it. 

When the public sees how much is being wasted in our acquisition system, they become justifiably 

outraged. So the public demands it, so we have an obligation to provide it.”

—William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense
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Chapter 7: DoD Initiatives Lead to Changes in Learning and DAU’s Organization

author. Having served as the Chair of DAU’s Board of Visitors since it was established 

in 1995, Gansler understood first hand the challenges the university faced in building a 

professional workforce with quality education. His leadership proved invaluable as the 

Department focused on improving workforce training.

SECTION 912C—WORKFORCE VISION

Among the actions in his Section 912c Workforce Vision, Cohen specifically identified 

three that directly affected DAU: improving the continuous learning program for acquisition professionals, developing training for issuing service contracts, and developing 

training for operating in the commercial business environment.

CONTINUOUS LEARNING

In a period of rapid change, the limitations of the traditional methods of communicating 

with the acquisition workforce became evident. The Department’s new military strategy, 

the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), was making major changes in the approach 

to warfighting that had repercussions for acquisition management.5 In his 2000 report, 

The Road Ahead: Accelerating the Transformation of Department of Defense Acquisition 

Logistics Process and Practices, Gansler wrote of the Department’s need for a parallel 

revolution to the RMA—a Revolution in Business Affairs.6 

Redirecting funds from support of aging weapon systems to modernization was a core 

concept in the business revolution. As the existing equipment—much procured during 

the 1970s—aged, the cost of keeping it operating rose dramatically, especially when 

it received heavy use. A program that kept the acquisition community informed of the 

most recent developments in acquisition policy, that allowed them to share experiences, 

and provided them with real-time support was essential to maintain the momentum of 

modernization. In a time of accelerating change, there was an acute need for continuous 

learning throughout the acquisition community.

This need had long been recognized. As early as the passage of DAWIA in 1990, continuous learning had been identified as one of the defining characteristics of a professional. 

In 1993, Vice President Gore, in his National Performance Review, emphasized that a 

world-class workforce requires continuous education, rotational assignments, and cross 

training at a minimum.

In August 1996, the Acquisition Reform Office issued an interim policy on continuing 

education and training.7 The purpose of the memorandum was to test the feasibility of 

adding a new dimension of continuing acquisition education and training to the existing 

standards in the 5000.52M.8 Conflicting differences among the Services about the details 

of this expansion, however, prevented a final policy from being issued.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

86

In 1996 and 1997, in an effort to get the word out, Gansler’s predecessor, Kaminski, 

had initiated action memoranda, a series of road shows, and special acquisition events 

for the entire workforce. He had also established the Acquisition Reform Communications Center (ARCC) under DAU to develop and deliver reform training using a variety 

of media such as videos, periodic satellite broadcasts, and publications. While these 

initiatives were valuable, they were initial solutions to a larger problem—the lack of a 

well-defined continuous learning program. 

Gansler had long been an advocate of a strong continuous learning program and brought 

this commitment with him when he assumed his position as Under Secretary. As a member of DAU’s Board of Visitors since its creation in 1995, he spoke often of the gap in 

DAU training. Addressing the Board of Visitors 2 months before he became the Under 

Secretary, Gansler related a meeting he held with senators interested in whether the 

acquisition workforce was current and whether the knowledge of senior-level acquisition professionals was being updated.

Gansler told the senators that by building continuous learning options—with flexibility for needs to be identified at the individual, supervisory, and team levels—a continuous learning policy would allow for a variety of just-in-time training tools. These 

would include acquisition reform courses, cross training in other career fields, rotational 

assignments, team-based training, and tuition assistance to assure currency in technical disciplines. The policy would also feature annual Individual Development Plans to 

promote professionalism by allowing workforce members to take charge of their own 

career development.9

In its Best Practices report, GAO pointed out that DAU was originally set up to deliver 

DAWIA training—not to deliver best practices quickly to program staff. Furthermore, 

critical of earlier ARCC efforts, GAO found attendees were not tracked and there was no 

assurance that the workforce received the training. For those who did attend, there was 

no evidence that the introductory nature of the training provided the depth or specificity 

to implement the practices at the workplace or in a time frame that would be helpful.

These GAO concerns about workforce training mirrored those of Gansler, and in January 1998 he issued Reform through Learning: Policy on Continuous Learning.

10 That 

the acquisition environment is dynamic, challenging, and changing was the message 

the policy conveyed. To keep pace, Gansler insisted the acquisition workforce must 

operate as a continuous learning community always striving to improve their professional knowledge and performance. To impose discipline he required that 80 continuous 

learning points of continuing education were to be earned every 2 years for acquisition 

personnel already certified for their positions.
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Chapter 7: DoD Initiatives Lead to Changes in Learning and DAU’s Organization

The continuous learning policy was the first of its kind in the federal sector. At the time 

only a few federal occupations required continuing education, and those that did, typically limited activities to maintaining functional currency through traditional classroom 

coursework.

DoD’s new policy on continuous learning stressed more than functional competencies 

and recognized that learning occurs outside the classroom. By combining academic 

course work, functional and leadership training, experience, and professional activities, 

a full range of developmental opportunities became available through the new policy. 

Expanding training beyond developing technical skills by emphasizing 27 leadership 

competencies identified by the Office of Personnel Management, the policy broke new 

ground.

Combined with a disciplined approach to enforcement, the new policy became a major 

contributor to creating a professional acquisition community. Furthermore, acquisition 

professionals were provided with the tools to deal with this change. Continuous learning 

for the acquisition workforce had finally become a reality. 

While the 1998 policy was oriented towards keeping current in a discipline, workforce 

members still needed to remain current with the Department’s acquisition processes and 

best practices changes. To ensure they had the opportunity to keep up with latest initiatives, DAU’s Acquisition Reform Communications Center (ARCC) produced distance 

learning modules.11

SERVICES CONTRACTING 

A second initiative in Cohen’s Workforce Vision addressed the ability of the workforce 

to effectively manage contracts for services as opposed to the more traditional contracts 

for goods or products. The rule-bound system that governed procurement was modeled 

on an earlier time when most procurement was of “things” rather than “services.” As a 

result, those who had grown up in the system were not prepared by experience or training 

to deal with the increased emphasis on obtaining services from the private sector. DoD 

needed to adopt the use of commercial practices to make these purchases.

Gansler insisted that the old approach, where the user would write requirements and 

then “throw them over the transom” to the people who issued the contracts, was hopelessly outdated and inappropriate. He was convinced that acquisition personnel would 

have to develop close working relationships and negotiate tradeoffs between the people 

who needed the item and the contracting officers. Put more simply, it would require 

teamwork. 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

88

To implement this change, Cohen directed that a senior team assemble to develop 

training focusing on acquiring services. Gansler chartered the Acquisition Workforce 

Training for Service Contracts Group in October 1998 to evaluate and make recommendations regarding this training.12 The Group, led by BGen Frank Anderson, USAF, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Contracting), initiated several actions to 

support this initiative including increased competitive sourcing, migration to paperless 

contracting, and expanded use of performance-based service contracts in their final 

report.13 DAU made substantial changes to its courses to incorporate these recommendations resulting in more current and useful training. 

COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT 

Introducing practices and techniques commonplace in the commercial environment 

to government was the third area addressed in Cohen’s Workforce Vision. To prepare 

the workforce to adopt these practices, training was critical. Courses in commercial 

practices were readily available from the private sector, and the Department took 

advantage of this by giving the acquisition workforce access to courses at top business and other academic institutions—some made available through partnerships with 

the private sector.

These courses were of great value but did not necessarily address the unique circumstances peculiar to government acquisition. For this reason, the Commercial Business 

Environment Training Study Group was chartered in November 1998 to make recommendations on developing courses that addressed the application of commercial practices 

in DoD.14 The Group made significant strides in incorporating commercial practices 

into training. Market research, commercial pricing, and commercial financing became 

part of DAU’s curricula.

DEFENSE REFORM INITIATIVE

The Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) was wide ranging in its proposed improvements to 

Defense acquisition. It resulted in 52 directives to streamline organizations for agility, 

to invest in people, and to exploit information technology.15

The DRI goal to streamline organizations had a direct effect on DAU. First, a Chancellor 

for Education and Professional Development was created to administer a coordinated 

program of civilian professional education and training throughout the Department. 

Secondly, DAU was to transform from its consortium structure to a unified structure 

under the leadership of DAU’s President.
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Chapter 7: DoD Initiatives Lead to Changes in Learning and DAU’s Organization

CHANCELLOR 

The newly created position of Chancellor was to focus on academic quality across all 

DoD educational institutions. The DRI had found that “DoD is a world-class organization despite rendering second-rate education, training, and professional development 

to its civilian employees.”

The cause of the second-rate status, according to the report, was the mixed quality of 

the Department’s educational programs and institutions that had no requirement for 

accreditation. The report stated that only one-fifth of its educational institutions were 

accredited by a recognized accreditation association. To remedy this, the Chancellor 

issued a directive requiring that all schools seek accreditation as soon as possible. 

On September 27, 1999, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre signed the Chancellor’s Charter mandating that every civilian professional education and training institution throughout the Department be accredited or be actively pursuing accreditation by 

January 1, 2000.16

Following this direction, DAU achieved accreditation for a 6-year period from the Council on Occupational Education in February 2003.17 With accreditation DAU took another 

step toward achieving recognition as a premier institution of professional education. 

