2024 IL App ( 4 th) 230415-U NO. 4-23-0415 IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS , P laintiff

- Appellee , v. DWAYNE BRANDON , Defendant -Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams County No. 17CF772
Honorable Scott D. Larson , Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment. ORDER ¶ 1 Held : The appellate court affirmed, finding the State’s conduct did not constitute error

. ¶ 2 In October 2017, the State charged defendant, Dwayne Brandon, with attempt ( first degree murder ) (720 ILCS 5/8

- 4(a) , 9- 1(a)(1) (West 20 16 )) and aggravated domestic battery ( 720 ILCS 5/12 -3.3(a), 12- 3.2(a)(1) (West 20 16 )). Following a January 2018 jury trial, defendant was convicted on both counts. After a Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel , 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)) and the appointment of Krankel counsel, the trial court denied defendant’ s motion to reconsider sentence and motion for a new trial. ¶ 3 Defendant appealed, arguing one of the State ’s lay witnesses improperly offered an expert opinion , the State made improper comment s during its closing argument, and the State violated the advocate

- witness rule and presented c umulative evidence. We affirm. 

## FILED July 30, 2024 Carla Bender 4 th District Appellate Court, IL NOTICE This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).- 2 - ¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND ¶ 5 In October 2017, officers responded to a call at a residence in Quincy , Illinois

. At the scene, a female, later identified as T.N., lay on the ground, receiving assistance from emergency medical technicians ( EMT )

. T.N. had t wo stab wounds, one on the left side of her neck and one close to her left shoulder. Officers observed defendant at the scene with blood on his pants

. When asked who stabbed her, T.N. responded that defendant stabbed her. Offic ers then placed defendant under arrest. As a result of the incident, the State charged defendant with attempt ( first degree murder ) (720 ILCS 5/8- 4(a) , 9- 1(a)(1) (West 20 16 )) and aggravated domestic battery ( 720 ILCS 5/12 -3.3(a), 12- 3.2(a)(1) (West 20 16 )). ¶ 6 In January 2018, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. T he State called Officer Mike Cirrincione, who testified about his observations and actions upon arriving at the scene. He testified defendant said, “I tried to kill that b itch . I tried to take that b itch out. Write that down.” ¶ 7 T he State next called T.N. , who testified she married defendant in August 2017. They had been drinking on the day of the incident and got into an argument , which escalated to the point whe re defendant grabbed a kitchen knife and said , “I ’ m gonna kill you, b itch .” Then, defendant stabbed her. T.N. managed to flee to a neighbor ’ s house. After being transported to the hospital, T.N. made a video- recorded statement to the police. The State first played the record ing without audio and admitted it into evidence. T.N. acknowledged she wrote a letter to the State upon defendant ’ s request because she did not want her husband to go to jail. In the letter, T.N. claimed “ that [ she ] had tripped ” and she was “a hundred perc ent sure” she was “ accidentally poked in the neck ” by the knife . To impeach T.N. , the State played the record ing again , this time with audio. In the recording , T.N. told the police defendant stabbed her and tried to kill her.- 3 - ¶ 8 The State called Ryan Bowers, an EMT who treated T.N. at the scene. Bowers first testified a bout his training and experience. As a paramedic, Bowers responded to medical and trauma calls , and he provided care t o sick or injured people. Bowers completed a two

- year special training program at Blessing Hospital and John Wood Community College. Bowers stated he wa s familiar with medicines and certain medical procedures and he had experience with life

- threatening inj uries . Bowers had been a paramedic for nine years , and he respond ed to approximately 500 calls per year. Bowers testified T.N. had significant blood loss , which concerned him because it could lead to shock, loss of consciousness, altered mental status, and even death. Bowers explained shock is “ a reaction that your body compensates when you have a traumatic experience , whether it be blood loss or other injury of some sort .” He testified T.N. ’ s shoulder wound could have penetrat ed her lung and caus ed death , depending on the angle

