U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

44–478 2008

ASSESSING THE FIGHT AGAINST AL QAEDA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

ON INTELLIGENCE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, April 9, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee 

( 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
(II) 

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas, Chairman 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, Alabama 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

RUSH D. HOLT, New Jersey 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

MIKE THOMPSON, California 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, Texas 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

NANCY PELOSI, California, Speaker, Ex Officio Member 

JOHN A. BOEHNER, Ohio, Minority Leader, Ex Officio Member 

MICHAEL DELANEY, Staff Director 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
(1) 

ASSESSING THE FIGHT AGAINST AL QAEDA 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:05 p.m., in Room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, the Honorable Silvestre Reyes 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Reyes, Boswell, Eshoo, Holt, 

Ruppersberger, Tierney, Thompson, Schakowsky, Langevin, Schiff, 

Hoekstra, Gallegly, McHugh, Rogers and Issa. 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. 

Good afternoon. Today we will focus on an issue at the top of this 

committee’s agenda, the threat from al Qaeda in Afghanistan and 

in Pakistan. We believe that Osama bin Laden and his most senior 

deputies use the largely ungoverned border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan as a safe haven to plan terrorist attacks against 

the United States and our allies. I think that today’s open session 

is an important companion to the committee’s classified work on 

this very important subject to our country. This is one of the biggest threats that we face, and the American people deserve to know 

about it. The committee plans to hold additional hearings on al 

Qaeda, both open and closed, in the coming months in order to 

focus on this threat and on our progress in countering it. 

Today we will receive testimony from three experts on al Qaeda. 

The first is Mr. Peter Bergen, a senior fellow at the New America 

Foundation in Washington, D.C., an Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is also a research fellow at New York University’s Center on Law and Security. He is also the author of numerous books on al Qaeda. Mr. Bergen is both a widely recognized expert on al Qaeda and is one of 

the few Westerners to have actually met and interviewed Osama 

bin Laden. 

Second, we will hear from Mr. Robert Grenier, who, during his 

27-year career at CIA, served as the Chief of the Counterterrorism 

Center, as the Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Near East 

and South Asia on the National Intelligence Council, and also as 

Special Assistant for Near East and South Asia to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Mr. Grenier is as accomplished 

as an intelligence officer can be. We are fortunate to have him here 

today to offer his insights to our committee. 

Finally, we will receive testimony from Steven Emerson, the Executive Director of the Investigative Project on Terrorism. Mr. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
2 

Emerson is also a well-known commentator on terrorism-related 

matters, and we look forward to his testimony. 

Thank you all for coming this afternoon. Welcome. 

On September 11th, 2001, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda attacked this nation. Immediately following the attacks, we knew 

that Osama bin Laden was responsible; we knew where he was; 

and we had the support of the entire civilized world in our efforts 

to pursue him and to pursue his organization. Yet, 7 years later, 

bin Laden remains free, and al Qaeda, incredibly enough, remains 

a threat. 

Most disturbing to me is that, while bin Laden continues to plot 

and to inspire extremism and hatred for the United States, the 

bulk of our troops is bogged down in Iraq, pursuing a war of choice 

against an enemy that did not attack us on 9/11. While over 4,000 

Americans have been killed in Iraq and hundreds more in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden remains alive, apparently comfortable 

enough to continue issuing statements from, of all places, what is 

believed to be a safe haven in Pakistan. 

As Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I am anxious 

to hear from our experts on how we got here and what we should 

do about it. 

In 2003, President Bush told the American people that al Qaeda 

was ‘‘not a problem anymore.’’ He was wrong. 

As the National Intelligence Estimate released last summer 

states, al Qaeda—and I quote—‘‘has protected or regenerated key 

elements of its homeland attack capability, including a safe haven 

in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas, operational 

lieutenants and its top leadership,’’ end quote. 

In other words, al Qaeda has the freedom to recruit, the freedom 

to train and the freedom to plot new attacks against the United 

States. 

Clearly the threat from al Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border region is real. Frankly, I am not confident that the United 

States has a winning plan to defeat the al Qaeda threat despite the 

efforts of our men and women in the Intelligence Community as 

well as those in our military and diplomatic corps. I look forward 

to hearing the panel’s expert views on why we have not eliminated 

this threat. 

Further, the committee appreciates the panel’s assistance in 

helping us understand the operational relationship between al 

Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the effect 

that the war in Iraq has had on our efforts to neutralize al Qaeda, 

and a reevaluation of our strategy in our conflict with al Qaeda. 

Thank you all again for joining us here today. 

Mr. REYES. I will recognize the Ranking Member of our committee Mr. Hoekstra for any statement that he may wish to make. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses for appearing with us today. This 

hearing today gives us a chance to discuss before the American 

people the continuing threat our nation faces not only from al 

Qaeda, but, from my perspective, the larger threat from radical 

Jihadist terrorism. 

I believe it is beneficial for the American people to hear more 

about the al Qaeda threat. I believe the committee will benefit from 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
3 

having this open hearing, but it is very positive, Mr. Chairman, to 

hear you state that we are going to have a series of hearings to 

evaluate the al Qaeda threat, both closed and open hearings. Obviously, these individuals may have information that may be classified or may have gotten access to classified information or whatever, but in this forum, they do not have the latitude to talk about 

it, so much of what we will be discussing today will be an incomplete recognition of what is actually on the record. 

More than 6 years after 9/11, our nation still seems to be—or we 

now seem to be at a crossroads. On the one hand, it is clear that 

our homeland has not been attacked since that tragic, fateful day. 

This cannot be called anything other than a success, and it is a testament to the hard work and dedication of the men and women of 

our Intelligence Community and of our military. 

On the other hand, there is a clear tendency by some in America 

and in this Congress to look at our success over the past several 

years as a cause or as an excuse to let down our guard. They have 

confused al Qaeda’s failure to successfully carry out an attack on 

our homeland as a lack of intent or as a lack of capability on the 

part of al Qaeda. 

The reality, from my perspective, is that al Qaeda has well expressed its intent and, I believe, has the capability to carry out an 

attack on our soil. What they have lacked over the past several 

years is the free rein to plod in the shadows and to do so without 

fear of a U.S. response. 

With our nation and freedom under attack, the smoke and the 

dust still billowing from the ruins of the World Trade Center, 

President Bush huddled with his national security team to discuss 

what needed to be done to protect our nation from another catastrophic attack. The President’s advisors told him the tools and the 

methods the U.S. intelligence agencies needed to track and to combat radical Jihadist groups like al Qaeda. Thus were born many of 

the highly effective antiterrorist tools that have helped keep this 

Nation safe: the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, the High-Value Terrorist Detainee Program. These programs were all briefed to congressional leaders, including to the Speaker. In fact, not a concern was raised until 

these programs were leaked to the press, unfortunately, turning 

them into political fodder instead of the valuable, clandestine 

counterterrorist tools that they were designed to be. 

I have to mention the fact that, as we are having this hearing, 

our intelligence capability to protect the American people, our embassies, our embassy personnel, troops overseas, and our allies continues to erode. As Senate Intelligence Chairman Jay Rockefeller 

declared on the Senate floor in February, the quality of the intelligence that we are going to be receiving is going to be degraded. 

It is not enough to discuss al Qaeda and the Jihadist terrorism and 

to ignore the erosion and the tools that the Intelligence Community 

says it needs, the very same tools that have kept our homeland 

safe for more than 6 years since 9/11. We need to strengthen our 

Nation’s terrorist surveillance capabilities by fixing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 

Some have asked, why does the United States need to employ 

tough counterterrorism programs? The answer is because the radVerDate Aug 31 2005 21:26 Nov 24, 2008 Jkt 044478 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A478.XXX A478

hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
4 

ical Jihadist threat did not end with the 9/11 attacks, nor did the 

responsibility of the President and Congress to protect our nation. 

If you listen to the statements of Osama bin Laden and of his deputy Zawahiri, it is easy to understand the seriousness of this 

threat, its global implications and the determination of radical 

Jihadists to strike America’s homeland. 

Osama bin Laden declared war against the United States with 

little fanfare in 1996 when he issued a fatwa titled Declaration of 

War against the Americans’ Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 

Places. He acted on this so-called ‘‘declaration of war’’ with al 

Qaeda attacks against the U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, 

against the U.S. Cole in 2000. 

Bin Laden claims parallels between the American presence in 

Iraq and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. For example, according to a strategy document posted to a Jihadist Web site in 2003, 

with guerilla warfare, the Americans were defeated in Vietnam, 

and the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan. This is the method 

that expelled the direct crusader colonialism for most of the Muslim lands. 

The purpose of al Qaeda’s terrorist campaign is supposedly to establish Osama bin Laden’s brand of radical Islam over what he 

calls the Caliphate, a region that, in bin Laden’s mind, constitutes 

historic Muslim lands expanding from Iraq to Indonesia. He said 

in 1998 that the pious Caliphate will start from Afghanistan. 

Zawahiri made a similar statement in October of 2005 in a letter 

when he wrote the goal in this age is the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet. In 2006, Zawahiri said the reinstatement of Islamic rule is the individual duty of every Muslim 

with every land occupied by infidels. 

Some have asserted—and I expect we will hear this a lot from 

the other side—that the radical Jihadist threat in Iraq is very limited or unreal, and that the U.S. should withdraw to focus on the 

so-called ‘‘real war on terror,’’ which some claim is confined to Afghanistan and the FATA in Pakistan. I cannot help but wonder if 

those who are focused on forcing our withdrawal from Iraq would 

be more comfortable with our invading a sovereign, nuclear-armed 

nation. 

As challenging as our relationship with Pakistan has been at 

times, it is also true that Pakistan has helped us capture more al 

Qaeda terrorists than any other nation. Others here today will say 

that the only reason al Qaeda is in Iraq is because we are there, 

but this ignores the fact that al Qaeda, like a moth drawn to a 

flame, will attack America and our people anywhere they can. I 

refer you again to the al Qaeda-led attacks against our embassies 

in Africa and against the Cole. This point of view also ignores bin 

Laden’s unequivocal 2004 statement that Baghdad is the capital of 

the Caliphate. 

In July 2005, Zawahiri gave this detailed four-stage plan for Iraq 

in a letter to Zarqawi, the now deceased head of al Qaeda in Iraq: 

The first stage, expel the Americans from Iraq; the second stage, 

establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop and support 

it until it achieves the level of the Caliphate over as much territory 

as you can to spread its power in Iraq; the third stage, extend the 

Jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq; the fourth 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
5 

stage—it may coincide with what came before—the clash with 

Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity. 

We have seen the world over that the threat from radical 

Jihadists is a global threat. It is a sophisticated threat that has 

spread its message; that has recruited followers; and that has 

planned terrorist attacks using the Internet, satellite television, 

and even computer games. Al Qaeda activity has been reported in 

dozens of countries, including China, Canada, Sweden, India, the 

Philippines, Thailand, Serbia, and Yemen. In the past month alone, 

al Qaeda allegedly has attempted two unsuccessful mortar attacks 

against our embassy and embassy personnel in Yemen. 

Our Nation, indeed, stands at a crossroad, and the choices we 

make in the days and months ahead are more than about this administration or even the next. They are about the future of our 

great nation and the security of her people. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing. I look forward 

to the hearings that we will be scheduling in the coming weeks. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra. 

Thank you for putting at least some of the things in perspective, 

because you are absolutely right. The next administration and future generations are going to have to deal with the mess that has 

been created over the course of the last 6, 7 years. The greater 

challenge, I think, is the one that calls on all of us to work collectively together to make sure that we have given the professionals 

charged with our national security the tools to keep us safe, at the 

same time balancing the rights that we all enjoy as Americans, because if we somehow do not have a balanced effort, then the terrorists will have won. So I think all of us are pledged to do that. 

I think all of us are pledged to continue to work jointly together, 

both with this administration with the time that remains for it and 

also with the new administration, to make sure that future generations are proud of the efforts that all of us are making to keep this 

country safe and the world safer for everyone. 

With that, I will now—— 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. I would ask unanimous consent that all of our opening 

statements be placed in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. With that now, Mr. Bergen, you are recognized 

for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF PETER BERGEN, SCHWARTZ SENIOR FELLOW, 

NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

Ranking Member, and thank you for this invitation and to the 

other members of the committee. 

We were asked to address three questions. One is: How is the 

hunt for Osama bin Laden and senior leaders of al Qaeda going? 

Two: What is the status of al Qaeda today? What might it be in 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
6 

the future? Three: What policy responses? We have 10 minutes 

each, so I will be brief. 

One: How is the hunt against Osama bin Laden and Ayman alZawahiri going? I think it is fair to say that it is going very poorly. 

There are all sorts of reasons for that, not the least of which is that 

bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are not making the kinds of 

mistakes that fugitives normally make. They are not talking on cell 

phones. They are not talking on satellite phones. The people in 

their immediate circles are not motivated by cash rewards. So the 

hunt is going poorly. 

Does it really matter if it is going poorly? My answer to that is 

very simple. To suggest that bin Laden is not in charge of the al 

Qaeda global jihadi network is to ignore the global communications 

revolution of the last 10 years. Bin Laden does not need to call 

somebody and ask for something to be done. He just releases a videotape or an audiotape. These are placed on the Internet. These are 

some of the most widely distributed political statements in history. 

Millions of people read about them, hear about them, see about 

them. Now, to everybody in this room, those statements probably 

seem very repetitive: Kill the Jews. Kill Americans. Kill Muslims 

who disagree with us, et cetera. In fact, many of these statements 

have specific instructions, and I will give you two or three examples. 

Bin Laden has made it official al Qaeda policy to attack the 

Saudi oil industry because he has a narrative about the United 

States that we can be bankrupted by the actions of al Qaeda. That 

is one of the reasons that we had an attack in 2006 on the most 

important oil facility in the world, the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi 

Arabia. Luckily, it was unsuccessful. If it had been taken off line, 

that is 10 percent of the world’s oil supply. 

There is a direct relationship between what the jihadi network 

will do and what bin Laden says. Similarly, both Ayman alZawahiri and bin Laden have called for attacks in Pakistan in the 

last several months. Pakistan is now suffering the largest epidemic 

of suicide attacks in Pakistani history in the past year. There are 

many other examples. 

So finding bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri is orders of magnitude more important than finding the other al Qaeda leaders we 

have found so far. It was great to find Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, 

but he has no ideas. It is people with ideas that change history, 

and both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden have a readily 

coherent set of ideas, which unfortunately quite a lot of people have 

signed up for. 

So now for the status of the al Qaeda organization. As you know 

from the NIE, it is resurgent. What is the evidence for the resurgence? One, the July 7, 2005 terrorist attack in Great Britain, in 

London. This was the largest terrorist attack in British history. It 

was poorly understood by both the British press and by the British 

Government at the beginning as a bunch of self-starting radicalized 

guys who got together and launched the attack. We now know 

more about the attack, two of the lead suicide attackers trained 

with al Qaeda in Pakistan. Two of them released videotapes with 

al Qaeda’s video production arm. It was an al Qaeda-directed attack. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
7 

What is interesting about the London attack is it looks a lot like 

the Cole attack of October 2000. It took them about a year to plan. 

It showed al Qaeda’s ability to stretch out thousands of miles from 

its base on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 

Then more broadly what is going on in Britain right now. You 

know from the public statements of John Evans, the head of MI– 

5, that there are 2,000 people in Britain they regard as serious national security threats, many of whom have links to al Qaeda in 

Pakistan. Four hundred thousand British citizens visit Pakistan 

every year on completely legitimate trips because they are British 

Pakistanis; if 0.01 percent of them hook up with a Kashmiri militant group or al Qaeda. That is 40 people with training. 

The other aspect of al Qaeda’s resurgence is what is going on in 

Afghanistan. In my view, the senior leadership of the Taliban and 

al Qaeda have morphed together ideologically and tactically. If you 

look at the suicide attacks in Afghanistan, they only really took off 

after they saw how effective they were in Iraq. There were almost 

no suicide attacks in Afghanistan in 2001, 2002, 2003; 27 in 2005; 

and 139 in 2006, geometrically progressing in number. That is because al Qaeda has learned from Iraq, and the Taliban have 

learned from the playbook in Iraq. IED attacks have doubled. Suicide attacks have quintupled. Attacks on international forces have 

tripled in the last year in Afghanistan. 

Another indicator of al Qaeda’s resurgence is, of course, what is 

going on in Pakistan, where we are seeing 60 suicide attacks last 

year compared to 5 the year before. Another indicator of al Qaeda’s 

resurgence is that other militant groups are joining al Qaeda: the 

GSPC, which is the largest Algerian group. The Libyan Fighting 

Group in the last several months, which is the largest Libyan Islamic group, has also joined al Qaeda. 

Then, of course, there is al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq did 

not exist before the invasion. It has had a disproportionately large 

effect on what is going on in Iraq. It got the U.N. to pull out. It 

attacked the Jordanian Embassy, which got Middle Eastern countries to pull out their diplomatic representatives. By attacking in 

Najaf and Samarra, it sparked a civil war. 

There have been 900 suicide attacks in Iraq, which is more suicide attacks in one country, in one place than there have been suicide attacks in history. Eighty to ninety percent of them are by al 

Qaeda in Iraq. 

Al Qaeda in Iraq is obviously taking some hits right now, but 

declarations of their being over, I think, would be premature, because whatever happens with United States policy in Iraq, we are 

obviously going to draw down. Drawing down will help al Qaeda in 

two ways. One is it will help their narrative that we are a paper 

tiger. That narrative is based on Vietnam, Beirut and Mogadishu. 

Two, it helps their strategy, much more importantly. They want to 

regroup and to get in a safe haven. So whatever drawdowns we do 

must take this into account. 

Other elements of al Qaeda’s regrouping, of course, include its 

video production arm, which has produced more videotapes last 

year than it did in its history previously, 90 videotapes. Videotapes 

imply cameramen. It implies editors. It implies distribution sysVerDate Aug 31 2005 21:26 Nov 24, 2008 Jkt 044478 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A478.XXX A478

hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
8 

tems. This is a group that takes its information operations very seriously, probably more seriously than we do. 

So that is a snapshot of where al Qaeda is today. Given that 

snapshot, what can they do in the future? I am not going to discuss 

Chicken Little scenarios like nuclear weapons, but I think there 

are two things they can do in the next 5 years that are very plausible. One, they can bring down a commercial jet—it does not have 

to be American, it can be anywhere in the world—with a rocketpropelled grenade or a surface-to-air missile. They tried to do this 

in Mombasa, Kenya, with an Israeli charter jet. It almost succeeded. This is something that they have the ability to do, and this 

is something they have a strong interest in doing, and it is something that we have seen them try to do before. 

Another thing they can pull off plausibly is an attack on a major 

European city with a radiological weapon. Such an attack would 

have a nasty effect on global investor confidence. It would not be 

a weapon of mass destruction, it would be a weapon of mass disruption. Nonetheless, it would seem to be a 9/11-style event. Likewise, bringing down a commercial jet would have a very nasty effect on global tourism and aviation. 

I believe that al Qaeda’s ability to attack the United States is extremely constrained looking at it in the next 5 years. The reason 

I say that is look at the plane plot of the summer of 2006. This 

was al Qaeda’s fifth anniversary celebration, as it were, of 9/11. 

The plane plot was very interesting, the plan to bring down as 

many as six American airliners. It was interesting for two reasons. 

First of all, they selected the hardest target imaginable, commercial aviation. They are not interested in attacking Des Moines 

malls. They are interested in attacking New York, Los Angeles and 

D.C. and commercial aviation. Two, they decided to do it in Britain. 

Why did they decide to do it in Britain? Because they have got people there. If they could have done it in the United States, they 

would have done it. There have been attacks by jihadi terrorists in 

the past, the World Trade Center attack in 1993, the attempt to 

blow up Los Angeles International Airport in 1999, and the 9/11 attacks. All of these attacks were conducted by people coming from 

outside. 

It is a lot harder to get into the United States right now. The 

Government has made it safer in a number of ways. The American 

public is more vigilant. Al Qaeda, while it is resurging, it is still 

not at the point it was on September 11th, 2001. So, while it is 

plausible that people acting in the name of al Qaeda might produce 

small-bore terror attacks domestically, in my view, a major al 

Qaeda attack is not so likely. 

The impact of the Iraq war was touched upon in the opening 

statements. Donald Rumsfeld famously complained: What are the 

metrics for losing or winning the war on terrorism in 2003? Well, 

one metric that I thought was relevant is terrorism figures. A colleague of mine at NYU used a very conservative methodology in a 

RAND database, and we found that if you compare the period between September 11th and the beginning of the Iraq war and the 

period from after the invasion up to September 2006, you find that 

the rate of jihadi terrorist attacks went up sevenfold around the 

world. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
9 

When I say jihadi terrorist attacks, they are attacks that kill at 

least one person or more. Of course, a lot of that happened in Iraq. 

A good deal of it happened in Afghanistan because of copycatting 

or learning on the job in Iraq by Afghans, mujahedin and Pakistanis. Also, a good deal of it happened in Europe—the London attacks, Madrid, the Glasgow attempts—and, of course, around the 

Arab world. 

Now, when I mention this, I am not making the absurd statement that the Iraq war caused all of these attacks, but it certainly 

energized the jihadi terrorist movement around the world in a way 

that, if you do the thought experiment where if the Iraq war had 

not happened, we might be in a slightly different place. 

Am I running out of time, by the way? 

The CHAIRMAN. You have got about 50 seconds. 

Mr. BERGEN. Okay. Some quick ideas about what we should do 

about this. 

I think one of the most critical things we can do is to create a 

universal database shared across all elements of the U.S. Government which looks at all insurgents, all terrorists, all of their clerics, 

and all of their friends and family. Friends and family are how you 

get into the jihad. I know that we are looking at the Iraqi insurgency in Iraq, and we are looking at the Afghan insurgency in Afghanistan, but we need to think about this globally. We need to 

look at the interconnections. We need to find who are the clerics 

who are disproportionately inciting young men to go to the jihad. 

This would be useful not only from an intelligence point of view, 

but also from a policy point of view. With such a study, we could 

say to the Governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where so 

many of these suicide attackers are coming from, it is this particular cleric and this particular mosque that are producing a disproportionate number of the suicide attackers. We are not saying 

this just because it is in our best interest, but that it is also in 

yours, because when these conflicts are over, this will blow back in 

your face as much as anywhere else. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Bergen follows:] 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
10 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 27 here 44478A.001
11 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 28 here 44478A.002
12 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 29 here 44478A.003
13 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 30 here 44478A.004
14 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 31 here 44478A.005
15 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 32 here 44478A.006
16 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 33 here 44478A.007
17 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 34 here 44478A.008
18 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 35 here 44478A.009
19 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 36 here 44478A.010
20 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 37 here 44478A.011
21 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 38 here 44478A.012
22 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 39 here 44478A.013
23 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 40 here 44478A.014
24 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 41 here 44478A.015
25 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 42 here 44478A.016
26 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 43 here 44478A.017
27 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 44 here 44478A.018
28 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 45 here 44478A.019
29 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 46 here 44478A.020
30 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 47 here 44478A.021
31 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 48 here 44478A.022
32 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 49 here 44478A.023
33 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 50 here 44478A.024
34 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 51 here 44478A.025
35 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 52 here 44478A.026
36 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 53 here 44478A.027
37 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 54 here 44478A.028
38 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 55 here 44478A.029
39 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Grenier, you are recognized for 10 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT GRENIER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

KROLL, INC. 

Mr. GRENIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Hoekstra. I 

want to thank you and the other members of the committee for inviting me here today. This is a privilege for me. 

I should begin by reminding you of something that you already 

know, and that is that I am almost 2 years now out of government, 

and there is much that I do not know now in terms of current privileged information beyond that which is openly available, nor do I 

have particular insight into the methodologies that are currently 

being employed. So I have not come here today to provide you with 

new information. 

What I hope I can do is to provide you with certain judgment and 

perspective based on many years as a partitioner in this area, and 

I hope that that will be of use to you in your very important oversight role in questioning and in testing assumptions and in challenging current practice in countering terrorism. 

I should point out further that I am a very strong personal believer in vigorous oversight, and all the more so now that I am no 

longer directly subject to it. 

With regard to Osama bin Laden, here we are 6-plus years after 

9/11, and the man remains at large. As Peter has pointed out, that 

is a very serious state of affairs. It is important that we effect his 

capture, although, I think we may differ on the degree to which it 

is important. 

I will tell you, quite frankly, that I am not terribly surprised that 

he is still at large. Tracking down bin Laden is going to be very, 

very difficult. Most of us who claim some expertise in this area, as 

Peter has already pointed out, believe that he is most likely hiding 

out in Pakistan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, I suspect somewhere north of the Khyber Pass and south of Chitral. It 

is a very, very difficult area. It is mountainous. It is fractured both 

demographically and anthropologically. It is a very hostile area not 

only to us as outsiders, but even to other Pakistanis who are not 

from that area. His location in that area actually is a guess. I 

mean, for all we know, he may be hiding in an apartment in Karachi certainly, for all that I know. 

