IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

JOHN’S GRILL, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES

GROUP, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

S278481

First Appellate District, Division Four

A162709

San Francisco City and County Superior Court

CGC-20-584184

August 8, 2024

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 

Evans concurred.
1

JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

S278481

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Plaintiffs John’s Grill, Inc., and John Konstin (together, 

John’s Grill) operate a restaurant in San Francisco. Like many 

businesses, John’s Grill suffered substantial financial losses 

during the COVID-19 pandemic. John’s Grill sought 

compensation for its losses from its property insurer, Sentinel 

Insurance Company, Ltd. (Sentinel). Sentinel denied coverage 

on various grounds, including that the loss or damage claimed 

by John’s Grill did not fall within the insurance policy’s “Limited 

Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage” endorsement. The Limited 

Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage endorsement generally

excludes coverage for any virus-related loss or damage that the 

policy would otherwise provide, but it extends coverage for virusrelated loss or damage if the virus was the result of certain 

specified causes of loss, including windstorms, water damage, 

vandalism, and explosion.

The validity of this specified cause of loss limitation is the 

focus of the parties’ dispute. John’s Grill acknowledges it cannot 

meet this limitation, but it contends the limitation is 

unenforceable because it renders the policy’s promise of virusrelated coverage illusory. The Court of Appeal below agreed 

with John’s Grill. It held that the promise of coverage was 

illusory because John’s Grill had no realistic prospect of 

benefitting from the virus-related coverage as written. (John’s 

Grill, Inc. v. The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (2022) 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

2

86 Cal.App.5th 1195, 1224 (John’s Grill).) It therefore

invalidated the specified cause of loss limitation and allowed 

John’s Grill’s claims for virus-related losses or damage to 

proceed. (Id. at p. 1212.)

We conclude the Court of Appeal erred by declining to 

enforce the specified cause of loss limitation under the 

circumstances here. The terms of the Limited Fungi, Bacteria 

or Virus Coverage endorsement are clear and unambiguous. It 

provides virus-related coverage, but only if the virus results 

from certain specified causes of loss. In accordance with longsettled principles of contract interpretation, the plain meaning 

of the policy governs. Because John’s Grill admits that it cannot 

satisfy the specified cause of loss limitation, it has no claim for 

coverage under the policy.

John’s Grill cannot escape this conclusion by citing the socalled illusory coverage doctrine. This court has never 

recognized an illusory coverage doctrine as such. The doctrine 

as articulated by John’s Grill does not appear in our precedents. 

But even assuming some version of the doctrine may exist under 

California law, we conclude that an insured must make a 

foundational showing that it had a reasonable expectation that 

the policy would cover the insured’s claimed loss or damage. 

Such a reasonable expectation of coverage is necessary under 

any assumed version of the doctrine. Here, however, John’s 

Grill has not shown it had a reasonable expectation of coverage 

under the policy for its pandemic-related losses. It has therefore 

failed to establish that the policy created the illusion of coverage

that rendered any contrary policy language unenforceable. 

Moreover, even setting aside this hurdle, and accepting John’s 

Grill’s articulation of the doctrine, it still cannot demonstrate
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

3

that the policy’s promised coverage was illusory. Even with the 

specified cause of loss limitation, the policy offered John’s Grill 

a realistic prospect for virus-related coverage. Because the 

Court of Appeal held otherwise, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the trial court, Sentinel successfully demurred to John’s 

Grill’s operative complaint for damages and other relief. 

“Accordingly, we assume that the complaint’s properly pleaded 

material allegations are true and give the complaint a 

reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all its 

parts in their context.” (Moore v. Regents of University of 

California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) “ ‘We treat the demurrer 

as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not 

contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] 

We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ ” 

(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank).)

According to its operative complaint, John’s Grill is “a 

historic, family-owned, landmark restaurant located in the 

heart of downtown San Francisco.” Its business was heavily 

impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and related state and local 

public health orders. For example, between March 2020 and 

September 2020, indoor dining — “the lifeblood of John’s Grill’s 

business” — was prohibited. After September 2020, indoor 

dining was limited to 25 percent of restaurant capacity. As a 

result of these restrictions, “John’s Grill suffered substantial 

financial losses and had to let 54 workers go.”

Moreover, even absent these restrictions, John’s Grill 

alleges it “would have had to close and suspend its operations 

due to the worsening pandemic-level presence of the 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

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Coronavirus in, on, and around the Insured Premises.” The 

COVID-19 virus is a deadly infectious disease that can be 

transmitted from person to person through small respiratory 

droplets, which spread when an infected person coughs or 

exhales. The droplets can also “land on objects and surfaces 

around the person” and may infect others who come into contact 

with the object or surface. John’s Grill further alleges, “When 

physical droplets containing COVID-19 land on or otherwise 

attach to surfaces, [the virus] renders those surfaces and the 

immediate surrounding area unusable because there is 

substantial risk of people getting sick, transmitting infection to 

others, and possibly dying as a result of touching those 

surfaces.” Given the presence of the COVID-19 virus in the 

community, “John’s Grill could not have reopened during this 

ongoing closure period due to the high statistical likelihood, if 

not certainty, that the Insured Premises would have been 

regularly re-damaged by the recurrent reintroduction of 

infectious Coronavirus into the Insured Premises from COVID19 infected individuals and personal property.”

John’s Grill had purchased a first-party commercial 

property insurance policy from Sentinel. Under the policy, 

Sentinel generally agreed to pay for “direct physical loss of or 

physical damage to” covered property. The covered property 

included both the physical premises of John’s Grill and personal 

property associated with its restaurant business. In the event 

the direct physical loss or damage to property caused a

suspension of business operations, Sentinel agreed to pay for 

“the actual loss of Business Income” suffered by John’s Grill 

“during the ‘period of restoration,’ ” as well as any “reasonable 

and necessary Extra Expense” incurred “during the ‘period of 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

5

restoration’ that [John’s Grill] would not have incurred if there 

had been no direct physical loss or physical damage to property.” 

“Extra Expense” includes expenses incurred to “avoid or 

minimize the suspension of business and to continue 

‘operations’ ” and to “repair or replace any property.” The 

“period of restoration” begins on the date of direct physical loss 

or damage and ends when the property “should be repaired, 

rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality” 

or when the “business is resumed at a new, permanent location.”

As noted, the policy included a Limited Fungi, Bacteria or 

Virus Coverage endorsement. The endorsement added a broad

exclusion for loss or damage caused by viruses and other 

microorganisms: “We will not pay for loss or damage caused 

directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or 

damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that 

contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss: [¶] 

(1) Presence, growth, proliferation, spread or any activity of 

‘fungi,’ wet rot, dry rot, bacteria or virus.”1 However, the 

exclusion did not apply if the “ ‘fungi,’ wet or dry rot, bacteria or 

virus results from fire or lightning” or to the extent the 

endorsement provided specific additional coverage.

The specific additional coverage provided by the 

endorsement applied only “when the ‘fungi,’ wet or dry rot, 

bacteria or virus is the result of one or more of the following 

causes that occurs during the policy period . . . . [¶] (1) A 

‘specified cause of loss’ other than fire or lightning; [¶] 

1 The policy defined “fungi” as “any type or form of fungus, 

including mold or mildew, and any mycotoxins, spores, scents or 

by-products produced or released by fungi.”
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(2) Equipment Breakdown Accident occurs to Equipment 

Breakdown Property, if Equipment Breakdown applies to the 

affected premises.” Elsewhere in the policy, “specified cause of 

loss” was defined as “[f]ire; lightning; explosion, windstorm or 

hail; smoke; aircraft or vehicles; riot or civil commotion; 

vandalism; leakage from fire extinguishing equipment; sinkhole 

collapse; volcanic action; falling objects; weight of snow, ice or 

sleet; [and] water damage.”

Under this specific additional coverage, Sentinel agreed to 

pay “for loss or damage by ‘fungi,’ wet rot, dry rot, bacteria and 

virus.” In this context, “loss or damage” was defined as follows: 

“(1) Direct physical loss or direct physical damage to Covered 

Property caused by ‘fungi,’ wet rot, dry rot, bacteria or virus, 

including the cost of removal of the ‘fungi,’ wet rot, dry rot, 

bacteria or virus; [¶] (2) The cost to tear out and replace any 

part of the building or other property as needed to gain access 

to the ‘fungi,’ wet rot, dry rot, bacteria or virus; and [¶] (3) The 

cost of testing performed after removal, repair, replacement or 

restoration of the damaged property is completed, provided 

there is a reason to believe that ‘fungi,’ wet rot, dry rot, bacteria 

or virus are present.” The policy limit for this additional 

coverage was $50,000 with 30 days of business interruption.

John’s Grill sought coverage under the policy for its 

pandemic-related losses, i.e., “lost Business Income due to the 

Closure Orders and the damage caused by the presence of 

Coronavirus in and around the Insured Premises.” Sentinel 

denied the claim by letter. The letter stated, “We have 

completed a review of your loss and have determined that since 

the coronavirus did not cause property damage at your place of 

business or in the immediate area, this business income loss is 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

7

not covered. Even if the virus did cause damage, it is excluded 

from the policy, and the limited coverage available for losses 

caused by virus does not apply to the facts of your loss.” Among 

other grounds for denial, the letter cited the policy’s 

requirement of direct physical loss or damage to property. It 

explained, “This property policy protects your business personal 

property and/or building against risks of direct physical loss or 

damage at your Scheduled Premises. You have not identified 

any direct physical loss to any property at a scheduled 

premises.” Similarly, the letter maintained, “The Business 

Income coverage is not provided for your claim because there 

has been no physical loss or damage caused by or resulting from 

a Covered Cause of Loss to property at a scheduled premises.” 

Regarding the Limited Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage 

endorsement, the letter stated, “As we understand your loss, the 

virus did not result from a specified cause of loss; therefore, 

there is no coverage for your claim based on the limited coverage 

for virus.”

A short time later, John’s Grill filed this lawsuit.2 Its 

operative complaint included causes of action for breach of 

contract, bad faith denial of an insurance claim, and unfair 

business practices, among others. In addition to the historical 

facts described above, the complaint alleged several theories 

2

In the underlying lawsuit, John’s Grill sued both Sentinel 

and The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (Hartford). 

Hartford successfully moved to quash service based on lack of 

personal jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeal affirmed as to 

Hartford. (John’s Grill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1201.) 

