NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JAMES ROBINSON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0805 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2016-002571-001

The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix

By Colin F. Stearns

Counsel for Appellant

James Robinson, San Luis

Appellant

FILED 9-27-2018
STATE v. ROBINSON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge James P. Beene joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 James Robinson appeals his conviction and sentence for one 

count of sale or transportation of narcotic drugs. After searching the entire 

record, Robinson’s defense counsel identified no arguable question of law 

that is not frivolous. Therefore, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), defense counsel asked 

this Court to search the record for fundamental error. Robinson was 

granted an opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona and 

did so. After reviewing the entire record, we reject the arguments raised in 

Robinson’s supplemental brief and find no error. Accordingly, Robinson’s 

conviction and sentence are affirmed.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In the afternoon of October 14, 2015, an undercover detective 

with the Phoenix Police Department stopped his unmarked vehicle at the 

corner of 13th Avenue and Pima Street in Phoenix and waved to a group of 

males standing nearby.1 An older African-American man wearing blackand-white checkered shorts approached the vehicle. The detective stated he 

“was looking for some rock,” or crack cocaine. When the man asked how 

much, the detective said he “wanted a dub,” or $20 worth. The man in the 

checkered shorts walked over to an individual, retrieved an item, and 

returned to the vehicle with an off-white-colored rock the detective 

recognized as crack cocaine. The detective paid the man $20, denied the 

man’s request for “a hit,” and left the area. A second detective passing by 

shortly thereafter also saw an older African-American man wearing blackand-white plaid or checkered shorts on the corner. 

 

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions 

with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” State v. 

Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996).
STATE v. ROBINSON

Decision of the Court

3

¶3 Fifteen minutes later, a uniformed officer canvassed the area 

attempting to locate and identify the man who completed the drug 

transaction. The officer contacted an older African-American man in blackand-white plaid shorts walking in the street nearby. The man gave his name 

as James Robinson. Both the officer and the undercover detective confirmed 

the man they contacted was the same man depicted in Robinson’s driver’s 

license photo. 

¶4 Robinson was indicted on one count of sale or transportation 

of narcotic drugs. At trial, a forensic scientist confirmed the substance the 

detective purchased was 191.6 milligrams of cocaine base, or crack cocaine,

which the parties stipulated is a narcotic drug. 

¶5 Following an unsuccessful motion for judgment of acquittal, 

the jury convicted Robinson as charged. At a separate trial on prior 

convictions, the State presented certified records and fingerprint evidence 

to verify Robinson’s prior felony convictions. The superior court then 

sentenced Robinson as a non-dangerous, repetitive offender to the 

minimum sentence of 10.5 years’ imprisonment and credited him with 239 

days of presentence incarceration.

DISCUSSION

¶6 Within his supplemental brief, Robinson argues insufficient 

evidence supports his conviction and, therefore, his sentence is excessive 

and illegal.

2 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he relevant 

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 

353, 357, ¶ 22 (2007) (citation omitted). Therefore, we will affirm a 

conviction so long as “substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, 

viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.” 

Id. (citation omitted). Substantial evidence may exist even where conflicting 

evidence is presented. See State v. Flowers, 110 Ariz. 566, 567 (1974).

¶7 A person is guilty of sale or transport of a narcotic drug if he 

“knowingly . . . [t]ransport[s] for sale, . . . offer[s] to transport for sale . . . , 

sell[s], transfer[s], or offer[s] to sell or transfer a narcotic drug.” A.R.S. § 13-

3408(A)(7). Crack cocaine is a narcotic drug. A.R.S. § 13-3401(20)(bb) 

(defining “narcotic drug” to include “any substance neither chemically nor

 

2 We have received Robinson’s motion for substitution of counsel and to 

proceed in propria persona. It is ordered denying the motion.
STATE v. ROBINSON

Decision of the Court

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physically distinguishable from . . . coca leaves,” whether “of natural or 

synthetic origin”). The record contains sufficient evidence upon which the 

jury could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson knowingly 

sold the undercover detective $20 worth of crack cocaine and was therefore 

guilty of sale or transport of a narcotic drug. Additionally, Robinson’s 

sentence was within the statutory range.3 A.R.S. § 13-703(C), (J).

Accordingly, we find no error in the conviction or sentence.

¶8 Robinson argues the indictment was insufficient to apprise 

him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. An indictment 

is “a plain, concise statement of the facts sufficiently definite to inform the 

defendant of a charged offense.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.1(a); accord State v. 

