United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on

International Relations, House of

Representatives

April 1997 U.N. PEACEKEEPING

Status of Long-standing

Operations and U.S.

Interests in Supporting

Them

GAO/NSIAD-97-59

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276145 

April 9, 1997

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman

Chairman, Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The cost and effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations and their

relationship to U.S. interests have emerged as major issues in recent years.

Most of the over 40 peacekeeping operations undertaken since 1948 lasted

only a few years, but some have continued for years with no clear end

point in sight. Although the United States was assessed by the United

Nations for peacekeeping operations at a rate of about 31 percent in 1996,

current law limits payment of the U.S. contribution to 25 percent.1

 In

response to your request, this report discusses (1) the budgetary and

personnel cost of the eight long-standing U.N. peacekeeping operations,2

(2) whether these operations are carrying out their mandates, (3) the

status of efforts to resolve the underlying conflicts, and (4) the reasons the

executive branch continues to support these operations. Table 1 shows the

eight operations, the years they were authorized, and their locations.

1

Section 404(b)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994-95 (P.L. 103-236) prohibits the

use of funds appropriated after fiscal year 1995 for the payment of U.S. assessed contributions for U.N.

peacekeeping operations in an amount greater than 25 percent of the total of all assessed contributions

for an operation.

2

“Long-standing” refers to current (ongoing) operations more than 5 years old, as discussed in our

scope and methodology. All dollar amounts shown in this report are nominal dollar values and have

not been converted to constant dollars to reflect inflation rates since 1948 because U.N. officials could

not allocate the costs of these operations by year.

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Table 1: Long-standing U.N.

Peacekeeping Operations

Name

Year

authorized Location

U.N. Truce Supervision Organization

(UNTSO)

1948 Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria

(Middle East)

U.N. Military Observer Group in India

and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

1949 India, Pakistan (Kashmir)

U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1964 Cyprus

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force

(UNDOF)

1974 Israel, Syria (Golan Heights)

U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon

(UNIFIL)

1978 Lebanon

U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission

(UNIKOM)

1991 Iraq, Kuwait (Persian Gulf)

U.N. Angola Verification Mission

(UNAVEM) II and III

1991a Angola

U.N. Mission for the Referendum in

Western Sahara (MINURSO)

1991 Western Sahara

aWe evaluated UNAVEM II and III as one operation, as discussed in our scope and methodology.

Background At the direction of the U.N. Security Council,3

 the United Nations

undertakes peacekeeping operations to help maintain or restore peace and

security in areas of conflict. Such operations have been employed most

commonly to supervise and maintain cease-fires, assist in troop

withdrawals, and provide buffer zones between opposing forces. The main

objective of peacekeeping operations, according to U.N. and U.S. policies,

is to reduce tensions and provide a limited period of time for diplomatic

efforts to achieve just and lasting settlements of the underlying conflicts.

U.N. and U.S. policies state that peacekeeping is not—and should not

become—a substitute for peacemaking.4

 These policies (and peacekeeping

authorities) emphasize the connection between peacekeeping and

peacemaking and the limited nature of peacekeeping, stating that the

purpose of peacekeeping is to provide “finite windows of opportunity” for

parties to resolve disputes and begin reconstructing their societies. These

policies state that peacekeeping operations should not be open-ended

3

Under article 24 of the U.N. charter, the Security Council is primarily responsible for maintaining

international peace and security. The Council consists of 5 permanent and 10 nonpermanent members.

The latter are elected for 2-year terms by the General Assembly, with five new members elected every

year. Decisions on all substantive matters require nine affirmative votes and must have the

concurrence of all five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the

United States).

4

The United Nations defines peacemaking as actions to resolve conflicts by peaceful means such as

mediation and negotiation.

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commitments, but instead, should be linked to concrete political solutions,

and recommend that operations deploy only after agreed settlement plans

are in place.

In recognition of the fact that U.N. and U.S. policies were not clear

regarding the factors to consider when deciding whether to undertake new

or extend existing peacekeeping operations, in recent years both U.N. and

U.S. policies have become much more focused on this issue. Both now call

for disciplined and coherent choices about which new and existing

peacekeeping operations to support. U.S. policy concerning these matters

is discussed in Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25),5

 the 1996 U.S.

National Security Strategy, and other executive branch documents, such

as the President’s 1995 and subsequent annual reports to Congress on

peacekeeping. Among other things, U.S. policy requires rigorous scrutiny

of existing operations when they are reviewed by the U.N. Security

Council to assess the value (to U.S. interests) of continuing them.6

 U.S.

policy suggests that U.S. officials consider voting against long-standing

operations that are failing to carry out their mandates, in order to free U.N.

resources for other operations.

Results in Brief The eight long-standing operations are deployed in environments where

the underlying conflicts have defied diplomatic resolution, sometimes for

decades, and have become, essentially, costly and open-ended

commitments. Only two of these operations had successfully carried out

their mandates, while the remaining six either had only partially carried

out their mandates or had not carried them out. Although all but one of

these operations were undertaken to create stable, secure environments to

assist diplomatic efforts aimed at settling these underlying conflicts,7

diplomatic efforts to resolve these conflicts had stalled in all but one case.

Nevertheless, U.S. officials currently see no reasonable alternative to

continuing these operations because they help stabilize conflicts in key

areas of the world.

5

PDD-25, a classified document, was issued in May 1994. An unclassified summary was issued at the

same time.

6

Among the factors to be considered in determining broad U.S. interests in continuing an operation are

whether (1) U.N. involvement advances U.S. interests; (2) there is a threat to or breach of international

peace and security; and (3) the operation has clear and practical objectives, a mandate appropriate to

the mission, realistic exit criteria, and an identified end point for U.N. involvement.

7

UNIKOM was deployed to monitor Iraqi compliance with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions,

not in support of diplomatic efforts to end the Persian Gulf conflict.

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The eight operations accounted for about $6 billion (over one-third) of the

$17 billion that the United Nations has spent on peacekeeping operations

since 1948, and continue to account for a substantial share of current U.N.

peacekeeping budgetary and personnel costs. In 1996, for example, they

accounted for about 42 percent of the $1.4 billion estimated annual cost of

U.N. peacekeeping and almost 60 percent of the nearly 25,000 troops

serving in U.N. operations worldwide. Under current law, the U.S. share of

the estimated annual cost of these operations for 1996 was about

$148 million.

Our review of U.N. and U.S. reports and other information indicates that

the operations in the Golan Heights and Persian Gulf (UNDOF and UNIKOM)

had successfully carried out their mandates and increased security and

stability in their areas of operation. Operations in the Middle East, Cyprus,

and Angola (UNTSO, UNFICYP, and UNAVEM) had partially carried out their

mandates and made some positive contributions to stability in their areas

of operation. Operations in Kashmir, Lebanon, and Western Sahara

(UNMOGIP, UNIFIL, and MINURSO) generally had not carried out their mandates

and, according to U.N. reports, had contributed marginally to more secure

and stable environments in their areas of operation. U.N. and U.S. reports,

and officials we met with, attributed the six operations’ mixed record of

success to a variety of factors, such as lack of cooperation from the

disputing parties and outdated or impractical mandates. For example, U.N.

reports identify lack of cooperation by the parties to the conflict in

southern Lebanon as a key factor keeping the U.N. operation there from

carrying out its mandate.

Despite repeated calls from the U.N. Security Council for the parties to

make progress toward settling the underlying conflicts, as of

February 1997, only the conflict in Angola was the subject of ongoing talks

between the disputing parties.8

 Peace talks and other diplomatic efforts

associated with the conflicts in Cyprus, Kashmir, the Middle East, and

Western Sahara had stalled.9

 Only in Angola and Western Sahara were

settlement plans in place before peacekeeping forces first deployed. U.N.

and U.S. officials and experts we met with attributed the lack of success in

settling these conflicts to a variety of factors, including the weak political

will of some disputing parties and the deeply rooted nature of some of the

conflicts.

8

Ongoing talks between the disputing parties in Angola support the implementation of their peace

accord.

9

The Persian Gulf conflict was never the subject of peace talks.

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Despite the long-standing operations’ cost and mixed performance in

carrying out their mandates, U.S. policymakers support continuing these

operations because, in their view, they help to stabilize conflicts that could

threaten U.S. foreign policy objectives. In their judgment, ending these

operations—or even modifying them substantially—would risk renewed

conflict and damage future peacemaking efforts. U.S. officials told us that

some of these operations probably would not have been initially approved

under current U.S. and U.N. peacekeeping policies. At this time, however,

U.S. officials see no reasonable alternative to continuing these operations

indefinitely, given their assessment of the potential harm to U.S. foreign

policy objectives if the underlying conflicts resumed, balanced against

what they consider to be these operations’ relatively moderate cost. In

continuing to support what have become essentially open-ended

commitments to peacekeeping, however, the executive branch does not

appear to give adequate consideration to other factors articulated by U.S.

policy that seek to ensure that peacekeeping operations are limited in

duration, linked to concrete political solutions, and have exit criteria and

identified end points for U.N. involvement.

This report contains a recommendation that the Secretary of State take

action to begin addressing the issues raised by our analysis.

Cost of Long-standing

Operations

U.N. and U.S. financial reports and other documents show that the eight

long-standing U.N. peacekeeping operations account for about $6 billion

(35 percent) of the $17 billion in total costs incurred by U.N. peacekeeping

operations since 1948, when the first one (UNTSO) was deployed in the

Middle East to monitor the cease-fire after the first Arab-Israeli War. Partly

because of their longevity, 5 of these operations are among the 10 most

costly U.N. operations ever undertaken. Table 2 shows the eight

long-standing operations’ total cost since 1948.