John’s Grill has not challenged that portion of the Court of 

Appeal’s opinion, so we need not consider it.
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

8

under which John’s Grill would be entitled to insurance 

coverage for its pandemic-related losses. As relevant here, 

John’s Grill maintained that the specified cause of loss 

limitation in the Limited Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage 

endorsement rendered any promise of coverage illusory, thus 

requiring Sentinel to cover pandemic-related losses regardless 

of cause. John’s Grill argued that the specified cause of loss 

limitation was “absurd” because the specified causes “are not the 

kinds of things that cause a virus.” The specified cause of loss 

limitation was therefore “impossible to satisfy,” its inclusion in 

the policy “outrageous,” and its application contrary to John’s 

Grill’s “reasonable expectations” regarding the Limited Fungi, 

Bacteria or Virus Coverage endorsement.

In its cause of action for unfair business practices, John’s 

Grill further addressed the Limited Fungi, Bacteria or Virus 

Coverage endorsement. It alleged that the specified cause of 

loss limitation could not be satisfied because the specified losses 

were “incapable of either (1) acting as the causative agent of 

genetic substitution, insertion, deletion, recombination, 

reassortment, or other means of genetic mutation that cause 

viruses, or (2) otherwise creating conditions that can fairly be 

said to be a proximate cause of a virus.” Moreover, John’s Grill 

alleged that “no reasonable insured would expect that any virus 

that causes them loss would be capable of satisfying the absurd 

coverage requirement, nor would a reasonable insured expect an 

insurance policy to contain such a coverage requirement.”

Sentinel demurred to the complaint on the ground that 

John’s Grill had not alleged facts sufficient to state any cause of 

action. Among other things, Sentinel argued that virus coverage 

under the Limited Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage 
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THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

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endorsement was not illusory. As an example, Sentinel cited an 

opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court discussing transmission 

of pseudorabies virus by windstorm. (See Curtis O. Griess & 

Sons, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. (Neb. 1995) 528 N.W.2d 329, 

331 (Griess).) Sentinel also maintained that coverage was not 

illusory because “there are circumstances where virus, bacteria, 

mold or rot coverage could be provided.”

The trial court sustained Sentinel’s demurrer. It reasoned 

that Sentinel’s policy would be illusory if “there were no 

possibility of coverage,” but John’s Grill had not made such a 

showing. The court stated, “It is not a stretch of the imagination 

to conclude that some of the listed specified causes of loss (e.g., 

water damage or windstorm) could cause fungi damage. In 

addition, it is possible that a windstorm could cause a virus 

[citing Griess].” The court found that the language of the policy 

was “clear and unambiguous” and therefore enforceable against 

John’s Grill.

On appeal, John’s Grill again contended the coverage 

offered by the Limited Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage 

endorsement was illusory. The Court of Appeal agreed. (John’s 

Grill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1220.) It first appeared to hold

that the language of the endorsement was ambiguous: 

“Literally read, [the specified cause of loss limitation] is 

indecipherable when applied to viruses. The critical limiting 

phrase is that, for the Limited Virus Coverage to apply, the virus 

must be the ‘result of’ one of a number of enumerated causes. 

But none of the listed causes has anything to do with the 

biological processes that actually cause a virus. . . . Only if the 

words are taken to refer to circumstances in which a specified 

cause is a vector for transmission of a virus does the language 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

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begin to make any sense in the context of this particular peril

[water damage]. But that is not what the words say, and more 

importantly, it is not the only interpretation to which the phrase 

‘result of’ is reasonably susceptible. Pathogenic causation — in 

the sense that, say, cancer may be said to be the ‘result of’ a toxic 

carcinogen — is another perfectly reasonable interpretation 

that could be adopted, and it tends to favor John’s Grill’s 

contention that the Specified Causes Clause is impossible to 

meet.” (Id. at p. 1221, fn. omitted.)

Next, the Court of Appeal held that, even under Sentinel’s 

interpretation of the Limited Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage 

endorsement as including transmission, the endorsement did 

not offer a realistic prospect for virus-related coverage. The 

court accepted that the endorsement might provide coverage for 

loss or damage to “ ‘living property’ ” (i.e., animals and possibly 

plants) that were infected by a virus transmitted through a 

specified cause of loss identified in the policy, as in the Griess

example. (John’s Grill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1223; see id. 

at pp. 1223–1224.) But because John’s Grill apparently did not 

own any living property, the Court of Appeal believed the 

endorsement was nonetheless illusory in the context of this case. 

The court stated, “[I]n the end, all Griess shows is that it is 

possible to conjure up many scenarios that might notionally pose 

a risk of damage to some form of ‘living property’ for some 

businesses. But on this record, none of these abstract risks bear 

on the insurance policy Sentinel underwrote for this insured.” 

(Id. at p. 1224.) It concluded, “Because Sentinel has not 

proffered enough to demonstrate a realistic prospect of John’s 

Grill ever benefitting from the Limited Virus Coverage based on 

events the parties might reasonably have anticipated during the 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

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Policy period, we agree that Sentinel has, ‘through sweeping 

language,’ rendered the Policy’s virus coverage terms ‘virtually 

illusory.’ ” (Ibid.) The court therefore reversed the judgment as 

to Sentinel and remanded for further proceedings. (Id. at 

p. 1228.) We granted Sentinel’s petition for review.3

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review and Policy Interpretation

“On review of the judgment of the Court of Appeal 

reversing the superior court’s order[] sustaining defendant[’s] 

demurrer[], we examine the complaint de novo to determine 

whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under 

any legal theory . . . .” (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 

25 Cal.4th 412, 415.) “[I]t is well settled that a general 

demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in 

the complaint [citation]; that the question of plaintiff’s ability to 

prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such 

proof does not concern the reviewing court [citations]; and that 

plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled 

to some relief [citation].” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. 

(1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496.)

