COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Bumgardner 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

THOMAS ARTHUR CHILTON, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1265-00-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 AUGUST 28, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge 

 Craig S. Cooley for appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether the 

appellant's suspended sentence was extant when the trial judge 

revoked it and ordered him to prison. We hold that it was and 

affirm the judgment. 

I. 

 On October 4, 1990, Thomas A. Chilton, Jr. signed a plea 

agreement, and he pled guilty to one count of forgery and to one 

count of uttering. By order entered November 21, 1990, the trial 

judge sentenced Chilton "on the charge of forgery, to . . . a term 

of 10 years, with all suspended for 10 years upon the conditions 

that [Chilton] serve 12 months in . . . jail" and "[o]n the charge 
of uttering, . . . to . . . a term of 10 years, with all suspended 

for 10 years." The order included as "conditions of the suspended 

. . . sentences . . . that [Chilton] must keep the peace, be of 

good behavior and obey all laws for a period of 10 years (each 

charge)." In addition, the order "places [Chilton] on supervised 

probation upon release from confinement." Several years later, in 

a ruling that is not contested by this appeal, the trial judge 

amended the sentencing order to delete the requirement of 

"supervised probation upon release from confinement" and found 

that this requirement "was not a part of [Chilton's] plea 

agreement." 

 Following a hearing in April 1992, the trial judge found that 

Chilton violated the conditions of his suspended sentence. The 

judge entered an order on April 22, 1992 revoking "the previously 

suspended sentence . . . on the charge of forgery," ruling that 

"the previously suspended sentence on the charge of uttering 

remain as previously imposed," and sentencing Chilton, "on the 

charge of forgery, to confinement . . . for a term of 9 years." 

Following hearings in April 2000 and May 2000, the trial judge 

found that Chilton again violated the conditions of his suspended 

sentence. The judge entered orders on May 19, 2000 which revoked 

the previously suspended ten-year sentence on the charge of 

uttering and "re-suspend[ed] 5 years [of that sentence], giving 

[Chilton] 5 years to serve." This appeal followed from the entry 

of the May 19, 2000 orders.

- 2 -
 II. 

 Chilton contends that his arrest in 1992 revoked his 

suspended sentence on the uttering charge and that the trial judge 

did not re-suspend the uttering sentence when he revoked Chilton's 

forgery sentence. He argues that the judge's oral comments at the 

1992 hearing are dispositive of his actual ruling and prove that 

the judge did not re-suspend the uttering sentence. Therefore, 

Chilton contends the trial judge erred by imposing a sentence on 

the uttering charge on May 19, 2000. 

 Chilton relies on Code § 19.2-306 for his argument that his 

arrest automatically revoked the suspended sentence on the 

uttering conviction. In pertinent part, that statute states as 

follows: 

 The court may, for any cause deemed by it 

sufficient which occurred at any time within 

the probation period . . . revoke the 

suspension of sentence . . . and cause the 

defendant to be arrested . . . , whereupon, 

in case the imposition of sentence has been 

suspended, the court may pronounce whatever 

sentence might have been originally imposed. 

 The trial judge's Show Cause Order, which was the basis for 

Chilton's arrest in February 1992, merely provided that Chilton 

should "show cause why the suspended sentence previously imposed 

should not be revoked." Whether or not Chilton's arrest revoked 

the suspended sentence, the issue remains whether the trial 

judge re-imposed it as the statute allows. The record 

establishes that at the close of the 1992 hearing, the judge 

- 3 -
said: "The Court will revoke the balance of the 10 years that 

it sentenced you on the forgery offense and require that you 

pull the balance of that time in the penitentiary." Although 

this comment does not mention the uttering charge, it also does 

not indicate that the judge intended Chilton to be free of the 

burden of the other suspended sentence. 

 More importantly, the express language of the trial judge's 

1992 order directly contradicts Chilton's argument. The Supreme 

Court has consistently "stated that '[i]t is the firmly 

established law of this Commonwealth that a trial court speaks 

only through its written orders.'" Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 

Va. 85, 94, 501 S.E.2d 134, 140 (1998) (citation omitted). See

also Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 205, 208, 135 S.E.2d 770, 773 

(1964). Moreover, appellate courts "presume" that the trial 

judge's order "accurately reflects what transpired." Stamper v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979). In 

view of the opportunity that attorneys are afforded to have orders 

corrected, see id., and in the absence of an objection to an 

order, we will apply "[t]his presumption . . . where an order 

conflicts with a transcript of related proceedings." Marttila v. 

City of Lynchburg, 33 Va. App. 592, 598, 535 S.E.2d 693, 696 

(2000). 

 The record establishes that the April 22, 1992 order contains 

the judge's explicit ruling "that the previously suspended 

sentence on the charge of uttering remain as previously imposed." 

- 4 -
Thus, Chilton was subject to the conditions attendant to the 

suspension of the uttering sentence when the Commonwealth alleged 

he violated those conditions. We hold that the trial judge did 

not err in entering orders on May 19, 2000 revoking the suspended 

sentence on the uttering charge. 

 By reply brief, Chilton argues for the first time that the 

April 22, 1992 order was not served on him and that he had a right 

to notice and to be present "when an alteration or addition to his 

sentence is made." At the hearing from which this appeal arises, 

Chilton's trial attorney only argued "that when the plea bargain 

was entered in this case . . . the 20 years was all handled 

together . . . [and] that there is still no outstanding time on 

the uttering charge." Because Chilton raised no issue at trial 

concerning a right to be present or any other due process 

concerns, we will not consider those issues on appeal. See Rule 

5A:18. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment. 

 Affirmed. 

- 5 -