. He testified T.N. ’ s neck wound could have damag ed her spinal cord and led to paralysis or death. He also testified T.N. ’ s neck wound could have severed the arteries in her neck and resulted in rapid blood loss or “exsanguina tion.” When Bowers asked T.N. what happened to her, T.N. responded her husband stabbed her and tried to kill her. ¶ 9 Defendant chose to testify in his defense. Like T.N. , defendant testified they had been drinking when they began to argue

. Defendant then offered a different reason for T.N. ’ s stab wounds. He testified he approached her while holding the knife, they began to fight , and they fell to the floor. He then grabbed the knife by the blade and just “poked her .” On

cross - examination, t h e State confronted defendant with comments he made to officers that he tried to kill T.N

. Defendant insisted he did not remember them. After the eighth, “N o, I don ’ t remember , ” the State said , “T hat ’ s a good thing [ Officer Cirrincione ] wrote it down because I- 4 - guess you can ’ t remember a lot.” Upon the ninth , “N o, I don ’ t remember,” the State commented , “It’ s amazing how memory works , isn ’ t it ? ” and concluded the cross -examination. ¶ 10 During its closing argument, the State quoted defendant’ s statement, “I tried to kill the b itch , ” and asserted:

“ In Adams County, in our county, when you do what he did, when you try to kill someone, we don ’ t look the other way. We charge you with attempt first

- degree murder. And the Judge is going to tell you that attempt first

- degree murder, to prove that, the People have to prove two propositions and we have to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. ” After additional argument and playing the video of T.N. ’ s statement again, the State continued:

“ In Adams County, you don ’ t get to do that. In Adams County, if you do those things, you will be charged. You will be arrested and you will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. And now we rely on you, members of the community to look at that person and say no, you don ’ t get to do it. This case has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in our minds and you, sir, are guilty. You are guilty of attempt first

- degree murder to T.N., and you are guilty of aggravat ed domestic battery. Find just that. ” T he State then concluded its closing argument. ¶ 11 The jury found defendant guilty on both counts. During the March 2018 sentencing hearing, the State dismissed the aggravated domestic battery count because it “fairly- 5 - and appropriately merges into the attempt (first degree murder) charge.” T he trial court sentenced defendant to 20 years in priso n. ¶ 12 In July 2018, based on a claim of i neffective assistance of counsel raised in defendant’s pro se motion for a new trial, the trial court held a Krankel inquiry and appointed counsel. Krankel counsel then filed a motion to reconsider the sentence and a motion for a new trial based on the ineffectiveness claims. T he court denied both after a hearing

. ¶ 13 Th is appeal followed. ¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues the State committed “ many and varied errors and misconduct, ” identifying three specific purported errors and the cumulative errors therein

. Defendant contends the State elicited improper opinion testimony from Bowers , made improper
statement s and created an “us -v ersus - them” mentality during clos ing argument , improperly repeated defendant’ s responses during cross -examination before asking its next question

— a process the State initially referred to as “looping”

— and offer ing cumulative , prejudicial evidence. D efendant also argued t he cumulative errors committed by the State denied him a fair trial and amounted to plain error. ¶ 16 We start by noting defendant correctly acknowledge s the forfeit ure of the issues in his brief

. Plain error is a well

- established exception to forfeiture. People v. Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48, 89 N.E.3d 675. R eviewing courts find plain error (1) when “a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error , ” or (2) when “a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’ s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness- 6 - of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. The threshold determination “under either prong of the plain error doctri ne is determining whether there was a clear or obvious error at trial.” Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49. Defendant relies on second -prong plain error here. We take each argument in turn. ¶ 17 A. Lay Witness Opinion Testimony ¶ 18 Defendant claim s Bowers ’s testimony abo ut T.N. ’s injuries and how those injuries could cause death, as well as defining and describing two advanced medical terms , “shock” and “exsanguination ,” a mounted to improper lay witness opinion testimony. Defendant acknowledges “ the State inadvertently la id proper foundation for him to testify as an expert ” but contend s Bowers d id not in fact possess the relevant qualification s to offer expert testimony