What I think is almost certain is that, wherever he is, he is keeping a very low profile. I doubt that he is moving at all. The number 

of individuals who are directly knowledgeable of his whereabouts, 

I suspect, is extremely small. As Peter has already pointed out, it 

is certain that he and his confederates are using very careful and 

very disciplined tradecraft in controlling his communication, 

whether it is by videotape, audiotape or otherwise. 

I would point out that Eric Rudolph, the American terrorist responsible for the attack on the Olympics in Atlanta and for a number of other bombing attacks in the United States, managed to remain at large for over 5 years in the mountains of North Carolina 

despite the fact that he was at the top of the FBI’s most wanted 

list, that there was a $1 million bounty on his head, and that there 

were very active efforts, both official and nonofficial, to effect his 

capture. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
40 

Bin Laden has a great many advantages over Eric Rudolph given 

where he is, given where he is hiding, and given the capabilities 

that are at his disposal. So, again, I am not terribly surprised at 

all that he has not been captured. Quite frankly, I think that it is 

quite likely that he is going to remain at large for an indefinite period of time. 

In terms of methodologies that one might employ to effect his 

capture, well, there are a great many things that have been done 

that could presumably be done, but I think that they fall in two 

broad categories. One I would call a network-based approach. Since 

bin Laden does communicate at least to some degree, the theory is 

that there is some sort of a human chain that extends from him 

to others outside the immediate area where he is hiding, and that 

if you were to capture an individual somewhere in that chain and 

interrogate that individual, you could then trace the chain back to 

bin Laden. 

There are two very obvious problems with this. The first is that 

you have got to capture someone in that chain alive. It is most likely that the individuals who have even indirect knowledge of the 

network that is being employed by bin Laden in order to communicate are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We have not 

captured anyone alive in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

for quite some time. There have been a number of terrorists who 

have met their demise there, but they have all been the victims of 

lethal strikes. They have not been captured. Those close to them 

have not been captured, and we have not been able to recover their 

material, either documents or electronic media. So that is a real 

problem. 

Secondly, even if we were to capture one of these individuals, as 

Peter has said, the tradecraft that is being employed, I suspect, is 

probably not terribly sophisticated. In fact, its great merit, I would 

imagine, is in its simplicity, but our ability to follow the trail, as 

it were, the human trail, back to bin Laden would be reliant on 

mistakes on their part, because it is quite easy and it is quite simple to effect what we would call nonpersonal communications so 

that there are firebreaks in that human chain leading back to bin 

Laden. Again, it would require a mistake, a breakdown in discipline on their part, in order for us to unravel that. 

A second broad approach that we might employ would be what 

I would call a local informant-based approach. That assumes that 

wherever bin Laden is hiding, there must be some resultant anomaly. If he is hiding in a compound somewhere in a remote area of 

northern Pakistan, presumably, there are outsiders who occasionally travel into that area in order to effect communications with bin 

Laden. There may well be an unused guesthouse on a compound 

which historically has been used and no longer is being used, and 

nobody knows why. There may be anomalies in terms of the 

amount of food that is being provided to a particular location that 

is not consistent with the number of people who are known to be 

there. 

None of those indicators would be in any way definitive, but if 

you had one or more of those indicators, that would be an indication that you ought to follow up vigorously with some sort of a local 

investigation. In order to do that, however, given the atomized naVerDate Aug 31 2005 21:26 Nov 24, 2008 Jkt 044478 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A478.XXX A478

hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
41 

ture of the areas in which bin Laden is most likely hiding, you 

would have to have a great number, a great many informants, any 

one of which would only be able to cover a very small, localized 

area. 

You cannot do that for all of northern Pakistan. What you can, 

perhaps, do is to set some priorities of areas that you would particularly want to look at. I think that there are some criteria that 

you could set for which are the areas that you particularly want 

to look at hard. Then you would have to move about very vigorously and systematically to identify and to recruit informants in 

each of those areas. It is a very, very difficult, time-intensive, manpower-intensive effort. I do not say that it cannot be done, but even 

if you did everything right, you would also have to be very lucky, 

I think, to succeed in the end. 

Particularly when we are talking about a local-informant and investigation-based approach, that has the further problem associated with it that it would largely be unrelated to the larger effort 

to kill, to capture or to otherwise neutralize senior members of al 

Qaeda who are hiding in the safe haven in the Northwest Frontier. 

I might differ a little bit from Peter in that as important as I concede the effort to locate, to capture or to otherwise eliminate bin 

Laden and Zawahiri, I think it is actually much more important in 

the near term that we continue the effort to kill or to capture senior lieutenants who, unlike bin Laden and probably unlike 

Zawahiri, are directly involved in the effort to launch terrorist attacks across the border in Afghanistan, in Western Europe and, 

perhaps, much farther afield. That is a very broad topic, and perhaps we will get into it in the Q&A portion. 

I will just make two broad points here. One is that what we are 

trying to do in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are two 

broad things, two broad objectives, and they work in direct conflict 

with one another. The first is that we are trying to kill or to capture senior terrorists who are engaged in plotting against us. At 

the same time, we are trying to deny them safe haven in that area. 

Progress against one of those objectives works directly against our 

efforts in the other respect, and vice versa. 

The second broad point that I would make is that the only way 

that we are really going to get an arm around this problem, and 

the only way that we are going to make anything like permanent 

progress, is to deny the FATA as a safe haven for bin Laden, for 

al Qaeda and for related extremists. I believe that the only way 

that we are going to do that is through a long-term counterinsurgency effort that will be multifaceted and that will be as much 

economic- and political- as it will be military- and intelligencebased. It will be something that can really only effectively be done 

by the Pakistanis, but once we have convinced them that they must 

do it, then it will require a great deal of vigorous support on the 

part of the United States in a very long-term commitment to sustain that effort. 

With regard to the much broader, literally global struggle against 

al Qaeda, again, that is a very, very broad topic. I would just like 

to stress three points there. The first is that I agree with Peter 

that it is absolutely vital that we sustain the progress that has 

been made and, in fact, make further improvement in the situation 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
42 

with regard to al Qaeda in Iraq. It would be tremendously dangerous for us if al Qaeda were able to establish an effective safe 

haven in the Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq. 

Secondly, one of the things that is often overlooked, I think, is 

the fact that we rely absolutely on the effectiveness of our allies in 

the war on terror. We do not tend to think so much about it in 

terms of resources. We do not tend to focus on it nearly as much, 

but we would be essentially dead in the water were it not for the 

vigorous efforts of our allies. I think that, therefore, capacity-building is an extremely important part of our international program 

that is often relatively overlooked. 

The third has to do with the war of ideas, this whole issue of 

whether we are creating more terrorists than, in fact, we are killing and capturing. I believe that currently we are, and that unless 

there is effective engagement in the so-called ‘‘war of ideas,’’ we are 

not going to turn a corner on that. I do not think that we have engaged in that battle at all. I think to the extent that we have 

thought about it, our thoughts have been confused. However, I 

think that the keys to progress in that area are in two areas that, 

frankly, should be great national strengths of ours. The first is a 

commitment to justice. The second is a commitment to democracy. 

With that, I will end my statement. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Grenier. 

[The statement of Mr. Grenier follows:] 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
43 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65 here 44478A.030
44 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 66 here 44478A.031
45 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 67 here 44478A.032
46 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 68 here 44478A.033
47 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 69 here 44478A.034
48 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 70 here 44478A.035
49 

The CHAIRMAN. We have got less than 8 minutes left in the vote. 

We have got three votes. I want to recess the committee and then 

come back with Mr. Emerson’s opening statement. 

Thank you. The committee is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order. 

With that, Mr. Emerson, you are recognized for 10 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN EMERSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

THE INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM 

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity here, and I thank you and your fellow Members for holding 

this hearing. 

I would like to say that I was very impressed with my colleagues’ 

testimony. They leave me very little to say, of course, but I will try. 

I apologize for the length of my testimony. It was designed to relieve any of you of the need to take any Ambien. 

So I would say, first of all, that the first problem we face right 

now is the new government in Pakistan. As you know, Musharraf 

had attempted to broker peace with the tribes and militia, and it 

culminated in a counterproductive deal between the tribal and militant leaders in northern Waziristan. According to the deal, foreign 

fighters were to leave north Waziristan, and then tribal leaders 

were to clean house. It did not happen. The insurgency in the 

FATA area grew emboldened by what could be seen as an official 

government sanction of these illegal armed groups. Regardless, the 

deal ended when Pakistani forces crushed militants who seized 

control of the infamous Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007. 

Since then, tribal and militant leaders have denounced Musharraf 

and have even carried out 36 suicide bombings against military 

targets alone. 

Now, with the new recent elections, there is a lot of uncertainty. 

Musharraf played both sides of the house, but largely it was a 51– 

49 deal in working with the U.S., but also in knowing that his flow 

of new fighter jets and lots of billions of dollars depended upon the 

ability to keep finding new al Qaeda leaders. Miraculously, one 

leader after another was captured almost on a regular basis, on a 

yearly basis, but the new Pakistani Government lead by the People’s Party will likely seek, unfortunately, a Northwest Frontier 

policy and a Federally Administered Tribal Area policy that differs 

markedly from Musharraf’s policy. 

I think one of the basic recommendations that I would come out 

with is that we need to make sure that the new Government of 

Pakistan sees that it is in its own best interest to be as aggressive 

as possible in the Taliban areas of Waziristan and in the FATA 

area in the Northwest Frontier Province, and to allow the United 

States the latitude to unilaterally conduct cross-border strikes and 

Predator strikes at high-value targets as had been done just several weeks ago. 

As far as the hunt for bin Laden, my belief is that, if we look 

at bin Laden, he was certainly the pinnacle of his organization that 

was reached on September 10th, 2001. Since then, it has been dispersed. It has been largely incapacitated as an organization, although it has reconstituted itself with new leaders taking part in 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
50 

replacing two-thirds of the leadership that had been taken out, either killed or captured, since 9/11. 

There is some good news as to a high-ranking leader that we 

identified in the testimony, Abu Obaidah al-Masri. Today, it was 

revealed that he was found dead. I do not know the circumstances 

of his death, but at least that is one more major leader who has 

been taken out. 

Now, having said that, al Qaeda is both an organization, again, 

really constituting lots of miniorganizations or other organizations 

like the Islamic Movement of the Maghreb, GSPC, the Egyptian Islamic Vanguards, the al-Zawahiri acquisition back in 1995. 

It is also a movement. I think, as a movement, frankly, it is almost more dangerous than as an organization. In that respect, we 

see what is happening in Europe in terms of the plots that have 

occurred in Denmark, in the U.K., in Madrid, and most recently in 

Germany. Germany was quite interesting because this converges 

directly with what the Director of the CIA said 2 weeks ago, that 

we are about to see a new type of profile of Islamic militants come 

through our borders, one that will not be as detectable as the other 

proverbial types, meaning that the two major members of this cell 

in Germany that were about to attack Ramstein Air Force Base as 

well as nightclubs and American bars frequented by Americans 

were Germans who had converted to Islam. Their arrests have resulted in some incredible interrogations and confessions that have 

revealed how they transited to al Qaeda-affiliated camps in Pakistan on their own volition. As a result of going there, they hooked 

up and got trained in how to carry out bombings. 

The same can be said for the Danish plot. The same can be said 

for the July 2005 bombing of the trains in London. Then in other 

countries such as Italy and Belgium, we find also other plots. Some 

of them do not show a linkage directly to al Qaeda. 

For example, the Hofstede Group carried out the killing of Teddy 

van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker who had made a film called ‘‘Submission.’’ It was particularly horrifying when it was carried out several 

years ago because it was simply a group of young Muslims based 

in Belgium—not in Belgium, but in the Netherlands—who basically 

said, we are going to kill anybody who insults the Prophet or who 

insults Islam. They stabbed him, and they shot him multiple times, 

as a result of which colleagues of his—eight colleagues of his and 

members of the Parliament had to go into hiding. Today there are 

at least seven members of Parliament there who are still members 

or who are former members who are in hiding as a result, including Geert Wilders, who just made a film called ‘‘Fitna.’’ 

Even though the film can be considered anti-Islamic, I would 

refer you to the very good article written by the Ranking Republican Mr. Hoekstra, who wrote a piece in the March 27 issue of The 

Wall Street Journal in which he stated, reasonable men in free societies regard Geert Wilders’ anti-Muslim rhetoric and films like 

‘‘Fitna’’ as disrespectful of the religious sensitivities of members of 

the Islamic faith, but free societies also hold freedom of speech to 

be a fundamental human right. We do not silence, jail or kill people 

with whom we disagree because their ideas are offensive or disturbing. We believe that when such ideas are openly debated, they 

sink on their own weight and attract few followers. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
51 

The fact of the matter is that there has been a reconstitution. 

