PRESIDENTIAL 

HELICOPTER

VH-92A Program Is 

Stable and Making 

Progress While 

Facing Challenges

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2018

GAO-18-359

Revised May 9, 2018 to correct table 1 on page 4 and on the 

Highlights page. The heading of the first column should read: 

“then-year dollars in millions” rather than “billions.”

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-359, a report to 

congressional committees

April 2018

PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER

VH-92A Program Is Stable and Making Progress While 

Facing Challenges

 

What GAO Found

The Presidential Helicopter (VH-92A) program’s planned aircraft quantities and 

key schedule events remain stable, and the program’s latest cost estimate 

shows a decrease of 2.4 percent, or about $123 million (see table below).

Contractor officials attribute these cost reductions to the small number of design 

changes, stable requirements, and efficiencies from cost saving initiatives.

VH-92A Program Quantities Remain Stable and Cost EstimatesHave Decreased

April 2014 

initial baseline

August 2017 

latest estimate

Percentage 

change

Cost estimate (then-year dollars in 

millions)

Development $2,805.7 $2,731.6 -2.6%

Procurement 2,379.0 2,330.3 -2.0

Total program acquisition 5,184.7 5,061.9 -2.4

Total program acquisition unit cost 225.4 220.1 -2.4

Expected total quantities (number 

of aircraft) 

23 23 0%

Source GAO presentation of Navy data.│ GAO-18-359

The program's stability is also attributable to the Navy's acquisition strategy. The 

contractor, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation is converting its existing commercial S92A helicopter to VH-92A helicopters, as depicted below. 

Conversion of Sikorsky’s Commercial Helicopter to the VH-92 Helicopter

While the program has made progress, it continues to face development 

challenges that may adversely affect its ability to deliver fully capable VH-92A

aircraft on time. Recently, the Navy and contractors have 

• taken steps to address parts shortages and track any related delays;

• investigated the cost and schedule implications of a request to modify 

the forward door of the aircraft; and 

• continued work to resolve issues related to electromagnetic event 

survivability and landing zone suitability. 

Final resolution of these issues may not occur until after production start, 

currently scheduled for March 2019.

View GAO-18-359. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 

or sullivanm@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy's VH-92A program—also 

known as the Presidential Helicopter—

provides new helicopters for safe, 

reliable, and timely transportation for 

the President of the United States. The 

Navy plans to acquire a fleet of 23 VH92A helicopters to replace the Marine 

Corps’ existing fleet of VH-3D and VH60N aircraft. Initial delivery of VH-92A 

helicopters is scheduled to begin in 

fiscal year 2020 with production ending 

in fiscal year 2023. 

The Navy’s acquisition strategy hinges 

on three key factors: (1) utilization of a 

commercial aircraft, (2) integration of 

mature technologies, and (3) retention 

of Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) original airworthiness 

certifications to avoid costly total 

airworthiness recertification.

The National Defense Authorization 

Act of 2014 included a provision for 

GAO to report on the VH-92A program 

annually, which GAO has been doing 

since 2011. This report discusses (1) 

the cost and schedule status of the 

program and (2) challenges facing the 

program in system development.

To determine how the program is 

progressing, GAO analyzed program 

documents; and spoke with officials 

from the program, the Defense 

Contract Management Agency,

contractors, and testing offices.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any 

recommendations in this report, but will 

continue to monitor the potential for 

cost growth and schedule delays as 

the program responds to design 

changes and challenges meeting 

capability requirements.
Page i GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

Letter 1

Background 2

VH-92A Program Remains Stable with Cost and Schedule 

Progressing as Planned 4

Program Is Addressing Some Developmental Challenges 7

Agency Comments 10

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 13

Appendix Il GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 14

Related GAO Products 15

Table

Table1: Initial and Current VH-92A Program Quantities and Cost 

Estimates 4

Figure

Figure 1: Conversion of the S-92A Commercial Helicopter to the 

VH-92A 3

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

Abbreviations

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

EDM Engineering Development Model

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

MCS Mission Communications System

SDTA System Demonstration Test Article

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 30, 2018

Congressional Committees

The Navy’s VH-92A program—also known as the Presidential 

Helicopter—provides new helicopters for safe, reliable, and timely 

transportation for the President of the United States and other parties as 

directed by the White House Military Office. The Navy plans to acquire a 

fleet of 23 VH-92A helicopters to replace the Marine Corps’ existing fleet 

VH-3D and VH-60N aircraft. Initial delivery of VH-92A helicopters is 

scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2020 with production ending in fiscal 

year 2023.

