IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0730

Filed November 30, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAVON JOSHUA JENNINGS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Richard H. 

Davidson, Judge.

Javon Jennings appeals his conviction for child endangerment causing 

death. AFFIRMED.

Katherine Kaminsky Murphy of Kate Murphy Law, P.L.C., Glenwood (until 

withdrawal), and Krisanne C. Weimer of Weimer Law, P.C., Council Bluffs, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., May, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2020).
2

VOGEL, Senior Judge.

Following a jury trial, Javon Jennings was convicted of child endangerment 

causing death in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(b) and (4) (2018).1 

Jennings appeals, asserting prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of 

counsel,

2 and insufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict. 

The jury could have found the following facts admitted into the record. J.H. 

was born in December 2016. On April 18, 2018, J.H.’s mother—who was also 

Jennings’s live-in paramour—left for work a few minutes before 4:00 p.m. 

Jennings supervised J.H. alone while the mother was at work, though a friend and 

his young son visited with Jennings and J.H. at the residence until about 4:30 p.m. 

that day. When the mother came home around 11:20 p.m., Jennings told her J.H. 

was sick. The mother checked on J.H. and found the child tense and groaning, 

but the mother managed to sooth the child to sleep before she went to bed herself. 

Around 4:30 the next morning, Jennings awoke and found J.H. cold and stiff. 

Jennings called 911, and emergency medical personnel and law enforcement 

responded to the home. Resuscitation efforts on the child were futile. An autopsy 

 

1 Jennings was also found guilty of involuntary manslaughter by commission of a 

public offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(b), (3), and (4) (2018), 

which merged into the greater offense prior to sentencing. 

2 Under legislation effective July 1, 2019, we lack authority to consider ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal. See State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 

226, 231 (Iowa 2019) (citing Iowa Code § 814.7 (2019)). This legislation also 

prohibits us from considering pro se filings when a defendant has counsel. See 

2019 Iowa Acts ch. 141, § 30 (codified at 814.6A(1)). However, this legislation 

does not apply retroactively. See Macke, 933 N.W.2d at 235 (“We conclude the 

absence of retroactivity language in sections 814.6 and 814.7 means those 

provisions apply only prospectively and do not apply to cases pending on July 1, 

2019.”). Because Jennings’s judgment and sentence were entered prior to July 1, 

2019, we may consider his ineffective-assistance claims, including those 

contained in his pro se brief, on direct appeal. See id.
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performed later that day noted multiple blunt-force injuries to J.H.’s head, neck, 

torso, and extremities, resulting in a fractured femur and hemorrhages to several 

internal organs. The autopsy report listed the cause of death as “multiple blunt 

force injuries” and the manner of death as “homicide.” 

Jennings was arrested and charged with the child’s death. The matter came 

on for trial beginning February 5, 2019. The jury found him guilty of involuntary 

manslaughter involving a public offense and child endangerment causing death. 

Following the district court’s denial of his motion in arrest of judgment and motion 

for new trial, the court merged the two counts into a single count of child 

endangerment causing death and sentenced Jennings to an indeterminate period 

of incarceration not to exceed fifty years. 

I. Standard of Review

“We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo.” State v. 

Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). “If an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim is raised on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings, we may decide the 

record is adequate to decide the claim or may choose to preserve the claim for 

postconviction proceedings.” Id. To prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim, 

Jennings must show: “(1) his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and 

(2) this failure resulted in prejudice.” Id. 

We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law. 

State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). “We will consider all the 

evidence presented, not just the inculpatory evidence.” Id. “Evidence is 

considered substantial if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it 
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can convince a rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id.

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Jennings raises several instances of what he claims to be prosecutorial 

misconduct resulting in denial of a fair trial. However, the State correctly asserts 

his claims are not preserved as Jennings did not object to them during the trial. 

See State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 138 (Iowa 2018) (stating claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct not raised in the trial court would be reviewed only in the 

context of ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Radeke, 444 N.W.2d 476, 

479 (Iowa 1989) (“[A]lleged misconduct by opposing counsel must be asserted 

before the issues are submitted to the jury.”). Therefore, Jennings has not 

preserved his claims of prosecutorial misconduct for our review.3

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 

Jennings argues his attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of his 

right to confidential clergy-penitent conversations, neglecting to even recognize 

two jail-house phone calls were consultations with someone he now claims is a 

religious leader. The two calls included brief discussions about various Muslim 

practices, dress, hair style, and observances during Ramadan. Jennings claims 

counsel should have objected to the admission of recordings of the two phone calls

and asserted the calls were privileged communications. See Iowa Code § 622.10

 

3 Jennings did not ask us to consider his claims of prosecutorial conduct under an 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel framework, but even if he had, we would find the 

record insufficient to address the claims and preserve them for postconviction 

proceedings. See State v. Coil, 264 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1978) (“Even a lawyer 

is entitled to his [or her] day in court . . . .”).
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(privileging confidential communications with clergy and certain other 

professionals). To secure this privilege, Jennings must show such 

communications were: “(1) confidential, (2) entrusted to a person in his or her 

professional capacity, and (3) necessary and proper for the discharge of the 

function of the person’s office.” State v Alspach, 524 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa 1994). 

However, the State at trial only referred to this other person as Jennings’s “friend,” 

and nothing in the record identifies this other person or would alert counsel that 

the person was Jennings’s religious advisor. Such an identification is necessary 

to trigger the privilege for communications with a clergy member, as opposed to a

conversation between mere acquaintances discussing aspects of the Muslim faith. 