When we look at the larger picture, what are we facing? This hearing is supposed to focus on al Qaeda, but my contention and my 

testimony, half of my 50 pages—and I apologize for the length—focuses on al Qaeda or on al Qaeda-linked plots in Europe, on the 

use of the FATA area and the Northwest Frontier Province to 

launch attacks, on the use of self-anointed franchises in Europe, 

and then on homegrown franchises in the United States or in Canada or in London that attach themselves to al Qaeda’s ideology. 

It is my basic contention that we cannot decouple al Qaeda from 

the larger battle against radical Islamic etiology from which it 

stems. If we do, we are guaranteed to lose the war against al 

Qaeda. Al Qaeda was born out of an organization, as are almost 

all other Sunni movements, called the Muslim Brotherhood. That 

is what drives al Qaeda. It also drives Hamas. It drives Islamic 

Jihad. Their etiology—it is the etiology of al Qaeda as well—is intrinsically hostile to secular democracies that value pluralism, the 

separation of church and state, free speech, minority rights, and 

freedom of religion. 

A former member of the Clinton administration, who I worked 

with in combating terrorism back in the 1990s, Richard Clarke, 

stated in testimony in 2003 that the issue of terrorist financing in 

the U.S. is a fundamental example of the shared infrastructure 

levered by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al Qaeda, all of which enjoy 

a significant degree of cooperation and coordination within our borders that commonly carries the extremist Muslim Brotherhood. All 

of these organizations are descendants of the membership and etiology of the Muslim Brotherhood. So, therefore, I think that it is 

imperative that we look at the larger problem of radical Islamic etiology of which al Qaeda exploits and propagates, but that also is 

propagated by a host of other organizations that were derived from 

the same parent, parental organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. 

As you probably are aware, in the Holy Land Foundation trial 

that was held last fall in Texas, more than 100,000 documents 

were released that were probably the most important national security documents released in the last 30 years. In those documents 

they revealed the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood itself 

had implanted itself within American borders with the same intent 

as al Qaeda, but to do it internally; that is, to carry out an internal 

jihad from within—a ‘‘civilizational jihad’’ they called it—to sabotage and to subvert U.S. democracy from within. 

I call this almost the stealth jihad. On one hand, you have open 

attacks which we recognize as terrorist attacks. Then you have infiltration. That is as dangerous an attack as well, because that undermines our whole basis of democracy. 

The fact that a Hezbollah member was able to infiltrate the CIA 

and FBI recently, and the fact that a member of the Hofstede 

Group infiltrated AIVD shows that these Islamic radical groups are 

trying to penetrate Western intelligence, and they have already 

penetrated Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian intelligence organizations. One only has to look at ISI in Pakistan to see how much 

they have been compromised historically and how they are still 

compromised and are unwilling to admit that they have far more 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
52 

knowledge about where bin Laden’s likely whereabouts are or al 

Zawahiri’s than they have admitted publicly. 

So I believe that we cannot afford to basically isolate the problem 

only as al Qaeda. One only has to look at what happened after the 

Danish cartoons, which resulted in 24-hour protection for Hirsi Ali, 

who is a member of the Dutch Parliament, and for other parliamentarians. 

Now, in the United States itself, I am submitting for the record 

an actual wanted poster, printed in an Arabic newspaper, of a 

woman named Wafa Sultan, who resides in the United States. She 

emigrated from Syria. She was a Syrian Muslim. She has spoken 

out against radical Islam on television, on al-Jazeera of all places, 

and has debated even the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood’s use of al-Qaradawi, who has himself issued fatwas calling 

for the killing of Americans in Iraq and for the killing of Jews. 

Well, he declared that Ms. Sultan insulted Islam. Then this poster 

came out that said that she was a vilifier of Islam; it said ‘‘Wanted 

for Justice.’’ That poster, which I am holding up here, is clearly the 

first time, I believe, that an American—she is an American now— 

has gone into hiding on her own volition, without the protection of 

the FBI, because of the threats stemming from the larger etiological confrontation spawned by radical Islam. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Emerson. 

[The statement of Mr. Emerson follows:] 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
53 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 81 44478A.036
54 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 82 44478A.037
55 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 83 44478A.038
56 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 84 44478A.039
57 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 85 44478A.040
58 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 86 44478A.041
59 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 87 44478A.042
60 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 88 44478A.043
61 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 89 44478A.044
62 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 90 44478A.045
63 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 91 44478A.046
64 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 92 44478A.047
65 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 93 44478A.048
66 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 94 44478A.049
67 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 95 44478A.050
68 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 96 44478A.051
69 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 97 44478A.052
70 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 98 44478A.053
71 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 99 44478A.054
72 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 100 44478A.055
73 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 101 44478A.056
74 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 102 44478A.057
75 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 103 44478A.058
76 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 104 44478A.059
77 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 105 44478A.060
78 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 106 44478A.061
79 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 107 44478A.062
80 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 108 44478A.063
81 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 109 44478A.064
82 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 110 44478A.065
83 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 111 44478A.066
84 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 112 44478A.067
85 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 113 44478A.068
86 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 114 44478A.069
87 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 115 44478A.070
88 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 116 44478A.071
89 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 117 44478A.072
90 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 118 44478A.073
91 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 119 44478A.074
92 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 120 44478A.075
93 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 121 44478A.076
94 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 122 44478A.077
95 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 123 44478A.078
96 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 124 44478A.079
97 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 125 44478A.080
98 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 126 44478A.081
99 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 127 44478A.082
100 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 128 44478A.083
101 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 129 44478A.084
102 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 130 44478A.085
103 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, all of your statements in their 

entirety will be part of the record. We really appreciate your being 

here. 

Let me start the questioning. 

First, we know that al Qaeda attacked us on 9/11. As some of 

you have indicated, we know we have made some significant 

progress, but Osama bin Laden in particular and al Qaeda in general continue to be an issue for us. Whether it is al Qaeda-specific 

or al Qaeda as the cause that other organizations or other groups 

choose to align themselves with in order to carry out terrorist action globally against Western countries, nonetheless, 7 years later, 

al Qaeda is still able to recruit; they are still able to train; and in 

particular, Osama bin Laden is still able to send out his messages, 

as well as al-Zawahiri. Whether or not they are coded messages or 

just messages of encouragement, they are still problematic to all of 

us. 

My first question is: How is it that al Qaeda has been able to 

regain strength? With Osama bin Laden still at large, what does 

this specifically mean for al Qaeda? I will ask each of you to comment. 

Mr. BERGEN. How is it that al Qaeda has regained strength? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. How is it that he has been able to regain 

strength? Secondly, what is the role that Osama bin Laden plays 

to that end? 

Mr. BERGEN. We know in 2002, Mr. Chairman, that the documents that were picked up on the battlefield after the fall of the 

Taliban revealed that al Qaeda internally felt under great pressure, and there was a fair amount of criticism for months within 

al Qaeda for attacking the United States. These documents say we 

have got an 800-pound gorilla coming after us, the United States. 

The attack was a dumb idea. 

In 2002, al Qaeda, by its own account, not by our account, was 

on the ropes. A critical component in al Qaeda’s resurgence was the 

Iraq war, because, A, it confirmed bin Laden’s large narrative 

about the United States; B, it increased radicalization around the 

Muslim world; and it increased anti-Americanism. So al Qaeda was 

able to take the Iraq war and basically use it as a life raft, and 

of course they kept their safe haven on the Afghan-Pakistan border. 

Safe havens are very important because without safe havens, you 

cannot train. Without training, you cannot be an effective terrorist. 

We do not train the American Army on the Internet. It turns out 

that you do not train effective terrorists on the Internet; you train 

them in training camps. So they kept their safe haven on the Afghan-Pakistan border, and they have this important new development in Iraq. Both the Democrats and the Republicans tend to say 

that the central front is either in Iraq or in Pakistan. The problem 

is the central fronts are in both countries right now. So those are, 

I think, some of the factors of the resurgence. 

How important is bin Laden to the movement? I believe that if 

von Stauffenberg had killed Hitler with a bomb under the conference room table in 1944, World War II would have finished 

much quicker. Bin Laden and Hitler are very different people, but 

certain people influence history very directly. As for Ayman alVerDate Aug 31 2005 21:26 Nov 24, 2008 Jkt 044478 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A478.XXX A478

hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
104 

Zawahiri and bin Laden, it was their idea for 9/11 largely. Al 

Qaeda is their creature. If you took them away from the scene, the 

organization itself would be very wounded. We weren’t attacked by 

a set of ideas on 9/11, we weren’t attacked by an ideological movement. We were attacked by an organization. Organizations have 

leaders. Bin Laden is the most important leader. If we capture or 

kill Ayman al-Zawahiri, that would be useful, but it would not be 

as important as capturing bin Laden. Ayman al-Zawahiri is somebody who, even within the organization, is not regarded with great 

love. People love bin Laden. That is a very strong word. 

Mr. GRENIER. Well, I would support what most people have just 

said. I think when we talk about al Qaeda as narrowly defined, 

that organization that was responsible for the attacks on 9/11, it 

has been able to reconstitute itself in the Pakistan-Afghanistan 

border areas. I was there in Pakistan when members of al Qaeda 

were fleeing out of Afghanistan. At that point they were intent on 

making their way through Pakistan to Iran and to the gulf. It was 

as a result of that, their sort of moving through these ratlines, if 

you will, through Pakistan, that we were able with our Pakistani 

allies to wrap up a very large number not only of senior al Qaeda 

cadres, but also of simple fighters who were coming out of Afghanistan. 

At a certain point they realized that there was an opportunity for 

them to gain safe haven in the tribal areas. The first great concentration of them we saw was in South Waziristan. We really sort 

of tumbled into that in the spring of 2004. I will not recount all 

of the agonized history, but there were effective actions that were 

taken by ourselves and by the Pakistanis there. There was a migration up into North Waziristan and into the Bajor Agency, and 

that is really still where the center, if you will, of safe haven activity on the part of al Qaeda still exists. 

Because of some of the history that Steve just mentioned, particularly the agreement that was reached by General Musharraf 

with the extremists in North Waziristan in September of 2006, unfortunately they have been able to establish themselves quite firmly in that area, and that is the situation as it still persists here 

today. 

With regard to al Qaeda in Iraq, that is a very significant phenomenon. It is somewhat different, however, I think, from the narrative that I have just described. Al Qaeda in Iraq was a creature, 

a creation, of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was sort of, roughly, 

affiliated with al Qaeda. He was not sort of a bayat-swearing member of al Qaeda, but he was able, if you will, to establish a franchise. 

And he saw a great benefit to himself and his organization in assuming, if you will, the al Qaeda brand. And as Peter has pointed 

out, we see the same thing replicating itself elsewhere, organizations which heretofore have seen themselves as part of a national 

struggle, whether in Morocco particularly, in Algeria, in Libya, and 

elsewhere. Now as they have been stymied in their efforts to take 

over their native countries they have, if you will, rebranded themselves as al Qaeda, in this case al Qaeda in the Arab Maghreb, and 

also are beginning to think of themselves and their mission in very 

different terms. The former GSPC, now a major part of al Qaeda 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
105 

in the Arab Maghreb, whereas before saw its mission as 

Islamizing, liberating their country Algeria, now they see themselves quite self-consciously as part of a global jihad. And I think 

that is significant. We are seeing the same thing now with hitherto 

independent movements in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We now see 

members of the Taliban who before, although they were providing 

assistance and safe haven to al Qaeda, now they see themselves 

much more so than before as part of the same global movement. 

The same is true of the collection of the extremist groups within 

Pakistan, the rise of Pakistanis who now refer to themselves loosely as Tehrik-e-Taliban. They now again see themselves, rather than 

people who were locked in the highly particular goals and aspirations, they now see themselves as part of a much wider movement. 

So, on the one hand, al Qaeda as narrowly defined I think is a 

phenomenon largely of the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal areas, but 

the influence of bin Laden has been one to spread the brand 

around the world. 

I disagree a little bit with Peter in that my belief is that if bin 

Laden were to die tomorrow it would not mean the end of al 

Qaeda. I think that he is a great symbol for the movement. I think 

the fact that he is still alive and remains at large is greatly encouraging to those within al Qaeda and to members of that much 

broader movement. But I think that they would find a way to carry 

on both as a movement and as an organization if he were to meet 

his demise. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Emerson. 

