1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v. Criminal Action No. 23-116 (JDB)

NDUBUISI JOSEPH OKAFOR,

 Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Ndubuisi Okafor faces charges centered around allegations that he used his 

medical license to illegally distribute controlled substances. In particular, he is charged with 

conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; 

maintaining drug-involved premises and aiding and abetting in the same in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 856(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and twenty-seven counts of unlawful distribution of controlled 

substances and aiding and abetting in the same in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2. See Superseding Indictment [ECF No. 34] (“Indictment”) at 5–9. Trial is scheduled for 

October of this year. 

Currently before the Court is a raft of motions from both sides. Okafor moves to dismiss 

the indictment and to suppress certain evidence. See Okafor’s Mot. to Dismiss With Mem. of P. 

& A. [ECF No. 41] (“Mot. to Dismiss”); Mot. to Suppress Evid. Derived From Computers, Phone, 

iCloud and/or Social Media Acct. Searches [ECF No. 40] (“Mot. to Suppress”).1 The government 

counters with motions of its own, seeking permission to use certain evidence at trial and asking 

1 Okafor also filed a motion asking the Court to exclude one piece of evidence the government sought 

permission to introduce in one of its motions. See Def.’s Mot. in Lim. 1 Concerning Alleged Victim J.V. [ECF No. 

46]. Because this motion operates in effect as an opposition to the government’s motion, the Court treats it as such.
2 

the Court to preclude Okafor from engaging in trial tactics the government views as inappropriate. 

See U.S.’s Mot. to Admit Evid. Intrinsic to the Charged Conduct and Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b) [ECF No. 37] (“Mot. to Admit Evid.”); U.S.’s Suppl. to its Mot. to Admit Intrinsic Evid. 

& Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) [ECF No. 63] (“Suppl. to Mot. to Admit Evid.”); U.S.’s Mot. 

in Lim. to Impeach the Def. with his Prior Conviction Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 609 & Specific 

Instances of Conduct Under Rule 608 [ECF No. 39] (“Mot. to Impeach”); U.S.’s Omnibus Mot. 

in Lim. [ECF No. 38] (“Omnibus Mot.”). 

 The motions are now fully briefed and ripe for resolution. 

Background2

Okafor, a District of Columbia-based doctor, headed a national drug distribution ring 

beginning around May 2021 and ending upon his arrest in April 2023. See Indictment at 5; Mot. 

to Admit Evid. at 1. To do so, Okafor leveraged his status as a physician, prescribing oxycodone 

and promethazine with codeine—both controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Act, 

21 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq.; see 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.12(b)(1)(xiv), 1308.15(c)(1)—to co-conspirators 

and individual patients in pursuit of profit rather than treatment. See Indictment at 5. 

In broad strokes, the scheme went something like this. Co-conspirators sent Okafor 

prescription requests with patients’ names, dates of birth, pharmacy addresses, and drug types and 

quantities. Indictment at 6. Despite knowing that the patient information was frequently false, 

Okafor would oblige. Id. at 7. In exchange for each prescription, the co-conspirators would pay 

Okafor cash in the range of $180 to $300. Id. The co-conspirators would then use or sell the 

substances. Id. 

2 The following summary is based on the factual assertions in the indictment and the government’s motions, 

which the Court relates solely as a summary of what the government intends to prove at trial. The Court’s reliance on 

these alleged facts for purposes of this opinion should not be construed as an endorsement of their truth, which is a 

determination for the jury. 
3 

To avoid detection by state authorities, Okafor often issued the prescriptions across state 

lines, and sometimes prescribed the same medications to the same purported patients in many 

states and listing different home addresses—or, conversely, to the same co-conspirators in the 

same states under different names. Id.; Mot. to Admit Evid. at 6–7, 9. Okafor frequently changed 

the listed first name to avoid detection while retaining the real patient’s last name, in the hope that 

otherwise skeptical pharmacists would think the co-conspirators were merely picking up family 

members’ prescriptions. Mot. to Admit Evid. at 6. All told, Okafor issued prescriptions in this 

manner in at least thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia, despite being licensed to 

prescribe only in the District of Columbia. Id. at 1, 3, 22. 

As to the individual patients, the story is simpler: from his medical office, Okafor would 

prescribe large quantities of controlled substances “on demand” to patients without any meaningful 

examination, and again often in exchange for cash payment. Id. at 2, 6, 9. He would sometimes 

issue these prescriptions to his patients’ real names and other times to pseudonyms to enable them 

to collect more prescriptions than would otherwise be possible. Id. at 8–9. For one patient, for 

instance—whom the government intends to present as a witness at trial—Okafor wrote at least 

nineteen oxycodone and promethazine with codeine prescriptions within a three-month period. Id.

The government indicted and arrested Okafor in April 2023 and filed a superseding 

indictment a year later.

Analysis

I. Motion to Dismiss 

Okafor moves to dismiss the indictment on two primary grounds: that the Controlled 

Substances Act is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and that it in fact cannot apply to 

him given his status as a registered doctor. Each ground for dismissal can be rejected easily. In 
4 

ruling on each, the Court is mindful that it must presume the truth of the government’s proffered 

facts. United States v. Park, 938 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Ballestas, 

795 F.3d 138, 148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

A. The law is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Okafor. 

Okafor first contends that the Controlled Substances Act is unconstitutionally vague as 

applied to him. Mot. to Dismiss at 4. The argument draws on the precept that a conviction violates 

due process “if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary 

intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages 

seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18 (2010) 

(quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). But to survive such a challenge, a 

statute’s scope need not “be clear in every application.” Id. at 21; see also United States v. Sandlin, 

575 F. Supp. 3d 16, 30 (D.D.C. 2021). Instead, the statute need only provide fair notice “as applied 

to the particular facts at issue.” Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. at 18. So long as Okafor’s

conduct was “clearly proscribed,” he “cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to 

the conduct of others.” Id. at 18–19 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., 

Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)). 

Okafor’s alleged conduct was clearly proscribed. As relevant here, the Controlled 

Substances Act makes it a federal crime to “knowingly or intentionally” distribute or dispense a 

controlled substance, “[e]xcept as authorized.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). There is no dispute that Okafor 

in fact distributed or dispensed controlled substances. This case therefore turns on the 

authorization exception, under which registered doctors like Okafor are “authorized” to prescribe 

controlled substances without violating the statute, see id. § 822(b), so long as they issue the 

prescription “for a legitimate medical purpose” and “acting in the usual course of [their]
5 

professional practice,” 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). If they prescribe controlled substances outside of 

those guardrails, however, registered doctors are “subject to the penalties provided for violations” 

of the Controlled Substances Act. Id.

According to the indictment, Okafor issued prescriptions “regardless of [his] patient’s 

individual diagnosis and for periods of time that were inconsistent with accepted use,” Indictment 

at 6; “exchange[d] controlled substance prescriptions for cash” with the knowledge that his coconspirators “would pick up and divert the controlled substances” for profit, id.; knowingly 

prescribed to false names and addresses, id. at 7; falsified medical records to cover up his unlawful 

activities, id. at 7–8; and more. These activities are not borderline cases that lend themselves to a 

good-faith dispute over proper pain management. They fall in the heartland of the statute, which 

aims to criminalize those who sell drugs “not for legitimate purposes, but primarily for the profits 

to be derived,” with a particular concern for “the diversion of drugs from legitimate channels to 

illegitimate channels.” United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135 (1975) (cleaned up). 