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Table 2: Long-standing Operations’

Total Cost Since 1948 (Through

December 1996)

Dollars in millionsa

Peacekeeping operation Location Total cost

UNTSO Middle East $491

UNMOGIP Kashmir 105

UNFICYP Cyprus 840

UNDOF Golan Heights 662

UNIFIL Lebanon 2,661

UNIKOM Iraq-Kuwait 312

UNAVEM Angola 757

MINURSO Western Sahara 244

Total $6,072

aAll dollar amounts shown in this table are nominal dollar values. They have not been converted to

constant dollars to reflect inflation rates since 1948 because U.N. officials could not allocate the

costs of these operations by year.

Source: Compiled by GAO from U.N. and U.S. budget documents.

The eight long-standing operations also account for a substantial share of

current U.N. peacekeeping budgetary and personnel costs. In 1996, for

example, they accounted for about $588 million (42 percent) of the 

$1.4 billion estimated annual cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations and

14,897 (almost 60 percent) of the 24,919 troops serving in U.N. operations

worldwide as of December 31, 1996. At the 25-percent rate the executive

branch is authorized to pay under current law, the U.S. share of the

estimated annual cost of these operations will be about $148 million. The

State Department said the size and cost of most long-standing operations

has been reduced over time and attributed some of these reductions to the

implementation of PDD-25. Table 3 shows the number of U.S. and other

personnel assigned to each operation, its current estimated annual cost,

and the U.S. share of these costs.

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Table 3: Number of Personnel and

Estimated Annual Costs for

Long-standing Operations (as of

December 1996) Military personnel Annual cost

Dollars in millions

Peacekeeping operation Total U.S. Total U.S. sharea

UNTSOb 163 4 $27 $7

UNMOGIPb 45 0 7 2

UNFICYP 1,197 0 24c 6

UNDOF 1,046 0 32 8

UNIFIL 4,505 0 126 32

UNIKOM 1,102 11 17d 4

UNAVEM 6,608 0 323 81

MINURSO 231 15 32 8e

Total 14,897 30 $588 $148

aCalculated at the 25-percent rate currently authorized by U.S. law for payment of assessments

for U.N. peacekeeping. The United Nations, however, continues to assess the United States at the

rate of about 31 percent and considers the difference as arrears owed to the United Nations by

the United States.

bUNTSO and UNMOGIP are financed through the U.N. regular budget, not peacekeeping

assessments. The U.S. assessment for the U.N. regular budget is 25 percent.

cSince June 1993, the Cypriot and Greek governments have paid about half of the annual cost of

this operation. This figure is the net U.N. cost.

dSince November 1993, the Kuwait government has paid two-thirds of the annual cost of this

operation. This figure is the net U.N. cost.

eAlthough the United States has voted in the U.N. Security Council to reauthorize MINURSO since

its inception, the executive branch has not secured funding for this operation since fiscal

year 1994. Congress ordered the recision of funds appropriated for fiscal year 1995 and did not

approve a supplemental budget request for fiscal year 1996 that included funds for MINURSO.

The executive branch did not request funds for MINURSO in its fiscal year 1997 budget, but has

requested funds in its fiscal year 1998 budget for both the current MINURSO assessment, and

the arrears accumulated since 1995 due to its failure to pay the U.N. assessment for this

operation.

Source: Compiled by GAO from U.N. and U.S. budget documents.

Progress in Carrying

Out Mandates

Two of the eight operations—UNDOF and UNIKOM—generally have carried

out their mandates and helped to maintain stability in their areas of

operation. Three other operations—UNTSO, UNFICYP, and UNAVEM—have

partially carried out their mandates and made some positive contributions

in their areas of operation. The remaining three operations—UNMOGIP,

UNIFIL, and MINURSO—generally have not carried out their mandates and,

according to U.N. reports, had contributed only marginally to more secure

and stable environments in their areas of operation. Our assessment of

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these operations was based on an extensive review of U.N. and U.S.

reports, expert studies, and interviews with U.N., U.S., and foreign

government officials.

In commenting on this report, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations noted

that categorizing the long-standing operations as “successful,” “partially

successful,” or “not successful,” based on the degree to which they carried

out their mandates, was a simple, understandable concept. However, such

a categorization may not be fully adequate to capture the

multidimensional, complex interests involved in each operation. We agree

with the observation that whether these operations are carrying out their

mandates is but one measure—albeit an important one—of enduring U.S.

interests in supporting them, and we discuss the broader contextual issues

regarding U.S. foreign policy interests in a subsequent section of this

report.

Operations Generally

Carrying Out Their

Mandates

UNDOF UNDOF was established in May 1974 to monitor the buffer zone between

Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights established under the

U.S.-negotiated disengagement agreement following the 1973 Arab-Israeli

War.10 Its mandate is to help maintain the cease-fire between Israel and

Syria, supervise the initial disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, and

supervise the areas of separation and arms limitation on the Golan

Heights. Its 6-month mandate has been renewed each November and May

since 1974.

UNDOF performs its tasks with the cooperation of the parties and helps

maintain stability and calm in its area of operations, according to U.N. and

U.S. reports and officials and experts. UNDOF personnel man checkpoints

and observation posts and conduct vehicle and foot patrols along

predetermined routes within the area of separation. The force establishes

temporary outposts and conducts additional patrols from time to time to

perform specific tasks. Every 2 weeks, UNDOF inspects arms and force

levels in the areas of limitation. These inspections, carried out with the

assistance of Israeli and Syrian liaison officers, generally have proceeded

smoothly with the cooperation of both parties, although both parties

restrict the movement of UNDOF personnel in some areas. About 80 UNTSO

10U.N. Security Council resolution 350 (1974).

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military observers function as an integral part of UNDOF (as discussed

below). Since 1992, UNDOF has been streamlined twice, resulting in a

20 percent reduction in both its size and cost.

UNIKOM UNIKOM was established in April 1991 to monitor the demilitarized zone

between Iraq and Kuwait, established after the Gulf War, and the Khawr

’Abd Allah waterway.11 Its mandate is to monitor and deter violations of

the Iraq-Kuwait border and observe any hostile action between Iraq and

Kuwait. After 1993, UNIKOM was reinforced and authorized to take action to

prevent or redress small-scale violations of the border or demilitarized

zone.12 Its mandate continues indefinitely until all five permanent

members of the U.N. Security Council agree to end it.

The U.N. Secretary General, U.S. officials, and experts report that UNIKOM

contributes significantly to the calm that prevails in its area of operation.

UNIKOM monitors the demilitarized zone, which is about 200 kilometers

long and extends 10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into Kuwait, and

the 40-kilometer-long Khawr ’Abd Allah waterway with a combination of

patrol and observation bases, observation points, ground and air patrols,

and investigation teams. U.N. officials report that the governments of Iraq

and Kuwait generally cooperate with UNIKOM. It maintains its headquarters

at Umm Qasr and liaison offices in Baghdad and Kuwait City. Since 1993,

the Kuwaiti government has paid two-thirds of UNIKOM’s annual cost, and

after March 1996, the number troops was reduced by 6 percent.

Operations Partially

Carrying Out Their

Mandates

UNTSO UNTSO was established in May 1948 to supervise the Arab-Israeli truce in

Palestine called for by the U.N. Security Council following the first

Arab-Israeli War.13 Subsequently, it has performed a variety of tasks

entrusted to it by the U.N. Security Council. These included supervising

11U.N. Security Council resolution 687 (1991) established, among other things, a demilitarized zone

along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait to be monitored by a U.N. observer force. U.N. Security

Council resolution 689 (1991) approved the U.N. Secretary General’s plan for establishing UNIKOM.

12U.N. Security Council resolution 806 (1993).

13U.N. Security Council resolution 50 (1948) called for the cessation of hostilities in Palestine and

decided that the truce should be monitored by the U.N. Mediator, with the assistance of a group of

military observers.

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the 1949 Arab-Israeli armistice agreements,14 monitoring the cease-fires

near the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights after the 1967 Arab-Israeli

War, and providing experienced personnel to support the deployment of

other peacekeeping operations. It currently helps UNDOF and UNIFIL to

implement their mandates by providing observers to help man observation

posts and conduct patrols and inspections.15

In the Golan Heights, about 80 UNTSO observers, under the supervision and

operational control of the UNDOF commander, man 11 observation posts

located in the area of separation maintained by UNDOF and in the vicinity of

the lines on both sides; they also inspect the areas of arms and forces

limitation every 2 weeks. UNTSO generally has received cooperation from

Syrian and Israeli forces in carrying out these inspections and has helped

UNDOF keep its area of operation calm.

In southern Lebanon, about 60 UNTSO observers, under the operational

control of the UNIFIL commander, man five observation posts along the

Lebanese side of the 1949 armistice line and operate four mobile teams in

the UNIFIL area of operation under Israeli control where UNIFIL units are not

deployed. At these locations, UNTSO observes and monitors the situation

but, like UNIFIL (discussed later), has had limited success in ensuring peace

and stability in its area of operation.16

UNFICYP UNFICYP was established in March 1964 to help end violence between the

Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island of Cyprus.17 Its

mandate is to (1) prevent the recurrence of fighting between the two

communities and (2) help maintain law and order and return normal

14Four armistice agreements were established between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Israel denounced the agreement with Egypt in 1956 and the remaining agreements after the 1967

Arab-Israeli War. The U.N. Secretary General rejected Israel’s unilateral actions, however, and held

that the agreements remained in force. The two agreements between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan were

ended by the 1979 Egypt-Israel and 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaties. At Egypt’s request, however,

UNTSO continues to maintain a small post in the Sinai. Its office in Amman, Jordan, was closed in

1995.