. ¶ 19 Illinois Rule of Evidence 701 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) sets forth the foundational requirements for lay witness opinion testimony. People v. Loggins , 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, ¶ 79, 130 N.E.3d 432. In order to offer opinion testimony (1) a lay witness must have “ ‘ personal knowledge of the matter ,’ ” (2) “[t] he opinion or inference must also be ‘ helpful to a clear understanding of the witness ’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue ,’ ” and (3) the opinion or inference should “ ‘not [be] based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. ’ ” Loggins , 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, ¶ 79 (quoting Ill. R. Evid 701 (eff. Jan 1, 2011)). “Lay witness opinion testimony is admissible where the facts could not otherwise be adequately presented or described to the fact finder in such a way as to enable the fact finder to form an opinion or reach an intelligent conclusion.” People v. Novak , 163 Ill. 2d 93, 102, 643 N.E.2d 762, 767 (1994) , abrogated on other grounds by People v. Kolton , 219 Ill. 2d 353, 848 N.E.2d 950 (2006).- 7 - ¶ 20 On the other hand, “ [a] n individual will be permitted to testify as an expert if that person’ s experience and qualifications afford him or her knowledge that is not common to laypersons, and where such testimony will aid the fact finder in reaching its conclusion. ” Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 104. “ The expert may gain his or her knowledge through practical experience rather than scientific study, training, or research. ” Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 104 . “ There is no precise requirement as to how the expert acqui res skill or experience. ” Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 104. “ The burden of establishing the qualifications of an expert witness is on the proponent of the expert ’ s testimony. ” Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 104

. It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a witness has been qualified as an expert. People v. Jordan , 103 Ill. 2d 192, 208, 469 N.E.2d 569, 576 (1984). ¶ 21 O ur supreme court in Novak concluded the testimony of two witnesses was admissible as expert testimony despite being inadmissible as lay witness opinion testimony, even when the State did not call the witnesses as experts

. Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 99, 102

. In Novak , which involved an aggravated criminal sexual assault charge , the defendant lured a victim unde r the pretenses of improving the victim ’ s baseball skills and then committed the offense. Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 97. To rebut the defense ’ s position “ that defendant only applied various sets of muscle strength and flexibility exercises to the victim ’ s neck and shoulders ,” the State called two witnesses. Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 98-99. The two witnesses had been professional athletes and trainers and testified to their opinions concerning the defendant ’ s alleged training methods. Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 99-101. The supreme court found no error in the witnesses offering expert testimony , finding that “[ t]hrough education, training, experience, or a combination of each, these witnesses possessed knowledge that is not common to the average c itizen ” and “this knowledge aided the jury in reaching its conclusion.” Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 104.- 8 - ¶ 22 Here, defendant contend s Bowers lacked the qualification s to provide expert testimony that the wound s of T.N. and the blood loss w ere life

- threatening

. Even if we found testimony about stab wounds on the neck and left shoulder and the fact substantial blood loss could cause death wa s beyond the knowledge of a lay witness, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude Bowers d id possess the relevant qualification s as an expert
. Bowers received training and education from Blessing Hospital and John Wood Community College . H e had nine year s’ experience as a paramedic , and he responded to almost 500 calls each year. Bowers was famil iar with medicines and certain medical procedures and has seen life

threatening injuries

. Recall, “[t]here is no precise requirement ” for how a person attains the requisite skill or experience to offer expert testimony. Novak , 163 Ill. 2d at 104 . Even though the State did not formally offer Bowers as an expert witness , a s in Novak , the State provided sufficient evidence to show Bowers possessed the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to opine on T.N. ’ s injuries. Specifically, B owers ’s nine years of experience and training as a paramedic qualified him to testify regarding the seriousness of stab wounds to T.N.’s neck and shoulder and her substantial blood loss . Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by allow ing Bowers to testify accordingly