3 The Court of Appeal noted that, during the pendency of 

the appeal, the parties had reached a settlement and stipulated 

to dismissal. (John’s Grill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1205; 

see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.244.) The Court of Appeal 

declined to dismiss the appeal because it raised “issues ‘of 

continuing public interest which are likely to recur.’ ” (John’s 

Grill, at p. 1205, quoting Bay Guardian Co. v. New Times 

Media LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 438, 445, fn. 2.) We granted 

review notwithstanding this settlement, and we likewise

consider the issues in this matter on their merits, even though 

they are technically moot.
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

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“Insurance policies are contracts and, therefore, are 

governed in the first instance by the rules of construction 

applicable to contracts.” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral 

Ins. Co. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 645, 666.) “ ‘Thus, “the mutual 

intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed 

governs interpretation.” [Citation.] If possible, we infer this 

intent solely from the written provisions of the insurance policy. 

[Citation.] If the policy language “is clear and explicit, it 

governs.” ’ ” (Yahoo Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (2022) 

14 Cal.5th 58, 67 (Yahoo).) “When interpreting a policy 

provision, we must give its terms their ‘ “ordinary and popular 

sense,” unless “used by the parties in a technical sense or a 

special meaning is given to them by usage.” ’ [Citation.] We 

must also interpret these terms ‘in context’ [citation], and give 

effect ‘to every part’ of the policy with ‘each clause helping to 

interpret the other.’ ” (Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1999) 

21 Cal.4th 1109, 1115 (Palmer).)

“A policy provision is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to 

two or more reasonable constructions despite the plain meaning 

of its terms within the context of the policy as a whole.” (Palmer, 

supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1115.) “ ‘The mere fact that a word or 

phrase in a policy may have multiple meanings does not create 

an ambiguity.’ [Citation.] Rather, the meaning of the word or 

phrase must be considered in light of its context.” (Yahoo, supra, 

14 Cal.5th at p. 69.) “ ‘If the terms are ambiguous . . . , we 

interpret them to protect “ ‘the objectively reasonable 

expectations of the insured.’ ” [Citations.] Only if these rules do 

not resolve a claimed ambiguity do we resort to the rule that 

ambiguities are to be resolved against the insurer.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 67.)
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

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B. “Specified Cause of Loss” Limitation

It appears undisputed that, read literally, the Limited 

Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage endorsement provides 

coverage only when “the ‘fungi,’ wet or dry rot, bacteria or virus” 

results from certain causes, including “[a] ‘specified cause of loss’ 

other than fire or lightning.” As noted, “specified cause of loss” 

is defined in the policy as “[f]ire; lightning; explosion, windstorm 

or hail; smoke; aircraft or vehicles; riot or civil commotion; 

vandalism; leakage from fire extinguishing equipment; sinkhole 

collapse; volcanic action; falling objects; weight of snow, ice or 

sleet; water damage.” These specified causes mirror, with two 

omissions, the traditional named perils identified in insurance 

industry forms for commercial property insurance coverage. 

(See 5 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition (2023) 

§ 41.02[1][a].)

To the extent this language is “ ‘ “clear and explicit, it 

governs.” ’ ” (Yahoo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 67.) The Court of 

Appeal held that this language was not clear, but rather it was 

“indecipherable when applied to viruses.” (John’s Grill, supra, 

86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1221.) John’s Grill similarly argues that a 

literal reading “makes no sense.” Both conclusions rely on the 

premise that viruses cannot replicate outside of a host organism,

and thus they cannot “result[] from” an inanimate force or 

phenomenon. But replication is not the only way that a force or 

phenomenon may bring about a virus. A force or phenomenon 

may also transmit a virus. Indeed, the Court of Appeal 

acknowledged as much. (Id. at pp. 1221–1222.)

Thus, in ordinary usage, a person might say that a viral 

infection resulted from contaminated drinking water or contact 

with a contaminated object. The contaminated water or object 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

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did not cause the virus to replicate, but it nonetheless brought 

the virus to a new environment where it could do so. From that 

perspective, the virus “result[ed] from” the contaminated water 

or object because the contaminated water or object transmitted 

it to the new environment. Given this ordinary usage, it is 

reasonable to construe the policy language as including 

transmission. Under this construction, the policy language is

not indecipherable or otherwise unclear when applied to viruses.

The Court of Appeal appeared to believe that this possible 

construction rendered the specified cause of loss limitation at 

best ambiguous. (John’s Grill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1221–1222.) But the alternative interpretation proposed by 

the Court of Appeal rendered the policy language 

“indecipherable” in its view. (Id. at p. 1221.) This situation does 

not lead to an ambiguity. Policy language is ambiguous “only if 

it is susceptible to two or more reasonable constructions despite 

the plain meaning of its terms within the context of the policy 

as a whole.” (Palmer, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1115, italics 

omitted.) “ ‘The mere fact that a word or phrase in a policy may 

have multiple meanings does not create an ambiguity.’ 

[Citation.] Rather, the meaning of the word or phrase must be 

considered in light of its context.” (Yahoo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 69.) An interpretation that is nonsensical, or which renders 

the policy language indecipherable, is not a reasonable

construction and cannot create an ambiguity. Contrary to the 

Court of Appeal’s position, courts are required to interpret policy 

language in a reasonable manner so that it “makes sense as 

applied.” (John’s Grill, at p. 1222.)