See id. Moreover, during the pretrial hearing, defense counsel was concerned any 

reference to Islam or Allah may create bias in the jury and feared the jury’s

“passions may be inflamed.” Such words were then deleted from the recording. 

Jennings’s counsel was therefore working to protect Jennings to ensure a fair trial. 

With no suggestion the person on the other end of the conversation was Jennings’s

religious advisor, his counsel had no duty to object to the admission of the 

recordings based on an unasserted privilege. 

Furthermore, even if Jennings could show his counsel breached an 

essential duty and the redacted recordings should not have been admitted, 

Jennings can show no resulting prejudice from these conversations that only 

vaguely related to the death of the child. In opening statements, the State 

accurately described the recordings to be admitted:

You’re also going to hear on June fourth he made a call to a 

friend where he stated acts are judged by intentions. Went on to say 
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anything that would happen, if it was unintentional, they would judge 

me on that. I didn’t intentionally do nothing, you know what I mean. 

Based on the overwhelming evidence of Jennings’s guilt, as discussed below, we 

find no prejudice resulted from admitting these recordings, and we reject his 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on the supposed privilege of these

conversations.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Jennings asserts the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence.4 The 

State claims he failed to preserve error because he never challenged the 

sufficiency in a motion for judgment of acquittal, instead waiting until a motion for 

new trial to assert his claim. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(6) (allowing the 

district court to grant new trial “[w]hen the verdict is contrary to law or evidence”). 

We note Jennings made a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the 

State’s evidence. Limited to this opinion, we choose to address his sufficiency 

argument.

Jennings’s main complaint is that there was not a specific time frame proven 

during which the fatal injuries were inflicted. Thus, he asserts he was wrongly the 

focus of the police investigation. However, the record contains ample evidence 

 

4 The jury instructions set forth the elements for child endangerment causing death:

1. On or about the 18th day of April, the defendant was the 

person having custody or control over [J.H.].

2. [J.H.] was under the age of fourteen years.

3. The defendant intentionally committed an act, committed a 

series of acts, or used unreasonable force, torture or cruelty that:

a. resulted in bodily injury to [J.H.], OR

b. was intended to cause serious injury to [J.H.].

4. The defendant’s act or acts resulted in the death of [J.H.]. 
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J.H. was happy and healthy until Jennings took sole responsibility for the child’s 

care prior to death.

The mother testified she often noticed scrapes and bruises on J.H. after the 

child was in Jennings’s care, but the mother reasoned the child was simply 

“adventurous and wild, climbing all the time, jumping off of things, just a wild child, 

full of fun.” Jennings claimed recent bruising on J.H.’s face resulted from the child

climbing a chair and falling into a heater. J.H. had a virus that caused vomiting 

within a week of death, but it seemed to have passed by April 18, 2019, and was 

of no serious concern to the mother at that time. On the morning of April 18, the 

mother recorded a few short videos of J.H.—which were admitted into evidence—

depicting a healthy child “getting up and dancing around and jumping.” Other 

witnesses testified J.H. seemed healthy and normal that day, including Jennings’s 

friend who saw J.H. as late as 4:30 p.m. and testified “[e]verything was fine” when 

they parted. The mother left J.H. in Jennings’s sole care from the time she left for 

work until around 11:20 p.m., when she returned home to find J.H. “groaning” and 

“tense.” Jennings attributed J.H.’s condition to illness. He found J.H. dead hours 

later. The State medical examiner, Dr. Dennis F. Klein, determined in the autopsy 

report that the child died of “multiple blunt force injuries” consisting of “blunt force 

injuries of head and neck, blunt force injuries of torso, blunt force injuries of 

extremities and cerebral edema,” and the manner of death was “homicide.” A 

pediatrician concluded in a report J.H.’s “injuries are the result of physical abuse.” 

With no other explanation of the multiple injuries and Jennings being the sole 

caretaker in the hours before J.H.’s death, the record contains sufficient evidence 

to uphold the verdict.
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V. Pro Se Issues

Jennings also filed a pro se brief, raising issues of ineffective assistance of 

counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. However most of his claims are general 

assertions without a specific reference to the record for us to review or are 

repetitive of his counsel’s claims already addressed. His only separate, properly 

presented claim asserts his counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the 

State made reference in closing argument to J.H.’s older sibling, T.H., being 

present at an earlier occasion when J.H. supposedly fell down stairs and sustained 

bruises to the head. The State said:

Why did [the mother] trust the defendant to keep watching her 

child after the two prior incidents? She said I believed him every time 

when he had said he let [J.H.] fall down the stairs. By the way, that 

was at his statement [to police] when he talked about the fall down 

the stairs issue. He was over talking to—I think the statement was I 

was talking to my homey . . . . [T.H.] was there. 

(Emphasis added.) Jennings asserts this statement—“[T.H.] was there”—violated 

a motion in limine barring reference to T.H. However, the motion in limine only 

prohibited “[a]ny statements of [T.H.] offered through recording or testimony.” 

Because the State only mentioned T.H. without offering any of the child’s 

statements, the State did not violate the motion in limine. Furthermore, the State 

was only quoting Jennings from a police interview, which had already been 

admitted into record without objection when the State played a recording in open 

court. Therefore, Jennings’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this 

brief reference to T.H.
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VI. Conclusion

Jennings’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct are not preserved for our 

review, we reject his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and we find 

sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Therefore, we affirm Jennings’s

conviction. 

AFFIRMED.