U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

65–627PDF 2011

ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND

NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN

SOUTH ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 5, 2011

Serial No. 112–26

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for South and 

Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .............................................. 6

The Honorable Nisha Desai Biswal, Assistant Administrator for Asia, U.S. 

Agency for International Development .............................................................. 16

Mr. Daniel Feldman, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, U.S. Department of State ................................................................... 24

Mr. Donald Sampler, Deputy Director, Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development ......................................... 31

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Robert O. Blake: Prepared statement .......................................... 8

The Honorable Nisha Desai Biswal: Prepared statement .................................... 19

Mr. Daniel Feldman: Prepared statement ............................................................. 27

Mr. Donald Sampler: Prepared statement ............................................................. 34

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 64

(1)

ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES 

AND NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN SOUTH ASIA 

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon. I welcome all my colleagues to this 

hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 

We will make opening statements, myself and the ranking member. 

Other members can make a 1-minute statement if they choose to 

do so. 

There was an unidentified package in the subway from the Capitol building to this building, and that is why other members aren’t 

here yet, because they are making their way various routes to this 

committee or they are going elsewhere and won’t come. One or the 

other, I am not sure. But I think that is why there aren’t more 

members here yet. Or they are suspects, as the ranking member 

suggests. 

Anyway, this hearing was called with the intention of following 

up on Secretary of State Clinton’s testimony at the full committee 

that we heard last month, but with an exclusive focus on South 

Asia. This will give members the opportunity to ask more specific 

questions both about the Fiscal Year 2012 proposed budget as well 

as U.S. strategy throughout the region. 

South Asia continues to be the source of many of the most critical challenges to U.S. National security and will likely continue to 

be in the future. The most immediate challenge is the war in Afghanistan. At the NATO summit in Lisbon this past November, 

NATO members presented their plan to cease all combat operations 

in Afghanistan by 2014. The administration’s strategy to meet this 

deadline relies on a vast number of complex variables, many of 

which are out of our control. At the center of this effort lies the 

mission to build the capacity of the Afghan National Security 

Forces. 

Although we have seen significant gains within the Afghan National Army, the capabilities of the Afghan National Police lag behind. I would like to call the subcommittee’s attention to the tragic 

2

incident just yesterday in which two coalition soldiers were shot 

and killed by a man wearing an Afghan border policeman’s uniform. While it is not yet clear whether this man was indeed a policeman or an insurgent masquerading as a policeman, incidents 

like this are, unfortunately, far too common. They raise significant 

concerns about how successful our efforts have been so far, how effective our screening process is, and whether our 2014 deadline is 

realistic. The most tragic outcome for this conflict would be to repeat the mistakes of the past by leaving Afghanistan before we 

have had the opportunity to solidify the gains that our troops have 

fought so hard for over the past decade. 

The administration’s policy also emphasizes the importance of 

reconciliation with the Taliban, which is an extremely thorny issue. 

Setting aside the question of whether it is even possible to achieve 

reconciliation, we are talking about allowing to return to power the 

same extremist thugs who terrorized women and ruled according to 

a radical interpretation of Islam that disregards basic human 

rights. 

I hope the witnesses here today will elaborate on the administration’s plans for the conduct of these negotiations as well as what 

exactly is considered negotiable. I hope they will also discuss how 

the administration is planning to balance the concerns that India 

and Pakistan may have surrounding both the negotiations process 

as well as how the Afghan Government that may emerge would affect the strategic balance of the region. 

Afghanistan, however, is not our only concern in South Asia. 

Years of Pakistani mistrust of the U.S. has resulted in a relationship in which cooperation on certain issues is often accompanied by 

obstruction on others. The Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan 

Act of 2009, also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, 

was intended to change this by authorizing up to $1.5 billion in civilian aid per year through 2014. Among other goals, the legislation is supposed to convey to Pakistan that the U.S. interest is in 

a strategic partnership and not just a transactional relationship. 

Although we have seen improved cooperation with certain elements of the Pakistani Government, the positive benefits of KerryLugar-Berman have not yet spilled over into other arenas, such as 

security, in any meaningful way. The fact remains that Pakistani 

and U.S. strategic interests diverge on certain issues, especially 

those concerning Islamist terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, 

which the Pakistani 

ISI continues to view as a strategic asset vis-a`-vis India. 

How, then, does the administration plan to address these critical 

issues that continue to warp our entire policy in the region? I 

would hope that as a strategic partner Pakistan would not merely 

cooperate with us when it suits their immediate interests. 

Although I have focused almost exclusively on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and to some degree India, I hope some of our panelists will 

discuss our programs in the other countries of the region. But after 

all, I only have 5 minutes, so I have to keep mine relatively brief. 

You have all only get 5 minutes, too, unfortunately. Several examples include our programs to assist the Sri Lankans in their postcivil war reconciliation and our efforts to help the Nepalese Government continue its transition to democracy. 

3

Without any further delay, I would like to recognize my good 

friend from New York, the ranking member, Mr. Ackerman, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for assembling this panel of superstars. 

Mr. Chairman, the heart of our security dilemma in South Asia 

lies in a region that covers the northwest of Pakistan and the 

southeast of Afghanistan. Whatever the lines on the map may indicate, this cross-border area is where the focus of our concerns 

should lie. Here is where al-Qaeda has sought cover; here is where 

the Afghan Taliban is sustained; here is where the Pakistani 

Taliban is strongest. Here is where the Afghan warlords make 

their deals. Here is where the reach of the Pakistani state is weakest. Here is where the combination of cooperation and perfidy by 

the ISI is most stark. Here is where both the convergence and divergence between U.S., Pakistani, and Afghan interests are most 

clear. 

This region is the chokepoint for much of the war matriel going 

into Afghanistan, both ours and theirs. This is the region where violence, radical Islamism, is most concentrated and secure. This region is the chief operating area for our drones because it is the 

area most saturated with high value targets. 

Even though this broad scenario has been the same for years, we 

are always, always, always making progress, except we never seem 

to get anywhere. The number of attacks against our side continues 

to rise. The number of fighters on the other side never seems to 

drop. President Karzai is alleged to be a crook. President Zardari 

is alleged to be President Zardari. Pakistan is about to go broke or 

collapse or broke. Afghanistan’s new government continues to 

plumb new depths in the practice of corruption. 

The border is open to us. The border is open to them. The ISI 

is cooperating with us. The ISI is cooperating with them. The Afghan National Security Forces are always being trained and always 

melting away. 

I know that our President in December 2010 announced, ‘‘We are 

seeing significant progress,’’ he said, ‘‘against the core goal,’’ and 

that al-Qaeda senior leadership are under more pressure and that, 

‘‘we are clearing more areas from the Taliban control and more Afghans are reclaiming their communities,’’ he said. I know that he 

questioned that, ‘‘The gains we have made are still fragile and reversible,’’ said the President. I know that he affirmed the goal 

agreed to at the November 2010 Lisbon NATO summit to move toward what he said was a transition to full Afghan lead for security 

that will begin early next year—that is 2011—and will conclude in 

2014, said the President. 

Mr. Chairman, I know all that, but I can’t see anything changing. The money keeps getting spent and the wounded and the dead 

keep coming home. Maybe from Washington the progress can’t be 

discerned amid all of the conflicting data and narratives. I hope, 

indeed, I pray, that things are going to be better than they are 

from here. But after 10 years of hearing the same sales pitch, I 

tend to doubt it. 

I doubt that our money is buying anything that is deep or durable. I doubt that these new trained security forces are going to take 

4

the lead in weeks, much less years. I doubt the leaders in the Afghan Government and the Pakistani Government are going to do 

anything except pursue their own narrow, venal, self-interest. I 

doubt the ISI will ever stop working with us during the day and 

going to see their not-so-secret friends in the Lashkar-e-Taiba or 

Jaish-e-Mohammed, and other terrorist groups at night. Most of 

all, I doubt that we aren’t being taken for suckers and that the 

massive expenditures and the terrible sacrifices of our troops will, 

in the end, be vindicated by anything that resembles success. 

A few words about India and other South Asian States. The 

brightest light in South Asia’s constellation and the strategic center 

of gravity for the region is India, which has been on a sustained 

path toward economic and political empowerment. As the world’s 

largest democracy, India is a natural partner for the United States. 

And I am delighted by the way that our relations have blossomed 

ever since the Clinton administration. 

My complaint here, however, is much the same as it has been for 

some time. Our relations with India are still too narrow and still 

too shallow. Some of the responsibility is ours, some is theirs. On 

the economic side, there is too much opportunity being lost to outdated rules, regulations and laws limiting the attractiveness of accessibility of India as a destination for business and investment. 

On the defense and security side, things are going well between our 

two defense establishments, and I have hope high hopes that he 

will go much further still. America makes the best defensive equipment in the world and India’s security requirements are very, very 

real. 

And here, the United States has failed India in that we have not 

used our diplomatic leadership and agenda for setting capability to 

focus global attention to the threat to India from Pakistan-based 

terrorists such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, that continue to raise money 

from all over the world. If there is, God forbid, another Mumbailike strike, we will not be able to say that we did our utmost to 

prevent it, because in truth we haven’t. 

The ambitions of these terrorists have only grown and a fullfledged global campaign to crush these thugs still awaits, at our 

peril. The governments in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh 

are in varying degrees transitional, and all face tough challenges 

in knitting together the social fabric of their nations. Some have 

faced revolutions, others civil war or conflict. Each faces the difficult task of providing a government that serves all of its people, 

that is bound by the law, and that is answerable ultimately to their 

publics. 

American aid to these national efforts serves our national interest and reflects the values that we hold most dear. Partnership 

with these nations as well as our friends in the Maldives serves our 

national interest for very little relative cost and should be sustained even in these very difficult economic times. 