UNIFIED STRUCTURE

It had been recognized for some time that the consortium structure seriously limited 

DAU’s ability to meet its potential. As early as January 1993, Congress tasked GAO to 

report on DAU’s progress in implementing DAWIA and questioned the effectiveness of 

a consortium.18 As concerns about the consortium grew, other studies were conducted 

that led to a 1997 Process Action Team (PAT) on Acquisition Education and Training 

Structure and Process that examined the effectiveness of the Department’s training.19 

The team recommended in its final report that DAU’s organization be streamlined to 

make it more effective.20

The 12-member consortium, the PAT reported, was excessively large, duplicative, and 

costly. Its members reported to several different command chains. There was leadership 

ambiguity and a cumbersome decision-making process. The President of DAU lacked the 

authority to direct compliance with his policies. Where these policies were seen by the 

various leaders of the consortium schools to be in conflict with their particular interests, 

the policies could be ignored. As a result, faculty qualifications among the consortium 

members were inconsistent, and the lack of accountability was especially problematic 

in ensuring that all schools accommodated acquisition reform and cross training.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

90

In July 1999, responding to the PAT’s recommendations, DAU issued its Transition 

Strategy outlining the actions it would take to transition to a unified structure.21 Deputy 

Secretary Hamre formally endorsed this strategy in November 1999 when he issued a 

DRI Directive requiring a unified structure commenting:

The unified structure will enable DAU to achieve economies, improve quality, 

and establish the preeminent faculty required to meet the academic standards established by the Chancellor for Education and Professional Development.22

The unified structure made two major changes to DAU and both addressed resource 

control. First, all facilities of the university were to be an integral part of DAU and 

no longer part of the individual Services. Secondly, all personnel, including faculty, 

administrators, and staff, were to be direct employees of the university and report to its 

President. Reducing the personnel count from about 700 to 556, this action reinforced 

DRI’s tenet of eliminating waste and duplication.

Four campuses were established to replace the consortium. They were: Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia; Fort Lee, Virginia; Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia; and Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, Ohio.23 The campuses were placed under the direct authority of DAU’s 

President whom the PAT recommended be a senior acquisition official. 

On October 31, 2000, former DAU Vice President and DSMC Commandant, Frank J. 

Anderson, Jr., was appointed as DAU’s President. Before retiring from the Air Force, 

Anderson had served in significant high-level acquisition positions including Director 

of Contracting, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 

Acquisition Education

Training & Career Dev. Executive Institute Office of the 

President

Administration

and Services

Strategic Planning

Action Group

Chief Info.

Officer Provost Chief Financial

Officer

Fort Belvoir, VA

Campus

Fort Lee, VA

Campus

WPAFB, OH

Campus

Norfolk, VA

Campus

School of Program 

Management

Figure 8. DAU Unified Organization 2000
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Chapter 7: DoD Initiatives Lead to Changes in Learning and DAU’s Organization

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition; and Air Force Competition Advocate General, Headquarters U.S. Air Force.24

Another recommendation the PAT made was to improve the organization and staffing 

of the Office of the President. The new organization, as shown in Figure 8, reflects this 

recommendation, which significantly expanded the 1992 infrastructure of a president 

supported by three directorates.

In June 2000, Gansler approved the relocation of DAU’s headquarters staff from Alexandria, Virginia, to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This collocation of DAU headquarters with the 

Defense Systems Management College was completed in September 2000 and resulted 

in further cost savings. The personnel who were employees of the various Services were 

reassigned to DAU.

DOD’S EDUCATION AND TRAINING PAT

Besides recommending that DAU be restructured under one leader, the PAT reviewing 

the Department’s education and training made other recommendations to improve the 

effectiveness of DAU. Two recommendations—refining customer relationships and 

recruiting and retaining preeminent faculty—were top priorities.

DAU’s New Fort Belvoir, Virginia, Campus
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

92

CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS

The PAT found the relationship between functional boards and DAU needed improvement. In February 2001, the Under Secretary issued a memorandum outlining the roles 

and responsibilities of those involved in DAU’s career development functions.25 According to the memorandum, DAU’s President and the Director for Acquisition Education, 

Training, and Career Development (AET&CD) were responsible for training the acquisition workforce. Specifically, DAU’s President was to develop the training to meet the 

career paths and educational standards established by the Director, AET&CD. 

A new structure emerged where existing functional boards were to be replaced with 

Functional Advisors who retained the responsibilities of the previous functional boards. 

Functional Integrated Process Teams (FIPTs) were to conduct many of the activities that 

had previously been performed by informal working groups under the former functional 

boards. Each Functional Advisor appointed an executive secretary as chair of the team.

DAU established program directors for each functional area. They were to work with 

the FIPTs and course managers to structure the content for courses and integrate content 

across the curriculum within their functional career paths. The roles and responsibilities 

of Functional Advisors and the FIPTs are shown below:

An Overarching Integrated Process Team (OIPT) was formed to serve as a decisionmaking body. Besides making recommendations to the USD(AT&L), it was to address 

unresolved issues forwarded by an FIPT and set priorities for new learning requirements. 

Functional Advisor Functional Integrated Process Team

Functional Advisors were to be subjectmatter experts on the qualifications and career 

development requirements for their assigned 

career field(s) and promote multifunctional 

career paths. their responsibilities included:

• establish and oversee fiPts 

• Designate the fiPt leader

• annually certify that DaU courses are 

 current, technically accurate, and 

 consistent with standards in 5000.52-m

• identify competencies, recommend 

 modifications, establish or disestablish 

 certification courses, and periodically 

 review requirements 

• Consider continuous learning needs

Functional Integrated Process Teams

supported the functional advisors in carrying 

out their responsibilities; membership included:

• a leader appointed by the fa

• a DaCm representative from each service

• a functional expert from each service 

 selected by the Component acquisition 

 executive 

• functional experts for the DoD Components 

 as determined by the fa 

• DaU Program Directors to function as the 

 focal point for all curriculum issues 

 concerning courses under their purview

Figure 9. DAWIA Checklist in 1994 DAU Catalog
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Chapter 7: DoD Initiatives Lead to Changes in Learning and DAU’s Organization

PREEMINENT FACULTY

The PAT found that existing faculty appeared ill-prepared to present timely information 

to their students. Acquisition policies and procedures were changing at an accelerating 

pace and far outpacing the knowledge of the instructors:

Chairs of several functional boards described faculty as uninformed about 

current acquisition policies. Moreover, because they lacked relevant experience 

in the fields of acquisition, the faculty were unable to develop courses without 

extensive intervention on the part of the functional board. Curricula development 

was another problem. It was found to be a tedious, time-consuming process and 

the courses lagged far behind policy changes. Furthermore, for the most part, 

existing faculty were not highly skilled in incorporating instructional technology into curricula.

GAO’s Best Practices report supported the opinion that faculty capabilities needed 

improvement stating, “For the most part, faculty are evaluated on the basis of hours of 

training provided in the classroom and do not incorporate up-to-date case studies or 

exercises.” GAO was clear that the field perception of DAU needed to be improved from 

the current emphasis on student throughput to making direct connections with program 

offices and providing targeted training and performing as consultants. 

To address these issues the PAT recommended DAU be staffed with preeminent faculty 

defined as “practitioners who possess the experience, right knowledge in their field(s), 

and communication skills to reach the DoD acquisition workforce and to assist workforce 

members in developing skills required to perform competently.” They were to serve as 

consultants to assist workforce members in reforming DoD’s acquisition system. The 

following hiring qualifications were required for future faculty members:

• Possess a graduate-level degree

• Be certified at DAWIA Level II to instruct Level I courses; for all other 

courses, faculty members must be certified at DAWIA Level III

• Have previous teaching experience in an acquisition-related area in a DoD 

Service School or college-level environment in the private sector (or prior 

to development or delivery of DAU curriculum) and successfully complete 

DAU instructor certification training.

In 2000, Gansler issued a Civilian Faculty Plan that addressed qualifications for faculty.26 All new professors were to be appointed for an initial term of 4 years under the 

provisions of Title X of the Excepted Service. Title X allows the flexibility to draw 

from the widest population of qualified personnel. Under the new policy, metrics for 

assessing faculty performance were to be established, and annual recommendations for 

pay increases were to be based on value-added factors such as increased capabilities 

and sustained contributions.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

94

The plan provided four levels of faculty rank with advancement approved by the Faculty 

Evaluation Board chaired by the Provost. A Faculty Development Program was created 

that afforded faculty members the opportunity to tailor their professional development 

yearly. BGen Frank Anderson, Jr., USAF, DAU’s Vice President, expressed what he 

expected from the faculty: 

A truly world-class faculty will be teaching practitioners, renewing contacts 

outside academe, dealing with real-life acquisition problems, finding out what 

works and what doesn’t, collecting lessons learned, and bringing these lessons 

back to be incorporated into their courses.27

When 2000 came to a close, DAU had transitioned from a consortium to a unified 

organization; had redefined collaborative relationships; had established standards for a 

preeminent faculty, and had taken action to improve the products it delivered. Concurrent with these changes, many of the study groups initiated under Section 912c were 

beginning to publish results of their reviews.

The most influential for DAU was the October 1999 report Commercial Business Environment: Accelerating Change through Enterprise Teaming that reviewed commercial 

best practices to achieve the Revolution in Business Affairs. Gansler responded to the 

report by issuing a memorandum the following month directing that DAU adopt key 

attributes of the corporate university approach to incorporate cross-functional teaming 

across the defense business enterprise to accelerate organizational goals and manage 

change.28

Under Anderson’s leadership, DAU soon structured a business plan, Smart Business 

20/20, to accomplish this goal. DAU, Anderson realized, had a unique opportunity to 

structure itself for the 21st century, recognizing that without a revolution in acquisition 

training, there could be no Revolution in Business Affairs:

By allowing the delivery of the right education and training to the right people 

in the right place and at the right time ...The university must remain cognizant 

that without a revolution in acquisition training, there can be no revolution in 

business affairs.29

Smart Business 20/20 set a clear vision for the new corporate university that prepared 

for a different training environment that had qualities valued by the workforce: adaptability, speed, customer focus, and targeted training
95

Chapter 7: DoD Initiatives Lead to Changes in Learning and DAU’s Organization

Endnotes

1. Department of Defense Report to Congress, Actions to Accelerate the Movement to the New Workforce 

Vision (April 1, 1998). 

2. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Defense Reform Initiative, November 1997. <http://www.

defenselink.mil/pubs/dodreform/>

3. Memorandum, Larry S. Barlow, Director of Administration, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), to Director, Organizational and Management Planning, Transfer of Functions 

(October 27, 1998). Transfers the Director for Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development (AET&CD) function and related resources from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition Reform) to the Defense Acquisition University. Consolidation due to Defense 

Reform Initiative (DRI), November 1997, directed the restructuring of civilian education within the 

DoD. <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/AETCD%20functional%20transfer.pdf>

4. U.S. General Accounting Office, DoD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Programs 

Implement Best Practices, NSIAD-99-206 (August 1999). <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99206.

pdf>

5. Department of Defense, Military Transformation “A Strategic Approach” (January 2002). <http://www.

oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf>

6. Jacques S. Gansler, Road Ahead: Accelerating the Transformation of Department of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Processes and Practices (June 2, 2000). 

7. Memorandum, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) Colleen Preston, to Director, 

Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development; Functional Board Chairs; Directors, Acquisition Career Management; and President, DAU, Interim Policy on Continuing Acquisition Education 

and Training (August 7, 1996). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%207.pdf>

8. Department of Defense Manual 5000.52-M, Acquisition Career Development Program (November 

1999) issued under DoD Directive 5000.52, Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career 

Development Program (October 25, 1991).

9. Defense Acquisition University, Board of Visitor Minutes, September 10, 1997.

10. Department of Defense Policy, Jacques Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Reform through Learning: Policy on Continuous Learning (January 5, 1998) 

11. On July 9, 2001, DAU established a Continuous Learning Center, which launched a new Web site. 

The site opened with 24 continuous learning modules that would be available 24 hours a day, 7 days 

a week. 

12. Memorandum, Jacques Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), 

Review of Acquisition Workforce Training, Processes, and Tools for Services Contracts (October 19, 

1998). <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap_archive/Docs/train-charter.pdf>

13. BGen Frank J. Anderson, Jr., USAF, Report of the 912(c) Study Group for Review of the Acquisition Training, Processes, and Tools for Services Contracts (June 25, 1999). <http://www.acq.osd.

mil/dpap_archive/Docs/servrpt.pdf>

14. Memorandum, David Oliver, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, to Secretaries of the 

Military Departments et al., Commercial Business Environment Training Team (November 12, 1998). 

<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap_archive/Docs/training-charter.pdf>

15. Department of Defense Reform Initiative Directive #52: Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 

Consolidation (November 8, 1999)<http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Personnel%20

Downsizing%20Plans.pdf>

16. Department of Defense Directive 5124.7, Chancellor’s Charter (September 27, 1999). 

17. Defense Acquisition University, Planning, Policy, and Leadership Support Accreditation - Self Study, 

to Council on Occupational Education. <https://intranet.dau.mil/hq/ppls/selfstudy.asp>

18. U. S. General Accounting Office, Acquisition Management Implementation of the Defense Acquisition 

Workforce Improvement Act, NSIAD-93-129, April 1993. <http://161.203.16.4/d44t15/148920.pdf>
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

96

19. Department of Defense Process Action Team, Acquisition Education and Training Structure and Process, chartered by R. Noel Longuemare, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition 

and Technology) (May 20, 1997).

20. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Final Report of the Process Action Team on “Acquisition Education and Training Structure and Process.” (August 1997). 

<http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_history/Final%20PAT%20Report.pdf>

21. Defense Acquisition University Transition Strategy Key Implementation Actions for a Unified Defense 

Acquisition University (July 1, 1999). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_history/Layton%2040.

pdf>

22. Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Reform Initiative (DRI) Directive No. 52, Defense Acquisition University Consolidation (November 8, 1999). 

23. The unification also included three education centers (Rock Island, Illinois; Port Hueneme, California; and Columbus Ohio) and six classroom facilities (Boston, Massachusetts; Fort Monmouth, New 

Jersey; Patuxent River, Maryland; Huntsville, Alabama; Los Angeles, California; and San Diego, 

California). The National Defense University and the Defense Contract Auditing Institute became 

affiliated schools.

24. Biography of Frank J. Anderson, Jr., Air Force Link. < http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=4524>

25. Memorandum, David Oliver. Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Functional Area Charters 

for the Acquisition Career Development Program (February 26, 2001). <http://www.dau.mil/aboutdau/DAU_History/layton%2057.pdf>

26. Memorandum, Jacques Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), 

to President, Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition University Civilian Faculty Plan 

(November 13, 1999). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/docs/DAU%20Civilian%20Faculty%20Plan.

doc>

27. Defense Acquisition University, Board of Visitors Minutes (December 1, 1999).

28. Memorandum, Jacques Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), 

to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., Section 912(c) Commercial Business Environment 

Final Report (November 23, 1999). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Memo%20Comm

ercial%20Business%20Environment.pdf>

29. Defense Acquisition University, Board of Visitors Minutes (December 1, 1999). <http://www.dau.

mil/about-dau/DAU_History/BOV%2012-99.pdf> 
97

From Unified 

Structure to 

Corporate 

University

8

DAU must adapt 

and prepare for a 

different training 

environment and the 

continuous changing 

needs of the acquisition workforce. 

Adaptability, speed, 

customer focused, 

and targeted training 

are qualities valued 

by the workforce.

—Frank Anderson

DAU Vice President

Board of Visitors Minutes 

December 1, 1999 
98

The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

This Chapter discusses DAU’s transition from 

a traditional university, offering a broad range 

of classroom courses of limited duration for a 

highly diverse population, to a corporate university focused on achieving the goals of a 

particular organization—the Department of 

Defense—and the members or clients of that 

organization, the AT&L community. 

Chapter 

8 OVERVIEW
99

Chapter 8: Unified Structure to Corporate University

Introduction

In the 1980s and 1990s, American industry and government were faced with the challenges of rapid change and a geographically dispersed workforce. How could leadership 

provide this workforce with the current information they needed and at the time they 

needed it? How could large organizations effectively manage the changes necessary 

for their success? In both cases, shared knowledge and immediate dissemination of 

information were the answers. 

Industry attempted to address these questions by developing corporate universities. In 

some ways the word “university” can be misleading. The traditional university calls 

up images of a broad range of classroom courses during a period of limited duration 

teaching a highly diverse population. Alternatively, the corporate university is focused 

on achieving the goals of a particular organization, and its students are members of that 

organization. 

Fostering a learning culture that inculcates the values, traditions, and goals of the organization is key to a corporate university that acts as a “change agent” to implement and 

manage corporate-wide changes. The corporate university provides a “continuous learning capability that enables organizations to identify, distill, and harness the cutting-edge 

trends, practices, and technologies to achieve organizational objectives.”1

A 1999 report, Commercial Business Environment: Accelerating Change through Enterprise Teaming, reviewed commercial best practices in the Department. The report advised 

the Department to adopt a corporate university model within the AT&L community as 

a philosophical and structured approach that senior leaders could use to implement and 

manage DoD-wide change initiatives. This model would provide a training program 

that would meet the needs of the various functional organizations (e.g., requirements, 

acquisition, logistics, and financial) while bringing them together under the DoD enterprise-teaming concept—i.e., Team Acquisition.

In adopting the corporate university model, the report recommended that DAU faculty 

skills be realigned from their current focus of providing job certification to providing consulting and performance support to the workforce. Such a strategy, the study 

suggested, might change the current field perception that DAU emphasized student 

throughput instead of performance support. 

A new organizational structure and different processes were now needed to provide 

solution-based teaming to support the customer. In this context, DAU’s mission would 

serve an additional purpose: nourishing key change initiatives and enterprise teaming 

with the acquisition community. To define the steps necessary for DAU to become a 

corporate university, the Department chartered a Commercial Business Environment 

Study Group to explore options and make recommendations 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

100

The Group issued a Corporate University Strategy for recasting DAU to a corporate 

university in November 2000.2 Frank Anderson, who had become DAU’s President a 

month before the strategy was issued, recognized that to be successful, the university 

would need to prepare the acquisition workforce to think differently, develop better 

business practices, and shape smart business deals. “DAU,” he said. “must adapt and 

prepare for a different training environment and the continuously changing needs of the 

acquisition workforce. Adaptability, speed, customer focus, and targeted training are 

qualities valued by the workforce.” 3

The Corporate University Strategy contained “a road map” for the new DAU, which 

would provide online business and performance support in addition to certification 

training. The road map is shown here: 

At the end of 1999, DAU had begun to transform its organization, culture, infrastructure, 

and processes to be more responsive to the changing needs of the acquisition workforce. 

But acquisition organizations also wanted to minimize the cost of learning and make the 

best investment possible in education and training. They wanted learning that included 

insights and solutions; lessons learned; mistake avoidance; and the latest legal, regulatory, and acquisition reform information. Finally, they wanted training, consulting, and 

research tailored to their precise needs and delivered where and when they needed it. 

In other words, they wanted a corporate university.

The next step for DAU was to prepare a strategic plan to provide the university with a 

clear vision moving it beyond resident training to a broader role for managing and accelerating change as a corporate university. Part of the plan would include a Knowledge 

Focus on

Job Training

Certification 

Training

Focus on

24-7 Availability

Continuous

Learning

PerformanceSupport Tools

Knowledge

Management

Focus on

Performance

Consulting

Change 

Management

Performance Support

Certification and

Traditonal Training Online Business

Figure 10. DAU Corporate University Road Map 
101

Chapter 8: Unified Structure to Corporate University

Management system to enable the acquisition community to share common knowledge, 

experiences, and lessons learned. The university also began to form partnerships with 

industry, academic institutions, and other government agencies to leverage resources.

CORPORATE PLAN

The plan setting DAU’s new vision was Smart Business 20/20.

4 Originally chartered 

to provide acquisition education, training, and research, the new vision was that the 

university must be a leader in such areas as problem-based learning and knowledge 

management.

Smart Business 20/20 presented five corporate goals to achieve DAU’s new vision. The 

goals shown below focus on technology, customer relations, performance support by 

faculty, better performance measurements for faculty, hands-on training techniques using 

case studies, and better integration of learning products across functional areas:

Supporting Elements

• Employ distributed learning where appropriate and cost 

effective.