John’s Grill next argues that the plain language of the 

policy should not be enforced under the so-called illusory 
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coverage doctrine. It contends that the specified cause of loss 

limitation makes it impossible, or virtually impossible, for it to 

recover for virus-related loss or damage. Thus, in its view, the 

limitation should be disregarded, and any virus-related loss or 

damage should be covered under the policy regardless of cause. 

For reasons we explain, we disagree that the specified cause of 

loss limitation is unenforceable under the circumstances here.

This court has never recognized an illusory coverage 

doctrine as such. The Court of Appeal below cited the wellestablished principle that “ ‘ “[w]ords of promise which by their 

terms make performance entirely optional with the 

‘promisor’ . . . do not constitute a promise.” ’ ” (John’s Grill, 

supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1220–1221; see Rest.2d Contracts, 

§ 2, com. e.) But the performance sought by John’s Grill is not 

optional; it is expressly excluded by the terms of the policy. 

Moreover, although the type of optional promise cited by the 

Court of Appeal is sometimes described as an “illusory” promise 

(Steiner v. Thexton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 411, 423), that idea is 

distinct from a claim that a binding promise of insurance 

coverage is illusory. The principle of contract formation cited by 

the Court of Appeal does not imply the existence of an illusory 

coverage doctrine in general or in any particular form. The 

consequences of an optional or discretionary promise are wellestablished and do not generally involve invalidating express 

terms or limitations on performance. (See Perdue v. Crocker 

National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 923 [if a contract is formed, 

discretion may be limited by the implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing]; see also Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. 

Marathon Development California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 

374 [“as a general matter, implied terms should never be read 
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to vary express terms”].) Amicus curiae United Policyholders 

claims that “[n]early 70 years ago, this Court held that a 

contract provision that effectively renders the express promises 

made in the contract illusory is unenforceable.” But the 

authority cited by United Policyholders did not consider a 

contract provision that rendered an express promise illusory. To 

the contrary, we considered whether a sales contract that failed 

to fix the purchase price was unenforceable because it was “so 

uncertain and indefinite that the intention of the parties in 

material particulars cannot be ascertained.” (California Lettuce 

Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 474, 481.) 

Our consideration of that situation provides little guidance 

regarding the enforceability of the clear terms of the specified 

cause of loss limitation under the circumstances here.4

More relevant is our express endorsement of the 

proposition that “ ‘[a]n insurance company can limit the 

coverage of a policy issued by it as long as such limitation 

conforms to the law and is not contrary to public policy.’ 

[Citation.] ‘An insurance policy may exclude coverage for 

particular injuries or damages in certain specified 

circumstances while providing coverage in other circumstances.’ 

[Citation.] It follows that an insurer is not absolutely prohibited 

from drafting and enforcing policy provisions that provide or 

leave intact coverage for some, but not all, manifestations of a 

particular peril. This is, in fact, an everyday practice . . . .” 

4 John’s Grill does not contend the policy itself is 

unenforceable based on lack of consideration. Nor does John’s 

Grill assert any traditional contract defenses such as fraud, 

mistake, illegality, or unconscionability.
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

17

(Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 747, 

759 (Julian).) 

“For example, a policy might exclude losses caused by 

freezing to plumbing, but provide coverage for other types of 

freezing, or vice versa. The fact that the exclusion does not 

apply to all types of freezing does not, by itself, render it invalid. 

Likewise, an insurance policy can provide coverage for weather 

conditions generally, but exclude coverage for specific weather 

conditions such as hail, wind, or rain. The fact that hail, wind, 

and rain are types of weather conditions does not bind the 

insurer to insure against all weather conditions, or none at all. 

A reasonable insured would readily understand from the policy 

language which perils are covered and which are not.” (Julian, 

supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 759.)

We have recognized only limited situations where the 

plain language of an insurance policy will not be enforced. For 

example, “to be enforceable, any provision that takes away or 

limits coverage reasonably expected by an insured must be 

‘conspicuous, plain and clear.’ ” (Haynes v. Farmers Ins. 

Exchange (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1198, 1204 (Haynes).) John’s Grill 

does not contend the specified cause of loss limitation runs afoul 

of this principle. Indeed, the coverage provisions of the Limited 

Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage endorsement begin with a 

clear statement of the specified cause of loss limitation: “The 

coverage described in 1.b. below only applies when the ‘fungi,’ 

wet or dry rot, bacteria or virus is the result of one or more of 

the following causes . . . . [¶] (1) A ‘specified cause of loss’ other 

than fire or lightning.” John’s Grill complains about the length 

of the policy and the fact that the phrase “specified cause of loss” 

is not defined in the Limited Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

18

endorsement itself, but it does not contend these circumstances 

alone render the specified cause of loss limitation unenforceable.

As another example, we have held that “[p]olicy exclusions 

are unenforceable to the extent that they conflict with 

[Insurance Code] section 530[5] and the efficient proximate cause 

doctrine.” (Julian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 754.) This doctrine 

ensures that insurance coverage is available where a covered 

cause of loss “is the predominant, or most important cause of a 

loss.” (Ibid.) “By focusing the causal inquiry on the most 

important cause of a loss, the efficient proximate cause doctrine 

creates a ‘workable rule of coverage that provides a fair result 

within the reasonable expectations of both the insured and the 

insurer.’ ” (Ibid.) In this context, we have “rejected insurers’ 

attempts to contract around the proximate cause doctrine 

through sweeping language that would have rendered the 

policies’ coverage terms virtually illusory.” (Id. at p. 756.) But 

we have enforced limitations on coverage that do not violate the 

efficient proximate cause doctrine where “a reasonable insured 

would readily grasp the difference” between covered and 

excluded losses, thus “undermining the threat of illusory 

insurance.” (Id. at p. 760.) John’s Grill does not contend that 

the efficient proximate cause doctrine or Insurance Code 

section 530 has any relevance here.

