J-S13003-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

SCOTT ANTHONY NANNI 

 Appellant No. 1578 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 18, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013141-2013 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.

*

 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 07, 2016 

 Scott Anthony Nanni appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, following his conviction 

for 6 counts of sexual abuse of children – possession of child pornography.1 

After careful review, we affirm. 

 On September 10, 2013, Donny Bryant notified the police department 

that a netbook computer he had purchased from Nanni contained images of 

young girls in various sexual acts. Based on that information, the police 

secured a search warrant for the residence where Nanni was staying in 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). 
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Sewickley.2 When they entered the house, Nanni, who was wearing 

women’s underwear, a bra and a wig, ran down a hall away from the officers 

where he stepped behind a computer to undress. The police read Nanni his 

Miranda3 rights which he signed and he consented to speak with them. 

Nanni explained that he had an application on his computer that would pull 

pornography from the internet and, while that application sometimes pulled 

child pornography, he would only view adult pornography. Nanni later 

admitted that he would sometimes, however, save the child pornography 

files on his computer. The age-range of the children in those files was 6-to14 years old. An officer testified that Nanni admitted to wearing size 10 

children’s underpants which he would masturbate into while viewing the 

saved child pornography. 

 At trial, the court admitted into evidence 5 images and one video 

found on a hard drive from the Sewickley house. Officers were not able to 

testify with regard to which of the nine hard drives found in the house had 

the images on it. At trial Nanni testified that he did not remember signing a 

Miranda waiver; he also denied admitting to possessing or viewing child 

pornography. N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 5/19/14, at 58, 60, 63. Rather, he 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Nanni was visiting a friend at the Sewickley house at the time he was 

arrested. His main residence, however was in Granville, West Virginia, 

where he lived with his grandmother. 

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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testified that the officers questioned him for several hours, repeating “the 

same questions over and over,” id. at 59, and that the officers 

“misconstrued quite badly what [he] said.” Id. at 65. 

 After trial, the court found Nanni guilty of all six counts of 

viewing/possessing child pornography and sentenced him to time served 

(339 days), to be followed by one year of house arrest and a five-year 

probationary tail. Nanni was also required to comply with the lifetime 

registration requirements under this Commonwealth’s Sexual Offender 

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).45 Nanni unsuccessfully 

challenged the weight of the evidence in post-sentence motions. This timely 

appeal follows. 

 On appeal, Nanni presents the following issues for our review: 

(1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. 

Nanni’s repeated requests for new counsel and APD 

Hudak’s motion to withdraw when there were irreconcilable 

differences between client and attorney? 

____________________________________________ 

4 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10-9799.41. SORNA, the successor to Megan’s Law 

II, was enacted on December 20, 2011, and became effective on December 

20, 2012. Because Nanni was convicted after the effective date of SORNA, 

he is subject to its provisions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(1). 

5

 Section 9799.14 of SORNA establishes a three-tiered system of specifically 

enumerated offenses requiring registration for sexual offenders for differing 

lengths of time. Id. Pursuant to section 9799.15(a)(1), a person convicted 

of a Tier I offense must register for 15 years. A Tier II offender must 

register for 25 years, while a Tier III offender, like Nanni, must register for 

the remainder of his or her life. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(2), (a)(3). 
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(2) Were the guilty verdicts against the weight of the evidence 

because Bryant’s testimony was unreliable, the alleged 

confession was unrecorded and unspecific, and there was 

overwhelming evidence that Mr. Nanni did not possess 

child pornography? 

 Nanni first complains that the court improperly refused to permit 

Attorney Hudak to withdraw from his case, prior to trial, when he and his 

counsel had “irreconcilable differences that prohibited [him] from getting 

adequate representation.” Appellant’s Brief, at 19. Specifically, Nanni 

contends that he did not have enough time to discuss his case with Attorney 

Hudak or view his discovery. 