• Implement actions to make the FIPTs effective and ensure 

integration of learning products across functional areas.

• Enhance job performance by promoting performance-targeted

learning through hands-on curricula (e.g., case studies, 

gaming, and simulation).

• Promote critical thinking by requiring learners to analyze, 

synthesize, and evaluate challenging problem-based 

scenarios to make smart decisions.

• Establish an information technology management plan and 

deploy an electronic administrative backbone to support the 

Knowledge Management architecture.

• Aggressively pursue early involvement in acquisition–

policy working groups to develop or revise learning materials 

concurrent with emerging acquisition initiatives.

• Participate as team members, consultants, and advisors in our 

customers’ acquisition processes.

• Establish, maintain, and promote a means to facilitate the 

sharing of common knowledge, experiences, and lessons 

learned among faculty and staff and the acquisition 

community to use in the virtual Communities of Practice.

• Develop and implement a recruiting, compensation, and 

incentive program that will provide and retain highly qualified 

faculty and staff.

Corporate Goals

1. Provide Our Customers with What 

They Need, When and Where They 

Need It

2. Operate a Premier Learning 

Enterprise

3. Advance Excellence in Acquisition 

Business Practices

4. Employ Knowledge Management 

to Enhance Learning and 

Productivity

5. Provide Our Stakeholders and

Customers with a Preeminent 

Faculty and Staff

Figure 11. Goals from Smart Business 20/20
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

102

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

A cornerstone of the new corporate university architecture would be Knowledge Management. Gansler chartered a Knowledge Management Study Group to recommend 

the feasibility of evolving the Deskbook (described in Chapter 4) into a Knowledge 

Management system.

The Deskbook, the group reported, was a centralized database to which subject matter 

experts only reluctantly contributed their expertise. The policy information was static 

and needed modernizing to focus on managing the information side of learning and 

establish links to other knowledge management systems. At the same time, the Services 

and subject matter experts were voluntarily forming their own Web-based communities 

where knowledge was shared freely. But there was no coherent system for knowledge 

generation, organization, development, and distribution.

By November 1999 the Knowledge Management Group issued its report, Developing 

an Acquisition Knowledge Management System, finding that to bring sources together, 

“a systematic process for acquiring, creating, integrating, sharing, and using information including insights and experiences was needed.”5 Knowledge Management became 

the process. 

One of the primary elements of Knowledge Management is the sharing of knowledge 

among the members of a specific community. The task requires both the formation 

of communities with shared requirements and delivery of the required knowledge in 

a timely fashion. DAU used the four-step model shown below to launch and sustain 

knowledge communities:

STEP 1: KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY 

CREATION

specifications for getting knowledge 

communities launched in a just-in-time 

approach providing a high probability 

of success.

STEP 2: INFORMATION ACCESS 

AND DISTRIBUTION

STEP 3: KNOWLEDGE SHARING 

AND EXPANSION

STEP 4: KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY 

RENEWAL

specifications for ensuring fast, user

friendly access to databases that place 

information in context for users and 

facilitate rapid learning and decision making.

specifications for tools, protocols, and 

guidelines that encourage and facilitate 

information sharing and dialogue that 

promotes growth in the body of 

knowledge available to the community.

specifications for sustaining membership in the knowledge community and 

for continually improving the quality of 

knowledge sharing and value of 

knowledge created.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION

KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITIES

Figure 12. Knowledge Management Road Map 
103

Chapter 8: Unified Structure to Corporate University

Knowledge Management was at the core of the Revolution in Business Affairs from an 

educational perspective since shared knowledge is critical for the workforce to successfully attain higher performance. In June 2000, Gansler signed a memorandum directing 

the Defense Acquisition Policy Steering Group to develop a DoD Knowledge Management System: 

The goal of the system is to offer knowledge sharing opportunities, problemsolving capabilities, and a source for continuous learning to the acquisition 

professional by providing a mechanism for creating, accessing, and applying 

acquisition knowledge that should be made available to the acquisition workforce when and where they need it.6

Gansler’s memorandum emphasized to Department stakeholders the need to adopt a 

corporate university model within the acquisition community. Such a university was 

required to create a learning culture that embraces change and continuously adapts to 

new challenges—a key factor in achieving streamlined organizations and a professional 

acquisition workforce. 

At the core of Knowledge Management are “knowledge assets” that include communities of practice and other acquisition resources that can be accessed from one public 

site providing ready access to peers, expert help, and lessons learned. The creation 

of these communities fosters continuous learning, a critical function of the corporate 

university. 

To support existing knowledge communities, create new ones, and develop a framework from which DoD as a whole could benefit, an “electronic gateway” through 

which free-flowing information could be accessed was required. The new Knowledge Management framework would be a portal, i.e., a single, unified site that brings 

together a wide range of learning resources for the use of learners. Examples of 

knowledge assets featured:

• Mandatory Policies and Procedures • Leadership Messages

• Best Practices • Computer-Based Training

• Lessons Learned • Models and Simulations

• Electronic Discussions • Profiled, Customized 

• Links to Communities of Practice Information

• Links to Other Relevant, Useful Sites • Question-Based Reasoning

PARTNERSHIPS

The report Accelerating Change through Enterprise Teaming explored all facets of a 

corporate university and emphasized partnerships to leverage resources. Traditional universities had been the model for DAU during the years of its evolution. It had remained 
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

104

fairly insular with little contact with those outside the Defense establishment. But the 

transition to a corporate university required a broader vision.

Anderson had recognized this fact when DAU officially began to operate as a unified 

structure in September 2000. In his corporate plan, Smart Business 20/20, he said, “To 

be successful we must establish a collaborative implementation process that involves 

all of our stakeholders and customers.” For Anderson, these stakeholders and customers 

went well beyond the bounds of government organizations.

Gansler saw government-industry partnerships as necessary for the Revolution in Business Affairs advocating that DoD needed an expanded partnership with a prospering 

commercial industry. DAU’s new corporate university aimed to foster partnerships allowing the university to harness capabilities not available internally, including access to 

industry expertise and industry exchange. 

In addition to partnerships with industry, the corporate university model also required 

partnerships with academic institutions. While industry relationships would provide 

the real-world perspective, relations with other universities would link DAU with the 

scholarly examination of acquisition issues including research. These universities could 

also supplement DAU’s educational capability integrating DAU training into programs 

leading to degrees, which the early framers of DAWIA had emphasized as crucial for 

building a professional acquisition corps.

Signing of DAU, FTI Letter of Intent, Feb. 16, 2001. Seated from left: Spiros G. Pallas, Principal Deputy 

to the Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, OUSD(AT&L); Frank Anderson Jr., DAU President; 

and Lavon Jordan, CEO Frontier Technology, Inc. Standing from left: Scoop Cooper; Paul McMahon, 

Director of Strategic Partnerships, DAU; and Ron Schroder, Vice President, Frontier Technology, Inc.
105

Chapter 8: Unified Structure to Corporate University

By the end of 2003, DAU had formed 65 partnerships with universities, defense contractors, and a number of professional and government organizations. With these partnerships, DAU was standing at the intersection of industry, academia, and government, 

and was uniquely positioned to provide the knowledge and information to continue the 

transformation of acquisition management. 

DAU, like corporate America and the Department, had to downsize, restructure, reengineer, and reorganize to reduce costs. This was particularly relevant since DAU was 

supporting a workforce that had increased 46 percent since 1998. According to Anderson, 

DAU’s new business model required training to be different in five ways to accommodate the new changes:

(1) More people must be reached, (2) knowledge management must become 

integral to capture and maintain intellectual capital, especially with an aging 

workforce, (3) technology must be used to expand training allowing individuals 

and supervisors more control over training, (4) changes in training should address 

deficiencies and improve overall quality of learning, and (5) a robust continuous 

learning program must be an integral part of our initial strategic planning.7

As the Bush Administration came to office and the eighth USD(AT&L) was appointed, 

DAU was maturing to a best-in-class premier corporate university to support a growing 

and diversified acquisition workforce.

DAU Headquarters staff and faculty photo, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (2000)
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

106

Endnotes

1. Department of Defense Report, Commercial Business Environment: Accelerating Change through 

Enterprise Teaming, Commercial Business Environment Study Group (October 1999). 

2. Department of Defense Report, Corporate University Strategy, Commercial Business Environment 

Study Group (November 1, 2000). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Commercial%20B

usiness%20RIT.pdf>

3. Defense Acquisition University, Board of Visitors Minutes (December 1, 1999).

4. Defense Acquisition University, Business Plan 2001: Smart Business 20/20 (July 2000). <http://www.

dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/SB2020.pdf>

5. Department of Defense Report, Developing an Acquisition Knowledge Management System (November 

8, 1999). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Knowledge%20Management%20System.

pdf>

6. Memorandum, Jacques Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), 

to Defense Acquisition Policy Steering Group, DoD Acquisition Knowledge Management System (June 

30, 2000). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Memo%20Knowledge%20Mgt%20System.

pdf>

7. Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition University Business Plan 2001: “Smart Business 

20/20 Preparing for the Future” (July 2000). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/SB2020.

pdf>
107

9

What matters in the 

end is Completion. 

Performance. Results. 

Not just making promises, but making good 

on promises.

—President George W. Bush

President’s Management 

Agenda, Fiscal Year 2002 

The Corporate 

University 

Matures 
108

The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

This Chapter describes the tremendous strides 

DAU made toward maturity as a corporate university supporting the nation’s warfighters in 

five key areas: (1) Performance Learning Model; 

(2) curriculum content and delivery methods; 

(3) customer outreach and appointment of 

individual leaders responsible for key learning 

products; (4) focused business processes; and 

(5) revitalization of the quality and morale of 

the DoD acquisition workforce.

Chapter 

9 OVERVIEW
109

Chapter 9: The Corporate University Matures

Introduction

In January 2001, President George W. Bush was inaugurated. The President’s Management Agenda for FY 2002 provided a message to Congress about the new administration’s 

strategy for improving the management and performance of the Federal Government. 