Moreover, this statute is particularly ill-suited for an as-applied vagueness challenge. Cf.

United States v. Robinson, 253 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2017) (collecting cases rejecting 

vagueness challenges to § 841). As Okafor notes, to convict him under § 841, the government will 

need to convince a jury that he “knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.” 

Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370, 2376 (2022). So Okafor did not violate the statute unless 

he was “aware that what he [did was] precisely that which the statute forbids,” such that he was 

“under no necessity of guessing whether the statute applie[d] to him.” Screws v. United States, 

325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945); see, e.g., United States v. McHugh, 583 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2022). 

Because “a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness,” Vill. of Hoffman Ests., 455 

U.S. at 499, Okafor fails to establish that his (by hypothesis) knowingly unauthorized conduct was 
6 

not clearly proscribed. 

B. Doctors are vulnerable to prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act.

Next, Okafor points out that the standard the government is using to prosecute him comes 

from a regulation interpreting the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), not the language of the 

CSA itself. See Mot. to Dismiss at 7 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)). And, he continues, that 

regulation is unlawful because Congress did not intend registered doctors to be subject to 

prosecution under the CSA. See id. at 13 (“One cannot both (1) have a DEA registration . . . and 

(2) be guilty of issuing an unauthorized prescription that was authorized by that registration.”); id. 

at 8 (“It was the manifest purpose and intent of the drafters of the CSA and § 841 simply does not 

apply to a person who has received a DEA license to issue controlled substances.”). It follows, 

Okafor says, that the indictment—premised as it is on an invalid regulation—is void and fails to 

give sufficient notice of the allegations against him. 

The argument fails twice over. First, the suggestion that registered doctors are immune 

from CSA prosecution was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Moore, 423 

U.S. 122 (1975). The Court there rebuffed the argument that “a licensed physician . . . was 

exempted from prosecution under § 841 by virtue of his status as a registrant.” Id. at 124. Noting 

that the CSA exempts “certain activities,” not “certain persons,” id. at 131, the Court held that 

“registered physicians can be prosecuted under § 841 when their activities fall outside the usual 

course of professional practice,” id. at 124. That is precisely the sort of prosecution Okafor faces.

Second, Okafor’s “notice”-related complaint about the indictment itself—as opposed to the 

underlying theory of prosecution—demands too much of the indictment. Okafor protests that the 

indictment “does not include an allegation that . . . [Okafor] knew the charged prescriptions were 

unauthorized.” Mot. to Dismiss at 9. It seems that Okafor objects only to the absence of the word 
7 

“unauthorized,” as the indictment alleges that he “knowingly and intentionally distribute[d] and 

dispense[d] controlled substances, outside the scope of professional practice and not for a 

legitimate medical purpose.” Indictment at 9. But just two years ago the Supreme Court explained 

that an indictment under § 841 “need not set forth . . . a lack of authorization.” Ruan, 142 S. Ct.

at 2379 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 885). And in any event, indictments need not incant magic words, and 

the indictment here does plenty to “inform [Okafor] of the precise offense of which he is accused 

so that he may prepare his defense.” United States v. Williamson, 903 F.3d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 

2018) (quoting United States v. Verrusio, 762 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see also United States 

v. Abou-Khatwa, 40 F.4th 666, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“The indictment need only contain ‘a plain, 

concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.’” 

(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1))) (cleaned up).

3

Accordingly, the Court will deny Okafor’s motion to dismiss. 

II. Motion to Suppress

Next, Okafor moves the Court to suppress some of the evidence the government uncovered 

during two different searches, one of Okafor’s office and the other of his home. Both searches 

were executed pursuant to search warrants, but Okafor argues that the warrants were insufficiently 

particularized and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. Mot. to Suppress at 1. Okafor does 

not challenge the warrants in their entirety; instead, he challenges them only insofar as they 

permitted the search of his computers, phone, iCloud, and/or social media accounts. Id. And he 

challenges them on only one basis: that the warrants did not “describe the search methodology” 

3 Okafor seems also to suggest that the indictment must be dismissed because it “illegitimizes a medical 

standard for patient treatment that is within the contours of District of Columbia law.” Mot. to Dismiss at 5. The 

Court has no occasion to explore what would happen if federal and state law conflicted because Okafor offers no 

reason to believe that they do. He says only that “[a] review of the statutes shows that there are set standards 

delineating how physicians in the District of Columbia may treat pain patients.” Id. at 6. He does not point to any 

such statute, and the Court has difficulty imagining that the District of Columbia permits the sort of illegitimate drug 

distribution that the government alleges. See 48 D.C. Code § 903.08(a)–(d).
8 

the government planned to use. Id. at 1–2.4

The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “particularly describe the place to be 

searched and the person or things to be seized.” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006); 

see U.S. Const. amend. IV. Nothing in the Amendment’s text adds that the warrant must also 

describe “the precise manner in which [it is] to be executed,” Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 98 (quoting 

Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979)), and no binding decision “requires a search 

protocol before a warrant may be issued,” Matter of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 79 (D.D.C. 

2014) (emphasis omitted). 

Okafor suggests that the Constitution might nonetheless demand that a warrant specify a 

search protocol when it authorizes a search of electronic media. The Court need not decide this 

question because, regardless, the warrants were executed in objective good faith. Under the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule, “evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a 

search warrant” need not be excluded, even if the warrant is found lacking. United States v. 

Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 

(1984)). And “the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication” that 

the officers acted in good faith. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012); see also

United States v. Thorne, 548 F. Supp. 3d 70, 130–31 (D.D.C. 2021); United States v. Hill, 575 

F. Supp. 3d 185, 193–94 (D.D.C. 2021). 

The warrants here justified good-faith reliance. Okafor does not dispute that the warrants 

were issued by a neutral magistrate pursuant to probable cause that evidence related to Okafor’s 

4 Okafor also says in passing, without elaboration, that the warrants “failed to place any limit on the scope of 

the searches and seizures.” Id. at 3. The Court cannot tell if this is a separate argument or if it is in service of the 

search protocol argument. See Matter of the Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI 013888003738427, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 

167 (D.D.C. 2014) (asking for a search protocol from the government only to “help limit the possibility that locations 

containing data outside the scope of the warrant will be searched”). If it is a separate argument, it is unpersuasive.
9 

alleged criminal activities would be found on his electronic devices and accounts. And on the only 

dimension Okafor does challenge—methodological description—the warrants exceeded what any 

binding authority required. They listed in detail some of the proposed search strategies, which 

would include: 

[S]urveying various file ‘directories’ and the individual files they contain 

(analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains 

and opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files); conducting a file-by-file 

review by ‘opening,’ reviewing, or reading the images or first few ‘pages’ of such 

files in order to determine their precise contents; ‘scanning’ storage areas to 

discover and possibly recover recently deleted data; scanning storage areas for 

deliberately hidden files; and performing electronic ‘keyword’ searches through all 

electronic storage areas to determine whether occurrences of language contained in 

such storage areas exist that are related to the subject matter of the investigation.