15UNTSO is funded through the U.N. regular budget. Its mandate is of indefinite duration, so the U.N.

Security Council does not regularly review and reauthorize it.

16Various sources, including U.N. and State and Defense Department officials, said that UNTSO is

generally viewed as overlapping UNDOF, UNIFIL, and the Multinational Force and Observers in the

Sinai. These sources noted, however, that (1) UNTSO is the only operation currently authorized to

implement the remaining Arab-Israeli armistice agreements, (2) it operates in areas of southern

Lebanon where UNIFIL is denied access, and (3) its remaining Sinai post is valued by Egyptian

authorities as a symbol of continued U.N. involvement in the peace process with Israel. State

Department said it is discussing ways to streamline UNTSO’s administrative structure with the U.N.

Secretariat and interested member states, and noted that the number of military observers assigned to

UNTSO has been reduced from 220 to 163 since August 1995.

17U.N. Security Council resolution 186 (1964).

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conditions to the island. A mediator, designated by the U.N. Secretary

General, was to promote an overall settlement to the dispute.18 Since 1964,

UNFICYP’s mandate has been periodically renewed, usually for 6 months.

Since the 1974 Turkish invasion,19 UNFICYP has helped prevent the

recurrence of fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot

communities, and the situation has remained generally calm, according to

U.N. reports and U.S officials. The parties cooperate with UNFICYP to a

reasonable degree, allowing the force to maintain a 180-kilometer-long

buffer zone between the cease-fire lines.20 UNFICYP uses observation posts

and patrols to keep the cease-fire lines and buffer zone under constant

surveillance. Despite the absence of major fighting since 1974, violence

has nonetheless broken out on several occasions. In August 1996, for

example, a large number of civilians entered the buffer zone from both

sides, and the resulting violence left 1 dead and over 74 injured, including

12 UNFICYP personnel. U.N and U.S. officials criticized both Greek and

Turkish Cypriot authorities for allowing the incident to occur, noting that

UNFICYP personnel were not equipped for riot control.

From the beginning of the Cyprus operation, the U.N. Secretary General

has reported that the presence of foreign troops on Cyprus, the close

proximity of opposing troops along some parts of the buffer zone, and the

influx of arms and military equipment made it more difficult for UNFICYP to

carry out its mandate. In various resolutions, the U.N. Security Council has

expressed concern about these issues, and has urged the parties to reduce

force levels and defense spending. U.N. reports show that, despite its best

efforts, UNFICYP has been unable to (1) reduce the number of foreign troops

on Cyprus, (2) convince the parties to withdraw from all positions in close

18According to U.N. document S/5653, dated April 11, 1964, UNFICYP’s operations and the mediator’s

activities were separate but complementary. According to a former U.S. ambassador to Cyprus, for

example, the mediator frequently took the initiative with the parties to seek arrangements for more

normal conditions of life on the island. After mediation efforts broke down in 1966, the U.N. Secretary

General asked his special representative for Cyprus to employ his good offices to seek a resolution to

the conflict. In 1975, the Security Council, by resolution 367 (1975), asked the Secretary General to

renew his efforts to resolve the conflict.

19After a coup d’etat by Greek Cypriots thought to favor union with Greece, Turkey invaded northern

Cyprus in support of Turkish Cypriots. UNFICYP was directed to supervise the cease-fire lines and 

de facto buffer zone established between the two sides. The two sides have been unable to reach a

formal cease-fire agreement and, according to U.N. reports, this has significantly complicated

UNFICYP’s task.

20The buffer zone varies in width from less than 20 meters in Nicosia to some 7 kilometers near

Athienou. It covers about 3 percent of Cyprus, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

UNFICYP provides security for civilians of both communities living or working in the buffer zone.

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proximity to the buffer zone,21 or (3) influence the parties to slow the

modernization of their military forces. In a June 1996 report on UNFICYP, for

example, the U.N. Secretary General said that “[d]espite continuous efforts

by UNFICYP, no progress had been made [toward reducing force levels and

defense spending on Cyprus]. On the contrary, both sides have continued

to improve their military capabilities . . . .”22 U.N. and U.S. officials report

that the parties react to improvements in the other’s military capabilities,23

 thus increasing tensions on the island.24 In a February 7, 1997, letter to

Congress,25 President Clinton said that “. . . for any [peace] initiative to

bear fruit, the parties must agree to steps that will reduce tensions and

make direct negotiations possible.”26

UNFICYP’s efforts to restore normal conditions to Cyprus have been only

partially successful. It has delivered humanitarian aid to Greek Cypriots

and Maronites living in northern Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots living in

southern Cyprus. It also has conducted “humanitarian reviews” that focus

on improving living conditions for these minorities. According to State

Department officials, Greek Cypriot authorities have agreed to implement

UNFICYP’s recommendations for improving living conditions in southern

Cyprus, while Turkish Cypriot authorities have been less cooperative in

improving conditions in the north. However, UNFICYP has not increased

substantially informal contacts between the two communities, despite

repeated calls from the U.N. Security Council and others to increase such

contacts as a means of reducing tensions and promoting understanding.

Despite UNFICYP’s presence, the political situation on Cyprus has

deteriorated since 1964. Turkish Cypriot authorities have established a

21In May 1989, UNFICYP reached an agreement with both sides whereby they “unmanned” their

positions and ceased their patrols in certain sensitive locations in Nicosia. The opposing troops were

thus moved further apart and, as a result, the number of incidents in Nicosia was reduced. Subsequent

attempts to extend the agreement to cover all areas where the two sides are in close proximity to each

other have failed.

22U.N. Secretary General report S/1996/411, June 7, 1996, p. 3.

23According to U.N. and U.S. officials and a peacekeeping journal, Cyprus has become the one of the

most densely militarized areas in the world.

24For example, the Cypriot government’s recent decision to purchase Russian-made SA-10 antiaircraft

missile systems prompted the Turkish government to threaten to use military force to prevent the

installation of those systems.

25Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2373 (c)) requires the President to submit to Congress periodic reports

on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

26The Secretary of State and the Director of the State Department’s Office of Southern European

Affairs recently made similar public statements.

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separate government and declared their sovereignty,27 established a de

facto international frontier, and insisted on a unilateral right to

secession—moving Cyprus further away from a solution that reaffirms the

sovereignty of a federated Cypriot state, as called for in U.N. Security

Council resolutions. External involvement in the conflict has increased

despite U.N. efforts, culminating in the 1974 Turkish intervention in

northern Cyprus. According to U.N. Security Council resolutions, U.N.

reports, a 1993 study, and Defense and State Department and foreign

government officials, member states are concerned about the operation’s

effectiveness and cost.28

UNAVEM II and III UNAVEM II was authorized in May 1991 to help implement a negotiated

settlement of the Angolan civil war.29 Its mandate was to verify the

implementation the May 1991 peace settlement30 by (1) monitoring the

cease-fire between Angolan government and Uniao Nacional para a

Independencia Total de Angola31 (UNITA) forces and (2) observing and

verifying national elections,32 held in September 1992. After UNITA rejected

the election results, however, civil war resumed. After the November 1994

signing of the Lusaka Accords and the implementation of a cease-fire

between government and UNITA forces, UNAVEM III was authorized in

February 1995 to assist the parties in implementing this new settlement.33

Its mandate is to supervise, control, and verify the (1) cease-fire,

(2) quartering and disarming of government and UNITA forces,

27On November 15, 1983, Turkish Cypriot authorities proclaimed the “Turkish Republic of Northern

Cyprus.” Only Turkey recognizes this arrangement.

28Until June 1993, UNFICYP was financed entirely by voluntary contributions. Continual deficits

prevented timely payment of bills presented by troop-contributing governments. Citing the

deteriorating financial situation and frustration over the lack of progress toward a lasting political

solution to the problem on Cyprus, a number of governments withdrew their forces in 1992 and 1993,

bringing UNFICYP’s continued existence into question. Eventually, other governments contributed

troops and the Security Council, by resolution 831 (1993), brought UNFICYP under the regular

peacekeeping assessment process. During this period, UNFICYP was reduced in size by 28 percent.

Since that time, U.N. assessments have been used to pay for the portion of UNFICYP’s costs not

covered by voluntary contributions. Together, Greece and Cyprus make voluntary contributions that

cover almost half UNFICYP’s annual cost.

29U.N. Security Council resolution 626 (1988) first established UNAVEM to monitor the withdrawal of

Cuban troops from Angola. This mandate was carried out successfully. U.N. Security Council

resolution 696 (1991) established a new mandate for the operation and renamed it UNAVEM II.

30Known as the Acordos de Paz para Angola (Peace Accords for Angola) or the Bicesse Accords.

31National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

32U.N. Security Council resolution 747 (1992) enlarged UNAVEM II’s mandate to include observing and

verifying elections in Angola.

33U.N. Security Council resolution 976 (1995) established a new mandate for the operation and

renamed it UNAVEM III.

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(3) integration of government and UNITA military forces, and (4) formation

of a unified national government.34

UNAVEM III’s efforts to help implement the Lusaka Accords have been only

partially successful, according to U.N. and U.S. reports and officials and

other sources, largely because the parties have not fully complied with the

accords or fully cooperated with the United Nations. In October 1996, for

example, the U.N. Secretary General reported that overall progress toward

implementing the accords was disappointing. The cease-fire generally was

holding, although there were a high number of violations in some

provinces, and government troops generally had withdrawn to their

barracks. Over 63,000 UNITA troops had reported to 15 quartering areas, but

overall, fewer weapons and ammunition were surrendered than expected.

