U.S. Naval War College

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

CIWAG Case Studies Reports & Studies

11-2012

Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in

Honduras

John D. Waghelstein

Follow this and additional works at: http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Reports & Studies at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for

inclusion in CIWAG Case Studies by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact

daniel.desilets@usnwc.edu.

Recommended Citation

Waghelstein, John D., "Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in Honduras" (2012). CIWAG Case Studies. 1.

http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/1
UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

CENTER on IRREGULAR WARFARE andARMED GROUPS

United States Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Draft as of 121916

COL John Waghelstein

Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in 

Honduras
Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in 

Honduras

Col. John D. Waghelstein
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

2

Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG)

US Naval War College, Newport, RI

CIWAG@usnwc.edu

This work is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This case study is available on CIWAG’s public website located at 

http://www.usnwc.edu/ciwag
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

3

Message from the Editors

In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on 

Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary 

mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting edge research on Irregular 

Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) 

curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars 

together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array 

of violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part 

of an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by 

world-renowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles and 

books. Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving and 

adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to 

meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world.

Col. John D. Waghelstein (Ret.) is the author of this case study, 

which examines ways of recognizing an insurgency while it is still in its 

early stages. This case looks at the strategic and operational effects of 

interagency friction, intelligence assessments, and how to recognize the 

nature of the conflict. It includes a framework for analyzing insurgencies 

at their earliest stages; it also provides a set of benchmarks that have 

helped operators to better understand their environment. The framework is 

not meant to be conclusive; rather, it is a set of questions to help current 

operators consider when and whether an organized rebellion is forming. 

The case also raises the issue of what other indicators we should be aware 

of in a 21st century, social media world.

It is also important to note four critical caveats to this case study. 

First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author 

and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval 

War College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to 

correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible 

for the content of this case study. Third, this is a methodology for 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

4

recognizing an insurgency and is just one approach. There are others and it 

is up to the student—the practitioners and operators—to adapt this 

framework and others to suit their environment and conditions. And 

fourth, the study questions presented in all CIWAG case studies are 

written to provoke discussion on a wide variety of topics including 

strategic, operational, and tactical matters as well as ethical and moral 

questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The point is to make 

these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills 

the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 

world and to show them the dilemmas that real people faced in highpressure situations. 

Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are 

intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students 

conducting research on Honduras and Latin America will probably find 

the extensive bibliography at the end of the case helpful. Compiled by the 

case study author and by CIWAG researchers at the Naval War College, 

the bibliography is a selection of the best books and articles on a range of 

related topics. We hope you find it useful and look forward to hearing 

your feedback on the cases and suggestions for how you can contribute to 

the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the 

Naval War College.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

5

Table of Contents

Message from the Editors 3

Acknowledgments 6

I. Introduction 9

II. Phase One and Two Insurgencies 14

III. Background 16

Map 1: Central America and the Caribbean.......................................... 19

Map 2: Honduras, Overview....................................................................... 20

Map 3: Honduras and the Bolsones.......................................................... 21

IV. The Checklist 22

A. Discussion......................................................................................................... 23

V. Messages and Reports (M&R) 29

A. M&R 1-6: July 1982 to July 1984.............................................................. 29

B. Reaction............................................................................................................. 33

C. M&R 7 March–30 November 1986.......................................................... 35

D. The End of the Case, the End of an Era.................................................. 55

VI. Annexes 56

Annex A: Analyzing Insurgency..................................................................... 57

Annex B: Memorandum of Phone Conversation with General John 

Galvin (U.S. Army, Ret.)..................................................................................... 77

Annex C: Recollection........................................................................................ 79

Annex D: Reflections on Contributing Factors ........................................ 81

Annex E: Early Special Operations Force—What Came Before........ 83

Figure 1: Gulf of Fonseca ............................................................................. 96

VII. Bibliography 105
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

6

Acknowledgments

Thanks to the following contributors to this case:

LTC Robert Watson

AMB John Negroponte

GEN John Galvin

GEN Fred Woerner

MG John Stewart

COL Tom Kuster

LTC John Fishel

CPT Joe Carrera
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

7

Acronyms and Terms

AOH: Honduran Army

CBI: Caribbean Basin Initiative

CONUS: Contiguous United States

CREM: Regional Training Center (Centro Regional de Entrenamiento 

Militar)

DR: Dominican Republic

ESAF: Armed Forces of El Salvador (Fuerza Armada de El Salvador)

ESF: Economic Support Funds

FAST: Forward Area Support Team

FDR: Franklin Delano Roosevelt

FMLN: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo 

Martí de Liberación Nacional)

FOB: Forward Operating Base

FSLN: Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de 

Liberación Nacional)

GOH: Government of Honduras

Good Neighbor Policy: The Good Neighbor Policy was first introduced by 

President Franklin Roosevelt and dealt with U.S.-Latin American 

relations. The policy pledged non-interference in the domestic 

affairs by the U.S. and looked to increase mutual trade 

relationships. 

JTF: Joint Task Force

JTF-B: Joint Task Force Bravo

Monroe Doctrine: A policy outlined in President James Monroe’s 7th

State of the Union Address in 1823. In his speech, Monroe 

declared that the Americas should be free of all influence from 

Europe—any further efforts on the part of Europe at colonizing the 

Americas would be seen as a provocation and would see retaliation 

from the United States. 

MPLC: Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement, aka Cinchoneros
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

8

MTT: Mobile Training Team

ODA: Operation Detachment Alpha

PCH: Communist Party of Honduras

PRTCH: Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers of Honduras

Roosevelt Corollary: Enacted in 1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt, 

this policy was a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine. It put forth 

the idea that the United States should assume responsibility for 

enforcing good behavior in South America, and thus prevent any 

intrusion by outside powers. 

RSOI: Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration

SAF: Special Action Force (8th Special Forces Group [Airborne], Special 

Action Force, Latin America)

SCIF: Secure/Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

SFG: Special Forces Group

SFGA: Special Forces Group Airborne

SFOD A/B: Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha/Bravo

SOT-A: Special Operations Team—Alpha

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

USEMB: United States Embassy

USMILGP: United States Military Group
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

9

I. Introduction

In the early hours of July 4, 1982, buildings in the Honduran 

capital of Tegucigalpa shook with a bomb blast that rattled the windows 

and turned off the lights. Such acts were not uncommon over the border in 

El Salvador, but were shocking in Honduras. The newly elected 

government of Suazo Cordova, the first civilian leader after a decade of 

military rule, had just been served notice that the civil war in El Salvador 

between the ruling military government and the leftist insurgents (the 

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN) had spread to 

Honduras. According to the communiqué the bombers issued that night, 

the act had been carried out by Salvadoran guerrillas in retaliation for 

Honduran army counterguerrilla operations against them in the disputed, 

demilitarized, border region between the two countries. This region, the

bolsones, resulted from the so-called Soccer War of 1969 and had become 

safe havens for the El Salvadoran insurgents.

The guerrillas escalated their activities in the Honduran city of San 

Pedro Sula on September 17, 1982 by seizing the Chamber of Commerce 

and holding 80 members hostage for eight days. Their demands included 

the immediate release of a Salvadoran insurgent held by the Hondurans 

and the expulsion of all foreign advisors. 

The hostages were eventually released and the guerrillas’ demands 

ignored. The hostage takers were flown to Cuba via Panama. Taking 

hostages had been the hallmark of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in their 

successful 12-year war against the Somoza regime (1967–1979), and now 

Honduras was getting a taste. The ugly war in El Salvador had spilled over 

to Honduras. Or had it? The questions that were raised in response to these 

incidents varied widely between different officials. Was Honduras really 

next, or was this merely spillover from the chaos of the region?

In 1980, a Honduran Committee for Solidarity with the Struggle 

for Central American Peoples had been organized, which enlisted support 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

10

for the El Salvadoran FMLN and established liaison for aid from 

communist Nicaragua. The Revolutionary Party of Central American 

Workers of Honduras (PRTCH) and several other small revolutionary 

groups joined the PCH coalition in 1982. One such group that would be 

heard from was the Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement (MPLC) or 

“Cinchoneros.”

For nearly 18 months there was silence from the guerillas and then 

it began. Reports of attacks on the Honduran Supreme Court building, 

police stations, a military school, and the Salvadoran consulate filtered in. 

What was really going on? Why weren’t these reports taken seriously and 

acted upon? What were we missing? For nearly three years a budding 

insurgency had been incubating in plain view, but various factors 

precluded a formal recognition of it or an effective response. Lacking a 

means of identifying trigger points of insurgency, the powers that be were 

mostly oblivious to impending threats. The situation required a fresh and 

experienced observer to assess what was happening, and a matrix by 

which to evaluate those threats.

Honduras was my last insurgency. 

In the preceding 26 years, I had participated in operations in 

Vietnam and South East Asia, the Cuban missile crisis, Panama, the 

Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and El Salvador. Pretty much anywhere 

there was an insurgency, I had seen some aspect of it.

My involvement in Honduras came with assuming command of the 

7th Special Forces Group (SFG) in the spring of 1985. The group’s beat 

was all of Latin America and the Caribbean. At that time, the situation in 

Honduras did not look like much of an insurgency and 7th SFG’s focus 

was elsewhere: El Salvador and Nicaragua. The ongoing war in El 

Salvador got a sizable amount of the 7th’s attention, and all those Russianmade tanks and other stuff that had been provided to the new Marxist 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

11

government in Managua, Nicaragua got the rest. Honduras was an 

afterthought. The 7th SFG’s mandate did include backstopping the army 

of Honduras (AOH) with training and advice and implementing war plans 

should the Nicaraguans decide to invade their neighbor. But our focus was 

Honduras’s neighbors, and this was essentially a conventional role, with 

little concern for our rear.

My initial assessment was that an internal threat by some sort of 

insurgents or at least rebels seemed to be active in Honduras. The question 

was who, how, and why?

All this changed, however, over the several months I visited 

Honduras in spring 1985. As I read the reports—cable traffic, mostly—I 

became suspicious that something more sinister might be brewing. An 

attack here, an incident there, a person targeted, and propaganda targeting 

the government and later targeting us. It all seemed more than random acts 

of violence; it looked organized. An old framework from my Vietnam 

counterinsurgency days helped pose the right assessment questions. Some 

of those questions were: Was there evidence of subversive (and/or 

Communist) groups operating within the country or receiving external 

assistance? Was there increasing provocation to force governmental 

response? Were local officials being kidnapped or killed?

Complicating matters, my concerns were dismissed by the U.S.

Embassy, Southern Command, and the Honduran Army. At this point, 

almost three years after the initial attacks, the almost universal response 

was “we killed all the guerrillas in ‘82 and ’83.” The Honduran police 

entity (FUSEP) was much less dismissive, but they were thin on the 

ground and 7th SFG was proscribed from dealing directly with them 

because of post-Vietnam legislation.

So the question became: Was there really an insurgency festering 

in Honduras? If so, what evidence did we have, and how could we 

persuade others to our point of view? 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

12

Having (mis?)spent most of my career in the counterinsurgency 

arena, I knew that the typical “gringo” way of direct confrontation was not 

going to get anywhere, so I opted for a more subtle approach: I altered 7th

SFG deployments to Honduras from one massive annual surge operation 

to a series of deployments involving fewer teams but having a constant 

presence. 

Instead of sending the Group HQ and two battalions for a few 

weeks, we put four to six operational detachments alpha (ODAs) and a B 

detachment on a continuous rotation. I directed these teams to report 

whatever they saw, paying particular attention to what was going on in 

Honduras on the ground. Their job was to read the tea leaves and figure 

out whether there was any merit to our suspicions. 

Over the next year, we had full-time Special Forces assets 

observing and reporting while training with the AOH. Because a SF Group 

had its own Intelligence unit, we were also able to report our observations 

directly into the intelligence stream. You will see the reaction that 

generated.

It took a while and a lot of reporting, in-fighting, and rethinking,

but eventually Southern Command changed its position and came to the 

conclusion there was something occurring on the north coast of Honduras. 

If it had not been for Gen. John Galvin, this might have ended differently. 

Of all the Southern Command Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) I worked 

for over three decades, he was the most effective. Eventually the AOH 

also became believers and, with a little help from us, took the lead in 

dealing with the threat. Ultimately, the guerrillas were destroyed.

This case is about an insurgency that apparently had all the 

essentials for success but never transitioned beyond Phase One, the protoinsurgency phase. According to Daniel Byman,

1

the success or failure of a 

 

1 For an excellent report on how insurgencies move from ragtag bands of fighters 

or terrorists to “full-blown insurgencies,” see Daniel Byman, Understanding

Proto-Insurgencies (Rand, 2007).
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

13

proto-insurgency depends in large part on the reaction of the state. This 

case examines a wide range of issues that worked against the Honduran 

government’s success at extirpating the insurgency, including institutional 

indifference and preoccupation with external threats on the part of the 

Honduran Army, bureaucratic inertia on the part of the American incountry entities, and turf sensitivity by U.S. intelligence. In spite of these 

obstacles, the Government of Honduras (GOH) eventually neutralized the 

insurgent threat. The prevailing question is: How was this threat 

recognized?

Case study users are encouraged to use both the Vietnam-era 

checklist in Part IV and Analyzing Insurgency (Annex A) as tools for 

getting at the guts of this case. Those of us who were on the ground then 

did not have the benefit of much more than the checklist. 

Discussion Questions

1. What role does institutional friction play in the slow acknowledgement 

of the existence of an insurgency in this case? 

2. What institutional adaptation does the 7th Group implement to 

improve their ability to assess the situation on the ground? 

3. What friction does this create with other institutions, and why? 

4. How could you overcome that friction?
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

14

II. Phase One and Two Insurgencies

Phase One insurgencies are usually more about propaganda or 

public affairs than a serious threat to the government. Scattered acts of 

terrorism may be all the insurgency is capable of conducting but, as we 

know from the Middle East, they can still be effective. Sometimes there is 

a series of well-publicized attacks on the infrastructure, which would 

include electrical, transportation, and communications targets. 

Assassinations have also served the same purpose and are particularly 

effective if the target is a well-known official (e.g., Archduke Franz 

Ferdinand in Sarajevo, June 1914; President Anwar Sadat in Cairo, 

October 1981). These types of attacks are relatively easy to conduct, are 

cheaply resourced, serve as confidence builders, and most importantly get 

the public’s attention. In El Salvador during this same period, for example, 

the highly vulnerable power grid was targeted almost nightly by a much 

more developed and aggressive FMLN insurgency. The first actions in 

Honduras were small in scope and relatively timid.

When an insurgency has solidified a portion of the population as a 

base, has well-established logistics, has developed the necessary 

infrastructure, and has built enough internal confidence and uncertainty in 

the targeted regime, it may be time to ratchet up the volume and go to 

Phase Two. This phase can include all the activity of Phase One as well as

armed group attacks on public security forces, visible international 

entities, or even well-guarded military bases. It should be noted that 

determining this “inflection point” is an art and not a science.2 There have 

 

2 This transitional stage is expounded upon in the report by Daniel Byman, 

Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, op.cit. The report focuses on “measures that 

indicate when proto-insurgencies may grow into full-blown insurgent 

movements.” Byman cites the following indicators to consider: (1) the strength of 

the proffered identity; (2) group composition; (3) relations with other community 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

15

been insurgencies that have overthrown the targeted government in short 

order (two years for Cuba) and others that have not (20 years for China). 

No formulas, no scripts, and no precedents exist that offer a sure-fire 

roadmap to victory for either side. There had been some low-level 

insurgent activity in Honduras. The question was, how serious was it?

 

members; (4) use of and response to violence; (5) existence of sanctuary; (6) 

external support; and (7) state response (p. 51).
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

16

III. Background

The Cold War in the 1950s witnessed Soviet support of leftist 

movements in Central America, but distance and logistics made these 

threats ineffective. When the leftist Jacobo Arbenz regime took power in 

Guatemala (1953–1954) and began threatening U.S. economic and 

political interests, for example, CIA support helped to overthrow Arbenz.3

Indeed, throughout the region, the United States supported those 

threatened friendly governments with military aid. With Fidel Castro’s 

1959 triumph in Cuba, however, there now existed a base for exporting

revolution into the Southern hemisphere, and Castro wasted little time in 

spreading his brand of revolution (see Venezuela 1960). In response to this 

new threat, President Kennedy’s policy initiatives included the Alliance 

for Progress and counterinsurgency efforts to support U.S. allies besieged 

by Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements. The primary 

counterinsurgency effort was carried out by the 7th Special Forces Group 

(SFG) (1961-1962); the 8th Special Action Force (SAF) (1963–1973) and 

the 7th SFG (1973–present). 

From 1960 to 1979, U.S.-backed Latin American militaries put 

these insurgencies out of business with painful regularity. From Argentina 

to Guatemala, Castro-inspired guerrillas suffered defeat after defeat, the 

most spectacular being the disastrous end to Che Guevara’s Bolivian 

adventure in 1967. The Bolivian operation was in large part the result of 

the training efforts of an 8th SAF Mobile Training Team (MTT) that 

 

3Kate Doyle and Peter Kornbluh, “CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 

Documents,” George Washington University National Security Archive 

Electronic Briefing Book No. 4. Accessed Aug 11, 2011. 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

17

deployed from Panama.4 Moscow, having consistently advised 

accommodation and long-term subversion, watched with an “I told you 

so” attitude. This slower “peaceful revolution” approach seemed to have 

worked in Chile with the 1970 election of Marxist Salvador Allende. This 

success was short-lived, however, as the Chilean military overthrew the

regime in 1973.5 By the mid-1970s, after repeated failures, the Moscowline advocates and the pro-Havana players reached a synthesis and began a 

combination of armed revolution and temporary alliances with dissatisfied 

non-communist elements. This synthesis eventually achieved a near

success in El Salvador and victory in Nicaragua in 1979.6 The Soviets and 

Castro had finally achieved what had eluded revolutionaries for two 

decades.

Despite this apparent synthesis of Havana- and Moscow-based 

insurgencies, there were fissures in the façade. “Castroites” were known 

for impatience and Moscow adherents for caution, which sometimes led to 

 

4

Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in 

Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007); Stephen G. Rabe, The Most 

Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist 

Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 

1999); Michel Gobat, “Review of ‘Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance 

for Progress in Latin America’,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 

(2008): 872-873; Stephen M. Streeter, “Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal 

Counter-Insurgency: Guatemala and the Contradictions of the Alliance for 

Progress,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 57-68; Ernest R. May, “The 

Alliance for Progress in Historical Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 41, no. 4 (1963).

5 Paul E. Sigmund “The ‘Invisible Blockade’ and the Overthrow of Allende,” 

Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974).

6 For a brief synopsis of events in El Salvador and Nicaragua, see “El Salvador 

Civil War,” GlobalSecuirty.org, 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/elsalvador2.htm (accessed July 

12, 2011); William M. LeoGrande and Carla Anne Robbins, “Oligarchs and 

Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador,” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 5 (1980): 1084-

1103; William M. LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” 

Foreign Affairs 58, no. 1 (1979): 28-50.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

18

rash acts or lost opportunities. Their differences sometimes were violent. 

At the end of the El Salvadoran insurgency, one group recognized the 

futility of continuing the struggle and pulled the rest to a negotiated end to 

the war.7 Honduran leftist organizations had a similar experience but 

ended without a seat at the bargaining table.

The Honduras case here may be considered the last in a series of 

Soviet-backed attempts to destabilize the region. 

 

7 Charles T. Call, “Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the 

Rule of Law in El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 4 (2003): 

827-862; Tricia Juhn, Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations 

and the Conspiracy to End the War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); 

“War’s End in El Salvador,” The Economist, 1 February 1992. 

http://www.economist.com/node/13311602.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

19

Map 1: Central America and the Caribbean
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

20

Map 2: Honduras, Overview
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

21

Map 3: Honduras and the Bolsones
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

22

IV. The Checklist

The indicators in this checklist8 were designed to help clarify the 

general level of insurgent activity but may only point toward cumulative 

effect. Remember that the typical first phase is primarily focused on 

infrastructure development and in sensitizing the population. Each act, 

even the non-violent ones, are part of that theatre that educates and 

informs the population and points out the government’s weaknesses. 

Insurgency Checklist

1. Have communist-trained leaders been found in the country?

2. Is there evidence of clandestine subversive organizations in 

the country?

3. Is there evidence or indication of a subversive organization 

that is receiving external assistance? 

4. Are there detectable efforts to create or increase unrest and 

dissension among the people? 

5. Is there propaganda against actual or proposed government 

programs?

6. Are there active disinformation campaigns?

7. Is there agitation or resistance against efforts of the 

government to resolve problems causing dissatisfaction?

8. Are there attempts to provoke restrictive measures from the 

government? 

9. Are local officials being kidnapped or killed?

10. Is there evidence of small guerilla groups or guerilla action 

on a small scale?

 

8 Source: Special Text ST 31-176 Counterinsurgency Planning Guide, EEI p. 53. 

Pub date-1963/1964
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

23

A. Discussion

1. Have communist-trained leaders been found in the 

country?

Creating “wiring diagrams” of insurgent organizations is 

difficult and time-consuming, but vital to success. Those 

organizational charts with names, biographies, contacts, and 

photographs are a must in putting insurgencies out of business and 

in many ways are similar to the effort needed to dismantle 

organized criminal organizations such as the Mafia. There were 

communists in Honduras, but due to the operation of General 

Alvarez Martinez, chief of the AOH, there was little activity, and 

few prominent players’ names even made the papers.

2. Is there evidence of clandestine subversive 

organizations in the country? 

Getting inside these organizations is dangerous business 

that requires deep-cover agents or turned members. Answering this 

indicator’s question, as with the previous one, relies partly on 

electronic intercepts (SIGINT) and other forms of technical 

intelligence (e.g., PHOTINT)9for information, but the critical

route is via human sources. Human intelligence (HUMINT) trumps 

all. The satellite photos may tell you where the bad guys are and 

SIGINT what they are saying at the moment, but they do not tell 

you where they will be and what they have planned for tomorrow.

During the “quiet time,” the leftist organizations, for the most part, 

were exhibiting a low profile.

3. Is there evidence or indication of a subversive 

organization that is receiving external assistance? 

This type of support is the easiest to quantify. Consider 

how much effort went in to interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail

 

9 PHOTINT: Photographic Intelligence
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

24

during the Vietnam War.

10 The unending flow of troops and 

supplies kept the war in southeast Asia going and was almost 

impervious to our interdiction efforts. But outside assistance isn’t 

the only way to keep an insurgency going. Other means of support 

come from the opposing military through capture; from the general 

population, either freely given or coerced; and from manufacture 

within the organization. In the early stages, an insurgency often 

relies heavily on outside support. As it becomes more developed, 

internal support picks up some, but not all, of the slack. For 

example, when it came to the leftists’ 1984 destruction of the PanAmerican Highway Bridge over the Rio Lempa in El Salvador, 

outside demolition specialists from Eastern Europe were called in 

to drop the bridge.

The Sandinistas were making no secret of their support of 

whatever action was being taken against the governments of El 

Salvador and Honduras. Periodically there would be a successful 

interception of supplies, such as the 1982 intercept of a weaponsladen truck on the El Salvador-Guatemala border. U.S. intelligence 

services are particularly attuned to outside logistical movement and 

its quantification. Once the existence of this support is known, 

however, the real job is assessing how much are you interdicting. 

 

10 “The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a network of routes by which men and munitions 

were sent from North Vietnam to the battlefields of South Vietnam and 

eventually also to Cambodia during the Vietnam War. These routes ran through 

the Truong Son Mountains, on both sides of the border between Vietnam and 

southeastern Laos.” Edwin E. Moise, “Review of ‘The Road to Freedom: A 

History of the Ho Chi Minh Trail’,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 3 (2006): 558; 

Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 

Conflict,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 175-200; Gregory T. Banner, The War 

for the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Army Command and General Staff College, 1993); 

John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War

(New York: Wiley, 1999).
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

25

As in Vietnam, the difficulty in quantification is how much of what 

are you stopping. We knew how many trucks were destroyed, but 

were never certain as to many trucks were involved to begin with.

4. Are there detectable efforts to create or increase unrest 

and dissension among the people?

All insurgencies draw propaganda points from an existent 

set of issues or grievances that concern all or parts of the 

population. These issues can be exploited for their propaganda 

value. In Vietnam, for instance, the U.S./South Vietnamese 

Strategic Hamlet program attempted to separate the guerrillas from 

the population.11 It also separated the population from their 

villages and from the tombs of their ancestors, however, with 

serious repercussions and loss of popular support for the 

government. As we shall see below, the Honduran left used the 

presence of large numbers of “gringos,“ the road-building 

operations, and the presence of El Salvadoran troops in the 

Honduran Regional Military Training Center (Centro Regional 

Entranimiento Militar, or CREM) as issues. 

5. Is there propaganda against actual or proposed 

government programs?

Even the best-intentioned program designed to alleviate 

discontent can be used as grist for the propagandist’s mill. A twist 

here, a little spin there, and the program becomes ineffective, 

dangerous, or sinister. In El Salvador, the three-phase land reform 

program achieved considerable success in undermining the 

 

11 John C. Donnell and Gerald Cannon Hickey, The Vietnamese “Strategic 

Hamlets“: A Preliminary Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1962); 

Peter F. Leahy, “Why Did the Strategic Hamlet Program Fail?”

(Thesis/dissertation (M.S.): National government publication, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, 1990); Philip E. Catton, “CounterInsurgency and Nation Building: The Strategic Hamlet Programme in South 

Vietnam,“ The International History Review 21, no. 4 (1999): 918-940.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

26

FMLN’s appeal. The FMLN responded by refashioning and 

focusing on the least effective segment, thereby diminishing the 

whole reform program. Through the propagandist’s lens, the muchneeded farm-to-market road building became twisted into 

“disruption of Honduran tranquility,” “unfairly benefitting special 

interests or privileged families,” or “roads are for U.S. invasion of 

Nicaragua.”

6. Are there active disinformation campaigns? 

False, partially false, or marginally false disinformation 

campaigns can generate dissatisfaction with the government and, 

as noted above, with government programs. Rumors seem to travel 

faster than radio waves in rural Third World cultures, and once 

repeated they are often held as gospel, particularly when there is no 

dissenting view. The war in the arena of public opinion is as 

important as combat in the jungle, if not more so.

7. Is there agitation or resistance against efforts of the 

government to resolve problems causing dissatisfaction? 

Closely related to the previous indicator, this action takes 

disinformation a step up, and we might witness a peaceful 

demonstration against the government’s programs. A peaceful 

demonstration can be changed to a violent one in a wink and lead 

overzealous law enforcement to bloody reprisal. Each such 

incident can provide the agitator with a new propaganda 

opportunity. 

8. Are there attempts to provoke restrictive measures 

from the government?

The next step on the escalator for the insurgent is 

government prohibition against all demonstrations. The real goal is 

to create an environment where all means of expression are denied. 

The unavailability of outlets for debate adds to the frustration of 

the population, which in turns improves the movement’s recruiting 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

27

opportunities. One of the objectives in the Venezuelan FLN 

insurgency (1960–1966) was to incite the military to overthrow the 

democratically elected government of Romulo Betancourt. Once 

that had been achieved, the army would then be able to be more 

easily dealt with. The army stayed loyal in this case, and the 

guerrillas eventually were defeated. 

9. Are local officials being kidnapped or killed? 

As with other acts of violence, attacks such as assassination 

or kidnapping get press coverage for the insurgents. Hostage taking 

requires a bit more sophistication and nerve, as the hostage and 

hostage takers are in the same target area until there is a break in 

the standoff. A relatively simple but effective tool, assassination 

has been used for centuries. Michael Collins’s use of assassination 

in Ireland (1920–1921) eventually helped bring the British Empire 

to the negotiating table, and assassination eventually helped drive 

the British out of Palestine (1947–1948). Assassination is theatre, 

demonstrates government weakness and vulnerability, and, when 

the victim is unpopular, helps the insurgent gain legitimacy. In 

Vietnam, for example, the targets of VC assassination were often 

tax collectors and unpopular village officials.

10. Is there evidence of small guerilla groups or guerilla 

action on a small scale?

When guerrilla groups begin combat operations such as 

raids and ambushes, it is a sign that things are about to escalate. 

This is the critical moment in a Phase One insurgency. The 

operations in this stage are small confidence-building exercises 

that demonstrate that the regime is vulnerable. If successful and the 

government is slow or ineffective, the tempo and lethality will 

increase. If begun prematurely and the government reacts with 

vigor and competence, the guerrillas may be vulnerable to 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

28

government counterattack, as in the case of Che Guevara’s death in 

Bolivia (1967).

The following series of messages and news reports are the heart of 

this story of the evolution from indifference and near-total disregard to 

recognition, engagement, and commitment. They are a sampling of the 

more noteworthy intelligence reports and indicate the scope and direction 

of both the Honduran insurgent and Honduran counterinsurgency 

operations. It was these documents and others that led this writer to 

conclude that although the Honduran left was not particularly effective, it 

still was out there and needed careful watching. The FSLN success in 

Nicaragua and the near-success of the FMLN in El Salvador warned 

against dismissing a Honduran insurgency out of hand.

Each message references the Insurgency Indicator Checklist above 

and Annex A, Analyzing Insurgency. As you read each message and apply 

the indicators, think about the following questions.

Discussion Questions

1. What are the limitations of this framework in the 21st century? 

2. Does social media (Twitter, YouTube, blogs, etc.) change the way you 

analyze a proto-insurgency? 

3. Where else would you look for signs of a proto-insurgency in 21stcentury social media? 

4. Does social media activism equate to a proto-insurgency? 

5. Should it be added to the list of warning signs?

6. What lessons does the Arab Spring, especially the Egyptian 

experience, add to this insurgency framework?
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

29

V. Messages and Reports (M&R)

A. M&R 1-6: July 1982 to July 1984

Over a period of two years, a slow but steady insurgency was 

fomenting. These six messages track how, if you have the right questions 

and can ascertain the correct answers to these questions, an insurgency can 

be identified. Episodes of bombing, assassination, kidnapping, and 

development of safe havens are indications that an insurgency is brewing. 

Message 1

DATE: 4 JUL 82 

LOCATION: TEGUCIGALPA 

CENTRAL POWER STATION WAS BOMBED BY MEMBERS OF 

THE FROYLAN TURCIOS COMMAND, A HONDURAN-BASE CELL 

OF THE FMLN [El Salvadoran insurgency]. SEEN AS AN ACT OF 

RETALIATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS 

FOR ITS INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #5, #10 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion

This act achieved several of the insurgents’ goals. It served notice 

on the Honduran government that solidarity existed among all of the leftist 

organizations and that an attack on one element was an attack on all. In 

addition to the inconvenience of power outages, attacking the power 

station gained everyone’s attention in the capital city and demonstrated the 

government’s vulnerability.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

30

Message 2

DATE: 17 SEP 82

LOCATION: SAN PEDRO SULA 

CINCHONEROS SEIZED CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND HELD 

80 HOSTAGES FOR EIGHT DAYS. DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF 

HONDURAN, SALVADORAN [Alejandro Montenegro: FMLN] AND 

OTHER LATIN AMERICAN LEFTIST ACTIVITISTS, THE 

EXPULSION OF U.S. ADVISORS AND WITHDRAWL OF 

HONDURAS FROM THE NEWLY-FORMED CENTRAL AMERICAN 

DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #9 and #10

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; Sec. 3, Catalyst;

and Sec. 6, Force and Coercion

There is probably no more effective event than a hostage situation. 

Whether the release of political prisoners was achieved or not, the fact that 

the government was forced into negotiations with the Chinchoneros is 

significant. After a week the hostages were released and the guerrillas 

were flown to Panama, en route to Cuba. Not only did such an action 

demonstrate the government’s weakness in performing its key role of 

protecting itself, but it had tremendous domestic and international 

propaganda value. In August 1978, a similarly spectacular operation led 

by Sandinista Comandante Eden Pastora marked the beginning of the end 

of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua.

Message 3

DATE: 19 JUL 83 

LOCATION: OLANCHO DEPARTMENT 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

31

91 HONDURAN INSURGENTS WITH LOGISTICAL SUPPORT 

FROM NICARAGUA HAD THE OBJECTIVE OF RALLYING UP TO 

3,000 COMBATANTS. BY SEP 83, ALMOST ALL HAD EITHER 

BEEN KILLED, CAPTURED OR SURRENDERED.

Commentary 

Insurgency Indicator #3 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support

Once again, intervention in a Central American country was 

conducted from a neighboring safe haven/launchpad. It was also an 

indication of the insurgency’s anticipated recruitment. That the threat was 

eliminated so quickly and thoroughly had a telling effect on the Honduran 

government and generated a false sense of security. It left untouched the 

potential of Nicaragua as a logistical base for future endeavors. It also 

assumed that the other side wouldn’t learn from the experience.

Message 4

DATE: NOV 83

LOCATION: SAN PEDRO SULA 

HONDURAN INTELLIGENCE UNCOVERED A PLOT BY THE 

PRTC-H TO ASSASSINATE GENERAL ALVAREZ MARTINEZ, 

COMMANDER OF THE HONDURAN ARMED FORCES. PRTC-H 

MEMBERS WERE RECEIVING TRAINING IN SAN PEDRO SULA 

WITH SPECIFIC EMPHASIS ON HOW TO NEUTRALIZE VIP 

BODYGUARDS AND THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator #3 and #9 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion

This plot, unlike July’s Olancho debacle launched from outside 

Honduras (Message #3), was home-grown and more sophisticated. The 

Honduran Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (Partido 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

32

Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos de Honduras, or 

PRTC-H) training took place in the San Pedro Sula, an area with a history

of radical politics. An assassination of such a key officer as Gen. Martinez 

would have had considerable propaganda value and demonstrated the 

strength of the insurgents as well as the potential for generating an AOH 

overreaction. One aspect of an urban operation is the high-visibility aspect 

with lots of witnesses and lots of media. Keep in mind that an act such as 

an assassination is theater and the target is not the audience. A crackdown,

whether it works or not, is still grist for the propaganda mill.

Message 5

DATE: 26 MAR 84 

LOCATION: SAN PEDRO SULA 

FIVE SEPARATE BUT COORDINATED TARGETS STRUCK BY 

THE CINCHONEROS INCLUDED THE HONDURAN SUPREME 

COURT BUILDING AND A MILITARY SCHOOL IN 

TEGUCIGALPA, TWO POLICE STATIONS AND THE 

SALVADORAN CONSULATE IN SAN PEDRO SULA

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator #10 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion

This spectacular operation demonstrated the growing 

sophistication of the insurgency. Multifaceted and well-timed, it not only

achieved the wounding of the government but also got the region’s 

attention. Once again, the urban setting is instructive re: the population 

and the media. The capital (Tegucigalpa) and the San Pedro Sula were 

“target-rich” environments and pointed out the government’s weaknesses 

in protecting its own.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

33

Message 6

DATE: JUL 84 

LOCATION: EL PARAISO 

INFILTRATION INTO EL PARAISO DEPARTMENT OF AT LEAST 

19 GUERRILLAS TRAINED IN CUBA; MOST DESERTED OR WERE 

CAPTURED

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #3 and #10

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support; and Sec. 6, Force and 

Coercion

Except for number of guerrillas, this was a repeat of July 1983.

This insurgent setback marked the beginning of a quiet time. For the next 

17 months, there was little guerrilla activity to report and an internal threat 

almost disappeared. For the Honduran authorities, this was further 

indication that all was under control.

B. Reaction

Consistent with our centuries-old policy regarding the Americas 

and as part of the Reagan doctrine of aggressively opposing Communism, 

the United States was working not only to expel the Soviets and their 

Cuban surrogates from Central America but also to upend their clients, the 

Sandinistas. In light of this, it is not surprising the Honduran authorities 

were focused on the externals and had been since 1979, when the 

Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua. When this writer took command 

of the 7th SFG in 1985, the unit’s primary role was to support the 

Hondurans against the Sandinistas’ external invasion threat. 

SF deployments were designed to back-stop and encourage the 

Hondurans in repelling that invasion. Annual exercises saw the group 

headquarters and several SF detachments attached to the Honduran army 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

34

units for a period of two to three weeks, during which war plans were 

exercised.

When queried about their views as to the threats, a large majority 

(roughly 7 in 10) of the AOH officers told this writer that the Sandinistas 

with their Soviet-made T-55 tanks were the main danger, while the 

minority (3 in 10) still viewed El Salvador and her 40,000 combat veterans 

as such. When asked if there was an internal threat, these officers 

invariably dismissed that idea as having been destroyed in the Olancho 

department in 1983 and 1984.

There was one notable exception to this conventional wisdom.

The comments of the Public Security Force (FUSEP) commander 

in the La Ceiba region were of a different cast than the military’s. He 

believed that he was faced with a budding insurgency on the north coast 

and had too little with which to respond. He stated he had talked to his 

AOH counterparts and was told if there was a problem it was a “police 

matter, not an army job” and he should deal with it. He said with only four 

officers and two vehicles he was unable to do much. It could be argued 

that FUSEP, heretofore barred from U.S. security assistance, was simply 

trying to get a place at the feeding trough. (In 1985, there existed a 

Vietnam-era prohibition against supporting police forces. An exemption 

would eventually be granted to both Honduras and El Salvador.) 

However, the police, being closer to the population and its issues, 

usually have a better handle on what was happening in the countryside. 