We have reported on this program since 2011; for a list of prior reports, 

see related GAO products at the end of this report. The National Defense 

Authorization Act of 2014 included a provision that we report on the VH92A program annually until the Navy awards the full-rate production 

contract.1 This report discusses (1) the cost and schedule status of the 

program and (2) the challenges facing the program in system 

development.

To determine how the program is progressing in terms of its cost and

schedule performance, we analyzed program documents (including the 

acquisition strategy and contractor progress reports). To understand 

potential program challenges and steps taken to address those 

challenges, we discussed the program’s status and risk management with 

the VH-92A program officials, officials from the Defense Contract 

Management Agency (DCMA) as well as contractors—Sikorsky Aircraft 

Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company (the prime contractor for the 

program).2 We interviewed program officials from the Navy’s Presidential 

Helicopter Program Office, as well as officials from the offices of the 

Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation, and Department of 

Defense, Developmental Test and Evaluation to better understand the 

test and evaluation aspects of the program.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to April 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 1 Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 252 (2013).

2 In November 2015, Lockheed Martin acquired Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit and obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Marine Corps uses a fleet of 23 helicopters to support the President 

in the national capital region, and when traveling in the continental United 

States and overseas. These aircraft have been in service for decades. In 

April 2002, the Navy began development of a replacement helicopter later 

identified as the VH-71 program. By 2009, schedule delays, performance 

issues, and a doubling of cost estimates from $6.5 billion in 2005 to $13 

billion in 2009, prompted the Navy to terminate the program.

The need for a replacement helicopter remained, and in 2010 the VXX 

Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program was started. By April 2012, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved a new Navy 

acquisition approach. The Navy’s acquisition strategy hinges on three key 

factors: (1) utilization of an in-production commercial aircraft, (2) 

integration of mature technologies, including a government-owned 

mission communications system (MCS) design,3 and (3) retention of 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) original airworthiness certifications 

to avoid costly total airworthiness recertification.

In May 2014, the Navy awarded a fixed-price incentive firm target contract 

to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, a Lockheed Martin company, to develop 

the VH-92A Presidential Helicopter, which is based on Sikorsky’s S-92A 

commercial helicopter. This contract type includes a ceiling price that 

limits the maximum amount that the Navy may pay the contractor under 

the contract, subject to other contract terms. The VH-92A is expected to 

provide improved performance, survivability, and communications 

capabilities, while offering increased passenger capacity when compared 

to the legacy helicopters.

Sikorsky is taking aircraft from an active production line (at the Sikorsky 

plant in Coatesville, Pennsylvania) to a dedicated VH-92A modification 

 3The program contains no critical technologies, due to its use of an existing helicopter and 

components. However, the program is using a government-designed MCS, which is the 

only technology that is not in use in another aircraft in the same configuration as required 

for the VH-92A.

Background
Page 3 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

facility for subsystem integration at its plant in Stratford, Connecticut.

When the aircraft arrives from Coatesville, some S-92A-unique 

components not required for the VH-92A, such as select circuit breaker 

panels, are moved. Subsequently, aircraft undergo modifications to 

support installation and accommodation of VH-92A-specific subsystems 

including the mission communications system racks and the wiring for 

MCS. According to program officials, the aircraft is then transferred to the 

Sikorsky facility in Owego, New York where integration of a mission 

communications system, painting, and contractor-led testing, executive 

cabin interior installation, and delivery of aircraft to the government will

take place. See figure 1 for a depiction of the conversion of the Sikorsky 

commercial S-92A aircraft to the VH-92A presidential helicopter.

Figure 1: Conversion of the S-92A Commercial Helicopter to the VH-92A

The VH-92A development program includes delivery of two Engineering 

Development Model (EDM) test aircraft and four System Demonstration 
Page 4 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

Test Article (SDTA) aircraft.4 According to contractor officials, the first 

flight of the first EDM aircraft took place July 28, 2017. The second EDM 

aircraft’s first flight occurred November 11, 2017. The four SDTA 

helicopters are production representative aircraft, built under the 

development contract, and are now in the early modification stages.

The VH-92A program is currently within its total program acquisition cost 

estimate and on schedule to meet major milestones. Since the start of the 

development effort, about 4 years ago, planned aircraft quantities and key 

schedule events have remained stable, and the program’s latest cost 

estimate shows a total decrease of 2.4 percent or about $123 million in 

development and procurement. Total program acquisition cost declined 

from an expected $5.18 billion to $5.06 billion, with program acquisition 

unit costs decreasing also by 2.4 percent. Contractor officials attribute the 

development cost reductions to the low number of design changes, no 

added requirements, and realized efficiencies from cost saving initiatives.