. Since there was no error, there can be no plain error. See Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶¶ 48-49. ¶ 23 Defendant cites People v. Jackson , 2017 IL App (1st) 142879, 82 N.E.3d 194, where the court applied Novak but found the two paramedic s’ testimony inadmissible . There, the defendant was charged with kicking a police officer in the shins when the police officer responded to paramedics who were tendering help to the defendant. Jackson , 2017 IL App (1st) 142879 , ¶ 1

. As his defense, the defendant introduced evidence indicating he was having a seizure

. Jackson , 2017 IL App (1st) 142879 , ¶ 15

. T he paramedics, though unable to medically- 9 - examine the defendant, testified the defendant did not have a seizure. Jackson , 2017 IL App (1st) 142879 , ¶¶ 15-16 . The court found the paramedics ’ testimony inadmissible, concluding the paramedics were not trained to diagnose seizures

. Jackson , 2017 IL App (1st) 142879 , ¶ 52. ¶ 24 Jacks on is distinguishable

. There , the paramedics essentially rendered a diagnosis, which they were not qualified to do

. Jackson , 2017 IL App (1st) 142879, ¶¶ 52-53. T he paramedics never testified to any specialized training or experiences relating to seizure s. Jackson , 2017 IL App (1st) 142879 , ¶ 52. Here, Bowers ’ s testimony on the seriousness of T.N. ’ s condition did not exceed his education and experience as a paramedic. Besides his training, Bowers testified that he provided care to sick and injured people and had seen life -threatening conditions

. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Bowers ’ s te stimony. Consequently, there can be no plain error. Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶¶ 48-49. ¶ 25 B. “Us

- Versus

- Them” Mentality ¶ 26 Defendant next claim s the State used an “us -v er sus- them” mentality during its closing argument, highlighting two statement s. The State began its argument by repeating defendant’ s statement that he tried to kill T.N. and saying , “In Adams C ounty, in our county, when you do what he did, when you try to kill someone, we don ’ t look the other way. We charge you with attempt first

- degree murder .” In ending its closing argument, the State returned to this theme :

“ In Adams County, you don ’ t get to do that. In Adams County, if you do those things, you will be charged. You will be arrested and you will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. And now we rely on you, members of our community to look at that person and say no, you don ’ t get to do it. ”- 10 - ¶ 27 “[ P] rosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument and improper remarks will not merit reversal unless they result in substantial prejudice to the accused. ” People v. Redd , 173 Ill. 2d 1, 30, 670 N.E.2d 583, 597 (1996). “In review ing a challenge to remarks made by the State during closing argument, the comments must be considered in the context of the entire closing statements of the parties.” People v. Williams , 192 Ill. 2d 548, 573, 736 N.E.2d 1001, 1015 (2000). “A reviewing court will find reversible error only if the defendant demonstrates that the remarks were improper and that they were so prejudicial that real justice was denied or the verdict resulted from the error.” People v. Neal , 2020 IL App (4th) 170869, ¶ 166, 150 N.E.3d 984 . “ Generally, arguments urging a fearless administration of justice or commenting unfavorably on the evils of crime do not constitute error. ” People v. Blue , 189 Ill. 2d 99, 128- 29, 724 N.E.2d 920, 935 (2000)

. On the other hand, urging the jurors to send a
message by their verdict is improper because it does not ten d to make the fact of the defendant’ s guilt more or less true

. People v. Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d 53, 7 8 , 803 N.E.2d 405, 4 20 (2003), as modified on denial of reh ’g (Jan. 26, 2004) ; Blue , 189 Ill. 2 d at 132. ¶ 28 In Johnson , the State included the following remarks in its closing argument : “ ‘ [T]hey think they run this society. Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to ask that you respond affirmatively that they do not. We as a society do not have to live in their twisted world. We do not have to accept their values. We don ’ t have to allow that to happen in our community. We don ’ t have to allow these guys blasting sawed off shotguns at other human beings. We as a people can stand together and say, no, you ’ re not going to do it here. And if you do, you have- 11 - the— you will be held responsible for your actions. ’ ” Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d at 77. There, our supreme court reasoned remediation of society ’ s ills distracted the jury from its responsibility to consider the guilt or innocence of an individual

. Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d at 77-78. T here , the arguments by the State sought to engender an “us -versus- them” mentality that is

“ inconsistent with the inherent principles of the criminal trial process. ” Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d at 80. W hen the State , through “ an extended and general denunciation of society ’ s ill s ,” incite s the jury to act out of undifferentiated passion and outrage, rather than reason and deliberation , the comments are improper

. Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d at 79. ¶ 29 However, the Johnson court acknowledged that “ limited prosecutorial exhortations are proper where it is made clear to the jury that its ability to effect general and specific deterrence is dependent solely upon its careful consideration of the specific facts and issues before it.” (Emphases in original .) Joh nson , 208 Ill. 2d at 79 (citing People v. Harris , 129 Ill. 2d 123, 159, 544 N.E.2d 357, 372 (1989)) . In Harris , the State remarked during its closing argument that the jurors enjoyed “ ‘ a unique opportunity *** to do something about crime. *** We listen to it on the news, in the newspaper ***. Everybody hears about crime. Nobody does anything about it. You have a unique opportunity to actually do something about crime on your streets

. *** You are the only ones that sit between this man, this ticking bomb, a nd that door. ’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris , 129 Ill. 2d at 159.- 12 - The court condoned such an argument because it “ apparently intended to persuade the jurors to convict because by convicting they would prevent both crime in general, and further crime by this defendant. ” Harris , 129 Ill. 2d at 159. ¶ 30 Here, we cannot conclude the State ’s closing argument ra n afoul of the rule in Johnson

. The State did say , “A nd now we rely on you, members of our community to look at that person and say no, you don ’ t get to do it ,” like urging to send a message. However, the State made no mention of “ society ’ s ill s .” Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d at 79. Rather, the State ’ s argument focused more on defendant as an individual by referring only to him and his conduct. By recounting the specific facts of this case in painstaking detail , the State couched the jury ’ s charge in relation to defendant specifically , and not to deterring crime generally. See Harris , 12 9 Ill. 2d
at 159. The State did not mention society ’ s problem with violence or urge the jury to “send a message” responding to that problem, like it did in Johnson

. Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d. at 78. The State spoke only of defendant and the legal repercussion s he would face. It was a statement about the consequences of committing attempt ( first degree murder ) and aggravated domestic battery , including prosecution “ to the fullest extent of the law.” The State also restated the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt following both the consequence of committing a crime and a similar statement under the same theme during the closing argument

. We do not find an “us

versus- them” mentality engendered in the context found in Johnson to incite the jury to act out of undifferentiated passion and outrage

. Therefore , in th is context, in light of the entire closing argument, we do not believe the two statement s referencing Adams County were improper. See Williams , 192 Ill. 2d at 573. ¶ 31 Defendant directs our attention to People v. Wheeler , 226 Ill. 2d 92, 129, 871 N.E.2d 728, 748 (2007) , where our supreme court held , “T he prosecutor ’ s closing argument ***- 13 - appears deliberately designed to forge just the sort of ‘us-versus- them ’ mentality decried by this court in Johnson and foster a situation where jurors might feel compelled to side with the State and its witnesses in order to ensure their own safety.” Ther e, the prosecutor framed himself as the underdog and the only person seeking justice for the victim, disparaged the defense attorneys, compared a sitting trial judge’ s testimony to f ormer United States President Bill Clinton ’ s evasive, perjured testimony a bout Monica Lewinsky , bolstered police officer testimony, posed a hypothetical where the jurors call 9 -1- 1 but have to hold because police could not respond to their emergencies because they were writing reports, and generally instilled fear into the juror s. Wheeler , 226 Ill. 2d at 107