Schwartz, 188 Ariz. 313, 319 (App. 1996). “Each count of an indictment or 

information must state the official or customary citation of the statute . . . 

the defendant allegedly violated.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.1(d). The purpose of 

the indictment is simply to provide notice of the charges, however, and it 

need not detail the prosecution’s theory of the case. Schwartz, 188 Ariz. at 

319-20. The indictment here accuses Robinson of knowingly selling or 

transporting the narcotic drug crack cocaine in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3408

on or about October 14, 2015. Nothing more was required, and we find no 

error.

¶9 Robinson argues the statutory definition of “narcotic drug” 

is unconstitutionally vague and does not include crack cocaine. We 

disagree. Coca leaves are a narcotic drug and include “cocaine, its optical 

isomers and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture or 

preparation of coca leaves.” A.R.S. § 13-3401(5), (20)(bb). This definition 

plainly includes crack cocaine, see United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669, 676 

(5th Cir. 1990) (“Cocaine base is merely an isomer of cocaine.”)—a fact 

Robinson stipulated to at trial. 

¶10 Finally, Robinson argues he was not tried before “a properly 

constituted jury” because the pool of seventy potential jurors contained 

only two African-American individuals and did not accurately represent 

 

3 The record reflects Robinson was arrested and incarcerated on April 7, 

2017, and held until sentencing on December 1, 2017, for a total of 238 days

of presentence incarceration. Although the trial court erroneously gave 

Robinson credit for 239 days of presentence incarceration, the error is in 

Robinson’s favor and is, therefore, not fundamental because it did not 

prejudice him. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶¶ 19–20 (2005) 

(explaining fundamental error is error that both goes to the foundation of 

the case and prejudices the defendant).
STATE v. ROBINSON

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the racial makeup of his community. We will not reverse a conviction based 

upon irregularities in the selection of a jury, however, if a fair and impartial 

jury was ultimately secured. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(a) (noting “[a] party 

may challenge the panel on the ground that its selection involved a material 

departure from the requirements of law,” but “must be in writing, specify 

the factual basis for the challenge, and make a showing of prejudice to the 

party”); State v. Thomas, 133 Ariz. 533, 537 (1982) (“[A]bsent some showing 

of abuse and resulting prejudice, Rule 18.4(a) does not require reversal so 

long as a party’s right to an impartial jury is not impaired.”). Robinson does 

not allege, let alone demonstrate, that the jurors ultimately selected could 

not or did not render a fair and impartial verdict, and we find no error. 

¶11 Further review reveals no fundamental error. See Leon, 104 

Ariz. at 300 (“An exhaustive search of the record has failed to produce any 

prejudicial error.”). All the proceedings were conducted in compliance with 

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. So far as the record reveals, 

Robinson was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and 

was present at all critical stages including the entire trial and the verdict.

See State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 104 (1990) (right to counsel at critical stages) 

(citations omitted); State v. Bohn, 116 Ariz. 500, 503 (1977) (right to be 

present at critical stages). The jury was properly comprised of twelve jurors, 

and the record shows no evidence of jury misconduct. See Ariz. Const. art. 

2, § 23; A.R.S. § 21-102(A); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(a). The superior court 

properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charged offenses, the 

State’s burden of proof, and Robinson’s presumption of innocence. At 

sentencing, Robinson was given an opportunity to speak, and the court 

stated on the record the evidence and materials it considered and the factors 

it found in imposing the sentences.4 See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.9, 26.10. 

CONCLUSION

¶12 Robinson’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. 

 

4 Although the record does not contain a presentence report, it is apparent 

the superior court ordered the report and that both the court and the parties 

received and considered the report, as well as the mitigation report 

submitted by Robinson, in advance of the sentencing hearing. Under these 

circumstances, the absence of the presentence report in the appellate record 

does not amount to fundamental error. See State v. Maese, 27 Ariz. App. 379, 

379-80 (1976); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.4(c) (requiring the presentence 

report to be “delivered to the sentencing judge and to all counsel” but not 

filed).
STATE v. ROBINSON

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¶13 Unless defense counsel finds an issue that may be 

appropriately submitted to the Arizona Supreme Court, his obligations are

fulfilled once he informs Robinson of the outcome of this appeal and his

future options. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). Robinson

has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a 

pro per motion for reconsideration or petition for review.