Ex. A to U.S.’s Mot. for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal [ECF No. 51-1] (“Ex. A”) at 70; see 

also Ex. B to U.S.’s Mot. for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal [ECF No. 51-2] (“Ex. B”) at 62 

(similar). The warrants also explained, over the course of pages, why the government required the 

flexibility to go beyond those methodologies as necessary: “Any pre-defined search protocol 

would only inevitably result in over- or under-inclusive searches” given the difficulty of predicting 

where and how digital files will be stored.” Ex. A at 69; see also Ex. B at 61 (same).

 In sum, the warrants went to great lengths to alert the magistrate, to the extent possible, to 

the methods the government anticipated using. Cf. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094 

(10th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is folly for a search warrant to attempt to structure the mechanics of the 

search and a warrant imposing such limits would unduly restrict legitimate search objectives.”). 

And the warrants explained and justified the limits of the government’s ability to predict its 

methodology. Cf. Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1276 (a search warrant “may allow a broader sweep when 

a reasonable investigation cannot produce a more particular description”). In light of the dearth of 

authority requiring the warrants to contain additional methodological limitations, it cannot be said 
10 

that the searching agents were unreasonable in “presum[ing them] to be valid.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 

923; see also Thorne, 548 F. Supp. 3d at 132 (“Defendant’s suggestion that an individual law 

enforcement agent seeking a warrant should be expected to succeed where all of these bodies have 

thus far left the issue unresolved is unreasonable.”). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Okafor’s motion to suppress. 

III. Motion to Admit Evidence 

The government seeks to present evidence of various acts that it characterizes as either 

“intrinsic,” and therefore not subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), or “extrinsic” but 

nonetheless admissible under that rule. See Mot. to Admit Evid. at 1. As explained below, the 

Court will admit all but one piece of the government’s evidence. 

Rule 404(b) governs the admissibility of “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Because a crime with which a defendant is charged is not an “other” crime, 

the first step under Rule 404(b) is to determine whether the rule applies at all. If the evidence goes 

to this crime or act, in other words, Rule 404(b) has nothing to say about it. Courts dub this 

category of acts “intrinsic,” and define it by reference to three buckets: an act is intrinsic if it “(a) 

is part of the charged offense; (b) is offered as direct evidence of the charged crime; or (c) was 

performed contemporaneously with the charged crime and facilitated” it. United States v. 

Roberson, 581 F. Supp. 3d 65, 72 (D.D.C. 2022); see also Abou-Khatwa, 40 F.4th at 677. This is 

a “narrow” set of acts that excludes evidence merely necessary to, for instance, “complete the 

story” or “explain the circumstances” surrounding a crime. Roberson, 581 F. Supp. 3d at 71

(cleaned up); see United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

“Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act,” meanwhile, is evidence of an extrinsic act 

and thus subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 
11 

879 (D.C. Cir. 2016). But an act’s status as extrinsic does not exclude it from evidence. To the 

contrary: Rule 404(b) “is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion,” Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929, that 

permits evidence of extrinsic acts for many purposes, among them to prove “motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. 

Evid. 404(b)(2). And extrinsic acts in a conspiracy prosecution are generally granted 

“considerable leeway” to, for instance, “inform the jury of the background of the conspiracy 

charged, to complete the story of the crimes charged, and to explain to the jury how the illegal 

relationship between the participants in the crime developed.” United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 

18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 33–34 (2d Cir. 2000)); 

see also McGill, 815 F.3d at 879. 

Next to that long list of permissible purposes stands one forbidden one. Rule 404(b) 

prohibits exactly one type of evidence: extrinsic evidence “which lacks any purpose but proving 

character.” Bowie, 232 F.3d at 930. So Okafor’s blanket objection to this evidence on Rule 404(b) 

grounds can succeed only if the evidence (a) is extrinsic and (b) will serve no purpose other than 

to demean Okafor’s character. As discussed below, each type of evidence the government 

proposes to introduce is either intrinsic or carries a legitimate, non-character purpose under Rule 

404(b) and thus is not barred by that rule. 

But passing Rule 404’s test does not guarantee admission: “Evidence admissible under 

Rule 404(b) may still be prohibited under Rule 403’s balancing of prejudice and probativeness.” 

Abou-Khatwa, 40 F.4th at 679; see also Bowie, 232 F.3d at 930. And because the Court has 

significant Rule 403 concerns about two of the government’s pieces of evidence—concerns that 

are fatal to one—it discusses those following the Rule 404(b) analysis. 
12 

A. Rule 404(b) does not bar any of the government’s proffered evidence.

An initial note. Some of the evidence bears on what the government calls “charged” 

conduct—that is, distributions that the government has charged as distinct distribution counts 

(counts 12–29 of the indictment) under 18 U.S.C. § 841. See Mot. to Admit Evid. at 7. Other 

evidence bears on distributions that the government calls “uncharged” conduct—distributions the 

government has not charged as distinct counts, but that it nonetheless contends were made during 

and in furtherance of the charged conspiracy, and as part of the charged crime of maintaining drug 

premises. Id. Although helpful shorthand, this distinction does not dictate the Rule 404(b) 

analysis, because, as the government points out, acts can be intrinsic even if they evidence 

distributions that were not charged individually. If uncharged acts are part of or provide direct 

evidence of the conspiracy or maintenance of drug premises charges, they will nonetheless qualify 

as intrinsic. McGill, 815 F.3d at 881. Accordingly, the Court does not segregate “uncharged” 

from “charged” distributions for purposes of the Rule 404(b) analysis. 

All of the evidence, the Court concludes, is permissible under Rule 404(b)—some as 

intrinsic (and therefore not subject to the rule) and some as extrinsic but offered for a non-character 

purpose. 

i. Intrinsic Acts

First, the government represents that it will introduce evidence—testimonial and 

documentary—of numerous illicit prescriptions Okafor wrote his patients and purported patients 

during the period of the conspiracy and the maintenance of the drug premises. Adopting the 

government’s naming system, this describes portions of the evidence the government proffers 

regarding Cooperating Witness 1, see Mot. to Admit Evid. at 9; Co-Conspirator 5, id. at 9–10; CoConspirator 8, id. at 11; Co-Conspirator 9, id. at 11–12; Co-Conspirator 10, id. at 12–13; Co-
13 

Conspirators 1 and 2, id. at 15; Co-Conspirators 3 and 4, id. at 16; Co-Conspirator 6, id. at 17; 

three undercover officers and one confidential source, id. at 18; and a patient dubbed J.V., id. at 

19. It also describes part of the evidence the government purports to have uncovered while 

executing its search warrants. Id. at 25. Only some of these distributions were charged 

independently, but all are intrinsic: each is “an act that is part of” at least one of the charged 

offenses, Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929, because each shows Okafor distributing controlled substances 

during the period the indictment covers—the exact activity that underlies all three categories of 

charges (conspiracy, distribution, and maintaining drug premises) facing Okafor. The acts are 

intrinsic whether the evidence comes in the form of the prescriptions themselves, see, e.g., Mot. to 

Admit Evid. at 9, 16, testimony regarding the prescriptions, e.g. id., Okafor’s notes and papers 

documenting the prescriptions, e.g. id. at 10–12, 25, physical bottles of medicine prescribed by 

Okafor, e.g. id. at 17, or conversations (for example with pharmacists) in which Okafor confirmed 

that he wrote a prescription, e.g. id. at 12–13, 17; see also Suppl. to Mot. to Admit Evid. at 4. In 

all events, the evidence is of an act—writing prescriptions—intrinsic to the charged crimes.

Next, the government wishes to present evidence of conversations, in various forms, where 

co-conspirators requested prescriptions from Okafor for themselves or pseudonyms, or where they 

instructed others how to do so. This describes portions of the evidence the government proffers 

regarding Cooperating Witness 1, Mot. to Admit Evid. at 8; Co-Conspirator 9, id. at 12; CoConspirators 1 and 2, id. at 14–15; Co-Conspirators 3 and 4, id. at 16; and Co-Conspirator 6, id. at 

17. It also describes some of the evidence found pursuant to the search warrant. Id. at 25. Some 

of these conversations occurred in person at Okafor’s medical practice; others occurred over 

messaging apps. Either way, because the conversations solicited the controlled substances Okafor 

is charged with distributing, they were “performed contemporaneously with” and “facilitated” the 
14 

charged crimes and are therefore intrinsic. See Roberson, 581 F. Supp. 3d at 73 (messages 

soliciting the charged crime are intrinsic acts). By the same token, Co-Conspirator 5’s Instagram 

advertisements for controlled substances, featuring photographs of medications apparently taken 

in Okafor’s examination room, are intrinsic, as they provide direct evidence of an act—solicitation 

of customers—taken during and in facilitation of the conspiracy. See Mot. to Admit Evid. at 10. 

And the same goes, too, for various documents on which the government says Okafor kept track 

of the money his co-conspirators and patients owed him for the illicit prescriptions, as well as 

documents recovered from Co-Conspirators 9 and 10 listing patient names and tracking 

prescription activity: these documents were prepared during the conspiracy and to facilitate its 

primary goal, that is, the collection of profit. See id. at 10, 12–13, 17, 25. 

Okafor’s co-conspirators’ use of fake identities is similarly intrinsic. The government says 

it will produce evidence that the co-conspirators carried identification and bank cards in alternate 

names, and that co-conspirators frequently picked up prescriptions using false names. This 

describes portions of the evidence the government proffers regarding Cooperating Witness 1, id. 

at 9; Co-Conspirator 5, id., Co-Conspirator 8, id. at 11; Co-Conspirator 9, id.; Co-Conspirator 10, 

id. at 13; Co-Conspirators 1 and 2, id. at 13–15; Co-Conspirator 4, id. at 16; and Co-Conspirator 

6, id. at 17. Because the fake identities were used “contemporaneously” with the conspiracy and 

“facilitated” the co-conspirators in their quest to multiply the amount of drugs they could obtain, 

this evidence is intrinsic and falls outside the governance of Rule 404(b). 

The government also plans to introduce evidence of the manner in which Okafor prescribed 

controlled substances to a cooperating witness, undercover law enforcement officers, and a patient 

the government calls “J.V.” Id. at 8–9, 18–19. According to the government, Okafor prescribed 

these patients controlled substances after little or no examination, essentially on demand. This 
15 

evidence too is intrinsic, because Okafor’s issuance of these prescriptions and the care he took 

while doing so is precisely the conduct underlying the prosecution. See United States v. Robinson, 

68 F.4th 1340, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (evidence that doctor “scarcely examined” patients and an 

undercover officer supported the conclusion that he “simply did not establish a proper relationship 

with his patients before prescribing them oxycodone”). And the government’s anticipated 

presentation of cash seized from various members of the conspiracy, Mot. to Admit Evid. at 14, 

25, is similarly intrinsic, because Okafor and other members of the conspiracy possessed the cash 

as part of the conspiracy, which had a primary “goal,” McGill, 815 F.3d at 882, of accumulation 

of profit.

ii. Extrinsic Acts

Not all the government has to offer is intrinsic, however. For instance, the government 

intends to introduce evidence that pharmacists and pharmacies around the country took note of 

Okafor’s suspicious prescribing practices and refused to fill his prescriptions, called authorities, or 

imposed nationwide blocks on his prescriptions. See Mot. to Admit Evid. at 12, 23–24; see also

Suppl. to Mot. to Admit Evid. at 1–2. Although pharmacists’ refusals to fill Okafor’s prescriptions 

might provide attenuated support for the notion that Okafor issued prescriptions, it is not “direct 

evidence,” Roberson, 581 F. Supp. 3d at 72, of those allegedly unlawful prescriptions. Nor, more 

obviously, is their refusal “part of the charged offense” or done to facilitate it, id.—to the contrary, 

the pharmacists were trying to prevent the distributions. 

The evidence is nonetheless not barred by Rule 404(b). The characterization as extrinsic 

only means that Rule 404(b) governs it. And Rule 404(b), recall, excludes only acts offered only 

to show Okafor’s character. Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929–30. The inference that the government wants 

the jury to draw from the fact that Okafor’s prescription practices “concerned pharmacists so much 
16 

. . . that they stopped filling his prescriptions,” Robinson, 68 F.4th at 1347, is not the forbidden 

character inference but rather that Okafor had notice that his practices were beyond the pale. 

Evidence inspiring such an inference is permissible under Rule 404(b), which lists intent, 

knowledge, absence of mistake, and lack of accident as acceptable purposes.

Similar reasoning applies to the government’s financial analysis suggesting that Okafor 

transitioned his medical practice “to a primarily cash business” “leading up to and during the 

charged conspiracy.” Mot. to Admit Evid. at 25. To begin with, that the transition was done 

“leading up to” the conspiracy counts as a strike against it in the intrinsic test, which focuses largely 

on “temporal proximity.” United States v. Thorne, Crim. A. No. 18-389 (BAH), 2020 WL 122985, 

at *13 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2020).

5

 But more important, again, is what the fact of the financial 

transition shows. The government wants jurors to draw an inference: that Okafor knew his 

dealings were shady and took steps to evade authorities as a result. This is not intrinsic—but, by 

the same token, it is permissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, absence of mistake, and lack of accident. 