Little progress had been made toward the formation of an integrated

armed force, as called for by a framework agreement reached by the

government and UNITA in May 1996. UNAVEM III and others continued to

clear land mines, but their operations were hindered by restrictions placed

on them by UNITA,

35 and casualties continued unabated.36 Plans to create a

unified national government have been postponed as a result of

disagreements over the future status of the UNITA leader and other issues.

According to Defense Department officials, both sides claim that 

UNAVEM III is biased against them, and factions on both sides have used this

suspicion to undermine the peace process.

Since early 1996, the Security Council has at times reauthorized 

UNAVEM III’s mandate for short intervals (1 or 2 months) in an attempt

pressure the parties to improve their compliance, and had warned the

parties that the United Nations would not remain in Angola indefinitely.

UNAVEM III’s mandate was scheduled to end by February 1997, but the U.N.

Security Council reauthorized UNAVEM III’s mandate for 1 month in an

attempt to pressure the parties to form a unified national government.37

The resolution stressed the need for the parties, in particular UNITA, to take

urgent and decisive steps to comply with their commitments to ensure the

34According to an annex to the U.N. mandate, “control” implies the act of directing, regulating,

verifying, and monitoring. It does not imply the use of force.

35According to the State Department, mine clearing operations also were hindered by confusion and

misunderstanding resulting from the Angolan government’s attempt to bring all mine clearing activities

under a single office.

36The United Nations estimates that there are 10 million land mines in Angola, which suffers from one

of the highest per capita mine accident rates in the world. There are an estimated 70,000 amputees,

and an executive branch official testified in 1996 that land mines killed as many as 200 people every

week.

37U.N. Security Council resolution 1098 (1997).

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continued involvement of the international community in the peace

process. Member states have expressed concerns about the slow pace of

implementation of the Lusaka Accords and warned that the international

community cannot support indefinitely a peace process that is not fully

supported by the parties themselves. U.S. officials expect the operation to

continue through August 1997 because of delays in implementing some

elements of the settlement and the time needed to withdraw troops.38

Operations Generally Not

Carrying Out Their

Mandates

UNMOGIP UNMOGIP grew out of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan, which

was established in January 1948 to provide its good offices to the

governments of India and Pakistan to facilitate restoring peace and order

and holding a plebiscite on the question of Kashmir39 joining India or

Pakistan.40 In April 1948, the U.N. Security Council recommended the use

of military observers to supervise the cease-fire.41 The first group of

observers did not arrive until January 1949, after a cease-fire was

established. In July 1949, this group of observers, which formed the

nucleus of UNMOGIP, was directed to supervise the cease-fire line

established by the Karachi agreement between India and Pakistan. In

March 1951, after the U.N. Commission was ended,42 UNMOGIP was

established as an autonomous operation to continue supervising the

cease-fire in Kashmir.43 Its mandate is to observe and report, investigate

complaints from the parties of cease-fire violations along the line of

38According to U.N. and U.S. officials, a smaller follow-on U.N. operation will be needed until the end

of 1997 to complete the implementation of the Lusaka Accords and to consolidate the gains made so

far in the peace process. In a February 1997 report (S/1997/115), the U.N. Secretary General said that

the main activities of this operation, in addition to carrying out residual military tasks, should focus on

political, police, and human rights issues; humanitarian activities; and public information programs.

39Officially known as the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

40U.N. Security Council resolution 39 (1948).

41U.N. Security Council resolution 47 (1948).

42Security Council resolution 47 (1948) envisaged three related but distinct steps: a cease-fire, a truce

period during which India and Pakistan would withdraw their forces from the area, and (finally)

consultations to establish the conditions for holding a plebiscite. No agreement could be reached on

the second and third objectives and, after it became clear that mediation efforts had been exhausted,

the Security Council adopted resolution 80 (1950) by which it decided to end the U.N. Commission for

India and Pakistan.

43U.N. Security Council resolution 91 (1951).

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control in Kashmir, and submit its findings to each party and the U.N.

Secretary General.44

UNMOGIP’s ability to carry out its mandate has been affected by two major

conflicts between India and Pakistan. In early August 1965, large-scale

fighting broke out along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and eventually

spread south to the India-Pakistan border. The two sides agreed to a

cease-fire and withdrew their forces to the positions they held before

hostilities began, and UNMOGIP resumed its tasks. At the end of 1971,

large-scale fighting again broke out between India and Pakistan. The 1972

Simla agreement ended this conflict and established new cease-fire lines.

UNMOGIP has had limited success in carrying out its mandate since 1972.

According to U.N. reports and U.S. officials, UNMOGIP has been unable since

that time to monitor or investigate complaints fully, or to keep the Security

Council fully informed of developments related to the observance of the

cease-fire. Pakistani military authorities have continued to lodge

complaints with UNMOGIP about cease-fire violations, but, beginning in

1972, the Indian government took the position that UNMOGIP’s mandate had

lapsed.45 Since then, the Indian government has not cooperated with

UNMOGIP or lodged any complaints with it, and Indian military authorities

have restricted UNMOGIP’s activities on the Indian side of the line of

control.46 UNMOGIP’s 45 military observers, according to U.N. reports,

observe, to the extent possible, and report on the strict observance of the

cease-fire along the 500-mile line of control, about half of which is in very

high mountains and is very difficult to access.

According to a U.N. report and State and Defense Department officials,

UNMOGIP’s presence has played only a marginal role in defusing the tense

situation between India and Pakistan, two presumed nuclear powers. U.N.

and U.S. officials told us that UNMOGIP has had limited effectiveness in

preventing the escalation of hostilities in Kashmir and was not in a

position to prevent two India-Pakistan wars in that region. U.N. officials

maintain that UNMOGIP’s role is not to prevent war—only to monitor and

report on cease-fire violations along the line of control.

44UNMOGIP is funded through the U.N. regular budget. Its mandate is of indefinite duration, so the

U.N. Security Council does not regularly review and reauthorize it.

45The Indian government’s position is that UNMOGIP’s mandate applied only to the line of control that

existed prior to the 1971 war—not to the line of control established thereafter.

46Indian authorities, however, have continued to provide accommodation, transport, and other

facilities to UNMOGIP.

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UNIFIL UNIFIL was established in March 1978 to assist in restoring peace in

southern Lebanon after the Israeli invasion.47 Its mandate is to (1) confirm

the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, (2) restore

international peace and security in southern Lebanon, and (3) assist the

Lebanese government in reestablishing its effective authority in southern

Lebanon. Its 6-month mandate has been renewed each January and July

since 1978.

UNIFIL maintains checkpoints on principal roads, observation posts to

monitor movement in its area of operations, and posts that combine

control and observation functions. Unarmed UNTSO military observers,

under the operational control of the UNIFIL commander, man five

observation posts and patrol in the area under Israeli control (where UNIFIL

has been unable to deploy). The mountain terrain in UNIFIL’s area of

operations is harsh and rugged, making observation and movement

difficult.

According to U.N. reports and U.N., State and Defense Department, and

foreign government officials, UNIFIL generally has been unable to carry out

its mandate. U.N. reports consistently state that “UNIFIL’s mandate,

contained in Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and reaffirmed by

subsequent resolutions, remained unfulfilled.”48 Israeli forces remain in

southern Lebanon, occupying about 10 percent of Lebanon’s territory, and

have invaded twice, in 1982 and 1993. The Israeli military has not allowed

UNIFIL to deploy into the “security zone” established north of the

Israel-Lebanon border. UNIFIL has been unable to restore peace and

security in southern Lebanon, which remains the site of intense conflict

between Israeli forces and their allies and groups like Hizbollah, an

Iranian-supported terrorist organization. In April 1996, for example,

Hizbollah launched rocket attacks on settlements in northern Israel from

sites in UNIFIL’s area of operation. Subsequent Israeli artillery fire killed

more than 120 civilians, including more than 100 seeking shelter in a UNIFIL

compound. UNIFIL has been unable to assist in restoring Lebanese

government authority in southern Lebanon, which is controlled by Israel

and its allies and Hizbollah or other Shiite groups.

According to U.N. and U.S. reports and officials and experts, UNIFIL

endeavors, to the best of its ability, to prevent its area of operations from

being used for hostile activities and to protect civilians caught in the

47U.N. Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

48See, for example, the January 1996 report of the U.N. Secretary General on UNIFIL for July 20, 1995,

to January 22, 1996 (S/1996/45).

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conflict. According to Defense Department and U.N. officials and other

experts, UNIFIL has had a limited effect on the security situation in southern

Lebanon because the belligerents are not (or are only slightly) restrained

by UNIFIL’s presence. Some officials and experts observed that UNIFIL’s

mandate is one-dimensional because it only addresses the Israel-Lebanon

component of the conflict—it had ignored the former conflict between

Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)49 and ignores the

current conflict between Israel and Hizbollah. U.N. reports and officials

state that UNIFIL has no authority to prevent Lebanese forces, including

Hizbollah, from resisting Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. UNIFIL

was reduced in size by 10 percent between 1992 and 1993 and by a further

10 percent between 1995 and 1996.

Although not part of its mandate, UNIFIL helps the local civilian population

if they are subject to harassment and, subject to available resources,

provides humanitarian assistance, medical and dental care and supplies,

water, food, fuel, electricity, engineering work, and escorts for farmers.

According to U.N. and U.S. officials and experts, withdrawing UNIFIL would

have the greatest effect on local civilians, who would lose the

humanitarian and medical assistance UNIFIL provides, and would create a

political and military vacuum that would likely be filled by Hizbollah.

MINURSO MINURSO was established in April 1991 to help settle the conflict between

Moroccan and tribal forces in Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony.50

Under the settlement plan accepted by both sides, its mandate was to

monitor and verify the cease-fire between Moroccan and Frente Popular

para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro51 (Frente POLISARIO)

forces,52 verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara,

monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops in

designated locations, ensure the release of all political prisoners or

detainees, oversee the exchange of prisoners of war, implement a refugee

repatriation program, identify and register voters, organize and ensure a

49Southern Lebanon became the site of intense conflict between PLO and Israeli forces after armed

PLO elements arrived from Jordan in the early 1970s and the 1975-76 Lebanese civil war left the PLO as

the dominant force in the area. PLO attacks on Israel from bases in southern Lebanon sparked the

March 1978 Israeli invasion that precipitated the establishment of UNIFIL. Most PLO forces were

withdrawn from the area in 1993.

50U.N. Security Council resolution 690 (1991).

51Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro.

52Frente POLISARIO is the military arm of the Sahrawi tribe. Its leader is Mohamed Abdelaziz. Defense

Department officials said that total Frente POLISARIO strength is probably between 1,000 and 3,000

troops. In contrast, Morocco has about 100,000 troops in Western Sahara.

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free referendum on whether Western Sahara should join Morocco or

become an independent state, and proclaim the results.

Due to the parties’ divergent views on key elements of the settlement plan,

MINURSO was unable to implement its full mandate. Instead, MINURSO was

limited to identifying voters, monitoring local police and ensuring security

and order at voter identification and registration sites, and verifying the

cease-fire. According to U.N. and U.S. officials and reports and other

studies, MINURSO has made limited progress toward carrying out the first

part of its reduced mandate because the parties were unable to agree on

procedures for voter identification (eligibility) or conducting the

referendum. In May 1996, the U.N. Security Council suspended the

referendum process and some other elements of MINURSO’s operations and

ordered a reduction in the number of military and civilian staff,53 but

directed it to continue to monitor the cease-fire between Moroccan and

Frente POLISARIO forces. According to U.N. and U.S. reports, the voter

registration and referendum processes have been suspended because of a

lack of cooperation from Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO authorities.

MINURSO continues to monitor the cease-fire, which has largely been

respected by the parties. According to the State Department, the

maintenance of this cease-fire has helped reduce tensions between Algeria

(which supports Frente POLISARIO) and Morocco and the risk of broader

instability in North Africa. However, recent threats made by some Frente

POLISARIO leaders to resume fighting if there was no progress toward a

political settlement indicate the frailty of the cease-fire. The State

Department has informed both parties that the United States will not

support further renewal of MINURSO in its present form without significant

progress toward a political settlement. MINURSO’s critics say that continued

U.N. presence favors Morocco’s de facto occupation of Western Sahara.

Status of Efforts to

Resolve the

Underlying Conflicts

Although their mandates differ in recognition of the particular

circumstances of the underlying conflicts, seven of the eight long-standing

peacekeeping operations originally were deployed in support of

diplomatic efforts to achieve lasting settlements of these conflicts.54 U.N.

and U.S. policies recognize that peacekeeping has a much greater chance

of success when it is linked with ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a

settlement and that, ideally, a settlement plan should be in place before a

53As a result, MINURSO’s monthly budget declined from $5.6 million to $2.7 million.

54UNIKOM was deployed to monitor Iraqi compliance with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions,

not in support of diplomatic efforts to end the Persian Gulf conflict.

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force deploys. We found, however, that most diplomatic efforts aimed at

settling the underlying conflicts associated with the seven operations have

stalled over time. As of February 1997, only the conflict in Angola was the

subject of ongoing peace talks (which supported the implementation of

the Lusaka Accords). Talks associated with the conflicts in Cyprus,

Kashmir, Western Sahara, and Syria and Lebanon in the Middle East had

stalled or stalemated, although U.S. officials told us that they hoped to

restart talks concerning Cyprus and Syria during 1997. Also, only in Angola

and Western Sahara were settlement plans in place before U.N. forces

deployed.55 Table 4 shows which operations had settlement plans when

they were deployed and summarizes the current status of diplomatic

efforts to resolve the underlying conflicts.

55In should be noted that current U.S. policy, which recommends deploying peacekeeping operations

only after an agreed settlement plan is in place, was not in effect when the long-standing operations

were initially authorized and deployed.

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Table 4: Status of Diplomatic Efforts Associated With Long-standing Operations

Operationa Settlement plan in place when deployed? Status of related peacemaking efforts

UNTSO No • No current U.N.-sponsored negotiations.b

• U.S.-sponsored negotiations between Israel and Syria stalled by

 territorial and security issues.

• U.S.-sponsored Israel-Jordan peace process concluded.

• U.S.-sponsored Israel-Palestinian peace process in progress.

UNMOGIP No • No current U.N.-sponsored negotiations or efforts to organize a

 plebiscite to settle the status of Kashmir (the U.N. Commission was

 ended in 1951).

• India rejects U.N. intervention in the Kashmir issue.

• State Department believes prospects for an eventual political

 settlement have improved recently.c

UNFICYP No • U.N.- and U.S.-sponsored negotiations stalled by fundamental

 disagreements over the nature of the post-conflict government

 framework and other issues.

• U.N., U.S., and foreign government officials hope to restart talks in

 1997.

UNDOF No • No current U.N.-sponsored negotiations.b

• U.S.-sponsored negotiations between Israel and Syria stalled by

 territorial and security issues.

• U.S. officials hope to restart talks in 1997.

UNIFIL No • No current U.N.-sponsored negotiations.b

• Resolution of conflict in southern Lebanon tied to the resolution of the

 Israel-Syria conflict; negotiations to end that conflict stalled by

 territorial and security issues.

UNAVEM Yes • Ongoing talks support implementation of the Lusaka Accords, which

 provide the military and political framework for demobilizing

 combatants and forming a unified national government.

MINURSO Yes • U.N.-sponsored settlement plan stalled by seemingly intractable issues

 related to voter identification and eligibility.

• Recent attempts to restart direct talks between Morocco and Frente

 POLISARIO proved unsuccessful.

• U.N. Secretary General has named a Special Envoy (former U.S.

 Secretary of State James Baker).

aWe excluded UNIKOM from this table because, unlike the other operations, it was not deployed

in support of peace talks.

bAccording to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the United States has requested that the

United Nations not sponsor peace talks between Israel and Syria or Israel and Lebanon.

cRecent elections in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir and signals from India and Pakistan of

readiness to renew high-level talks have improved prospects for an eventual settlement,

according to the State Department.

Sources: Compiled by GAO from information in U.S. national security and budget documents, as

well as discussions with U.N., U.S., and foreign government officials and peacekeeping experts.

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Negotiating and implementing political settlements of underlying conflicts

have proved difficult and elusive over the years. U.N., U.S., and other

reports, various officials, and peacekeeping experts attributed the lack of

success in settling conflicts to the following factors:

First, many of the conflicts involve particularly contentious or

complicated issues that appear intractable given present circumstances.

Three of the long-standing operations, for example, are associated with

the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has proved to be particularly difficult and

drawn out. The U.N. role in negotiations to settle this dispute is limited,

largely because Israel views the conditions outlined by various U.N.

General Assembly resolutions as an unacceptable basis for talks.

U.S.-sponsored talks between Israel and Syria are currently stalled, and

some experts regard a settlement of the Israeli-Syrian conflict as a

necessary precursor to resolving the conflict in southern Lebanon and

ending the “cold peace” between Israel and Egypt.

Second, most of the conflicts involve intrastate (civil) and ethnic conflict

and unresolved issues related to decolonization. The conflicts in Angola,

Cyprus, and Lebanon, for example, involve intrastate conflict. Angola,

Cyprus, Kashmir, Palestine, and Western Sahara are all former European

colonies. U.N., U.S., and foreign government officials and scholars said

experience suggests that U.N. peacekeeping and diplomatic efforts have

been relatively less successful dealing with deep-seated civil and ethnic

strife than with interstate conflict.

Third, some of the conflicts are part of a larger conflict, and negotiations

to end them do not include all parties with a substantial stake in or

influence on the conflict. The Greek and Turkish governments, for

example, have not been direct participants in the talks to end the conflict

on Cyprus, although they both are deeply involved in the conflict and their

support and cooperation are key to achieving a lasting settlement.

Similarly, diplomatic efforts to settle the conflict in Western Sahara have

not directly addressed tensions between Algeria and Morocco, which play

a large role in that conflict.56

Fourth, some of the conflicts involve disputing parties that are weakly

committed to achieving a settlement and are not cooperating fully. In 1992

and 1994, for example, the U.N. Secretary General reported that a “lack of

56Algeria and Morocco severed diplomatic relations in March 1976, shortly after the conflict in Western

Sahara started, and did not restore them until May 1988. Algeria reportedly supports Frente POLISARIO by

providing arms, military training, and logistical support, and allows the rebels to operate its main

logistics base in southwestern Algeria, near the border with Western Sahara.

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political will” blocked an agreement on Cyprus that was otherwise within

reach.57 The U.N. Security Council and Secretary General and U.S. and

foreign government officials have made similar statements about the

commitment of the parties to the conflict in Western Sahara to achieving a

settlement. U.N. and U.S. officials and some experts attributed the

disputing parties’ weak commitment partly to the failure of third parties to

create the conditions conducive to achieving a negotiated settlement. They

cite, for example, an apparent reluctance on the part of the U.N. Security

Council and U.S. officials to pressure Greece and Turkey to resolve their

differences over Cyprus as contributing to the lack of progress toward a

settlement in that conflict.58, 59 Some U.N. and U.S. officials and experts

attributed the failure of settlement plans in Angola60and Western Sahara to

the absence of a post-referendum power-sharing formula. In Western

Sahara, for example, the “winner take all” nature of the proposed

referendum removed any incentive for the parties to compromise on voter

identification issues.

In some conflicts, according to U.N. and U.S. reports and officials, foreign

government officials, and experts, the long-standing U.N. operations

themselves may contribute to the difficulty of achieving settlements by

reducing tensions and making maintenance of the status quo seem more

preferable to the parties than making the difficult choices and

compromises necessary to achieve settlements. In such cases, one expert

noted, peacekeeping can provide an excuse for the parties not to tackle

peacemaking. The long-standing U.N. presence on Cyprus and in

57U.N. Secretary General reports S/24830 (11/19/92) and S/1994/629.

58One source ascribed the failure of Cyprus talks in 1992, for example, to the reluctance of the U.N.

Security Council, and particularly the United States, to press Turkey for concessions when Turkish air

bases were being used to supply humanitarian aid to Iraqi Kurds (A Global Agenda: Issues Before the

48th General Assembly of the United Nations, John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson, ed., University

Press of America, Inc., 1993).

59Congress has tried to link aid to Turkey to progress on a Cyprus settlement on several occasions.

After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, for example, Congress placed an embargo on arms

transfers to Turkey. Later, after the House of Representatives rejected a partial lifting of the embargo,

Turkey retaliated by closing U.S. bases. The U.S. embargo lasted until 1978. Congress has made other

attempts in subsequent years to pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus.

60The reference is to the failure of the 1991 Bicesse Accords.

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Western Sahara frequently were cited as examples of this phenomenon.61

U.N. and State Department officials said that, during periodic reviews of

long-standing operations, it is appropriate for the U.N. Security Council

and member states to ask whether these operations have become part of

the underlying problem.

Role of Peacekeeping in

Reaching a Settlement

Some U.N., U.S., and foreign government officials, peacekeeping experts,

and studies have suggested increasing pressure on the parties to achieve

settlements in some of these conflicts by raising the cost of delay, for

example, by increasing the frequency of U.N. Security Council review of

the peacekeeping operations or by cutting their size. Applying pressure to

the parties was a consideration in recent U.N. Security Council decisions

to reduce the number of military observers assigned to MINURSO, suspend

the voter identification process in Western Sahara, and reauthorize 

UNAVEM III for short intervals. Some officials were leery of employing this

tactic, however, because its ultimate sanction was the threat of

withdrawing the peacekeeping operations. Sensing that the international

community actually was not prepared to take such steps, the parties might

continue their delays, leaving the United Nations with two unappealing

choices: backing down from the threatened withdrawal or actually

withdrawing. One State Department official said that pressuring the

parties in the short run could pressure the United Nations and key

interlocutors in the longer run because, at some point, the (implied) threat

of withdrawal may become unbelievable. Additionally, some U.N., U.S.,

and foreign government officials and experts doubt that withdrawing

forces would increase either the pace or fruitfulness of associated peace

negotiations.

Why the Executive

Branch Supports the

Long-standing

Operations

Despite the cost and mixed performance of long-standing operations in

carrying out their mandates, State Department and other U.S. national

security officials see no reasonable alternative to continuing them

because, in their judgment, these operations advance U.S. foreign policy

objectives by helping to stabilize and prevent the recurrence of conflicts in

key areas of the world. In their view, the economic and military costs

associated with such conflicts would exceed any savings achieved by

ending these operations. Additionally, in their view, the political cost and

risk of modifying these operations to bring them more into line with

current U.N. and U.S. policies is too high to justify the effort. Because U.S.

61A January 1994 Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, staff study report, for

example, concluded that “[m]any observers believe that UNFICYP has become part of the problem

rather than part of the solution, and that its presence lessens any sense of urgency in finding a

solution” to the underlying conflict.

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officials have not identified specific exit criteria or end points for U.N.

involvement, their support for these operations has become, in essence, an

open-ended commitment—a result which U.S. policy seeks to avoid.

U.S. Officials Support

These Operations Based on

Policy Considerations

Our review of reports and other documents, and discussions with Defense

and State Department officials, indicates that U.S. policymakers support

continuing the eight long-standing U.N. operations because, in their

judgment, they help to stabilize conflicts in critical regions of the

world—the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, southern Europe, southern

Africa, and southwest Asia. According to U.S. documents and officials, the

operations in the Middle East (UNTSO, UNDOF, and UNIFIL) support the

U.S.-led Middle East peace process by reducing tensions and help uphold

the security of Israel, long a key U.S. foreign policy concern. Similarly,

according to these sources, UNIKOM helps safeguard Kuwait’s borders, plus

two-thirds of the world’s known oil reserves, and underscores the

international community’s commitment to blocking Iraqi aggression, while

UNFICYP helps prevent an outbreak of conflict on Cyprus that could draw

Greece and Turkey—key North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies—into

war, endangering both peace and the stability in the region. Support for

the other long-standing operations was based on similar considerations.62

U.S. officials’ and some experts’ assessment of the value of the

long-standing operations is based on the premise that ending them could

result in renewed conflicts, which would be substantially more expensive

than maintaining these operations, or send the wrong diplomatic signals to

the parties or region, undermining important diplomatic efforts.

Additionally, U.S. officials believe that no regional or other practical

alternatives to U.N. intervention exist in these cases.63 In this context,

these officials and some experts view the eight operations as cost-effective

alternatives for the U.S. government over taking no action, taking

62A 1997 State Department Inspector General report on the implementation of PDD-25 concluded the

following: (1) national interest considerations overrode other important factors set out in PDD-25

when U.S. officials reviewed U.N peacekeeping operations and (2) State Department officials had not

closely scrutinized long-standing operations using these factors as called for by PDD-25. The Inspector

General recommended that U.S. officials institute a thorough interagency review of long-standing

operations.

63According to U.S. officials and experts, regional organizations generally lack both the capability and

credibility to field large peacekeeping forces or intervene successfully in conflicts. Such organizations

have less resources, are less impartial, and are more susceptible to the influence of regional powers

than the United Nations. These officials and experts said, for example, that the Organization of African

Unity lacked the capability to mount a large, complex peacekeeping operation in Angola, although

member countries contributed substantial numbers of troops to UNAVEM, while the Arab Maghreb

Union lacked the credibility to intervene in Western Sahara because the conflict involved two key

members of that regional organization, Algeria and Morocco.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
B-276145 

unilateral action, or helping to resolve or rebuild after a more widespread

conflict.64 According to U.S. and U.N. documents and officials, foreign

government officials, and some experts, these operations remain useful,

despite their longevity, because they help stabilize conflicts at a time when

their resolution remains impossible. For example, according to U.S.

documents and officials, increased tensions or renewed conflict on Cyprus

could spark a costly regional conflict between Greece and Turkey.

Likewise, according to these same sources, ending UNMOGIP could increase

tensions and the risk of war between India and Pakistan by appearing to

favor India over Pakistan. Table 5 summarizes the information we

obtained from U.S. officials and other sources regarding the U.S. foreign

policy interests served by continuing the eight operations.

Table 5: U.S. Foreign Policy Interests Served by Long-standing Operations

Operation U.S. interests served

UNTSO • Contributes to Middle East stability by helping to reduce tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

• Operates in areas of southern Lebanon where UNIFIL is not deployed.

• Implements the remaining 1949 Arab-Israeli armistice agreements.

• Withdrawing UNTSO might signal reduced international support for the Middle East peace process.

UNMOGIP • Contributes to stability in South Asia by helping to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan.

• Demonstrates continued U.N. support for settling the Kashmir question by peaceful means.

UNFICYP • Contributes to stability in southern Europe by helping to prevent civil war on Cyprus and hostilities between Greece

 and Turkey.

• Withdrawing UNFICYP would increase tensions and could spark a costly regional war.

• Encourages continued diplomatic efforts to reunify Cyprus by peaceful means.

UNDOF • Contributes to Middle East stability by helping to ease tensions between Israel and Syria.

• Withdrawing UNDOF might signal reduced international support for the Middle East peace process.

UNIFIL • Contributes to Middle East stability by helping to ease the humanitarian crisis in southern Lebanon.

• Withdrawing UNIFIL might signal reduced international support for the Middle East peace process, and would

 likely increase the influence in southern Lebanon of Hizbollah, an Iranian-supported terrorist group.

UNIKOM • Contributes to stability in the Persian Gulf by helping to maintain the integrity of the Iraq-Kuwait border.

• Helps safeguard international access to the Persian Gulf.

• Underscores the international community’s determination to block any outlet for Saddam Hussein’s expansionist

 ambitions.

UNAVEM • Helps ease the humanitarian crisis caused by Angolan civil war.

• Contributes to stability in southern Africa by helping to end a prolonged civil war.

• Helps reestablish order and security in a country that provides 7 percent of U.S. oil imports and where U.S. firms are

 major investors.

MINURSO • Contributes to stability in North Africa by preventing a return to hostilities in Western Sahara that could involve Algeria

 and Morocco.

• Withdrawing U.S. support for MINURSO could damage bilateral relations with Morocco, which favors continuing the

 operation and has been a valuable, longtime U.S. friend and ally.

Sources: Compiled by GAO from information in U.S. national security and budget documents, as

well as discussions with U.N., U.S., and foreign government officials and peacekeeping experts.

64The State Department noted that most of the long-standing operations had been reduced in size and

cost in recent years.

