United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1997 NAVY DEPOT

MAINTENANCE

Privatizing Louisville

Operations in Place Is

Not Cost-Effective

GAO/NSIAD-97-52

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-275524 

July 31, 1997

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

As requested, we are providing a follow-up to our September 1996 report

on the Navy’s preliminary cost comparison of privatizing-in-place

maintenance workloads at its Louisville, Kentucky, depot with transferring

the workloads to other Navy facilities.

This report provides the results of our review of the Navy’s final cost

analysis and early contractor cost data through May 1997. Our objectives

were (1) to determine whether privatizing the depot maintenance

workload in place at Louisville is more cost-effective than transferring the

workload to other DOD facilities and (2) to review the practicability of

transferring the Louisville workload to other defense commercial

contractor facilities.

Background During the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, the

Department of Defense (DOD) recommended that the Louisville depot be

closed and its workloads transferred to several DOD facilities. The naval

gun repair workload was projected to transfer to the Norfolk Naval

Shipyard, Virginia; the Phalanx ship close-in-air defense system to the

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana; and the engineering support

functions to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, California.

During the BRAC Commission’s review of DOD’s recommendations, the city

of Louisville proposed that DOD privatize the depot workload in place. The

Commission found that the Navy’s savings estimate did not include all

costs at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard and that an additional $18 million

could be required. Further, the Commission found that the Navy did not

include $13.4 million in closure-related moving costs and that these

additional costs could increase the one-time cost to close to $136 million.

While the additional closure costs could extend the closure payback

period from 3 to 4 years, the Navy’s cost estimate supporting closure was

accepted by the Commission. The Commission also found that the gun

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systems engineering functions at Louisville are consistent with operational

requirements, and that the maintenance and overhaul functions performed

at the facility have contributed substantially to the effectiveness of the

facility in serving the Department of the Navy. The Commission

recommended the following:

“close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville. Transfer

workload, equipment and facilities to the private sector or local jurisdiction as appropriate

if the private sector can accommodate the workload onsite; or relocate necessary functions

along with necessary personnel, equipment and support to other naval technical activities,

primarily the Naval Shipyard, Norfolk; Naval Surface Warfare Center, Hueneme, California;

and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana.”

Subsequently, the Navy made a preliminary decision to privatize-in-place

the Louisville depot’s operations, with some Navy program management

positions remaining at the privatized facility. The decision was made to

retain the field engineering support function at the privatized Louisville

depot.1

On the basis of our review of the Navy’s preliminary cost analysis, we

reported in September 1996 that privatization-in-place did not appear to be

the most cost-effective approach given excess capacity in DOD’s depot

maintenance system and in the private sector.2

 We stated that

privatization-in-place would not reduce excess capacity and that such

privatization, if not effectively managed, including the downsizing of

remaining depot infrastructure, could exacerbate inefficiencies inherent in

underutilized depot maintenance capacity. For example, the Norfolk Naval

Shipyard and Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center, the primary depot

facilities that could have received the Louisville workloads, are expected

to have 7.1 million and 1.8 million direct labor hours of excess capacity in

1999.

According to industry representatives, the private sector has been

reducing its excess capacity through mergers, closures, and

consolidations, but DOD has not made comparable reductions in its

infrastructure. For example, a recent Defense Science Board study team

concluded that privatization-in-place should be avoided, since it tends to

preserve excess capacity. A privatization task force comprised of top

1

The 170 Navy civilians in the Louisville engineering support pool are assigned to the Naval Surface

Warfare Center, Crane Division.

2

Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to Privatizing-in-Place at the Louisville,

Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202, Sept. 18, 1996).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
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executives from the aerospace industry that was formed in 1996 by the

governor of California concluded that privatization-in-place

“inhibits the realization of cost savings intended from base closures and the performance

goal improvements that privatization is intended to achieve. Privatization-in-place,

therefore, does not solve the excess capacity problem within either the public or private

sector of the defense industrial base.”

Our September 1996 report was based on preliminary Navy estimates that

were updated just prior to contract award. As you are aware, the Secretary

of the Navy notified Congress on June 13, 1996, that as provided for in the

Competition in Contracting Act, the Navy intended—in the public

interest—to award non-competitive contracts to the two defense

contractors selected by the Louisville local redevelopment authority. On

July 19, 1996, the Navy awarded contracts to Hughes Missile Systems

Company for the Phalanx ship close-in-air defense system and to United

Defense Limited Partnership for gun repair workloads.

