Filed 10/17/22 Conservatorship of V.M. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

Conservatorship of the Person 

of V.M.

2d Civil No. B318934

(Super. Ct. No. 21PR-0304)

(San Luis Obispo County)

PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF THE 

COUNTY OF SAN LUIS 

OBISPO,

 Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

V.M.,

 Objector and Appellant.

V.M. appeals from a judgment appointing respondent as 

conservator of her person for a one-year period. The judgment 

was entered following a jury trial. The jury unanimously found 

that appellant is “presently gravely disabled due to a mental 
2

disorder.” At the time of trial, appellant was a 22-year-old 

woman. 

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting her medical records and in allowing respondent’s 

expert witness to refer to the records. The records were admitted 

pursuant to the business records and admission exceptions to the 

hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, §§ 1271, 1220.)1 In addition, appellant 

claims she was denied her right to cross-examine doctors who did 

not testify but whose opinions were relied on by respondent’s 

expert. We affirm.

Pretrial Hearing

At a pretrial hearing appellant objected to the admission of 

her medical records (“the records”) from three facilities: Stanford 

Health Care (Stanford), San Luis Obispo County Psychiatric 

Health Facility (SLO County PHF), and Aurora Vista Del Mar. 

Appellant’s counsel said: “I object to them being admitted, as 

they do state the admissions of [appellant] in this matter.” 

Respondent’s expert, Dr. Rose Drago, “can use them as part of 

her opinion, but she cannot bring them into evidence” because 

they contain hearsay and appellant did “not have an opportunity 

to cross-examine the people who made the [out-of-court] 

statements.” Counsel’s objection was based on People v. Sanchez 

(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). Counsel conceded the records 

are relevant evidence. 

Respondent argued that the records are admissible “under 

the business records exception to the hearsay rule.” (§ 1271.) 

Respondent said the records had been redacted “[s]o what’s 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence 

Code. 
3

remaining should be statements that are attributed to 

[appellant], herself.” 

The trial court overruled appellant’s objection for the 

following reasons: “Number one, there’s at least one hearsay 

exception that applies in this case pursuant to Evidence Code 

[s]ection 1271 [the business records exception]. Based on my 

review of the records, it is evident to me that the writings were 

made in the regular course of business. [¶] Number two, . . . the 

writings were made at or near the time of the act, condition, or 

event. [¶] Number three, . . . the declarations of the custodians 

of records have sufficiently identified the record and the mode of 

their preparation. [¶] And . . . the records . . . appear to be 

trustworthy. They’re not fabricated. . . . [¶] . . . [M]any of the 

statements in the records are statements made by [appellant], 

herself, so they come in under [the hearsay exception for] a 

party[’s] admission [(§ 1220)].”2

Evidence Presented at Trial

The trial occurred in February 2022. At that time, 

appellant was living at the Crestwood Champion Healing Center 

(Crestwood), a secured facility in Lompoc. She had been there 

since October 2021. 

Dr. Drago’s Testimony

Dr. Drago, a psychiatrist, was called by respondent as an 

expert witness. In preparation for her testimony, she reviewed 

the records, the conservatorship investigative report, and 

“doctors’ declarations from [appellant’s] facility.” Two weeks 

before the trial, she interviewed appellant via Zoom. 

2 Section 1220 provides: “Evidence of a statement is not 

made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the 

declarant in an action to which he is a party . . . .”
4

Dr. Drago diagnosed appellant as having a “schizoaffective 

disorder, bipolar type.” This is “a hybrid of schizophrenia and 

manic depressive illness.” 

During the interview, appellant did not exhibit symptoms 

of her disorder: “She’s in a good place [Crestview] right now. 

She’s stable on her medications, seemingly. So her mood was 

stable, and there . . . was no overt evidence of psychosis during 

the interview.” 

Dr. Drago read two notes from the records. One note from 

April 2021 said, “‘Patient [appellant] stated that she had hit a 

guy on the street because she felt threatened but could not state 

why she felt threatened. And patient has not been taking her 

meds . . . .’” The other note from May 2021 said, “[Appellant] 

states that, . . . ‘The voice inside her head,’ . . . has been . . . 