You have described an agenda wherein a lot of ground has to be 

covered, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from distinguished witnesses. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. Are there 

any other members of the committee who would like to make a 1-

5

minute opening statement? We will proceed with the introductions 

of our distinguished panel here this morning. 

First, we have Ambassador Robert Blake, who was appointed Assistant Secretary of South and Central Asian Affairs in May 2009. 

He previously served as Ambassador to Sri Lanka and Maldives, 

and as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. mission in New Delhi. 

He has also held a number of positions at the State Department 

in Washington, including Senior Desk Officer for Turkey; Deputy 

Executive Secretary and Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. We welcome you here, Ambassador. 

Next, we have Nisha Desai Biswal, who currently serves as 

USAID’s Assistant Administrator for Asia. Prior to her appointment, she served as the majority clerk for the State Department 

and Foreign Operations Subcommittee on the House Committee on 

Appropriations. She also previously served on the professional staff 

of the House International Relations Committee, where she was responsible for South and Central Asia policy as well as oversight of 

the State Department and USAID. We welcome you here, Ms. 

Biswal. 

Next, we have Dan Feldman, who is one of the three deputies to 

the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His previous government experience includes serving as Director of Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council 

in the Clinton administration, where he was responsible for global 

human rights issues, and as counsel and communications adviser 

to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee. Thank you for being here Mr. Feldman. 

Finally, last but not least is Larry Sampler, who is currently the 

Principal Deputy Assistant to the Administrator and Deputy Director of the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs at USAID. 

Prior to this, he served as the Deputy Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the Department of State and as the Chief 

of Staff for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Sampler has also served in the Special Operations community 

of the U.S. Army, and we thank him for his service to our country. 

For 15 years I believe, Mr. Sampler, is that correct? 

Mr. SAMPLER. That is right. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you for your service, and thank you for all 

your services here in the different capacities. 

Gerry, would you want to make a 1-minute statement? You are 

welcome to do so. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. I am very 

interested in the testimony today. I do have a prepared statement. 

Without objection, I would ask it be inserted in the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me just say, an issue, Mr. Chairman, that I 

think we on a bipartisan basis need to follow, and that is the whole 

CERP program, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. 

It has grown enormously. It falls through the cracks. The intentions are all goods, but the amounts are not so big. It would make 

it one of the largest bilateral aid programs in the world, and we 

need to get our arms around it in terms of making sure it is efficacious and making sure that we have full auditing trails of such 

6

large amounts of money. So I am interested in hearing our witnesses talk about that today, too. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We will remind the panel, 

as you probably know, we operate under the 5-minute rule, both for 

members up here and the panelists. As I say, we have a very distinguished panel here this afternoon. There should be a lighting 

system which should be functioning there to let you know how 

much of the 5 minutes are being used. A yellow light will come on 

when you have 1 minute to wrap up. The red light will come in, 

and you are supposed to stop then. If you didn’t cooperate too 

much, I have tap the little gavel. And at some point I will bang 

it pretty loudly. 

Your testimony in full, of course, will be taken for record, and we 

will get into things in questions as well. 

Mr. Ambassador, you are our first witness. So we appreciate you 

being here. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT O. BLAKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL 

ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ackerman, members of the committee. I am very pleased to be here today to speak 

with you about U.S. foreign policy priorities and needs in South 

Asia. I have submitted testimony about the countries under my 

purview, and I would just briefly summarize it now. 

Mr. Chairman, South Asia holds more than 1.4 billion people, 

nearly a quarter of the world’s population, and yet only 2.5 percent 

of the world’s GDP. More than 50 percent of South Asians are 

under 25 and nearly three-quarters of them live on less than $2 a 

day. This burgeoning, multi-ethnic region, anchored by the growing 

prosperity and global reach of India, plays an instrumental role in 

world affairs, international commerce, and global peace and security. Since 2008, democratically elected leaders govern all South 

Asian countries, an indication that India’s democracy has served as 

a useful model in the region. 

The United States and India enjoy a truly global strategic partnership now, thanks to President Obama’s recent visit in November 

2010. India’s 8 percent growth rate makes it the world second fastest growing major economy today. During the President’s visit he 

announced trade deals that exceeded $14.9 billion in total value, 

with $9.5 billion in U.S. export content, supporting almost 54,000 

jobs. 

India is also among the fastest growing sources of investment 

into the United States. In the last decade, investment capital coming from India to the United States grew at an annualized rate of 

53 percent, reaching $4.4 billion in 2009. 

The strategic partnership with India will remain among our top 

foreign policy priorities. As the President told the Indian Parliament last year, with India assuming its rightful place in the 

world, we have an historic opportunity to make this relationship 

between our countries a defining partnership for the century 

ahead. 

7

I would like to take note of the recent resumption of talks between India and Pakistan and the demonstration of goodwill by 

both sides. Both countries made important strides during Home 

Secretary talks last week by agreeing to set up a hotline between 

their two governments to share information about the threats of 

terrorism and to share and facilitate the work of commissions investigating terrorist attacks. 

Turning to Bangladesh, it is a democratic and moderate Muslim 

country of 160 million people with a rapidly growing economy. It 

is a country with which the United States has a strong interest in 

maintaining close relations. Since Prime Minister Hasina was 

elected in December 2008, Bangladesh has denied space to terrorist, captured several key leaders of violent insurgent groups, 

and prioritized improving relations with India. 

When I went to Bangladesh 2 weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, I 

pressed the government to protect the integrity of civil society and 

the autonomy of Grameen Bank. I warned that a failure to find a 

compromise that respects Dr. Yunus’ global stature and maintains 

the integrity and effectiveness necessary of Grameen could affect 

our bilateral relations. 

Off the coast of southern India lies Sri Lanka, still recovering 

from its 26-year conflict with the LTTE. Positioned directly on the 

shipping routes that carry petroleum products and other trade from 

the Gulf to East Asia, Sri Lanka remains a strategic interest to the 

United States. An important contributor to the global peacekeeping 

operation, it is poised to be a capable and willing partner to effectively combat violent extremist, trafficking, and piracy. But the 

government’s worrying record on human rights, its weakening of 

democratic institutions and practices, and the way in which it conducted the final months of its conflict against the Tamil Tigers, 

hamper our ability to fully engage. We continue to stress the important of reconciliation and accountability for the future stability 

and prosperity of that country. 

Nepal is one of the poorest countries in Asia, but it continues its 

dramatic transformation from a caste-bound constitutional monarchy racked by a bloody Maoist insurgency to a Federal republic 

that represents and includes all minorities and ethnicities. Although numerous challenges remain, overall trends are positive. 

When Nepal’s leadership demonstrates its readiness to move forward on the final elements of the peace process, we stand ready to 

provide limited supports for some aspects of that. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, South Asia is one of the most vital 

regions of the world for the United States, and its importance will 

only grow. The recent histories of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, 

Bhutan, and Maldives show they are joining India in consolidating 

democracy and contributing to the peace and security of the larger 

world. They may seem small, but they understand the need to 

think big and the importance of working with us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blake follows:]

8


65627a_1.eps
9


65627a_2.eps
10


65627a_3.eps
11


65627a_4.eps
12


65627a_5.eps
13


65627a_6.eps
14


65627a_7.eps
15


65627a_8.eps
16

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Your timing was impeccable. 

Ms. Biswal, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NISHA DESAI BISWAL, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. BISWAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, and members of the committee, thank you 

very much for the invitation to testify today on behalf of President 

Obama’s Fiscal Year 2012 budget for USAID programs in South 

Asia. It is a particular honor for me to appear before this committee after having served here as professional staff, and I am also 

very pleased to be here with my colleagues, Bob Blake, Dan Feldman, and Larry Sampler. 


65627a_9.eps
17

Mr. Chairman, USAID’s development programs in Bangladesh, 

India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are addressing critical development 

challenges and advancing critical American interests. With nearly 

one-fourth of the global population, a third of which still lives in 

poverty, South Asia continues to experience significant development challenges. At the same time it is a region of strong economic 

growth and impressive progress. The American people can take 

pride in the role that the United States has played in this progress, 

whether it be the Green Revolution of the sixties and seventies, 

which saved millions of lives by increasing agricultural productivity, or the strides that we are making today on reducing infant 

and maternal deaths and improving other health outcomes. 

Our investments in South Asia have also benefited the American 

people. For example, in the last decade, U.S. Exports to India have 

quadrupled and Indian investment in the United States has grown 

significantly. In fact, globally U.S. exports to developing countries 

overall has grown six times faster than our exports to major economies. 

USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah has talked about the need for 

the United States to reach out to the 2–3 billion people who are 

currently at the bottom of the economic pyramid who have the potential to rise to the middle class. A large portion of the bottom billion reside in South Asia. By establishing links to them today with 

these future consumers, we can effectively position American companies for marketing to them in the future. 

To improve our own efficiency, USAID is reforming the way that 

we do business, streamlining our procurement processes, broadening our partner base, employing the strategic use of science and 

technology to create more innovative solutions and strengthening 

our evaluation capability to better assess when the programs are 

working and when they should be replicated. 

USAID missions in South Asia are applying these lessons to 

focus our resources in this very densely populated region of profound poverty, chronic food insecurity, and environmental vulnerability. 

Across the region, USAID devotes about 50 percent of our 2012 

request toward improving health outcomes. Nepal, India, and Bangladesh are all USAID focus countries for the Global Health Initiative. Our investments in the health sector in South Asia have been 

highly effective, resulting in improved maternal and child health, 

slowed rates of population growth, and virtually eradicating polio 

and other childhood disease. In the past two decades, India has reduced its infant mortality by 27 percent, Nepal by 39 percent, and 

Bangladesh by 37 percent. 

About 20 percent of the request is for improving food security 

and agriculture in South Asia. Despite the advances of the Green 

Revolution, the region has once again become food insecure. So in 

Bangladesh our programs focus on improving production outputs of 

rice, maize, and fisheries, and supporting research for saline-resistant rice that can grow in the country’s flood plains, which are becoming increasingly more saline. 

In Nepal, the program targets the southern Terai, the breadbasket region of Nepal, which has stalled agricultural productivity 

because of the violent conflict of recent years. 

18

In India, the U.S. has embarked on a strategic partnership with 

the Government of India to harness the capabilities of both the 

United States and India in addressing poverty and hunger in India, 

as well as tackling these challenges globally. President Obama and 

Prime Minister Singh announced the Partnership for an Evergreen 

Revolution in November during that historic visit. 

Mr. Chairman, South Asia also faces strong and unique environmental vulnerabilities that challenge its growth. Changing water 

supply caused by shifting glaciers and monsoon patterns threaten 

economic growth, health, and security. So we are working with scientific communities, other U.S. Government agencies, and private 

sector, to help communities manage these dwindling resources and 

to address the consequences on health and social issues. 

We are also focusing on disaster risk reduction. Because the region is so prone to cyclones, monsoon floods, and earthquakes, as 

we saw this week the minor earthquake in northern India, we are 

launching an effort to mainstream disaster risk reduction into our 

development programs, working with other donors, including the 

World Bank, so that we can minimize the impact of disasters in 

this region. 

Finally, because we know that strengthening weak governance 

and improving transparency and accountability is critical to everything that we do, we are building these good governance programs 

into every sector of work that we do in South Asia, including expanding the democratic space in post-conflict transitions in Sri 

Lanka and Nepal, strengthening weak institutions in Bangladesh, 

and tackling corruption throughout the region. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Biswal follows:]

19


65627b_1.eps
20


65627b_2.eps
21


65627b_3.eps
22


65627b_4.eps
23


65627b_5.eps
24

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony. 

Mr. Feldman, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL FELDMAN, DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. FELDMAN. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today 

to discuss U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I have submitted my written remarks for the record and will briefly highlight 

some key points. 

The President’s Fiscal Year 2012 budget outlines the resources 

required to build on hard-won security and civilian gains that we 

have achieved through the sacrifice of our military and civilian personnel serving in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, I want to briefly frame the way forward and explain how we intend to utilize the 

resources the President requested to reinforce the progress of the 

military and civilian surges while also launching a political process 

aimed at splitting the Taliban from al-Qaeda. This diplomatic 

surge, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her recent speech, would 

bring the Afghan conflict to an end, further our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda, and help to stabilize 

the region. 

First, Afghanistan, where alongside our military more than 1,100 

civilians are working to bolster the Afghan Government and lay a 

foundation for sustainable economic growth that will undercut the 

insurgency. Assisting us is a broad international coalition—46 nations, one-third of them Muslim majority, form the international 

contact group which met recently in Jedda, Saudi Arabia, hosted 

by the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 

We are at the high water mark of the military effort, and as 

President Karzai announced on March 22, we are preparing to 

transition provinces and districts to an Afghan lead that encompass 

roughly 25 percent of Afghanistan’s population. This will advance 

the transition plan agreed to at the Lisbon summit in November 

and which President Obama reaffirmed in his December policy review. We look forward to combat troop reductions starting in July, 

and continuing, based on conditions on the ground, with transition 

to Afghanistan security being completed by 2014. As we have long 

said, the Afghans must take responsibility for their own future. 

With our allies and partners, the United States will realign our 

civilian and military resources in these provinces to support the Afghan Government’s increasing responsibility for security and the 

delivery of other essential services to its citizens. Our civilians will 

continue to support the stabilization mission, but will also focus increasingly on developing the capacity of critical Afghan Government institutions. 

As General Petraeus testified, retreating from our surge in Afghanistan with our troops still in the field and the handoff to Afghanistan security will be just getting underway would be a grave 

mistake. During transition, State, USAID, and our civilians from 

eight other agencies will shoulder increased responsibilities. WithVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:24 Jul 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\040511\65627 HFA PsN: SHIRL
25

out a fully resourced State and USAID role in Afghanistan, hardearned progress by our troops and civilians will be put at risk. 

Equally important is our civilian assistance to Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation with deep ties and strong interests in Afghanistan. We are broadening our partnership and focusing on shared 

threats as well as addressing Pakistan’s political and economic 

challenges. Since 2009, we have worked with the Pakistani Government and the Pakistani people, including through our enhanced 

strategic dialogue process, which met last year three times at the 

ministerial level. This has helped better focus assistance on Pakistan’s urgent energy and economic needs and coordinate our efforts 

against violent extremist organizations. 

Even as we have had serious challenges to our relationship, some 

of which have made headlines, we have continued civilian and military efforts throughout the country and even expanded our cooperation. Challenges must still be overcome in our relationship 

with Pakistan as distrust lingers on both sides. And as recent 

events underscore, we need to work together carefully to prevent 

misunderstandings and disagreements from derailing progress. But 

it is critical that we remain engaged in Pakistan and help its democratically elected leaders as they work to address the myriad of domestic challenges they face, whether on religious freedoms or economic policy. 

We believe that the gains of the past 2 years on both sides of the 

border have created space for an Afghan-led reconciliation effort 

settlement aimed at achieving a political settlement of the conflict 

that will isolate al-Qaeda and enhance regional stability. The U.S. 

supports this Afghan effort. Over the last 2 years we have laid out 

our unambiguous redlines for reconciliation with the insurgents. 

They must renounce violence, they must abandon their alliance 

with al-Qaeda, and they must abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan, including its protections for the rights of women and minorities. Those are necessary outcomes of any negotiation. Insurgents 

now face a clear choice—disown al-Qaeda and enter into a political 

process under Afghanistan’s Constitution, or continue to face military pressure. 

All of Afghanistan’s neighbors, including Pakistan, have legitimate concerns that should be understood and addressed by the Afghan Government in any reconciliation process with steps that provide transparency and reassurance. They also have responsibilities, 

including respecting Afghan sovereignty, which means agreeing not 

to play out their rivalries within its borders and working with 

Kabul to improve regional stability. 

We are encouraged by a resumption of dialogue between Pakistan and India and the positive steps taken by Prime Ministers 

Singh and Gilani last week as a part of cricket diplomacy. We look 

to them and all of Afghanistan’s neighbors to help ensure that alQaeda and the syndicate of terrorism is denied safe haven everywhere. 

Let me conclude by reiterating that the President’s Fiscal Year 

2012 budget request for Afghanistan and Pakistan is critical to the 

success of our military efforts. The success of counterinsurgency is 

based largely on the ability of civilian institutions and law enforcement governance and development to replace military forces as 

26

soon as security is restored. While tackling corruption is a challenge, we are working with our Afghan and Pakistani partners to 

ensure that U.S. tax dollars are utilized effectively and efficiently. 

Enduring partnerships with Afghanistan and Pakistan are vital 

to U.S. national interests and stability in South and Central Asia. 

There have been points in our history when we have disengaged 

from Pakistan and Afghanistan, with disastrous results. We cannot 

afford to make that mistake again. 

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feldman follows:]

27


65627c_1.eps
28


65627c_2.eps
29


65627c_3.eps
30


65627c_4.eps
31

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Sampler, you are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DONALD SAMPLER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. SAMPLER. It is a pleasure to be here today to talk about the 

Afghanistan and Pakistan portion of the Fiscal Year 2012 budget 

request and how it contributes to U.S. national security interests 


65627c_5.eps 65627c_6.eps
32

in the whole of South Asia. My full written statement has been entered into the hearing record, and for purposes of opening remarks 

I would like to just highlight a few key points from that statement. 

With respect to national security, U.S. foreign assistance is an 

inseparable part of U.S. And global security. As Secretary Gates, 

Admiral Mullen, and General Petraeus have all emphasized to the 

Congress, we need a fully engaged and fully funded national security presence, to include the core components of our Nation’s civilian power, the State Department and USAID. 

In the most dangerous areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan today, 

USAID works side by side with our military and civilian colleagues, 

participating in the shape, clear, hold, build, and transfer efforts, 

administering development projects, playing a critical role in stabilizing districts, building responsive local governance, improving the 

lives of ordinary citizens, and ultimately helping to prepare the 

way for American troops to return home. 

With respect to oversight and accountability, we must be good 

stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars. We understand this. Central to 

all of our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan is an understanding 

of the critical importance of oversight and accountability. These are 

areas on which USAID’s leadership has focused intensely as they 

represent key parts of our agency’s reform agenda and our team’s 

approach in both countries. I will be happy to discuss this if asked. 

With respect to sustainability, one element of the value that 

USAID adds to the whole-of-government approach is our expertise 

at integrating the urgent and immediate needs of stabilization 

work with the important and lasting benefits of more traditional 

assistance. In Afghanistan, guided by the Afghanistan-Pakistan Review conducted last December, USAID’S 2012 budget request supports two priorities of national security in Afghanistan—attaining 

stabilization goals and establishing the basic conditions that make 

investments sustainable. Towards the first, our focus will be to 

focus and establish the conditions that will support stability 

through programs that generate employment, resolve disputes, involve the population and their local governance, and provide services in key population centers. 

Toward the second priority, our focus will be on foundational investments that help maintain stability while enabling growth and 

sustaining legitimate governance. Highlights of these investments 

include the strategic reprioritization of resources in the energy sector; continued support in the areas of gender, education, and 

health; and increasing the capacity of public and private institutions to generate revenues, generate economic growth, and sustained development efforts. 