“What matters in the end,” the President told Congress, “is Completion. Performance. 

Results. Not just making promises, but making good on promises.”1 In other words, 

rather than launching new initiatives, follow-up would be emphasized.

Bush appointed Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge, Jr., as USD(AT&L) in May 2001. Aldridge 

served as Secretary of the Air Force during the first Bush Administration, and prior to his 

second appointment, he was Chief Executive Officer of the Aerospace Corporation.

Aldridge shared Bush’s sentiment about acquisition reform saying: “I don’t particularly like the term Reform ... and since I don’t like the term, I’ve decided to move into 

something called Acquisition and Logistics Excellence.” For Aldridge, the Department’s 

limited resources could be much better spent identifying, re-tailoring, and institutionalizing the system’s initiatives arising from the reform movement.

Considering Aldridge’s thoughts on the term “acquisition 

reform,” it was appropriate that soon after his confirmation, 

he changed the name of the Acquisition Reform Office (to 

which DAU’s President reported) to Acquisition Initiatives. In 

December 2000, upon the departure of Stan Soloway, Donna 

S. Richbourg was designated the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform. 

In July 2001, Aldridge selected Richbourg as the Director, 

Acquisition Initiatives. Her prior experience included a 

number of senior positions with responsibility for leading 

acquisition reform. Training the acquisition workforce was 

immensely important to Richbourg—particularly alternative training that allowed workers to receive training without leaving their home offices.

Aldridge’s tenure was short, just 2 years, as he left in May 2003. His tenure, however, 

was deeply marked by the events of 9/11 and the post-9/11 emphasis on transformation. 

Education of the acquisition workforce, particularly just-in-time training, became ever 

more critical and necessary to the nation’s effort to support warfighters deployed to 

Afghanistan and Iraq. During this time, significant strides were made by the university 

Donna S. Richbourg

Director, Acquisition Initiatives, 

OUSD(AT&L)
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

110

to establish and maintain a premier university in support of the nation’s warfighters in 

five key areas:

• First, DAU began to modernize acquisition training creating a conceptual 

foundation for the new learning environment with a Performance Learning 

Model.

• Second, curriculum content and delivery methods were reengineered to 

extend learning beyond the course itself.

• Third, DAU reorganized to reach out more effectively to its customers and 

established key leadership positions with responsibility for its learning 

products.

• Fourth, business processes that focused on performance, results, and 

accountability were developed.

• Fifth, DAU used its learning assets to support Aldridge’s’ goal to Revitalize the Quality and Morale of the Acquisition Workforce. 

USD(AT&L) Edward Aldridge addresses the graduates of APMC 01-3, December 14, 2001, at Scott 

Hall, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This was Aldridge’s first address to a DAU graduating class—delivered 

during a wartime setting shortly after the events of 9/11. Aldridge told the graduates that people were 

DoD’s most important asset, and they should take care of their people.
111

Chapter 9: The Corporate University Matures

PERFORMANCE LEARNING MODEL

Changes moving DAU toward its corporate university goal had already begun when 

Aldridge took the Under Secretary position. A Performance Learning Model (PML), 

shown below, became the structural foundation for the new learning environment.

The PLM demonstrates how the three key knowledge assets critical to a corporate university would be supported. These assets, Communities of Practice, Continuous Learning, and Performance Support, expanded DAU’s primary mission of developing and 

delivering DAWIA training by linking experts and practitioners in virtual communities 

24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

The PLM was a revolutionary concept and, in 2003, won the coveted Brandon Hall Gold 

Medal Award for Excellence in e-Learning Best Practices. The Model did more than 

symbolize the modernization of acquisition training. It was the cornerstone for building 

a mature and successful corporate university. 

For DAU, a new way of doing business was heavily dependent on leveraging information technology, and 2001 served as a foundation year when a digital repository 

Figure 13. DAU Learning Construct: Modernizing Acquisition Training—Performance Learning Model 

(PLM) (2001)
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

112

of knowledge objects and products was started. The repository was essential for 

identifying, collecting, organizing, analyzing, and distributing acquisition-related 

knowledge to support certification courses, continuous learning, communities of practice, 

and performance support. Importantly, DAU issued an e-learning strategy, Technology 

Road Map for e-Learning and Performance Support.2 Its 21 goals focused on learnercentered services, the development of digital knowledge repositories, and the technical 

infrastructure to support students, faculty, and other stakeholders

DAU was using the power of the Internet and computer-based instruction to make learning accessible anytime, anywhere. DAU delivered its first interactive Web-based course, 

Simplified Acquisition Process, in 1997. In 1998 DAU offered eight distance learning 

courses with 15,750 hours of e-learning. By 2001, the new corporate university offered 

18 online courses. Comparing 1998 and 2003, the number of students using e-learning 

each year had increased from 627 to 40,846. DAU’s reputation as a leader in e-learningwas also growing as the university, and its President won prestigious awards from distance learning from 1999 to 2003.

LEARNING BEYOND THE COURSE 

DAU began reengineering its program management, contracting, and logistics curricula 

in 2001. The reengineering helped students carry the lessons they had learned in the 

classroom back to their workplace and enabled them to apply their knowledge to make 

better business decisions.

The restructuring of the flagship Program Management Office Course, which was once 

14 weeks long, was redesigned to a hybrid course requiring only 6 weeks in residence. 
113

Chapter 9: The Corporate University Matures

Prior to attending classes, role-playing scenarios and background information were 

delivered first via 50 hours of Internet training. Case-based teaching, emphasizing critical thinking and problem-solving skills, comprised most of the 6 weeks in class. Casebased training had been recognized and used in portions of DAU courses since the early 

nineties. However, this program management course was unique because case-based 

learning became the dominant form of classroom learning.

DAU also moved toward increased distributed learning, which uses the power of the 

Internet and computer-based instruction to make learning accessible anytime, anywhere. 

Instructors and students could take advantage of technology to create an interactive and 

individually responsive learning community regardless of physical location. Online 

courses, continuous learning modules, knowledge sharing, communities of practice, 

and performance support—all of which are the centerpieces of the corporate university—are accelerated by distributed learning; by 2003 significant strides were made in 

every one of these areas.

PMT-402

Executive 

Program

Manager’s 

Course

Meets statutory requirement 

for PEO/ACAT I/II PM & 

Deputy PM (10 U.S.C. 1735) 

• Tools-based

• Modules

• Business 

 areas

• Tracks DoDI

 5000.2

• Internet

• GS 12–13

• 03–04

• Application/

 knowledge 

 based (cost/

 sched /perf)

• Tracks DoDI 

 5000.2

• Internet/

 classroom

• GS 9–12

• O3–O4

25 hours, online 35 hours, online +

1 week classroom

80 hours,

online

50 hours, online +

6 weeks classroom

10 weeks classroom

Level I

certification

ACQ-201

Intermediate

Systems

Acquisition

Course

ACQ-101

Fundamentals 

of Systems

Acquisition

Management

PMT-352

Program

Management

Office Course

PMT-250 

Program

Management

Tools Course

PMT-401

Program 

Manager’s

Course

• Critical 

 Thinking/ 

 Problem

 Solving (cost,

 sched/perf)

• Business 

 acumen

• Case-based

• Classroom

• Potential ACAT I,

 IA, II, & lll PMs,

 Dep PMs & other 

 senior acq mgrs

• PEOs & ACAT 

 I, IA, II PMs

 & Deputy PMs

Level III

certification

• Case-/scenario-

 based

• Critical thinking/

 problem solving

• Application of 

 knowledge

 (cost/sched/perf)

• Tracks DoDI 

 5000.2

• Internet/

 classroom

• GS 13–14

• O4–O5

Level II

certification

• Knowledge 

 based

• 11 functional 

 areas

• Internet

• GS 5–9

• O1–O3

4 weeks 

classroom

Figure 14. Program Management Career Track
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

114

CUSTOMER FOCUS

To promote a more customer-centered approach and build speed and agility into delivering training, DAU implemented a complete realignment of its organization in 2001. 

Five regional campuses were established near major customers and significant student 

populations:

1. Capital & Northeast—Fort Belvoir, Virginia (includes DSMC)

2. Mid-Atlantic—Patuxent River, Maryland

3. Midwest—Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

4. South—Huntsville, Alabama

5. West—San Diego, California

Collocating served three important purposes: reducing student travel costs and time away 

from the job, significantly improving DAU’s ability to deliver business solutions by working directly with program teams, and increasing continuous learning opportunities. All of 

these supported Aldridge’s goal to revitalize the morale and quality of the acquisition 

workforce.

DAU Regions
115

Chapter 9: The Corporate University Matures

Internal organizations were also created to support DAU’s new customer-centered focus. 

Prior to DAU becoming a unified structure in 2000, courses were developed by member 

schools. A Curricula Development and Support Center (CDSC) was established at Fort 

Belvoir in 2002 to centralize the process. The Center was staffed with five directors representing key functional areas: (1) Program Management; (2) Contracting; (3) Logistics 

and Sustainment; (4) Business, Cost Estimating, and Financial Management; and (5) 

Engineering and Technology. The program directors were responsible for developing 

course content, determining delivery methods, preparing course materials, and ensuring 

courses across the entire curricula were sequenced. Importantly, they served as critical 

liaisons with the functional community as they were members of the Functional Integrated Process Teams led by Functional Advisors.

The Center also coordinated the university’s performance support to the workforce including consulting, targeted training, research, and rapid deployment. A Director, Rapid 

Deployment Training (RDT) was created to respond to the accelerated changes in acquisition. It was a reincarnation of the Acquisition Reform Communications Center that had 

been formed in 1995 for rapid transmittal of acquisition reform information. The RDT 

Center would release essential information about a limited number of highly important 

initiatives within days of the policy and in parallel with changing the curricula.

As DAU was organizing to focus on the customer, the corporate university was maturing. 