‘louder’ . . . recently . . . to the point where she cannot hear her 

own thoughts.” Dr. Drago opined that this “is an example of an 

auditory hallucination.” 

In response to a question whether appellant “is

. . . compliant with her prescribed psychiatric medications,” Dr. 

Drago responded: “In a facility such as Crestwood, which is a 

locked structured facility, yes, she is compliant. As an 

outpatient, she historically has not been compliant with 

medication.” Appellant told Dr. Drago that she did not have “a 

mental illness” and “would stop her medication . . . if she were on 

her own.” 

Dr. Drago opined that, if appellant stopped taking her 

medications, she would be “gravely disabled.” Notes from a 

medical facility indicated that, without her medications, “[s]he 

has hallucinations, usually hearing things, and becomes 

delusional, feeling a threat from others sometimes.” 
5

Dr. Drago further opined, “[W]ithout treatment in a 

structured setting right now, she would be disorganized in her 

thinking, probably hallucinating, probably paranoid and suicidal,

and not able to even come close to providing for her needs. She’d 

be vulnerable. She’d be in a homeless community where she’s 

been before, and it would not be a safe situation for her.” 

Dr. Drago noted that appellant had attempted suicide on 

three occasions. The first hospitalization occurred in 2017 “after 

a suicide gesture of laying on the railroad tracks.” “She . . . had 

two serious suicide attempts in 2021 that both led to 

hospitalization and serious injuries.” During the second attempt, 

which occurred in September 2021, appellant drank bleach. 

Appellant “tends to minimize” the suicide attempts. 

Appellant’s Testimony

Appellant testified: Her plans for the future are “to live 

back at home with my mother and to start working.” She does 

not have a mental disorder and does not experience “auditory 

hallucinations.” If she were on her own, she would not take her 

medications. She was admitted to Stanford Health Care because 

she had “jumped from a four-story building.”3 She was “homeless 

in 2020 from December until January.” 

Closing Argument

During closing argument, respondent’s counsel told the 

jury: “[F]rom the records that you will see from three separate 

medical facilities, from three separate admissions, . . . and as Dr. 

Drago described, [appellant], indeed suffers from symptoms that 

are associated with mental illness. You'll receive these medical 

3 According to Stanford’s medical records, appellant said 

she had “jumped from the 4th story” of a “parking structure,” but 

“[a] tree broke her fall.” 
6

records in the deliberation room, and I encourage you all to take 

the time to review them.” 

Respondent’s counsel continued: “You'll see in the exhibits 

that [appellant] denies having a mental illness; however, you will 

also see in the exhibits that [she] acknowledges hearing noises, 

endorses thought broadcasting, has paranoia, and has tangential 

thinking. As such, I urge you to find that . . . [she] has a mental 

disorder . . . .” “The medical records entered into evidence 

will . . . show that she has failed to take her psychiatric 

medications in the past . . . .” 

The California Supreme Court’s Sanchez Opinion

Appellant argues, “Mental health records and related 

testimony were improperly admitted in violation of the Sanchez 

rule against admission of case-specific hearsay, and of appellant’s 

state and federal rights to cross-examine witnesses.” (Bold and 

capitalization omitted.) “Hearsay may be briefly understood as 

an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of its content. . . . 

Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls under an 

exception.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 674.) 

In Sanchez our Supreme Court held: “If an expert testifies 

to case-specific out-of-court statements to explain the bases for 

his opinion, those statements are necessarily considered by the 

jury for their truth, thus rendering them hearsay. Like any other 

hearsay evidence, it must be properly admitted through an 

applicable hearsay exception.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

p. 684, fn. omitted.) “What an expert cannot do is relate as true 

case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they 

are independently proven by competent evidence or are covered 

by a hearsay exception.” (Id. at p. 686.) “Case-specific facts are

those relating to the particular events and participants alleged to 
7

have been involved in the case being tried.” (Id. at p. 676.) 

“Sanchez applies to conservatorship proceedings.” 

(Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 438, 448.)