In Pakistan, U.S. civilian assistance is critical to maintaining 

and deepening a long-term strategic partnership that the United 

States is forging with the people and the Government of Pakistan. 

Our budget request for fiscal 2012 reflects a sustained commitment 

to cooperation based on mutual goals and values, which include 

building a more secure, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan. In 

support of this commitment we will focus U.S. efforts and resources 

on the following four priority sectors: Energy; economic growth, focusing on agriculture; stabilization; and the social sector, specifically education and health. 

33

In conclusion, we recognize fully the challenges we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Problems of limited capacity, corruption, 

narco activities and their corrosive effect on government all exist. 

For our part, there are issues related to limited resources, the 

pending military drawdown, contracting oversight, and the placement and protection of our civilian staff in the field. But these are 

calls to exercise care and due diligence and to explore ways to do 

better with fewer resources. These are not reasons to abandon our 

vital national security interest nor the hard work and sacrifices 

made thus far. 

Finally, in closing, I know that some of the committee are military veterans, and I thank you also for your service. But I also 

would like to recognize and thank the hundreds of civilians who 

are serving or have served in frontline countries on the other side 

of the world as part of our whole-of-government approach to national security. Many of them lived and worked side by side with 

fellow Americans in the military, sharing the same hardships, the 

same separations from loved ones, and the same risks. These young 

men and women, all of them, whether they are in uniform or not, 

deserve the best that our Government and our agency can do to 

support them as they do their job, which is to represent the very 

best of America to the rest of the world. 

I am truly honored to be here today, and look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sampler follows:]

34


65627d_1.eps
35


65627d_2.eps
36


65627d_3.eps
37


65627d_4.eps
38


65627d_5.eps
39


65627d_6.eps
40


65627d_7.eps
41

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Sampler. We want to 

thank all the witnesses who have testified here this afternoon. Now 

the members here have 5 minutes to ask questions. I will begin 

with myself. 

Mr. Feldman and Mr. Sampler, the latest quarterly report for the 

three inspector general offices charged with monitoring U.S. nonmilitary aid programs in Pakistan set off a flurry of media coverage, all focusing on the stark assessment of the progress of the 

Pakistan program: ‘‘One year after the launch of the civilian assistance strategy in Pakistan, USAID has not been able to demonstrate measurable progress.’’

While many of us appreciate the challenges of implementing a 

substantial assistance package in the Pakistani environment, it remains unclear what the $6 billion in civilian development and humanitarian aid over the last decade has done to overcome antiAmerican sentiment there. Additionally, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman 

legislation was to achieve this very objective. It was supposed to 

demonstrate to Islamabad that the U.S. wished to move beyond the 

transactional relationship that had fomented so much distrust. As you state in your testimony, Mr. Feldman, $1.5 billion has already been distributed. We are now discussing the budget for year 

3 of this 5-year program and we have seen little, if any, progress 

on some of the most significant security issues. A couple of questions relative to that. What is your assessment of the success or 

lack thereof of our civilian and security assistance to date? 

Secondly, more broadly, what are the trends in the relationship? 

Do you see evidence of any increasingly shared strategic outlook or, 

absent that, at least an improved ability to manage our strategic 

differences in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

Thirdly, alternatively, does the Davis case and other controversies point to growing bilateral tensions and increasing strategic divergence? Our efforts to date have focused overwhelmingly on highly visible projects like infrastructure assistance at the expense of 

democracy and governance programs. Why have these so-called 

high visible programs not led to warmer relations or improved public opinion concerning the U.S.? 

Finally, why did legislative strengthening programs like the Provincial Assembly Program in Peshawar not get extended, and what 

specifically is SRAP doing to help facilitate the growth of political 

parties in Pakistan? 

I know that is a lot to answer, but I have only got 5 minutes and 

if I ask them individually, I won’t get to the third or fourth tier 

questions. So I will shut up and start listening. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The relationship, as I 

tried to be very honest about in the opening statement, is a complex one. And I don’t mean to sugarcoat it. Obviously, we have 

gone through a difficult time recently. But it is against the backdrop of real strides, very significant strides, in the overall bilateral 

relationship over the course of the last 2 years. 

U.S. security assistance builds Pakistani capability and increases 

its willingness to engage in difficult fights. Last year, for the first 

time, Pakistan conducted major combat operations in five of the 

seven tribal areas, tribal agencies, at significant cost and sacrifice, 

as well as since 2009, in Malakand, which includes Swat Valley. 

42

We rely on the Pakistan security institutions to prioritize 

counterinsurgency, to move to eliminate save havens, to cooperate 

with us in deleting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 

I would say as the broadest frame a difficult partnership with 

Pakistan is far better than a hostile Pakistan and is vital to U.S. 

national security interests. If we were to have economic or political 

collapse in Pakistan, it would threaten our most critical national 

security interests. 

In terms of our civilian assistance programs, I will defer in part 

to my colleague from USAID. But we have made great strides since 

Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation was passed just 18 months ago or 

so. As I noted, $1.5 billion has been spent since then. The GAO reports focus on the amount from Fiscal Year 2010 funding, the first 

year of Kerry-Lugar-Berman, so it looks like a smaller amount 

than has actually be spent altogether. And $500 million of that 

$1.5 million was for flood relief and recovery efforts, and we are 

now moving into more flood reconstruction. 

Many of those projects are given—the lead time to start many of 

these projects are just now getting underway. I think we will see 

much more significant expenditures in the months ahead. As Larry 

laid out, we have sought to focus and prioritize those projects in 

those four key sectors that are of most core national security interest not only to the Pakistanis but also to us. That is helping to ensure that there is energy and electricity, to help create jobs, there 

is a counter to extremism, and helping to promote education and 

health opportunities. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time has expired. So, Mr. Sampler, 

I will however let you respond however you would like to in a second round or maybe I can get the answers in writing or some point. 

The question is basically we spend all this money and they still 

hate us. What should we do about that. But I will let you get to 

it later. 

I think, Mr. Ackerman, you are next for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since 2001, the 

amount of assistance, military and otherwise, that we have provided to Pakistan is pushing close, I think, to $20 billion. That is 

a bunch of money. By anybody’s reading of how popular the United 

States is in Pakistan, the numbers hardly measure on any type of 

meter. Our popularity could not be too much worse. For a country 

that is completely victimized by terrorists, with us being just about 

the sole—not quite the sole, but numerically pretty much there—

protector of the people against the terrorists, at least in our efforts 

to do that, and the astonishing contrast to how we are regarded 

there gives one pause to say: What are we doing, how effective are 

we in getting our message across. 

Of course, we do this in large measure for our own reasons, our 

own security reasons, besides the humanitarian reasons. But why 

hasn’t all of this help and assistance demonstrated in a measurable 

way to the people of Pakistan that we are not the enemy? 

Any volunteers? So if we gave another $20 billion, I guess, would 

they like us in the morning as we loved them $20 billion another 

night? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Ranking Member, thank you for the question. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. You don’t mean that. 

43

Mr. SAMPLER. With respect to the amounts of money and the return on investment in terms of popularity, it is at the moment in 

time not possible to make a direct correlation between amounts 

given and popularity. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I know you can’t buy love, but a little like. 

Mr. SAMPLER. I draw attention to surveys done after the earthquake and the flood relief. Those were opportunities where popular 

opinion in Pakistan were dramatically affected and pretty directly 

affected by the immediacy of the results and the immediacy of the 

relief that was provided. The continued assistance is in support of 

the strategic campaign we have with Pakistan to develop this partnership over time. I believe Secretary Clinton mentioned in her remarks at one point that there is now a communication strategy for 

how we take better advantage of the money that we are spending. 

Ambassador Munter is adamant that we brand the work we do in 

Pakistan as from the American people. 

So there are steps being taken to make sure that we do get value 

for the investment where we can, but it would be inaccurate to 

state that the primary reason for the investment is for a momentary blip in popularity. We are in Pakistan and we are in a partnership with Pakistan for the long haul, and our investment is evidence of that. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me ask a different question, different subject. Help me play chess, which means we are going to do three 

moves at least instead of the usual what move is next. India suffered a huge catastrophe in Bhopal, a chemical spill. If you take 

a look at what is happening in Japan, it is absolutely frightening. 

We have helped in India with our 123 nuclear agreement to provide for nuclear energy. One of the thoughts in doing that was so 

that they are less reliant on the possibility of doing business with 

Iran and buying crude from Iran. If India decides to be as cautious 

as most countries are and slows down their nuclear and civilian energy projects, how likely is it that Iran will be higher on their 

radar for supplying the energy that they so voraciously need to consume? 

Ambassador Blake, people are pointing to you. 

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Ranking Member, first of all, on the Japanese 

situation, I think it is really too early to say what effect Japan is 

going to have on India’s nuclear program. I think India does remain very much committed to carrying out its nuclear program because it has such huge energy needs that are going to be needed 

for its growing economy and its growing population. So we continue 

to work very closely with our Indian friends to carry out the civil 

nuclear deal. I think they remain committed to it. We haven’t received any indications of that. 

In terms of India’s continued reliance on Iran for oil and gas, 

India presently imports about 15 percent of its oil from Iran, and 

I think that actually our sanctions and the international sanctions 

have had some impact because Indian companies, big companies 

like Reliance, increasingly are reading the tea leaves and understand that they have to make a choice, they have to make a strategic choice between trading with Iran and trading with the United 

States and the broader world. Increasingly, they are moving toward 

us. I think that is a very, very positive signs. It also puts pressure 

44

on the Iranians. So I actually think that the trends are good in this 

respect. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Kind of the same 

question I think the ranking member and I are asking relative to 

Pakistan. I remember seeing a political cartoon some years ago, it 

has probably been 10 now, in which there was a Middle Eastern 

man who was looking, smiling at a bag that had been provided to 

them for an aid of some sort and had a flag on there, and it said, 

Food. The caption under there was: Those Americans are so 

thoughtful, food and a flag to burn. 