My discussions with U.S. in-country assets mirrored the AOH 

position regarding insurgency. They were unanimous that there was no 

insurgency and little to be concerned about. This writer had been reading 

the Honduras traffic while an analyst at Carlisle’s Strategic Studies 

Institute and thought there might be more going on there than was 

commonly believed. As a result of these conversations and the traffic, I 

modified the focus of our deployments. Each deploying detachment would 

continue to co-locate and exercise with those AOH battalions as per the 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

35

war plans. Individual team training objectives were also to continue as 

before, but another requirement was included: Each team member was 

provided with the Vietnam-era Insurgency Indicator Checklist. They were 

instructed to remain objective, to observe, and to report any activity that 

might have an effect on their mission to support the AOH in case of a 

Sandinista attack. This included looking inward.

The following are a sample of the message traffic between March 

and October of 1986, as well as various news reports. By no means does 

this cover all the reporting. Because the 7th SF Group had a Military 

Intelligence Company as part of its TO&E, it could and did report directly 

into the intelligence stream. As we shall see below (23 April 1986),

bureaucratic reaction was not long in coming.

The question is, if you had been in place in Honduras at the time, 

what would you have made of these messages? Do you see the same 

insurgency indicators as we did? If not, why not? Moreover, if you had 

been in SOUTHCOM or SOCOM at this time, what would you have 

thought of these messages? Are they persuasive evidence of an 

insurgency? What would it have taken to change your mind? Why did it 

take us so long to change perceptions on the nature of the threat?

C. M&R 7 March–30 November 1986

After 18 months of inactivity, and complacency on the part of the 

Honduran army, the Honduran government, and the United States, the 

insurgency again erupted. In eight short months, from May to October 

1986, the official reaction shifted from an assessment that there was “not 

an insurgency, nor is one likely to develop” (Message #14, 27 May), to the 

realization that the insurgent situation in Northern Honduras was a “great 

threat to the internal stability of Honduras” (Message #21, 28 October). 

Again, these insurgents’ activities follow the checklist referred to earlier. 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

36

Message 7

DATE: 7 MAR 86

SOURCE: 7th SFG

LOCATION: LA CUMBRE.

FUSEP SGT KILLED BY LEFTISTS AT AN INSURGENT SAFE 

SITE/TRAINING AREA.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator #9 and #10 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion

The first indication of instability often is an attack on the police, 

the first line of governmental defense. This incident arose when a FUSEP 

officer went to investigate reports of strange activity in the hills above La 

Cumbre. When he arrived, he was shot and killed. The site was being used 

by insurgents for training and indoctrination. 

Message 8

DATE: 14 MAR 86 

SOURCE 7th SFG

LOCATION: TEGUCIGALPA 

ANTI-U.S. DEMOSTRATIONS ORCHESTRATED BY PCH. AND 

SUPPLEMENTED BY SOPHISTICATED PROPAGANDA IN LA 

PRENSA, TARGETING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE. 

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #4, 5, and 6

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues

In this incident we can see the age-old hot button issue of foreign 

presence. Probably no other concern could generate such a wide 

agreement among Hondurans as this. Coincidently, little comment was 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

37

made over the low footprint of the nearly invisible Special Forces 

detachments deployed down at the battalion level.

News Report 1

DOI 18 March 1986

The Armed Forces will present to national and foreign reporters 

today a bus seized in Colomoncague, Itibuca Departmentt, where 

ammunition and weapons, supposedly for Salvadoran guerillas, were 

carried. Preliminary reports indicate that the vehicle was seized over the 

weekend. After a thorough search, lethal weapons were discovered hidden 

inside.

The national authorities, in addition to this action, have carried out 

several seizures of weapons destined for the FMLN, a guerrilla 

organization that has been our territory to subvert order in El Salvador.

The number of people detained has not yet been disclosed. 

Colomoncague, in the country’s west, is located 2 km from the Salvadoran 

border. There are about 15,000 Salvadoran refugees in this sector.

Commentary 

Insurgency Indicator #3 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; and Sec. 5, 

Support

It was quite common to use commercial carriers in support of 

insurgent logistics. In El Salvador, for example, a truck bound for the 

FMLN was intercepted on the Guatemalan border with several hundred 

weapons traced to the Vietnamese army and the Vietnam War.

Message 9

DATE: MAR 86 

SOURCE 7th SFG
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

38

LOCATION: JOCON.

JESUITS CONTINUE ANTI-U.S. PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. 

REPORTS INDICATE CONGREGATIONS ARE BEING TOLD THAT 

TF 135 IS BUILDING A ROAD TO INVADE NICARAGUA

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #4, #5, and #6

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues

The underlying purpose of the Yoro Road was to improve the 

quality of life in the Yoro valley so that the people of the region would be 

less likely to fall for Marxist-Leninist propaganda. Opposition came from 

the political left in Honduras and worldwide. One of the more outrageous 

claims was from some Jesuit priests who told congregations along the path 

of the road—specifically in Jocon—that its purpose was an invasion of 

Nicaragua. A brief look at a map would show just how ludicrous the 

charge was. It is over 100 miles from Jocon in northern Honduras to the 

Nicaraguan border, through even more inhospitable terrain than in Yoro 

province.12

News Report 2

DATE: 31 March 1986

This weekend special Honduran Army troops are looking for a 

group of armed men who have reportedly been sighted by peasants near 

the community of Esparta. The search is being conducted by troops of the 

4th Infantry Battallion headquartered in the port city of La Ceiba, in 

northern Hondruras, with help from light planes of the Honduan Air 

Force. ... An officer of the 4th Infantry Battallion, who asked to remain 

anonymous, said that soldiers from his battalion are combing all the 

 

12 Information in commentary provided by LTC John T. Fishel, SOUTHCOM J5.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

39

mountain area and do not rule out the possibility that “guerrilla cells” have 

gone into the jungle.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator #10

News Report 3

DATE: 2 April 1986

A Tegucigalpa radio station reported Salvadoran guerillas crossed 

into Honduras through Mapulaca, Lempira. The guerillas took over the 

town of Los Planes but were expelled by the Honduran Army Special 

Forces.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator #10

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization

Message 10

DTG: 23 APR 86

FM:USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO 

TO: CDR 7TH SFGA 

REQUEST THAT YOU FIRST SEND YOUR IIR’S TO THE 

USDAO/JCIOE, HONDURAS SO THEY CAN EFFECT COUNTRY 

TEAM COORDINATION PRIOR TO PUBLICATION

Commentary

The bureaucratic in-fighting began with this relatively innocuous 

request. What was really at stake was whose story was going to be told. 

Even without analysis, 7th SFG reports on insurgent activities 

were viewed as a threat. Both of the embassy’s intelligence entities (DIA 

and CIA) had consistently reported “all’s quiet on the Southern Front.”

Once that position was taken, anything that contradicted it was dismissed 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

40

or viewed as a threat. As each detachment returned from its deployment to 

Honduras, it was debriefed by the 7th SFG’s S-2 and MI company 

personnel. Additionally, each detachment had at least one and usually two 

or three operations and intelligence-trained personnel who could assist in 

assessing the information gathered while in-country. What was being 

injected into the intelligence flow was raw information, not distilled 

intelligence. And while no one was making any sweeping judgments as 

yet, it was obvious that something was afoot.

The issue was in part one of turf or rice bowls and, as General 

Galvin so aptly put it, stovepipes were a major problem faced by our 

embassies. SouthCom was dependent on several intelligence sources, but 

the major contributors—CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and TF-B—

were in Honduras, and they all had the same story. Inertia prevented them 

from thinking beyond their assessments. Gen Galvin recognized that his 

best source of intelligence was the all-source CAJITF in Washington, and 

not the embassy (see Annex B). 

Message 11

DTG: 29 APR 86

FM: CDR 1ST SOCOM FT BRAGG NC 

TO: USCINSCO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM 

SUBJ: INSURGENT ANALYSIS 

IN SHORT THERE SHOULD BE LITTLE DOUBT WE ARE 

CONFRONTING SOPHISTICATED ORCHESTRATION OF A 

MARXIST-LENINIST INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS WHICH WILL 

BE FUELED BY THE GROWING ALLIANCE WITH 

NARCOTRAFICANTES, CUBA, LIBYA AND PERIPHERALLY THE 

SOVIET UNION, WHICH VIEW VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY IN 

THE REGION AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

41

Commentary

This most welcome message came at a time when the theater 

intelligence entities were up in arms over the 7th’s reporting. Remember, 

the 7th was not doing the analysis but simply reporting directly into the 

intelligence stream. SOCOM J-2, however, did analyze the traffic and 

took the position reflected above. This did nothing to reduce the angst and 

noise levels within the theater intelligence community. It would take 

divine intervention or the CinC to turn that around. 

Message 12

DOI: 05 MAY 86 

SOURCE 7th SFG 

REPORTED STUDENTS FROM THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 

WERE USING AN ECOLOGY ORGANIZATION, AS A FRONT TO 

SUPPORT A 12-MAN HONDURAN TERRORIST GROUP, TRAINED 

IN CUBA BY LIBYANS WHOSE MISSION WAS TO CAUSE 

DAMAGE TO PALMEROLA AFB IN HONDURAS

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #1, #2, and# 6 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; Sec. 3, Catalyst;

and Sec. 5, Support

It has long been understood that there is a connection between 

some ecology groups and insurgency and that an ecology organization 

might be used as a front. The Honduran Palmerola Air Base had become 

the focus of leftist propaganda efforts because of the base’s central and 

visible role in support of all U.S. military and civic action activities.

Cooperation between some regimes (e.g., Cuba, Libya) and 

various terrorist groups had become sophisticated to the point that there 

was a terrorist or nationalist group with access to just about every type of 

expertise or training facility.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

42

Message 13

DOI: 21 MAY 86 

SOURCE: 7th SFG 

A COMMUNICATIONS SCHOOL (ESCUELA RADIO FONICA) 

OPERATED BY CATHOLIC PRIEST ON THE NORTH COAST OF 

HONDURAS IS REVEALED TO BE A FRONT FOR SUBVERSIVE 

ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORTED BY FUNDS SENT THROUGH 

SWITZERLAND

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #4, #5, #6, and #7

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 3, Catalyst; Sec. 5, Support; and Sec. 9, 

Other Questions

Described by its proponents as the interpretation of Christian faith 

through the consciousness of the poor and by its critics as a “Christianized 

Marxism,” liberation theology grew in the Latin American church during 

the 1950s and 1960s and provided a framework for analysis and 

interpretation of class and wealth distribution. Among the initiatives 

associated with this theology among the Catholic clergy were the “base 

communities” advocated as the preferred path for social activism by the 

1968 Medellin Conference of the Roman Catholic bishops. Created in 

rural and urban areas, these Christian base communities organized 

illiterate but faithful farmers into autonomous economic and religious 

associations under the guidance of the local priest or laity. The community 

members found that their association within these groups supported the 

idea that Jesus had come to save them and to care for them here and in the 

afterlife. The active pursuit of social justice appealed to the community 

members and the local priesthood alike. The Marxist portion of liberation 

theology encouraged the alliance with Cuban-backed activists that 

emerged in the later 1970s in Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile,
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

43

and elsewhere. For the insurgents, this alliance gave them the legitimacy 

they had been denied. For the counterinsurgents, it added a whole new 

dimension to the struggle for the hearts and minds of the population.13

Message 14

DTG: 27 MAY 86

FM: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM 

TO: ALL

SUBJECT: SUBVERSIVE SITUATION IN HONDURAS 

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY CONTINUES IN HONDURAS, BUT 

THERE IS CURRENTLY NOT AN INSURGENCY, NOR IS ONE 

LIKELY TO DEVELOP IN THE NEXT 6 TO 12 MONTHS. THE 

EXISTING SUBVERSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE IS NOT ADEQUATE 

TO SUPPORT ACTIVITY OTHER THAN LIMITED URBAN 

TERRORISM FOR A SHORT PERIOD

Commentary

Here we see SOUTHCOM still not yet convinced of a serious 

threat. This view can be attributed to a number of causes, including the 

near-total focus on the border as reflected in the assessment of the U.S. incountry intelligence community I had noted a year earlier. There was still 

the same near-total focus of the AOH and its dismissal of the north coast 

activity as “a police [FUSEP] matter.” There was the near-total focus of 

the Central American Joint Intelligence Task Force (CAJITF) on the war 

in El Salvador and the CIA’s Contra operations against Nicaragua. The 

lesson here is that all bureaucracies suffer from inertia or momentum and 

are not easily diverted. Group think affects analysis. A fresh set of eyes 

and ears may not always be welcomed.

 

13 Information in this commentary provided by LtC Robert Watson USA Ret and 

the author.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

44

Five days after the CINC’s 27 May message, I sent him the 

following letter:

2 June 1986

Dear General Galvin:

By now you should have received the two promised messages on 

the Phase I Insurgency and the evaluation of the Honduran Battalions. I 

hope these prove useful to you. 

There appears to be a difference of opinion regarding just what a 

Phase I Insurgency looks like and our willingness to admit it exists. In a 

recent message (SOUTHCOME SCJ-I, subject: SUBVERSIVE 

SITUATION IN HONDURAS, 272100ZMAY86), the point was stressed 

that there is no insurgency in Honduras. The message describes what is 

taking place in Honduras and then denies an insurgency exists. It is not my 

intention to debate over this point. Since 1979, I’ve been personally 

involved in the ongoing definitional dispute over what Low Intensity 

Conflict is or is not. The rhetoric produced during that debate and now 

with the insurgency in Honduras appear to me as distinctions without 

differences.

What gives me more concern regarding the message is we may be 

headed toward the oft-repeated error of waiting until it is a recognizable 

insurgency before taking preemptive steps to deal with it. If we deny the 

existence of a threat because it is not serious or denigrate the guerillas’

capacity to obuild infrastructures or generate propaganda, we will I 

believe make a serious mistake. The Hondurans are focusing where we 

focus, to date that has been largely on the conventional threat from 

Nicaragua. They will, as were the Salvadorans, be slow to relook the 

internal causes of popular discontent. In El Salvador before October 1979, 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

45

there was a preoccupation with outside support of the guerillas. This 

worked to the detriment of an internal analysis – nation-building answer to 

the root causes of the insurgency. Later, during my tour, I asked the 

Salvadoran officers why this was so. Their response was their leadership 

knew only how to fight one way—conventionally. It was a most difficult 

task to redirect that Army inward even after their insurgency had almost 

(or had?) reached Phase III. What I’m concerned with is the inertia we 

may encourage if we fail to press the Hondurans to look inward and 

prepare for the struggle that will inevitably escalate. While it is my fondest 

hope Danny Ortega will have an attack of terminal stupidity and cross the 

border for real, I doubt if it will happen. I have no doubts that we could 

handle such an eventuality. 

I’ve given much thought to what our opponents seem to have 

learned of late. I believe the key lessons they’ve learned from Grenada et 

al. are:

“Don’t permit the noise level to penetrate the U.S. consciousness 

again.”

“Don’t give the gringos an opportunity to do what they do best—

conventional war.”

“Keep it low on the spectrum.”

“If the insurgency in Honduras can be kept alive and growing and 

at the same time be kept below the U.S. attention level, then the chances 

of success will be greater.”

To counter our enemy’s new-found wisdom, I propose we continue 

to work quietly with our Honduran counterparts to develop their 

counterinsurgency capability. We should develop not only their military 

capacity to conduct counter-guerilla operations but also develop the 

requisite sensitivity and capacity to deal with the non-lethal aspects of an 

insurgency threat, e.g., nation-building (PSYOPS and Civil Affairs). It 

costs less in comparison with a conventional buildup and will make the 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

46

Honduran Army even more respected by the people it is pledged to 

defend.

The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) stands ready to assist you 

to that and any other end.

Message 15

DOI: 10 JUN 86 

SOURCE: 7th SFG

REPORTED THREATS FROM LEFTIST/AUTHENTIC FACTION OF 

THE HONDURAN PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION TO 

INITIATE STRIKES THROUGHOUT THE EDUCATIONAL 

COMMUNITY AND AMONG LEFTIST LABOR MOVEMENTS IF 

THEIR DEMANDS FOR GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION WERE 

NOT MET.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator # 4, #5, and #7

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; Sec. 3, Catalyst; 

Sec. 7, Legitimacy; and Sec. 9, Other Issues

Message 16

DOI: 19 JUN 86 

SOURCE: 7th SFG

REPORTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY 

GROUP (ETAS- AUXILLARY TECHNICAL SCHOOL OF 

SECURITY) BY THE PCH [Honduran Communist Party], FUTH 

[Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers] AND SITRATERCO [Labor 

Union of the Tela Railroad Company] LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS TO 

MONITOR SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE EL 

PROGRESSO AREA.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

47

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator #2 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization; and Sec. 5, Support

By now, the frequency of reports from El Progresso indicted that 

this area was a focal point of subversive goings-on. The El Progresso area 

and the nearby university campus at San Pedro Sula had a long history of 

anti-government activity.

News Report 4

DATE: 22 July 1986

Six Salvadoran guerrillas were killed in a clash with the Honduran 

Army, it was reported officially today in Tegucigalpa. The military clash 

occurred last Friday in the sector of Los Filos in the western department of 

Lempira on the Salvadoran border. The report by the Honduran Army 

states that the Honduran troops did not sustain any casualties, despite the 

fact that they were ambushed by the guerillas while patrolling the border. 

It also states that the slain rebels were buried in the place where they were 

killed to prevent their being preyed upon by buzzards or jungle animals.

The Honduran soldiers who fought the Salvadoran guerrillas 

belonged to the Special Forces and the 12th Infantry Batallion. The report 

adds that the fighting occurred in the same region where a soldier was 

killed last week when he stepped on a mine made and placed by the rebels.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator #10

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion

News Report 5

DATE: 28 July 1986

“Terrorism Alert”
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

48

Today the Pentagon ordered all U.S. diplomatic offices and 

civilian and military installations in Honduras to establish a maximun 

security alert due to the fear of terrorist attacks. [These orders prohibit 

visit to urban areas unless on specific missions.]

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #2 and #4

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion

News Report 6

DATE: 9 August 1986

“Army and FUESP Conduct Anti-Terrorist Operation”

Upon orders from General Humberto Regalado Hernandez, the 

Armed Forces General Command has proceeded to carry out an operation 

throughout the nation to control and prevent any act of terrorism which 

affects the citizenry. This operation is being carried out jointly by 

members of the Public Security Forces (FUSEP) and soldiers of various 

Armed Forces Units, who are being deployed to various areas night and 

day and are asking citizens to show their identification papers. ... Military 

authorities hereby urge the citizens, particularly those who have to travel 

at night due to their studies or work, to carry their identification papers 

and thus avoid problems concerning their identity.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #2, #4, and #8

Message 17

DOI: 11 AUG 86 

SOURCE: 7th SFG

EDITORIALS IN “LA TRIBUNA” COMPLAINING OF HONDURAN 

GOVERNMENTS INABILITY TO IMPOSE ORDER AND 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

49

GUARANTEEING SECURITY OF ITS CITIZENS. SUGGEST ARMED 

FORCES COULD TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IF GOVERNMENT 

IS INCAPABLE OF IMPOSING “ORDER”

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #4 and #7 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 7, Legitimacy

A time-tested technique for insurgents has been to portray the 

government as unable to maintain order or to protect the population. A 

weak government invites another government, or a coup. Alternatively, a

government goaded into overreaction plays into the insurgents’ hands 

when in the process of restoring order it creates unacceptable levels of 

collateral damage.