5 The cited statute provides, “An insurer is liable for a loss 

of which a peril insured against was the proximate cause, 

although a peril not contemplated by the contract may have 

been a remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of 

which the peril insured against was only a remote cause.” (Ins. 

Code, § 530.)
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

19

This court confronted the prospect of illusory coverage 

more directly in Safeco Ins. Co. v. Robert S. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

758 (Safeco). Safeco involved a homeowners insurance policy in 

which the insurance company “agreed to defend and indemnify 

the insureds in the event of claims brought against any insured 

for bodily injury caused by ‘an occurrence,’ which the policy 

defined as an accident resulting in bodily injury during the 

policy period.” (Id. at p. 762.) The policy contained an exclusion 

for “bodily injury ‘arising out of any illegal act committed by or 

at the direction of an insured.’ ” (Ibid.)

In Safeco, the homeowners were sued after their teenaged 

son accidentally shot and killed a friend while playing with a 

gun he believed to be unloaded. (Safeco, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 

p. 761.) A juvenile court found that the son had committed 

involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)) and 

placed him on probation. (Safeco, at p. 761.) After the 

homeowners tendered defense of the lawsuit to their insurance 

company, the company sought declaratory relief that coverage 

was unavailable under an “ ‘illegal act’ ” exclusion in the policy. 

(Ibid.)

We held, as an initial matter, that the phrase “ ‘illegal

act’ ” was ambiguous because it was “susceptible of two 

reasonable meanings.” (Safeco, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 763.) It 

could be construed broadly to mean “any act prohibited by law. 

But the term can also be interpreted more narrowly as meaning 

a violation of criminal law.” (Ibid.) We determined that it would 

be inappropriate to read the phrase narrowly, and if it were read 

broadly it would be “so broad as to render the policy’s liability 

coverage practically meaningless.” (Id. at p. 764.) “[A] violation 

of ‘any law’ would include the law governing negligence, which 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

20

holds individuals responsible for the failure to exercise ordinary 

care resulting in injury to another.” (Ibid., citing Civ. Code, 

§ 1714.) But the insurance policy promised coverage for 

negligence (through its use of the term “accident”), and “[t]hat 

promise would be rendered illusory if . . . we were to construe 

the phrase ‘illegal act,’ as contained in the policy’s exclusionary 

clause, to mean violation of any law, whether criminal or civil.” 

(Safeco, at p. 765.) In the end, we concluded that “the illegal act 

exclusion cannot reasonably be given meaning under 

established rules of construction of a contract” and “must be 

rejected as invalid.” (Id. at p. 766.) For the last proposition, we 

relied on Civil Code section 1653, which provides, “Words in a 

contract which are wholly inconsistent with its nature, or with 

the main intention of the parties, are to be rejected.”

Our discussion of illusory coverage in Safeco was therefore 

expressly predicated on the insoluble ambiguity of the phrase 

“illegal act” in light of the overall policy, including its promised 

coverage for “accident[s].” (Safeco, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 765.) 

We had no occasion to consider whether unambiguous policy 

language might be invalidated under a theory of illusory 

coverage. Safeco does not support John’s Grill’s contention that 

the specified cause of loss limitation is unenforceable.

John’s Grill relies on Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative 

Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 

(Shade Foods) to support its contention that the specified cause 

of loss limitation should be disregarded. But that case, like 

Safeco, involved a potentially ambiguous policy term whose 

interpretation was aided, in part, by the prospect of illusory 

coverage. The insured in Shade Foods was a processor and 

supplier of almonds for use in breakfast cereal. (Id. at p. 861.) 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

21

It was covered by an insurance policy “that provided general 

liability coverage with a $1 million limit per occurrence and 

property coverage for ‘stock’ with a $3 million limit.” (Id. at 

pp. 861–862; see id. at p. 872 [policy declarations “listed ‘stock’ 

as having ‘special’ coverage within a limit of $3 million of 

insurance”].)

After a customer found that a batch of almonds was 

contaminated with wood splinters, a dispute arose over whether 

this loss was included in the insured’s “ ‘stock’ ” coverage. 

(Shade Foods, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.) The appellate 

court determined that the policy could reasonably be construed

to cover the loss. (Id. at pp. 873–874.) It explained, “consistent 

with the narrow interpretation of exclusionary clauses, the 

qualifying language may reasonably be construed as applying to 

the present case, thereby causing the exclusion to be 

inapplicable.” (Id. at p. 874.) Among the reasons to adopt such 

a construction, the court observed, “The insurance coverage for 

‘stock’ would be meaningless if it did not apply to the almonds, 

owned by others, that were processed at [the insured’s] plant.” 

(Ibid.) Moreover, “the coverage for physical damage on [these]

premises would be illusory if it were forfeited by transporting 

the products to another location.” (Ibid.) Thus, while Shade 

Foods supports the proposition that courts should avoid reading 

ambiguous policy language in a manner that would render 

coverage illusory, it does not support the contention by John’s 

Grill that the specified cause of loss limitation should be 

disregarded.

