[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Joltin, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8168.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8168

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. JOLTIN.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Joltin, Slip Opinion No. 

2016-Ohio-8168.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 

including misappropriation of client funds, failing to keep a client 

reasonably informed about the status of a legal matter, failing to promptly 

deliver funds that a client is entitled to receive, failing to cooperate in a 

disciplinary investigation, and failing to properly maintain and use a client 

trust account—Two-year suspension with one year stayed on conditions. 

(No. 2016-0261—Submitted August 16, 2016—Decided December 19, 2016.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2015-022. 

_______________________ 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Benjamin Joltin of Canfield, Ohio, Attorney Registration 

No. 0072993, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in November 2000. In a 

complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct on April 13, 2016, relator, 

disciplinary counsel, charged Joltin with multiple violations of the Rules of 

Professional Conduct arising largely from the financial mismanagement of his 

practice. Among other things, the complaint alleged that he commingled personal 

and client funds, misappropriated client funds, failed to promptly deliver funds that 

clients or third persons were entitled to receive, misled a client about the reason he 

was unable to promptly deliver her funds, and failed to maintain any records 

regarding his client trust account for several years. The parties submitted stipulated 

findings of fact and misconduct, aggravating and mitigating factors, and 77 

stipulated exhibits. They also agreed to dismiss two alleged rule violations. 

{¶ 2} After hearing Joltin’s testimony and reviewing the stipulated 

evidence, a panel of the Board of Professional Conduct issued a report largely 

adopting the parties’ stipulations of fact and misconduct and recommending the 

dismissal of an additional alleged violation. Although relator argued that Joltin’s 

misconduct warranted an indefinite suspension from the practice of law, and Joltin 

argued in favor of a fully stayed suspension, the panel recommended that Joltin be 

suspended from the practice of law for two years, with the final 18 months stayed 

on conditions. The board adopted the panel’s report in its entirety. Relator objects 

to the board’s recommended sanction and urges us to impose a two-year suspension 

with no stay. 

{¶ 3} For the reasons that follow, we sustain relator’s objection in part, 

overrule it in part, and suspend Joltin from the practice of law for two years with 

the second year stayed on conditions. 

 
January Term, 2016 

3

Misconduct 

Count One: The Torok Matter 

{¶ 4} In September 2012, Lisa Torok hired Joltin to represent her in a 

complex divorce case. Joltin stipulated that he agreed to accept a flat fee of $2,500, 

which was later increased to $3,000. But Torok gave him a check for $18,000 to 

hold in his trust account to cover her legal fees, with the balance to be distributed 

to her at her direction.1

 At the time Joltin deposited Torok’s check, his client-trustaccount balance was $28.70. Six days later, he issued a $4,000 check to himself 

with the notation “Torok” on the subject line, but he had not earned that amount as 

either a fee or a reimbursement of expenses. 

{¶ 5} In November 2012, Joltin deposited $88,000 in personal funds into 

his client trust account, thereby commingling personal and client funds. Although 

he initially testified that the deposited funds were an inheritance, he later conceded 

that they represented an executor’s fee he had earned from his grandparents’ estate. 

At Torok’s request in January 2013, Joltin issued her a check for $15,000, but when 

she attempted to cash the check in September, the bank returned it for insufficient 

funds. After the client informed Joltin that the check had been dishonored, he sent 

her an e-mail message stating that the domestic relations court had placed a 

restraining order on the distribution of the funds, but it was Joltin’s use of Torok’s 

money for his personal purposes—not the restraining order—that caused the bank 

to dishonor the check. 

{¶ 6} Joltin later issued two checks to Torok—one for $1,800 in September 

2013 and another for $5,000 in December 2013—and should have held another 

$11,200 of her money in trust. But as of January 1, 2014, his client trust account 

balance was just $421.78. 

 

1

 The purpose of the excess funds is not established in the record, and relator has not alleged that 

either Joltin or Torok intended to conceal assets from Torok’s spouse in the divorce proceeding. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

{¶ 7} Torok terminated Joltin’s representation on February 25, 2014, and a 

fee dispute ensued. Torok claimed that they had agreed to a fixed fee of $2,500, 

and Joltin claimed that the $18,000 deposit was a retainer toward his hourly fees, 

which were in excess of $4,000. Joltin ultimately agreed to accept $3,000 plus 

$300 for filing fees and expenses. After Joltin gave Torok a $4,900 cashier’s check 

in April 2014, he still owed her $3,000, but he did not respond to her numerous 

attempts to obtain the remaining funds. He did not refund the final $3,000 to Torok 

until December 7, 2015—just 9 days before his disciplinary hearing. 