Also extrinsic but admissible is evidence of Okafor’s debts. See Mot. to Impeach at 7. The 

government concedes that the debts are not intrinsic, and instead says they provide a motive for 

the crimes charged and are therefore offered for a permissible Rule 404(b) purpose. The Court 

agrees. See, e.g., United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2006) (“sorry state of [the 

defendant’s] finances” admissible under Rule 404(b) “as evidence of his motive to embezzle”); 

United States v. Bergstein, 788 F. App’x 742, 745–46 (2d Cir. 2019) (similar).6

5 But see McGill, 815 F.3d at 882 (“evidence of preconspiracy drug dealing” was intrinsic “as long as it 

continued after appellants entered into the charged conspiracy, because such evidence became direct evidence of the 

drug dealing within the conspiracy”); United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 153 F. Supp. 3d 130, 180–81 (D.D.C. 2015) 

(preparation for act taken as part of conspiracy intrinsic to conspiracy). 6 Bergstein held debts intrinsic rather than extrinsic but nonetheless admissible, but the Second Circuit 

employs a more generous test for intrinsic acts. Id. at 746.
17 

Consider, too, a recorded jail call between Okafor and a co-conspirator that happened 

shortly after the co-conspirator’s arrest. Mot. to Admit Evid. at 15. From jail, the co-conspirator 

called another co-conspirator, who put Okafor on the line; the first co-conspirator then referred to 

Okafor as “boss” and asked Okafor to help pay bail. Id. This call is not intrinsic to the charged 

crimes. Neither asking nor being asked to pay bail, of course, is unlawful, nor is actually paying 

it. So the call is not “part” of any charged offense, nor is it “direct evidence” of it. See Roberson, 

581 F. Supp. 3d at 72. We come closer with the third possibility, that the call was “performed 

contemporaneously” with a charged offense and facilitated its commission. Id. The call may have 

facilitated the conspiracy, broadly defined, as free co-conspirators are presumably more effective 

than jailed ones. But evidence is more likely to be intrinsic to a conspiracy when it furthers the 

specific “goals of the conspiracy” rather than being tangentially related, United States v. Khanu, 

664 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83 (D.D.C. 2009), and the conspiracy’s goal was making money, not freeing 

friends. So the call does not fall within the “narrow” category of intrinsic acts. Bowie, 232 F.3d 

at 929. 

The call is nonetheless not barred by Rule 404(b). The government does not seek to admit 

the call to persuade the jury of Okafor’s bad character; paying bail is generally a nice thing to do. 

Instead, it seeks to demonstrate Okafor’s relationship to his co-conspirator. Connecting coconspirators is a permissible use under Rule 404(b). See Mathis, 216 F.3d at 26. 

Finally, there is the former patient the government calls J.V. See Mot. to Admit Evid. at 

18. J.V. fatally overdosed on oxycodone and diphenhydramine, and, after a complaint from his 

father, the D.C. Board of Medicine inquired with Okafor about his treatment of J.V. Id. at 18–19. 

Shortly thereafter, Okafor created backdated and false records of appointments with J.V., 

apparently (the theory goes) to cover his tracks. Id. at 19. The government has not charged Okafor 
18 

with J.V.’s death, and it represents that it will not “introduce evidence or imply that [Okafor’s] 

unlawful prescriptions for oxycodone caused J.V.’s overdose death.” Id. at 19 n.17. Instead, the 

government wishes to introduce evidence that Okafor prescribed oxycodone to J.V.; expert 

analysis of those prescriptions; the Board of Medicine’s inquiry; and the backdated records. Id. at 

19. 

The prescriptions and expert analysis are intrinsic for the reasons stated above: the act and 

manner of prescribing is precisely the conduct for which Okafor is charged. Neither the inquiry 

nor the altered records are intrinsic, however. The Board’s inquiry, like the pharmacists’ refusals 

to fill prescriptions discussed above, was obviously not part of, direct evidence of, or in facilitation 

of the charged crimes. And as for the falsified records, Okafor presumably created them in an 

effort to retain his medical license—helpful to the conspiracy but not central to it. Again, this 

evidence is being offered for its implications: the government wants the jury to draw the conclusion 

that Okafor falsified records because of a guilty mind. See United States v. Belfiore, No. 22-20, 

2024 WL 2075128, at *2–3 (2d Cir. May 9, 2024) (that medical provider falsified records claiming 

that he had arranged an emergency appointment on behalf of a patient who died of an overdose 

was evidence that the provider “was not prescribing oxycodone in subjective good faith”). So, 

although extrinsic, the evidence satisfies Rule 404(b). 

* * * 

Setting aside for the moment Rule 403, Okafor does not seriously contest most of these 

conclusions on the 404(b) front. He doesn’t do much more than assert a few times that the evidence 

the government proffers “clearly turns on [his] character and would only prove that [he] is a bad 

person.” Def.’s Opp’n to Evid. that the Gov’t Seeks to Introduce as Intrinsic Evid. or as 404(b) 

Evid. [ECF No. 58] (“Opp’n to Mot. to Admit Evid.”) at 8–9. For the reasons given above, the 
19 

Court disagrees. 

Meanwhile, Okafor places most of his eggs in a procedural basket: he argues that this Court 

“must first determine the existence and scope of the conspiracy” before it can assess whether acts 

are intrinsic or extrinsic to the conspiracy. Id. at 4; see also id. at 6–7. And, Okafor continues, 

because the government has failed “to prove by clear and convincing evidence” that he participated 

in a conspiracy, that inquiry must come out in the negative. Id. at 5.

Okafor misunderstands the procedural posture. Taking as true, for now, the evidence the 

government proffers, there is more than “sufficient” proof “to support a finding” that a conspiracy 

existed and that Okafor participated in it—and that is all the government must show at this 

juncture. Roberson, 581 F. Supp. 3d at 76; see also Mosquera-Murillo, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 183. 

Of course, as with Okafor’s other requests for a preliminary determination of conspiracy, he is free 

to renew this objection at trial if he believes the government has failed to connect the conspiracy 

as promised. See Order Denying Mot. for Prelim. Determination of Conspiracy [ECF No. 65] at 

4. 

The Court notes, however, that a defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction on the 

permissible uses of evidence if that evidence is intrinsic to some but not all charges a defendant 

faces. See United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2008). So Okafor may

receive a limiting instruction for evidence falling in this category, even if the Court has ruled that 

it is intrinsic for admissibility purposes. And of course he remains free to object at trial if he 

believes the evidence actually unearthed strays from the government’s representations in a relevant 

manner. 

B. Rule 403 permits the evidence related to J.V. but bars the jail call.

That Rule 404(b)’s doors are open does not necessarily mean the evidence can come in. 
20 

Rule 404(b) evidence remains subject to Rule 403’s pervasive probativeness-versus-prejudice 

balancing test, McGill, 815 F.3d at 880, under which “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence 

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,” Fed. R. Evid. 403. With two exceptions, Okafor does 

not do much to cause concern that any of the evidence discussed above fails that test, and the Court 

finds that it does not: the danger of unfair prejudice of the evidence does not “substantially 

outweigh[]” its probative value. See id. 

The most notable exception concerns the Board of Medicine’s inquiry about J.V.’s death 

and Okafor’s subsequently falsified records. See Opp’n to Mot. to Admit Evid. at 9–10; Def.’s 

Mot. in Lim. 1 Concerning Alleged Victim J.V. Both sides of the Rule 403 scale weigh heavily 

here. On the one hand, the probative value is quite high: that Okafor’s reaction to the Medical 

Board’s investigation of a patient overdose was to falsify records speaks volumes about his 

awareness that his practices were questionable. On the other hand, the potential for prejudice is 

equally concerning: although the Court expects the government to hew to its promise not to imply 

that Okafor caused J.V.’s death, it will be difficult for the jury not to speculate.

Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s analysis in an analogous situation is instructive. Just as here, the 

government there intended to introduce testimony that “specific patients” of a defendant doctor 

had died as a result of oxycodone. See United States v. Robinson, Crim. A. No. 16-98 (CKK), 

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234734, at *3 (D.D.C. June 19, 2017). And just as here, the government 

promised not to show that the defendant “caused the death or injury” of those patients. Id. at *2. 