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In the interest of making U.N. peacekeeping a more selective and effective

tool for advancing U.S. national security interests, current U.S. policy

seeks to ensure that peacekeeping operations have clear and practical

mandates, are reviewed periodically by the U.N. Security Council, are

limited in duration with specified time frames tied to intermediate or final

objectives, and have exit criteria and identified end points for U.N.

involvement. U.S. officials recognized that the long-standing operations

were not fully consistent with this policy, and told us that some of these

operations probably would not have been initially approved under current

U.S. (or U.N.) peacekeeping policies. Some operations, for example, had

outdated or unclear mandates (as previously discussed) or were not

reviewed periodically by the U.N. Security Council. At the time of our

review, U.S. officials had not identified realistic exit criteria or end points

for U.N. involvement for any of these operations. U.S. budget and other

documents and discussion with State Department officials indicate that

U.S. officials support continuing these operations until durable peace is

achieved in the underlying disputes. For example, the State Department

said that the exit criteria for UNIKOM include “a clear indication of Iraq’s

peaceful intentions towards its neighbors.” Such broad statements do not

(1) provide estimates of when such an end state might be achieved or

(2) indicate what specific intermediate or final objectives are sought, what

actions U.S. officials will take to achieve those objectives, or how the

peacekeeping operation helps attain those specific objectives.

U.S. officials told us they were reluctant to modify these operations to

bring them more into line with current policies because, in their view, the

political costs and risks of making such changes were too high to justify

the limited benefits. U.S. officials said, for example, that modifying UNIFIL’s

mandate to more accurately reflect its current activities65 could undermine

international support for the operation and send the wrong diplomatic

signals to the parties or region, undermining important U.S. Middle East

diplomatic efforts. Similarly, they said that modifying UNMOGIP to institute

periodic Security Council review would increase regional tensions by

appearing to favor Pakistan over India, require approval by the U.N.

General Assembly, and periodically occupy the Security Council with a

range of contentious issues related to these two countries’ difficult

bilateral relationship. U.S. officials’ reluctance to modify other

long-standing operations was based on similar considerations.

65For example, providing local civilians with humanitarian and medical assistance.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
B-276145 

Conclusion The eight long-standing operations have become costly and open-ended

commitments. Only two of these operations had successfully carried out

their mandates, while the remaining six either had only partially carried

out their mandates or had not carried them out. Although seven of these

operations were undertaken to create stable, secure environments to

assist diplomatic efforts aimed at settling these underlying conflicts,

diplomatic efforts to resolve the underlying conflicts had, in most cases,

stalled. Nevertheless, U.S. officials currently see no reasonable alternative

to continuing these operations because they help stabilize conflicts that

could threaten U.S. foreign policy interests. In their view, ending these

operations would risk renewed conflict and damage future peacemaking

efforts. However, continued support of these operations does not appear

to give adequate consideration to other factors articulated by U.S. policy

that seek to ensure that peacekeeping operations are limited in duration,

linked to concrete political solutions, and have exit criteria and identified

end points for U.N. involvement.

Recommendation In light of U.S. interests in supporting well-defined peacekeeping

operations linked to concrete political solutions, we recommend that the

Secretary of State take the lead in working with the U.N. Security Council

to identify specific exit criteria and strategies for these operations. This

should be done in a manner consistent with PDD-25, balancing the need to

bring closure to these operations with other U.S. interests, such as

stabilizing conflicts that pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy objectives.

These strategies need not propose immediate ends to these operations, but

rather, may focus on how and when the desired end states can be

achieved, what intermediate and final objectives are sought, and what

specific role these operations play in achieving the sought-after end states.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, after consulting with U.N. officials,

generally agreed with our report. The Mission commented that the report

provides a cogent and succinct analysis of the long-standing operations for

guiding congressional policy decisions on these operations. The Mission

also noted that PDD-25 provides clear guidance that the duration of

peacekeeping operations should be tied to clear objectives and realistic

criteria for ending them. At the Mission’s suggestion, we have modified our

recommendation to include a reference to PDD-25.

The State Department raised three general issues: (1) the eight

long-standing operations play an important role in advancing U.S. foreign

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
B-276145 

policy objectives; (2) peacekeeping operations themselves should not be

held responsible for the failure of diplomatic efforts to resolve underlying

conflicts; and (3) the United States cannot use its veto authority lightly,

lest other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council be encouraged

to use their vetoes, possibly to the detriment of the United States.

Our report assesses whether the long-standing operations have achieved

their specific mandates and discusses the role these operations play in

advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives. We did not suggest that any of

the operations be terminated without giving due consideration to the

foreign policy objectives being advanced. Our report also recognizes that

many peacekeeping operations are intended to provide an opportunity for

diplomats to begin their peacemaking efforts; diplomatic failures are key

to the long-term nature of these peacekeeping operations, not the reverse.

Finally, we fully agree that the United States should not use its veto

authority in the U.N. Security Council lightly. It is for that reason that we

recommend that the Secretary of State take the lead in working with other

Council members to identify exit criteria, end points, and strategies for

these operations that are consistent with U.S. interests and objectives.

The Defense Department commented that our report could be

strengthened by further elaboration on three points. These are: (1) the

executive branch must consider a range of factors when evaluating the

renewal of U.N. peacekeeping operations, such as whether U.N.

involvement advances U.S. policy objectives; (2) the executive branch has

taken steps to reduce the cost of these operations or help spur the

disputing parties to resolve their differences; and (3) the risks and

consequences associated with ending the long-standing operations include

the possible resumption of warfare between the parties.

We have elaborated on these points in the text of this report. Our report

discusses the role that these long-standing operations play in advancing

U.S. foreign policy objectives, but indicates that all the goals set out in

current U.S. peacekeeping policy may not be immediately achievable. As

our report points out, however, none of the long-standing operations has

realistic exit criteria, intermediate objectives, end points, or exit

strategies. We recognize that the executive branch has taken steps to

reduce the cost of these operations and spur some disputing parties to

move toward resolving the underlying conflicts. We also recognize that

ending these operations prematurely could result in resumed conflict. We

have not called on the executive branch to end these operations; instead,

we have recommended that the executive branch, working with other

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
B-276145 

members of the U.N. Security Council, develop realistic exit criteria and

intermediate objectives for these operations, and strategies for achieving

them. In our opinion, more clearly defining intermediate objectives and

specific exit criteria for these operations will further—not threaten—U.S.

interests.

The Mission and the Defense Department each also provided technical

comments that have been incorporated into the report as appropriate.

Comments received from the Mission, State, and Defense are reprinted in

appendixes I through III, respectively.

Scope and

Methodology

Our review focused on the eight current U.N. peacekeeping operations

shown in table 1 because analysis of U.N. reports and records showed that

only two operations active for 5 years or more had ever ended.66 We

evaluated UNAVEM II and III as one operation because (1) the ultimate U.N.

objective in Angola remained the same throughout—to help implement a

political settlement ending the Angolan civil war;67 (2) the U.N. presence in

Angola was continuous from 1991 to the present and, after the resumption

of civil war in 1992, U.N. officials offered to expand UNAVEM II to help

implement a new peace plan; and (3) various U.N. and U.S. documents,

including the President’s fiscal year 1997 budget, view the existing

operation as dating from 1991.

To determine the cost of long-standing U.N. peacekeeping operations, we

analyzed U.N. and U.S. financial reports and discussed these costs with

U.N. and U.S. officials who oversee the U.N. regular budget and

peacekeeping financing. We did not independently verify the accuracy of

financial information obtained from U.N. and U.S. reports or other

sources. To determine the extent to which these operations carried out

their mandates and the status of diplomatic efforts to resolve the

underlying disputes, we analyzed the U.N. Security Council resolutions

authorizing these operations, recent U.N. reports and evaluations of these

operations and associated diplomatic efforts, and other expert

evaluations. We also discussed these issues with U.N., U.S., and foreign

government officials and peacekeeping experts. To determine what factors

U.S. officials considered when deciding whether to support continuing

66The first U.N. operation in the Sinai ended after almost 11 years, when Egypt withdrew its consent

shortly before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The second operation in the Sinai ended after almost 6 years,

when Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979.

67In contrast, the U.N. objective in UNAVEM I was to monitor the withdrawal of foreign (mostly

Cuban) troops from Angola as a precondition for ending that civil war.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
B-276145 

these operations, we analyzed State and Defense Department reports and

other documents and discussed this issue with U.S. officials who monitor

the eight operations and U.S. regional interests.

To gather information for our analysis, we interviewed over 40 key

officials at the Departments of Defense and State, the U.S. Mission to the

United Nations, U.N. headquarters, and foreign government missions to

the United Nations. At the State Department, we interviewed officials in

the Bureau of International Organization Affairs responsible for

monitoring the eight operations and the U.N. Security Council, as well as

officials in the appropriate regional bureaus. At the Defense Department,

we interviewed officials in the office that monitors peacekeeping and

humanitarian operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for International Security Agreements. At the U.S.

Mission to the United Nations, we interviewed the political and military

advisers who monitor the eight operations. At U.N. headquarters, we

interviewed key officials and military advisers in the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations from the Africa, Asia and Middle East, and

Operations Divisions and from the Lessons Learned Unit; and officials in

the U.N. Office of Program Planning, Budget and Accounts who oversee

the U.N. regular budget and peacekeeping financing. We also interviewed

officials and military advisers from four troop-contributing countries as

well as a number of experts from institutions such as The Heritage

Foundation, the National Defense University, and the U.S. Institute for

Peace.

We also reviewed hundreds of reports, plans, and other key documents at

these locations as well as dozens of scholarly studies and journal articles

on U.N. peacekeeping. At the State Department, we reviewed

communications with overseas posts and the U.S. Mission to the United

Nations selected by Department officials. We also reviewed the

workpapers and a report prepared by the State Department Inspector

General during a recent review of the implementation of PDD-25. At the

Department of Defense, we reviewed documents maintained by the office

that monitors peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, including

assessments of some long-standing operations prepared by the Defense

Intelligence Agency. Additionally, we reviewed appropriate U.N.

documents regarding these operations, including their authorizing

resolutions, mandates, and evaluation and financial reports.