Table 1 compares the initial and current quantity and cost estimates for 

the VH-92A program.

Table1: Initial and Current VH-92A Program Quantities and Cost Estimates

Source: GAO presentation of Navy data.│ GAO-18-359

The Navy’s cost estimate has decreased over the past 4 years, which, 

according to the contractors, is primarily because the Navy has been able 

to limit the number of necessary design changes. To date, there have 

been minimal design changes that required modifications. Some of the 

modifications included the addition of formation lights, wireless antennas, 

 4During the development phase, the VH-92A program will conduct risk-reduction activities, 

systems integration/engineering design work, test & evaluation procedures, and operator 

training.

VH-92A Program 

Remains Stable with 

Cost and Schedule 

Progressing as 

Planned

April 2014

initial baseline

August 2017

latest estimate Percentage change 

Cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions)

Development $2,805.7 $2,731.6 -2.6%

Procurement 2,379.0 2,330.3 -2.0

Total program acquisition 5,184.7 5,061.9 -2.4

Total program acquisition unit cost 225.4 220.1 -2.4

Expected total quantities (number of aircraft) 23 23 0
Page 5 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

and design changes to radios needed for wideband line of sight

capability.5 These changes are included in the modifications being 

performed at the Sikorsky facility in Stratford, Connecticut. The program 

office is gathering information for a design change to the upper-half of the 

forward door that will provide a less obstructive view of individuals 

entering or exiting the aircraft, and increase the field of vision of 

individuals entering or exiting the aircraft using the forward air stair door.

Design, structural, and other analyses for this door effort are needed to 

ensure there would be no effect on the overall airworthiness certification 

for the aircraft.

In January 2018, Sikorsky reported it had accomplished about 63 percent 

of development work, leaving about 37 percent of work remaining to be 

completed over the next two years, when the development effort ends in 

October 2020.6 At this point, DCMA’s cost estimate at completion for the 

VH-92A program indicates a final price that will be lower than the ceiling 

price for the contract. Another indication of contractor cost performance is 

the use of its management reserve. The management reserve account is 

held for growth within the currently authorized work scope, for rate 

changes, and for unanticipated in-scope issues that become known 

during the program, including development. These funds are not used to 

offset accumulated contract overruns or underruns. According to DCMA, 

now that new discovery in system development is tapering off, it is 

reasonable to assume Sikorsky will be able to finish the contract with 

sufficient management reserve available to contract completion. 

To control costs, the Navy and contractor have taken advantage of 

opportunities such as leveraging the FAA’s airworthiness certification 

process, optimizing work processes, and reducing the movement of 

aircraft between contractor sites.

• Leveraging Federal Aviation Administration Airworthiness 

Certification Process: The Navy plans to determine production 

readiness through audits and inspections included as part of the FAA 

airworthiness certification process, which is used to determine if an 

aircraft is safe to operate. According to program officials, by relying on 

the procedures built into the airworthiness process, they no longer 

 5Wideband line of sight capability provides high speed data links for situational 

awareness.

6This represents the unclassified portion of the development contract.
Page 6 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

needed to conduct their own separate production readiness review—

saving $3 million, which will be reinvested into the program.

• Optimizing Work Processes:Sikorsky saved time and money by 

using, in some cases, modeling analysis rather than actual testing 

events. As previously reported, Sikorsky decided to certify the 

aircraft’s de-icing capability using modeling analysis.7 Sikorsky and 

other subject matter experts agreed that actual testing was not 

required and simulated analyses would suffice toward obtaining FAA 

certification. This revised approach resulted in a savings of 

approximately 2 months of schedule and $3 million in cost associated 

with actual de-icing testing—all of which were applied to other 

activities within the contract. Similarly, Sikorsky saved about $1.2 

million by using modeling in certifying aircraft systems in a high 

intensity radio frequency (HIRF) environment rather than by the actual 

testing.

• Reallocating Development Activities between Facilities:Sikorsky 

achieved a total of $10.7 million in savings, due to work cost 

reductions (worth an estimated $7.5 million) and by reducing the 

number of flights between development facilities (resulting in savings 

of $3.2 million). According to the contractors, these savings have 

been reinvested in the program.

The program appears on schedule to meet its major milestones.8 In April 

2016, we reviewed the program’s Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) and 

compared it against best practices criteria in the GAO Schedule 

Assessment Guide.9 At that time, we determined the schedule could be 

reliably used to define when and how long work will occur and how each 

activity is related to the others. We reviewed the IMS again this year and 

found that the quality of its data has decreased. As a result, slips to the 

program’s critical path may not be as apparent as in the past.10 Given the 

 7GAO, Presidential Helicopter: Program Progressing Largely as Planned, GAO-16-395 

(Washington, D.C.:Apr.14, 2016).