That court recognized, as this one does, that the testimony nonetheless posed “a significant risk 

that [the jury] would speculate” that the defendant had caused the deaths “and seek to punish” him 
21 

for doing so. Id. at *5; see also United States v. Aponte Rivera, Crim. A. No. 21270 (JEB), 2023 

WL 6646336, at *2–3 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2023). 

But a significant divergence between that case—in which Judge Kollar-Kotelly excluded 

the evidence—and this one convinces the Court that the evidence should come in. In Robinson, 

while the potential prejudice was great, the probative value of the evidence was “insignificant” 

because the only purpose for which the government offered the evidence of the patient deaths was 

that it would “help explain why the drug is highly regulated.” 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234734, at 

*4–5. That relatively uncontroversial point was “not . . . a contested issue” and the government 

did not need it “to satisfy any central element of its claims.” Id. at *4, *6. And the court added 

that admission might be appropriate if the government offered the evidence for a different 

purpose—for instance, if the defendant “knew about some adverse health event related to a 

patient’s oxycodone use before he issued them a prescription.” Id. at *6. 

So while the potential prejudice in that case was similar, the probative value was much 

less. Here, by contrast, the probative value is high. Okafor’s forgery is strongly indicative of his 

state of mind—something central to the government’s quest to prove that Okafor knowingly 

prescribed in an unauthorized manner. See Ruan, 142 S. Ct. at 2376. Furthermore, the government 

contends that Okafor continued prescribing controlled substances in a dangerous manner after 

being notified of J.V.’s death, see U.S.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Admit Evid. Intrinsic 

to the Charged Conduct and Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) [ECF No. 62] (“Reply to Def.’s 

Opp’n to Mot. to Admit Evid.”) at 9—analogous to the hypothetical in Robinson about continuing 

dangerous prescribing practices after receiving notice of adverse health consequences resulting 

from oxycodone use. 

This is a close call. But “Rule 403 tilts . . . toward the admission of evidence in close 
22 

cases,” such that “the balance should be generally struck in favor of admission.” United States v. 

Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, 

the Court will permit the introduction of the evidence concerning J.V. 

One other piece of evidence requires a Rule 403 analysis, and this one fails. As recited 

above, the government wishes to introduce a recorded jail call among Co-Conspirator 1, CoConspirator 2, and Okafor, wherein Co-Conspirator 2 asks Okafor to pay Co-Conspirator 2’s bail. 

Mot. to Admit Evid. at 15. The government, it seems, wants the call in evidence to demonstrate 

the relationship between Okafor and his co-conspirators. But the call’s probative value to that 

effect is extremely limited because the government has plenty of other routes to establishing that 

relationship, including balance sheets, WhatsApp messages, and data matching prescriptions to 

requests the co-conspirators made; Okafor will have a hard time trying to argue that he did not 

know these people. See Mot. to Admit Evid. at 10, 14–15; Thorne, 2020 WL 122985, at *6 (“[T]he 

probative value and unfair prejudice of an item of evidence ‘may be calculated by comparing 

evidentiary alternatives,’ and ‘the probative worth of any particular bit of evidence is obviously 

affected by the scarcity or abundance of other evidence on the same point.’” (quoting Old Chief v. 

United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997))). The potential for prejudice, meanwhile—while not as 

high as with the J.V. evidence—is significant, as a call from jail to Okafor may associate Okafor 

with criminality in jurors’ minds and cause them to presume that he runs in criminal circles. In 

light of the negligible probative value of this call and its potential for significant prejudice, the 

Court will exclude it under Rule 403. 

Accordingly, the Court will grant the government’s motion to introduce evidence in large 

part but deny it to the extent it seeks to introduce evidence of the jail call among Okafor and CoConspirators 1 and 2. 
23 

IV. Expert Testimony

The government plans to offer expert testimony on Okafor’s prescribing practices, 

including two doctors’ opinions that Okafor inadequately examined patients before prescribing 

them controlled substances and that many of his prescriptions lacked a legitimate medical purpose. 

See Mot. to Admit Evid. at 20–23. 

The parties are in substantial agreement about the permissible scope of this testimony. 

Okafor concedes that the experts may “testify as to whether any given prescription had a possible 

medical purpose” or “as to whether the defendant’s practice of prescribing medication is consistent 

with standard medical practice.” Opp’n to Mot. to Admit Evid. at 11–12. He objects only to expert 

testimony about Okafor’s “state of mind” and “the definition of legal terms and the meaning of the 

terms ‘for a legitimate medical purpose’ and ‘usual course of his professional practice.’” Id. at 

10–11 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)).7

For its part, the government agrees with those limitations. It represents that its experts will 

not testify to Okafor’s state of mind, only to objective medical standards. Reply to Def.’s Opp’n 

to Mot. to Admit Evid. at 11. And as for the terms “legitimate medical purpose” and “usual course 

of his professional practice,” it explains that the experts will opine only on their medical, and not 

their legal, definitions. Id. “[E]xpert testimony on the medical standard of care is not tantamount 

to an impermissible expert opinion on the governing legal standard just because the two standards 

overlap,” United States v. Hofschulz, 105 F.4th 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks 

omitted), so this brand of testimony is—as Okafor acknowledges—perfectly permissible.

The Court will therefore allow the proffered expert testimony. 

7 Okafor also expresses concern that the experts will testify about the legal standard for medical malpractice 

in civil cases, id. at 11–12, but the Court sees no reason to fear that this will happen.
24 

V. Impeachment of Okafor

Should Okafor testify at trial, the government wishes to impeach his credibility using 

evidence of a prior conviction and four instances of what it characterizes as dishonest conduct. 

See Mot. to Impeach at 1, 11. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion. 

A. The government may impeach Okafor with evidence of his prior conviction.

Okafor pled guilty in the District of Maryland in July 2008 to tax evasion in violation of 

26 U.S.C. § 7201; filing false income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206; and health care 

fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. Mot. to Impeach at 1. He was sentenced to 65 months’ 

imprisonment, released from incarceration on March 15, 2013, and placed on 36 months of 

supervised release. Id. After he submitted false expense reports to Probation, his supervised 

release was revoked and he was sentenced to one month of incarceration in June 2016. See id. at 

5–6; U.S.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Impeach [ECF No. 60] at 1.

Federal Rule of Evidence 609 governs the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions 

used to impeach a witness. Under that rule, admission is mandatory if “the court can readily 

determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving—or the witness’s 

admitting—a dishonest act or false statement” and less “than 10 years have passed since the 

witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later.” Fed. R. Evid. 

609(a)(2), (b). Where more than ten years have passed since the later of those two dates, admission 

shifts from mandatory to discretionary, such that it is appropriate “only if” the evidence’s 

“probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its 

prejudicial effect.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1). 

Okafor was released more than ten years ago, placing his conviction in the discretionary 
25 

bucket.8

 Among the factors to be weighed in that bucket are “the nature of the crime, the time of 

the conviction, the similarity of the past crime to the charged crime, the importance of the 

defendant’s testimony, and the degree to which the defendant’s credibility is central to the case.” 

United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Here, nearly every factor weighs 

in favor of admission. 