Results in Brief The Navy’s privatization-in-place of the workloads at the Louisville depot,

without reducing excess capacity at its remaining depots, does not appear

to be as cost-effective as transferring the workloads to other underutilized

Navy facilities. Our analysis shows that the Navy’s final cost comparison of

the proposed privatization-in-place versus the transfer of workloads to

other Navy facilities understated the annual savings from transferring the

work and overstated the one-time transfer cost. We estimate the one-time

transition cost for transferring the workload is about $10 million less than

the Navy projected. Using our estimate, the cost for the transfer option is

about $234 million, or about $100 million more than the

privatization-in-place option. We estimate annual savings of $29.9 million

for the transfer option, or about $20.6 million more than the Navy

estimated. Using our estimates, the transfer option would pay back the

additional one-time transition cost in less than 3.5 years, compared to the

additional 12-year payback period computed using the Navy estimates.

The Navy’s analysis recognized that transferring the workloads to

underutilized facilities would reduce the overhead cost for each

production unit. However, the Navy’s analysis applied per-unit savings

only to the workloads transferred and not to existing workloads at

receiving locations. Our analysis applies overhead per-unit savings to

workloads at the receiving locations as well as for those being transferred.

We estimate that transferring the workload rather than privatizing-in-place

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would have resulted in savings of about $48.6 million over the first 5-year

period. Further, after that time, transferring would result in annual savings

of about $29.9 million.

One of the contractors at Louisville could take over part of Louisville’s

workload at another industrial activity it operates that has significant

excess capacity. The United Defense Limited Partnership has the

capability and the capacity to handle the gun repair workload at a

government-owned, contractor-operated facility in Fridley, Minnesota,

which currently manufactures gun systems. We estimate that transferring

the gun repair workload to the Fridley facility could result in annual

savings of about $9.2 million on the consolidated Navy workloads

performed at that facility. Navy officials stated that the Navy intends to

divest itself of this facility. Officials at the Hughes Missile Systems

Company in Tucson, Arizona, said they could not handle the other

Louisville workload—the Phalanx close-in-weapon system—in existing

facilities without incurring large infrastructure costs.

We recently issued a report identifying DOD infrastructure activities as a

high-risk area.3

 Our primary concerns related to inefficient business

processes and excess capacity. We pointed out that DOD needs an overall

plan for addressing the problem. The situation at Louisville is

representative of this overall concern.

Annual Recurring

Costs Make

Privatizing-in-Place

the Less

Cost-Effective Option

Our analysis of the Navy’s comparative cost study shows that the Navy

overstated transfer cost by about $10 million and understated annual

recurring savings by about $20.6 million. Using the revised data, we

estimate that privatizing-in-place the Louisville depot workload will cost

about $48.6 million over the 5-year contract period, rather than save

$63.7 million as the Navy estimated. Further, beyond the initial 5-year

contract period, we estimate that transferring the workload would result

in additional annual savings of at least $29.9 million. The actual annual

savings could be higher or lower depending on future workloads and

capacity utilization at both Louisville and the Navy shipyards and warfare

centers.

Analysis of Navy Study The Navy’s comparative cost analysis of the workload transfer and

privatization options considered annual recurring and one-time transition

cost elements. The Navy reported that transferring the workload to other

3

High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997).

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
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depots would result in higher annual savings, but would require larger

one-time transition costs. Based on this information, the Navy estimated

that it could save about $63.7 million over the 5-year contract period by

privatizing-in-place rather than transferring the workloads to other depots,

as shown in table 1.

Table 1: Summary of the Navy’s Cost

Analysis of Transfer and Privatization

Options Over the 5-Year Contract

Period Cost by closure option

Dollars in millions

Type of cost Transfer Privatization Difference

One-time $243.6 $133.4 $110.2

Annual recurring 427.4 473.9 –46.5

Total $671.0 $607.3 $63.7

Source: Navy cost analysis.

Using this data, it would take 12 years to pay back the one-time cost

difference.

However, we found that the Navy’s cost analysis:

• overstated one-time transition costs to transfer workload to other depots

by $9.4 million and

• excluded $20.6 million in annual recurring savings at the receiving depots

($103 million over the 5-year contract period).