8The program office acknowledge the production decision objective date, which is the 

approved most desired date, is now expected to occur 2 months later than planned—in 

March 2019 rather than January 2019. In addition, an OSD, November 2017, assessment 

of the VH-92A program predicts the production decision will be four months beyond its 

objective date (this is driven, in part, by previous production delays). 

9GAO, Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, GAO-16-89G 

(Washington, D.C.: December 2015).

10The critical path is generally defined as the longest continuous sequence of activities in 

a schedule. 
Page 7 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

change in the quality of the IMS data over the past 2 years and the fact 

that it raises questions about the program’s ability to maintain schedule, 

we will continue to closely monitor this situation as the program 

progresses.

While the program has made progress, the VH-92A program continues to 

face development challenges that could adversely affect Sikorsky’s ability 

to deliver fully capable aircraft on time. Those challenges include parts 

shortages and potential design changes. The Navy and contractors have 

plans in place and have undertaken actions to meet these challenges. In 

addition, the program anticipates not meeting some capability 

requirements before entering production. Overall, these challenges

impact Sikorsky’s ability to deliver fully-capable aircraft on time and may 

affect cost and schedule.

As of November 2017, DCMA has reported supplier delays in delivering 

some key components. For example, Sikorsky is experiencing significant 

parts shortages for the two SDTA aircraft undergoing modification at the 

Stratford facility (this includes components such as sheet metal and 

machined parts). As a result, according to the program office, Sikorsky 

has, in some instances, resorted to temporarily using parts that are 

awaiting qualification in place of VH-92A specified parts, which will be 

fully qualified when the FAA certification is obtained. According to DCMA, 

the parts shortages resulted in a 1-month work pause, but Sikorsky has 

since resumed modification of the two SDTA aircraft. However, as a 

consequence, Sikorsky now has three aircraft in the modification process 

at the same time and according to DCMA, this is putting a burden on 

needed parts and manpower. Further, DCMA officials explained that 

since the SDTAs are production representative aircraft, Sikorsky cannot 

deliver the SDTAs with substitute parts for acceptance by the 

government. As a result of the parts shortages, Sikorsky has missed 

several of its internal milestones during the aircraft build process. As 

contractor officials have reported, the program has been able to maintain 

the overall schedule through a number of work-arounds.

To mitigate the parts shortages, Sikorsky has been conducting quarterly 

meetings with suppliers where they discuss supplier issues, corrective 

actions, and future actions needed to address the shortages. Sikorsky 

has also placed personnel on site at supplier locations to expedite the 

delivery of parts. If subcontractors are unable to improve their parts 

supply chain, continued challenges with parts shortages could further 

delay government-integrated testing. The start of government testing has 

Program Is 

Addressing Some 

Developmental 

Challenges
Page 8 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

slipped by 2 months to July rather than May 2018 as had been planned.

In addition to this delay, if an initial production part fails during flight 

testing, the test event could pause, since there is a lack of replacement 

spares in stock to change out the failed part. This would further adversely 

affect the government’s test plans. We have previously reported on 

design changes already experienced in the program;11 they have 

contributed to reducing the amount of time available to complete 

government-led testing prior to the production decision. The program 

office now characterizes its integrated test schedule as aggressive and 

it’s a risk factor the program office is tracking.

In addition, some performance requirements may not be fully achieved 

until after the production decision currently scheduled for March 2019. For 

example, the program is monitoring and managing development that 

could affect the aircraft’s ability to meet requirements associated with 

operation in an electromagnetic environment, landing zone suitability, and 

the propulsion system. Below is additional information on each 

performance requirement.

• Electromagnetic Environment: Modifications have been made to 

ensure the VH-92A aircraft can operate in a degraded 

electromagnetic environment normally associated with a nuclear 

event. The program currently plans to complete system level 

electromagnetic environment testing in 2019, and is working to obtain 

initial results of that testing to support the program’s production 

decision. However, until all solutions have been verified, there is a 

possibility the program will have to retrofit produced aircraft, which 

could lead to increased cost and schedule delays.

• Landing zone suitability: The White House South Lawn is the most 

frequent location utilized for helicopter operations in support of the 

President. The lawn is a highly visible, size-constrained landing zone 

where damage to the White House grounds needs to be minimized.

Currently, however, the program is not meeting a key system 

capability requirement to land the aircraft without adversely affecting 

the landing zone (including the White House Lawn). The program 

expects to implement a solution for this about 5 months after the start 

of production. There is a possibility of increased cost and schedule 

delays if the program has to retrofit produced aircraft.