By 2003, an e-Learning and Technologies Center, including Knowledge Management, 

was created. DAU’s new customer-centered organization is shown below:

DaU 

West

Office of the

President

President

Commandant, DaU

HQ Staff

Performance resource mgt

Chief learning office

strategic Planning

DaU 

midwest

DaU 

south

DaU 

mid-atlantic

DaU 

Capital and

northeast

DsmC school of

Program

managers

Program management

Contracting

logistics and sustainment

Business, Cost estimating, financial mgt

engineering technology

rapid Deployment training

Curricula Development support Center e-learning technologies Center DaU operations

Board of Visitors

executive institute

acquisition Workforce &

Career management

e-learning technology

Knowledge management

e-learning

Figure 15. DAU Organization Chart 2003
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

116

BUSINESS PROCESSES FOR RESULTS

In defining leadership, most authors distinguish between leadership and management. 

Leadership is creating a vision, setting direction, aligning people, and leading change; 

while management is planning, budgeting, organizing, staffing, controlling, and problem solving. DAU’s President Frank Anderson was convinced that his was a leadership 

role, and a clear vision was critical to shape the organization’s future. Testifying before 

Congress in July 2002, he shared his philosophy about the importance of “deliberate 

strategic planning”:

The leader must provide a clear vision and long-term perspective to shape the 

organization’s future. This provides the mission, vision, strategic goals, and 

strategies to attain them. A deliberate strategic planning process links performance, and accountability for results is essential to guide the organization. All 

too often, strategic plans are drafted and approved and then become dust collectors that never influence organizational results. To avoid this very common 

outcome, the strategic plan must be constantly managed and reviewed.3

Complying with the DAU President’s determination to 

implement smart business practices and the provisions of 

the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the 

Chief Financial Officer Act of 1990, and the President’s 

Management Agenda, DAU implemented a performancedriven strategic planning system in 2002, The DAU 2002–

2009 Strategic Plan—Training Transformation (T2).

The plan integrated total customer requirements, strategic 

planning, budgeting, cost accounting, faculty workload, and 

other key processes into an enterprise-wide business system 

that leveraged modern information technologies. Furthermore, it provided a highly integrated approach to budget 

and performance management that began with the notion of end-to-end alignment. The 

T2 Strategic Plan provided for:

• Better management information

• Setting strategic goals

• Measuring performance

• Clear linkage of budget/costs/planning/products/priorities

• Financial/accounting system to report costs information

• Early warning of developing problems (cost trends)

• Monitoring and reporting goal achievement

• Accountability

The DAU Strategic Plan 2002– 

2003, Training Transformation 

(T2)
117

Chapter 9: The Corporate University Matures

Nourishing key change initiatives, DAU refocused its 

mission in 2000: to provide practitioner training 

and services to enable the 

AT&L community to make 

smart business decisions and 

deliver timely and affordable 

capabilities to the warfighter.

This mission captured the 

need for DAU to quickly 

adapt and disseminate new 

business approaches. It also 

recast DAU as a corporate 

university where promoting performance improvement from the customer’s perspective was vital. To support the corporate university model, DAU implemented a performance-driven strategic planning process, which included four planning and evaluation 

products: 

1. Strategic Plan covers a 7-year period updated annually.

2. Annual Performance Plan has tasks and performance measures for the current year.

3. Annual Performance Report evaluates and assesses the actual versus planned 

accomplishments for the year.

4. Annual Report provides DAU’s customers and stakeholders a report of 

achievements for the preceding year.

Management de­cisions based on real-time data through newly designed internal systems 

provided leadership real-time visibility to better manage. These systems included tools 

for cost accounting, time accounting, and budgeting. The seamless linkage of these 

systems and a performance-driven strategy allowed DAU to efficiently operate using 

best-in-class commercial business practices.

REVITALIZE QUALITY AND MORALE

Aldridge set five goals for the acquisition, technology and logistics workforce. One, 

Revitalize the Quality and Morale of the Acquisition Workforce, was particularly relevant 

to DAU. To provide further opportunities for the acquisition workforce, Aldridge added 

new career fields for training in Facilities Engineering and Science and Technology. 

This decision would engage DAU in a new curriculum design effort for the two new 

career fields.

To get the right people in the right place at the right time, Aldridge turned to human 

capital strategic planning. He embraced the Acquisition Workforce Demonstration 

Figure 16. The DAU Strategic Planning Process Relationship
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

118

Project (AcqDemo) because of the personnel management flexibility it provided. 

AcqDemo added the element of right pay with a contribution-based compensation 

and appraisal system that provides salary increases based on performance. 

DAU’s 7-year strategic plan set up critical business processes to reward people based on 

specific measurable contributions whereupon Anderson commented: “We enhance our 

service to the DoD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics community and help them 

add value in their vital support to the warfighter.”4 General Schedule (GS) employees 

at DAU were converted to the AcqDemo project in 2001.

Aldridge, like his predecessors Gansler and Kaminski, strongly believed that continuous 

learning was essential to enhance professional knowledge and performance. Toward 

that end, he signed a memorandum in May 2002 revising the 1998 continuous learning 

policy issued by Gansler. 

“All members of the acquisition workforce,” he directed, “must participate in meaningful continuous learning activities to stay current and proficient in functional disciplines.”5 Aldridge’s 

memo emphasized that Components should give priority to certification training over 

other continuous learning activities.

Another important step he took to achieve his goal was creating a Director of Defense 

Procurement and Acquisition Policy in November 2002.6 This Director was to serve 

as his principal advisor for acquisition workforce career development training. Deidre 

Lee was appointed to fill the new position. DAU’s President would report directly to 

Lee under this reorganization.

In December 2002, Aldridge sent DAU President Frank Anderson a letter congratulating 

DAU for their recent selection as Best Virtual Corporate University and Best Use of Technology.7 The Corporate University Best-in-Class (CUBIC) Awards honor and recognize 

corporate universities that apply best practices. Over 50 competed for the awards, and 

receiving the award demonstrated DAU’s progress toward attaining its vision to be “a 

premier corporate university serving DoD acquisition, technology and logistics.” 

The award also demonstrated DAU could be competitive with the best from the private 

sector given aggressive leadership. Anderson received the Corporate University Leader 

of the Year proving this point. Aldridge’s letter commended Anderson saying: “This is a 

real testimony to you as a strategic visionary and a transformational leader.” 

Aldridge applauded DAU’s accomplishments over the 2 years he had served as 

USD(AT&L), which he expressed in his testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on 

Armed Services on March 9, 2003.
119

Chapter 9: The Corporate University Matures

The most important ele­ment in acquisition is the human element, and all the 

high-tech weapons in the world will not transform U.S. Armed Forces unless 

we also transform the way we think and the way we train. DAU has embraced 

a new performance learning model for training, upgrading their certification courses to include critical thinking and case studies, adding Web-based 

continuous learning, providing on-site support to our workforce from regional 

campuses, and offering Web-based practitioner sharing of best practices and 

lessons learned. DAU has done so well they have been recognized by their peers 

as being the “best in class” premier corporate university.

DAU’s recognition as a “best in class” premier corporate university was an extraordinary 

achievement. A successful DAU had been the shared vision of Congress and Department 

leadership since 1990. The journey from passage of DAWIA in that year to the fully 

realized Defense Acquisition University of 2003 stands as a great accomplishment. As 

DAU’s President, Anderson transitioned this success by setting a clear vision for the 

future, using technology to transform the organization, and reorganizing as often as necessary with a focus on selecting, aligning, and empowering the right leadership team.

Convinced that people are an organization’s most important element, Anderson inspired, 

influenced, and empowered the DAU team to excel. Through their efforts, the 134,431 

members of the acquisition workforce in 2003 were superbly prepared to acquire the 

right materiel and support for the warfighter.
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ENDNOTES

1. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The President’s Management 

Agenda (Fiscal Year 2002): p. 1. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf >

2. Defense Acquisition University, The DAU Technology Road Map for e-Learning and Performance 

Support (June 2001). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/Layton%2023.pdf> 

3. Frank J. Anderson, Jr., testimony regarding leadership principles before the U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Workforce, Empowerment, and Government Programs (July 16, 2002): p. 2. <http://

www.dau.mil/about-dau/DAU_History/020711%20Anderson%20Congressional%20Testimony.

pdf>

4. Defense Acquisition University, FY 04 Performance Report (President’s Message): p. 2. 

5. Memorandum, Edward Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., Continuous Learning Policy for the Department 

of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Workforce (September 13, 2002). <http://www.acq.

osd.mil/dpap/Docs/CLMEMO.pdf>

6. Memorandum, Edward Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics) to Principal Staff Assistants, Defense Planning Guidance Flow-Down Implementation 

Plan (August 6, 2002).

7. Letter, Edward Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 

to President Defense Acquisition University (December 17, 2002). <http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/

DAU_History/021217%20E%20C%20Aldridge%20Jr.pdf>
121

A

Under Secretaries 

of Defense

(Acquisition)

APPENDIX
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Appendix A: Under Secretaries of Defense (Acquisition)

UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

PL 95-140, October 21, 1977, established the position of Under Secretary of Defense, at 

a level immediately below the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The two initial appointees 

to this rank were the Under Secretary for Policy and the Under Secretary for Research 

and Engineering, the latter replacing the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 established the position of Under 

Secretary for Acquisition as the successor to the Under Secretary for Research and 

Engineering. The title changed to Under Secretary (Acquisition and Technology) in 

the Defense Authorization Act of 1994, PL 103-160, November 19, 1993. The Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (PL 106-65) redesignated the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition and Technology) as the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). 

RICHARD P. GODWIN—Served with the Atomic Energy Commission. Bechtel, Inc., 

1961–1986. Member of the Defense Science Board. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), September 30, 1986–September 30, 1987.

ROBERT. B. COSTELLO—Served with the U.S. Navy in World War II. General 

Motors Corporation, 1960–1986. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) in 1987. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), December 18, 1987–May 12, 

1989.

JOHN A. BETTI—Served with Chrysler Corporation, 1952–1962. Ford Motor Company, 1962–1989. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), August 11, 1989–December 31, 1990.