{¶ 8} Relator sent his first letter of inquiry to Joltin on March 27, 2014, but 

Joltin did not timely respond. He responded to a second letter of inquiry, and his 

attorney responded in part to another letter promising to provide additional 

information. When the additional information was not sent, a deposition was 

scheduled. But after requesting and receiving several continuances and being 

subpoenaed for a November 2014 deposition, Joltin failed to appear at the 

appointed time. The board did not find Joltin’s testimony that an attorney friend 

had told him that the deposition had been postponed to be credible, because he 

offered no evidence to corroborate it and the scheduling letter plainly stated that the 

deposition would not be rescheduled for any reason. 

{¶ 9} The parties stipulated and the board found that Joltin’s conduct 

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit advance legal fees and 

expenses into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are 

earned or expenses incurred), 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver funds 

or other property that the client is entitled to receive), 1.16(e) (requiring a lawyer 

to promptly refund any unearned fee upon the lawyer’s withdrawal from 

employment), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.1(b) and Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G) 

(both requiring an attorney to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation). Because 

relator failed to present any evidence addressing the factors to be considered in 
January Term, 2016 

5

determining whether Joltin’s fee was reasonable, however, the board recommended 

that we dismiss an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer 

from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly 

excessive fee). 

{¶ 10} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and agree that Joltin’s conduct 

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c), 1.15(d), 1.16(e), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c) and Gov.Bar R. 

V(9)(G), and we dismiss the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) with respect 

to this count. 

Count Two: The Cayavec Matter 

{¶ 11} In 2009, Joltin represented Roger Johnson in a personal-injury 

matter. Before settling the case, Joltin received a notice of assignment from 

Johnson’s treating physician, Dr. Michael Cayavec. On October 29, 2009, he sent 

Dr. Cayavec a letter of protection accepting the terms of the assignment. Joltin 

settled Johnson’s case in September 2013 and distributed the settlement proceeds 

to his client, but he did not notify or pay Dr. Cayavec because he had misplaced 

and forgotten the letter of protection. Although relator sent Joltin two letters of 

inquiry regarding the doctor’s grievance in October 2014, Joltin waited until March 

12, 2015, to respond. He did not pay Dr. Cayavec the $3,400 that he was owed 

until December 7, 2015. 

{¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board found that Joltin violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) by failing to promptly deliver the funds to which Dr. Cayavec 

was entitled and that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) and Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G) by 

failing to timely cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation. The board 

also dismissed an additional alleged violation on relator’s motion. We adopt the 

board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to this count. 

Count Three: The Patterson Matter 

{¶ 13} In February 2014, Joltin agreed to assume representation of Mark 

Patterson in an eviction matter as a favor to another lawyer who was unable to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

complete the representation. Patterson paid him $205—$105 of which was for 

filing fees. Although Joltin attempted to file the eviction action, the court twice 

rejected his filings for technical deficiencies. Patterson attempted to reach Joltin 

by telephone from mid-March through early June, but spoke only with a secretary 

who assured him that Joltin was working on the case. Joltin did not respond to an 

e-mail in which Patterson detailed the issues to be set forth in the eviction 

documents. In April and May 2014, Patterson sent e-mails terminating Joltin’s 

representation and requesting a refund, but Joltin did not respond to either e-mail. 

Joltin’s March 2015 response to relator’s November and December 2014 letters of 

inquiry was neither complete nor timely. And he waited until the following 

December to refund Patterson’s $205. 

{¶ 14} The parties stipulated and the board found that Joltin’s conduct in 

the Patterson matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with 

reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep 

the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.15(d), 1.16(d) 

(requiring a lawyer withdrawing from representation to take steps reasonably 

practicable to protect a client’s interest), 1.16(e), and 8.1(b) and Gov.Bar R. 

V(9)(G). The board also dismissed an additional violation on the motion of relator. 

We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to this count. 

Count Four: Trust-Account Records 

{¶ 15} Joltin testified that he stopped maintaining client-trust-account 

records in 2008 and did not resume that practice until relator commenced his 

investigation in 2013. He admitted that he did not maintain a record of the funds 

he held on behalf of each client and that he did not maintain his bank statements or 

perform a monthly reconciliation of his client trust account. He also admitted that 

he had no idea what his client trust account balance was in 2012 when he should 

have been holding Torok’s funds. 
January Term, 2016 

7

{¶ 16} Joltin stipulated that he repeatedly misused his client trust account 

and failed to safeguard client funds from December 2012 through March 2014—

spending client funds before they were earned, repeatedly commingling personal 

and client funds, and paying his personal expenses directly from his client trust 

account on at least 85 occasions. Joltin’s client trust account was overdrawn on 

multiple occasions, and he failed to respond to at least four of relator’s letters of 

inquiry regarding those overdrafts. He also failed to appear pursuant to subpoena 

at two depositions to address these overdrafts—the first was set for April 14, 2014, 

and the second, also discussed in Count One above, was scheduled for November 

5, 2014. 