Using this data, we estimate that the Navy would save about $48.6 million

over the 5-year contract period by transferring the Louisville workload to

other depots, as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Our Cost Analysis of Transfer

and Privatization Options Over the

5-Year Contract Period Cost by closure option

Dollars in millions

Type of cost Transfer Privatization Difference

One-time $234.2 $133.4 $100.8

Annual recurring 324.5 473.9 –149.4

Total $558.7 $607.3 –$48.6

Using this data, we estimate the cost of transferring this work would pay

back the one-time cost difference in about 3.5 years.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
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One-Time Transition Costs

to Transfer Overstated

Transition costs are one-time, up-front costs that are incurred to

disestablish the Louisville facility as a government-owned and operated

activity and to establish operations to perform the required work under

the privatization-in-place or transfer options. The key transition cost

elements for the privatization-in-place option were personnel separation

and relocation costs and civilian retraining, administrative, and

environmental costs. The key transition cost elements for the transfer

option were personnel separation and relocation costs; equipment

relocation and military construction costs; and other property

transportation, administrative, repair process documentation, and

environmental costs.

The Navy estimated that the transition costs would be about $243 million

for the transfer option and $133 million for privatizing-in-place—a

one-time cost difference of about $110 million to transfer the workloads.

Our analysis shows this cost difference is overstated by $9.4 million

because the Navy (1) did not justify about $8 million in administrative

costs for the transfer option and (2) did not adjust the estimated personnel

relocation costs by about $1.4 million to reflect the smaller number of

employees that would be needed. Adjusting the Navy’s estimate for these

factors reduces the difference between the two options to about

$100 million, as shown in table 3.

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Table 3: Our Estimate of One-Time

Transition Cost Estimates to

Privatize-in-Place Versus Transfer

Louisville Depot Workload to Other

Navy Depots

Cost

Transition cost categories

Transfer

option

Privatization

option Difference

Military construction $32,820

Environmental 11,204 $5,225

Personnel transfer/severance 76,192a 64,339

Civilian retraining 3,824 11,380

Transportation 12,466 1,740

Property disposal 2 3,033

Phone services 6 12

Equipment relocation 42,127 3,993

Equipment disposal 232 20

Interim contract costs 4,600 2,355

Administrative 3,108 b 11,829

Minor construction 1,480 3,225

Repair/refurbishment 3,617 1,640

Other procurement 3,726 322

Other costs 38,800 24,239

Total costs $234,204 $133,352 $100,852

aWe reduced the Navy’s personnel relocation cost estimate by $1.4 million to reflect the actual

number of people that would be needed at the receiving depot.

bWe reduced the Navy’s administrative cost estimate for $8 million in unjustified costs.

Source: Navy cost analysis, with our adjustments as footnoted.

Annual Recurring Savings

From Transfer Option

Understated

Our analysis shows the Navy estimate of $9.3 million annual recurring

savings from transferring the workloads to underutilized facilities was

understated by $20.6 million. We estimate annual recurring savings to be

$29.9 million, or about $150 million over the 5-year contract period. The

Navy estimated the impact of overhead rate savings on workloads being

transferred to the underutilized facilities but did not apply the overhead

rate to existing workloads at those facilities. We developed our estimate

using labor rate data from the potential receiving Navy locations at the

Norfolk and Crane facilities and revised it to reflect the reduction in

overhead costs that would result from spreading fixed overhead costs over

a larger workload base. As shown in table 4, reduction in rates at the

Norfolk and Crane facilities would produce annual savings of about

$20.6 million on their existing workloads.

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Table 4: Our Estimate of Annual

Overhead Rate Savings on the Existing

Workloads at Receiving Depots Receiving depots

Direct labor

hours

Reduction in

rates Savings

Norfolk Naval Shipyard 8,969,051 $1.32 $11,807,215

Crane Surface Warfare Center 4,337,000 2.02 8,776,380

Total $20,583,595

Note: Direct labor hours and rate reductions are yearly averages over the period of the

privatization contracts.

The draft of this report we provided to DOD for comment stated that the

$29.9-million consolidation savings were in addition to the BRAC

Commission’s $28.6 million savings estimate. Navy officials did not agree

that the total BRAC savings should be added to the consolidation savings

estimate. They noted that the estimated BRAC savings were based on the

elimination of depot and nondepot personnel and base operating costs.

They further stated that much of the nondepot related savings had been

achieved under privatization, and that the depot related savings were

reflected in the $29.9-million estimate. After reviewing supporting Navy

and BRAC data, we agree that some, but not all of the BRAC savings from

eliminating nondepot personnel and operating support costs had been

achieved and depot savings were reflected in our $29.9-million estimate.

