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Approved for Public release 09-MDA-4885 (20 OCT 09)

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

D EPA RT M E NT OF D EFE N SE

*

**

Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)

1984 – 1994

B

ALLISTIC MISSILE DEFE

NSE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

DEPART M ENT OF DEFENSE

Missile Defense Agency (MDA)

Established January 2, 2002

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)

1994 – 2002
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

FOREWORD

The mission of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) History 

Office is to document the official history of America’s missile 

defense programs and to provide historical support to the MDA 

Director and MDA staff.

This pamphlet is intended to acquaint readers with the history 

of the Nike Zeus Project, the U.S. Army’s first effort to develop 

an antiballistic missile (ABM) system that could intercept 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This pioneering effort 

was ambitious and controversial. The groundbreaking Nike Zeus 

Project demonstrated the possibility of intercepting an ICBM, but 

suffered from technical and operational shortcomings that made it 

impractical to deploy. Despite these shortcomings, the Nike Zeus 

Project was instrumental in establishing the foundations for its 

successor, the Nike-X Project, a more robust ballistic missile defense 

system. 

Constructive comments and suggestions from readers are 

welcome. Please forward them to Dr. Lawrence M. Kaplan, MDA 

Historian, at Lawrence.Kaplan@mda.mil, or by telephone at (703) 

882-6546.
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M



As the Cold War unfolded following World 

War II, America determined 

that it faced a hostile and 

expansionist Soviet Union. 

The growing threat of Soviet 

long-range aircraft and 

long-range missiles posed 

an unprecedented challenge 

to defending America against 

attack. In response, the policies 

of containment and deterrence became the cornerstones of American 

strategic doctrine, with a heavy reliance on nuclear weapons and 

strategic air power to discourage any Soviet or Soviet-supported 

military aggression. During the Eisenhower administration this 

policy of striking back decisively against any aggressor was known as 

“massive retaliation” and evolved into the policy known as “mutual 

assured destruction” or MAD in the Kennedy administration. By the 

early 1960s, the advent of long-range Air Force ballistic missiles and 

Navy submarine-launched ballistic missiles joined manned bombers 

in completing America’s strategic deterrent triad. 

Although deterrence relied primarily on offensive measures, 

strategic missile defense (defending the continental United States) 

became an increasingly desirable adjunct to American strategic 

capabilities. Following World War II, the Air Force’s Project Wizard 

began developing a strategic antiballistic missile (ABM) system and 

in the early 1950s the Army began developing 

a theater ABM system, Project Plato, to protect 

deployed military forces against short-range 

ballistic missiles. During this period, however, 

the Army was at a significant disadvantage when 

competing for annual budget money with the 

other services since it did not have a strategic 

offensive mission. In 1955, this situation 

began changing after intelligence reports of an 

Project 

Wizard
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M



impending Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat 

spurred the Department of Defense (DoD) to launch several highpriority offensive missile programs among the services. These 

competing missile programs, which were intended to achieve early 

operational capabilities, blurred distinctions between the services’ 

roles and missions. In this environment the Army sought to compete 

with Project Wizard for a role in strategic missile defense. 

In March 1955, as part of its air defense 

research, the Army commissioned Bell 

Telephone Laboratories, the research and 

development branch of the Western Electric 

Company, to examine the prospects for 

developing a strategic ABM system. Bell 

Labs had developed the first generation nonnuclear Nike I (Ajax) antiaircraft surfaceto-air missile (SAM) and was developing a 

second generation nuclear-armed Nike B 

(Hercules) SAM. 

Bell Labs conducted an 18 month Nike II feasibility study that 

examined continental United States air defense requirements for the 

1960s against both high-performance air-breathing threats and longrange ballistic missiles. Initially, the study explored the possibility 

of a common antiaircraft defense system covering all high-altitude 

threats, which employed a missile with different warheads, one for 

use against missiles and one for use against 

aircraft. In June 1955, as concern increased 

over the ICBM threat, the Army requested the 

study shift its focus primarily to missile defense. 

The shift coincided with General Maxwell D. 

Taylor’s appointment as Army Chief of Staff. 

He aggressively sought to increase the Army’s 

share of the budget and became a staunch 

Hercules

AJAX

Taylor
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M



advocate for expanding the Army’s air defense role into strategic 

missile defense. 