It sort of, unfortunately, went to what many of us feel about our 

aid, how frustrating it is that the American taxpayer puts out so 

much money and unfortunately we are still despised in many 

places around the world, despite what the United States does and 

the American taxpayer. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I guess 

it comes down to fundamental approaches, and frankly, we have to 

admit and should admit that the fundamental approach that we 

have been taking to establishing stability and friendships in these 

parts of the worlds has failed. Failed. It is a failure. We are now 

in a situation where there is more turmoil and more anti-American 

hatred than before. Perhaps one of the fundamentals we are talking about is the idea that we can in some way build other people’s 

nations for them. 

I would agree with Mr. Sampler that when he just mentioned 

emergency and crisis assistance brings us good will. When people 

are most desperate and most vulnerable and we help with a helping hand and we help people with medicines and food and water 

at a time when their families are being threatened, we can win 

their friendship. And that should be, Mr. Chairman, the focus of 

America’s efforts. The money that we are spending for nation building has been a waste. It has not built the ties that we thought it 

would build. 

So as we go to cut our budgets and try to find the most effective 

way of spending our limited dollars overseas, Mr. Chairman, I 

would suggest that, from what I am hearing today and what I have 

been looking at over the last few years, that we need to change the 

fundamental of going from nation building uber alles to perhaps 

crisis and emergency assistance and being there when they need 

us. 

I don’t believe that any amount of nation building can change the 

fundamentals of another society unless of course we want to occupy 

that society for decades and decades and decades, which I don’t believe Americans want to do that anywhere, especially Afghanistan. 

I appreciate Mr. Feldman’s optimism. His testimony has been 

very optimistic about Afghanistan. Let me just suggest that it runs 

contrary to everything the rest of us are seeing in Afghanistan. It 

is not becoming more stable. We have a situation now where the 

disruption of radical Islam now that we had driven out after 9/11, 

after the Northern Alliance drove the Taliban out of their country, 

with our help, the situation is actually a lot worse in terms of 

American security today. 

45

I would suggest that perhaps this amount of spending—well, let 

me ask you this just straight out, Mr. Feldman. Can assistance basically succeed? Can our spending and our development projects 

succeed if the government structure that we have foisted upon the 

Afghanistan people is contrary to their basic culture? This is a culture of the most diversified and I would say the most bottoms-up 

culture in the world. This is a village culture. Eighty percent of the 

people live in villages. They believe in the tribal chief and the tribal alignments. Can we change that? Can we force them to accept 

the central government? 

The structure we have tried to force upon them and are currently 

trying to force upon them is the most centralized system that I 

have identified in the world. You have Karzai, who is elected, and 

then he appoints the provincial leaders. Is that correct, Mr. Feldman? The provincial leaders are not elected. What kind of corruption would we have in this country if the President of the United 

States—oh, boy, he’s elected, thus we have democracy—but he 

would appoint all the Governors and then the Governors would appoint the police chiefs and the heads of the education and everything all the way down the line would be, when it got to the people 

level, was associated with somebody in the capital city, who all 

they know has a brother who is engaged in the drug trafficking. 

Do you think we can succeed with that type of reality? 

Go ahead, Mr. Feldman. Tell me I am wrong. Give me some reason for optimism. I am ready for it. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Thank you. In terms of looking for a reason for 

optimism, I would first point to the Washington Post op ed from 

last week that says: Afghanistan’s Reasons for Optimism, by Jim 

Dobbins and Craig Charney. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I never get optimistic when I read the Washington Post. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Again, I am not seeking to be Pollyannish in this, 

and we certainly recognize the vast difficulties here. But I think if 

you look back at the testimony by General Petraeus, by Secretary 

Gates, by Chairman Mullen in terms of significant military successes recently and how we are using that to leverage what we 

hope, and which we have always said that this cannot be resolved 

just on the battlefield and therefore this is the reason why we are 

seeking to move forward with this third——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are we asking for any structural changes? I 

was in Bonn when this whole system was created, we threatened 

Zahir Shah, the former king, to accept this and to accept Karzai, 

I might add. He wasn’t Zahir Shah’s pick. Is there any indication 

that we are willing to accept a change in what we forced on these 

people, this centralized structure? Because they are not going to accept it. These village chiefs, these village leaders are not going to 

accept mandates from a central government, especially when the 

guy up there is from a different tribe or whatever. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. If the gentleman 

would like to answer briefly the question or statement or like to 

make the gentleman optimistic up here. 

Mr. FELDMAN. In citing some of this polling data released last 

week—and, again, I am not using it as the only framework to view 

this through. I am also dubious about some polling. According to 

46

these polling numbers, 63 percent of Afghans said that they are 

better off than they were 5 years ago. Fifty-nine percent of Afghans 

think their country is moving in the right direction. Karzai’s approval ratings were 62 percent. That is not a case for optimism, but 

it is a case of looking at what—I don’t think you can accurately say 

we are foisting this upon them, by any means. This is the system, 

the legitimate, credible system of government that is in place now, 

and this is what we are working with. 

But I think that per my opening statement the two key pieces 

here are, first of all, the transition announcement and the fact that 

we have now embarked on the real transition, including this announcement of seven provinces and districts encompassing 25 percent of the country’s population, which was announced by President 

Karzai just a week or so ago, and the fact that the transition frame 

as announced in Lisbon, which will be completed by the end of 

2014, has now started. 

But second of all, trying to bring all the assets that we have to 

bear; not only the continuation of a very robust military and civilian surge, but also this diplomatic and political surge, which we 

are seeking to bring this to conclusion. But the military and civilian campaigns have to go hand in hand, and the Afghan Government, as you rightly note, has to build credibility with its own people. And that is what our assistance has gone to do, to try to ensure that there are alternatives presented to the Afghan people to 

the insurgency. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The ranking 

member, Mr. Ackerman, had to go to the floor to offer an amendment on a bill that is being taken up on the floor so he is being 

now ably represented as the acting ranking member by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, who is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the panel. 

I mentioned in my brief opening remarks my concern about 

CERP, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. Since 

2004, nearly $2.64 billion has been appropriated for this program. 

I am concerned that there is little transparency and little accountability. And the amounts are now quite large. 

Originally, maybe the intention of CERP was to augment the 

ability of a military commander to provide something other than 

guns and uniforms in a village or in a region so that he or she 

could respond quickly without a lot of bureaucracy in fixing a 

bridge or rebuilding a school or whatever it might be. This is now 

a very serious, large aid program. There was, for example, a special 

inspector general report in January that raised the question of 

whether all of programs we have invested in through this program 

might be at risk of waste because, oops, we forgot to build in a 

maintenance component. 

So I would like to hear your view about CERP and whether there 

is sufficient accountability and transparency in what we are doing 

moving forward. 

Mr. Feldman. 

Mr. FELDMAN. I will defer to my colleague. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Thank you. I am familiar with CERP actually from 

my time in the military service as well, and it is a valuable tool 

47

because what we find is that there are times when the military is 

present in advance of USAID’s ability to be present and do the 

work. So I appreciate your recognition that CERP had a place and 

has a time. 

The discussion about how we use it now is a valid one. I will note 

that recently, to encourage the interaction between USAID and our 

military colleagues with respect to CERP, there is a manual that 

has been developed, a civilian guide to how CERP is being used. 

It allows and encourages and in fact in some cases strongly encourages the USAID development experts working at the PRT and even 

further down at the DST, where these military commanders are 

employing CERP, to engaged on how it should be done, how it is 

integrated into longer-term development projects. 

What the nuances of the use of CERP are, the military perspective may be shaped by the winds through which they view the particular project and the context politically in the village. The USAID 

perspective will be different. One is not right and one wrong. What 

we have to do is learn to integrate them. So we are working quite 

closely at PRT and DST levels on coordinating and making sure 

that CERP is applied appropriately and an integration and smoothly harmonized with the development work that USAID is doing. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would say to you, Mr. Sampler, when you get to $1 billion a year, that is real money. And the military are not 

development experts. They are wonderful at all kinds of things, but 

that is not their mission. And that is what they are doing right 

now; they are running a development program through CERP. 

That is not their main expertise. And that is my concern; that with 

the best of intentions, you have to ask yourself what could go 

wrong with amounts that large. And are there mechanics in place 

to account for it in a transparent way. That continues to be a concern to me. 

Let me ask you in the time I have left, Mr. Rohrabacher and the 

chairman really raised questions about the success of our efforts in 

Pakistan and Afghanistan. One measure of whether we are successful or not I guess is do they like us. Another might be more 

concrete metrics in terms of what got built or repaired or invested. 

I would be interested in hearing what are your metrics for success 

or failure and how do you think we are doing? What constitutes 

success in Pakistan, for example? 

Mr. FELDMAN. Well, are you asking both Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. I thought I would start with Pakistan. But 

you can pick either. 

Mr. FELDMAN. If I have less than a minute, I will try to put them 

together, and that is I would go back to the President’s December 

review and what he has laid out as the touchstone here, which is 

a region that is free from al-Qaeda; a stable, independent Afghanistan rid of insurgency and proxy conflicts fought by neighboring 

states. So it is political resolution to the conflict. 

I think you can look at a variety of different metrics, depending 

on what you are seeking for success. As I noted in the Pakistan answer, in particular, and at least three or four members have now 

asked about the kind of popularity piece. Again, I don’t put that 

much stock in polling numbers. I would note that they are not all, 

48

again, against us. In polling that was through December of last 

year, so pre the most recent situation in Pakistan, we had gradually crept up kind of mid-teens to over 40 percent in terms of approval ratings by Pakistanis of the U.S. And I think that that goes 

to the fact that we were really addressing for the first time in 

many years this trust deficit which we had talked about quite a bit. 