Message 18

DOI: 15 AUG 86

SOURCE: Southern Command J2 

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT HAVE 

CONTACTED VARIOUS HONDURAN RADICAL LEFTIST GROUPS 

AND REQUESTED THAT THEY HELP TO DESTABILIZE THE 

HONDURAN GOVERNMENT AND DISTRUPT DEMOCRATIC 

REVOLUTIONARY FRONT THROUGH THE USE OF VIOLENCE 

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator #3 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support

The linkage between the Sandinistas and radical groups in 

Honduras is evident in this intercept.

Message 19

DOI: 29 AUG 86 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

50

SOURCE: 7th SFG

SOURCE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION 

PERTAINING TO VARIOUS SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND 

THEIR COMMAND STRUCTURE: PROGRESSIVE STUDENT 

MOVEMENT (MEP) TWO LEADERS, TWO ADVISORS, TWO 

COURIERS, ONE FINANCIAL SUPPORTER DAGOBERTA 

PADILLA STUDENT FRONT (FREDAP) LEADER, VICEPRESIDENT, LEGAL ADVISOR, FOUR ASSISTANTS OMAR 

RIVERA, MARIO MENDOZA, AND SAUL “SOCRATES” CUELLO 

ARDON HAVE BEEN NAMED AS LEADERS OF THE “FIFTH 

COLUMN” IN EL PROGRESSO, YORO. THIS GROUP IS 

REPORTEDLY CONTROLLED BY HONDURAN COMMUNISTS 

(NFI) AND NICARAGUAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. [Note: This 

level of detail was typical of 7th SFG’s reporting.]

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #1, #2, and #3

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization; and Sec. 5, Support

At this point, things began to change. On September 28, 1986, the 

7th SF Group Commander and one of the 7th’s recently returned B 

Detachment Commanders briefed USCINCSO with latest set of IIRs. The 

briefing highlighted the escalation and cumulative effects of insurgent 

activities. At the end of the briefing, General Galvin let it be known that

he had sufficient information to believe that a Phase One insurgency 

existed on the north coast. His exact words were, “I now have the smoking 

gun I need. ...”

With the CinC on board, it did not take long for a major climate 

change to be reflected in the message traffic.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

51

Message 20

DTG: 08 OCT 86

FM: DA WASH DC 

TO: CDR 1ST SOCOM FT BRAGG NC 

SUBJ: SOCOM REPORTING IN USSOUTHCOM AOR 

THE COOPERATIVE SPIRIT OF 7TH SFG PERSONNEL IN 

PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE INFO TO 470TH MIGP* PERSONNEL 

IS TO BE COMMENDED....THE TRIAL PERIOD OF 60 DAYS HAS 

EXPIRED, AND HAS RESULTED IN THE PUBLISHING OF 20 

BIOGRAPHIC IIR’S AND 7 ORDER OF BATTLE IIR’S.

2. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT 

ITEMS:

A. SFG SOLDIERS HAVE INFO VALUABLE TO 

SOUTHCOM....

[Note: The 470th MI Group was SouthCom’s MI unit based in the 

Canal Zone.]

Commentary

The 7th SFG’s contribution to the understanding of the insurgents’

organization was the result of paying close attention to the detachments’

surroundings and of establishing contacts with a wide-ranging segment of 

Honduran society.

Message 21

DOI: 28 OCT 86 

SOURCE: 7th SFG

LTC ROMERO, 4TH BN [La Ceiba], STATES THE INSURGENT 

SITUATION IN NORTHERN HONDURAS TO BE A “GREAT 

THREAT TO THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF HONDURAS.” 

RECENT CLASHES WITH ARMED AND ORGANIZED 

SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS, DISCOVERY OF WEAPONS AND FOOD 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

52

CACHES, AND INFORMATION ON INSURGENT CELLS AND 

SUPORTERS, HE SAID, WERE ONLY THE BEGINNING OF AN 

UNRAVELING SUBVERSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE STORY. 

ROMERO INDICATED A LINK BETWEEN INSURGENTS AND 

“NARCO-INSURGENTS”. LARGE AMOUNTS OF MARIJUANA 

FIELDS DISCOVERED NEAR TOCOA IN EARLY OCTOBER 

WORTH 7 MILLION U.S. DOLLARS LINKED TO SUBVERSIVES.

THE ONBOARD COMPUTER OF AN AIRPLANE CARRYING 1,000 

KILOS OF COCAINE DOWNED IN LA CEIBA 8 OCT 86 

CONTAINED COORDINATES FOR A CLANDESTINE AIRFIELD 

NEAR ARENAL, YORO. ARENAL IS A CENTER FOR LEFTIST 

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators # 1, #2, #3, and #10 

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support; Sec. 6, Force and Coercion; 

and Sec. 9, Other Questions

Beginning in 1985, an expert from Ft Bragg’s 9th Psychological 

Operations Battalion was attached to each deploying A Detachment. He 

was charged with playing the role of “commissar” (political/public 

affairs/psy ops adviser) and was to participate in detachment seminar 

discussions on the insurgency indicators (see above Indicator Checklist) 

and what, if anything, was going on in their area. He also functioned as 

another set of eyes in assessing the AOH unit the team was training. After 

a suitable period, the teams invited their Honduran counterparts to sit in 

and participate. In time, Honduran LtC Romero became a devoted 

participant in these “seminar” discussions. It is obvious from these 

messages that he became a convert. While it is possible that this 

conversion may have been in part the result of wanting a piece of the pie, 

there is little doubt there was something going on, and he and others soon 

began to focus on the potential of an insurgency in his area of operations.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

53

The same day, the U.S. Defense Attaché reported the following:

Message 22

DTG: 28 OCT 86

FM: USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO

TO: DIA WASHDC 

SUBJ: HO MILITARY SHIFT RESOURCES TO 

COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 

COMMENTS: LTC ROMERO IS TAKING THE INSURGENT 

SITUATION IN NORTHERN HONDURAS QUITE SERIOUSLY. 

APPARENTLY, THE CINC AND JOINT STAFF ALSO CONSIDER 

THE PROBLEM THERE TO BE EXTENSIVE AND THREATENING.

Commentary

Insurgency Indicators #2 and #3

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization; Sec. 5, Support

Not only had the U.S. point of view been altered but at least one 

major Honduran commander, LtC Romero, now saw the insurgency as a 

real threat. How was it possible that the Honduran military changed its 

point of view? There is a case to be made that the Hondurans saw the 

threat as one that could be used to increase U.S. aid. The AOH viewed 

U.S. aid to the Contras and to the ESAF as a zero-sum game and were not 

happy with how little they were getting. As far as the drug issue, one has 

to look no further than Colombia to see the advantages of linking the 

guerrillas with drugs. Insurgents historically have derived their support 

from the locals, the opposition, their own manufacturing, and from a 

sponsor. The evolution of drugs as a source of finance began with 

guerrillas availing themselves of the drug wealth in a symbiotic relation 

with producers. Later, they cut out the drug producers and began 

producing it themselves. By the 1980s, insurgents were no longer as 

dependent on clandestine resupply. The logistics of insurgency had 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

54

changed to the point where insurgent movements that had the drug 

advantage were almost financially independent. 

The joke in El Salvador was the FMLN could afford state-of-theart communications equipment that was better than what the U.S. was

providing the ESAF. It could be ordered by cell phone from the best 

manufacturers, paid by credit card, drawn from a secure foreign account,

and FedExed to the users.

Message 23

DOI: 04 NOV 86 

SOURCE: 7th SFG

A FUSEP AGENT WAS KILLED ON 2 NOV 86 BY SUSPECTED 

SUBVERSIVES IN THE NOMBRE DE DIOS MOUNTAINS. 

Commentary

Insurgency Indicator #10

Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

55

D. The End of the Case, the End of an Era

By the beginning of 1987 SouthCom J-2, Col John Stewart, had 

published an extensive study entitled “Honduras: The Phase One 

Insurgency on the North Coast.” This publication made it official 

although, as noted above, General Galvin’s position had already had a 

salutary effect on the intelligence community. 

In Honduras, combined AOH/FUSEP units with U.S. intelligence 

and logistics support took the offensive. These combat operations

triggered a number of contacts with the guerrillas, particularly in the 

Nombre de Dios Mountains. By the year’s end, armed field elements of 

the insurgency were out of business. Contra and Sandinista units still kept 

things stirred up on the border, however, and the war in El Salvador built 

in intensity. AOH units throughout the country became more effective in 

their dealings with the Honduran population. (See Annex C.) In November 

1989 the Berlin Wall came down, and the El Salvadoran FMLN’s “Final 

Offensive” failed. The Soviets ceased supporting the Sandinista regime 

and, by extension, the FMLN.

In April 1990, Nicaraguan president and Sandinista Daniel Ortega 

had an attack of terminal stupidity and allowed himself to be un-elected. 

Violeta Chamorra’s surprise victory ended both Sandinista and Contra

border incursions into Honduras. Peace came to El Salvador a year later 

with the signing of the peace treaty. In September of 1992 the bolsones 

territorial issues were resolved, with Honduras getting two-thirds of the 

disputed territory. By 1993, a Central American Free Trade Agreement 

was in place.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

56

VI. Annexes
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

57

Annex A: Analyzing Insurgency

by Colonel John D. Waghelstein, USA (Ret.) and Dr. Donald 

Chisholm14

February 2006 

Conventional War is to Irregular War as intercollegiate lacrosse is to 

Indian lacrosse. The former is played on a clearly defined field by a 

prescribed and equal number of players, under defined rules for a set 

time period. The Indian brand was played by any, and usually unequal, 

number on each side, with neither rules nor time constraints over an 

undefined area. Those who would play the Indian brand of the game 

should not expect to be governed by NCAA rules.

— James Trinniman, late Professor, U.S. Army War College

Planning and executing effective conventional combat operations 

begins with practical analysis of the enemy, that is, imposing a structure 

on the problem, devising several plausible courses of action, and 

ascertaining which course of action is likely to achieve the strategic 

objective. Established planning tools such as the Commander’s Estimate 

of the Situation (CES) or the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) 

were developed as problem-solving tools for understanding and defeating 

 

14 Dr. Donald Chisholm is Professor and Head, Contemporary Operations and 

Environments Division, in the Joint Military Operations Department of the U.S. 

Naval War College. He earned his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. in political science 

from the University of California, Berkeley. His published research addresses 

operational planning; military personnel systems; cognitive and organizational 

limits on rationality; organizational adaptation; organizational failure and 

reliability; and privatization of public activities. Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: 

Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel System, 1793-

1941 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001) received the 2001 RADM 

Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distinguished Contribution to Naval Literature.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

58

largely symmetrical opponents in conventional combat operations between 

the armed forces of states. They have been wonderfully effective in this 

context.15

Devising and executing successful counterinsurgency campaigns 

also demands effective problem solving.16 Getting the analysis right is 

critical. Although it might seem appropriate to employ proven 

CES/MDMP planning tools to problems of insurgency, these tools have 

shown themselves less well-adapted to this context than they are to 

conventional combat operations. The CES and MDMP represent 

formalized expressions of problem solving as developed and adapted for 

the military context during a historical period in which most military 

tactical and operational thought was directed toward the successful 

conduct of major conventional combat operations between states (mostly 

Western) with similarly organized and equipped militaries. They represent 

 

15 John Dewey pointed out long ago that the human decision maker is first and 

foremost a problem solver, following, more or less, several steps to make nontrivial decisions: recognizing and identifying a problem (an occasion for a 

decision), imposing a cause-and-effect structure on that problem, generating 

alternative solutions, evaluating those alternatives comparatively, and choosing 

an alternative. Dewey’s insights provided the foundation for the work of Herbert 

A. Simon and others in the field of modern cognitive science. See John Dewey, 

The Public and Its Problems (Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 1985) (originally 

published 1927).

16 Although we focus here on the analysis of insurgency as an essential precursor 

to devising an effective counterinsurgency campaign (whether in support of a 

host nation or as an occupying power), there are also implications for those 

occasions on which the U.S. may find itself as a matter of policy providing 

support to insurgency, as it did not so long ago in places such as Nicaragua and 

Afghanistan. Tools for analyzing insurgency do exist. The CIA developed its 

“Guide to Analysis of Insurgency.” There are also Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and 

Terrorism (London: Brassey’s, 2005), which has been used at National Defense 

University, and David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

(New York: Praeger, 1964) used at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff 

School.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

59

one useful method of problem solving but do not exhaust the range of 

possible practical methods.17

Insurgencies represent what Simon has called “ill-structured”

problems, and others have referred to as “ill-defined” or “wicked”

problems.18 It is not that insurgencies are without structure; rather, the 

decision maker does not know very much about that structure, in part 

because it may be entirely novel, in part because such problems typically 

involve a large number of variables that interact in important, non-simple 

ways; that is, they are problems of “organized complexity.”

19 The decision 

maker’s primary challenge is to ascertain what those variables are and 

how they interact, allowing him to move the problem of insurgency from 

one that is ill-structured to one that is well-structured, and become more 

susceptible of manipulation and amelioration if not solution. That is, the 

bulk of the energy expended will typically be devoted to structuring the 

problem followed by generating alternative courses of action.20 Absent 

reasonable accuracy in assessing the problem’s structure, no courses of 

action developed will solve that problem. 

 

17 We hasten to point out that the analytic instrument outlined in this paper is not 

inconsistent with the CES/MDMP, and with analysis to come we should be able 

to outline how they complement each other and may be meshed together. We do 

not here consider Operational Net Assessment.

18 See Herbert A. Simon, “The Structure of Ill Structured Problems,“ Artificial 

Intelligence 4(1973): 181-201. In like manner, “wicked“ problems are to be 

distinguished from “tame“ problems.

19 See Warren Weaver, “Science and Complexity,“ American Scientist 36(1948): 

536-544. Weaver argued that the problems facing the physical sciences 

comprised three general types: simple problems with few variables and simple 

interactions; problems of disorganized complexity, with many variables, but 

whose interactions are essentially random and susceptible of effective 

summarizing by measures of central tendency and dispersion; and problems of 

organized complexity. The last type of problem is that most likely to present 

itself to the decision maker as ill-structured.

20 See Donald Chisholm, “Problem Solving and Institutional Design,“ Journal of 

Public Administration Research and Theory X(1996).
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

60

Several specific reasons fall out from this general foundation as to 

why the CES/MDMP planning tools are relatively less effective in 

converting insurgencies from ill-structured to well-structured status than 

for addressing more conventional conflicts.

I. Assumptions

Because the CES/MDMP planning tools were not intended for 

comprehending insurgencies, their embedded assumptions about what 

matters in the analysis do not match the essential elements of the structure 

of insurgencies: key factors are excluded, while others are 

overemphasized. Insurgencies are not primarily military problems 

(although they inevitably involve security issues and may include military 

operations). Concomitantly, the structures of insurgency are considerably 

more complex: their constituent parts are at root social, economic, and 

political. However, the oft-repeated truism that the “center of gravity is the 

people” does not take one very far in devising a counterinsurgency 

campaign to defeat a specific insurgency. The truism that countering 

insurgency is first and foremost a political, not a military, problem and 

that effectively countering insurgency therefore requires application of all 

elements of national power, not just the military, also does not provide 

much practical guidance for campaign planning, especially when military 

factors are more readily analyzed and measured. Using such conventional 

planning tools, therefore, can and has resulted in an undue emphasis on 

military force in counterinsurgency campaigns, undercutting the 

effectiveness of such campaigns.21

 

21 We are encouraged by recent trends in planning military operations toward 

more comprehensive analysis that incorporates and accounts for key non-military 

variables.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

61

II. Variation

Insurgencies differ far more from one another in pertinent ways 

than do conventional combat operations. Such differences are typically 

relatively subtle and nuanced. Notwithstanding their surface similarities, 

this obtained even during the Cold War heyday of communist-backed 

insurgencies.22 Given the high probability that the U.S. will, for the 

foreseeable future, find itself engaging in support to counterinsurgency 

across a wide range of states, many of them non-Western, variation in the 

structures of insurgency seems only likely to increase. Distinguishing two 

basic types of insurgency—doctrinal or revolutionary insurgency, and 

insurgency as part of a war of liberation—proved an important step 

forward four decades ago, but does not provide sufficient analytic leverage 

for dealing with contemporary insurgencies.23

The rise of what some have called a “global Islamist insurgency”

that may target individual states but maintains pretensions to an end to 

Western power and the creation of a sort of supra-national “caliphate”

suggests strongly that the range of types of insurgency is being 

significantly expanded, as do alliances between insurgents and criminal 

gangs.24 That is to say, today we do not have an adequate taxonomy for 

categorizing the varieties of insurgencies we will encounter. We cannot 

simply assign a specific insurgency to a particular category and proceed 

 

22 Although the communists generally tried to present a common face to the 

West, profound differences of opinion characterized the various communist 

theorists and practitioners of insurgency, from Lenin to Mao to Castro and 

Guevara, quite apart from differences across the cultures in which they were 

attempting to foment and support insurgencies. The variation across communist 

insurgencies confronted during the Cold War, however, pales in comparison with 

the insurgent variation we confront today.

23 See Galula (1964).

24 See Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Australian Army, “Countering Global 

Insurgency, A Strategy for the War on Terrorism,“ Canberra & Washington, 

D.C., September-November 2004.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

62

from there to select from a pre-existing menu of responses associated with 

that category.

III. Evolution

In contrast with the requirements for planning and executing 

conventional combat operations, the origins and etiology of any given 

insurgency matter. Consequently, understanding insurgency, generally, 

and a given insurgency in particular, depends on clear, practical,

historically grounded social, economic, and political analysis, combined 

with sound understanding of the cultural context in which the insurgency 

takes place. The practical lesson of these convergent factors is that no 

single analytic template will work across all insurgencies, even for 

countering insurgency manifested in a particular time and relatively 

confined place.25

At the same time, the historical record plainly shows that 

insurgency, both generally and in the specific case, has been remarkably 

adaptive in response to counterinsurgency campaigns and new 

circumstances, and often in very short order. During the present period, 

characterized by fast-paced technological innovation, new tools are daily 

becoming available to insurgents and potential insurgents, who have 

demonstrated remarkable speed in adaptation and adoption.26 Oddly, 

 

25 Linn’s analysis of the post-Spanish American War insurgency in the 

Philippines revealed, for example, that, even restricting focus to Northern Luzon, 

variation across small regions was substantial enough to render ineffective any 

approach that sought to treat the insurgency as a unitary actor with a common 

structure. See Brian M. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-

1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon,“ Military Affairs

51(1987): 62-66. 