{¶ 17} The board found that Joltin’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 

1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each client that sets forth the 

name of the client; the date, amount, and source of all funds received on behalf of 

the client; the date, amount, payee, and purpose of each disbursement made on 

behalf of the client; and the current balance for each client), 1.15(a)(3) (requiring a 

lawyer to maintain a record for the lawyer’s client trust account, setting forth the 

name of the account, the date, amount, and client affected by each credit and debit, 

and the balance in the account), 1.15(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to maintain all bank 

statements, deposit slips, and cancelled checks, if provided by the bank, for each 

bank account), 1.15(a)(5) (requiring a lawyer to perform and retain a monthly 

reconciliation of the funds held in the lawyer’s client trust account), 1.15(b) 

(permitting a lawyer to deposit his or her own funds in a client trust account for the 

sole purpose of paying or obtaining a waiver of bank service charges), 1.15(c), and 

8.1(b) and Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G). We adopt the board’s findings of fact and 

misconduct with respect to Count Four of the complaint. 

Sanction 

{¶ 18} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

relevant factors, including the ethical duties the lawyer violated and the sanctions 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 

2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. We also weigh evidence of the aggravating 

and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13). 

{¶ 19} As aggravating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found 

that Joltin committed multiple offenses, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and 

failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process until after relator filed his complaint 

with the board. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3), (4), and (5). The board also found 

that he acted with a dishonest and selfish motive by distributing $4,000 of Torok’s 

funds from his client trust account to himself within days of the initial deposit 

without having earned that amount. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2). 

{¶ 20} The parties stipulated and the board agreed that mitigating factors 

include the absence of a prior disciplinary record and letters from friends and 

colleagues attesting to Joltin’s good character and reputation, as demonstrated by 

his professional competence, attention to detail, zealous advocacy, courteous 

behavior both in and out of the courtroom, and good reputation for truth and 

veracity. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) and (5). The board also afforded mitigating 

effect to Joltin’s remorse, noting that he freely acknowledged the wrongfulness of 

his conduct and wrote formal letters of apology to the affected clients. 

{¶ 21} The board accepted the parties’ stipulations that Joltin made full and 

free disclosure of his actions to the disciplinary board and that he made a “good 

faith effort to make restitution,” but it afforded very little weight to these factors 

because his actions were not timely. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(3) (providing that a 

timely, good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of 

misconduct may be considered as a mitigating factor). And although Joltin testified 

that he had limited the scope of his practice, had revised his general office 

procedures, had begun to comply with Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 requirements regarding 

his client trust accounts, and had voluntarily engaged a mentor just days before the 

hearing in this matter, the board did not give those factors any mitigating effect. 
January Term, 2016 

9

{¶ 22} The board discussed multiple events in Joltin’s personal life—

including three deaths in his family and the unraveling of his marriage—that 

negatively affected his physical and mental health at the time of the charged 

misconduct, his consultations with mental-health professionals, and his decision to 

enter into a three-year contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program on 

December 1, 2015. It determined, however, that the evidence was insufficient to 

establish that Joltin suffered from a mental disorder that was causally related to his 

misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). And the board was not convinced that 

the steps he had recently taken to address his mental-health issues would prove 

effective over time. Thus, the board did not consider those personal challenges to 

be mitigating factors, stating that there was not proof that they were a cause of his 

misconduct. 

{¶ 23} For misconduct that included significant violations including a 

complete failure to maintain required client-trust-account records and 

misappropriation of client funds, relator recommended that Joltin be indefinitely 

suspended from the practice of law. Joltin argued in favor of a fully stayed 

suspension. 

{¶ 24} After comparing the facts of this case to those in the cases 

propounded by the parties, however, the board found Joltin’s conduct to be most 

comparable to Disciplinary Counsel v. Coleman, 144 Ohio St.3d 35, 2015-Ohio2489, 40 N.E.3d 1092. Coleman accepted $18,000 from an incarcerated client and 

agreed to invest the money on the client’s behalf. Id. at ¶ 5. But he misappropriated 

the money. Id. at ¶ 5-6. When the client directed Coleman to make several 

distributions, he made them from his personal funds, but the client grew suspicious 

because the disbursements were made with money orders and cashier’s checks. Id.

at ¶ 6-7. Coleman falsely assured the client and presented him with a fraudulent 

ledger in an effort to persuade him that the funds remained safely deposited in his 

client trust account. Id. at ¶ 7. The client terminated the representation and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

demanded that Coleman return his money. Eventually, Coleman began to make 

periodic payments to the client, but it took him almost two years to repay the money 

that he had misappropriated. Id. 