The data showed that about $12 million of the BRAC savings was achieved

by eliminating nondepot personnel and operating costs. However, we

could not determine exactly how much of this amount had been saved.

In its 1995 report, the BRAC Commission expressed concern about savings

that were not included in the Cost of Base Realignment Actions model.

Specifically, the Commission identified the exclusion of savings achievable

by consolidating functions at fewer locations. The Commission reported

that even though savings from consolidation are difficult to estimate, they

are a legitimate savings due to the closure process.

Declining Workload May

Further Increase Costs

Declining workloads and the impact of these declines on maintenance cost

have been key reasons for closing depots through the base realignment

and closure process. Consolidating workloads from the closed facilities

with workloads in remaining depot facilities was to improve capacity

utilization at remaining facilities and reduce costs by spreading fixed

overhead costs over a larger number of production units. According to

Navy officials, over the 4-year period between 1992 and 1995, the

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Louisville depot’s workload declined about 32 percent. They noted that

further Navy workload declines are likely.

DOD officials stated that the repair workload for the Phalanx system is

about what was projected for the fiscal year 1997 contract period.

However, the gun repair workload initially projected for fiscal year 1997

has not materialized. In July 1996, at the time of contract award, the

contractor’s overhead rates were based on a projected funded workload

valued at about $44.9 million. In September 1996, United Defense Limited

Partnership rates for fiscal year 1997 were renegotiated based on a lower

projected funded workload valued at about $35.2 million. According to

Defense Contract Management Command and contractor officials, the

actual value of the 1997 funded gun repair workload could be as low as

$21 million—a reduction of over 50 percent from the initially projected

funded workload. As a result, United Defense Limited Partnership has an

increasingly fewer number of production units to share its fixed overhead

costs, resulting in increased costs for each unit produced. As an indicator

of these increased costs, in May 1997, United Defense increased its

estimate of funding required for 13 contract items by $3.3 million—an

increase of 26 percent. These 13 items are the only line items from the 

46 funded line items in the gun repair workload for which the contractor

has reported any costs for fiscal year 1997. According to Navy officials,

under the cost-type contract used at the Louisville depot, it is likely that

additional Navy workload declines will increase costs further. Contractor

and local reuse authority officials note that efforts are being made to bring

in other gun repair workload as well as some commercial work. However,

officials stated that the high overhead rates make it difficult for the

Louisville depot to attract new work. We have reported that workload

declines in Navy shipyards have also resulted in losses that will require

rate increases.4

One of the key advantages of the transfer option was to broaden the

workload base at the receiving location to lessen the impact of temporary

shifts in workload. As workloads continue to decline, a larger industrial

facility with a broader workload base could potentially reassign laborers

to another workload with less impact on the total cost of operations.

4

Defense Depot Maintenance: Challenges Facing DOD in Managing Working Capital Funds

(GAO/T/NSIAD/AIMD-152, May 7, 1997).

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
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Potential for Using

Existing Contractor

Facilities for the

Louisville Workload

We examined the potential for consolidating portions of the Louisville

workloads with compatible military programs currently being

accomplished in DOD contractor facilities to determine if consolidation

savings could be achieved. The Louisville depot’s gun repair workload

constitutes about 46 percent of the total maintenance workload at that

facility. We determined that this workload fits the existing capabilities and

available capacity of the government-owned, contractor-operated United

Defense Limited Partnership facility in Fridley, Minnesota, which currently

operates with significant excess capacity. Such a move could result in a

gross annual savings of about $13.9 million for Fridley’s existing workload.

However, because labor rates are higher at the Fridley facility, the

transferred workload would cost $4.7 million more per year than at the

Louisville depot, reducing the potential annual savings for the

consolidated workload to $9.2 million.

Navy officials stated that consolidation at the Fridley facility is not a

realistic option since the Navy plans to divest itself of that facility. It is

uncertain where the contractor may decide to locate the current Fridley

research and development, production support, and manufacturing

workloads. Since the Louisville depot has related workload with

significant excess capacity, it is one option that may be considered. If

these workloads were moved to the Louisville depot, significant overhead

savings could be achieved for the gun repair workloads currently

performed there.