We are seeking to move from a far more transactional relationship 

in Pakistan to a much broader and deeper one. That was crystallized by the strategic dialogue process that we have had hosted 

three times by the Secretary at a ministerial level year but, most 

importantly, which had 13 different substantive working groups, 

everything from security to water to energy and infrastructure, 

helping the Pakistani Government meet the needs of the Pakistani 

people, which is in our own national security interest as well as 

that of the Pakistanis. 

So that is how I would look at success in Pakistan. 

Mr. CHABOT. Than you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentleman from Illinois, who is the chairman of the Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Mr. Manzullo, is recognized. 

I should have also indicated Mr. Rohrabacher is the chairman of 

the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee in Foreign Affairs 

as well. 

Mr. Manzullo, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement 

for Ms. Biswal. I was wondering where I had seen you before. Then 

I remembered you had been part of Mr. Obey’s staff. 

Ms. BISWAL. Yes, sir, as well as on this committee prior to that. 

Mr. MANZULLO. That is correct. That is correct. In your testimony you stated in the third paragraph, the last sentence: ‘‘I hope 

to get a better sense of the committee’s priorities in the region 

what USAID can do answer questions and address concerns.’’ Then, 

on the second page, the fourth paragraph, you say: ‘‘Under the 

leadership of Dr. Shah, USAID has reformed the way we do business. We are broadening our partner base to make it easier for 

small businesses, organizations, to partner with us. We are employing strategic use of science and technology and seeking out innovations that can have a game-changing impact.’’

Are you familiar with the development innovations ventures? 

Ms. BISWAL. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Were you here last week when I questioned Dr. 

Shah on the wisdom of that program? 

Ms. BISWAL. I was not present, but I do understand the nature 

of your question. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Well, this gives $30 million in grants. It employs 

10 new full-time employees of the State Department. A brand new 

program. It duplicates what other agencies are doing in the area 

of science and technology. It makes foreign companies as well as 

U.S. companies and individuals available for $30 million for new 

innovations, we and are in the process of ending that program 

through various techniques. 

I just find it extraordinarily difficult to believe that USAID 

would begin to expand its role into strategic use of science and 

technology. One in particular is spending money on fuel cell reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:24 Jul 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\040511\65627 HFA PsN: SHIRL
49

search and there is already millions being spent in the private sector. 

Can you tell me how you can justify expanding USAID’s mission 

at a time when there is hardly enough money to take care of the 

original mission? 

Ms. BISWAL. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a fair question. Let me 

explain to you my view of why I think this is an important area 

for us to expand into. USAID has funded a lot of very important 

work in improving health outcomes and in improving development 

outcomes. But we have not had the focus on innovation or the partnership with the private sector that I think can look at nontraditional ways of finding solutions that perhaps are not in our quiver 

of arrows right now but perhaps could have a much greater transformative impact. And so the idea here is to seek out what we don’t 

know, what others are doing in the private sector, in academia that 

might have a game changing impact and invest in a very small 

amount initially to see if that——

Mr. MANZULLO. I understand. A $30 million—hiring 10 brand 

new bureaucrats is not a small amount. And how would that help 

feed the most needy now? 

Ms. BISWAL. For example, one program that we are looking at in India is for $173,000 to look at mobile technology as a way of improving health care delivery in rural areas in India where you can 

through mobile technology——

Mr. MANZULLO. What is that? What is mobile technology? 

Ms. BISWAL. From cell phones and smart phones. Because of the 

high prevalence of mobiles in the area——

Mr. MANZULLO. The problem with that is DIV, you don’t check 

what our agencies are doing. You don’t check with what NIST is 

doing, what the SBIR program is doing. You are adding arrows to 

your quiver when most agencies are taking arrows out of the quiver, to use your metaphor. 

I am just suggesting to you that Americans are not in the mood 

for USAID or any other agency to expand, to increase its activities. 

You have got your hands full feeding the needy. And what I would 

like you to do is to furnish me within 10 days—and, Chairman, if 

you could make this in order—I want copies of all of the awards 

that were made, including the one on fuel cell technology. I don’t 

want to have to get a subpoena. Can you give me your assurance 

at this hearing that you will furnish copies of the awards that were 

made under this program? 

Ms. BISWAL. I will give you my assurance that we will comply 

with that request. 

Mr. MANZULLO. That is good enough, and so I will leave you 

alone. Thank you. It is good to see you back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Hot and cold. Thank you very much. We appreciate 

that very much. And we will go now to the gentleman from Florida 

if he has any questions, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it 

very much. For the panel I am alarmed by the killings and beheadings that took place this past weekend in Afghanistan as a result 

of the Koran burning that happened in my State of Florida. 

Though certainly it was within the pastor’s constitutional rights to 

burn the Koran, I don’t believe it was the right thing to do. 

50

What is more alarming, however, is that it appears that more 

than just Taliban ties participated in this violent protest. The 

media has reported that students at Kabul University have been 

especially enthusiastic in calling for death to America. It makes me 

wonder if any of the tens of billions of dollars we are sending in 

development aid has really done anything to develop Afghanistan 

either civilly, politically, educationally, or economically. 

Are we wasting our time over there? Are we wasting our time 

and money over there? I know the question has been asked several 

times. I would like to have an answer. 

Mr. FELDMAN. I would just start with the fact that we obviously 

abhor the burning of a holy text, but nothing justifies the kind of 

violence that we saw in Mazar several days ago. I would note on 

the positive side that Afghan leaders, including Ulema leaders and 

President Karzai, are urging calm, that the situation seems to be 

getting calmer and more stable. The report that I saw today about 

protests the Kabul University were fairly small, a few hundred students and certainly not violent. And so hopefully the arc of this has 

wound down. 

But I would certainly note that I think that the statement by the 

President, his second statement over the weekend, addressed this 

issue most specifically, I think, and eloquently when he said the 

desecration of any holy text, including the Koran, is an act of extreme intolerance and bigotry. But to attack and kill innocent people in response to that is outrageous and an affront to human decency and dignity. 

I don’t know if there is anything else my colleagues what to add. 

Mr. SAMPLER. I will just add, and partly also in response to a 

previous question about nation building or state building, the investment is not going to prevent college students from protesting 

but it will build the capacity of the government to respond to protests and address them in ways that are more recognizable and acceptable to the rest of the world. 

The focus in terms of the state assistance that we give to the 

Government of Afghanistan is focused on that. When these things 

happen, as they may, how will the state be able and capable to response. In Mazar the response was inadequate. I would argue that 

in Kandahar the response was different, inadequate in different 

ways. What we need to be able to measure and to continue to apply 

resources and metrics to is the ability of the state to respond when 

things like this occur. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I have one other question, Mr. Chairman. What 

is the capability for the Afghan state to harness its own resources 

to become as self-sufficient as possible and are there proper oversight and accountability requirements currently? What international bodies would be responsible for oversight and accountability as international forces transition and draw down? For the 

entire panel. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Obviously the sustainability aspect here is one 

that we have been very, very focused on. Ambassador Holbrooke 

used to say frequently that agriculture was our chief nonsecurity 

priority in Afghanistan. Rebuilding the economic infrastructure has 

been at the core of what we have been seeking to do. 

51

There is obviously much that we are continuing to look at to help 

Afghans find the resources to make it a more sustainable state. 

And USAID can perhaps speak about some of the extractive initiatives and others that are currently being looked at. 

In terms was oversight this is something that we have tried to 

factor into every aspect of our relationship in both Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, and we have particularly focused resources on looking at 

our own contracting processes, subcontracting processes, and having many more civilians in the field to help to oversee that has 

aided that effort quite a bit. 

Mr. SAMPLER. In the waning seconds, there is the now the High 

Office of Oversight that the Government of Afghanistan has created and we are working to build their indigenous capability with 

their own High Office of Oversight. In the meantime and in addition to that we have an initiative called A3, accountable assistance 

for Afghanistan, and the notion there is that we will assess ministries and provide technical assistance as required to bring them 

up to international standards, and we will provide continuing oversight. And we have a number of what we call host country contracts with specific ministries that have been quite successful at 

delivering the goods and services of governance through these 

mechanisms that were mentioned. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this 

hearing. I am sorry I am late so I don’t have the benefit of your 

earlier perspectives. So if this is a bit redundant, I apologize. But 

let’s talk a little bit about what is happening across the Arab world 

and the potential there in terms of the Arab spring and a reaching 

for more democratic ideals as well as in South Asia, the ongoing 

interest in expanding democratic capability, capacity. 

If you think about it, the concept of democracy really rests upon 

two pillars. The first is respect for the inherent dignity and therefore rights of all persons of a society and then, secondly, a responsibility for the rule of law. And in that regard, we have some things 

that are in dire conflict. 

If you look at, for instance, the situation in Pakistan where the 

gentleman, the highest ranking Christian in the government, Mr. 

Shahbaz Bhatti, was assassinated about a month ago on the heels 

of others who had spoken out against the blasphemy laws. This is 

a very, very powerful setback for the notion of expanding democratic ideals and democratic capacity. 

Throughout the Middle East as well there is a diaspora going on 

where its Christian populations are fleeing Iraq, they are under 

pressure in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon. And so I would like to hear 

some of your perspectives on how to heighten awareness of this as 

a U.S. Government and how societies who are striving to again 

achieve more democratic ideals have to reconcile themselves with 

the concept that all persons have dignity and therefore rights, and 

particularly if you lose the Christian communities throughout the 

Middle East you are losing a true leavening influence that has a 

rightful place to be there alongside other historic communities, a 

historic right as well as a right based upon the natural rights of 

man. You will lose the leavening influence and the buffering capacVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:24 Jul 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\040511\65627 HFA PsN: SHIRL
52

ity that those communities have historically had between differing 

factions. 