The Nike II study assumed that a precisely guided nuclear 

warhead would be necessary to ensure successful interception of 

a ballistic missile. By comparison to World War II air defense 

objectives, where a 10 to 15 percent attrition rate was acceptable 

against aircraft, the nuclear ballistic missile threat required defense 

levels of 95 to 100 percent attrition against hard to kill reentry 

vehicles. Studies showed that using a 50 kiloton nuclear warhead in 

the interceptor missile required relatively small miss distances to kill 

an enemy warhead, and the use of a high-yield defensive warhead 

did not reduce the need for a guidance system of high accuracy.

The first question addressed was where 

in the attacking missile’s trajectory–the 

boost, midcourse, or terminal phase–an 

intercept should take place. Given the 

limited information collection capabilities 

against hostile missile launches, the study 

assessed the midcourse intercept option 

too difficult to be feasible and proposed 

a terminal-phase interceptor in its place. 

Technological limitations suggested that 

a homing system would be unworkable 

for the interceptor and the most attractive 

guidance method would be one based on 

the Nike Ajax/Nike Hercules command 

systems. 

The study recognized that an extensive communications network, 

integrating detection, acquisition, tracking and launch control 

radars, data processing, computation, and tactical control would 

be necessary to make the system work. All of these disparate parts 

would have to work together very rapidly as an integrated whole. 

Ballistic 

Trajectory
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M



Given limited warning times of 10 to 15 minutes for a missile attack, 

most actions had to be semiautomated. A human operator would 

only be able to veto a programmed launch. 

The challenge of discriminating real warheads from a debris 

cloud and other radar countermeasures posed a significant problem. 

The study recognized that high rates of ICBMs arriving over their 

targets, coupled with the difficulty of discriminating decoys from 

real warheads, would require a system capable of engaging up to 20 

targets per minute.

In January 1956, Bell Labs advised the Army that a long-range, 

high-data-rate acquisition radar would be an essential component of 

any ballistic missile defense system. Bell Labs also advised that if 

development of this vital radar could begin immediately, an interim 

ABM defense might be possible with the developmental Nike B 

(Hercules) missile system.

Bell Labs subsequently completed 50,000 analog computer 

simulation intercepts of ballistic missile targets. These simulations 

indicated that it was possible to intercept a target flying through 

space at 24,000 feet per second. Bell Labs presented their findings 

to the Army in October 1956. 

In November 1956, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson 

attempted to disentangle Army and Air Force air defense 

responsibilities by distinguishing between “area” and “point” defense. 

The first, assigned to the Air Force, involved “the 

concept of locating defense units to intercept 

enemy attacks remote from and without 

reference to individual vital installations, 

industrial complexes or population centers.” 

Point defense, an Army responsibility, was “the 

defense of specified geographical areas, cities 

Wilson and vital installations.” Air defense missiles 
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M



designed for point defense were to be limited to horizontal ranges 

of approximately one hundred nautical miles. Even so, it was not 

easy to draw a clear distinction between area and point defense, and 

a rivalry grew between the Army and Air Force as they developed 

competing air defense missiles. 

In February 1957, the Army initiated the Nike II development 

program with Western Electric as the prime 

contractor, and Bell Labs and the Douglas 

Aircraft Company as subcontractors, and 

changed the name to the Nike Zeus Project. 

The contract laid out a six-year development 

program for the Nike Zeus antimissile missile 

system under the supervision of the Army 

Rocket and Guided Missile Agency, an element 

of the Army Ordnance Missile Command at 

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Bell Labs served as 

the technical project director while the Douglas 

Aircraft Company undertook development of 

the nuclear-capable Zeus exoatmospheric (outside the atmosphere) 

interceptor, which represented the third generation in the Nike air 

defense guided missile family. Zeus was intended to be part of an 

integrated ABM defense system that included advanced radars for 

acquisition and tracking, and battle management communications 

equipment, which the Nike II study indicated would be necessary. 

The Army also intended to draw upon 

Project Plato’s development in furthering 

the Nike Zeus Project. 