We also reviewed the potential for transferring the Phalanx close-in

weapon system, which accounts for the remaining 56 percent of the

depot’s workload, to the Hughes Missile Systems Company facility in

Tucson, Arizona. This does not appear to be a feasible option because

previous Hughes production consolidation initiatives, which resulted in

the closure of unneeded facilities to reduce excess capacity, limited

available capacity to the production of circuit cards. Hughes officials

stated that prior to their consolidation initiatives, the Tucson facilities

would likely have had the necessary capacity to absorb Louisville’s

Phalanx workload.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

Costly excess capacity in the Navy depot infrastructure has been

aggravated by the recent privatization-in-place of the Louisville depot. Our

February 1997 report on defense infrastructure identified infrastructure

activities as a high-risk area that requires breaking down cultural

resistance to change, overcoming service parochialism, and setting forth a

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
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clear framework for a reduced defense infrastructure to avoid waste and

inefficiency. Our primary concerns related to inefficient business

processes and excess capacity. We pointed out that DOD needs an overall

plan for addressing the problem. The situation at the Louisville depot is

representative of this overall concern. While this facility is now leased by

the local reuse authority and operated by the contractors, it is increasingly

inefficient as the workload continues to decline. The Navy must pay the

cost for this inefficiency and the inefficiency of other facilities that could

have been made more productive and cost-effective had the Louisville

workloads been consolidated there.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Navy to (1) develop a plan for reducing excess depot maintenance

capacity and costs and (2) prior to exercising any contract options for the

Louisville workload, conduct a cost analysis that would compare the

cost-effectiveness of privatizing the Louisville workload in place with

transferring it to underutilized DOD or contractor facilities. The cost

analysis should also include the total cost and savings associated with

overhead cost reduction that would be realized at underutilized DOD and

contractor facilities for workloads already produced at these locations.

Agency Comments DOD’s response to our draft report, which is provided in appendix I,

generally concurred with our recommendations. DOD concurred with the

intent of our recommendation to develop a plan to reduce excess capacity

but stated that it would be inappropriate to wait until such a plan is

developed before deciding to exercise the contract renewal options for the

Louisville workload. The DOD response noted that in deciding whether or

not to exercise the Louisville contract options, the Navy must follow the

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). While we recognize that the Navy

must follow the FAR in executing contract options, the regulations provide

the Navy with some degree of latitude in deciding whether to execute

contract options. If it develops an overall plan for reducing excess

capacity, the Navy can consider the cost implications of excess capacity at

other DOD depots before executing contract renewal options on the

Louisville workload. Nonetheless, we revised our recommendation so the

development of a plan to reduce excess capacity is separate from our

recommendation related to exercising the option on the Louisville

workload. DOD agreed that there is a need to reduce excess depot

maintenance capacity.

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DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Navy conduct a

cost analysis before exercising any renewal options for the Louisville

workload. DOD stated that it will direct the Secretary of the Navy to

conduct and adequately document a cost analysis in conjunction with any

decision affecting the continuation of previously privatized workloads

from the Louisville depot. However, the DOD response noted that the

alternatives permitted by BRAC did not include transferring the Louisville

workload to other contractor facilities, and therefore, that analysis would

be inappropriate. We continue to believe that reducing excess capacity in

both the public and private sectors is essential to reducing the cost of

DOD’s depot maintenance program. Therefore, in making future workload

allocation decisions for the Louisville workload, DOD and other contractor

facilities should be considered.

The draft of this report stated that the Navy planned to implement a pilot

program for pension portability at the Louisville depot.5

 The program

would have allowed DOD civilian employees of this depot and other

activities on closed military bases whose jobs were privatized-in-place to

accrue years of federal service for the purpose of determining eligibility

for civil service retirement benefits for their private sector employment.

Subsequently, the Deputy Secretary of Defense announced that the

Department would not be establishing a pilot program at Louisville or any

other privatized facility. We removed the information contained in our

draft report referring to this program.

Scope and

Methodology

To examine the cost-effectiveness of the Louisville depot

privatization-in-place relative to transferring the work to other DOD

facilities, including the impact of excess capacity in existing Navy

facilities, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the

• Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Secretary of the

Navy in Washington, D.C.;

• Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Surface Warfare Center

Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia;

• Naval Surface Warfare Center field locations in Louisville, Kentucky; Port

Hueneme, California; and Crane, Indiana;

• Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Virginia; and

5

This program was authorized by section 1616 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 1997, P.L. 104-201.