This is also very important in the Israeli-Palestinian question. 

We like to talk about trying to resolve those differences between 

Jews and Muslims, but there are three legs to this stool. It is Jews, 

Christians, and Muslims. We are struggling as a government to figure out how to communicate that effectively and to raise it to the 

level that it needs to be raised, both in our bilateral relationships 

but also in our multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. 

So I would like to hear your commentary on that, please. 

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Fortenberry, let me start and I will ask Dan to 

chime in. I would like to say that I think there is a very broad and 

encouraging trend in South Asia, which is that for the first time 

now in the history of that region there are democratically elected 

governments in every single South Asian country. The most recent 

entrants to that club were Bhutan, which was a monarchy and now 

has become an elected Parliament, and then the Maldives, which 

had for 30 years an autocrat and they had a very good, fair election 

in 2008. Bangladesh also in 2008 had its freest and fairest elections 

ever. 

So the broad trends in South Asia are actually very positive, and 

I would submit that the United States has played a very important 

role through our assistance in helping many of those democratic 

transitions. 

So let me just ask Dan to also chime in on the Afghanistan/Pakistan part. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Sure. The assassinations of Governor Tazir and 

Mr. Bhatti were truly tragic. They were obviously very committed 

to tolerance and to education of Pakistan’s future generations. We 

felt it very deeply. I went to the memorial service held here by the 

Embassy for Minister Bhatti. He had been in to see Secretary Clinton just a few weeks before his death. 

It is an issue that our ambassadors, Ambassador Munter and 

Ambassador Eikenberry, raise frequently in terms of their ongoing 

concerns about discrimination. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. It is important to note that Shahbaz Bhatti, 

while being the highest ranking Christian in the Pakistani Government was also highly interested and effective in protecting other 

minority rights because he was a man compelled by this fundamental ideal of justice for all people. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes, absolutely, and it is an issue that we raise 

frequently in our dialogues with the governments and in this case 

in particular with the Pakistani Government and have really put 

it as one centerpiece of those discussions. I know that in addition 

to Secretary Clinton’s own meeting with Minister Bhatti, our 

Under Secretary for Global Affairs, our Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Human Rights and Labor all have been to Pakistan 

recently and raised this prominently in their issues, and it is something that we continue to be very, very committed to. 

I would say on the rule of law front this is a cornerstone of some 

of our civilian assistance programs in Afghanistan, and Mr. Sampler can speak a little bit in more detail about some of those. But 

this is a hallmark of civil society, and it is in many ways why we 

53

again tried within our strategic dialogue to really enhance and promote the role of civilian government and everything that a civilian 

government can and should stand for and its responsiveness and 

protection for his people. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. We will go into 

a second round here. We don’t have to necessarily take up our full 

5 minutes, but if the gentleman would like to do that, I will start 

off myself. I will not take 5 complete minutes. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, brought up something 

I also intended to bring up and that was the incident where this 

knucklehead burns a Koran and then a far in excess reaction occurs over in Afghanistan where literally people’s lives are lost. And 

I was just wondering first of all with respect to the four Nepalese 

soldiers in particular, who were some of the victims here, do we 

know if—the different countries that are over there have different 

rules of engagement. Some are armed, some my understanding is 

may or may not have ammunition and different things. Do we 

know what the Nepalese were operating under at the time? 

Mr. FELDMAN. For the rules of engagement, I think that would 

be per the UNAMAs mandate but I am not sure. 

Mr. SAMPLER. I can’t speak with authority to the UNAMAs mandate now, but when I was chief of staff the guards actually had a 

fairly liberal rule of engagement policy. They would not necessarily 

have to have been or to have allowed themselves to have been disarmed. 

Mr. CHABOT. Some of the countries themselves have different restrictions on their own troops, don’t they? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Mr. Chairman, you may be speaking about the 

troop-contributing nations to ISAF in particular and you are certainly right, but that is way beyond my purview. 

Mr. CHABOT. I would be interested to find out what they were 

operating under, first of all. And then second of all, do we have any 

insight or any intelligence or any feedback that we have gotten as 

to what the reaction has been in Nepal about such a horrific thing 

happening to their soldiers? Because they have been a pretty key 

part in different exercises around the world and have good troops 

as far as I understand. Have we heard anything about that? 

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Chairman, I actually called the Nepalese Ambassador when I heard about this and expressed my condolences. He 

actually wasn’t aware of it at the time, but I think, as you say, the 

Nepalese have soldiers serving around the world. They have suffered casualties like this in the past. They are known for their 

bravery and their service, the Gurkhas in particular. 

Mr. CHABOT. Do we know if they were Gurkhas or not? 

Mr. BLAKE. I don’t know about these particular ones. 

Mr. CHABOT. That was the first thing that came to mind. 

Mr. BLAKE. I don’t think this is going to in any way impede their 

continued service in peacekeeping operations around the world. 

This is something that the Nepalese take great pride in. I think 

that will continue. I see no indication that that has changed. 

Mr. CHABOT. If we could have some follow-up on the questions 

that I raised. And then secondly, relative to India, one of the things 

that I find particularly annoying as a Member of Congress and a 

representative of the taxpayers who send dollars to India—and let 

54

me preface by saying that I consider India to be an important ally 

to the United States and important trading partner and even more 

so in the years to come hopefully—is that in the U.N. they have 

a history of not being particularly in sync with where the United 

States is. 

I asked to have the most recent year available, which I think is 

2009, the numbers how they were with the U.S., and I was informed that they were not particularly big, overall voting. They 

were with us 30 percent of the time, not counting a consensus vote. 

And on important votes they were with us 11 percent of the time. 

And one would hope that a strategic ally, a friend of the United 

States, would be with us a bit more than 11 percent. 

Mr. Ambassador, did you want to comment on that? I met with 

the Ambassador from India on the same topic and expressed my 

concern about that. What would you have to say? 

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Chairman, this is something that we have had 

a long dialogue with our friends in India about. I would say that 

things are changing. India is now on a 2-year rotation, just started 

in January and will be on for the next 2 years. We have made it 

a point on very important votes to talk to them. And I would point 

to things like some of the recent IAEA votes over the last several 

years on Iran where India has similar interests to ours in terms 

of ensuring that there is not going to be another nuclear weapons 

state in the region and they have taken some very important votes 

with the United States and with the majority on the IAEA. 

Mr. CHABOT. Not to interrupt, but what you said is when it is 

in their interest. So when our interests align, they are with us. 

Thanks a lot. 

Mr. BLAKE. But I would say even on some of these things like 

human rights, where traditionally the Indians have not been willing to support country-specific resolutions, I think there has been 

an evolution and will continue to be an evolution. One of the most 

important trends in India over the last 10 years is they want to 

be a responsible global power. They want to help to manage the 

international system. So I think that we are going to see an evolution in their voting patterns, and I think we have already seen 

some evolution in their voting patterns and I expect that to continue. 

Mr. CHABOT. I appreciate it, but again 11 percent is not very 

good on the important votes. And I would hope that they would be 

in line naturally more often and not only if it is just in their best 

interests. 

Thank you very much, and my time has just expired. Gerry, we 

are going into a second round if you wanted to ask any questions. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask you 

about the issue of corruption. Some economists have argued in the 

past that corruption can be an economic efficiency in being able to 

sort of hot wire around normal bureaucracy and get things done. 

But all of the stories one hears about the levels of corruption in 

this region, from Afghanistan to India, is that we have crossed a 

very different threshold and we are talking about huge impediments actually to economic development and the ability for some 

kind of regular business code and protocol. 

55

I am wondering what your views are and how do we reconcile 

our foreign assistance and economic assistance programs in light of 

the obvious fact that massive corruption is occurring in some of 

these governments? What protections do we take for U.S. tax dollars? 

Mr. BLAKE. We all have answers to that, but let me start on that 

with respect to India because I think it is important. First of all, 

as you rightly point out, Mr. Connolly, corruption is a huge issue 

right now in virtually every one of these states. In India the corruption issue has brought Parliament to a standstill for the last 6 

months because they have been focused on particularly telecoms 

corruption. And I think it has also had a deterrent effect on investment, and most Indians would say that as well. So there are real 

costs to the problem of corruption. 

But I also think that the government is committed to trying to 

deal with this. They have obviously a very open civil society and 

independent judiciary, a very free Parliament, all of whom are 

looking to address this. 

The other thing that India has, which is really important is a 

right-to-information law, that they passed in 2005 where any Indian citizen can apply to find out how his or her tax money is being 

spent at any level of the government, and they have done so, so 

much so in fact people who have exercised this right have been 

threatened because they have been effective in asserting their 

rights. 

So this is something where the United States has now started an 

open government initiative with India to try to promote open government, not just in India but in other parts of the world. And I 

think it is another sign of how, again, India wants to take a greater 

responsibility in the world and wants to promote some of the values that we both cherish. 

So I think they certainly have problems, but they have their own 

institutions to deal with those problems and, most importantly, 

they are now ready to work with us to try to promote open government elsewhere in the world through things like rights to information. 

Let me ask my colleagues in they want to——

Ms. BISWAL. Thank you very much. I wanted to add to that, 

maybe answer your question in three ways. One, what we are 

doing to protect taxpayer resources; two, what we are doing to 

build capacity in these countries to tackle corruption; and, three, 

where we are working with governments what steps we take to ensure that those resources are safeguarded. 

And the vast majority of U.S. assistance does not go through government-to-government mechanisms but goes through nongovernmental organizations, and we take great care in ensuring proper 

oversight of that assistance, including through monitoring, through 

periodic audits. Whenever we do find an instance of wrongdoing, 

we try to take steps immediately to correct and curtail when any 

problems have occurred. 