Technical challenges abounded in 

the Nike Zeus Project because so much 

of the developmental work done was 

groundbreaking. The proposed missile 

design, the design architecture of the 

system’s radars, the computer and Zeus (A-Model)

Nike Zeus 

Project Office 

Emblem
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M



communications integration, and even finding adequate ranges for 

testing, had to be developed from the ground up. From the outset 

these technical challenges and projected high costs made Nike Zeus 

a continuing target of criticism, particularly from the Air Force and 

the scientific community. 

In the midst of this growing controversy, the Soviet Union 

announced a successful test flight of an SS16 ICBM in August 1957; and on October 

4, 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik, the 

world’s first artificial satellite. These catalytic 

events heightened concerns about American 

vulnerabilities to a Soviet ICBM attack 

and created a political environment more 

supportive of developing and fielding an ABM 

system. 

A few weeks after the Sputnik launch, the 

Army stood firm in pressing for Nike Zeus development. General 

Taylor advised Congress:

“We can see no reason why the country cannot have an 

antimissile defense for a price which is within reach. I am 

sure many of you have heard the statement that the dollar 

requirements for this kind of defense are astronomical and 

that the whole concept is beyond consideration. I can assure 

you that the studies which I have seen lead 

me to a different conclusion. We can have an 

antimissile defense....”

In early November 1957, the presidentially 

appointed Gaither Panel (named after its chairman, 

H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., then chairman of the 

board of directors of the Ford Foundation and a 

founder of the RAND Corporation), submitted its 

Sputnik

Gaither
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M



report on continental defense, 

“Deterrence & Survival in 

the Nuclear Age,” to the 

Eisenhower administration. 

The report assigned the highest 

priority to protecting the nation’s primary deterrent, Strategic Air 

Command (SAC) bombers, from a surprise Soviet attack, and 

recommended having active missile 

defense at SAC bases. This included 

developing radars capable of providing 

early warning of missile attacks, hardening 

radars against countermeasures, and 

employing interim antimissile defenses 

using available weapons such as the Nike 

Hercules and land-based versions of the 

Navy’s Talos air defense missile. The 

report also recognized the importance of 

protecting cities and other key targets:

“[T]he importance of providing active defense of cities or 

other critical areas demands the development and installation 

of the basic elements of a [missile defense] system at an 

early date. Such a system initially may have only a relatively 

low-altitude intercept capability, but would provide the 

framework on which to add improvements brought forth by 

the research and test programs.”

By early 1958, the Army and Air Force 

rivalry over dominance of the strategic 

missile defense program prompted Secretary 

of Defense Neil H. McElroy to settle the 

dispute. On January 16, 1958, he assigned the 

active strategic defense mission to the Army. 

Later that month, the Nike Zeus Project 

received additional support from a National 

B-52

McElroy

Hercules Talos
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M



Security Council position paper (NSC 5802) 

on continental defense that called for “an 

anti-ICBM weapons system as a matter of the 

highest national priority.” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for an 

administration commitment to accelerate 

Nike Zeus development, but President Dwight 

D. Eisenhower’s defense secretaries, Neil 

H. McElroy (1957-59) and Thomas S. Gates 

(1959-61), along with many in the scientific 

community, were not convinced the program 

was worth the cost and effort to rush to an 

early deployment. President Eisenhower also 

was skeptical, questioning whether an effective 

ABM system could be developed in the 1960s. 

The same attitude continued into the Kennedy 

administration (1961-63).

The Army’s preliminary deployment 

studies reportedly estimated that 60 Nike Zeus 

batteries, each armed with 50 interceptors, 

would be sufficient to protect major cities and 

major military installations and would cost 

approximately $10 billion. The costs rose to 

approximately $15 billion for 120 Zeus batteries 

offering expanded coverage to urban centers 

with populations larger than 100,000 and major 

industrial targets. 

President John F. Kennedy took a keen interest in Nike Zeus 

development. In pondering why Nike Zeus was so controversial 

among scientists, he once commented to Dr. Jerome Wiesner, his 

Science Advisor: “I don’t understand. Scientists are supposed to be 

rational people. How can there be such differences on a technical 

Eisenhower

Gates

Zeus

(B-Model)
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M



issue?” He was particularly concerned about the system’s viability 

in the face of mounting pressure for its deployment. Dr. Wiesner 

explained:

“In 1961, when President Kennedy first 

began to survey his military problems, his 

attention was drawn forcefully to an antimissile system, the Nike-Zeus. He began 

to get a flood of mail, from friends, from 

Congress, from people in industry. The 

press pointedly questioned him about his 

plans to deploy the Nike-Zeus system. He 

began to see full pages for it in popular 

magazines like Life and Saturday Evening 

Post, proclaiming how Nike-Zeus would 

defend America and listing the industrial 

towns that would profit from the contracts 

for it.... This pressure built up to the point 

where President Kennedy came to feel that 

the only thing anybody in the country was 

concerned about was the Nike-Zeus. He 

began to collect Nike-Zeus material. In one 

corner of a room he had a pile of literature and letters and 

other materials on the subject. He set out to make himself 

an expert on the Nike-Zeus and spent hundreds of hours 

gathering views from the scientific community about it.”

As with any groundbreaking 

system in development, the 

early Nike Zeus test results 

were mixed. Though the radar 

and communications systems 

progressed reasonably well, 

many early test firings of the 

missile failed in part due to 

Wiesner

Kennedy

Zeus Intercept Test
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

10

design flaws. Refinements in the missile design and other system 

components continued and in late 1961 a Zeus missile supported by 

all of its associated system components successfully intercepted a 

Nike Hercules target missile at White Sands Missile Range, New 

Mexico. In early 1962, the Army transported the entire system to 

the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands and began 

conducting a series of Zeus tests against live ICBM targets with the 

following results:

Mission 

Number Date Target Remarks

K1 6-26-62 Atlas D Failure

K2 7-19-62 Atlas D Partial Success

K6 12-12-62 Atlas D Success (first missile in salvo)

K7 12-22-62 Atlas D Success (first missile in salvo)

K8 2-13-63 Atlas D Partial Success

K10 2-28-63 Atlas D Partial Success

K17 3-30-63 Titan I Success

K21 4-13-63 Titan I Success

K15 6-12-63 Atlas D Success

K23 7-4-63 Atlas E Success

K26 8-15-63 Titan I Success

K28 8-24-63 Atlas E Success

K24 11-14-63 Titan I Success
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

11

Although the test program showed promise in 1962, DoD 

decided not to proceed further with Nike Zeus development. Nike 

Zeus had too many technical and operational shortcomings to 

warrant continuation. Dr. Wiesner explained:

“[T]here were several things wrong about the NikeZeus that would have made it relatively ineffective in real 

situations. First, as originally designed, it was supposed 

to intercept incoming missiles at very high altitudes, out 

of the atmosphere. This meant that it was easily confused; 

an enemy could mix real nuclear missiles with lightweight 

decoys made to look like missiles and send them in against 

Nike-Zeus, so that it would be totally saturated. To correct 

this we allowed the incoming devices to come down into 

the atmosphere; the difference in weights allowed the heavy 

pieces, the real warheads, to go on, while all this other 

lightweight decoy junk was slowed down and separated out. 

This tended to work somewhat better, but even so, the whole 

system as conceived really wasn’t good enough. It could 

not respond fast enough. Its radars weren’t good enough. Its 

traffic-handling capacity–that is, the number of missiles it 

could deal with at one time–was not adequate.

“Also, Nike-Zeus was subject...

to something called blackout; that 

is, if a nuclear explosion were set 

off to destroy an incoming missile, 

it also upset the gas in the air, 

‘ionized’ it–electrons strip off from 

the molecules, and for a while the 

gas acts like a metal rather than 

a gas so that radar waves cannot 

go through it and you cannot see 

what is behind it. Nike-Zeus was 

open to this in two ways. First, if Zeus (B-Model)
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

12

you fired some rockets and they set off their own nuclear 

weapons, you might generate self-blackout. Second, if the 

enemy recognized that the defense had this vulnerability, he 

could design his offensive system to occasionally dump in 

a rocket with a nuclear warhead, explode it, and generate 

enough ionization to black out your radars. But, NikeZeus had another interesting weakness–by the time it had 

been brought down to a reasonably low altitude so that the 

atmosphere would filter incoming devices, no one could be 

sure that when it set off its nuclear explosion it would not 

damage itself....

“Still another problem with the Nike-Zeus was that its 

destruction of the incoming nuclear weapons depended on 

a phenomenon called neutron heating. When one explodes 

a nuclear weapon near another nuclear weapon, a flux of 

neutrons is released; these penetrate into the guts of the 

second nuclear weapon and heat it enough to melt it. 