John’s Grill relies on a respected practice guide for the 

proposition that “[e]ven plain language may not be enforced if 

doing so would render the promised coverage illusory.” (Croskey 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

22

et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter 

Group 2023) ¶ 4:29.) But the guide goes on to explain, “Instead, 

the language will be construed in a manner that the insured 

reasonably would expect.” (Ibid.) To the extent our precedents 

have discussed the concept of illusory coverage, we have 

likewise emphasized an insured’s reasonable expectations. 

(See Julian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 761 [the efficient proximate 

cause doctrine “brings about ‘a fair result within the reasonable 

expectations of both the insured and the insurer’ ”]; Safeco, 

supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 766 [proper inquiry focuses on the 

expectations of “reasonable insureds”]; see also Haynes, supra, 

32 Cal.4th at p. 1204 [“coverage reasonably expected by an 

insured”]; Shade Foods, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 874 [chosen 

construction “unquestionably squares with the objectively 

reasonable expectations of the insured”].) The Court of Appeal 

below agreed that “the test for illusory coverage must focus on 

objective reality and the insured’s reasonable expectations of 

coverage.” (John’s Grill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1224.) 

Thus, even if we were to consider this line of thinking,

John’s Grill would have to show it had a reasonable expectation 

of coverage for its pandemic-related losses. It has not. A

reasonable insured would understand that virus coverage under 

the Limited Fungi, Bacteria or Virus Coverage endorsement 

was limited and would be available only if the virus resulted 

from certain causes. (See Julian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 760 

[reasonable insured would “readily grasp the difference” 

between separate chains of causation].) Based on the policy 

language, John’s Grill could not have an objectively reasonable 

expectation when it obtained the policy that it would provide 

coverage for all virus-related loss or damage, regardless of 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

23

cause. (See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 

48 Cal.3d 395, 408 [an insured cannot reasonably expect 

coverage where the cause of the loss is “expressly excluded under 

the policy”].) John’s Grill argues that it had a reasonable 

expectation there would be “a reasonable number of factual 

scenarios in which it would have limited coverage for loss caused 

by virus.” But the clear and unambiguous policy language 

defined the factual scenarios in which John’s Grill would have 

coverage. To the extent John’s Grill contends it reasonably 

expected additional coverage based on other circumstances, 

such an expectation is contradicted by the policy language, and 

it is wholly unsupported and undefined. John’s Grill has not 

shown it had a reasonable expectation in virus-related coverage 

beyond the policy’s terms.6

The absence of any reasonable expectation of coverage 

would appear sufficient to foreclose John’s Grill’s claim for 

coverage here. But even setting aside that hurdle, and accepting 

John’s Grill’s articulation of the illusory coverage doctrine, it 

cannot prevail. John’s Grill contends the specified cause of loss 

6 John’s Grill also argues its reasonable expectations might 

be relevant where the terms of the policy “are ambiguous or 

conflicting, or if the policy contains a hidden trap or pitfall, or if 

the fine print purports to take away what is written in large 

print.” (Hallowell v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. (Del. 

1982) 443 A.2d 925, 928.) We have already explained why the 

policy terms here are neither ambiguous nor conflicting. Nor 

has John’s Grill shown the policy contains a hidden trap or 

pitfall, or that the specified cause of loss exclusion was 

unreasonably buried in fine print. We therefore have no 

occasion to consider how or whether the circumstances 

identified in Hallowell might affect our interpretation of an 

insurance policy.
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

24

limitation renders the policy’s virus-related coverage illusory, 

and it is therefore unenforceable, unless there is some 

reasonably expected set of circumstances in which virus-related 

coverage is available.7 In this context, it is important to note 

that John’s Grill bears the burden of alleging facts sufficient to 

support the application of the doctrine. The policy itself does not 

support John’s Grill’s claim for coverage. Only through the 

application of the illusory coverage doctrine does John’s Grill 

arguably have coverage. The application of the doctrine is 

essential to its claims, and therefore John’s Grill must support 

its application here with sufficient factual allegations in its 

complaint. (See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 

437, fn. 4 [“The absence of any allegation essential to a cause of 

action renders it vulnerable to a general demurrer”].)

John’s Grill relies principally on its assertion that the 

specified cause of loss limitation is illogical or indecipherable 

when applied to viruses. We have already explained why this 

assertion is unpersuasive. John’s Grill also offers the purely 

conclusory assertion that the forces and phenomena identified 

in the specified cause of loss limitation are “incapable” of 

“creating conditions that can fairly be said to be a proximate 

cause of a virus.” But John’s Grill never addresses, for example, 

why a virus at its premises could not result from phenomena 

7 John’s Grill emphasizes the idea of fairness in this context, 

but there is already an established body of law addressing the 

circumstances in which a contract (or contractual provision) 

might be rendered unenforceable based on unfair or overly 

harsh terms: the doctrine of unconscionability. (See, e.g., OTO, 

L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125.) John’s Grill has not 

attempted to show this doctrine applies here.
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

25

such as a windstorm or water damage that carried it there, or 

even an explosion, vandalism, or riot or civil commotion that 

releases it. Case law demonstrates that such scenarios are not 

implausible. (See, e.g., Griess, supra, 528 N.W.2d at p. 331 

[“Appellee plaintiff’s swine were infected with pseudorabies 

after a tornado carried the virus to its swine-raising 

operation”].) Indeed, our criminal law contemplates that 

biological agents such as viruses can be dispersed by “explosive, 

thermal, pneumatic, or mechanical means.” (Pen. Code, 

§ 11417, subd. (a)(6).) John’s Grill itself alleges that “[d]roplets 

containing Coronavirus can . . . travel and remain infectious 

while suspended in the air” and the virus “can remain infectious 

on a variety of surfaces and objects from a few hours to several 

days.” The potential for virus transmission or dispersal by 

inanimate force or phenomenon is apparent from these 

allegations.