Mr. EMERSON. You raise a great question. How is it that al 

Qaeda could reconstitute itself in such an incredible way 61⁄2 years 

later after all of the efforts we have gone through, cutting the 

money, arresting, killing, targeting people, killing top leaders, interrogating, getting our intelligence? How could they still do this. 

I think my response would be, one, there was almost a perfect 

storm that developed right after 9/11, and one was the incredible 

fast-paced developments of information technology that allowed al 

Qaeda to transmit propaganda as well as communicate internally 

without being detected by U.S. technology. We were not fast 

enough to figure out how they were getting their tapes, how they 

were communicating among themselves. In the 1990s we picked up 

their cell phones and we picked up their satellite cell phones, but 

they have gone beyond that, way beyond that. So they figured out 

a way to communicate without us detecting what they were saying. 

We used to hear the word ‘‘chatter.’’ Well, you know what the word 

‘‘chatter’’ means; it is disparate words and doesn’t mean anything 

to us. It is nonstructured data. 

Number two, there are a lot of demobilized Jihadists from after 

the Afghanistan invasion. 

Number three, there was the liberation of territory essentially established by the Taliban and al Qaeda supporters in Waziristan 

and parts of Afghanistan and certainly in the FATA and the NorthWest Frontier Province. 

Four is European laws had not come to grips yet with the fact 

that a lot of the extremist Muslim immigrants had an easy—there 

were no laws restricting the flow back and forth between Europe 

and Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries who had supported 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
106 

terrorism. So there was a large migration, I shouldn’t say massive, 

but a large flow of people who went into Pakistan, got training, 

then came out and went back to Europe. So bases in Europe got 

established. 

And then, of course, you had self-anointed franchises. 

So al Qaeda sort of grew again by virtue of its children in the 

Maghreb, in Algeria, in Lebanon, in Gaza. 

You know, when you asked the question of the reconstitution of 

al Qaeda, you could ask the same question of Hamas, which was 

on its legs when it was blockaded entirely and it is still surviving 

very well. You could have asked the question about Islamic jihad, 

you could have asked it about GSPS. 

All of these groups show one thing in common: The transcendence of radical Islamic theology over self-interest, over civil 

interests, over any national interests, over any economic interests. 

15 of the 9/11 hijackers came from families that had wealth considered to be evaluated more than $10 million in value. So it shows 

that wealthy families produced kids who carried out the 9/11 attacks. 

So that transcendence of radical Islamic theology is what we 

were dealing with, and I think we have failed, honestly, as a government to come to terms with this. 

And I give you one great example. When Karen Hughes, who was 

Under Secretary of State, was in charge of this outreach program, 

and to use the market of ideas, she thought that 60-second commercials and radio stations were going to basically convert people 

who believed in jihad and suicide bombings into rational, democratic, secular, pluralist folks. It didn’t work. It wouldn’t work. She 

ended up meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood thinking that, if 

we are rational, they are rational. We view others the same way 

we view ourselves. Well, it wasn’t the case. They lied to her. In 

fact, we ended up empowering the Muslim Brotherhood and empowering radical Islamic groups around the world, including groups 

in the United States, into believing somehow that we are a weak 

tiger and very weak and naive in believing that somehow talking 

to people was the only way we were going to convince them that 

the free market would produce a rational response. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Emerson. 

Mr. Hoekstra. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the 

witnesses. I appreciate your time and your knowledge on this background. And with all that we have studied on the committee over 

the last number of years, I think we start and have an appreciation 

for how complex that issue is and how difficult it is to get your 

hands around it. And I think in this last question, in your opening 

testimony, you talked about one thing that I agree with you on, is 

their ability to use new technology, use the Information Age, and 

use it to their benefit to drive their message to perhaps provide 

some direction to where they want these disparate organizations to 

move and to get things done. 

I think the other thing that I believe about al Qaeda is that it 

is a learning organization. It adapts as its reality changes, it 

adapts very, very quickly. They have used various things to proVerDate Aug 31 2005 21:26 Nov 24, 2008 Jkt 044478 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A478.XXX A478

hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
107 

mote their brand identity, whether it was the occupation of the two 

holy places or the holy cities. 

A while back the popular line was to say, well, you know you 

need to deal with the Palestinian issue, because that is what is 

fueling al Qaeda and radical jihadism. Then it is Iraq. Then it is 

the Danish cartoons. Now it may be builders sometime over the 

next couple months as that evolves and takes on a life of its own. 

Then it was 9/11. But they have been very, very effective in driving 

their message through technology. 

I was in Libya last week, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco. I have been 

to Algeria. And it is interesting, as they have evolved, it is very interesting to be able to go and meet with Muammar Khadafi, and 

find out that Khadafi is now an ally with us in a certain context 

against radical Jihadists, as are the governments in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. So as radical Jihadists morph, so do we. And I 

think we can make a very good argument that we need to do more, 

but we need to do more of it quicker. 

The thing that I would be interested in is your perception of the 

ability of al Qaeda, al Qaeda Central as we have referred to it out 

of Pakistan, the Pak-Afghan border, to extend its reach and influence into Western Europe, into the United States, to coordinate, direct, plan, train attacks against these. How good is it? 

During the break I think we were talking about the book, there 

was a book that came out, Leadership Jihad. And in that book, he 

makes the argument that al Qaeda Central isn’t that important 

anymore, that radical Islam has taken a life of its own, and that 

eliminating bin Laden, taking care of Zawahiri, it is not that big 

of a deal anymore. I think the panel here may disagree with it. But 

I would be interested in your ability or your perception of al Qaeda 

to be able, from al Qaeda Central, to project into Western Europe 

and into the United States through homegrown terrorism. And we 

will go through the list. 

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hoekstra. Al Qaeda’s 

ability to expand influence into Western Europe is obviously pretty 

high. I mean, the statement by John Evans, the head of MI5, that 

there were 2,000 people that they consider serious security risks 

sort of speaks for itself. Britain of course is particularly problematic because so many British Muslims visit Pakistan every year; 70 

percent of British Muslims are Pakistani, and a disproportionate 

number of those are Kashmiri. 

The problem is also true in many European countries, but we are 

somewhat insulated by several factors in the United States. First 

of all, there is something called the American Dream. I grew up in 

Britain; I am not aware of a British dream or an EU dream certainly. And a country built on immigration like the United States 

is able to integrate its American Muslims much better. American 

Muslims are better educated than the average American, they have 

higher incomes, et cetera, et cetera. 

It is very hard to prove negatives, but I don’t think al Qaeda 

sleeper cells exist in this country. If they exist, they are either comatose or dead. They have done nothing in the last several years. 

We have seen people particularly with al Qaeda living in the 

United States, but they are very small in number compared to the 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
108 

numbers we are seeing in Europe. And I can give you the names, 

but the names, you can count them on a few hands. 

So I think al Qaeda’s ability to extend its influence into the 

United States is very small. But that has never been a problem 

anyway. When being attacked by jihadi terrorists, they are people 

coming from outside: Ramzi Yousef, Ahmad Ressam, the 9/11 hijackers. So luckily we are somewhat insulated. In terms of Europe 

it is a very different picture. 

Now, of course you could have a mass casualty attack on a group 

of Americans in Europe quite easily. If the plane bomb plot in the 

summer of 2006 had succeeded, that is six American airliners, do 

the math; it is what, almost 2,000 people. It would have been a 9/ 

11 style event. So that is really where the problem is, and that 

problem is going to get worse rather than better because for demographic reasons Europeans are not having children anymore. When 

you visit Florence in the future, it will be like the neutron bomb 

has gone off, where there are buildings but no Italians because 

Italians are simply not having kids. These countries face existential 

choices, which is we are either going to have a country without people or we are going to have to import a lot of people from somewhere else. And where will those people come from? In most European countries, the Middle East or North Africa. And, through a 

combination of European racism, a certain amount of alienation, a 

certain amount of homesickness, a number of those immigrants 

will turn to the al Qaeda ideology. Think about 9/11. 9/11 wasn’t 

incubated really in Afghanistan; it was as much incubated in Hamburg as it was in Afghanistan. 

So that is the problem going forward. And in some ways there 

is some optimism there, because it is harder to get in the United 

States. European countries also are realizing belatedly that they 

have this domestic problem. 

Mr. GRENIER. I would very much agree with what Peter has just 

said. One of the things that I would point to as we look at the number of actual terrorist attacks, such as what occurred in London in 

July of 2005 and a number of others, to include some potentially 

catastrophic attacks that have been hatched in Western Europe 

and fortunately have not come to fruition. For the most part, if I 

am not mistaken, the would-be perpetrators and/or perpetrators of 

those acts have been self-motivated and self-organized. These were 

not individuals who were recruited out of the tribal areas in Pakistan and then dispatched into Western Europe in order to mount 

these attacks. For the most part, these are people who came together sort of self-consciously, if you will, as part of a community 

nursing resentments and deciding to do something about it locally. 

Where the link with al Qaeda has occurred is they have reached 

back from a place where they could get support, either it is ideological support, religious instruction, technical support, financial support, back into the Afghan-Pakistan tribal areas. And I think that 

is significant; where the impetus, where the initiative has come 

from is significant. And the fact that the impetus came from areas 

far removed from the safe haven is very significant. 

As Peter has pointed out, the chances of that sort of a plot being 

hatched in a place like Western Europe are far greater than a similar thing taking place in the United States. Number one, there is 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
109 

a much larger Muslim population in many of the Western European countries, much less integration, much more perceived cause 

for resentment and hatred of the West than, fortunately, is the 

case here in the United States. It doesn’t mean that it couldn’t happen here in the United States, but I think that the chances for it 

are much greater in Western Europe. 

One of the great concerns that I have is the relative ease of 

transport between Western Europe and the United States; the fact 

that we have a very permissive visa regime between Western European countries and the United States which would enable those 

who would do us harm who are not indigenous to the United States 

to travel into the United States. That is not an argument for somehow raising much higher visa barriers, but it is a fact that, given 

the nature of our society, given the open society that we want to 

foster and maintain, it necessarily carries with it a much greater 

risk and vulnerability. 

Mr. EMERSON. I would say that, first of all, there is a common 

narrative in al Qaeda’s mantra with all of the defendants arrested 

in every single plot since 9/11. That mantra is that there is a war 

against Islam, it has been carried out by the West or the U.S. or— 

by the West since the crusade in 1095 and therefore we have to 

avenge it. And that was the mantra of the Danish suspects arrested in September, that was the mantra of the German suspects 

arrested earlier this year, that was the mantra of the British suspects arrested in the second plot and in the videos released in the 

first attack in July of 2005. And, by the way, that is also the 

mantra of the averted attacks in the United States. And I guess 

I would disagree with Peter, who I, by the way, used to work with 

very closely many years ago, and I would disagree with him on one 

point: That I think that the radicalism in the United States has not 

manifested itself because we have done a much better job of intelligence gathering in terms of preventing attacks. But I think the 

radicalism is pervasive here because of the groups that exist here. 

One can see they all were derived—not all of them, but some of the 

mainstream, quote, groups were derived from the Muslim Brotherhood as revealed in the Holy Land documents. And their mantra 

is, and you can hear it and we hear it all the time when we attend 

their conferences, is that there is a war against Islam. And a Canadian intelligence official testified last year that that is the one single motivating factor in inducing young Muslim men to carry out 

attacks, that type of anger. 

And so we averted an attack at Fort Dix, only because of a Circuit City clerk who saw—he was copying videos and he saw something suspicious. We averted an attack in Ohio in Peoria. We averted an attack in Lodi. And people make fun of these arrests because 

people are arrested at a very early stage of the plots, and the FBI 

becomes a victim of becoming too aggressive. Had these plots matured more and the public had seen much more of the evidence, 

then I think the public would be convinced that we have a serious 

radical Islamic danger in the United States. It doesn’t mean that 

the vast majority of Muslims support it. They don’t. But there is 

a radicalization process going on here largely induced by some of 

the mainstream groups that, unfortunately, have been considered 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
110 

to be partners with the FBI when they should be considered outcasts. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra. 

Mr. Holt. 

Mr. HOLT. I yield to Ms. Eshoo. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Eshoo. 

Ms. ESHOO. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you for your testimony today. I have four questions. 

My first question is, what do you estimate the number of al 

Qaeda in Iraq today, and what did you estimate al Qaeda to be 

when we invaded? That is my first question. 