However, this effect does not work over very great distances; 

so the Nike nuclear explosion could be effective against 

only a limited number of incoming targets. Although I do 

not think that cost factors are the most important part of the 

argument against the ABM, this did create an economic case 

against it.”

The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations both looked 

beyond Zeus for a more 

capable ABM system. What 

emerged was a layered ABM 

system called Nike-X. It 

employed many advanced 

technologies, including a 

new family of electronic 

phased array radars that 

could detect and track a large Sprint Zeus/Spartan
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

13

number of objects simultaneously; 

a new terminal defense interceptor 

called Sprint, which made possible 

the use of atmospheric filtering 

to discriminate between enemy 

warheads and decoys; and it retained 

the Zeus missile, subsequently 

modified and renamed Spartan, for 

high-altitude targets. 

The Kennedy administration announced 

reorientation of its ABM efforts in the improved 

and more robust Nike-X Project in January 

1963. The following month, Secretary of 

Defense Robert S. McNamara testified before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee that 

the Soviet Union would have “the capability 

of deploying an antimissile missile system 

by 1966.” After Secretary McNamara added 

that the Nike-X Project “should be ready by 1970,” Senator Strom 

Thurmond (D-S.C.) began an effort to field the controversial Nike 

Zeus ABM system as soon as possible as an interim hedge against 

the possibility of “a period in which there will be a defensive gap” 

in U.S. strategic security. On April 11, Senator Thurmond led an 

extraordinary effort in Congress to revitalize and 

accelerate the Nike Zeus Project. In the first Senate 

closed session held in twenty years, the Senate 

assessed the merits of Thurmond’s arguments, 

but determined that the proposed Nike-X Project 

had more promise than revitalizing the Nike 

Zeus Project. 

Despite Senator Thurmond’s failed effort 

to revitalize the Nike Zeus ABM, its successful 

developments were instrumental in establishing 

Thurmond

Special Collections, 

Clemson University 

Libraries

McNamara
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

14

the foundations for its successor, the Nike-X Project, a more capable 

ballistic missile defense system. In particular, Nike Zeus developers 

gained vital knowledge of what worked and what failed while 

advancing discrimination and characterization studies, radar and 

computer technologies, and high-speed, high-heat missile design. 

For example, Zeus developers theoretically examined concerns about 

the effects of high-altitude 

nuclear detonations on radar 

signals and subsequently 

verified their findings in tests 

at Johnson Island in the North 

Pacific. Studies showed that 

radar signal attenuation from 

nuclear explosion effects 

could be mitigated by using 

higher frequency signals. As 

a result, the Zeus acquisition 

radar design was modified to double the planned frequency from 500 

to 1,000 megahertz. However, these higher frequency radars were 

never produced or tested. Other successful development examples 

included the Zeus target intercept computer for guidance of the Zeus 

ABM and the Zeus missile booster engine. The computer, designed 

with a modular construction of nearly 175,000 components, was 

the fastest and most reliable ground computer developed to date in 

the nation’s defense program, and the 450,000 pound-thrust booster 

engine was the most powerful single solid propellant motor ever 

successfully fired in the United States up to that time.

Following the decision not to deploy Nike Zeus, the Army 

continued the test program until December 1964 at White Sands 

Missile Range and May 1966 at Kwajalein Missile Range. During 

this period Nike Zeus also served briefly as a potential antisatellite 

weapon. The Army initially proposed employing a modified version 

of Zeus as an anti-satellite weapon to the Defense Department in 

1957, shortly after the Soviets launched Sputnik. The Defense 

Zeus Acquisition Radar
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

15

Department adopted the proposal in early 1962, when Secretary 

McNamara asked the Army to prepare the Zeus system for possible 

use in destroying satellites. The new program became known as 

Project MUDFLAP and used modified Zeus missiles in a variety of 

antisatellite tests at White Sands and Kwajalein. From 1963 to 1964, 

the Army maintained Zeus in readiness from Kwajalein to intercept 

satellites, if required. Testing resumed in 1964 and continued until 

the Nike Zeus Project’s termination in 1966.