 11GAO-16-395.
Page 9 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

• VH-92A propulsion system: The VH-92A program is pursuing 

technical improvements related to the S-92A propulsion system, 

which has yet to meet a VH-92A performance requirement. According 

to program officials, they expect Sikorsky to complete the engineering 

analysis of solutions for meeting this requirement by October 2018. 

Should they not meet the aforementioned schedule, however, the 

program office does not intend to delay production and will continue 

working on a solution to support the start of Initial Operational Test 

and Evaluation, in December 2019.12

Finally, according to the program office, based on an inquiry from the 

Integrated Steering Group,13 the program is investigating the cost and 

schedule impacts of modifying the forward door to provide greater 

visibility of individuals entering or exiting the aircraft. In anticipation of a 

request to do this modification, the Navy completed a trade study in May 

2017 that provided rough order-of-magnitude cost and schedule 

implications of three possible approaches (minimal, moderate, and 

extensive structural modifications) with airworthiness considerations built 

into the design analyses. The moderate and extensive approaches were 

determined to be unacceptable and removed from further consideration. 

As follow-on to the trade study, the program is working with Sikorsky to 

develop detailed cost and schedule information for the remaining minimal 

modification option.

According to the program office, it estimates that a solution could be 

implemented, if needed, during the first lot of production aircraft. Before 

this change to the door, as with any new performance requirement, can 

be approved, it must be considered by a number of DOD governing 

integrated product teams or groups. As we have previously reported, the 

 12An operational assessment (OA) will be conducted on operationally representative 

aircraft to provide a risk assessment of the aircraft to determine whether it meets 

requirements. The operational assessment will inform the low-rate initial production 

decision. In addition, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) is conducted on 

production representative articles, to determine whether systems are operationally 

effective and suitable to support a full-rate production decision. 

13The Integrated Steering Group is one of the program’s external governing bodies.
Page 10 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

program has a process for review and approval of requirements.14

Program officials told us that the Integrated Steering Group considered 

the request for the forward air door modification and approved the change 

in January 2018. The Executive Steering Group, which has final decision 

authority for the VH-92A program, was notified of the approved 

performance requirement change. Now that this change is approved, the 

Navy is considering using a basic ordering agreement it has with Sikorsky 

separate from the VH-92A contract for work to complete the change and 

the program office is working with the contractor to determine the best 

time to make the modification to the aircraft in order to minimize impact 

on the production schedule. Modifications that begin after production of 

an aircraft is underway may result in the need to retrofit already-built VH92A aircraft.

We are not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided 

comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix l. 

DOD also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate.

 14The program uses a management control process to govern requirement changes. It 

includes three governing bodies—the Capabilities Integrated Product Team (a workinglevel forum supporting the Marine Corps’ desired operating capabilities); the Integrated 

Steering Group (ISG) representing both the requirements and user communities, and the

Executive Steering Group (ESG), which is a senior oversight committee. When required, 

the ESG resolves critical issues and provides strategic guidance. The ESG also provides 

final decision authority for the VH-92A program.

Agency Comments
Page 11 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix ll.

Michael J. Sullivan

Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions
Page 12 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Shelby

Chairman

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 13 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix Il: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 14 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Bruce H. Thomas, Assistant 

Director; Marvin E. Bonner; Bonita J.P. Oden; Peter Anderson, Robin 

Wilson, and Marie Ahearn made key contributions to this report.

Appendix Il: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 15 GAO-18-359 Presidential Helicopter

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-17-333SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2017.1

Presidential Helicopter: Program Progressing Largely as Planned. 

GAO-16-395. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2016.

Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Program Established KnowledgeBased Business Case and Entered System Development with Plans for 

Managing Challenges. GAO-15-392R. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015.

Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Update on Program’s Progress toward 

Development Start. GAO-14-358R. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2014. 

Department of Defense’s Waiver of Competitive Prototyping Requirement 

for the VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program. 

GAO-13-826R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2013. 

Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Program Makes Progress in 

Balancing Requirements, Costs, and Schedule. GAO-13-257. 

Washington, D.C: April 9, 2013. 

Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Effort Delayed as DOD Adopts New 

Approach to Balance Requirements, Costs, and Schedule. 

GAO-12-381R. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2012.

Defense Acquisitions: Application of Lessons Learned and Best Practices 

in the Presidential Helicopter Program. GAO-11-380R. Washington, D.C.:

March 25, 2011.

 1This report’s assessment of the Navy’s Presidential Helicopter Program constituted 

GAO’s response to the annual reporting requirement for 2017, as required by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.

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