26 See, for example, International Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading 

the Iraqi Insurgency, Middle East Report N°50 – 15 February 2006, for an 

analysis of the insurgents’ execution of a sophisticated information operations 

campaign against the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

63

insurgents read, and they know about emerging theories of warfare, and 

they study their opponents’ ways of doing business as assiduously as we 

study theirs—if not more so. The implication is that even as we attempt to 

discern the structure of any given insurgency, its structure is likely to be 

changing in ways relevant to how we attempt to counter it. Given the 

empirical record of the requirement to counter insurgencies for a decade or 

longer, we may be confident that the structure of the insurgency will 

change profoundly. The challenge will be to comprehend the insurgency 

faster than the pace at which it adapts or otherwise changes, while 

simultaneously assessing secular trends in the structure of the 

insurgency.27

IV. Actors

The alpha and omega of analyses of insurgency are not our own 

forces and those of our foe. Rather, understanding insurgency requires that 

we consider the focal population, its government, the insurgents’ rank and 

file, and the insurgents’ leadership, along with institutions both secular 

and religious, other actors external to the focal nation, both state and nonstate, along with, at times, the U.S. population. Central to this part of the 

analysis is to understand the complex relationships among these actors. As 

we note below, key to success in countering insurgency is discerning, 

understanding, and exploiting (reinforcing or disaggregating) the seams 

among these central actors. 

 

27 International Crisis Group (2006), for example, argues that the present 

insurgency in Iraq has evolved through three distinct stages, as analyzed through 

the public statements of its various components: competition, consolidation, and 

confidence. Additionally, we would be wise to anticipate an initial period of 

ineffective groping in the dark in any counterinsurgency campaign.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

64

V. Sequential versus Cumulative

Although U.S. thinking about conventional combat now tends 

toward simultaneity and non-linearity in operations and campaigns 

combined with near-continuous analysis and adjustment, sequence and 

phasing remain the underlying architecture of our operational concepts 

and planning processes. And while counterinsurgency campaigns are 

susceptible of conceptualization in terms of broad phases, by force of 

circumstance those phases overlap in important ways, leaving their 

boundaries indefinite —largely because of the myriad actions they 

necessarily contain and the importance of the incremental, cumulative 

effects, vice sequential execution and completion, of those actions.28

VI. Doctrine

Notwithstanding encouraging recent efforts (not yet secular 

trends), doctrine for counterinsurgency has been and remains much less 

robust than for conventional combat operations, in part because the 

problem is less amenable to distillation in formal doctrine, but also 

because insurgency has historically been treated as an aberration 

distracting from the military’s real business of major conventional combat 

operations against similarly disposed armed forces of other states.29

Doctrine has usually lagged the evolution of insurgency and in any case 

has remained so non-specific as to constitute an inadequate guide to 

 

28 The empirical record plainly shows, for example, that counterinsurgency 

campaigns based on the assumption that development (i.e., schools, health 

facilities, utilities infrastructure, and the like) can only follow in train of the 

establishment of internal security are not destined to be successful.

29 This phenomenon is not new. It was as significant in the 19th century as it has 

been during the past several decades. See John D. Waghelstein, “Preparing the 

US Army for the Wrong War: Educational and Doctrinal Failure 1865-1891,“ 

Small Wars and Insurgencies 10(1999): 1-33. In the present setting the Army’s 

draft field manual for counterinsurgency and the Marine Corps’ revision and 

update of its classic Small Wars Manual are two very positive developments.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

65

understanding and action. Consequently, effective counterinsurgency 

planning and execution to date has in practice relied upon the intuitive or 

implicit knowledge of the experienced professional, often an iconoclast 

operating at the margins of the mainstream military.

30 Indeed, 

counterinsurgency campaigns have more probability of success when 

devised by professionals with broad personal experience of insurgency.

VII. Systems Perspective

The complexity of insurgency, in combination with its adaptive 

and evolutionary character and the typically long time frame for 

countering it, suggests strongly the practical value of treating it from a 

systems perspective. We do not here consider the relative utility of the 

various systems models as a basis for an informed perspective on 

insurgency. However, our approach is more consistent with a systems 

approach drawn from a biological rather than from a physical metaphor.31

VIII. Comparative Analysis

To the extent that systematic analysis of insurgency can be 

codified and formalized, it requires explicit comparison across historical 

 

30 Bernard Fall and Edward Lansdale personify those military officers residing at 

the margin of their military establishments who nonetheless prove highly 

effective in counterinsurgency. Fall was a member of the French resistance 

during World War II, also serving in a Moroccan infantry division. See Bernard 

Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,“ Naval 

War College Review (Winter 1998): 46-57. As an Army intelligence officer, 

Lansdale served in the OSS during World War II, in 1947 transferring to the Air 

Force from which he ultimately retired as a brigadier general. See Edward 

Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New 

York: Harper and Row, 1972), and Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The 

Unquiet American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988).

31 For an excellent practical example of a systems approach to understanding 

insurgency, see Kilcullen (2004), Appendix C, in which he analyzes the present 

insurgency in Iraq. 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

66

insurgencies. This allows highlighting characteristics common to all or 

most of them. Demarcating those factors peculiar to specific insurgencies 

becomes possible only with an appropriate analytical framework. In turn, 

such comparison and analysis must rest upon a solid foundation of the 

appropriate practical questions about insurgencies; absent such a common 

metric, no comparisons can be effected. Such analysis, we believe, will 

never submit to the same degree of formality as the CES/MDMP achieves 

for conventional operations. It will inevitably require an extraordinarily 

high degree of art on the part of the analyst.

IX. Questions

We do not suggest that insurgencies are so obscure and opaque 

that they remain fundamentally resistant to effective analysis, or that 

insurgents are inevitably invincible. To the contrary, like all mortals they 

have feet of clay and sometimes they can be downright stupid: Che 

Guevara comes to mind. We cannot, however, count on such inadequacy 

as a matter of course. Rather, defeating them requires asking the right 

questions and answering them with reasonable clarity and accuracy. 

Thus, offered here is a set of questions founded in practical 

experience, a systems perspective, and key concepts of operational art: 

strategic objective; center of gravity; critical strengths, weaknesses, and 

vulnerabilities; operational factors; and decisive points.32 These questions 

focus our attention on the beliefs and attitudes of the key players in 

insurgencies, their capabilities for action, and the relationships among 

these players. Posing and answering these questions, it is believed, will 

 

32 The Principles of MOOTW (Security, Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, Restraint, 

Perseverance, and Objective; often remembered as SLURPO) aid the military 

planner in distinguishing the implications for devising operations and campaigns 

addressing problems of insurgency from those of conventional combat 

operations. Thus, they offer general guidelines for thinking about problems of 

counterinsurgency.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

67

allow the officer confronted with understanding a real-world insurgency to 

assess and comprehend its fundamental characteristics in order to develop 

a plan for an effective counterinsurgency campaign, with emphasis on 

exploitation of critical vulnerabilities.

Although of necessity listed in linear order, we do not thereby 

suggest a priority for the questions nor a sequence in which they should be 

asked and answered. The several categories of question are also 

interrelated, though shown discretely below: answers to one will have 

important implications for the others. Finally, we note that not every 

question provided here will be relevant to every insurgency, but its 

relevance should at least be considered; and that we do not suppose that 

these questions exhaust the relevant questions for insurgencies of the 

contemporary period or for those that will arise in the future. 

1. Underlying Issues

Insurgencies do not find fertile ground in a population in which 

most sectors are generally contented with their lot in life. Underlying 

conditions of real grievance are necessary, usually described by a 

mismatch between sentiment of a significant portion of the population and 

government policies, especially the provision of public goods and 

services. One implication for counterinsurgency is for the government to 

make significant substantive changes in its policies in order to strengthen 

its ties to and legitimacy in the eyes of its population. Some grievances 

may result from factors well beyond the ability of the government to 

redress.

 What issues have the insurgents articulated as their sources 

of grievance (e.g., land distribution; ethnic, religious, or other 

discrimination and allied human rights concerns; control of natural 

resources by multinational corporations or a central government; 

access to government offices; access to scarce resources such as 

health, education, or other basic services, etc.)? 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

68

 What are the grievances of the population? Would a 

reasonable person consider them to be valid? Validity of grievance 

is not effectively assessed by objective condition.33

 Are the articulated grievances of the population and those 

of the insurgency the same? 

 What does the government believe to be the grievances of 

the population? Does it consider those grievances to be valid?

 Are the articulated grievances of the population the same as 

those perceived by the government?

 Has the government made genuine efforts to address these 

grievances? (For example, the Sultan of Oman improved health 

services, expanded education, and built roads to outdo the 

insurgents in the Dhofar rebellion [1962–1976].) Are these 

grievances practically addressable, or are they beyond the 

immediate capacity of the government (e.g., major social and 

economic dislocations caused by globalization)?

2. Underlying Characteristics

Grasping the basic characteristics of the population is essential to 

analyzing the nature and structure of conflict in the focal state. These 

characteristics set the historical frame of reference for the conflict under 

consideration and define the parameters for possible courses of action.

They are also likely to be suggestive of courses of action aimed at 

reinforcing or widening seams among insurgents or between insurgents 

and the population.

 What are the primary characteristics 

(political/social/economic/religious) of the population? What are 

 

33 What matters is gap between expectations and experience. On this essential 

point, see Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1970); and David O. Sears, The Politics of Violence: The New Urban 

Blacks and the Watts Riot (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

69

the basic cleavages in the population (e.g., Tutsi and Hutu in 

Rwanda)? Do these cleavages reinforce each other or are they 

cross-cutting (e.g., religious alignments cut across ethnic 

differences in Sri Lanka)?

 What are the primary characteristics 

(political/social/economic/religious) of the insurgent leadership? 

Of the insurgency’s rank and file?

 What are the differences between the characteristics of the 

population and the insurgency? Do these differences matter?

 What are the primary characteristics 

(political/social/economic/religious) of the government leadership?

 What are the differences between the characteristics of the

population and the government? Do these differences matter?

3. Catalyst

Notwithstanding genuine grievances among a population, some 

sort of catalytic agent is usually necessary to mobilize and translate 

unhappiness into insurgency. Defeating the insurgent hinges in good 

measure on understanding the aims of the leadership, and devising a 

means for separating that leadership from its rank and file and from the 

larger population.

 Has the insurgency articulated a desired end-state (e.g., 

overthrow and replacement of the existing government, 

establishing a new state from a portion of the existing state’s 

territory, limited self-rule, control of natural resources, or other 

lesser changes)? If not, can an implicit desired end-state be 

derived? What is the insurgency’s desired end-state? In short, does 

the insurgency have a well-developed alternative to the 

government that it is able to articulate?
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

70

 What political/social/economic/religious objectives has the 

insurgency articulated? How closely are these objectives connected 

to the grievances of the population?

 Are there other unarticulated but implicit objectives for the 

insurgency that can be derived? How closely are these objectives 

connected to the grievances of the population?

4. Organization

Organization matters. Although state-based militaries tend to 

exhibit very similar organizational forms, insurgencies may take very 

different organizational forms (highly centralized or cellular or highly 

decentralized) and the organization of any given insurgency may change 

significantly over the duration of a counterinsurgency campaign (e.g., an 

insurgency is likely to improve and consolidate its organizational 

arrangements the longer it is in existence). Courses of action appropriate 

against centrally controlled insurgencies may have little effect on those 

only loosely organized. Compound or complex insurgencies may become 

more common and, while more difficult to comprehend, may also present 

more seams for practical exploitation. Similarly, as both history (Peru) and 

recent experience (Iraq) demonstrate, insurgencies in a given place and 

time may very well not be unitary entities; they may be more aptly 

described as compound or complex insurgencies.

 Is there more than one insurgency? If so, do they co-exist in 

the same space, or do they operate in different areas (as in western 

and southern Sudan)? Are they coordinated, or do they compete 

with each other for support of the population? Are there seams that 

can be exploited?

 How long has the insurgency been underway (e.g., is it in 

an early, organizing phase or is it in a more mature phase with a 

well-developed infrastructure)? See also Section 8, History, below.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

71

 How is the insurgency organized (e.g., centralized or 

decentralized)? Does it follow an identifiable philosophy (e.g., 

Maoist)? What is the content of that philosophy? What are the 

strengths of the insurgent organization? Are the insurgency’s 

political/leadership elements distinct from its coercive elements 

(e.g., Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army)? Are there seams 

between the political and coercive elements that can be exploited?

 Does the insurgency control any territory? If so, what are 

its dimensions and boundaries? Does that territory include 

resources vital to the government (e.g., the Panguna copper mine 

on Bougainville in Papua New Guinea)?

5. Support

State-based militaries do not typically live off the land; they bring 

their own stuff with them. Nor during conventional combat operations do 

they worry much about the legitimacy of their actions among a given 

population. The contrary obtains on both counts during problems of 

insurgency. Counterinsurgency campaigns must grasp the type, strength, 

and distribution of support for insurgency in order to develop effective 

courses of action.

 To what extent does the insurgency depend upon local 

popular support? What type of support does the population

provide (e.g., food, shelter, intelligence, cadre)?

 Is there an identifiable ethnic, religious, racial or other 

component to the insurgency (e.g., ethnic Chinese in 1950s British 

Malaya)? Is the support of such identifiable components critical to 

the insurgency? Are there exploitable seams?

 Is support freely provided or is it coerced? Is domestic 

popular support vulnerable to interdiction?

 How do geography and demographics affect the 

distribution of support (e.g., does support vary significantly 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

72

between city and countryside)? Do ethnic differences fall out with 

geography (e.g., Muslims in Thailand’s four southernmost 

provinces vs. overwhelmingly Buddhist population in the rest of 

the country)? Do some regions offer more support and others less? 

Do these differences constitute vulnerabilities that can be 

exploited?

 Has the insurgency moved from the countryside, 

unpopulated areas, or safe havens to an urban environment? If the 

insurgents are able to hide within the general population, what 

does that suggest about the movement’s popularity, or about the 

government’s control over the population?

 Does the insurgency enjoy external support? What is the 

nature of that support (finances, arms, cadres, expert advice, 

political, etc.)? What are the sources of that support (related 

insurgencies in other states, other states, religious institutions, e.g.,

the Roman Catholic church and liberation theology in Latin 

America)? Is outside support critical to the maintenance or success 

of the insurgency (PRC support through Yemen to 1970s 

insurgents in Dhofar, Oman)? Is that support susceptible of 

interdiction?

 In sum, is the insurgency’s support primarily internal or 

external?

6. Force and Coercion

The coercive tactics employed and the level of coercion exercised 

varies by insurgency. Accurately understanding the coercive strategy 

increases the probability that it can be defeated and (remembering that 

insurgent violence is theater) that the counterinsurgent agent will find a 

way to exploit that strategy to separate the insurgent from the focal 

population.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

73

 What is the insurgency’s coercive strategy? What are the 

strengths and weaknesses of that strategy?

 What types of force/coercion does the insurgency employ 

(conventional operations, guerrilla warfare, raids, assassinations, 

terrorism, etc.)?

 How well-armed (types and numbers) is the insurgency?

 What is the net effect to date of the force/coercion used by 

the government forces?

7. Legitimacy

The empirical record shows that insurgencies do not require 

positive support from their focal population, but that suppressing active 

opposition from that population may be sufficient for their purposes.

Nonetheless, over the long run, the insurgent will need to build legitimacy 

for its program among that population even as it seeks to delegitimize the 

government or occupying authority. Effectively countering the insurgency 

therefore requires close attention to problems of legitimacy, particularly 

with respect to the development of integrated information operations in 

support of counterinsurgent efforts.

 What efforts has the insurgency made to establish and 

maintain its legitimacy? How has the population responded to 

these efforts? How has the international community responded to 

those efforts?

 What efforts, if any, has the insurgency made to 

internationalize the conflict? How has the international community 

responded to those efforts?

 Generally, what is the information climate? Who is doing 

what in this arena? What mechanisms are in play? Who is winning 

the information campaign?
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

74

8. History

Apart from the immediate origins of the specific grievances 

motivating the focal population, and the insurgency’s near-term 

development and evolution, every insurgency has a history that bears on 

the counterinsurgent campaign.

 How did the insurgency originate (e.g., a nationalist 

movement against a colonial power; in the wake of conventional 

combat operations between states; with the breakup of a state; as a 

result of long-festering grievances of some portion of the 

population of a given state; etc.)?

 Is there a historical experience/legacy of previous

insurgencies in the area of operations/country/region? What are the 

implications of that legacy? Is insurgency perceived by the focal 

population to be an accepted mechanism to redress grievances?

 Has the state ever had an effective, legitimate, central 

government that provides internal security and services to the 

population and controls its borders (e.g., neither Somalia nor 

Afghanistan have ever had such a government)?

9. Other Questions

Inevitably, given the wide variation in the structure of 

insurgencies, other questions will also be useful to address in any analysis.

We provide several such questions here that none of the categories above 

appropriately subsume. Effective counterinsurgency will also hinge on 

carefully and creatively developing other questions to be asked and 

answered about any given insurgency.

 Are there other legitimate political/social/religious 

institutions (political parties, organized religion, labor unions, 

women’s groups, environmental groups, etc.) that provide other 

venues for mobilizing the population or articulation of grievances? 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

75

Are these groups closer to the insurgency or to the government? 

Can they be co-opted?

 Has the insurgency formed alliances of convenience with 

other illegitimate or illegal groups (warlords, urban gangs, drug 

cartels, etc.)? What are the bases for these alliances (what goods or 

services does each provide for the other, e.g., finances, physical 

protection, base of operations, etc.)? Are there seams vulnerable to 

exploitation?

 What are the relevant spatial factors (i.e., geography, 

topography, climate)? Is the state or other area of concern an 

island, a peninsula, landlocked? Are its neighboring governments 

friendly to it, or do they support the insurgency overtly or covertly 

(e.g., Yemen and Oman or Iran and Iraq)? Can its borders be 

sealed? Are there areas within the state that the insurgency can 

exploit as havens or bases of operation (e.g., terrain relatively 

inaccessible to the government such as rainforests or mountains or 

densely populated urban terrain)? What is the character of that 

terrain?

 What other factors/variables/issues should be included in 

this analysis?

We began by observing that operational-level planning and 

execution of military operations comprises one type of problem-solving 

behavior. Effective problem solving commences with developing a 

practical understanding of the structure of the problem confronted.

Insurgencies, we contended, represent problems of organized complexity, 

which are most likely to be initially encountered as ill-structured 

problems. For such problems, which are not readily assigned to 

predeveloped categories, discovering or imposing a structure on the 

problem not only is the first step but is likely to constitute the 

preponderance of effort in problem solving. It forms the foundation for the 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

76

development of practical courses of action to solve or mitigate the 

problem at hand.

