NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ALEXANDER SAKHANSKIY, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10060 

D.C. No. 

2:13-cr-00160-MCE-1 

MEMORANDUM*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

LARISA SAKHANSKIY, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10061 

D.C. No. 

2:13-cr-00160-MCE-2 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 14, 2018

San Francisco, California

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAY 10 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-10060 

Before: BERZON and BEA, Circuit Judges, and BERG,** District Judge.

In these consolidated appeals, Alexander and Larisa Sakhanskiy (husband 

and wife) appeal their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (federal arson) for their 

role in a fire that burned their house down in Antelope, California. The 

Sakhanskiys argue that their conduct did not meet the statute’s interstate commerce 

element and the district court’s instructions, as well as its answer to a jury question

on this element, were in error. They also argue that the district court erred in 

allowing their former insurance attorney to testify at trial that he used the U.S. 

Mail to send a letter on their behalf to the insurance company’s attorney. For the 

reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.

1. The Sakhanskiys first challenge the jury’s finding that their home was 

“[a] building ... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting 

interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). They contend that the

evidence at trial failed to prove the interstate commerce nexus element of § 844(i) 

beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we 

consider whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 

 

** The Honorable Terrence Berg, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
3 16-10060 

S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). At trial, two witnesses testified that Mr. 

Sakhanskiy ran a “handy-man” business out of his home, in addition to working as 

an employee of a plumbing company. The government also presented evidence 

that Sakhanskiy placed advertising for the “Alexander’s Handyman” business, 

obtained several years of licenses related to the business, maintained a business 

bank account at a large multinational bank (Bank of America), and stored

numerous expensive construction tools on the property of his residence (several of 

which were manufactured by such multinational, interstate vendors as Craftsman, 

Dewalt, Hitachi, and Honda). This evidence was sufficient to permit a rational 

jury to find the interstate commerce element was met. A rational jury hearing such 

evidence could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Sakhanskiy residence 

“served as a home office or the locus of any commercial undertaking.” Jones v. 

United States, 529 U.S. 848, 856, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000). Thus, 

we conclude that this challenge is not well-taken.

2. The Sakhanskiys next contend that the district court erred by (1) failing 

to instruct the jury that a conviction on the arson charge requires a finding that “the 

fire substantially affected interstate commerce,” and (2) responding to a written 

question from the jury during deliberations concerning the definition of “interstate 

commerce.” This objection was not presented to the district court, however, so our

review is for plain error. See United States v. Del Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136, 
4 16-10060 

1146 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court’s arson jury instructions: (1) tracked the 

language of § 844(i) nearly verbatim; and (2) drew upon a slightly altered phrase 

from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones. The district court defined “interstate 

commerce” by instructing the jury that “[a] building is used in interstate commerce 

or in any activity affecting interstate commerce if it is used for a commercial 

purpose.” In Jones, the Supreme Court concluded that a residence was not “used

in interstate . . . commerce” in part because there was no allegation that it “served 

as a home office or the locus of any commercial undertaking.” Jones, 529 U.S. at 

856. The district court’s instruction here was not materially different from the 

language in Jones and did not constitute plain error. See United States v. Serang, 

156 F.3d 910, 914 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding in relation to § 844(i) that the 

appellant’s argument “that the ... jury instructions were insufficient because they 

did not contain the word ‘substantial’ are without merit”). Moreover, the district 

court’s subsequent reference back to the instruction, in response to the jury’s

written question during deliberations about the definition of “interstate commerce,” 

was not an abuse of discretion because there was no error in the jury instruction in 

the first place. 

3. Finally, the Sakhanskiys contend that the district court erred by allowing 

their former insurance attorney, Jerry Chong, to testify about his use of the U.S. 

Mail to send a letter containing Defendants’ itemized loss statement to Farmers 
5 16-10060 

Insurance’s attorney. This evidence was offered by the Government to establish an 

element of mail fraud (Count Three). The attorney-client privilege protects 

confidential communications between attorneys and clients, which are made for the 

purpose of giving legal advice. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 

389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). “The claim of privilege must be made 

and sustained on a question-by-question or document-by-document basis; a blanket 

claim of privilege is unacceptable. The scope of the privilege should be strictly 

confined within the narrowest possible limits.” United States v. Christensen, 828 

F.3d 763, 803 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Chong testified only 

that: (1) he was an attorney, (2) he recognized both the letter and his signature on 

his letterhead, and (3) he mailed the letter by U.S. Mail. None of these questions 

touched upon a confidential communication between Attorney Chong and his 

clients that was made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. 

AFFIRMED.