In retrospect, the Nike Zeus Project, the U.S. Army’s first effort 

at developing a strategic ballistic missile defense system, was an 

ambitious and controversial undertaking. The pioneering Nike Zeus 

Project demonstrated the feasibility of intercepting an ICBM, but the 

system’s technical and operational shortcomings made it impractical 

to deploy. Despite these shortcomings, the Nike Zeus Project played 

a pivotal role in preparing the way for its successor, the Nike-X 

Project, a more capable ballistic missile defense system.
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

16

NIKE ZEUS SYSTEM

The following Nike Zeus system description is from Branches 

of the Army, ROTC Manual 145-70, Headquarters, Department of 

the Army, October 18, 1963:

The Nike Zeus system is designed to protect the United States 

from intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. It uses the 

guidance techniques developed and the experience gained from 

Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules.

The Zeus system is composed of individual components that can 

be assembled in a building-block scheme. The “modular” design 

permits ease of increasing operational capabilities and tailoring of a 

Zeus defense complex to meet requirements consistent with the size 

and importance of the area to be defended. A Zeus defense complex 

might consist of one Zeus defense center (ZDC) and one or more 

Zeus firing sites.

Nike Zeus Operation
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

17

A typical target for Zeus would be an ICBM warhead streaking 

toward an area at a speed of about fifteen thousand miles per hour. 

It may be surrounded by a “cloud” or decoys, which the ICBM has 

ejected en route in an attempt to confuse the defense. Far out in space 

the entire cloud is located by the beams of the Zeus acquisition radar 

(ZAR) which has the sky under constant surveillance.

The ZAR, located at the ZDC, has a very long detection range and 

uses separate transmitting and receiving antennas. The transmitting 

antenna is triangular in shape and rotates three hundred sixty degrees 

in azimuth. The receiving antenna, which is hemispherical in shape 

provides omnidirectional coverage and rotates in synchronism with 

the transmitting antenna. Because of this rotation, radar return signals 

are focused successfully on each of the three racks of feedhorns 

to obtain target information. This information is processed by a 

computer to develop the data necessary for threat evaluation and 

weapon assignment. Once the computer determines that the object 

being tracked is a cloud of decoys, the entire cloud is brought under 

surveillance of a discrimination radar (DR) at the battery.

The Zeus firing battery will use three types of radars: 

discrimination radars (DR) for determination of the target from 

decoys, target tracking radars (TTR) for precision tracking of 

targets, and missile tracking radars (MTR) for guiding the Nike 

Zeus antimissile missiles to their targets. The DR ferrets the 

warhead from the surrounding decoys and pinpoints this incoming 

target for the TTR. The hyperaccurate TTR then provides precise 

target information to the Target Intercept Computer during the final 

phase of the engagement. The computer determines the trajectory 

of the target, examines it considering the Zeus missile performance 

characteristics for an optimum intercept, and launches the antimissile 

at the proper instant from an underground launching cell.
N i k e Z e u s : T h e U . S . A r m y ’ s F i r s t A B M

18

After launch, the MTR transmits steering orders to guide the 

Zeus missile to the kill point, which may be inside or outside the 

earth’s atmosphere. At this moment the Zeus warhead detonates, 

destroying the invader.

Several Zeus missiles can be in the air simultaneously, each on 

the way to its own intercept and obeying control orders meant for 

it alone. The Zeus missile is a solid-propellant rocket consisting of 

three stages—a booster, sustainer, and the jethead stage containing 

the warhead and onboard guidance.

The Zeus testing program has resulted in successful intercepts of 

both simulated and real ICBM targets.

The current Army Research and Development Program for 

ballistic missile defense of the continental United States includes 

two major tasks. First, the present Zeus test program will be 

continued. This program has been most valuable in providing 

information for development in the areas of ballistic missile defense 

and penetration aids for offensive missile systems. The second task 

will be to emphasize and accelerate the development of a system 

presently known as Nike X. Nike X is an advanced antimissile 

system made possible by the experience and knowledge gained in 

the development of Zeus. For some time now the Army has been 

investigating advanced radar antimissile configurations as part of 

the Zeus program. Nike X will employ an advance radar, the Sprint 

missile, and a large number of components developed in the Zeus 

program. Design and hardware developments have been initiated on 

these items.
Nike family of missiles 

(L to R): Ajax, Hercules, and Zeus
D E P A R T M E N T O F D E F E N S E

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENC

Y