My second question is on training. Can you describe where al 

Qaeda’s training is today, the quality of it, the number of graduates, so to speak, that they produce? Give us some indication of 

what you know about that. And to what extent do you think al 

Qaeda is responsible for the acts of murder, kidnapping, terror 

against Iraqi Christians? 

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you for those very excellent questions. The 

first one, al Qaeda in Iraq today, the size. Al Qaeda in Iraq is 80 

to 90 percent an Iraqi organization. That has changed over time. 

When it started of course it was largely foreigners. Al Qaeda in 

Iraq, even though it is a relatively small part of the insurgency, 

perhaps 3,000 would be the minimal number, maybe 5,000 would 

be the maximal, who is conducting 80 to 90 percent of the suicide 

attacks and therefore has had a disproportionate effect on the 

course of the war. 

The size of al Qaeda in Iraq when we invaded was zero. There 

was no—Zarqawi was in Kurdish Iraq, northern Iraq, which of 

course was an area more under our control than under Saddam. So 

there was no al Qaeda presence in Iraq. Unfortunately, as a result 

of our invasion, there is now. 

The second question, training al Qaeda today, where is it happening, how good are the graduates, what are they getting. Let’s 

look at the London attack of July 7, 2005 as a sort of model of this 

training. Two of the guides, two of the leaders trained in an al 

Qaeda training camp on the North-West Frontier Province. 

What are they learning? They are learning how to make a bomb 

with hydrogen peroxide. And one of my proposals is we need to be 

very careful henceforth about the way we control industrial 

strength hydrogen peroxide in this country. A bomb made out of 

hydrogen peroxide, and I have seen this being demonstrated in 

Britain, a relatively small amount would basically blow out the entire—everybody in this room would be dead. This is not the sort of 

thing you get at your hairdresser, industrial strength hydrogen 

peroxide. 

That is what is being taught. That was also the material that 

was going to be used in the summer plot to bring down the American airliners, that was also the material that was going to be used 

in the Ramstein Air Force Base. The numbers of people who are 

being trained are relatively small, but they are, unfortunately, 

enough to create these plots. 

Under the Taliban in Afghanistan, you are talking about hundreds of people going through training camps at any given moment. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
111 

Here, you are talking about 10, 20 guys, all guys of course, in a 

small compound not amenable to overhead imagery, not amenable 

to bombing, disguised, able to get the bomb-making, how to run a 

cell, enough to basically be an effective terrorist. So I hope that answers that question. 

And then the final question, al Qaeda’s attacks on Iraqi Christians, I really don’t know the answer to. 

Ms. ESHOO. Thank you. Does anyone want to add to what was 

just said in answering these questions? 

Mr. GRENIER. I think I would add a little bit with regard to the 

situation in Iraq. As Peter has pointed out, al Qaeda in Iraq is primarily an Iraqi phenomenon. Perhaps 90 percent of its numbers 

have been Iraqis. And so, yes, while I would agree that there really 

was no al Qaeda in Iraq before the invasion, part of the reason that 

we suddenly had this flowering, if you will, of al Qaeda in Iraq was 

that although there was very little visible sign of an Islamic 

radicalization among some elements of the Iraqi population that we 

saw elsewhere in the Arab and Islamic world, we didn’t see it in 

Iraq largely because of the climate of repression that existed there. 

Once a vacuum was created, the Ba’ath Party was removed, the 

Iraqi Army was removed, it suddenly became possible for this 

broad cultural phenomenon to manifest itself inside Iraq. It was 

precipitated I think by outsiders, foreigners who came into Iraq. 

But very quickly, again, in the absence of the further discrediting 

of the Ba’ath Party, radical Islamism became the primary ideology 

through which Iraqi nationalism expressed itself. 

Mr. ESHOO. It is a tragedy is what it is. That is just one word 

to describe it. 

Let me ask this. In moving forward, in January of 2009 we are 

going to have new leadership in the White House. And if two—either one of the Democrats are elected, they are promising a change 

of policy in Iraq. Can you fast forward and tell us what you think 

Iraq would look like with a drawdown of American troops and what 

it would look like, what Iraq would look like and al Qaeda? 

The CHAIRMAN. And if you can do it briefly, because we want to 

get all members to ask their questions. 

Mr. BERGEN. Briefly. Al Qaeda has a narrative about the United 

States as a paper tiger narrative. Any drawdown from Iraq will inform that narrative. Vietnam, Beirut, Mogadishu. 

We are on the horns of a dilemma. We are going to confirm their 

narrative and we will help their strategy the less we are there. On 

the other hand, the fact we are there increases radicalization and 

gives energy to the jihadi movement around the world. 

So my short answer is, it is a very difficult problem, because you 

have got to balance the fact that you are increasing radicalization 

by us being there, and yet at the same time if we simply abandon 

the field to al Qaeda they have a strategy as well, which is to regroup, get a place for a safe haven in Iraq. Right now they are not 

doing well, but we know that the Iraqi Army is not going to do better than the U.S. military against this group. And as it is more of 

an Iraqi problem, we can guarantee that al Qaeda—if it is more of 

an Iraqi military approach to al Qaeda, that is less strong than a 

U.S. military approach. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
112 

Mr. GRENIER. I guess my short answer to the question is that it 

very much would depend on how a drawdown occurred. Right now 

al Qaeda in Iraq has been knocked back on its heels. It is on the 

run. And the reason for it is because they were able to show themselves for who and what they are to the mass of the Sunni population in western Iraq. Living under al Qaeda in a place where they 

actually hold sway is not a pleasant experience, and that is the 

reason why we have had the Sunni Awakening, why the Sons of 

Iraq have organized themselves, and why they have accepted support from the United States. 

So I guess I would say that in the context of any sort of drawdown from Iraq, it would be very important for us to maintain the 

U.S. connection with the Sunni Awakening and to continue to support that. I think that we could do that with far fewer troops in 

Iraq. Quite frankly, as someone who spent 21⁄2 years devoted to 

Iraq since just before the invasion, why we are enmeshing ourselves in intra-Sunni fighting in Iraq is somewhat of a mystery to 

me. But I think that we could maintain what we need to do in the 

terrorism fight against al Qaeda with much smaller numbers of 

troops in Iraq. 

Mr. EMERSON. I would just say, I agree with Bob’s comments 

that essentially it is how you withdraw. And if it is a precipitous 

withdrawal, I think that al Qaeda would fill that void. I mean, al 

Qaeda had its ebbs and flows, and it is really now at its nadir because of the opposition that it instilled and the resentment that is 

so popular in the Sunni areas. 

The issue of al Qaeda seeing the United States on the run, 

vacating, running away, like bin Laden has said we ran from Beirut, we ran from Somalia, we ran from Vietnam, this would fuel 

their sense of emboldenment and I think empower them further. So 

it is how we draw down, and it is how you conduct the policies, as 

Bob just said, of continuing certain policies that have been very 

successful in terms of fueling a popular resentment against al 

Qaeda in Iraq, which really has resulted in a dramatic reduction 

of support for al Qaeda in Iraq in the last 2 years. 

You had asked a question before about to what extent is al 

Qaeda responsible for killing Iraqi Christians. We have worked 

with some Christians in certain Muslim countries, including Iraq. 

At least I have been in contact with them. And in Iraq, as you 

know, the Christian community has been decimated. A large exodus, about 50 percent have actually left the country, and the other 

50 percent have had to almost relocate themselves because of being 

forced out of areas. They have been forced out of areas because of 

a coalition. First it started off by al Qaeda, but now it has been 

picked up by radical Shiites who essentially had joined forces with 

the Sunnis at one point but now they have picked up the 

radicalized movement to push the Christians out of Iraq and to 

deny them. As you know, a major church leader was just assassinated just the other day, and that has been a regular occurrence 

almost every month now. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
113 

Following up on that, Mr. Emerson. If we leave, will the 

Chaldeans be better off in Iraq? Any chance at all that they would 

be better off? 

Mr. EMERSON. You know, it is a good question, Mr. Issa. I don’t 

know. The Chaldeans have been particularly oppressed. 

Mr. ISSA. But likely—just, you know, limited time here. But likely, if we were to leave today, they would be worse off? 

Mr. EMERSON. They would not be protected as much. Right. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Grenier, if we were to leave Iraq today, with the 

current Shia government and their mixed history on how they treat 

the Sunni, would it be reasonable to assume that al Qaeda would 

have an advantage by simply playing the Shia government and any 

failures of their fairness in order to gain a foothold of support back 

in the Sunni community? 

In other words—all my questions are very straightforward. A lot 

of people would have you believe a whole bunch of things about 

Iraq. The only thing that I am concerned about today with Iraq is 

if we leave are we better off? Some people have tried to say that 

if we get out of Iraq now things will be better. Specifically, the current government, as you see it, and that has been a public thing, 

today is not a government that Sunnis trust or that Sunnis believe 

they get fairness from. Realistically, the strides we have made in 

the Sunni community to get Sunni to fight this Sunni insurgency 

of al Qaeda, wouldn’t that take a tremendous step backwards if we 

were to precipitously leave or if we were simply not there today, 

so to speak? 

Mr. GRENIER. If there was a total U.S. withdrawal? Is that what 

you—— 

Mr. ISSA. That is what I am saying. 

Mr. GRENIER. I think that the short answer to your question is, 

yes, the situation I think would be far worse. The Sunni dominated 

government does not now nor do I think in the near term they are 

likely—— 

Mr. ISSA. The Shia dominated government. 

Mr. GRENIER. The Shia dominated government, is not likely to 

provide institutional support to the Sunni Awakening. Quite frankly, they see it as a threat to themselves. 

Mr. ISSA. And I can understand that with the historic past it is 

going to take time to heal those wounds. 

Mr. Bergen, when we look at the rest of the areas in which there 

has been radical jihadist activity over the years, the Hamas, funded by Iran, are Sunni; they in fact have conducted with Shia money 

for a long time a war, an insurgency against Israel. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. BERGEN. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA. The United States hasn’t been there, and we failed, all 

of us have failed to stop it, as I see it, because in fact the United 

States has not been able to get the buy-in and the actual combating 

of Hamas by the Palestinians. No matter how we look at good efforts, bad efforts, the bottom line is the Palestinian Authority has 

never been able to effectively attack Hamas and Israel has been effective only in attacking them, but in fact ultimately not eliminating the radicalism. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
114 

Is that a fair assessment of what we deal with in the Palestinian 

territories today, in Gaza particularly? 

Mr. BERGEN. I am not an expert in this area, but it seems so. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. In Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood had its 

roots and continues to this day, would you say that the Egyptian 

Government, whether we approve or don’t approve of their tactics, 

have for the most part been able to contain the activities of the 

Muslim Brotherhood, their growth, their exports, and their terrorist activities, recognizing there have been some stellar attacks 

over the years? But would you generally say that Egypt has, at its 

own expense in its own way, with limited help from the outside 

world, been able to contain the Muslim Brotherhood? 

Mr. BERGEN. Well, yes and no. Because you can make the argument that much of al Qaeda’s violence stems from the treatment 

of people like Ayman al-Zawahiri in Egyptian prisons. That is 

where he got more radicalized. And of course, the Muslim Brotherhood has done quite well in the elections; I would disagree with 

Steve on this point. I mean, al Qaeda hates the Muslim Brotherhood precisely because it participates in elections. So these are apples and oranges in many ways. 

Mr. ISSA. The reason that I am going through this line of questioning, recognizing that each one of these has a pitfall in some 

way, is as we as the intelligence community in a public hearing 

versus our often private, we are here to talk in a term of policy. 

Realistically, when we look at all the countries, and I only went 

through a smattering of them, I could have gotten into Lebanon 

and Hezbollah. Isn’t our only choice, whether it is in Iraq or anywhere else in the Muslim world, our only choice to find a government that will work with us, arm them, equip them, assist them 

in not radicalizing further, and fight jihadism in each and every 

one of those countries? And we could obviously go to Germany and 

other countries that are not Muslim countries and deal with theirs. 

But isn’t that ultimately our only choice, that whether we have 

troops in Iraq or not, we are going to have to be side-by-side with 

some Iraqi Government stopping this and stemming the flow of 

jihadism from that country? Isn’t that ultimately the only choice 

America has in not one or two but in dozens of countries? 

Mr. BERGEN. Not really. Because it depends on what form of government you are talking about. It is not an accident that so many 

members of al Qaeda develop in countries with authoritarian regimes. 

Mr. ISSA. Like Germany? 

Mr. BERGEN. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen. I 

mean, look at the vast disproportionate numbers within al Qaeda 

are these kinds of—emerge out of these kinds of societies. 