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• Defense Contract Management Command and Defense Contact Audit

Agency contractor sites at United Defense Limited Partnership, Fridley,

Minnesota, and Hughes Missile Systems Company, Tucson, Arizona.

To analyze the Navy’s cost study, we reviewed the supporting data for the

Navy’s cost analysis, comparing estimates under each budget category. We

reviewed the material cost elements for relevance, completeness, and

accuracy and discussed our observations with responsible Navy

management and contracting officials.

To determine the feasibility of transferring the Louisville workloads to DOD

contractor facilities, we interviewed officials from the United Defense

Limited Partnership and the Hughes Missile Systems Company, the two

companies awarded 1-year contracts for the Louisville workload. We also

interviewed Defense Contract Management Command and Defense

Contract Audit Agency officials at each facility, collected data on

contractor operating cost and current workload, and calculated the cost

impact of transferring the workload covered by the Louisville privatization

contracts to these private sector facilities.

We conducted our review from July 1996 through February 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the

Navy; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested

congressional committees. Copies will also be made available to others

upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions

regarding this report. Major contributors to this report were Jim Wiggins,

Julia Denman, Larry Junek, and John Strong.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
Related GAO Products

Defense Depot Maintenance: Challenges Facing DOD in Managing Working

Capital Funds (GAO/T/NSIAD/AIMD-152, May 7, 1997).

Depot Maintenance: Uncertainties and Challenges DOD Faces in

Restructuring Its Depot Maintenance Program (GAO/T/NSIAD-111, Mar. 18,

1997) and (GAO/T/NSIAD-112, Apr. 10,1997).

Defense Outsourcing: Challenges Facing DOD As It Attempts to Save

Billions in Infrastructure Costs (GAO/T/97-110, Mar. 12, 1997).

High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997).

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Privatization-in-Place Plans are Costly

While Excess Capacity Exists (GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec. 31, 1996).

Army Depot Maintenance: Privatization Without Further Downsizing

Increases Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201, Sept. 18, 1996).

Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to

Privatizing-in-Place the Louisville, Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202, 

Sept. 18, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Commission on Roles and Mission’s

Privatization Assumptions Are Questionable (GAO/NSIAD-96-161, July 15,

1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD’s Policy Report Leaves Future Role of

Depot System Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-96-165, May 21, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: More Comprehensive and Consistent

Workload Data Needed for Decisionmakers (GAO/NSIAD-96-166, May 21, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the

Public-Private Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr. 16, 1996 ) and (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-148,

Apr. 17, 1996).

Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not

Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

Depot Maintenance: Opportunities to Privatize Repair of Military Engines

(GAO/NSIAD-96-33, Mar. 5, 1996).

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
Related GAO Products

Closing Maintenance Depots: Savings, Personnel, and Workload

Redistribution Issues (GAO/NSIAD-96-29, Mar. 4, 1996).

Navy Maintenance: Assessment of the Public-Private Competition Program

for Aviation Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-96-30, Jan. 22, 1996).

Depot Maintenance: The Navy’s Decision to Stop F/A-18 Repairs at Ogden

Air Logistics Center (GAO/NSIAD-96-31, Dec. 15, 1995).

Military Bases: Case Studies on Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and 1991

(GAO/NSIAD-95-139, Aug. 15, 1995).

Military Base Closure: Analysis of DOD’s Process and Recommendations

for 1995 (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-132, Apr. 17, 1995).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for

Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center: Cost Growth and Other

Factors Affect Closure and Privatization (GAO/NSIAD-95-60, Dec. 9, 1994).

Navy Maintenance: Assessment of the Public and Private Shipyard

Competition Program (GAO/NSIAD-94-184, May 25, 1994).

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Allocating Workload Between the Public and

Private Sectors (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-161, Apr. 12, 1994).

Depot Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-93-292R, Sept. 30, 1993).

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Management and Restructuring to Support a

Downsized Military (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-13, May 6, 1993).

Air Logistics Center Indicators (GAO/NSIAD-93-146R, Feb. 25, 1993).

Defense Force Management: Challenges Facing DOD as it Continues to

Downsize its Civilian Workforce (GAO/NSIAD-93-123, Feb. 12, 1993).

Navy Maintenance: Public/Private Competition for F-14 Aircraft

Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-92-143, May 20, 1992).

Military Bases: Information on Air Logistics Centers (GAO/NSIAD-90-287FS,

Sept. 10, 1990).

(709220) Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-52 Navy Depot Maintenance
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