{¶ 25} We found that Coleman’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 

1.15(a)(2), 1.15(a)(3), 1.15(a)(5), and 8.4(c). As aggravating factors, we found that 

Coleman acted with a selfish motive by converting his client’s money to his own 

use and that he caused harm to a vulnerable client. Id. at ¶ 10; see also Gov.Bar R. 

V(13)(B)(2) and (8). Mitigating factors included his full disclosure and cooperative 

attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings as well as his good character and 

reputation. Id. at ¶ 10; see also Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4) and (5). We also attributed 

some mitigating effect to the personal hardships Coleman faced as the single parent 

of three children following a drastic decrease in his court-appointed caseload and 

income as the result of a change in appointment procedures. Id. at ¶ 14-15. 

Considering these factors and having determined that an actual suspension was 

warranted for Coleman’s misconduct, we suspended him from the practice of law 

for two years with 18 months stayed on the conditions that he work with a lawpractice monitor for the duration of the stayed suspension and engage in no further 

misconduct. Id. at ¶ 17. 

{¶ 26} Given the similarities between the financial misdeeds of Coleman 

and Joltin—including their commingling, misappropriation, failure to maintain 

adequate records of client funds in their possession, and false statements to their 

clients—the board concluded that their conduct warranted comparable sanctions. 

It therefore recommended that we suspend Joltin for two years but stay the final 18 

months on the conditions that he (1) serve a period of monitored probation, (2) 

complete three hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) addressing trustaccount maintenance in addition to the CLE required by Gov.Bar R. X(13), (3) fully 

comply with his existing OLAP contract, and (4) commit no further misconduct. 
January Term, 2016 

11 

{¶ 27} Relator objects to the board’s recommended sanction and argues that 

Joltin’s multiple acts of misconduct, including dishonesty and the misappropriation 

of client funds, warrants a harsher sanction. Comparing that conduct with the 

conduct at issue in Disciplinary Counsel v. McCauley, 114 Ohio St.3d 461, 2007-

Ohio-4259, 873 N.E.2d 269, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Crosby, 124 Ohio St.3d 

226, 2009-Ohio-6763, 921 N.E.2d 225, relator suggests that the appropriate 

sanction is a two-year suspension from the practice of law with no stay. 

{¶ 28} In McCauley, we indefinitely suspended an attorney who 

commingled personal and client funds, misappropriated funds from his client trust 

account to pay his personal and business expenses, overdrew his client trust 

account, and failed to maintain complete records regarding the client funds in his 

possession. Id. at ¶ 5-6. But McCauley misappropriated approximately $200,000 

from two clients who consigned their accounts receivable to him for collection and 

payment—whereas Joltin misappropriated $18,000. In addition, McCauley 

defaulted on a cognovit promissory note that he signed as part of an agreement to 

reimburse one of the clients from whom he misappropriated accounts receivable. 

He also misappropriated significant sums that he held on behalf of a third client and 

spent an additional $60,000 that had been deposited in his account due to a bank 

error. Id. at ¶ 10-11, 14-15. Like Joltin, McCauley ignored or failed to sufficiently 

respond to relator’s letters of inquiry about the underlying grievances, although he 

eventually stipulated that he engaged in much of the charged misconduct. Id. at 

¶ 6, 12, 20, 21. 

{¶ 29} We acknowledged that disbarment is the presumptive sanction for 

the misappropriation of client funds. Id. at ¶ 22; see, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 

Rothermel, 104 Ohio St.3d 413, 2004-Ohio-6559, 819 N.E.2d 1009. But we found 

that McCauley’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, eventual cooperation in the 

disciplinary proceedings, and acknowledgment of wrongdoing and sincere remorse, 

combined with payment of full restitution to his clients, outweighed aggravating 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

factors that included multiple offenses and a pattern of misconduct. Id. at ¶ 23; see 

also Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (3), and (4) and V(13)(B)(3) and (4). Therefore, we 

accepted the board’s recommendation that McCauley be indefinitely suspended 

from the practice of law in Ohio and be required to complete at least 12 hours of 

CLE in law-office and trust-account management in addition to the general CLE 

requirements. Id. at ¶ 24. 

{¶ 30} In Crosby, we confronted an attorney who commingled personal and 

client funds, used his client trust account as a personal checking account, failed to 

maintain complete records of all client funds coming into his possession, failed to 

properly train or supervise the employee he entrusted to maintain his client trust 

account, and retained earned fees in his client trust account in a deliberate attempt 

to shield the funds from judgment creditors and taxing authorities. Crosby, 124 

Ohio St.3d 226, 2009-Ohio-6763, 921 N.E.2d 225, at ¶ 5, 8-9, 12-13. 

{¶ 31} Although Crosby was not charged with misappropriating client 

funds, the evidence showed that he overdrew his client trust account and that on at 

least one occasion the account balance was nearly $8,000 less than the amount that 

had been entrusted to him by one of his clients. Id. at ¶ 9 and fn. 2. In mitigation, 

we found that Crosby had no prior disciplinary record and there was no evidence 

that he failed to make his clients whole. Id. at ¶ 16. Aggravating factors, however, 

included a pattern of misconduct, failure to fully cooperate in the disciplinary 

process, and Crosby’s dishonest and selfish efforts to hide his personal funds from 

his creditors. Id. at ¶ 17. On those facts, we suspended Crosby for two years with 

no stay and conditioned his reinstatement on the completion of 12 hours of CLE in 

law-office management and accounting in addition to the standard CLE 

requirement and payment or compromise of nearly $26,000 in judgments that had 

been taken against him. Id. at ¶ 22-34. 

{¶ 32} While there is no doubt that Joltin’s conduct is serious and warrants 

a period of actual suspension from the practice of law, it is not comparable to 
January Term, 2016 

13 

McCauley’s misappropriation of more than $300,000 from his clients and his bank. 

And while Joltin’s misconduct is similar to that of Crosby, we find that Crosby’s 

conduct was more egregious in that he admitted that he commingled personal and 

client funds not only as a convenience but also to shield his personal assets from 

judgment creditors and taxing authorities. Crosby at ¶ 13. In contrast, relator did 

not allege in its complaint or earnestly attempt to prove that Joltin deposited the 

$88,000 he received as an executor’s fee from the estate of his deceased 

grandparents into his client trust account with the intent to conceal his assets from 

his spouse. 

{¶ 33} Of the cases advanced by the parties and the board, we find that 

Joltin’s dishonesty and financial misconduct are most analogous to the misconduct 

at issue in Coleman. But in addition to misusing his client trust account, failing to 

maintain required records regarding his client trust account, and misappropriating 

$18,000 in client funds, Joltin also failed to honor a letter of protection issued to a 

client’s treating physician for more than two years after distributing settlement 

proceeds to his client and neglected another client’s matter. Moreover, he failed to 

respond to multiple letters of inquiry sent by relator, provided incomplete answers 

in others, and ignored subpoenas compelling his attendance at two separate 

depositions. Therefore, we agree with relator’s argument that a greater period of 

actual suspension is warranted given Joltin’s additional misconduct, the presence 

of serious aggravating factors including a dishonest and selfish motive, multiple 

offenses, a pattern of misconduct, and failure to cooperate in the disciplinary 

process as well as Joltin’s delays in making restitution, seeking a mentor, and 

seeking assistance from OLAP. Contrary to relator’s argument, however, we 

believe that a two-year suspension with the second year stayed on the conditions 

recommended by the board is commensurate with the severity of Joltin’s 

misconduct and will adequately protect the public from future harm. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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{¶ 34} Accordingly, we sustain relator’s objection in part, overrule it in 

part, and suspend Benjamin Joltin from the practice of law in Ohio for two years 

with the second year stayed on the conditions that he serve a one-year period of 

monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21), complete three hours 

of CLE addressing trust-account maintenance in addition to the CLE requirements 

of Gov.Bar R. X(13), remain in full compliance with his existing OLAP contract, 

follow all treatment recommendations of OLAP and his treating professionals, and 

commit no further misconduct. Costs are taxed to Joltin. 

Judgment accordingly. 

PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

LANZINGER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’CONNOR, C.J. 

_________________ 

LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 35} I respectfully dissent and would impose an indefinite suspension in 

this case. A two-year suspension with one-year stayed is insufficient when the 

presumptive sanction is disbarment for misappropriation of client funds. See

Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Rothermel, 104 Ohio St.3d 413, 2004-Ohio-6559, 819 

N.E.2d 1099, ¶ 18. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Catherine M. Russo, Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 

Tracey A. Laslo, for respondent. 

_________________