Based on practical experience and analysis of historical 

insurgencies, we developed and provided a set of questions that we believe 

will assist materially in comprehending the structure of any given 

insurgency. These questions address the characteristics of the key actors in 

any insurgency and the interrelationships among them, and, implicitly, 

provide a basis for developing courses of action intended to exploit the 

seams, either by reinforcing those interrelationships or driving wedges 

between the actors, while simultaneously working toward weakening the 

insurgent actors and strengthening the counterinsurgent agents. We leave 

for another discussion the specific practical issues associated with using 

the CES/MDMP processes to develop and evaluate courses of action based 

upon the analyses developed through these questions.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

77

Annex B: Memorandum of Phone Conversation with 

General John Galvin (U.S. Army, Ret.)

20 December 2010

General Galvin accompanied the outgoing CinC, General Paul 

Gorman, to what he described as a highly contentious meeting with 

General Walter Lopez, Commander, Honduran Armed Forces, in April 

1985, during which Gen. Lopez expressed his extreme dissatisfaction with 

the status of military aid to the AOH. The current aid package of $100 

million was tied up in congressional debate. Additionally, most assistance 

that did get through went to the El Salvadorans or to the CIA’s Contra 

training operation in Yamales, Honduras. Lopez felt that Honduras itself,

which was in real danger from the Nicaraguans and their Soviet-supplied 

T-55 tanks, deserved more. Honduran concerns focused on external 

threats, while the El Salvador war was an internal insurgency and the 

CIA’s focus was on destabilizing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. 

In their conversation about the insurgency, General Galvin 

remembered the AOH forces on the north coast region (San Pedro Sula to 

La Ceiba) as weak. [Note: It was not surprising that these units so far 

away from the main effort would be described as weak. This area was the 

one where the insurgency would develop.] 

The bolsones were a major problem in that they had become 

sanctuaries for the guerrillas. [Note: Per OAS-brokered ceasefire 

provisions, these border areas were forbidden to troops from both El 

Salvador and Honduras. This made them ideal for guerrillas to set up 

camps without interference.] SF deployments were a “two-fers” benefit, as 

the Hondurans got U.S. support without having to pay for it via Security 

Assistance and the United States. SF units improved readiness for war 

plans. The same held for Reserves and National Guard road building, 

airfields, and training at Palmerola. 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

78

Regarding the embassy: Gen. Galvin called Ambassador 

Negroponte first-rate. [Note: The ambassador departed the year Gen 

Galvin arrived]. The General was less complimentary re U.S. embassy 

intelligence entities. What was really “first-rate,” he said, was the Central 

American Joint Intelligence Task Force (CAJITF) operating in the 

Pentagon. This all-source fusion operation had the best of the community,

who were all-stars in their own organizations and were therefore of real 

assistance (“both protected and did not have to leave D.C.”) . They 

produced “good quality stuff.”

Regarding the threat of insurgency, the CinC felt that Tegucigalpa 

[USEMB] believed the Honduran Armed Forces had any internal threat 

“under control.” The embassy, MilGp, TF-B, attaché, and station believed 

“nothing was happening.”

“Any time you deal with an Embassy you are dealing with so many 

‘pipelines’ such as USAID, the Agency, the Country Team, etc., and the 

ambassador has a tough job.” The General believed the only way to fix 

this problem was that all traffic “must have [the Ambassador’s] signature 

on it”—in other words, “one god.” [Note: Dean Hinton, U.S. Ambassador 

in El Salvador 1981–1983, enforced this rule with outstanding results.]

Gen. Galvin further noted that “jealousies in the Intelligence field 

in embassies has weakened our position.”
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

79

Annex C: Recollection

by Captain Joe Carrerra, 7th SFG

During a trip I made to Nicaragua back in May 2003 ... I was 

interviewing a former council man in the port city of Corinto along the 

Pacific coast. During my discussion he mentioned that he was at one time 

the equivalent of a “Batallion Commander” during the war in the mid1980s. He was giving his version of his war stories in Honduras and their 

cross-border operations. After a few cold beers he reflected for a moment 

on one of the biggest obstacles they encountered. He stated that an 

important part of their mission was “consentizacion del pueblo” and the 

hardest parts of his mission was to go in after “los hijos de’ puta 

americanos” had provided the townspeople or villagers with medical 

treatment while taking care of the sick babies and elders. I knew exactly 

what he was referring to and I took this as a back-handed compliment.

They had little else to offer other than their ideology and at the end of the 

day the Hondurans were not too very impressed. As he added, I guess the 

“Catrachos” didn’t get their fill with words, as they still went to bed 

hungry. Perhaps on one level the effectiveness of what we were doing in 

Honduras could be measured on the social side by the Civic Action 

Programs and the apparent success these projects had, in addition to the 

other critical missions we were carrying out. This, coupled with the 

obvious success of the military training of the Honduran Armed Forces,

served to keep—in concert with several other factors—an insurgency from 

really taking hold in Honduras. As my council man friend summed it up, 

“Los gringos no ganaron en Honduras sin tener que pegarnos un tiro”—

it had the same effect as if they had shot us, without actually having to fire 

a bullet.

What he meant was the following: The impact of Civic Action 

Programs were quite significant in that they actually did quite a lot to help 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

80

win the hearts and minds of many of the Honduran campesinos that were 

basically sitting on the proverbial ideological fence between a Marxist 

ideology or something else that provided another option, even if it was 

wrapped around the mantle of liberation theology. In the case of this 

particular unit, liberation theology was not their strength. The truth being 

told, absent having a priest or member of the clergy present it would have 

been difficult for to make a strong case for liberation theology . This is 

quite different from the Jesuits that were operating in the UCA [Central 

American University] in both Nicaragua and El Salvador. In other words, 

the Civic Action Programs were extremely effective and had a lasting 

effect long after the Civic Action activity actually occurred.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

81

Annex D: Reflections on Contributing Factors

by Major General John Stewart, J-2 SOUTHCOM

7 January 2011

I arrived in SOUTHCOM in July of ’86. The previous J-2 had 

departed before my arrival. At that time, the big issues were the 

insurgency in El Salvador and secondarily the Sandinistas and support for 

the Contras, though the later was limited by official U.S. policy. Why was 

the elevation of the threat in Honduras so long in coming? I suspect there 

were several factors that supported the move by SOUTHCOM: the 

Gorman/Galvin meeting with the Honduran command in April 1985, the 

increasing need by the U.S. of Honduran cooperation, and the 

improvement of SOUTHCOM’s intelligence operations under General 

Galvin. JTF Bravo had grown to include logistics, training, and 

considerable intelligence collection capabilities. We did not want 

Hondurans fighting their own insurgency nor their thinking the U.S. did 

not take them seriously. Moreover, General Galvin promulgated a broad 

policy in the Americas to improve relations with Latin American military 

institutions. While the main hot spots were in Central America, he wanted 

to improve relationships throughout the AOR. So when senior Latin 

American military leaders presented him with issues, he responded with 

dispatch. In the case of Honduras, he would have put a microscope on the 

budding insurgency. ... Was it the focus on [Panama leader Daniel] 

Ortega that delayed SOUTHCOM’s response to the issue of the Honduras 

insurgency on the north coast? I suspect it was. First, I am not sure that 

General Gorman and his staff believed the insurgency to be anything more 

that low level criminal or tribal activity. As you point out, the in-country 

American intelligence folks were not reporting a serious insurgency.

Furthermore, during the period ’83–’85, the U.S. Congress was debating 

our policies toward El Salvador and Nicaragua, and one of the results was 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

82

the Bollin Amendment, which proscribed U.S. support for the Contras.

Additionally, Congress also limited U.S. military presence in El Salvador

[the 55-man limit]. Thus, in light of the very serious nature of the threat in 

Central America and to U.S. national security interests there as well as the 

restriction placed on U.S. policy makers and promulgators, including 

CINCSOUTH, SOUTHCOM had its hands full. 

When I arrived at SOUTHCOM, General Galvin was very 

dissatisfied with his intelligence organization and their entire operation.

To that end, I reviewed our entire J-2 operation and our relationships with 

other intelligence organizations, both within SOUTHCOM and nationally.

We worked with defense and national agencies as well as the in-country 

teams. We set up SOUTHCOM liaisons in our embassy in El Salvador and 

at JTF Bravo. I visited the latter frequently and traveled to DC to establish 

close relationships with appropriate intelligence organization in all of the 

National Intel Agencies. We worked hand in glove with CIA reps in 

Panama and SOUTHCOM and seconded a small military team under the 

station chief in El Salvador.

As we reviewed the situation in the late summer and fall of 1986 

for every area of importance to the CINC, we identified several major 

gaps and misunderstanding. We then focused on filling in the intelligence 

as completely as we could. Our work to reach out to the broader 

intelligence community paid off. We treated others as team members, and 

since we were closer to what was happening “on-the-ground,” they 

respected our work and helped us to improve collection and reporting. I 

believe that two key elements helped us come to describe that threat more 

accurately: General Galvin’s direction to support Honduras as a key ally,

and his priority on improving every aspect on SOUTHCOM’s intelligence 

operations and reporting. 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

83

Annex E: Early Special Operations Force—What Came 

Before

by Colonel Tom Kuster

The key intervention was begun under Gen Paul Gorman, who 

initiated the “persistent presence” concept with a series of rolling exercises 

in Honduras—the overarching AHAUS TARA series and other smaller 

exercises of shorter duration. Though billed as efforts to enhance the 

interoperability between U.S. and Honduran forces, they were unequivocal 

efforts to demonstrate U.S. resolve to the Sandinistas and provide 

tripwires for U.S. engagement if any Sandinista conventional retaliation 

occurred against FDN safe havens in Honduras. [Note: These deployments 

were designed not to focus on the potential insurgency but were in support 

of the major War Plan. The advantages accrued from these deployments 

were the repeated contact SF detachments made with Honduran units and 

with the country as a whole.34]

The FOB 73 section in the attached is noteworthy. On the one 

hand, the FOB was a participant in an overt combined exercise framework 

to achieve interoperability and heightened proficiency with a key 

Honduran battalion on a strategic LOC; on the other hand, it had distinct 

missions emanating from SOUTHCOM, outside the context of the 

exercise, that actually drove its mission profile and task organization. The 

latter, however, were directly tasked by the CINC and unknown to the 

exercise JTF Commander, an example of how Gorman truly understood 

how to employ his Special Forces, strategically and operationally to 

achieve multiple objectives. ... [Note: These missions were discontinued 

when Gen Gorman left the command]

 

34 From comments by Kevin M. Brew, Student, NWC
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

84

I. 1983-84: Central America

The inauguration of President Reagan brought about a significant 

shift in U.S. foreign policy—things were going to get significantly more 

proactive as national security attention turned increasingly to those arenas 

where the Soviet Union and its allies were challenging U.S. interests 

indirectly, fostering instability through insurgency and terrorism. The

Sandinistas had recently toppled the regime of Somoza in Nicaragua, 

installing a virtual Cuban satellite on the mainland. For the 7th SFGA, that 

meant that Latin America and the Caribbean were back on the radar.

The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, besides having the largest and 

best-equipped military force in Central America (supported from Cuba 

and the Soviet Union), was fostering the Farabundo Marti National 

Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba, of course, had ramped up 

its efforts to gain influence within the hemisphere and its hands were all 

over the situations in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Colombia, to name the 

most obvious. The Mariel boatlift in October 1980 had soured U.S.-Cuban 

relations even further. All of these confronted the Reagan Administration 

as it took the controls of the ship of state. 

In 1983, General Paul F. Gorman assumed command of the U.S. 

Southern Command in Panama. Gorman had recently been the J5 of the 

Joint Staff in Washington. He knew the “big picture” of national security 

and military strategic objectives from the Washington perspective; 

moreover, he knew how to influence the Pentagon and Services to support 

him. His Executive Assistant on the Joint Staff, Colonel Stuart Perkins,

35

assumed command of the 7th SFGA almost simultaneously. That personal 

relationship between the Theater Commander and “his” supporting Special 

Forces Group Commander would prove invaluable, on the one hand, while 

 

35 Perkins had a long history of Special Forces assignments, both enlisted and as 

an officer, including MACVSOG, 8th Special Forces Group in Panama, 10th

Special Forces Group and Special Operations Task Force Europe (SOTFE) in 

Europe. He was a Spanish and German linguist. 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

85

on the other, it caused all kinds of consternation for others on Smoke 

Bomb Hill and within the Army. The Group now had insights as to what 

exactly the CINC envisioned and what his expectations were for the 

Group to aid him in achieving his objectives. It also gave the CINC greater 

insights into what the obstacles were that were being faced by the Group,

particularly those beyond the Group Commander’s sphere of control in 

which the CINC’s influence needed to be brought to bear to remedy them, 

i.e., manning, equipment, parts resupply priorities, funding for increased 

language training, etc.

Gorman recognized that a single SF battalion (3rd Bn, 7th SFGA), 

as allocated to SOUTHCOM in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan’s 

Force Apportionment Annex, was not going to be able to provide 

SOUTHCOM the capacity that would be needed to take a more proactive 

posture throughout the region. The strategic intent would be to engage in a 

full-blown, low-intensity conflict across the theater (not simply a localized 

effort to buttress the government in El Salvador, albeit efforts there would 

also intensify). Foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency were to be 

the priority missions. Persistent presence, particularly in Central America, 

was going to be the routine, not simply a one-time, short-lived surge.

Gorman intended to challenge any Sandinista or Cuban illusion of a lack 

of resolve on the part of the U.S.

The 7th Special Forces Group, as a result of the contraction of 

Special Forces units in the mid-1970s, found itself apportioned to three 

distinct Regional CINCs—all, obviously, with widely disparate mission 

requirements: (1) Pacific Command, with responsibility for all of Asia and 

the Pacific; (2) Southern Command, with responsibility for all of Latin 

America (less Mexico); and (3) Atlantic Command, principally for its 

Caribbean responsibilities. The threats ranged from potential conventional 

conflict on the Korean peninsula, contingency follow-on actions in 

Southeast Asia, communist-inspired insurgencies in Central and South 

America, instability in the Caribbean to include any contingencies 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

86

regarding Cuba, even including defense of Alaska in the event of conflict 

with the former Soviet Union. The breadth of the 7th Group’s Mission 

Essential Task Lists and requisite language, area, and cultural orientation 

was staggering.

The efforts began immediately to reprioritize and reorganize the 

focus of the entire Group. Area orientation and theater alignment were 

shifted to apportion the entire Group to the CINC in SOUTHCOM, with 

LANTCOM relegated to a secondary priority and the Asia/Pacific 

responsibilities shifted to the 12th SFGA (USAR). Planning for 

involvement in the Korea exercise FOAL EAGLE was terminated.36 7th

SFGA’s long association with Asia/Pacific was now over. Latin America 

and the Caribbean were to be the sole focus, Job #1.

The area and language reorientation (away from Asia/Pacific focus 

to a Latin American focus) brought an immediate need to stock the Group 

with as many Spanish linguists, hopefully with regional experience, as 

possible and to do it fast. For some inexplicable reason, language 

orientation had not been an overriding factor in how the personnel 

management system determined where individuals were assigned. Guys 

who had been assigned to 3/7 SFGA in Panama (the majority of whom 

were Spanish linguists) were being parceled out to other units on Smoke 

Bomb Hill when they rotated back to the States; some had even been 

assigned to the European-focused 10th Special Forces Group at Fort 

Devens, Massachusetts. Some assignments made sense; guys with special 

skill sets being assigned as key instructors in the SF Schools system or if 

they held a senior grade (e.g., Sergeant Major) that had lower vacancies 

than the more junior enlisted grades. Some were amazingly nonsensical; 

one case was an African-American Weapons Sergeant (E-7, Sergeant First 

 

36 7th SFGA provided a small liaison element, under the control of the Group 

DCO, to facilitate the transition of the 12th SFGA into a primary role in FOAL 

EAGLE and continue with the 12th during the exercise (November 1983). After 

that the 7th SFGA essentially disengaged from involvement with USPACOM.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

87

Class), fluent in both Spanish and Portuguese, who had been assigned 

from 3/7 SFGA to a SFOD-A in the 10th SFGA with an area orientation to 

Poland—not much chance that he’d survive behind Soviet lines in Poland 

trying to blend into the local population! BG Joe Lutz, then Commander 

of the USA JFK Center, perhaps recognizing that pressure was surely 

coming from Gorman or others, changed the rules, giving the Group carte 

blanche to screen all the other units for Spanish linguists so they could be 

identified for consideration for reassignment to the 7th SFGA. This was 

the first infusion and, as they came in, others with Pacific orientations who 

may even have had long linkages with the 7th SFGA were moved out to 

make room ... a painful but necessary step.37 New officers and NCOs who 

were coming out of the SF Qualification Course, and were destined for 

assignment to 7th SFGA, were cycled through Spanish language training 

(at Fort Bragg) before joining the Group. Those who failed to achieve 

basic proficiency (at the lowest level, i.e., 1-1) were diverted to other 

assignments whenever possible. Funding was identified to increase local 

Spanish language training at Fort Bragg facilities, to include the Army 

Education Centers. The command mantra was simple: “If you can’t speak

Spanish, you won’t deploy. If you’re non-deployable, we need to replace 

you.” There was a swell of resistance, especially from those who feared 

being on the outside, looking in. The undertone was that the “Panama 

Mafia” was taking over the Group ... and casting all others aside. The 

actual truth, however, was that mantra was right on target—we couldn’t 

afford to carry anyone who wasn’t going to contribute to the mission. If 

you weren’t a linguist, able to operate with indigenous folks downrange, 

than you better have some unique skill that we really needed to justify 

your retention within the Group while you developed some degree of 

language proficiency. The intent from the SOUTHCOM Commander was 

 

37 Many of the old Asia-Pacific hands who were moved out of the 7th SFGA 

were designated to form the core of the 1st SFGA Headquarters and the 1st SF 

battalion (Okinawa) that were in the very early stages of re-activation.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

88

clear—he intended to employ the Group extensively within Honduras (and 

wherever else needed) to create persistent presence to counterbalance 

Cuban-Nicaraguan efforts to destabilize the area.