“A motion for change of counsel by a defendant for whom 

counsel has been appointed shall not be granted except for 

substantial reasons.” Pa.R.Crim.P 122(C). To satisfy this 

standard, a defendant must demonstrate he has an irreconcilable 

difference with counsel that precludes counsel from representing 

him. Commonwealth v. Spotz, [] 756 A.2d 1139, 1150 (Pa. 

2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Tyler, [] 360 A.2d 617, 619 

(Pa. 1976)). The decision whether to appoint new counsel lies 

within the trial court's sound discretion. Id. (citation omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 134 (Pa. 2008). 

 In open court on the morning of his scheduled trial, Nanni explained to 

the trial judge that, while he was incarcerated and awaiting trial on the 

instant charges, he “never had time, a chance to make any challenges to the 

evidence of anything” and “ha[dn’t] had time to talk to [Hudak or] . . . 

prepare for a trial.” N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 5/19/14, at 3. Counsel interjected 

that she had had four to five video conferences with Nanni prior to trial. 

Although Nanni admitted he did participate in these video conferences with 

Hudak, he claimed that he did not have his necessary “paperwork” with him 
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to adequately discuss his case. To allay his concerns, the trial judge 

permitted Nanni to meet with Attorney Hudak in his holding cell and prepare 

for trial for at least three hours prior to the 2:01 p.m. scheduled start of 

trial. The court found that this time was sufficient to allow him to prepare 

for a rather straightforward case in which three Commonwealth witnesses 

were called to testify and Nanni was the only witness for the defense. 

 Nanni relies upon Commonwealth v. Tyler, 360 A.2d 617 (Pa. 

1976), to support his claim that counsel should have been removed due to 

irreconcilable differences. In Tyler, the defendant, charged with murder, 

requested that his court-appointed attorney be dismissed and that new 

counsel be appointed. The defendant cited irreconcilable differences of 

opinion between himself and counsel as to the manner in which his trial 

should be conducted. Counsel also acknowledged the existence of a 

difference of opinion, but advised the court that he was precluded from 

explaining the nature of the differences due to the attorney-client privilege. 

The trial court denied the defendant’s request to appoint new counsel. As a 

result, the defendant chose to represent himself rather than permit 

appointed-counsel to represent him; the court ordered that counsel remain 

available for consultation and take proper and necessary steps on 

defendant’s behalf throughout the proceedings. Id. at 618. 

 On appeal, our Supreme Court found that the trial court forced the 

defendant to either accept court-appointed counsel, or to represent himself. 

Accordingly, the Court concluded that this choice did not “comport with the 
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constitutional standards required to be met before a court may accept an 

alleged waiver of one’s constitutional right to representation by counsel,” 

id. at 620, and reversed the defendant’s judgment of sentence and 

remanded the case for a new trial. 

 Instantly, this case is distinguishable from the facts of Tyler. While 

counsel did file a motion to withdraw from representing Nanni, citing “an 

irreconcilable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship . . . [which] has 

soured the [] relationship to the point where counsel of record can no 

longer, in good conscience, continue representing Mr. Nanni in this case,” 

Motion to Withdraw, 5/12/14, at 1-2, counsel did not renew this motion on 

the day of trial. In fact, she proceeded to represent Nanni effectively and 

without objection after the court permitted her to meet with her client for 

three hours prior to trial so that they could review paperwork and go over 

trial strategy. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/20/15, at 6 (trial judge opined, 

“[w]hatever dispute between [Nanni] and Ms. Hudak, it did not impede 

[Nanni’s] right to a fair trial and to effective counsel.”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 756 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 2000) (Where defendant and 

counsel offer competing contentions as to readiness of defense counsel for 

trial, it is for trial court to decide whose portrayal of counsel’s preparedness 

is more accurate). 