No Abuse of Discretion in Admitting the

Records under the Business Records Exception

Section 1271 states the business records exception to the 

hearsay rule: “Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, 

condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule 

when offered to prove the act, condition, or event if: [¶] (a) The 

writing was made in the regular course of business; [¶] (b) The 

writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or 

event; [¶] (c) The custodian or other qualified witness testifies to 

its identity and the mode of its preparation; and [¶] (d) The 

sources of information and method and time of preparation were 

such as to indicate its trustworthiness.” “These requirements 

may be satisfied by affidavit. [Citations.]” (Conservatorship of

S.A., supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 447.)

“The trial court has wide discretion to determine whether 

there is a sufficient foundation to qualify evidence as a business 

record; we will overturn its decision to admit such records only 

upon a clear showing of abuse.” (Conservatorship of S.A., supra,

25 Cal.App.5th at p. 447.)

As to the records from SLO County PHF and Aurora Vista 

Del Mar, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The records 

were accompanied by declarations under penalty of perjury from 

the custodian of records at each of the medical facilities. The 

custodians identified the records and attested that they had been 

“prepared by personnel . . . in the ordinary course of business, at 

or near the time of the acts, conditions, or events recorded.” The 

custodians described the mode of preparation of the records: “The 
8

records were prepared by different members of the above-named 

patient’s treatment team. The individual author(s) of each 

notation had personal knowledge of the act, condition, or event 

recorded. Each individual author either directly witnessed the 

act, condition or event recorded, OR was provided information by 

someone who directly witnessed the act, condition, or event 

recorded.” The trial court said, “I have reviewed the records very 

carefully . . . [and] they appear to be trustworthy. They’re not 

fabricated . . . .” 

With one exception, the Stanford custodian’s declaration is 

consistent with the declarations of the other custodians. The 

exception is the description of the mode of preparation of the 

records. The Stanford custodian states, “The mode of preparation 

of these records is described as copies of the originals.” Appellant 

contends that this statement does not meet the requirement of 

the business records exception that the custodian testify to the 

“mode of [the record’s] preparation.” (§ 1271, subd. (c).) 

We need not determine whether the Stanford custodian 

adequately described the mode of preparation of the records. The 

face of the Stanford records shows their mode of preparation so 

that a detailed description by the custodian was unnecessary. 

The Stanford records consist of three notes. The first was 

authored by Dr. Filza Hussain and filed on May 5, 2021. It was 

based on an original note prepared by Dr. Dany Lamothe and 

filed on May 4, 2021, the date appellant was admitted to 

Stanford. The second note was authored by Dr. Giovanni 

Dandekar and filed on May 17, 2021. It was based on an original 

note prepared by Dr. Natalie Ruth Marks and filed on May 14, 

2021. The last note was authored by Dr. Yelizaveta Sher and 
9

filed on May 19, 2021. It was based on an original note prepared 

by Dr. Dany Lamothe and filed on May 14, 2021. 

All three notes are heavily redacted so that only records of 

appellant’s statements are visible. These records obviously were 

prepared by appellant’s treatment team at Stanford based on her 

statements to members of the team. Testimony by the Stanford 

custodian as to their mode of preparation would merely have 

reiterated what was self-evident. 

The trial court said it had “reviewed the records very 

carefully.” “A trial judge has broad discretion in admitting 

business records under Evidence Code section 1271, and it has 

been held that the foundation requirements may be inferred from 

the circumstances.” (People v. Dorsey (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 953, 

961.)

Appellant maintains that “admission [of the records under] 

the business record exception is not proper in this case, because it 

. . . abrogates the rights of a person subject to civil commitment 

to cross examine witnesses.” But Sanchez makes clear that in a 

civil action, such as a conservatorship proceeding, case-specific 

hearsay is admissible if it falls within an exception to the hearsay 

rule. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686.) “Drago’s testimony 

about the contents of the records did not violate [appellant’s] 

constitutional rights because she related only case-specific facts 

that were proved by admissible evidence. . . . [T]he case-specific 

hearsay related by Drago came from medical records that 

qualified for admission under the business records exception to 

the hearsay rule.” (Conservatorship of S.A., 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 

448.)

Because the records were admissible under the business 

records exception, we do not consider respondent’s claim that 
10

“Welfare and Institutions Code section 5008.2 operates as an 

independent hearsay exception because it requires the trier of 

fact to consider the historical course of the individual[’s] illness, 

including considering the patient’s medical and psychiatric 

records.”4

Appellant Forfeited Claim She Was Denied the

Right to Cross-Examine Doctors Who Did Not Testify

Dr. Drago testified that, when she evaluates a patient, she 

considers “what other clinicians have thought.” Respondent 

asked Dr. Drago whether she felt “confident in coming to a 

diagnosis after reviewing records and having an interview with 

an individual.” She responded in the affirmative and gave the 

following explanation: “[B]y the time people get to this point, 

there’s usually been multiple clinicians that have weighed in . . . . 

So it’s not that I’m out in the desert . . . . [W]hen there’s been 

several clinicians seeing and saying pretty much the same thing, 

it helps a little bit more, too.” Dr Drago had earlier testified, 

“[A]s the notes from, I believe it was Stanford, indicate, 

[appellant] does become psychotic without medications.”

Based on the above testimony, appellant claims Dr. Drago 

relied on the opinions of other doctors “to bolster her diagnosis.” 

Appellant argues that she “was denied her state and federal 

rights to cross-examination” of these “non-testifying doctors.” 

(Bold and capitalization omitted.) 

4 Welfare and Institutions Code section 5008.2 provides in 

relevant part: “[T]he historical course of the person’s mental 

disorder . . . shall be considered when it has a direct bearing on 

the determination of whether the person is . . . gravely disabled, 

as a result of a mental disorder. The historical course shall 

include . . . the patient’s medical records as presented to the 

court, including psychiatric records . . . .” 
11

As authority for her argument, appellant cites our opinion 

in People v. Campos (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 304, 308 (Campos). 

There, the defendant contested a jury’s determination that he 

was a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen.Code, § 2960 et 

seq.) Dr. Mertz testified “that nontestifying experts who 

evaluated [defendant] concurred in her opinion that [he] met the 

MDO criteria . . . .” (Campos, supra, at p. 306.) We held: “Doctor 

Mertz was properly allowed to testify that she relied upon the 

reports in forming her own opinions. The trial court erred, 

however, when it allowed her to reveal their content on direct 

examination by testifying that each prior medical evaluation 

agreed with her own opinion. ‘[D]octors can testify as to the basis 

for their opinion [citation], but this is not intended to be a 

channel by which testifying doctors can place the opinion of 

innumerable out-of-court doctors before the jury.’” (Id. at p. 308.)

Appellant concedes that her “counsel did not expressly 

object to” the testimony in question. But she maintains that, “in 

light of the trial court’s ruling[] on admission of records, which 

were based on appellant’s rights to cross-examine witnesses . . . , 

any such objection would have been futile.” 

We disagree. The redacted records contained only 

appellant’s statements. They did not include the opinions of 

appellant’s doctors concerning her mental condition. It is 

therefore not reasonable to conclude that the court would have 

overruled a Campos objection to Dr. Drago’s testimony that she 

felt confident about her diagnoses because, by the time she gets a 

case, “there’s been several clinicians seeing and saying pretty 

much the same thing.” 

Accordingly, appellant forfeited the issue. “Ordinarily, ‘the 

failure to object to the admission of expert testimony or hearsay 
12

at trial forfeits an appellate claim that such evidence was

improperly admitted.’ [Citations.] ‘“The reason for the 

[objection] requirement is manifest: a specifically grounded 

objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error. It 

allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or 

limiting its admission to avoid possible prejudice. It also allows 

the proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify 

the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the 

prospect of reversal.”’” (People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7; see 

also People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434 [“‘In 

accordance with [section 353, subdivision (a)], we have 

consistently held that the “defendant's failure to make a timely 

and specific objection” on the ground asserted on appeal makes 

that ground not cognizable’”].) 

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

LUI, A.P.J.*

* Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 

Division Two, assigned by Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.
Hernaldo J. Baltodano, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Jean Matulis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Objector and Appellant.

Rita L. Neal, County Counsel, Chelsea K. Kuhns, Deputy, 

for Petitioner and Respondent.