IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT MEMPHIS

April 17, 2012 Session

DONALD ROBINSON v. MEMPHIS-SHELBY COUNTY AIRPORT

AUTHORITY

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County

No. CH-10-0006-3 Kenny W. Armstrong, Chancellor

No. W2011-02289-COA-R3-CV - Filed August 23, 2012

Petitioner, a police officer for the Memphis Airport Police Department (“MAPD”), was

terminated by the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority (“MSCAA”) for violating

several of its policies and procedures. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner argues that

MSCAA’s policies, and its application of those policies, violated his Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination. Petitioner also argues that MSCAA violated his equal

protection rights by applying its policies and procedures in a disparate fashion. After

throughly reviewing the record, we find no basis for Petitioner’s claims. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

and Remanded

DAVID R. FARMER,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which HOLLY M. KIRBY,J., and

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., joined.

Darrell J. O’Neal, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Donald Robinson.

Jonathan C. Hancock and Whitney M. Harmon, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee,

Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

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Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

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This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion

(continued...)
I. Background and Procedural History

Petitioner/Appellant Donald Robinson (“Mr. Robinson”) was employed by the

Respondent/Appellee MSCAA as a police officer for the MAPD for approximately five

years. On June 24, 2008, Darin Leake (“Investigator Leake”), an investigator with the

Memphis Fire Department, contacted Mr. Robinson and asked to interview him regarding

an alleged arson attempt that occurred on June 15, 2008. The alleged arson attempt occurred

at the home of Mr. Robinson’s girlfriend, with whom he had been residing. After Mr.

Robinson refused to be interviewed, Investigator Leake contacted Chief Robert Vester

("Chief Vester") of the MAPD and informed him that Mr. Robinson refused to be questioned

about the incident. Investigator Leake also informed Chief Vester that Mr. Robinson

threatened him during their phone conversation. On June 26, 2008, Chief Vester arranged

a meeting with Mr. Robinson, and after discussing the allegations of arson, told Mr.

Robinson to meet with Investigator Leake and “clear up this matter.” Thereafter, Mr.

Robinson met with Investigator Leake to discuss the alleged arson attempt.

Following the meeting between Mr. Robinson and Chief Vester, the matter was

referred to the MAPD investigative unit for an internal investigation. On August 28, 2008,

as a result of the internal investigation, Mr. Robinson was notified the he was being charged

with violating several MSCAA and MAPD policies and procedures. Mr. Robinson’s alleged

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violations were based on his elusive and uncooperative behavior during the Memphis Fire

Department’s investigation and his meeting with Chief Vester. After conducting an

administrative hearing on September 4, 2008, an MSCAA panel decided to terminate Mr.

Robinson. Mr. Robinson appealed his termination to the City of Memphis Civil Service

Commission (“the Commission”). Ultimately, on November 23, 2009, the Commission

determined that the MSCAA hearing was properly conducted, that Mr. Robinson’s conduct

provided a reasonable basis to support his termination, and that Mr. Robinson’s alleged

(...continued) 1

would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall

be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and shall not be cited

or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

Specifically, Mr. Robinson was charged with violating the following: (1) MSCAA Policy and 2

Procedure 407.3(1)(q) (“failure to cooperate with investigations or fact finding reviews”); (2) MAPD Policy

and Procedure Manual 01.02(IV)(C)(1)(o) and (r) (“failure to speak the truth at all times”); (3) MAPD Policy

and Procedure Manual 01.02(IV)(C)(3) (“unbecoming conduct”); and (4) MAPD Policy and Procedure

Manual 01.02, Law Enforcement Code of Ethics (sections related to integrity, cooperation with other officers

and agencies, and private life). 

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policy and procedure violations were supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

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On January 4, 2010, Mr. Robinson filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Shelby

County Chancery Court. Mr. Robinson argued that he was terminated for refusing to waive

his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, that the MSCAA policy requiring

him to cooperate with a criminal investigation in which he was a suspect was

unconstitutional, and that MSCAA violated his equal protection rights when it applied its

policy in a disparate fashion. On April 15, 2011, the trial court entered an order denying the

petition for writ of certiorari, finding that Mr. Robinson was not required to waive his Fifth

Amendment rights, he did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, and that MSCAA had a

reasonable basis to terminate him. Thereafter, on May 16, 2011, Mr. Robinson filed a motion

to alter or amend alleging that the trial court failed to rule on whether the Commission's

findings were in violation of his Fifth Amendment and equal protection rights. On

September 14, 2011, the trial court entered an order amending its previous ruling. In the

amended order, the trial court concluded that Mr. Robinson was not disciplined for invoking,

nor was he forced to waive, his Fifth Amendment rights, and further concluded that there was

no basis to support the argument that his equal protection rights were violated. On October

4, 2011, Mr Robinson filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

II. Issues Presented

Mr. Robinson presents the following issues, as restated, for our review:

(1) Whether the MSCAA’s written employment policy requiring

cooperation with investigations is an unconstitutional violation of an

employee’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,

(2) Whether the MSCAA violated Mr. Robinson’s Fifth Amendment

The Commission’s decision upholding Mr. Robinson’s termination provides:

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The Commission finds from all of the evidence that the conduct of Mr. Robinson in failing

to report to this [sic] supervisors that he was the subject of the MFD investigation, in dealing

with Mr. Leake, and in responding to MAPD supervisors and the MSCAA hearing panel,

gave the hearing panel a reasonable basis to support its disciplinary decision to terminate

Mr. Robinson’s employment. While the Commission acknowledges that Mr. Robinson was

entitled to assert his Constitutional Rightsin response to the MFD investigation, the manner

in which he responded to Mr. Leake (evasive and threatening) and to his MAPD superiors

(concealing, evasive and not forthright), were in violation of MAPD policies and

procedures, and in particular, not in conformance with Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. 

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privilege against self-incrimination by terminating him based on

violations of employment policies, and

(3) Whether MSCAA violated Mr. Robinson’s equal protection rights by

applying its employment policies in a disparate fashion.

III. Standard of Review

Judicial review of this matter is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedures

Act (“UAPA”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 27–9–114 (2000 & Supp. 2011); City of Memphis v.

Civil Serv. Comm'n of Memphis, 238 SW3d 238, 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). The UAPA,

provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case

for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the

rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative

findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of

discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial

and material in the light of the entire record.

(B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the

court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly

detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its

judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence

on questions of fact.

(i) No agency decision pursuant to a hearing in a contested case shall

be reversed, remanded or modified by the reviewing court unlessfor errors that

affect the merits of such decision.

(j) The reviewing court shall reduce its findings of fact and conclusions

of law to writing and make them parts of the record.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4–5–322(g)(h)(i) & (j) (2011).

Accordingly, after confirming that the agency has used the correct legal principles,

the court must then review the factual findings and determine whether the agency had a

reasonably sound basis for making those findings. City of Memphis, 238 S.W.3d at 243

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(citation omitted). We and the trial court review an agency’s findings under the “substantial

and material evidence” standard. Id. (citation omitted). Substantial and material evidence

has been defined as “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support

a rational conclusion’” and which “furnish[es] a reasonably sound basis for the decision

under consideration.” Id. (quoting City of Memphis v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 216 S.W.3d 311,

316 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Jackson Mobilphone Co. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876

S.W.2d 106, 110–11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993))). We will take into account evidence in the

record that fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence, but will not substitute our own

judgment on questions of fact or re-weigh the evidence. Id. (citing see Tenn. Code Ann. §

4–5–322(h)(5)(B)). Additionally, we afford great weight to an agency’s determinations

regarding the credibility of witnesses who appear before it. Id. (citation omitted). We will

not reverse an administrative decision on the basis that the evidence could also support

another result. Id. (citation omitted). Rather, we will reverse an agency's determination

“only if a reasonable person would necessarily arrive at a different conclusion based on the

evidence.” Id.

IV. Analysis

On appeal, Mr. Robinson does not contend that MSCAA’s decision to terminate him

was not supported by substantial and material evidence. Instead, Mr. Robinson argues that

MSCAA’s policies, and its application of those policies, violated his Fifth Amendment

privilege againstself-incrimination. Further, Mr. Robinson argues that MSCAA violated his

equal protection rights by applying its policies and procedures in a disparate fashion.

We disagree. All that MSCAA required of Mr. Robinson was to cooperate during the

investigation. Mr. Robinson refused to cooperate. As the trial court emphasized, Mr.

Robinson was never disciplined for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. In fact, Mr.

Robinson never invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. Nor was Mr. Robinson forced to waive

his Fifth Amendment rights. Instead, Mr. Robinson’s conduct throughout the investigation

was uncooperative, evasive, and raised serious concerns regarding his truthfulness. It was

this conduct that resulted in Mr. Robinson’s termination. The facts simply do not support the

Fifth Amendment issues that Mr. Robinson claims.

Moreover, we agree with the trial court that no equal protection violation occurred.

The only evidence cited by Mr. Robinson was that other officers who were charged with

criminal activity were not terminated from their positions with MSCAA. As noted above,

however, Mr. Robinson was not terminated because he was charged with criminal activity.

Mr. Robinson was terminated based on his violation of multiple MSCAA and MAPD

policies and procedures arising out of his failure to cooperate during the investigation of the

criminal activity with which he was charged. No evidence was presented to show that these

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other individuals were similarly situated to Mr. Robinson beyond the fact that they were

charged with criminal activity. Thus, we agree with the trial court, and the Commission, that

Mr. Robinson’s equal protection argument is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs of this

appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Donald Robinson, and his surety, for which execution may

issue if necessary.

_________________________________

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE

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