 The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Nanni did not 

demonstrate that he had an irreconcilable difference with Attorney Hudak 

that precluded her from adequately representing him. At most, Nanni’s 
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concerns consisted of wanting to spend more time with counsel to prepare 

for trial. See Commonwealth v. Floyd, 937 A.2d 494 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(irreconcilable differences warranting appointment of new counsel do not 

exist where defendant merely alleges strained relationship with counsel, has 

difference of opinion in trial strategy, lacks confidence in counsel’s ability, or 

where there is brevity of pretrial communications). We find that the court’s 

decision to deny Nanni’s request for a new attorney was not an abuse of 

discretion. Wright, supra. 

 In his next issue on appeal, Nanni challenges the weight of the 

evidence to support his convictions for possessing child pornography. 

Specifically, he alleges that Bryant’s testimony was unreliable, Nanni’s own 

confession was unrecorded and unspecific, and there was overwhelming 

evidence that Nanni did not possess child pornography. 

In Pennsylvania, the standard of review for an appeal challenging the 

weight of the evidence is well-settled. The finder of fact is the exclusive 

judge of the weight of the evidence and is free to believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 919 A.2d 279, 281-82 

(Pa. Super. 2007). Additionally, the finder of fact determines the credibility 

of the witnesses. Id. In reaching its decision, it is the duty of the finder of 

fact to reconcile inconsistent testimony and resolve any inconsistencies. 

Commonwealth v. Manchas, 633 A.2d 618, 624 (Pa. Super. 1993). 
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The relief sought in a weight of the evidence challenge is the award of 

a new trial. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held a new 

trial should only be granted if the finding was against the weight of the 

evidence and is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of 

justice. Commonwealth v. Whitney, 512 A.2d 1152, 1155-56 (Pa. 1986). 

Where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate 

court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 

A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003). Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the 

trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. Id.

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the crime of possession of child 

pornography as follows, “any person who intentionally views or knowingly 

possesses or controls any book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, 

film, videotape, computer depiction or other material depicting a child under 

the age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation 

of such act commits an offense.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d)(1). 

Instantly, Nanni acknowledges in the argument section of his brief that 

the evidence that Bryant provided “was immaterial to the six charges at 

issue.” Appellant’s Brief, at 26. In fact, Nanni’s conviction was supported by 

evidence gathered during the execution of the search warrant and 

subsequent investigation of his computer, two cabled hard drives, as well as 

his own confession of having viewed child pornography. While Bryant may 
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have alerted officers to the fact that Nanni was potentially doing something 

illegal, the charges were brought solely based evidence uncovered as a 

result of the subsequently secured search warrant, not upon anything Bryant 

told the police. 

We find that the trial court did not palpably abuse its discretion in 

ruling on Nanni’s weight claim. Champney, supra. Officers uncovered 

more than 1,700 child pornography videos and 490 files containing verified 

images of known child victims on Nanni’s desktop computer. The computer 

contained two user accounts. One of the accounts, named “NVZ,” was 

logged on at the time of the search and was password-protected. Nanni 

admitted that he used the name “NVZ” on his computer and was able to 

type the password into the computer to access that account. Once they 

were signed on, Nanni directed the officers to a folder entitled “x” that 

contained child pornography. Under the “NVZ” profile, officers also 

uncovered a West Virginia driver’s license in Nanni’s name, Comcast cable 

bills in Nanni’s name at the West Virginia address, a copy of Nanni’s resume, 

and a certification for a computer operating system class in Nanni’s name.6

Although Nanni argues that he never confessed to possessing or 

viewing child pornography, the evidence presented by the Commonwealth 

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6

 A computer forensics examiner testified that the person who set up the 

computer and cabled hard drives, which contained the subject images and 

videos, was more technically sophisticated than an average computer user. 

Nanni had told officers that he fixes computers for a living. 
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contradicts his position. Officer Roberts testified that Nanni admitted to 

having viewed child pornography that was stored in folders on his computer, 

that he masturbated to the pornography in size-10 children’s underwear and 

that he saved pornographic images of children aged 6-14 on his computer. 

Because it was the trial judge’s duty to reconcile inconsistent testimony and 

resolve any such inconsistencies, Manchas, supra, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the verdict was not 

against the weight of the evidence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 3/7/2016