As this was occurring, significant command and control 

arrangements were also placed into effect. At that time (spring 1983), the

SOUTHCOM special operations staff (J3 Special Operations Division) 

was a small staff component; Theater Special Operations Commands 

(TSOCs) had not been established and wouldn’t be for several years. It 

was clear that funneling the relationship of the Group to the wider 

SOUTHCOM staff and CINC through that small J3-SOD component was 

not going to be either effective or efficient. The Group’s relationship 

would become more of one like any other major component of the joint 

force, with a direct relationship to the J3 and Theater Operations Center 

for reporting, e.g., operations reporting, quarterly training briefings, 

readiness reporting, etc., and the Commander receiving command 

guidance and intent from the CINC (often directly). Neither the Army 

Component Commander (193d Infantry Brigade Panama) nor the 

Commander of the soon-to-be activated 1st US Army Special Operations 

Command (Provisional)38 were in the operational chain of command for 

the conduct of activities directed by the SOUTHCOM CINC through his 

staff. The Group HQs at Fort Bragg converted from a peacetime construct 

to that of a Special Forces Operational Base as called for doctrinally, with 

an Operations Center and Support Center to manage all activities. The 

second floor of the Group HQ’s building on Ardennes was secured with 

 

38 As a result of a year-long Special Forces Mission Area Analysis that had been 

pushed by Army Chief of Staff GEN Shy Meyers, the Commander JFK Center 

(MG Joe Lutz) had been directed to reorganize and establish the 1st SOCOM 

(Provisional) in 1983. Meyer was well aware of growing pressure in the 

Congress for a major consolidation of all Special Operations Forces within a new 

functional Combatant Command and proactively postured Army Special Forces 

for the change he saw as inevitable. In 1986, Congress mandated the 

establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command. 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

89

access control, RATT rig communications were established 24/7 with 

forward deployed elements, Area Specialist Teams were staffed within the 

Operations Center to support deployed elements within an AST’s assigned 

Area of Responsibility, Red Switch communications were emplaced to 

allow the CINC direct communications connectivity with the Commander 

and the Theater TOC with the SFOB Operations Center. Even small things 

began to change; rather than referring to “companies,” the lexicon shifted 

to terms like B detachments, Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), Area 

Command Bases (ACBs), etc. While the administrative and sustainment 

relationship for the Group and the CONUS-based battalions remained 

through the 1st SOCOM (Provisional), the operational chain of command 

shifted to a direct support (DS) relationship between the Theater 

Command and the Group. Initially, the rank-imbalanced power struggle 

over who would ultimately control the operational employment of the 3rd

SF Battalion in Panama played out between the Group Commander (a 

colonel) and the Commander of the 193rd Infantry Brigade (a major 

general), but in the end the SOUTHCOM CINC made it clear that all 

Special Forces assets would be managed and employed through the Group 

and its SFOB.39

The Regional Military Training Center (Centro Regional de 

Entrenamiento Militar, or CREM), on the northern coast of Honduras, 

serves as a case in point to demonstrate how quickly things did indeed 

change.

By 1982, it was clear that the Salvadoran Army needed a system 

that would enable refit, reconstitution, and retraining of its forces to 

 

39 Ironically, the Army Component Commander in SOUTHCOM (MG Fred 

Woerner) would later become the CINC SOUTHCOM, but by that time, not only 

had the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act been placed into effect 

but his view from the Joint perspective outweighed his previous parochial 

Service view. Additionally, SOUTHCOM by that time had a Theater Special 

Operations Command (SOCSOUTH) to command and control theater special 

operations.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

90

succeed in what was becoming a protracted counterinsurgency campaign 

against the FMLN. The existing facility in eastern El Salvador, the Centro 

de Entrenamiento Militar de las Fuerzas Armadas (CEMFA), handling 

basic and advanced individual training40 and turning conscripts into 

soldiers, couldn’t handle the expected demand, nor was the operational 

environment conducive to the objectives of focused collective training.

Moreover, once the U.S. Congress put a ceiling on the number of U.S.

military advisors in El Salvador at 55,

41 conduct of this mission inside El 

Salvador was essentially out of the question. The first choice for a training 

site outside the continental U.S. was at the U.S. Army School of the 

Americas, collocated at Fort Gulick, Panama with the 3rd SF Battalion 7th

SFGA, but the Panamanian government denied the request to bring the 

Salvadoran units into Panama. Seeking an alternative that would neither 

stir any repercussions within the U.S. Congress nor incite internal 

opposition42 within the host country, the decision to use Puerto Castilla,43

 

40 There was a continuous presence of Special Forces trainers at the CEMFA to 

guide the effort; formed as a Mobile Training Team, under the supervision of the 

USMILGP in San Salvador, the mission was primarily resourced from the 3d SF 

Bn 7th SFGA from Panama.

41 There has always been a debate as to the genesis of the magic number “55” as 

the cap on U.S. advisors. The tale that resonates the most is that when questioned 

by the Congress as to how many advisory personnel he thought he would need 

authorized, General Gorman responded, “55.” He had recently been briefed at 

Fort Gulick, Panama by the Commander of the 3rd SF Battalion, who had 

estimated that 55 SF personnel (as OPATTs, MTTs, etc.) would probably be 

needed to enhance the ESAF operational capability (a planning figure). That 

estimate did not include the multitude of non-SF requirements (logistics, 

communications, medical, aviation maintenance, etc.) that would also be needed 

to accomplish objectives outside the SF purview. In reaching for a number, he 

recalled the brief, and responded “55”—a cap that often became difficult to live 

within.

42 There were conflicts in the Honduran Congress and opposition from various 

factions in Honduran society that the introduction of Salvadoran soldiers on 

Honduran soil was a violation of Honduras’ declared neutrality. On 20 June 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

91

Honduras as the site for CREM was finalized in May 1982 when 

Honduras signed an amendment to a 1954 military collaboration 

agreement with the U.S. 

The mission of establishing the training facility and actually 

conducting the training was a security assistance activity—funded via 

military aid packages, approved by the U.S. Congress, for El Salvador 

(and to a lesser degree, Honduras). Previously, security assistance projects 

(MTTs, TATs, etc.) had been managed on Smoke Bomb Hill by an office 

known as the Security Assistance and Training Management Office 

(SATMO) under the direction of the Commandant, U.S. Army Institute for 

Military Assistance. This endeavor was too big, too complex, and had too 

much at stake to have what was essentially an administrative staff element 

in charge. In the eyes of the CINC, the mission was one for the 7th SFGA. 

Though any and all requirements that may be called for to remain 

consistent with security assistance parameters would be observed, the 

command and control of the mission would be executed through normal 

operational command and control of Theater CINC (through the Theater 

TOC) to the Group Commander (through the SFOB Operations Center) to 

the U.S. Mission Commander (at the CREM).

The Commander C-71 (1st SF Battalion 7th SFGA) was given the 

CREM mission, organizing a multidisciplinary task force of trainers, 

 

1983, the National Congress held a closed-door session to vote on the existence 

of the base. A compromise to quiet the opposition stated that the Salvadorans 

would not be called soldiers but rather “students” and the U.S. military personnel 

would not be called advisors, but rather “instructors.” Ironically, the personnel of 

the 7th SFGA had already arrived in-country the week before with all their 

equipment, and preparations were underway to begin the mission.

43 Although two locations (Puerto Castilla and Trujillo, the capital of Colon 

department) were commonly referred to as the site of the CREM, it was actually 

about 20 minutes away from Puerto Castilla near the small town of Silin on about 

140 hectares. A legal battle over the actual ownership of the land persisted in the 

Honduran courts for years.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

92

logisticians, and communications personnel, to deploy to Honduras for the 

first increment of 179-day rotations that was to last through 1985 when the 

CREM closed. This first element had to start from scratch: No existing 

facility to begin with, no viable airfield to sustain and resupply the 

mission, no training infrastructure (ranges, training areas, etc.) ... they had 

to start there before they could even begin accepting Salvadoran units for 

training. Task Force C-71 had to deploy to Honduras by sea—arrival by 

air wasn’t an option. The landing strip at Trujillo couldn’t accept the gross 

cargo weight of USAF aircraft, and ground movement by road from the 

major commercial airfields at San Pedro Sula or Tegucigalpa also wasn’t 

possible. The coastal road network was primitive to say the best; they 

were virtually impassable during the rainy season. Sustainment was by sea 

until infrastructure could be developed.44

The mission was to convert units of the Salvadoran Army into 

special counterinsurgency battalions called “hunter” battalions or 

cazadores of about 350 men. Their mission was to complement the ESAF 

Infantry Brigades assigned a regional presence mission by conducting 

search and clear operations in areas occupied by the FMLN guerrillas,

which the Salvadoran government would follow-up with reconstruction 

projects of social or economic development within a security framework 

to be provided by the regional brigade.45 As a first step, however, the 

 

44 Eventually the infrastructure around Trujillo and Puerto Castilla was 

significantly improved to sustain the CREM’s operations. Existing docks were 

extended; a new dock was added. Warehouses were built. A petroleum storage 

facility was installed. The landing strip at Trujillo was extended. Roads to San 

Pedro Sula and La Cieba were repaired and asphalted, finally linking Puerto 

Castilla with Tegucigalpa. Other U.S. military units that came later for the 

multiple combined exercises that followed benefited from these improvements, 

as did the general economy of the area. When TF C-71 established its initial base 

camp they were almost completely flooded out by the first rainy season—no one 

anticipated just how bad the coastal flooding would actually be. 

45 Following a concept that would return in later years in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan to “clear, hold, secure, and sustain,” providing an environment in 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

93

initial training was provided to a Honduran Army company that was 

assigned a security mission for the CREM. The ESAF units were not 

newly constituted; largely, they were battle-tested units that were 

undergoing refit and reconstitution. Both individual and collective tasks, 

culminating in battalion-level operations, were covered. Additionally, 

lessons learned and information on noted deficiencies that were being 

experienced by the U.S. Military Operational Planning and Training 

Teams (OPATTs) assigned to the ESAF Infantry Brigades were passed 

along to the training cadre at the CREM for incorporation into the 

program(s) of instruction to systemically spread them throughout the 

ESAF ground forces.

With efforts now underway to strengthen the operational capability 

of the Salvadoran Army to confront and succeed under the 

counterinsurgency combat conditions in their country, Gorman set his 

sights on key supporting objectives. Several key factors had to be 

addressed to meet the very real threat of Sandinista adventurism: the 

capabilities and resolve of Honduras had to be bolstered, lines of 

clandestine supply emanating from Nicaragua and Cuban had to be 

curtailed, and the threat of Sandinista incursions into Honduran territory to 

attack sanctuaries of the Nicaraguan opposition (commonly referred to as 

the Contras) had to be countered by clear demonstrations of U.S. resolve 

and genuine preparations to deal with such a contingency.

In February 1983, the United States and Honduras conducted a 

joint-combined military exercise, AHAUS TARA (“BIG PINE”), at that 

time the largest of its kind ever held in Honduras. It included roughly 

1,500 U.S. military personnel46 and over 4,000 members of the Honduran 

 

which the population could be secure from guerrilla action while the government 

sought to implement programs to win their confidence and meet social needs.

46 Billed as an exercise to improve the interoperability of combined forces, it 

included a wide variety of US military elements. US Army elements provided 

mobility for Honduran forces and logistics and communications support. US 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

94

Armed Forces, but the level of participation of Special Forces was 

marginal. To continue U.S. engagement, SOUTHCOM immediately began 

the planning of a follow-on exercise, AHAUS TARA II, to begin in August.

AHAUS TARA II was to be a considerably more extensive military 

exercise, involving over 5,000 U.S. military personnel with a JTF HQs 

(JTF-11) provided by Readiness Command (REDCOM) in Tampa to 

provide command and control. This exercise, however, was to have a 

much greater participation by Special Forces from the 7th SFGA. The 

Group, however, would find itself operating off two distinct task menus—

one generated by the exercise planners and command element from 

REDCOM and another with much more significant real-world 

implications provided through the CINC and J3 of SOUTHCOM but not 

shared with the REDCOM JTF and its exercise planners and staff.

In the general exercise plan, 7th SFGA was called upon to plan and 

conduct a series of small-unit counterinsurgency exercises with the 11th

Infantry Battalion of the Honduran Army, essentially to build upon the 

skills that they had received from an MTT from 3rd SF Bn 7th SFGA 

during the previous AHAUS TARA I. The 11th Infantry Battalion’s 

cantonment area (cuartel) was strategically located in southern Honduras 

astride the Pan American Highway. The wider operational mission for the 

Group that was not addressed in the exercise plan, however, had many 

more moving parts.

True, there was a mission to conduct small-unit exercises, 

eventually culminating in battalion-level operations and planning, but 

there were other objectives beyond merely enhancing the proficiency of 

the unit in its individual and collective tasks. The exercises were to expand 

the operational presence of the battalion throughout its assigned sector 

away from the “close to the cuartel” modus operandi that had existed up 

 

Navy elements included two landing ships and landing craft for amphibious 

movement. USAF coordinated and supported air supply and sustainment 

operations as well as airfield and air traffic control.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

95

to that time, while achieving a degree of interoperability with U.S. forces.

These would be the same objectives for most of the other U.S. military 

units that would be participating in the AHUAS TARA II exercise, 

regardless of their Service or function. 

However, beyond the awareness of the other exercise participants 

and the JTF cadre, the Group had additional tasks with more real-world 

connotations—tasks that significantly changed the SF component’s profile 

from a simple exercise unit to something else. To understand these 

missions and their role in the overall strategic intent of the CINC, one has 

to appreciate not only the political-military environment of the situation 

but also the geographic importance of where the 7th SFGA’s activities 

were to occur.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

96

Figure 1: Gulf of Fonseca

The Gulf of Fonseca was a strategic LOC for Sandinista resupply 

of the FMLN insurgency in El Salvador. It provided direct maritime 

access for small craft, fishing vessels, etc., from Nicaraguan ports, 

particularly Potosi, to the southern coast of El Salvador to include access 

to the Lempa River. The Pan American Highway transited from Nicaragua 

along the Honduran coast into El Salvador, providing another key LOC for 

smuggling of weapons, munitions, and key equipment. In the lexicon of 

any military planner, the area was key terrain for the adversary. From 

another perspective, it was also key terrain to support the introduction of 

Radar Site ESAF Naval FOB 73
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

97

U.S. force and sustainment into southern Honduras if a Sandinista 

invasion were to occur. The only viable docking area along the southern 

coast was near San Lorenzo, a short distance from the 11th Infantry 

Battalion’s cuartel. To the western side of San Lorenzo was a rudimentary 

landing strip that, if enhanced, could be used as an air LOC. Tiger Island, 

a short distance off the coastline, provided excellent sight lines for radar to 

track maritime and air movement across the Gulf. The reasons why 

Gorman wanted 7th SFGA smack dab in the middle were blatantly 

obvious to the Group planners but largely escaped the understanding of 

many in the JTF, who were firmly entrenched in an “exercise” mentality.

The mission analysis at the Group level led to the development of a 

set of core missions that would drive all subsequent planning, particularly 

the task organization, i.e., its versatility, its robustness, and its 

preparedness to rapidly shift from an exercise paradigm to combat 

operations:

 Through persistent presence, deter and disrupt smuggling of 

weapons and supplies from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas 

via the Pan American Highway LOC

 Expand proficiency and operational reach of the Honduran units(s) 

in order to be prepared to oppose/obstruct a Sandinista incursion 

across their border in the sectors paralleling the Pan American 

Highway; be prepared to counter a Sandinista incursion (to include 

anti-armor) along the Pan American Highway by force

 Conduct active force protection and situational awareness

 Maintain a mobile Quick Reaction Force capable of reinforcing 

Tiger Island and other contingencies as directed by SOUTHCOM 

The mission clearly called for a Forward Operating Base (FOB) 

capable of conducting independent operations, with minimal reliance on 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

98

support from other U.S. forces that may be in-country. FOB 7347 was 

tasked organized much like the Special Action Force concept originated 

by the 8th SFGA in the 1960s. The FOB C2 element was based on the 

larger SFOD-B model of the 70s with a full staff, S1 through S-5. Six 

SFOD-As were assigned.

48 The Group’s Aviation Platoon was attached,49

along with a PsyOps/Civil Affairs team to handle civil-military operations 

and civic action.

50 Additional engineer capacity was considered, primarily 

to assist in the construction of defensive positions (and to support civic 

action projects), but the idea was jettisoned when SOUTHCOM planners 

decided to collocate an Army Engineer Battalion with the FOB to improve 

both the docking piers and the austere landing strip to support 

contingencies requiring rapid reinforcement. The engineers were to be 

assigned an additional mission to support construction needs of the FOB.

 

47 The “73” designation was based on the fact that the then 3/7 SFGA Executive 

Officer (i.e., C-73) MAJ Phil Kensinger was to be FOB Commander. A fluent 

Spanish speaker was deemed essential to lead the mission, given the anticipated 

need to interact routinely with not only the Honduran 11th Battalion Commander, 

but others throughout the Honduran General Staff. LTG Kensinger would later 

culminate his career as the Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command. 

48 One of the SFOD-As was detached from the FOB location at San Lorenzo and 

positioned on Tiger Island to lead the security efforts that protected the radar and 

communications facilities on top of the mountain and the OGA maritime 

activities at the base.

49 The UH-1Hs operated from the FOB location; the 101st Air Assault Aviation 

Battalion based in Palmerola provided lift support to all other U.S. forces. To 

ensure the operational readiness of the FOB’s helos, the 7th SFGA SFOB 

requested that SOUTHCOM direct a higher priority (FAD-1) for the FOB 73 

Aviation Platoon for parts, supplies, fuels, lubricants, etc. A Forward Area Refuel 

and Re-arming Point (FARRP) were established at the FOB and to their great 

consternation the 101st Aviation Battalion was tasked to support any needs of the 

FOB Aviation Platoon as a mission-essential priority. 

50 Augmentation to the PsyOps/CA team was rolled in and out throughout the 

deployment to support a wide variety of civic action activities, such as dental, 

veterinary, well drilling, etc.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

99

SOT-As from the Group’s Military Intelligence Company, as well as 

counterintelligence personnel, were also included in the FOB’s force 

package. If that wasn’t enough, the package also required that a Secure 

Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) be established at the FOB; 

without it, the SOT-As would have been marginalized and the FOB’s 

connectivity to real-time sensitive intelligence from SOUTHCOM would 

not have existed. SOUTHCOM validated the need and requested the full 

support of the DIRNSA to make it happen, which it did. The only SCIF 

operational within the U.S. forces engaged in AHUAS TARA II was at 

FOB 73—something that should have been a signal to the planners in 

REDCOM and JTF-11 that there was more involved in the FOB 73 

mission than it appeared.

As an aside, a little-known aspect shows the attention to detail and 

the level of preparations involved in the pre-deployment ramp-up for the 

mission. A pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) to the Honduran 11th

Battalion discovered that the unit’s proclivity to avoid extended patrolling 

was partially based on the fact that they had no means to resupply forward 

elements in the difficult terrain throughout their sector. The survey team 

itself had rented horses from local campesinos to do their off-road area 

reconnaissance, but the Honduran military had never considered that 

option. With these insights gleaned from the PDSS, the Group arranged 

for some members of the deploying SFOD-As to attend a civilian muleskinning school in Pocatello, Idaho, where they learned the fundamentals 

of load packing and horsemanship in order to provide advisory assistance 

to the Hondurans on what was going to be for them a new method of 

resupply.