The Court of Appeal below did not believe the Griess

example was relevant because “John’s Grill is not a farm, and 

even assuming pets may be found on its premises from time to 

time, coverage is afforded for animals under the Policy only if 

‘[t]hey are owned by others and boarded by you, or owned by you 

and held for sale or sold but not delivered.’ If John’s Grill were 

operating a dog kennel or a pet store, perhaps the Griess case 

might have some relevance, but not on the actual business 

circumstances we are dealing with here.” (John’s Grill, supra, 

86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1223–1224.) But restaurants may hold 

living animals for sale, such as lobster or fish. In addition, a 

restaurant certainly handles both raw and cooked food. Sentinel 

agrees if food were contaminated by a virus, it “could be covered 

as lost stock or business property when they need to be 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

26

destroyed.” John’s Grill has not shown that the prospect of such 

contamination by water damage or other specified cause of loss 

is so unrealistic as to render the promised coverage illusory. 

John’s Grill could assess for itself whether it, specifically, was 

likely to benefit from the coverage based on the policy’s terms. 

The fact that John’s Grill’s particular business arrangements 

would make it unlikely to benefit from the policy’s limited virus 

coverage would be something for John’s Grill to consider when 

obtaining coverage. But even John’s Grill’s own conception of 

the illusory coverage doctrine is insufficient to justify 

disregarding the plain language of the policy. The Court of 

Appeal erred by holding otherwise.8

In sum, under the circumstances here, John’s Grill cannot 

invoke the illusory coverage doctrine to transform the policy’s 

limited virus-related coverage into unlimited virus-related 

coverage. The policy’s limitations on coverage were explicit and 

unambiguous. Absent some extraordinary circumstance, courts 

must enforce such explicit and unambiguous policy limitations. 

John’s Grill has not shown any such extraordinary 

circumstances exist here.9

8

In Brooklyn Restaurants, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd.

(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1052–1054, review granted 

June 12, 2024, S284887, another Court of Appeal followed 

John’s Grill and held that this specified cause of loss limitation 

was illusory and unenforceable. We disapprove Brooklyn 

Restaurants, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd., supra, 

100 Cal.App.5th 1036, review granted, to the extent it is 

inconsistent with this opinion.

9 Sentinel additionally argues that the Court of Appeal 

erred by holding that John’s Grill had adequately alleged “loss 
JOHN’S GRILL, INC. v.

THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

27

III. DISPOSITION

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 

remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

or damage” under the Limited Fungi, Bacteria or Virus 

Coverage endorsement and the overall policy. (See John’s Grill, 

supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1214–1217.) In light of our 

conclusion that John’s Grill cannot avoid the specified cause of 

loss limitation, we need not consider this argument. (See Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(3).) We therefore express no 

opinion regarding whether the Court of Appeal’s holding on this 

issue (or the same holding in Brooklyn Restaurants) is 

consistent with our recent opinion in Another Planet 

Entertainment, LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1106, 

1117, which considered the meaning of “direct physical loss or 

damage” to property in similar but not identical circumstances.

For its part, John’s Grill additionally argues that, 

regardless of whether the specified cause of loss limitation can 

be enforced, it does not apply to the policy’s time element 

coverage. (Cf. Cosmetic Laser, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Insurance

(D.Conn. 2021) 554 F.Supp.3d 389, 402–403.) The Court of 

Appeal did not need to consider this argument, and it was not 

encompassed within our grant of review. We therefore decline 

to consider it in the first instance. 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion John’s Grill, Inc. v. The Hartford Financial 

Services Group, Inc.

__________________________________________________________ 

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 86 Cal.App.5th 1195

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________ 

Opinion No. S278481

Date Filed: August 8, 2024

__________________________________________________________ 

Court: Superior

County: San Francisco 

Judge: Ethan P. Schulman

__________________________________________________________ 

Counsel:

Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, Nanci E. Nishimura, Brian Danitz, 

Andrew F. Kirtley and Julia Q. Peng for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

Reed Smith, John N. Ellison, Richard P. Lewis, Jr., Katherine J. 

Ellena and Kathryn M. Bayes for French Laundry Partners, LP, KRM, 

Inc., and Yountville Food Emporium, LLC, as Amici Curiae on behalf 

of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Covington & Burling, Richard Z. Lee, Barbara Tsao, Rani Gupta and 

David B. Goodwin for United Policyholders as Amicus Curiae on behalf 

of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Anna-Rose Mathieson, Melanie 

Gold; Steptoe & Johnson, Anthony J. Anscombe, Sarah D. Gordon; 

Wiggin and Dana, Jonathan Freiman, Tadhg Dooley, David R. Roth 

and Evan Bianchi for Defendants and Respondents.
Crowell & Moring and Mark D. Plevin for American Property Casualty 

Insurance Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 

Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion): 

Andrew F. Kirtley

Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP

840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200

Burlingame, CA 94010

(650) 697-6000

Rani Gupta

3000 El Camino Real

5 Palo Alto Square, 10th Floor

Palo Alto, CA 94306

(650) 632-4727

Anna-Rose Mathieson

Complex Appellate Litigation Group LLP

96 Jessie Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 649-6700