We conducted our review between February 1996 and February 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
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We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional

committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the U.S. Representative

to the United Nations, the U.N. Secretary General, and other interested

parties. Copies will be made available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions

about this report. Major contributors to this report were Tetsuo Miyabara

and Michael Rohrback.

Sincerely yours,

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

U.S. Mission to the

United Nations

36

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of State

38

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

50

Related GAO Products 55

Tables Table 1: Long-standing U.N. Peacekeeping Operations 2

Table 2: Long-standing Operations’ Total Cost since 1948 6

Table 3: Number of Personnel and Estimated Annual Costs for

Long-standing Operations

7

Table 4: Status of Diplomatic Efforts Associated With

Long-standing Operations

21

Table 5: U.S. Foreign Policy Interests Served by Long-standing

Operations

26

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Contents

Abbreviations

Frente POLISARIO Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia

el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Popular Front for the

Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro)

MINURSO U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western

Sahara

PDD-25 Presidential Decision Directive-25

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

UNAVEM U.N. Angola Verification Mission

UNDOF U.N. Disengagement Observer Force

UNFICYP U.N. Force in Cyprus

UNIFIL U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon

UNITA Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de

Angola (National Union for the Total

Independence of Angola)

UNIKOM U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission

UNMOGIP U.N. Military Observer Group in India and

Pakistan

UNTSO U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix I 

Comments From the U.S. Mission to the

United Nations

See p. 28.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix I 

Comments From the U.S. Mission to the

United Nations

See pp. 4, 7-8.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 3.

Now on p. 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 5.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Now on p. 7.

See comment 7.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 3.

Now on p. 8.

See comment 8.

See comment 3.

See comment 3.

See comment 9.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 3.

See comment 3.

Now on pp. 4, 9, 21.

See comment 10.

See pp. 25-26.

See comment 3.

See comment 3.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 3.

Now on p. 7.

See comments 3, 11.

Now on p. 19.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 19.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 19.

See comment 12.

Now on p. 19.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 21.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 13.

Now on pp. 10-11.

See comment 14.

Now on pp. 10-13.

See comment 15.

Now on pp. 11-12.

See comment 16.

Now on pp. 12-13.

See comment 16.

See comment 17.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 3.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 14.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 14.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 18.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 10.

Now on p. 21.

See comment 19.

Now on p. 22.

See comment 20.

Now on pp. 26-27.

See comment 3.

See comment 2.

See comment 4.

See comment 3.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter

dated March 7, 1997.

GAO Comments 1. Our report does not say or imply that the long-standing peacekeeping

operations were responsible for the failure of diplomatic efforts to resolve

the underlying conflicts. The report clearly states that peacekeeping

operations often are established to provide time for diplomats to

undertake peacemaking efforts.

2. Our report and recommendation recognize the need to balance a broad

range of U.S. interests, as described by PDD-25 and other U.S. policy, in

considering whether to support continuing these operations, including

whether they advance U.S. foreign policy objectives by helping to stabilize

conflicts in key areas of the world. In our opinion, however, goals such as

advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives and defining more clearly

mandates, endpoints, and exit criteria, as well as laying out a strategy for

achieving the desired end state, are not mutually exclusive. Various studies

and policy statements suggest just the opposite: namely, that clearly

defined operations are more likely to achieve their mandates—and thus

advance U.S. policy objectives.

3. We have revised our report to reflect this information.

4. Our report does not say or imply that the United States should invoke its

veto to end these operations unilaterally.

5. We have deleted this information from our report.

6. We have clarified our report on this matter.

7. Our report recognizes that U.S. officials support continuing the three

U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Middle East because of their role in

promoting stability and easing tensions between Israel and its Arab

neighbors, and that U.S. officials hope to restart now-stalled peace talks

between Israel and Syria in 1997. It also recognizes that U.S. officials

support continuing these operations until a Middle East peace is achieved.

However, this broad statement does not provide specific exit criteria or

exit strategies for these U.N. operations as intended by PDD-25; for example,

it does not identify intermediate objectives (as PDD-25 suggests) that would

allow the executive branch or Congress to assess what progress has been

made over time toward achieving the ultimate objective.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

8. Our report recognizes that UNTSO military observers (1) monitor the

situation and conduct inspections in the UNDOF area of operation on the

Golan Heights and (2) observe and monitor the situation in the portion of

the UNIFIL area of operation which is under Israeli control. According to a

recent U.N. report, these observers are under the operational control of

the UNDOF and UNIFIL commanders and perform tasks similar to those

conducted by UNDOF and UNIFIL troops to assist in carrying out the

mandates of these operations. In assigning UNTSO military observers to

support UNIFIL, however, the Security Council stipulated that these

observers would continue to function in southern Lebanon along the 1949

armistice line after the end of UNIFIL’s mandate.

9. Our report recognizes that, although unable to carry out its mandate,

UNIFIL endeavors to (1) prevent its area of operations from being used for

hostile activities, (2) protect civilians caught in the conflict or subject to

harassment, and (3) provide humanitarian and medical assistance.

10. Our report recognizes that U.S. officials support continuing UNIKOM

because it helps protect Kuwait’s borders and two-thirds of the world’s

known oil reserves, and underscores the international community’s

commitment to blocking Iraqi aggression. We have deleted the reference

to Persian Gulf peace talks.

11. Our report recognizes that MINURSO monitors the cease-fire, which

largely has been respected by Morocco and Frente POLISARIO since 1991.

12. Our report recognizes that MINURSO’s supporters say it has helped

prevent a resumption of hostilities between Morocco and Frente POLISARIO,

but a balanced presentation requires that we also recognize that the

operation has its detractors as well.

13. We have revised our report to clarify the difference between UNFICYP’s

mandate, the mandate of the former U.N. mediator for Cyprus, and the

mandate of the U.N. Secretary General’s good offices mission (which was

undertaken after mediation efforts broke down in 1966).

14. By numerous resolutions (1) calling for a political solution that

reaffirms the sovereignty of a single (federated) Cypriot state, (2) rejecting

the current de facto division of the island, and (3) condemning and

rejecting the 1983 declaration of a separate Turkish Cypriot state, the U.N.

Security Council has made it clear that preserving a single Cypriot state is

an objective of the Secretary General’s good offices mission.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

15. From the beginning of the Cyprus operation, the U.N. Secretary

General has reported that the presence of foreign troops and the influx of

arms and military equipment was a cause of concern for UNFICYP with

regard to the discharge of its mandate. In various resolutions, the U.N.

Security Council has expressed concern about the continued

modernization of military forces on Cyprus, and has urged both sides to

reduce force levels and defense spending. On numerous occasions, the

Secretary General has reported on UNFICYP’s efforts to implement these

and other measures aimed at reducing the likelihood of cease-fire

incidents. In June 1996, for example, the Secretary General reported that

“[d]espite continuous efforts by UNFICYP, no progress has been made

towards [reducing force levels and defense spending on Cyprus]. On the

contrary, both sides have continued to improve their military capabilities.”1

16. We have revised our report to clarify that the political situation on

Cyprus has deteriorated during UNFICYP’s long-standing presence.

17. Our report recognizes lack of political will by the parties as one factor

contributing to lack of success in settling the underlying conflict on

Cyprus.

18. Our report recognizes that U.S. officials (1) consider UNMOGIP a

cost-effective means of furthering U.S. foreign policy goals in South Asia,

(2) maintain that withdrawing or modifying the operation could harm

relations with Pakistan or India, and (3) believe that the operation serves

to mitigate tensions between the two (nuclear-capable) countries. We have

revised our report to reflect that recent developments may improve

prospects for an eventual political settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

19. Although Greece and Turkey may be involved in the mediation efforts,

tensions between these two countries, which play a large role in the

Cyprus conflict, are not directly addressed by diplomatic efforts to settle

the conflict.

20. The broad statement that achievement of a comprehensive peace is the

exit strategy for an operation does not identify specific criteria or

intermediate objectives (as PDD-25 suggests) that would allow for accurate

assessments of what incremental progress has been made toward

achieving the ultimate objective.

1

U.N. Secretary General report S/1996/411, June 7, 1996, p. 3.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See pp. 26-27.

See pp. 24, 27.

See pp. 25-26.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Related GAO Products

United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to

Restore Peace (GAO/NSIAD-97-34, Mar. 27, 1997).

Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Likely to Exceed Estimates

(GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR, Mar. 14, 1996).

Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia,

Somalia, and Rwanda (GAO/NSIAD-96-38, Mar. 6, 1996).

Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on

Unit Capability (GAO/NSIAD-96-14, Oct. 18, 1995).

Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force

and Observers (GAO/NSIAD-95-113, Aug. 15, 1995).

Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia

(GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995).

Peace Operations: Estimated Fiscal Year 1995 Costs to the United States

(GAO/NSIAD-95-138BR, May 3, 1995).

Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to

Regional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995).

Peace Operations: Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities

(GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, Feb. 13, 1995).

United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping Operations

Are Calculated (GAO/NSIAD-94-206, Aug. 1, 1994).

Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations In Bosnia

(GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr. 13, 1994).

Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia

(GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions

(GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993).

Haiti: Cost of U.S. Programs and Activities Since the 1991 Military Coup

(GAO/NSIAD-93-252FS, Aug. 5, 1993).

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
Related GAO Products

U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational Capability

(GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993).

Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Economic Sanctions

(GAO/NSIAD-93-174, Apr. 22, 1993).

United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations

(GAO/NSIAD-92-247, Sept. 9, 1992).

(711178) Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-97-59 U.N. Peacekeeping
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