First, consider the nature of the crimes. Were they more recent, these crimes would skip 

the balancing test altogether, as they each involved a dishonest act or false statement. To be 

convicted of tax evasion, Okafor had to admit to “willfully attempt[ing] . . . to evade or defeat” a 

tax, 26 U.S.C. § 7201; of filing false income tax returns, to “[w]illfully” submitting a tax return 

“which he [did] not believe to be true and correct,” 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); and of health care fraud, 

to “knowingly and willingly . . . defraud[ing] [a] health care benefit program,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1347(a). Cf. Mattiaccio v. DHA Grp., Civ. A. No. 12-1249 (CKK), 2019 WL 6498865, at *15–

17 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2019) (admitting similar convictions under Rule 609). And the factual 

statement appended to Okafor’s plea agreement more than satisfies these elements, with Okafor 

admitting to, for instance, “reporting false information to the Internal Revenue Service,” 

“providing his tax return preparers with false information,” “establishing sham corporations to 

create false expenses,” and making a “false statement . . . in furtherance of[] a scheme in which he 

knowingly, or with deliberate disregard of whether the statements were true or false, or with a 

conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth, obtained monies from health care benefit programs 

8 In its reply brief, the government argues for the first time that admission is mandatory because the ten-year 

clock should start upon Okafor’s release from his reincarceration for violating the terms of his supervised release, 

rather than from his initial release. See U.S.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Impeach at 1. There is some support 

for this approach, see Thorne, 2020 WL 122985, at *12 n.11 (collecting cases), but, as the government recognizes, the 

D.C. Circuit has not weighed in, see United States v. Moore, 75 F. Supp. 3d 444, 454 n.10 (D.D.C. 2014). The Court 

sees no reason to resolve the question given the government’s forfeiture of the argument, see Stand Up for Cal.! v. 

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 204 F. Supp. 3d 212, 313 n.51 (D.D.C. 2016), and the Court’s resolution of the motion in 

the government’s favor nonetheless.
26 

for hospital services he did not perform.” Mot. to Impeach at 2–4. We are now outside the window 

where this conviction would be automatically admissible, but it is nonetheless notable that the 

counts are precisely the sort of crimes that the Federal Rules of Evidence consider most reflective 

of a witness’s trustworthiness—and therefore most appropriate for impeachment. 

Next, the time of the conviction. We are outside the ten-year window—but barely, as 

Okafor was released in 2013. So while these convictions are somewhat stale, they are about as 

fresh as any dishonesty-related conviction subject to this balancing test will be. This factor 

therefore weighs against admission, but weakly. 

Third, the crimes with which Okafor is now charged are quite different than those of which 

he was convicted in 2008: those were financial crimes while these are drug crimes. There is a 

greater fear of prejudice resulting from admitting prior convictions “similar to the instant charge,” 

Thorne, 2020 WL 122985, at *25, on the theory that the evidence might be taken more for 

propensity than for untruthfulness. No such fear exists here, so the divergence points towards 

admission. 

Finally, should he choose to testify, Okafor’s credibility will likely be “central to the trial,” 

United States v. Moore, 75 F. Supp. 3d 444, 455 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), 

which also means his testimony is “particularly important,” United States v. Anderson, 174 

F. Supp. 3d 104, 108 (D.D.C. 2016). In light of Ruan, the government will have to prove that 

Okafor “knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.” 142 S. Ct. at 2376. And 

Okafor’s papers thus far have consistently maintained that his alleged co-conspirators duped him, 

which suggests that the case may come down to whether he can persuade the jury that he meant 

well. See Def’s Req. for a James Hearing [ECF No. 43] at 1. This factor, too, therefore weighs in 

favor of admission. Moore, 75 F. Supp. at 455; see also Anderson, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 107–08. 
27 

The Court acknowledges that Rule 609 prescribes a “stringent” test before a conviction 

more than ten years old may be admitted. Thorne, 2020 WL 122985, at *7. But it is hard-pressed 

to imagine a better candidate than the conviction here. Accordingly, the Court finds that the 

probative value of Okafor’s 2008 conviction “substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect,” Fed. 

R. Evid. 609(b)(1), and that the government may therefore impeach Okafor with it should he 

testify. 

B. The government may impeach Okafor by inquiring into prior dishonest acts, but 

it may not introduce extrinsic evidence of them.

The prior conviction aside, the government wishes to pursue a second strategy to impugn 

Okafor’s character for truthfulness should he testify. The government wants to cross-examine 

Okafor about what it characterizes as four instances of dishonesty. First, the government says 

Okafor obstructed justice in his District of Maryland case by creating and submitting fake, 

backdated invoices to introduce at trial, that the government obtained and executed a search 

warrant based on probable cause to that effect, and that the search confirmed its suspicions. Mot. 

to Impeach at 5; see also Order Denying Def.’s Mot. for Reconsideration of Detention Order [ECF 

No. 26] at 9. Second, the government says Okafor submitted false supervision reports to the 

Probation Office in that case, resulting in the revocation of his supervised release. Mot. to Impeach

at 5–6. Third, the government says Okafor submitted false statements to the D.C. and Maryland 

boards of medicine in which he downplayed the Maryland conviction and its penalties. Id. at 6–

7. Fourth and finally, the government says Okafor lied to the magistrate judge in this case about 

his foreign property ownership in an effort to minimize the risk that he might flee if released 

pretrial, and that the magistrate judge so found. Id. at 8.9

9 The government also included in this impeachment motion allegations about debts under which Okafor 

apparently labored, saying that they provide evidence of motive. Mot. to Impeach at 7–8. As the government later 
28 

Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) governs the impeachment of a witness using specific 

instances of conduct that did not lead to a conviction. A party may inquire on cross-examination 

about such instances “in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness,” so long 

as they “are probative of the [witness’s] character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 

608(b); see United States v. Miller, 738 F.3d 361, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2013). To avoid unfounded 

accusations, “the questioner must be in possession of some facts which support a genuine belief 

that the witness committed the . . . act to which the question relates.” Whitmore, 359 F.3d at 621–

22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Court has little difficulty concluding that these instances of conduct are probative of 

Okafor’s untruthfulness. Each, if true, involved lying to an authority, including multiple courts. 

The D.C. Circuit found an abuse of discretion in a court’s exclusion of evidence that a witness lied 

to a court and failed to report a driver’s license suspension to probation supervisors. See

Whitmore, 359 F.3d at 619; see also id. (“Nothing could be more probative of a witness’s character 

for untruthfulness than evidence that the witness has previously lied under oath.”). Like the 

witness in Whitmore, Okafor lied to courts and probation officials, and lying to a medical board 

in an attempt to reclaim a medical license is in a similar vein.