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I might just note that 

what the American President and this Congress have been attempting to do in Iraq is to make sure that Iraq is not an oppressive, totalitarian government such as the ones cited by the gentleman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 

Mr. Thompson. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
115 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, witnesses, for being here. I was out at another hearing; I don’t know 

if this has been said already, but I don’t think you can say it 

enough. With the discussion today about how the al Qaeda has become stronger over the recent time and in light of the hearings yesterday in the Senate and probably what is happening today in the 

House, where General Petraeus has stated that there is no light at 

the end of the tunnel, we haven’t turned the corner, and we have 

moved the champagne to the back of the refrigerator, I think it is 

important to note that none of these problems are the fault of the 

very brave and heroic U.S. military people who are serving abroad. 

They are doing an outstanding job, and I just don’t want anybody 

to come away with the feeling that they have let us down. 

Al Qaeda has used the situation with the Palestinians to generate a lot of anti-Western outrage throughout the Muslim community, and the administration has just recently—this administration 

has just recently engaged in trying to figure out a peace process for 

that situation. Has the administration’s reluctance to encourage a 

resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict heightened al Qaeda’s 

ability to build popular support and recruit new members? 

Mr. EMERSON. If I could respond and just add something to what 

Mr. Issa—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. No. You can do that later. This is my time. 

Mr. EMERSON. Okay. I won’t take your time away. I think that 

the bottom line is you can’t make peace unless somebody will make 

peace with you. And Israel faces a problem that it lives in a bad 

neighborhood and it can’t move. And Mr. Abbas may have good intentions, but he can’t basically even tie his shoelaces without getting permission. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you don’t think that waiting 7 years to engage 

has been a problem? 

Mr. EMERSON. I think in fact engagement is not the answer. I 

think that the notion even that an Arab-Israeli solution is going to 

tamp down al Qaeda is absolutely erroneous. And I think that if 

Israel was eradicated tomorrow you would still have the same degree of Islamic radicalism. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I understand. Thank you. 

Mr. BERGEN. We are interested in swing voters in the Muslim 

world. We are not going to influence bin Laden. He is irreconcilable. What we are interested in is basically getting the Muslim 

world to change its opinion about the United States. And there is 

no single issue that is more important than the Israeli-Palestinian 

process. And I would add to that that the Kashmiri peau process 

is something the United States hasn’t really engaged in, but that 

is something the United States should take a much stronger role 

in because there are some good movements there. We have done 

very little to help that process. And that is how al Qaeda often recruits people, through the Kashmiri militant process. 

Mr. GRENIER. If I could just add to that. I strongly disagree with 

Mr. Emerson. I think that our failure to use our influence in a way 

that would ameliorate the situation in Israel and Palestine has 

very much helped to improve the climate in which al Qaeda is able 

to recruit elements to its cause. But, as I think Peter is pointing 

out, even more so I think that it affects the climate within which 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
116 

terrorists operate. The vast majority of the Islamic world are moderate, they are not inclined or not susceptible themselves to becoming terrorists. However, I think that many of them are ambivalent. 

Many who don’t have to live under the deprivations of al Qaeda 

themselves feel fundamentally ambivalent about the fact that al 

Qaeda is among the few elements in the Islamic world who are confronting what they perceive broadly in the Islamic world as an 

enemy. 

The only way that we are going to eliminate al Qaeda is to isolate them and to turn the mass of the Islamic population actively 

against them. I don’t think you do that in the context of a much 

broader narrative in which Muslims are being seen as oppressed. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. There are about 500,000 Pakistanis 

living in the United Kingdom, and the planners of Britain’s most 

serious terrorist plots, the 2005 London underground bombings and 

the 2006 plot to bomb British airliners en route to the United 

States came about because of folks who are trained, terrorists who 

are trained in al Qaeda camps in Pakistan before they return to 

Britain. Do you think that the connection between Britain’s Pakistani population and al Qaeda safe havens in the FATA is a problem? Is there a connection there, and is that a problem for us? 

Mr. BERGEN. The short answer is yes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. In light of what the CIA Director said the other 

day about training Westerners, we would have a hard time distinguishing if they tried to come into this country? 

Mr. EMERSON. In fact, he was referring to the German plot, 

where the two Westerners had gone to Pakistan together with a 

Pakistani immigrant to Germany, and who subsequently just blew 

himself up in a suicide attack. But the two Germans had been to 

Pakistan to train. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Are they training any Americans there? Do you 

have any knowledge? 

Mr. EMERSON. I do not know of any specific knowledge of Americans being trained. I have talked to people in the intelligence community who say that there are Americans of—American immigrants here who have gone back to Pakistan, as we saw in the Lodi 

connection, to carry out attacks back here when they come back 

here. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Anybody else? 

Mr. BERGEN. The only American I can think of is Adam Gadahn. 

He is an exception that proves the rule. This is quite unusual. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, sometimes 

the difficulty of these kinds of hearing is that in a short time people are trying to make their points about where we are and either 

what we did wrong or right. But one thing I found that is completely missing today is putting in context. I am going read a couple things, if I can, quickly. 

One, Mr. Emerson, you talked about the fact that they talk often 

about Beirut, and then we left; the USS Cole, and how we left 

Yemen. All of those things, not only they talk about, but they use 

them in recruiting materials. We have recruiting materials where 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
117 

they recruited people around the world. So we need to put all of 

this in—that all happened before 9/11, that they were actively recruiting based on their successes and the fact that they chased us 

out of places I think is unbelievable. They also use the African embassy bombings. Somalia. They list them all. The 1993 World 

Trade Center, they consider that a successful attack. And they use 

them in recruiting materials. 

So this notion that all of a sudden now they are recruiting based 

on Iraq does not put it in the proper context, I don’t think. And 

I think that if we are going to make a knowledgeable assessment 

here we need to set all the facts on the table. And I just want to— 

a couple of things. This notion, or at least the image that has been 

given out today is that, gee, there is no terrorism existed in Iraq 

before we got there. That is clearly not true. It is clearly not true. 

And it wasn’t al Qaeda sponsored, but it was very interesting the 

parallels. I am just going to read a few that we know since the invasion. 

According to correspondence between two Iraqi entities, 79 regime directed attacks were successful against ‘‘saboteurs, Kurdish 

factions, U.N. Operations, and various international NGOs. A routine example is found in a Fedayeen staff officer responding to 

Uday Hussein’s authorization of a series of bomb attacks against 

foreigners staying in hotels in the northern region. Documents indicate that the regime’s use of terrorism was standard practice, although not always successful. From 1991 through 2003, the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power. Under Saddam, the Iraqi regime used its paramilitary Fedayeen-Saddam 

training camps to train terrorists for use inside and outside of Iraq. 

These are things that we know and are factual. 

In 1999, the top 10 graduates of each class Fedayeen-Saddam 

class were specifically chosen for assignment to London, where they 

were to be ready to conduct operations anywhere in Europe. A 

memo specifically states that these trainees are designated for suicide operations. 

One more memo from Saddam to the Revolutionary Council in 

the Iraqi Intelligence Service directed Saddam’s decision to form a 

group to start, quote, hunting Americans present on Arab soil, especially Somalia. A separate memo indicates Saddam ordering the 

Iraqi Intelligence Service Director to set up operations inside Somalia. The overlap between bin Laden’s and Saddam’s interests in 

Somalia provides a tactical example of the parallel between Iraq 

and radical Islam. 

Obviously, they weren’t working in cahoots, but their mission 

was identical. At the same time Saddam was ordering action in Somalia aimed at the American presence, Osama bin Laden was 

doing exactly the same. 

And I guess my point being, and I hope you can flush this out 

a little bit, that not only at the time I think, Mr. Bergen, you mentioned that they were saying they are down and out and, gee, we 

shouldn’t have done it, there are also many who argue in al Qaeda 

at the time they weren’t doing enough. They needed to be more aggressive. They needed to get more successes like the ones that they 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
118 

had had where they had the great successes, Beirut, Somalia. And 

the list goes on. They were trying to promote more of that. 

So I don’t think it is fair to say, well, they were down on the 

ropes and they weren’t doing any recruiting, and this breathes new 

life and taught them how to recruit. None of that is really true. 

There is a long history of these relationships. I mean, Abu Abbas 

of the PLF was found giving safe haven, who was the chief sponsor 

of the Achille Lauro event, in Baghdad in 2003. There is a long 

connection, and this guy was a Stalinist to the hilt. I think he had 

the largest collection of Stalinist works because he believed in the 

Stalinist method of cutouts and operatives to do his dirty work 

around the world. That is where he learned it. At least that is what 

he said he did, he learned it from those folks. 

So I think we have to be careful about this. Iraq can’t be handled 

from an intelligence perspective in isolation. It cannot. When you 

loaded up 130,000 troops in Afghanistan, to expect that he wasn’t 

going to do the same kind of things that he was already doing 

against us in other places around the world is ludicrous. The fact 

that Iran wouldn’t do it because somehow it was a nice war in Afghanistan and not a nice war in Iraq really doesn’t make any intelligence sense. And the notion that you said, well, gee, if we were 

to put 130,000 troops on the Afghan border, I would be really curious to know how you believe that would have in any way impacted 

operations in the tribal areas. 

And, Mr. Grenier, I would like you to respond to that as well, 

knowing the Pakistani Constitution clearly separated those areas 

out of their own country, which has added to their own difficulty 

there. And I would appreciate any response. Again, I am just looking for—it has been very focused today. We should put this in the 

proper context so we understand that terrorism didn’t just reinvent 

itself and automatically appear in Iraq the day we set foot on their 

soil. 

Mr. BERGEN. Of course that is correct. But the Iraq war amplified the energy in the jihadi movement. And without detaining you 

with the details, that is simply an objective fact. There is a great 

deal of evidence for this. 

The documents you quoted from are—the overall assessment of 

those documents is there is no operational link between al Qaeda 

and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. That is the document you were 

quoting from earlier. We are presumably talking about al Qaeda; 

we are not talking about Abu Abbas or others in this hearing; we 

are talking about people who can actually attack the United States. 

Abu Abbas killed of course Leon Klinghoffer, but that is one person, that is not a national security problem. So you asked about 

Pakistan. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would Italy agree with your assessment? How do 

you take terrorism in isolation and say the only group capable of 

attacking the United States is al Qaeda? I would be curious to your 

answer to that. Is the only group we should be worried about al 

Qaeda? 

Mr. BERGEN. I am not worried about radical vegetarians attacking the United States right now, but maybe at some point in the 

future. But al Qaeda—— 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
119 

Mr. ROGERS. Your cynicism is a bit offensive when you list the 

organizations, and the al Qaeda in the Maghreb is a great example. 

They migrated there for the financing, but they were still a threat, 

killed 150,000 people. I don’t know how you would dismiss that 

with a glib comment. That is a serious terrorist organization, took 

the lives of 150,000 people in the 1990s in Algeria. That is just to 

be dismissed? 

Mr. BERGEN. As to your question on Pakistan, there is a tremendous opportunity on Pakistan. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would understand why you wouldn’t answer the 

question, sir. 

Mr. BERGEN. As to your question on Pakistan, support for suicide 

bombing has dropped from 33 percent to 9 percent in the last several years. Support for bin Laden personally has dropped from 70 

percent to 4 percent in the last 9 months in the Northwest Frontier 

Province where he lives. 

There is a tremendous opportunity in Pakistan, but also a tremendous potential trap. Nothing has discredited Pakistani officials 

more than the claim that they are stooges of the United States, one 

of the reasons Musharraf is such an unpopular guy. So we have to 

be very careful in our responses in Pakistan. 

I think Pakistanis are beginning to dimly realize that this is a 

problem that is blowing back on themselves. Benazir Bhutto after 

all was the most popular politician in the country. She was killed 

by a Taliban cell. So I think that this year, if the Pakistanis don’t 

do what is required politically, the stars are aligning perfectly both 

in terms of the public opinion and also the politics at the higher 

level. 

So, just to strike a note of optimism, this year could be the year 

that Pakistan finally gets its act together, because previously it has 

not been clear whether it is a lack of willingness or a lack of capability or both that they haven’t gotten rid of the Taliban and the 

al Qaeda on their territory. So, looking forward, this might be a 

moment of opportunity. 

Mr. EMERSON. If I could associate myself with your comments. I 

think you are 100 percent correct that we can’t look at this in a 

vacuum. And the fact is that Saddam—I wrote a book in 1991 

about an Iraqi terrorist defector, and he detailed all of the terrorist 

operations that he was involved with or he was aware of that were 

supported by Saddam. And they were massive. They were against 

the United States in terms of planning or even carrying out operations. 