DONALD J. YOCKEY—Served with U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, 1944–1966. 

Rockwell International Corporation, 1966–1986. Principal Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense (Acquisition), March–December 1990. Acting Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition), January 1, 1991–June 20, 1991. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), June 20, 1991–January 20, 1993.

JOHN M. DEUTCH—Served with Office Secretary of Defense as Systems Analyst 

1961–1965. Under Secretary, Department of Energy, 1979–1980. Under Secretary 

(Acquisition) and Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), April 2, 

1993–March 11, 1994.

PAUL G. KAMINSKI—Served as U.S. Air Force Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Under Secretary (Acquisition and 

Technology), October 3, 1994–May 16, 1997.
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JACQUES S. GANSLER—Served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Materiel 

Acquisition). Assistant Director, Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics). Singer 

Corporation, ITT Raytheon Corporation, and TASC, Inc. Under Secretary (Acquisition and Technology) and Under Secretary (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), 

November 10, 1997–January 2001.

EDWARD C. “PETE” ALDRIDGE, JR.— Served as 16th Secretary of the Air Force, 

1986–1988. President of McDonnell Douglas Electronic Systems Company, 1988–1992. 

CEO of The Aerospace Corporation. Under Secretary (Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics,) May 8, 2001–May 30, 2003.
125

B

Acquisition 

Workforce 

Training Laws 

Issued from 

1984-1986

APPENDIX
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Appendix B: Acquisition Workforce Training Laws Issued From 1984–1986

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE TRAINING LAWS 

ISSUED FROM 1984–1986

1. 1984: The Deficit Reduction Act (P.L. 98-369, Title VII, Sec. 2721) required 

the head of each executive agency develop and maintain a procurement 

career management program in the executive agency to assure an adequate 

professional workforce. 

2. 1984: The Defense Procurement Reform Act (P.L. 98-525, Sec. 1243) established a minimum assignment for Program Managers of 4 years or until 

completion of a major program milestone. 

3. 1985: The Defense Procurement Improvement Act (P.L. 99-145, Sec.924)* 

required a person appointed as Program Manager of a major defense acquisition program have specific experience and complete the Program Management Course at the Defense Systems Management College or a “comparable 

course,” and have at least 8 years of experience in acquisition support and 

maintenance of weapons systems, at least 2 of which were performed while 

assigned to a procurement command. 

4. 1986: The Defense Acquisition Improvement Act (P.L. 99-661, Title IX, 

Sec. 932) required the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to enhance the 

professionalism and career opportunities available to acquisition personnel 

in terms of examination, appointments, classification, training, and assignments, and examine the feasibility of designating professional positions. 

*Section 934 of the Act required the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan to Congress for coordinating 

DoD’s education programs for acquisition personnel. The plan, sent to Congress in March 1988, 

expanded the mission of the Defense Systems Management College to direct, support, and coordinate 

the education and training of the acquisition workforce. Specifically, it institutionalized the Acquisition 

Career Enhancement (ACE) Program Action Group as the ACE Program Office at DSMC, designating 

it executive agent for the education and training of the Acquisition workforce. The plan further called 

for streamlining and consolidating the myriad of existing directives, instructions, and manuals on 

acquisition education and training. 
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CAPPENDIX

DoD Regulations 

Issued Before 

Implementation 

of the 1990 

Defense 

Acquisition 

Workforce 

Improvement Act 

(DAWIA)
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Appendix C: DoD Regulations Issued Before DAWIA

DoD Policy Year Issued Description

4000.8 1952 Called for a definitive program for recruitment and training of military 

Establishment of Basic Military and civilian contracting workforce personnel

Supply System Regulations 

1430.6 1961 Set forth training requirements for both civilian and military 

Armed Services Procurement contracting personnel and identified 13 different contracting courses 

Training Program that would be provided 

1430.7 1961 Established requirements for the training of military and civilian 

Armed Services Procurement contracting personnel listing all joint general and specialized 

Training Register contracting courses as well as Service-unique contracting courses 

1430.10-M-1 1966 Prescribed the minimum skill level and knowledge to be attained by 

DoD Civilian Career Program procurement personnel through mandatory courses, passing an

for Contracting and Acquisition equivalent test, or demonstrating requisite skills and knowledge 

Personnel through qualifying experience

5000.23 1974 Changed the minimum experience for Program Managers and 

Systems Acquisition required completion of the Program Management Course or the 

Management Careers Executive Refresher Course at the Defense Systems Management 

College. It placed program management on equal footing with 

operational, line, and command positions

Revised 1987 Public Law 99-145, November 8, 1985, required Program Managers 

of major programs to complete the Program Management Course at 

the Defense Systems Management College, effective July 1, 1987

5000.1 1971* Cornerstone of DoD’s efforts to improve acquisition management raising 

Major/Non-Major Defense the stature and authority of Program Managers 

Systems 

Revised 1987 Established streamlined acquisition organization (3-tiered management 

structure) of Service Acquisition Executive, Program Executive Officers, 

and Program Managers 

5000.48 1986 Established experience, education, and training requirements for 

Experience, Education, and military and civilian personnel assigned to contracting, quality 

Training Requirements for assurance, and business and financial management positions in DoD. 

Personnel Assigned to Acquisition Prior to this Directive, there had been no DoD mandatory training for 

military contracting personnel since the early sixties. Instead, each 

 Service was allowed to train its military personnel within Service

guidelines

5160.55 1964 Chartered the Defense Weapons Systems Management Center as the 

Defense Weapons Systems first school for Program Managers

Management Center 

5160.55 1971 Chartered the Defense Systems Management School (DSMS)

Defense Systems Management 

School 

5160.55 1977 Chartered the Defense Systems Management College, which replaced 

Defense Systems Management the Defense Systems Management School 

College 

1988* Expanded the role of the Defense Systems Management College to 

manage career training for the acquisition workforce 

5000.52 1988* Eliminated DoD 5000.23, 5000.48, 5100.58, DoD 1430.10-M-1. The 

Defense Acquisition Education USD(A) was responsible for establishing education, training, and 

and Training Program experience standards for each acquisition position and establishing 

functional boards

5000.52M 1989* The Manual complemented DoD 5000.52 and established the 

Career Development Program for mandatory career development program for military and civilian 

Acquisition Personnel personnel establishing experience, education, and training standards at 

entry, intermediate, and senior levels for certification in: general business;

contracting; industrial property administrator; purchasing; procurement 

clerk; manufacturing and production function; quality and reliability 

assurance; business and financial manager; program management; 

logisticians; and systems engineers

*Directives in effect when DAWIA passed in 1990 

DoD Regulations Issued Before

Implementation of the 1990 Defense Acquisition 

Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)
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APPENDIX

d

Defense 

Acquisition 

Workforce 

Improvement 

Act (DAWIA) 

Collaborative 

Organizational 

Framework
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Appendix D: DAWIA Collaborative Organizational Framework

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)

Section 1701

establishes policies and procedures for the effective 

management of acquisition workforce careers.

Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition (USD(A))

seCDef designee for managing 

and executing acquisition education 

and training program.

Section 1702

Have primary responsibility to develop and 

implement procedures that set education,

training, and career development 

opportunities for the acquisition workforce.

Military Department and DoD 

Agency Heads

Component Acquisition 

Executives (CAE)

DoD Components shall have 

management responsibilities 

for the acquisition workforce 

(includes the service 

acquisition executives (saes) 

for the military Departments 

and the acquisition executives 

in DoD agencies)

Section 1704

Director, Acquisition 

Education, Training, and 

Career Development 

(AET&CD)

formulates policy and 

coordinates the overall 

management of the 

training, education, and 

career development 

programs.

Section 1703

Defense Acquisition

University Structure

a proposed university

structure shall provide 

for the professional 

educational development 

and training of the 

acquisition workforce 

and research and analysis

of defense acquisition 

policy issues from an 

academic perspective.

the structure will include 

the Defense systems 

management College.

Section 1746

Directors of 

Acquisition Career 

Management (DACM)

shall assist the Caes in 

implementing the acquisition 

Career Development Program.

there is a DaCm for each 

service and the Director, 

aet&CD, serves as the DaCm 

for the DoD agencies

Section 1705

Defense acquisition Workforce Improvement 

act (DaWIa) Collaborative organizational 

Framework
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APPENDIX

e

Comparison 

Between Position 

Categories 

in Defense 

Acquisition 

Workforce 

Improvement Act 

(DAWIA) 

and DODM 

5000.52-M 

(1991)
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Appendix E: Comparison Between Position Categories in DAWIA and 5000.52-M (1991)

COMPARISON BETWEEN POSITION CATEGORIES IN

defense acquisition workforce improvement 

act (DAWIA) AND DoDm 5000.52-M (1991) 

Eleven career positions were listed in Section 1721 of DAWIA. In 1991, the Manual 

5000.52-M, Career Development Program for Acquisition Personnel, implemented 

DAWIA and listed the education, training, and experience requirements for 12 career 

fields and 13 career positions. The same “acquisition functions” appeared in both 

DAWIA and 5000.52-M. The chart below compares the two.

DAWIA (1990) 5000.52-M (1991)

Position Categories Position Categories/ Acquisition Functions

Career Fields

(1) Program Management (1) Program Management/Oversight (1) Acquisition Management

(2) Communication-Computer Systems 

(2) Systems Planning, Research, (3) Systems Planning, Research, (2) Science and Engineering

Development, Engineering, Development, and Engineering

and Testing (4) Test and Evaluation

(3) Procurement, including (5) Contracting (includes Construction) (3) Procurement and 

Contracting (6) Purchasing Contracting

(4) Industrial Property Management (7) Industrial Property Management

(5) Logistics (8) Acquisition Logistics (4) Acquisition Logistics 

(6) Quality Control and Assurance (9) Quality Assurance (5) Production

(7) Manufacturing and Production (10) Manufacturing and Production

(8) Business, Cost Estimating, (11) Business, Cost Estimating, (6) Business, Cost Estimating, 

Financial Management, and and Financial Management and Financial Management

Auditing

(9) Education, Training, and 

Career Development

(10) Construction

(11) Joint Development and 

Production with Other Government 

Agencies and Foreign Countries

(12) Auditing (7) Auditing*

(13) Education, Training, and Career 

Development is considered the13th 

position category. Unlike the other 12

position categories, however, it is not 

also a career field itself. Personnel 

performing these duties may come from 

acquisition or other related career fields.