We do work on economic governance in a lot of countries specifically to address this issue of corruption to improve the rule of law, 

to enhance that country and society’s ability to tackle corruption. 

And we are looking increasingly at what can we do to be building 

56

these host country systems, the procurement systems in governments, the budgetary systems in governments. Most governments 

don’t have the standards and meet the standards that we have for 

USAID in terms of entrusting funds into those governments. And 

so we conduct assessment of that government, independent audits 

of that government’s financial system, where there might be weaknesses, and then recommend the steps that need to be put in place 

to strengthen that system before we put any resources through government mechanisms. 

So it is an issue throughout the region. It is an issue that we are 

tackling both individually and in partnership with the countries in 

which we work. 

Mr. FELDMAN. I will say just very quickly, obviously corruption 

is an enormous problem in Afghanistan; in particular, fighting 

fraud and waste is certainly one of our highest priorities. One of 

the major aspects of our civilian surge, tripling the number of civilians that we have in the field over the course of the last 2 years, 

has been expanding the presence in the field, allowing experts to 

get out and have more hands on oversight over development 

projects. And we have also had a very active collaboration with our 

military in terms of putting stronger controls on our contractors. 

So within our Embassy, one of the resident ambassadors has 

been overseeing this with the military in terms of the various task 

forces, 2010, Shafafiyat and others, that look at the transparency 

and contracting process. 

And lastly, as Mr. Sampler can say a little bit more about if he 

has time, on our government-to-government assistance in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, this is an area that we have particularly 

scrutinized in terms of pre-certification requirements, the vetting 

processes, and how we ensure that any money that goes government-to-government has a variety of mechanisms of oversight governing it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentleman from California, the Foreign Affairs Committee chairman on the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I don’t want to sound too pessimistic here, 

but I kind of get the idea that you folks are very optimistic about 

an area that I don’t think we should be very optimistic about. 

Quite frankly, the one shining light in American foreign policy and 

perhaps in progress, diplomatic progress, that we have to show is 

India, and quite frankly, I think that reflects an evolution that has 

taken place in American policy since the end of the Cold War and 

also an evolution in India that also has taken place since the end 

of the Cold War. After the end of that stupid conflict that we were 

in for 4 to 5 decades, we now are hopefully readjusting to what 

would be the natural friendships in different countries, in Asia in 

particular. 

I don’t think that we have—the evolution in Russia should have 

been a lot further along, I believe, but we can talk about that in 

some other hearing. But even that, if you compare what we were 

30 years ago with Russia, we were at each other’s throats and now 

at least we can work together, and I would hope that 10 years from 

57

now we could have evolved into a real solid friendship with the 

Russian people. 

Well, that is the same with India. India during the Cold War was 

allied with the Russians. I don’t believe necessarily that our policy 

toward India was what has caused this. This is a natural thing, 

and I would hope that we have the intelligence to work and to 

make sure that India is our best friend in that part of the world 

because they are demonstrating a commitment to democracy. 

Pakistan, which is a hangover again from the Cold War, why 

were we so close to Pakistan? In order to balance off the Soviet 

Union. Pakistan isn’t committed to democracy. I am sorry, Pakistan is committed—the people who run that society are committed 

to Islamic government. And the people who get in their way are 

being murdered. And it is an unfortunate thing there. And to the 

point that we have been able to take a look at what is going on 

in Pakistan, our aid programs and all of these things we are trying 

to do for Afghanistan and Pakistan, we haven’t as much stabilized 

Afghanistan as we have destabilized Pakistan. And if they want to 

have their country and they want it to be a radical Muslim country, let them do it. And the fact is that Pakistan is committed to 

Islam. And they are dedicated people. They have every right to be 

dedicated to it. 

I think India is dedicated to prosperity for their people. And that 

certainly leaves a lot more openness toward how who we can work 

with and who we can’t in the future. And so I guess my—let’s get 

back to government structure and to what we can do. 

Should we have an India-based foreign policy in Asia and South 

Asia or should we be hanging on to this old tie with Pakistan that 

was established during the Cold War? 

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Rohrabacher, let me just start and just talk 

about our relationship with India, which is, as you know, the President made a very important trip to Asia last year because we really 

see Asia as fundamental to or security and economic goals. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I have one question that I 

would like to ask that is yes or no, because I am going to miss out 

on my time here. 

Is the Pakistan Government still providing—is it still the major 

source of supplies and weapons for the Taliban and the radical elements that the American troops are fighting in Afghanistan? If not, 

where are those supplies coming from? 

Mr. FELDMAN. That is a much longer than a yes-or-no question. 

But no, the Pakistan Government is not providing it. We have a 

very good and growing and strong relationship with the civilian 

and the military government. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You include the ISI as within the Pakistan 

government or are you putting that as a separate entity? 

Mr. FELDMAN. Writ large, we have tried to improve, and very 

successfully, our strategic relationship with all elements of the 

Pakistani Government. And as I noted from the very outset from 

my opening testimony, a difficult partnership with Pakistan is far 

better than having a hostile Pakistan. This is a country that is 

vital to our national security interests. We have to do this. We cannot make——

58

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have been hearing that for 50 years, and 

I will tell you, a realistic relationship, rather than basing a relationship on wishful thinking, is what will bring about peace in that 

part of the world. And what we have had is wishful thinking and 

what I call irrational optimism. 

There are ways of getting tough without getting belligerent with 

weapons, but we need to get tough and make sure that we are not 

looked at as patsies, and those people in Pakistan now look a lot 

us, as do several other groups of people, like we are patsies. They 

respect strength and they respect courage enough to stand up for 

one’s own interest as we should respect their rights. 

So anyway, I am sorry I have used up our time on this. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I want to return to my previous line of 

thoughts and questioning. When we engage other countries we tend 

to do so with concepts that are measurable—security capacity, economic capacity, civil service capacities—in order to create stabilization and then potential opportunities. But if you have got an eroding philosophical underpinning that doesn’t protect certain segments of society, how can the advances that we can do measure actually hold over time? The question becomes then—and this is not 

the United States’ responsibility alone. It is an international community responsibility—how do you continue to heighten and elevate the need, the urgency to protect vulnerable minority communities, particularly in areas that are proclaiming a desire for the 

pursuit of democratic ideals? 

Mr. Feldman, you appropriately went to the Embassy and expressed condolences for Shahbaz Bhatti’s death, and that is a respectable thing to do and we will do things like that on a case-bycase basis as the horror of this kind of persecution presents itself 

in a most dramatic fashion. 

But what about other ways is which we can collectively unify 

ourselves along with other countries and elevate these concepts of 

the principles of justice, the principles of democracy? And this has 

implications for places like Iran, where are the people of Iran, a 

certain segment anyway, are desiring a more just and moderate 

form of governance. If we focus intensely on these types of questions, I think it leads to outcomes that help in the long term develop real capacities and real vibrant democracies rather than just 

to focus on things that can collapse fairly rapidly. 

I would like your thoughts on that. Not rather than; in addition 

to. Let me put it that way. In addition to focusing on that which 

we can measure. 

Mr. FELDMAN. I believe Secretary Clinton when she testified perhaps to this committee also noted that this was not just an attack 

on a single man but on the values and tolerance and respect for 

people of all faiths and backgrounds. And she noted that had been 

championed, I would say in particular, as a rebuttal to Congressman Rohrabacher, that had been championed by Muhammad Ali 

Jenna, the founder of Pakistan. And this is very important. This 

is a civilian government that we strongly support. We work with 

them on a range of initiatives. And certainly a respect for tolerance 

and a broad-based growth of civil society is one of the core precepts 

59

that we engage with them on across the board. And this is a part 

of all of our conversations at every level, from the working level to 

the most senior level, when we do have discussions like these. 

On the civil society piece or——

Ms. BISWAL. Well, I would like to just maybe—because I think 

you ask a very thoughtful question that goes broader than this specific incident and it really does go to the core of our values on 

human rights, on human dignity and elevating those values. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. The incident is generalizable to the principle. 

It is a shocking incident that forces us to perhaps rethink some approaches here. 

Ms. BISWAL. Absolutely, and it is not an easy answer, and it is 

not a yes-or-no or a 5-minutes. But it goes to the core of what we 

as a government stand for and the work that we do in trying to 

build democratic societies and strengthen civil society organizations 

in countries, because we know that these countries when they are 

true democracies and deep democracies and when they have strong 

and vibrant civil societies that there is a greater recognition of that 

value of human dignity, and when there is a transgression against 

that human dignity that there is greater accountability for it. 

And so it is not an easy answer, but I think it is fundamental 

to why we are doing what we are doing around the world. 

Mr. BLAKE. If I could just add that American diplomats around 

the world make it their business to promote religious freedom and 

the protection of religious minorities. I can tell you even in a democracy like India there are problems at the state level at places 

like Karnataka and Orissa and our consuls general and our ambassadors are quick to respond to those and make public statements 

and express our concerns and hopefully take steps to work with 

those governments to address the underlying problems. 

And that is true—I can tell you for Central Asia, I am also responsible for Central Asia, I spend a lot of my time talking about 

religious freedom. It is an important part of the overall human 

rights equation and a really important part of developing responsive and responsible government that Secretary Clinton has talked 

over and over about. We spend a lot of our time, and I want to reassure you about that, this is a very high priority for all of us. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. I would like to 

thank all the witnesses for their testimony here this afternoon. I 

would like to remind members that they will have 5 legislative 

days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to include 

statements for the record. 

If there is no further business to come before the committee, we 

are adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(61)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

62


65627n.eps
63


65627m.eps
64

Æ


65627f.eps