And so I think you are 100 percent right that we overthrew a re- gime that was a terrorist regime, that was carrying out $25,000 

bounties for suicide bombers in Israel, that was carrying out operations in Europe against American embassies, that was a haven for 

hoards of terrorists from the Palestinian groups, secular Palestinian groups and the Marxist groups, and also some of the jihadist 

groups. Even though there was no linkage between 9/11 and Saddam, he still had linkages with Hezbollah, and Hezbollah had 

trained with him and he had provided weapons to Hezbollah. So 

you would think, how could this be, a secular—a Sunni providing 

weapons to a Shiite religious group. Well, this is the strange bedfellows that they produced. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
120 

So I think you are 100 percent right to note that that is the context in which we are dealing. And terrorism suddenly didn’t arise 

in Iraq just because we stepped in there in 2003; it had long been 

there. 

Mr. GRENIER. Clearly, Saddam has attempted to use terrorism 

for his own ends in the past and/or was supportive of terrorist efforts elsewhere, as Steve has just pointed out. In 1991, I have direct knowledge of the efforts on the part of Saddam Hussein and 

regime to employ Iraqi operatives as terrorists to attack American 

targets in the context of the first Gulf War. Fortunately, their 

tradecraft was very bad and we and our allies were able to wrap 

most of them up. I think probably the most notable example of 

those attempts occurred in Manila, as I recall. 

With regard to efforts on the part of Saddam’s operatives to get 

engaged in Somalia, I am not personally aware of that. I think, as 

Peter has pointed out, I am not aware of the compelling body of 

evidence of Saddam’s active support to Islamically inspired terrorists. There has been some dabbling on the margins, but I don’t 

think there was a link that was ever firmly made. But with regard 

to the fact that obviously he played host to Abu Abbas, that is a 

matter of historical record. 

Mr. ROGERS. But don’t you think it is very clear by the evidence 

and even what was uncovered since, that ideologically he wasn’t a 

radical Islam supporter, but for his own aims and ends he certainly 

did use, operate, and attempt, like you said, some successful, some 

not so successful, but he was certainly engaged in the activity. The 

evidence proves it. 

Mr. GRENIER. He tends to employ terrorist methodologies. 

Mr. ROGERS. My point is, if you commit a crime, I am not sure 

the motive of doing it for ideological reasons or for personal reasons, you have still committed the crime. 

The CHAIRMAN. But let’s stop the spinning. And by the rationale 

expressed here, then the ends justifies the means, and we ought to 

be prepared to invade other areas of the world that have similar 

conditions. And clearly that has not been the policy of our government, and we need to recognize that we are—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I don’t know where you are suggesting the spinning 

necessarily. Presenting the facts as you know them, you can take 

them for what you want. You can like the war or not. But the problem is if you only hear one set of facts you can’t make a conclusion. 

I am offended that you would say that. 

The CHAIRMAN. No. What I am trying to say is that we are where 

we are today because decisions were made to abandon the effort 

against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and make a hard charge into Iraq. 

Mr. ROGERS. There has been no abandonment of that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we certainly have not—we did not put the 

resources in there when we had bin Laden in Tora Bora. We left, 

and in fact Mr. Bergen in an article that he wrote said we pulled 

out the Fifth Special Forces which were the specialists for the—— 

Mr. ROGERS. And I would remind the chairman that the surge 

happened there after the Taliban regrouped itself near Quetta, not 

the al Qaeda. And then they have subsequently come in through 

the strength of people like Mehsud and others who have fostered 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
121 

that. That is a big difference than blaming the forces on the 

ground—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody is blaming the forces. What we are saying is that policy decisions have brought us where we are today, 

and that brings us back to the mess that we are in that is going 

to be passed on to the next administration. 

And, which brings me to a question that I want to ask you three 

gentlemen: Do you have a recommendation for the policymakers? 

Based on where we are today, based on the fact that we are going 

to elect a new President with a new administration that is going 

to have to I think refocus our foreign policy, do each of you, because you are experts in your respective fields that we want to 

hear from, do you have a recommendation for policymakers? And 

we will start with Mr. Bergen. 

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you. Let me just quickly say, Afghanistan 

and Pakistan are part of the same problem. They are not two distinct problems. Just as it would be completely absurd to have a discussion about Palestine without a discussion of Israel or vice versa, 

we have to consider both of these. So these are regional problems. 

We also have to say, as policymakers, that we are going to be in 

Afghanistan for a very long time. Afghans remember we closed our 

embassy there in 1989. They think we have a narrative that we are 

going to leave. We are going to be there for 15, 20 years. Let’s just 

say that we are going to be there for 15 to 20 years and effect the 

hedging strategies of the Pakistani government and all the regional 

players. 

We also need to help the Pakistanis with their 

counterinsurgency. They have a counterinsurgency problem, but 

they are set up to fight a land war with India. And some of our 

military aid should be conditioned on the idea that they bring people over here for counterinsurgency training; perhaps, with their 

permission very importantly, we help them set up some sort of 

counterinsurgency training in Pakistan. 

I mentioned the universal database for insurgents, terrorists, 

people joining the jihad, the clerics. I think this is an important 

thing that should be shared across all intelligence agencies. We 

need to redouble our efforts to find bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

and Mullah Omar, but we need to do it without any public fanfare 

so they don’t derive a propaganda victory. 

We also need to create an office of metrics where we can determine how are we doing. Because right now we have these discussions without really saying, well, are jihadi Web sites—are they declining in importance? Is support for suicide bombing going down 

in the Muslim world? These sorts of questions, which would indicate—we are never going to have a surrender ceremony, but there 

are certain metrics we can have which I detail in my testimony 

which would be helpful. 

And, finally, just a small tactical thing. Industrial strength hydrogen peroxide is a weapon of choice. We need to make sure that 

people buying that kind of material in this country are not doing 

so without the government being aware of it if it is for nefarious 

purposes. 

Mr. GRENIER. I would say I would agree with Peter that we need 

to have, to maintain, and to communicate a long-term commitment 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
122 

to the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. I think that the government in 

Pakistan, and Pakistani people in particular, as well as the Afghans, are fully expecting that we are going to leave. I think that 

they need to know that we are there for the long term. I think that 

on the Pakistani side of the border what we need to have is a longterm, sustained, committed counterinsurgency effort, of which economic development is a very important part. I think that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are a wonderful and romantic entity of the 19th century that we can no longer afford. I think those 

areas have to be incorporated into Pakistan proper. There needs to 

be a commitment on the part of the government of Pakistan to do 

that, and we need to be there for the long term to help them to 

do that so they can fully incorporate those areas into Pakistan and 

establish centralized government control over those areas in the 

same way that they do in Karachi and Lahore. 

With regard to Afghanistan, there too I think we need to have 

a long-term commitment, but there is a big caution there. I think 

that the major part of the fight against a resurgent Taliban is 

being led by U.S. and NATO forces. I think that so long as the effort is being led by foreign forces we may win a series of tactical 

victories but we will not succeed strategically. 

The long-term answer in Afghanistan has to be Afghan led. If 

that means building up and supporting local militias in southern 

Afghanistan in the way that the U.S. has been reluctant to do up 

until now, I would say so be it. But it has to be an Afghan-led solution there. 

Finally, with regard to Iraq, I think there are a lot of different 

ways of skinning the cat, and the broader context of the U.S. commitment to Iraq I think can be calibrated in different ways, but I 

think that a necessary component of that must be a continued commitment on the part of the United States to support the Sunni 

Awakening in a way that a Shia led government simply will not. 

Mr. EMERSON. I am just going to briefly add a couple of points. 

One is, according to some people I have spoken to in the intelligence community, the CIA has become risk averse in HUMINT 

collection and covert operations in Afghanistan. And I think Congress should encourage the CIA to be much more active and aggressive in carrying out collection and covert operations from 

disinformation to actual paramilitary operations in Afghanistan. 

Number two, I think that in Pakistan the U.S. really has to 

apply the full pursuit of all of its means of pressure on the new 

regime to cooperate with the U.S. and to give us latitude to go after 

the high targets, high value targets, as well as for them internally 

to understand that they cannot keep those areas, the FATA and 

the North-West Frontier Province, a liberation zone for the 

Taliban, because it is going to come back to bite them. 

Number three, I really do believe that overall we don’t teach our 

counterterrorism—there is no counterterrorism doctrine that teaches what the fundamentals of the enemy is all about. And that I 

think is essential. And unless we teach them about the Muslim 

Brotherhood and teach them about radical Islamic theology that 

envelopes all of these regimes and has implanted itself in Europe 

and in the United States, after all, we are here to talk primarily 

about protecting the U.S., then we want to protect Europe, and 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
123 

then we want to protect our interests overseas. Unless—and the 

thrust of the reported and aborted attacks in the United States 

have not come from al Qaeda, but from franchises or from self-activated cells mobilized by just the radical Islamic theology that had 

initially been propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood as early as 

1928. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hoekstra. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There has been a lot 

of discussion about this administration, the mess, and these kinds 

of things. I think where we need to move to, and I really appreciate 

the testimony of this panel today because I think what you have 

identified for us one more time is how complex this problem is and 

potentially how deadly it is, how dangerous it is, and how complicated it is going to be to develop the right strategies and the 

right tactics to confront this threat and ultimately defeat the 

threat. 

You know, there were some of us who were very critical of what 

we would say is the mess that President Bush inherited when we 

looked back at 9/11 and at, you know, what happened to the Intelligence Community in the 1990s, how al Qaeda and radical 

Jihadists were treated, and that problem was dealt with in the 

1990s. 

Obviously, there are strong views about how this administration 

has dealt with the threat, the things that they have done perhaps 

correctly, the things that maybe they could have improved on. 

I think the lesson that we need to walk away with from your testimony, your identification of what the problem is, this country 

needs to develop a long-term, bipartisan consensus on how to defeat this threat. You know, we need Republicans and Democrats, 

Congress and the administration to come together and do that. 

You know, there are all kinds of components to this. There is a 

military component. There is a political component. There is an 

economic component. Then, at the end of this whole process, you 

recognize that if you are going to be successful in Iraq or in Afghanistan or in Pakistan, it is going to have to be very much driven by people in those countries. 

You know, the U.S. cannot impose a solution in Iraq. We cannot 

impose a solution in Afghanistan or in Pakistan or in Northern Africa. You know, the only thing that we can do is to help create conditions that will enable those governments to be more successful 

against this threat. 

I hope that what we learn through this process, where we go 

through this year and where we end up in January is that we embark on that process of getting a bipartisan, long-term strategy, 

recognizing that we will continue to try more tactics to confront 

and to defeat this threat. Some of them will be successful. Some 

of them will be moderately successful. Others may be just dismal 

failures. Because, as much as we know, there is still a lot that we 

do not know about how to contain and to defeat this kind of threat. 

There is not a question in there. I just very much appreciate your 

helping to enlighten this committee and to give us your perspectives on where we are and where we need to go. So thank you very 

much. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING
124 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra. 

Mr. Rogers, do you have any closing? 

Mr. ROGERS. No, other than you look handsome today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

I want to echo Mr. Hoekstra’s comments. 

First of all, we very much appreciate your willingness to come in 

and to share your thoughts on this issue, and we hope we can 

count on you again in the not-too-distant future. Because we do 

have to work our way through these challenges, and it has got to 

be done on a bipartisan basis, and it has got to be done with the 

next administration in concert, I believe, by making a case to our 

allies that it is in everyone’s best interests to help us in the region 

with the challenges that we all face collectively there. 

NATO has stepped up somewhat, not in the way that, perhaps, 

a lot of us have discussed that they could be the most helpful with 

the limitations that they have imposed. Certainly, as we look at the 

long-term strategy and at the threat that al Qaeda and that all of 

these types of organizations pose, including the free-lancers—because I think all of you made reference to the fact that bin Laden 

and al Qaeda have given an inspiration to some of these people 

who are, for their own reasons, stuck in a situation that foments 

that kind of resentment in whatever country, whether it is in Europe, whether it is here or whether it is in other parts of the world, 

and that is a very dangerous situation. 

So, collectively, we need to find a way to work together, to understand that it is going to be a costly endeavor and costly not just 

in the traditional sense of money but also in resources and in effort 

that keeps the main focus on the goal, which is to try to eliminate 

these very dangerous actors out there. Because the threat has really dramatically changed from the Cold War days. 

So, again, thank you all for your testimony. There were some 

members who wanted to be here, but they are in markups, and 

they asked me if it would be possible for them to have some questions for the record. If you will agree to indulge that, we would 

very much appreciate it. 

Again, thank you for your time and for sharing your expertise. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

Æ 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with HEARING