*The Defense Contract Audit Agency manages the Auditing Function.
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APPENDIX f

Summary of 

Regulations 

Implementing 

Six Elements 

Required by the 

1990 Defense 

Acquisition 

Workforce 

Improvement 
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Appendix F: Summary of Regulations Implementing Six Elements Required by DAWIA

APPendix F—part I

summary of regulations implementing

six elements required by the 1990 Defense

Acquisition Workforce Improvement 

Act (dawia)

A Charter 

DoD Directive 5000.57, Defense Acquisition University, issued October 21, 1991, 

published the charter for the university structure. The charter established a collaborative 

relationship between DAU, Directors of Acquisition Career Management (DACMs), 

functional boards, and the Director Acquisition, Education, Training and Career Development (AET&CD).

A Mission (to include developing education, training, research, and publications

capabilities in the area of acquisition)

DoD Directive 5000.57, Defense Acquisition University, issued October 21, 1991, 

published DAU’s mission to (1) train professionals for effective service in the Defense 

Acquisition System, (2) achieve more efficient and effective use of available acquisition 

resources by coordinating DoD acquisition education and training programs and tailoring them to support the careers of personnel in acquisition positions, and (3) develop 

education, training, research, and publications capabilities in the area of acquisition.

Lines of Authority

DoD Directive 5000.57, Defense Acquisition University, issued October 21, 1991, 

established DAU’s organization and management. A consortium structure was established to serve under a President who reported to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). Consortium members remained part of their existing commands.
The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992–2003

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APPendix F—part II

A framework that shall cover courses from the basic through intermediate and

senior levels. At the senior level, the framework shall provide for a senior course 

DoD Directive 5000.52, Defense Acquisition Education and Training Program, 

issued October 15, 1991, was revised to update policy and responsibilities for a career 

development program. The 1990 Manual 5000.52-M, Career Development Program for 

Acquisition Personnel was a companion to DoDD 5000.52. Responsibility for career 

development of the acquisition workforce was assigned through DAWIA to the Director 

Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development (AET&CD). 

DoD Directive 5000.57, Defense Acquisition University, issued October 21, 1991, 

established a senior acquisition course at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

(ICAF), National Defense University. While not mandatory for certification, it was to 

be the capstone course for all members of the acquisition corps, regardless of career 

field.

A framework for a policy guidance council composed of senior DoD officials and

a Board of Visitors

DoD Instruction 5000.58, Defense Acquisition Workforce, issued January 14, 1991, 

established the Defense Acquisition Career Development Council (DACDC). Chaired 

by the USD(A), its members were senior Department officials who had oversight of 

acquisition career development. 

DoD Directive 5000.57, Defense Acquisition University, issued October 21, 1991, 

required a Board of Visitors (BoV) be chartered. Persons were selected for their preeminence in the fields of academia, business, and the defense industry to advise on 

organization management, curricula, methods of instruction, facilities, and other matters 

of interest to the university. 

A centralized mechanism to control the allocation of resources including funding

for students to attend courses, funding to conduct the courses, and funding to pay

instructor salaries

DoD Directive 5000.57, Defense Acquisition University, issued October 21, 1991, 

required DAU to establish a centralized mechanism to allocate resources whereby each 

Component’s training was to be centrally funded by the university—including the cost 

of courses and associated travel and per diem. The Army Training Requirements and 

Resources System (ATRRS) was selected as the centralized mechanism.
145

APPENDIX

G

Defense 

Acquisition 

Workforce 

Improvement Act 

(DAWIA) 

Personnel 

Data from 

FY 1993–2003
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Appendix G: DAWIA Personnel Data from FY 1993–2003

dEFENSE aCQUISITION wORKFORCE iMPROVEMENT

ACT (dawia) pERSONNEL dATA fROM fy 1993–2003

Sept 30 of

Each FY Civilian Military Total

93 98,496 15,812 114,308

94 94,348 15,768 110,116

95 97,892 16,488 114,380

96 91,715 16,292 108,007

97 89,789 15,755 105,544

98 81,992 14,332 96,324

99 77,917 13,816 91,733

00 79,162 13,749 92,911

01 96,212 13,461 109,673

02 105,087 15,051 120,138

03 134,431 16,167 118,264

NOTE: The six civilian occupation series, which always count as acquisition regardless of what organization a 

person is assigned to, are:

0246 Contractor Industrial Relations

0340 Program Management

1102 Contracting

1103 Industrial Property Management

1105 Purchasing

1150 Industrial Specialist
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APPENDIX

H

Defense 

Acquisition 

University Policy 

Memoranda

(Issued Before 

September 2000)
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Appendix H: Defense Acquisition University Policy Memoranda (Issued before September 2000)

Defense Acquisition University Policy 

Memoranda 

(Issued before September 2000)

INDEX

No. Date Title Supersedes

1 1997, March New Course Development, Revision, and #1, Course Content and

aintenance Process Administration, 1994

 http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/

 DAU_History/Policy%20Memo%201.pdf #4, Course Development:

n-Process Reviews, 1995

2 1997, March Course Sponsor and Offerer Requirements #2, Course Sponsor and Course

 http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/ Offerer Relationship

 DAU_History/Policy%20Memo%202.pdf Responsibilities, 1994

3 1997, March Student Attendance #3, Course Administration:

 http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/ Student Assessment and Missed

 DAU_History/Policy%20Memo%203.pdf Student Contact Hours, 1994

4 1997, March Academic Program Review #4, Course Development:

 http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/ In-Process Reviews, 1995 

 DAU_History/Policy%20Memo%204.pdf

5 2000, March Course Equivalency #5, Course Equivalency, 1997

 http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/

 DAU_History/Policy%20Memo%205.pdf

6 Blank

7 1997, June Continuing Education Units

 http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/

 DAU_History/Policy%20Memo%207.pdf

8 1999, July Course Prerequisites

 http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/

 DAU_History/Policy%20Memo%208.pdf

9 2000, January Registration for Hybrid Courses with 

nline and Classroom Sections

 http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/

 DAU_History/Policy%20Memo%209.pdf

10 2000, February Course Equivalency: General Services

dministration (GSA) Contract

 http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/

 DAU_History/Policy%20Memo%2010.pdf

11 2000, February Grading Policy
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APPENDIX

i

DAU Courses 

Offered by Career 

Field in 1991
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Appendix I: DAU Courses Offered by Career Field In 1991

DAU COURSES OFFERED BY CAREER FIELD IN 1991

Program Management

1 PMT 101 Systems Acquisition Fundamentals

2. PMT 201 Intermediate Systems Acquisition

3. PMT 301 Program Management Course

4. PMT 341 Systems Acquisition Contracting

Communications-Computer Systems

5. IRM 101 Automated Information Systems (AIS) Fundamentals

6. IRM 201 Intermediate AIS

7. IRM 301 AIS Procurement Strategies

8. IRM 302 AIS Advanced Management Program

Contracting

9. CON 101 Contracting Fundamentals

10. CON 102 Organizational Level Contracting

11. CON 103 Construction Contracting Fundamentals

12. CON 104 Contract Pricing

13. CON 105 Organizational Level Contract Pricing

14. CON 106 Construction Contract Pricing

15. CON 201 Government Contract Law

16. CON 211 Intermediate Pre-Award Contracting

17. CON 221 Intermediate Post-Award Contract Administration

18. CON 222 Organizational Level Contract Administration

19. CON 231 Intermediate Cost and Price Analysis

20. CON 241 Automated Information Systems

21. CON 301 Executive Contracting

22. CON 311 Executive Pre-Award Contracting

23. CON 321 Executive Post-Award Contract Administration

24. CON 331 Executive Cost and Price Analysis

25. CON 351 Contract Management

Purchasing

26. PUR 101 Small Purchase Fundamentals

27. PUR 102 Organizational Level Small Purchase

28. PUR 301 Executive Small Purchase

Industrial Property Management

29. IND 101 Contract Property Administration Fundamentals

30. IND 102 Contract Property Disposition

31. IND 103 Contract Property Systems Analysis

32. IND 201 Intermediate Contract Property Administration

33. IND 202 Contract Property Management Seminar

Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering

34. SYS 201 Systems Engineering Management

Test and Evaluation

35. TST 101 Introduction to Acquisition Workforce Test and Evaluation

36. TST 201 Test and Evaluation Management

37. TST 202 Intermediate Test and Evaluation

38. TST 301 Executive Test and Evaluation
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Manufacturing and Production

39. PRD 101 Production Management Fundamentals

40. PRD 201 Intermediate Production Management

41. PRD 202 Defense Manufacturing Management

42. PRD 301 Manufacturing and Quality Assurance

Quality Assurance

43. QUA 101 Quality Assurance Fundamentals

44. QUA 201 Intermediate Quality Assurance

45. QUA 301 Executive Quality Assurance

Acquisition Logistics

46. LOG 101 Basic Integrated Logistics Support

47. LOG 102 Fundamentals of Integrated Logistics Support

48. LOG 103 Integrated Logistics Support Overview

49. LOG 201 Integrated Logistics Support Management

50. LOG 202 Logistics Support Analysis

51. LOG 301 Reliability and Maintainability

52. LOG 302 Configuration Management

53. LOG 303 Provisioning

Business, Cost Estimating and Financial Management

54. BCF 201 Financial Management

55. BCF 202 Contractor Performance Measurement

Auditing

56. AUD 1130 Technical Indoctrination

57. AUD 4120 Statistical Sampling

58. AUD 4230 Graphic, Computational and Improvement Curve

59. AUD 1320 Intermediate Contract Auditing

60. AUD 8560 DCAA Supervisory Skills Workshop