COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

ROBERT CUPPETT 

v. Record No. 1240-94-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JULY 25, 1995 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 

 Andrew G. Wiggin (Office of the Public 

Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Robert B. Beasley, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Robert Cuppett (defendant) was convicted by the trial court 

for arson of a motor vehicle in violation of Code § 18.2-81. On 

appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, 

and a recitation of the facts is unnecessary to this memorandum 

opinion. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting 

to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Martin 

v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

The judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury, is entitled 

to the same weight as a jury verdict and will be disturbed only if 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Id. The 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated 

for publication. 
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credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and 

the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for 

the fact finder's determination. Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 

194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 

 Code § 18.2-81 provides, in pertinent part, that 

[i]f any person maliciously, or with intent to defraud an 

insurance company or other person . . . aid, counsel, or 

procure the burning or destroying by any explosive device 

or substance, of any personal property, . . . he shall, 

if the thing burnt or destroyed, be of the value of $200 

or more, be guilty of a Class 4 felony. 

Id. (emphasis added). "'[M]alice inheres in the doing of a 

wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or excuse, or as 

a result of ill will.'" Hamm v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 150, 

153-54, 428 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993) (quoting Bell v. Commonwealth, 

11 Va. App. 530, 533, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1991)). "Malice, 

therefore, in the case of arson, is not necessarily a feeling of 

ill will toward another person, but may be a purposeful intent to 

do a wrongful act." Hamm, 16 Va. App at 154, 428 S.E.2d at 520. 

It "may be inferred from the fact that a person intentionally 

burned insured property for the purpose of defrauding or injuring 

an insurance carrier." Id.

 While driving along an unlighted lane, through a "patch of 

woods," Oscar Dozier observed defendant and his wife as driver and 

passenger, respectively, of a darkened truck, stopped several 

hundred yards from a "Grand Am" car, also parked at the roadside. 

He saw a man exit the Grand Am with a "flare gun" in his hand and 

walk directly to and enter the truck with defendant and his wife. 
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Curious, Dozier made several slow "passes" through the area and 

detected the odor of gasoline emanating from the Grand Am and 

noticed a "flickering light in the floorboard" of the vehicle. 

With each approach of Dozier's vehicle, the truck "would start" and 

its "lights [would switch] on" and then "cut back off" when "they 

[the occupants] couldn't see me [Dozier]." After several minutes, 

the truck "made a U-turn and head[ed]" away. Dozier departed the 

area briefly, discovered the Grand Am engulfed in flames on his 

return and summoned police. 

 D.A. Moss, a "certified fire investigator," testified that the 

fire originated in the "floorboard" of the car and "samples" from 

that surface revealed the presence of a "gasoline petroleum 

product." Moss had noted a "strong odor of gasoline" about the 

Grand Am at the inception of his investigation.1

 The Grand Am, 

valued at $4100, was owned by defendant's wife and reported stolen 

by her to both local police and the insurer of the vehicle. 

 This evidence, together with other evidence in the record, is 

sufficient to support a finding that defendant "aid[ed], 

counsel[ed], or procure[d] the burning or destroying" of the Grand 

Am, including an inference of the requisite malice. Code 

§ 18.2-81; see Code § 18.2-18. Accordingly, we affirm the 

conviction. 

 Affirmed.

 

 1The gas tank of the vehicle remained "intact" following the 

fire.