UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

COOK, GALLAGHER, and HAIGHT 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private First Class WILLIAM J. PISER 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20110723 

Headquarters, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence 

Stephen E. Castlen, Military Judge 

Colonel Mary M. Foreman, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Patricia A. Ham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Imogene M. 

Jamison, JA; Major Richard E. Gorini, JA (on brief and reply brief). 

For Appellee: Major Robert A. Rodrigues, JA; Major Catherine L. Brantley, JA; 

Captain Jessica J. Morales, JA (on brief). 

 

13 March 2013 

-------------------------------- 

SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

--------------------------------

Per Curiam: 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of drunken operation of a motor vehicle 

causing injury to others, one specification of involuntary manslaughter, one 

specification of negligent homicide, and three specifications of reckless 

endangerment, in violation of Articles 111, 119, and 134, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 911, 919, 934 (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The military judge 

sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for five years, and 

reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority approved the adjudged 

sentence. 

This case is before our court for review under Article 66, UCMJ. In his sole 

assignment of error, appellant alleges Specification 1 of Charge III (negligent 

homicide) was unreasonably multiplied with the Specification of Charge II and 

Charge II (involuntary manslaughter). This assignment of error merits discussion 

and relief. 
PISER—ARMY 20110723 

2 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

In the Specification of Charge II, appellant was charged with involuntary 

manslaughter in violation of Article 119, UCMJ. The specification alleged appellant 

“on or about 19 November 2010, by culpable negligence, unlawfully killed PV2 SS 

by driving under the influence of alcohol and over the posted speed limit . . . .” 

Additionally, in Specification 1 of Charge III, appellant was charged with negligent 

homicide in violation of Article 134, UCMJ. That specification alleged appellant, 

“on 19 November 2010, unlawfully killed PV2 SS by negligently operating a 

vehicle, to wit: driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and 

over the posted speed limit . . . .” At trial, the defense did not object to these 

specifications as being an unreasonable multiplication of charges. However, the 

military judge sua sponte found the specifications to be multiplicious for sentencing. 

Pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial 307(c)(4), “[w]hat is substantially one 

transaction should not be made the basis for an unreasonable multiplication of 

charges against one person.” This principle is well established in military law. 

United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 336–37 (C.A.A.F. 2001). Thus, even where 

two charges are not technically multiplicious under the elements test: 

[t]he prohibition against unreasonable multiplication of 

charges has long provided courts-martial and reviewing 

authorities with a traditional legal standard — 

reasonableness — to address the consequences of an abuse 

of prosecutorial discretion in the context of the unique 

aspects of the military justice system. 

Id. at 338. 

 

In Quiroz, our superior court listed five factors to help guide our analysis of 

whether charges have been unreasonably multiplied: 

(1) Did the accused object at trial that there was an 

unreasonable multiplication of charges and/or 

specifications?; 

(2) Is each charge and specification aimed at distinctly 

separate criminal acts?; 

(3) Does the number of charges and specifications 

misrepresent or exaggerate the appellant's 

criminality?; 

 
PISER—ARMY 20110723 

3 

(4) Does the number of charges and specifications 

[unreasonably] increase [the] appellant's punitive 

exposure?; 

(5) Is there any evidence of prosecutorial overreaching or 

 abuse in the drafting of the charges? 

Id. at 338 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (internal alteration reflects 

the holding in Quiroz that “unreasonably” will be utilized instead of “unfairly.”). 

 In regards to the first Quiroz factor, appellant did not raise this issue at trial, 

and we, therefore, find this factor does not favor appellant. However, failure to 

raise this issue at trial is not dispositive. United States v. Gilchrist, 61 M.J. 785, 

789 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2005); Quiroz, 55 M.J. at 338. We also do not find in 

appellant’s favor in regards to the fourth Quiroz factor. At trial, the military judge 

found the two specifications to be multiplicious for sentencing and merged the 

specifications for purposes of sentencing. Thus, the specifications did not unfairly 

increase appellant’s punitive exposure. Likewise, regarding the fifth Quiroz factor, 

we do not find in appellant’s favor because there is no evidence of prosecutorial 

overreaching or abuse. Instead, as the defense recognizes, it is likely the 

government utilized alternative theories of charging due to the decision by the Court 

of Appeals for the Armed Forces, in United States v. McMurrin, 70 M.J. 15 

(C.A.A.F. 2011), which held negligent homicide was not a lesser-included offense of 

involuntary manslaughter. 

 

 In regards to the remaining Quiroz factors, however, we find in favor of 

appellant. As to the second factor, each specification is not aimed at distinctly 

separate criminal acts. Rather, both specifications criminalize appellant’s one act of 

causing the death of PV2 SS. Further, the third Quiroz factor is especially relevant 

here because appellant currently stands convicted twice for causing the death of but 

one person. Such a result exaggerates appellant’s criminality. 

 We therefore hold there was an unreasonable multiplication of charges in this 

case. See United States v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (noting one or 

more factors may be sufficiently compelling, without more, to warrant relief.). 

Accordingly, we will take appropriate action in our decretal paragraph. 

CONCLUSION 

The finding of guilty of Specification 1 of Charge III (negligent homicide) is 

set aside and that specification is dismissed. The remaining findings of guilty are 

AFFIRMED. Reassessing the sentence on the basis of the error noted, the entire 

record, and in accordance with the principles of United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 

(C.M.A. 1986), and United States v. Moffeit, 63 M.J. 40 (C.A.A.F. 2006), to include 
PISER—ARMY 20110723 

4 

the factors identified by Judge Baker in his concurring opinion in Moffeit, the 

sentence approved by the convening authority is affirmed. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.                        

Clerk of Court

FOR THE COURT: