[Cite as In re Disqualification of Donofrio, 135 Ohio St.3d 1253, 2012-Ohio-6338.] 

IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF DONOFRIO ET AL. 

THE STATE EX REL. PATEL v. CRAWFORD. 

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Donofrio, 135 Ohio St.3d 1253, 

2012-Ohio-6338.] 

Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Disqualification of 

appellate panel not warranted—Allegations of erroneous rulings cannot 

be litigated in disqualification proceeding—Affiant has failed to prove 

prejudice or bias.

(No. 12-AP-134—Decided December 17, 2012.) 

ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in the Court of Appeals for Belmont County 

Case No. 12-BE-28. 

__________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} Petitioner Arvind Patel has filed an affidavit with the clerk of this 

court under R.C. 2501.13 and 2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Gene 

Donofrio, Judge Joseph J. Vukovich, and Judge Mary DeGenaro from presiding 

over case No. 12-BE-28, now pending on Patel’s petition for a writ of mandamus 

in the Seventh District Court of Appeals. 

{¶ 2} Patel alleges that Judge Donofrio, Judge Vukovich, and Judge 

DeGenaro should be disqualified from hearing his underlying writ action because 

in a different case filed by him, Patel v. Bellaire, 7th Dist. No. 10-BE-27, 2012-

Ohio-4348, they issued a biased opinion that violated his constitutional rights. 

Specifically, Patel argues that the panel included false statements in the Patel

opinion, ignored “undeniable facts and evidence,” and “maliciously and 

wrongfully” affirmed the trial court’s judgment against him. As a result, Patel 

claims that this panel of judges is “incapable” of adjudicating the underlying writ 
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action and “will again deprive Patel of his Constitutional Right to due process due 

to his race and religion.” 

{¶ 3} For the following reasons, no basis has been established to order 

the disqualification of Judge Donofrio, Judge Vukovich, or Judge DeGenaro. 

{¶ 4} First, the gravamen of Patel’s affidavit is that the Seventh District 

violated his constitutional rights in the separate Patel case. However, whether the 

appellate court erred in that case cannot be litigated in an affidavit-ofdisqualification proceeding. It is well established that an affidavit of 

disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural 

law.” In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 

798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4. And a party’s disagreement or dissatisfaction with a court’s 

legal rulings, even if those rulings may be erroneous, is not grounds for 

disqualification. See In re Disqualification of Floyd, 101 Ohio St.3d 1217, 2003-

Ohio-7351, 803 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 4; In re Disqualification of Light, 36 Ohio St.3d 

604, 522 N.E.2d 458 (1988) (“alleged errors of law or procedure are legal issues 

subject to appeal and are not grounds for disqualification”). Therefore, Patel’s 

disagreement with the Seventh District’s Patel opinion does not demonstrate bias 

or prejudice and is not grounds for disqualification in the underlying writ action. 

The remedy for these and other legal claims, if any, lies on appeal, not through the 

filing of an affidavit of disqualification. In re Disqualification of Russo, 110 Ohio 

St.3d 1208, 2005-Ohio-7146, 850 N.E.2d 713, ¶ 6. 

{¶ 5} Second, Patel has failed to substantiate his claim of racial or 

religious bias. Allegations of such bias strike at the very heart of the judiciary and 

are among the most serious and damaging that can be directed at a judge. As a 

result, such claims must be proven by clear evidence establishing the existence of 

bias. In re Disqualification of Cunningham, 100 Ohio St.3d 1216, 2002-Ohio7470, 798 N.E.2d 4, ¶ 2. Here, Patel has submitted documents, transcripts, and 

affidavits from the Patel record in an attempt to show that the appellate court 
January Term, 2012 

3 

erred by misinterpreting the relevant evidence. However, he provides no 

evidence, beyond speculation, to support his assertion that the alleged errors were 

the product of bias—racial or otherwise. Vague or unsubstantiated allegations are 

insufficient to establish bias or prejudice. In re Disqualification of Walker, 36 

Ohio St.3d 606, 522 N.E.2d 460 (1988); In re Disqualification of Flanagan, 127 

Ohio St.3d 1236, 2009-Ohio-7199, 937 N.E.2d 1023, ¶ 4 (“Allegations that are 

based solely on hearsay, innuendo, and speculation * * * are insufficient to 

establish bias or prejudice”). 

{¶ 6} Finally, because the appellate panel has been the target of his 

personal criticism, Patel suggests they should be disqualified because the 

probability of their bias is now “too high to be Constitutionally tolerable.” Patel 

cites Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 

(1971), and Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 

(1975). As an initial matter, neither Mayberry nor Withrow support 

disqualification here. Mayberry involved the narrow issue of whether a judge 

should hear the criminal-contempt trial of a defendant when the same judge was 

the one reviled by the contemnor, and Withrow involved whether an 

administrative agency’s combination of investigative and adjudicative functions 

created an unconstitutional risk of bias. Mayberry at 466; Withrow at 47. The 

issue here is much broader: whether judges on an appellate court should be 

removed from a case involving a litigant who has previously criticized the court’s 

judicial opinions and lodged personal attacks against the judges. 

{¶ 7} In general, absent some indication that the criticism was so great 

that no reasonable judge could be expected to remain unaffected, personal attacks 

on a judge—even serious allegations of racism, such as here—will not lead to the 

judge’s disqualification. See Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, Section 21.8 (2d 

Ed.2007). As the United States Supreme Court stated in Mayberry, “[a] judge 

cannot be driven out of a case.” Id. at 464; see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
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Sweeney, 136 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir.1998), quoting 13A Wright, Miller & 

Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 3542, 577-578 (2d Ed.1984) 

(“ ‘A party cannot force disqualification by attacking the judge and then claiming 

that these attacks must have caused the judge to be biased against [her]’ ” 

[brackets sic]). “A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and 

the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these 

presumptions.” In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-

Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5. Those presumptions have not been overcome in 

this case. Nothing in the record suggests that Patel’s accusations against the 

Seventh District judges have affected or would affect their conduct in the 

underlying case. See, e.g., In re Disqualification of O’Neill, 100 Ohio St.3d 1232, 

2002-Ohio-7479, 798 N.E.2d 17, ¶ 17. Accordingly, the fact that this panel of 

judges has been the target of Patel’s criticism is insufficient to warrant their 

disqualification. 

{¶ 8} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 

denied. The case may proceed before Judge Donofrio, Judge Vukovich, and 

Judge DeGenaro of the Seventh District Court of Appeals. 

______________________