The potential prejudice, meanwhile, is slight, though not nonexistent. Because the 

proffered instances involved lying to authorities and not drug dealing, they bear only on the quality 

contemplated by the rule—untruthfulness—and do not pose much risk of infecting the jury’s view 

of Okafor’s propensity to commit the crimes charged here. And because each instance is supported 

by at least some evidence, the questioning is not pure “accusations.” Cf. Miller, 738 F.3d at 376 

(probativeness diminished and prejudice heightened because “the cross-examination would have 

conceded, this is Rule 404(b) evidence, not Rule 608 evidence, see U.S.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Impeach 

at 2 n.1, so the Court has discussed it alongside other Rule 404(b) evidence above.
29 

been based on accusations, not a prior judicial finding [the witness] had lied”); see also Whitmore, 

359 F.3d at 621–22. 

The government goes too far, however, in insisting that it be able to introduce documentary 

evidence of these instances of dishonesty. See Mot. to Impeach at 11. While the government may 

“ask questions” about these instances under Rule 608, it may not “adduce extrinsic evidence” of 

them. Whitmore, 359 F.3d at 619–20; see Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) (permitting specific instances of 

conduct “to be inquired into” but not to be supported by “extrinsic evidence”); United States v. 

Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1996). So the government must make itself content with 

Okafor’s answers.10 

* * * 

Accordingly, the government’s motion to impeach Okafor in the event he testifies is 

granted to the extent it seeks to introduce evidence of Okafor’s past conviction and to crossexamine him on the enumerated instances of dishonest conduct. It is denied to the extent it seeks 

permission to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the instances of dishonest conduct. 

VI. The Government’s Omnibus Motion in Limine

Finally, the government presents a grab-bag of motions in limine asking the Court to 

preclude certain tactics by Okafor and to endorse others by the government. See Omnibus Mot. 

These motions are largely premature.11 Cf. Flythe v. District of Columbia, 4 F. Supp. 3d 222, 226 

(D.D.C. 2014) (“[A] trial judge’s discretion extends . . . to the threshold question of whether a 

10 “Rule 608(b)’s bar against extrinsic evidence does not apply when the evidence is used to contradict a 

statement made by a witness during her testimony.” McGill, 815 F.3d at 907; see also United States v. O’Neal, 844 

F.3d 271, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016). So if Okafor testifies on direct examination in a way inconsistent with the materials 

the government wishes to introduce, it may ask the Court to reconsider this ruling. Cf. Luce v. United States, 469 

U.S. 38, 41–42 (1984) (noting that rulings in limine are “subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly when 

the actual testimony differs from what was contained in the . . . proffer”). 11 One of these motions asks the Court to admit co-conspirator statements in furtherance of the conspiracy 

subject to connection at trial. The Court has already effectively granted this motion and so will not discuss it here. 

See Order Denying Mot. for Prelim. Determination of Conspiracy.
30 

motion in limine presents an evidentiary issue that is appropriate for ruling in advance of trial.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

A. The summary charts and exhibits may be admitted subject to reasonable notice.

The government intends to introduce summary charts in lieu of “thousands of pages of 

detailed prescription data and records.” Omnibus Mot. at 14. Okafor objects, but principally on 

the ground that he has not yet seen the charts or underlying data. Def.’s Opp’n to Omnibus Mot.

[ECF No. 57] at 5–6. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 permits the admission of a “summary, chart, or calculation 

to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be 

conveniently examined in court.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006. “The voluminous underlying records must 

themselves be admissible and ‘must be made reasonably available for inspection and copying.’” 

Abou-Khatwa, 40 F.4th at 684–85 (quoting United States v. Fahnbulleh, 752 F.3d 470, 479 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014)). As long as the summaries “are accurate and nonprejudicial . . . the summaries can 

help the jury organize and evaluate evidence which is factually complex and fragmentally revealed 

in the testimony of a multitude of witnesses or documents throughout the trial.” Id. at 685 (cleaned 

up). Summary witnesses paired with such summaries, meanwhile, are subject to “strict limits” 

preventing them from “usurp[ing] the jury’s fact-finding function by summarizing or describing 

not only what is in evidence but also what inferences should be drawn from that evidence.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Cooper, 949 F.3d 744, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). 

Given the nature and volume of the evidence in this case, the Court expects that summary 

charts and witnesses will be appropriate and helpful, provided that they meet the requirements of 

Rule 1006. The government, however, must make both the underlying documents and the charts 

themselves available to Okafor “at a reasonable time and place,” Fed. R. Evid. 1006, with enough 
31 

time for Okafor to examine them prior to trial and raise any concerns he may have. The 

government represents that it will provide the charts to Okafor prior to trial, see Omnibus Mot. at 

14, but it must make the underlying records available, as well, Abou-Khatwa, 40 F.4th at 684–85. 

Trusting that the government will comply with the rule’s requirements, the Court will grant the 

motion. 

B. The remaining motions are premature and thus denied without prejudice.

The government’s remaining motions are premature and thus denied without prejudice. 

For instance, the government asks the Court to preclude Okafor from introducing evidence 

of lawful prescriptions, claiming that it would constitute improper character evidence. Omnibus 

Mot. at 2. The government quickly and wisely concedes, however, that Okafor may present such 

evidence “for a purpose other than character or propensity,” id. at 4 n.2; see also U.S.’s Reply to 

Def’s Opp’n to Omnibus Mot. [ECF No. 61] at 1, and the Court sees no reason to conclude that 

Okafor will not offer such evidence for a proper purpose—for instance, to demonstrate innocent

intent, as Okafor suggests, see Def.’s Opp’n to Omnibus Mot. at 2. Accordingly, the motion is 

denied—without prejudice, of course, to the government’s ability to object at trial if it believes 

Okafor is straying into improper territory. 

Next, the government asks the Court to preclude Okafor “from introducing any evidence, 

making any statement, or asking any questions that include[] or could reasonably be expected to 

elicit the defendant’s own hearsay statements.” Omnibus Mot. at 5. As Okafor points out, the 

government gives nothing by way of particulars or reason to believe that there is specific improper 

evidence Okafor is likely to elicit. Def.’s Opp’n to Omnibus Mot. at 2. Accordingly, the motion 

is denied. The parties are expected to know and abide by the rules of hearsay, and are free to object 

to any improper hearsay that may come up at trial. 
32 

The same goes for the government’s motions to order Okafor not to use “interview reports 

or rough notes” to impeach witnesses, Omnibus Mot. at 6, and not to present the jury with 

arguments about selective prosecution, id. at 7–9, trial strategy, id. at 9, plea and discovery 

negotiations, id. at 9, or jury nullification, id. at 10–11—none of which it gives any reason to 

believe will arise. Similarly, the government indicates its intent to introduce business records at 

trial, id. at 11—a move the Court expects will be uncontroversial, but cannot rule on without more 

detail. See Charles v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., Civ. A. No. 1:16-2054 (GMH), 2021 WL 

4439057, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2021) (“[I]ssues raised in motions in limine that may benefit 

from further development may be deferred until a later time.”).

Accordingly, the remaining motions are denied without prejudice to renewal. 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Okafor’s motions [ECF No. 41] to dismiss, 

[ECF No. 40] to suppress, and [ECF No. 46] to preclude evidence about J.V.; grant in part and 

deny in part the government’s motion [ECF No. 37] to admit evidence; grant the government’s 

[ECF No. 63] supplemental motion to admit evidence; grant in part and deny in part the 

government’s motion [ECF No. 39] to impeach; and grant in part and deny without prejudice in 

part the government’s [ECF No. 38] omnibus motion in limine. 

 An accompanying order will issue on this date. 

 /s/ 

 JOHN D. BATES 

 United States District Judge

Dated: September 23, 2024