- 113, 129. The State ’ s two comments about Adams County here do not compare to th os e statements in Wheeler . There were no personal attacks

. The State did not frame itself as a lone underdog seeking justice for the victim . Nor d id the State appeal to the jurors’ fears by asking them to imagine themselves as victims. The State asserted Adams County does not tolerate defendant ’ s conduct, prosecutes such conduct, and asked the jury to convict defendant. These comments did not create an “us -versus- them” mentality like the comments did in Wheeler

. ¶ 32 W e do not find the State ’ s statements during closing argument improper. They did not result in prejudice to defendant, let alone substantial prejudice, nor did the verdict result from them. Neal , 2020 IL App (4th) 170869, ¶ 166 ; Redd , 173 Ill. 2d at 30. The victim, although unwilling, provided substantial evidence of defendant ’ s intent, and defendant ’ s own statements did as well. Again, because no clear, obvious error occurred , there can be no plain error. See Sebby , 2017 IL 119445 , ¶¶ 48-49. ¶ 33 C. Other E rrors- 14 - ¶ 34 Finally, d efendant argues the State violated the advocate

- witness rule by commenting , “T hat ’ s a good thing [ Officer Cirrincione ] wrote it down because I guess you can ’ t remember a lot,” elicited prior consistent statements by constantly “looping ” testimony when it incorporated the last answer given into the subsequent question , and presented cumulative evidence by repeated ly playing the record ing of T.N. ’ s statement. We review each allegation in
turn. ¶ 35 To support his claim the State violated the advocate

- witness rule, defendant point s to a series of questions asked by the State during cross

- examination of defendant about whether he made a statement about his intention to kill T.N. After defendant responded to all of the questions with , “N o, I don ’ t remember,” the State commented , “T hat ’ s a good thing [ Officer Cirrincione ] wrote it down because I guess you can ’ t remember a lot. *** I t’ s amazing how memory works , isn ’ t it ? ” “T he advocate

- witness rule precludes an attorney from acting as advocate and witness in the same case .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Koen , 2014 IL App (1st) 113082, ¶ 39, 6 N.E.3d 354

. Here, the State did not act as a witness rebutting defendant’ s testimony

. T he a ssistant s tate ’s a ttorney did not take the oath and the stand as all other witnesses did. T he jury instruction clearly admonished the jury that “[t]he evidence which you should consider consists only of the testimony of the witnesses and exhibits which the Court has received,” and “[n]either the opening statements nor closing arguments are evidence and any statement or argument made by the attorneys which is not based on the evidence should be di sregarded.” Therefore, we observe no violation of the advocate

- witness rule. ¶ 36 Defendant relies on Blue to support his claim the State violated the advocate

- witness rule, but we find it inapplicable . In Blue , before trial, two a ssistant s tate ’s

a ttorneys int erviewed a witness after a warrant was issued for her arrest. Blue , 189 Ill. 2d at 134

.- 15 - During cross

- examination of that witness, the a ssistant s tate ’s a ttorneys who interviewed the witness repeatedly interjected testimony of their own through thinly veiled “objections ,” especially about the contents of the interview. Blue , 189 Ill. 2d at 135. For example, o ne of the assistant s tate ’ s attorneys objected, calling the witness ’ s testimony a lie. Then, on redirect examination, the other assistant s tate ’ s a ttorney argued with the witness about what he previously said to the witness and the witness ’ s condition at the time of the interview. Our supreme court determined the State ’ s objections and questioning “offered the jury a simultaneous rebuttal to [the wit ness ’ s] account of an event where both [ assistant s tate ’ s attorneys] were present.” Blue , 189 Ill. 2d at 137. This case is distinguishable

. Here, the State ’ s comment , “T hat ’ s a good thing [ Officer Cirrincione ] wrote it down because I guess you can ’ t remember a lot ,” while certainly sarcastic commentary not to be encouraged, did not serve to rebut defendant ’ s testimony. The rebuttal came from the testimony of the police officer s rather than t he t estimony of the attorney. This record does not present a situation analogous to Blue

. ¶ 37 Defendant also contends the State ’s constant “looping” w as an improper admission of prior consistent statement s from the witness

. Defendant describes “looping” as the State repeating a witness ’s answer to one question a t the beginning of the next question. For example , from Bowers ’ testimony, he answered one question with “S he kept repeating that, ‘ He tried to kill me, ’ ” and the State phrased the next question as follows : “S he kept repeating, ‘ He tried to kill me. ’ How long did it take to get to the hospital ?” The non sequitur is obvious

. Essentially, defendant argues the State repeated the testimony the jury just heard by “looping,” which constituted an admission of the prior consistent statement s. We find defendan t’ s argument misplaced. “ As a general rule, proof of statements made by a witness out of court harmonizing with his theory is inadmissible

. ” People v. Emerson , 97 Ill. 2d 487, 501, 455 N.E.2d 41, 47- 16 - (1983). “A witness may not testify in court as to stateme nts made out of court for the purpose of corroborating his trial testimony concerning the same subject. ” People v. Tisdel , 201 Ill. 2d 210, 216, 775 N.E.2d 921, 925 (2002)

. The rule is not applicable here because t he “looping” was based on an immediately preceding in

- court statement and thus could not be an out -of-court statement. Also, a s discussed above, the State ’ s questioning during its direct examination was not evidence. Therefore, although we might question the practice —undoubtedly the prosecutor believed the technique was clever , but the jury listening to the repe tition ad nauseum could very well find it irritating

— we do not find it to be error. ¶ 38 Defendant contends testimony from officers that he said he intended to kill t he victim on the day of the incident and the recording played multiple times at trial was cumulative evidence. We disagree. “Cumulative evidence and extensive evidence are not the same thing.” People v. Jones , 2020 IL App (4th) 190909, ¶ 150, 173 N.E.3d 978, 996

. Cumulative evidence “adds nothing to what was already before the jury.” Jones , 2020 IL App (4th) 190909, ¶ 150. At first blush, it may appear the recording added nothing to what was already presented to the jury. However, the State re playe d it after first publish ing it to the jury to either impeach T.N. or rebut the defense ’ s theory

. Further, the video was originally shown without sound, and only to show the extent of T.N. ’ s injuries. Once T.N. testified, the actual sound recording was publ ished for proper impeachment. Therefore, it added to what the jury heard. The recording was extensive evidence, not cumulative. See Jones , 2020 IL App (4th) 190909, ¶ 150. ¶ 39 Defendant also contends testimon y from officers about his statement he intended to kill the victim on the day of the incident was cumulative. We note th is testimon y was elicited in rebuttal. When t estimony might have been offered during a party ’ s case in chief, the question of whether it should be admitted in rebuttal is discretionary with the trial court. Kupcikevicius v.- 17 - Fitzgibbons , 41 Ill. App. 3d 405, 413, 354 N.E.2d 434, 441 (1976). Here, defendant on cross examination denied knowledge of h aving told the officers he intended to kill the victim , saying, “I don ’ t remember .” In rebuttal, the State called officers to testify to defendant’ s statement. Thus, the State had good reason to present more evidence of what defendant said that night. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting th is testimon y. Having found that none of defendant ’s allegations constituted error, there was no cumulative error . See People v. Green , 2017 IL App (1st) 152513, ¶ 118, 100 N.E.3d 491

. ¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 41 For the foregoing reas ons, we affirm the trial court’ s judgment. ¶ 42 Affirmed.