FOB 73 deployed to Honduras in August 1983 with a full combat 

load, plus all the training aids and equipment they’d need to conduct the 

individual and collective training of the 11th Battalion. Additionally, they 

brought in the materials (sandbags, concertina wire) that they would need 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

100

to convert the sleepy Honduran cuartel into the virtual firebase it quickly 

became.

With the CREM operating full bore on the north coast and FOB 73 

in the south, the SFOB established a Forward Area Support Team (FAST) 

in Tegucigalpa to facilitate reception, staging, and onward integration 

(RSOI) of unit personnel and equipment moving through either the JTF 11 

military airhead in Palmerola or the commercial facilities at Toncontin 

Airport in Tegucigalpa and to coordinate any matters with the Honduran 

General Staff that may be required. The FAST, led by a captain with 

several experienced E7s/E8s, all fluent linguists, was attached to the 

USMILGP but authorized direct liaison with key Embassy staff (e.g., 

Chief of Station, USAID Coordinator, etc.) to represent the Group’s 

interests. This decision proved immeasurably productive, not only in 

support of the CREM and FOBs,

51 but also for the many other SF MTTs 

and smaller-scale combined exercises that emerged in 1984, e.g., the Area 

Command Base/SFOD-As in Mocoron, Jutigalpa, Tamara and Mercala.

While all this activity surrounding FOB 73’s missions was 

underway, the Group couldn’t afford to forget about the crucial issue of 

effectively sustaining the operational tempo. The troops at the CREM 

were on a 179-day rotational cycle; we were gearing up the second 

rotation back at Bragg to assume the mission from the first group. They 

were undergoing an intensive pre-deployment training and review cycle.

Additionally, as soon as FOB 73 was out the gate and operational, 

SOUTHCOM generated another major requirement for a presence and 

training mission. The Group had fully anticipated that General Gorman 

 

51 An additional FOB (FOB 72) was deployed to Palmerola in early 1984 to 

command and control similar combined exercises (individual and collective 

training) with Honduran battalions along the border areas of El 

Salvador/Honduras and the El Salvador/Honduras/Guatemala tri-border area. 

Much like its counterpart (FOB 73), FOB 72 had a strategic mission beyond the 

training mission. 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

101

would want FOB 73 fully operational well beyond the life cycle of the 

AHAUS TARA II exercise and was planning on doing so, requiring that the 

troops there would have to rotate out no later than January 1984 in order to 

stay within the restraints of Army deployment policy. Army regulations at 

that time required that a soldier could not be deployed in a temporary duty 

status overseas for more than 179 consecutive days, unless deployed in 

declared hostilities. For all intents and purposes, we were at peace, not a 

state of declared hostilities, so we decided that we needed to establish a 

prudent rotation plan so that the guys could plan their lives with some 

degree of assuredness. Regardless of the nobility of that goal and how 

many times we revised the plan, we were constantly behind the eight-ball 

for one simple reason: The requirements emanating from SOUTHCOM 

kept expanding ... sometimes small, sometimes large. There was no point, 

however, where we reached a “stop that one, in order to do a new one”

stage; it was always “keep up what you’re doing and add this one.”

AHAUS TARA III would immediately follow the AHAUS TARA II

exercise and FOB 73 would roll along without skipping a beat.

Additionally, however, there was another requirement—one that would 

require another FOB. This one would focus on combined exercises with 

Honduran Army units assigned in the western portion of the country, 

along the border areas of El Salvador/Honduras and the El 

Salvador/Honduras/Guatemala tri-border area. Much like its counterpart 

FOB 73, FOB 72, as we would designate it, had a strategic mission 

beyond the training mission. As Salvadoran military operations against the 

FMLN improved, the guerrillas began to seek the sanctuary of the 

contested border areas (bulsones) resulting from the 1969 Soccer War 

between El Salvador and Honduras. These five areas were essentially “no 

man’s lands” where neither the Salvadoran nor the Honduran military 

would enter to exert influence because of the fear that each would perceive 

such actions by the other as a violation of Organization of American States 

negotiated cease-fire that ended the war and the eventual peace treaty that 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

102

both nations signed in 1980. The peace treaty left the adjudication of the 

status of the disputed border demarcation to the International Court of 

Justice, but at that time in 1983–84, the Court had not addressed the matter 

and it remained a sore point, particularly between the two militaries. With 

no sovereign force within the bulsones, the FMLN guerrillas had a secure 

safe haven—one where they could rest their forces, conduct training, stage 

and store resupplies, care for and rehabilitate their wounded, etc. Not only 

wouldn’t either the Honduran or Salvadoran military employ any ground 

forces into those areas, they both also proscribed any indirect fire 

(artillery, mortars) or aerial fire (from helicopters or fixed wing aircraft) 

into those zones. The results were camps within the bulsones, fully evident 

in overhead photography, operating with impunity and completely 

unchallenged. The hope was that SF trainers with the Honduran Battalions 

and the SF OPATTs with the Salvadoran brigades and cazadores could 

influence the extant military animosity sufficiently so that the countries’ 

militaries would cooperate in operations against the FMLN sanctuaries, 

under agreed-upon conditions ... even if the U.S. SOF personnel had to 

act as the facilitators of that coordination and cooperation.

Though the FOB 72 mission was not expected to launch until late 

1983 or early 1984, planning began in earnest in September 1983. One 

immediate wrinkle that was thrown into the mix by SOUTHCOM was an 

additional requirement for FOB 72 to provide secure compartmented 

intelligence support to the AHAUS TARA III Joint Task Force 

Headquarters that would be set up at Palmerola Air Base in Comayagua, 

Honduras. That wasn’t something that we’d expected. We surely 

anticipated we’d deploy FOB 72 with a SCIF capability, similar and 

compatible with that already cranking at FOB 73 so that it had 

connectivity to national intelligence systems, particularly the National 

Security Agency, but we envisioned basing FOB 72 near the town of 

Santa Rosa de Copan near the tri-border area, not in Palmerola, which was 

in a more centralized location within Honduras. To adjust we did as we 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

103

were directed, placing components (to include the SCIF) of FOB 72 in 

Palmerola but positioned a large chunk of the staff and all the actual 

SFOD-As at the forward location near Santa Rosa de Copan, with the 

SFOD-As dispersed to the Honduran units they’d be operating with. One 

was designated FOB 72 (at Palmerola); the operational satellite was 

designated FOB 72X (at Santa Rosa). Just like some sort of amoeba, once 

FOB 72 launched the SF presence was all over the map of Honduras.

One of the interesting dilemmas that the Group encountered 

throughout the Central America campaign was the difference in funding 

streams that applied to the different activities. There were fundamentally 

three distinct categories:

 The CREM was a security assistance activity, which placed it 

under a distinct regulatory regime under the oversight of the 

Army’s security assistance structure. The funding of supplies and 

materials required certain accountability and billing procedures; 

also, the Group’s personnel who participated in the mission at the 

CREM were authorized a certain per diem since they were 

essentially a “mobile training team” ... albeit not very mobile.

 The Group’s personnel at the FOB locations (72, 72X, and 73), 

however, were under “field conditions” participating in combined 

exercises, so per diem wasn’t authorized. Any transfer of materials 

to their partnered Honduran units had to be justified as occurring 

only to ensure the attainment of the “U.S. training objectives.”

This issue precipitated a number of audits and investigations as to 

whether such simple items as paper targets used by the Hondurans 

during marksmanship exercises should have been billed to the 

Honduran military rather than be provided from Group resources 

as an essential element to the attainment of the Group’s training 

objectives. The Group’s position was that the provision of key 

consumables within the context of the combined exercises 
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

104

contributed to the maintenance of our Foreign Internal Defense 

core tasks (individual and collective) such as area/language 

immersion, training techniques, etc.; moreover, the overarching 

objective of achieving a confident degree of interoperability with 

Honduran forces in order to support the Group’s ability to support 

combined operations that may be required by USSOUTHCOM in 

defense of Honduras or U.S. forces in-country. The concept of 

what became known as “Deployments for Training” (DFTs) 

eventually emerged and became a more acceptable practice. In 

later years (post-9/11), Congress granted specific authority to the 

Commander U.S. Special Operations Command to fund such 

activities with partner nations in support of the war on terror. 

 The FAST in Tegucigalpa was TDY with full per diem allowances 

to include lodging allowance.

To achieve some degree of equity between the three, the Group 

also had to carefully manage the rotation of teams (and individuals) 

between the venues since assignment to each locale was compensated 

differently and the expectation was that the op tempo would not diminish 

in the foreseeable future. 

The implications to the overall Group budget were also profound,

factoring in significantly increased blade hours; repair parts and resupply 

for the FOBs; increased TDY budgets for travels to theater for planning 

and briefings, etc.; increased training costs for language training (or 

refresher) for new personnel; and many other unforecasted requirements.

The “peacetime” forecasts in 1982 had in no way anticipated what would 

occur in 1983 and 1984. This caused ripples within the overall 1st

SOCOM budget, requiring the diversion of funds from other 1st SOCOM 

accounts to sustain the 7th SFGA operational requirements. The Group 

Comptroller became more and more a key participant in the internal 

operational planning process.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

105

VII. Bibliography

El Salvador

Books:

Juhn, Tricia. Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations 

and the Conspiracy to End the War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 

1998.

Articles:

“War’s End in El Salvador.” The Economist. 1 February 1992. 

http://www.economist.com/node/13311602.

Call, Charles T. “Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing 

the Rule of Law in El Salvador.” Journal of Latin American 

Studies 35, no. 4 (2003): 827-862.

Deere, Carmen Diane. “A Comparative Analysis of Agrarian Reform in El 

Salvador and Nicaragua 1979-81.” Development and Change 13, 

no. 1 (1982): 1-41.

LeoGrande, William M. and Robbins, Carla Anne. “Oligarchs and 

Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador.” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 5 

(1980): 1084-1103.

Reports, Websites, Other:

“El Salvador.” Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. 

http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/79.80eng/chap.5c.htm 

(accessed July 12, 2011).

“El Salvador Civil War.” GlobalSecuirty.org

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/elsalvador2.htm 

(accessed July 12, 2011).

Haggarty, Richard A. El Salvador: A Country Study. Washington, DC: 

Government Publication Office, 1988.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

106

Honduras

Books:

Euraque, Darío A. Reinterpreting the Banana Republic: Region and State 

in Honduras, 1870-1972. Chapel Hill: University of North 

Carolina Press, 1996.

Articles:

Bowman, Kirk. “The Public Battles over Militarisation and Democracy in 

Honduras, 1954-1963.” Journal of Latin American Studies 33, no. 

3 (2001): 539-560.

Reports, Websites, Other:

Merrill, Tim. Honduras: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Government 

Publication Office, 1995.

Insurgency/Counterinsurgency

Books:

David Galula. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. With a 

foreword by Robert R. Bowie. New York: Praeger Publishers, 

1964.

O’Neill, Bard. Insurgency and Terrorism. London: Brassey’s, 2005.

Articles:

Fall, Bernard. “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and 

Counterinsurgency.” Naval War College Review (Winter 1998): 

46-57. 

Mack, Andrew. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of 

Asymmetric Conflict.” World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 175-200.

Waghelstein, John D. “Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War: 

Educational and Doctrinal Failure 1865-1891.” Small Wars and 

Insurgencies 10 (1999): 1-33.

Reports, Websites, Other:

International Crisis Group. In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi 

Insurgency. Middle East Report N°50, 15 February 2006.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

107

Byman, Daniel. Understanding Protoinsurgencies. Rand, 2007.

Kilcullen, David. “Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War 

on Terrorism.” Canberra & Washington, D.C., SeptemberNovember 2004. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf

General Latin American History

Books:

Chase, Allan. Falange: the Axis Secret Army in the Americas. New York: 

G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1943.

Durham, William H. Scarcity and Survival in Central America: 

Ecological Origins of the Soccer War. Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 1979.

Kapuscinski, Ryszard. The Soccer War. New York: Viking Penguin, 1990.

Koeppel, Dan. Banana: The Fate of the Fruit That Changed the World. 

New York: Hudson Street Press, 2008.

Lewis, Paul H. Guerrillas and Generals: The “Dirty War” in Argentina. 

Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002.

Osiel, Mark. Mass Atrocity, Ordinary Evil, and Hannah Arendt: Criminal 

Consciousness in Argentina’s Dirty War. New Haven: Yale 

University Press, 2001.

Striffler, Steve, and Mark Moberg. Banana Wars: Power, Production, and 

History in the Americas. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.

Taffet, Jeffrey F. Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for 

Progress in Latin America. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Articles:

Edelman, Marc. “Soviet-Cuban Involvement in Central America: A 

Critique of Recent Writings.” Social Text 15, Autumn (1986): 99-

125.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

108

Fox, David J. “William H. Durham: Scarcity and Survival in Central 

America—Ecological Origins of the Soccer War.” Journal of 

Latin American Studies, no. 13 (1981).

Gobat, Michel. “Review of ‘Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance 

for Progress in Latin America’.” American Historical Review 113, 

no. 3 (2008): 872-873.

Katz, Mark N. “The Soviet-Cuban Connection.” International Security 8, 

no. 1 (1984): 88-112.

LeoGrande, William M. “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” 

Foreign Affairs 58, no. 1 (1979): 28-50.

Moore, John Norton. “The Secret War in Central America and the Future 

World Order.” American Journal of International Law 80, no. 1 

(1986): 43-127.

Pion-Berlin, David. “The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat 

Perception, and the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina.” Comparative 

Political Studies 21, no. 3 (1988): 382-407.

Sigmund, Paul E. “The ‘Invisible Blockade’ and the Overthrow of 

Allende.” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974).

Streeter, Stephen M. “Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal CounterInsurgency: Guatemala and the Contradictions of the Alliance for 

Progress.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 57-68

Reports, Websites, Other:

Special Report No. 90: Cuba’s Renewed Support of Violence in Latin 

America. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 

Public Affairs, 1981.

Doyle, Kate and Peter Kornbluh. “CIA and Assassinations: The

Guatemala 1954 Documents.” George Washington University 

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 4. 

Accessed Aug 11, 2011. 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

109

Grandin, Greg. “Democracy, Diplomacy, and Intervention in the 

Americas.” NACLA Report on the Americas 40, no. 1 (2007).

Seyler, Daniel J. The CBI and Caribbean Industrialization: An Assessment 

of the First Five Years and the Outlook under CBI. Miami, FL: 

The Academy for Educational Development, 1989.

U.S. Military, Diplomatic, and General History

Books:

Cole, Ronald H. Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of 

Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October–2 November 1983. 

Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997.

Currey, Cecil B. Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American. Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin, 1988.

LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central 

America. New York: W.W. Norton, 1984.

Lansdale, Edward. In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to 

Southeast Asia. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Pike, Fredrick B. FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally 

Gentle Chaos. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995.

Prados, John. The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam 

War. New York: Wiley, 1999.

Rabe, Stephen G. The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. 

Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. 

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.

Sexton, Jay. The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in NineteenthCentury America. New York: Hill and Wang, 2011.

Smith, Gaddis. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993. New 

York: Hill and Wang, 1994.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

110

Articles:

Catton, Philip E. “Counter-Insurgency and Nation Building: The Strategic 

Hamlet Programme in South Vietnam.” International History 

Review 21, no. 4 (1999): 918-940.

Fagen, Richard R. “The Carter Administration and Latin America: 

Business as Usual?” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 3 (1978): 652-669.

Gilderhus, Mark T. “The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications.” 

Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006): 5-16.

Hendrickson, David C. “The United States—F.D.R.’s Good Neighbor 

Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos by Frederick B. 

Pike." Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (1996).

LaFeber, Walter. “The Reagan Administration and Revolutions in Central 

America.” Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 1 (1984): 1-25.

Linn, Brian M. “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The 

First District Department of Northern Luzon.” Military Affairs

51(1987): 62-66.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. “Misplaced Emphasis.” Foreign Policy Summer, 

no. 47 (1982): 114-118.

MacDonald, C. A. “The Politics of Intervention: The United States and 

Argentina, 1941–1946.” Journal of Latin American Studies 12, no. 

2 (1980): 365-396.

May, Ernest R. “The Alliance for Progress in Historical Perspective.” 

Foreign Affairs 41, no. 4 (1963).

Moise, Edwin E. “Review of ‘The Road to Freedom: A History of the Ho 

Chi Minh Trail’.” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 3 (2006): 558.

Ricard, Serge. “The Roosevelt Corollary.” Presidential Studies Quarterly

36, no. 1 (2006): 17-26.

Weaver, Warren. “Science and Complexity.” American Scientist 36 

(1948): 536-544.

Williams, Gary. “Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983.” Journal of 

Latin American Studies 29 (1997): 131-169.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

111

Reports, Websites, Other:

“U.S. Military Civic Action Programs and Democratization in Central 

America,” Democracy Backgrounder 6, no. 3, September 1995. 

Accessed Aug. 16, 2011. http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/27c/482.html

Banner, Gregory T. “The War for the Ho Chi Minh Trail.” Army 

Command and General Staff College, 1993.

Donnell, John C., Hickey, Gerald Cannon. The Vietnamese “Strategic 

Hamlets”: A Preliminary Report. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 1962.

Leahy, Peter F. “Why Did the Strategic Hamlet Program Fail?” Master’s 

thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990.

Perry, Robert S. Civic Action and Regional Security. Headquarters, United 

States Southern Command, Panama.

Read, Ian. “The Rise and Fall of United Fruit Company: Reinterpreting 

the Role of the United States Government and American Popular 

Opinion.” Unpublished ms, 2000.

Sanford, Jonathan E. CRS Report for Congress: Major Trends in U.S. 

Foreign Assistance Fiscal 1978 to Fiscal 1990. Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, 1989.

Treaties and Government Publications

“May 7, 1982 Annex to the Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement 

between the Government of the United States of America and the 

Government of Honduras. Signed at Tegucigalpa on 20 May 

1954.” 3025, United Nations, 1982 

http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/12/9/00010048.pdf

U.S. Agency for International Development. “USAID History.” 2011. 

http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html.
WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

112

Other

Merriam-Webster. “Caudillo Definition.” http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/caudillo

Chisholm, Donald. “Problem Solving and Institutional Design.” Journal of 

Public Administration Research and Theory X (1996).

Dewey, John. The Public and Its Problems. Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 

1985.

Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1970.

Moylan, Tom. “Denunciation/Annunciation: The Radical Methodology of 

Liberation Theology.” Cultural Critique 20 (1991-1992): 33-64.

Sears, David O. The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the 

Watts Riot. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1973.

Shakespeare, William. Macbeth. Act 4, Scene 1, 44-49.

Simon, Herbert A. “The Structure of Ill Structured Problems.” Artificial 

Intelligence 4 (1973): 181-201.

Weaver, Warren. “Science and Complexity.” American Scientist 36 

(1948): 536-544.
Draft as of 121916

UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

CENTE

R on IRREGULAR WARFARE andARMED

GROUPS