Opinion issued December 22, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 15
- 00583
- CV

——————————— THE HONORABLE MARK H ENRY, COUNTY JUDGE OF GALVESTON COUNTY , Appella nt

V. THE HONORABLE LONNIE COX , JUDGE OF THE 56TH DISTRICT

COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY, Appell e e
On Appeal from the 56 th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 15
- CV
- 05832 O P I N I O N In this interlocutory appeal, 1 appellant, t he Honorable Mark Henry, County Judge of Galveston County, challenges the district court’s 2 order granting appellee,
t he Honorable Lonnie Cox, J udge of the 56th District Court and Local Administrative Judge of Galveston County, a temporar y injunction suspe nding the
termination of the employment of Bonita Quiroga, the Galveston County Director of Judicial Administra tion , directing the reinstatement of her employment , and enjoining Henry and “his agents, servants, and representatives, and those acting in
concert with him , ” from taking action against Quiroga, her department, and her staff

. In four issues, Henry contends that the “temporary injunction order has become moot on appeal,” the district court lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction to grant the tempor ary injunction , the district court “did not validly exerci se its supervisory jurisdiction ” in granting the temporary injunction , and the temporary injunction is otherwise invalid. We affirm

. Background In his amended petition, Judge Cox a lleges that in 2 000, the judges of the Galveston County District Courts and County Courts at Law “selected” Quiroga as

1 See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC

. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2015).
2 The Honorable Sharolyn Wood, sitting by assignment.3

Director of Judicial Administration (“DJA”) and the Galves ton County Commissioners Court approved their selection . Although her DJA duties were “overwhe lmingly judicial in nature,” Quiroga also performed certain duties for the county judge and c ommissioners. Fourteen years later, on July 24, 2014, Judge Henry, who had taken office in 2011, purported to unilaterally terminate Quiroga ’s employment as DJA

. In the months that followed, certain Galveston County District Court Judges, County Court at Law Judges, and a Probate C ourt Judge (collectively, “the j udges” ), 3 speaking through Judge Cox, the Local Administrative Judge, endeavored to reinstate Quiroga to her position. At Cox’s request, the Office of Court Administration of the State of
Texas (“OCA”) sought an opinion in the matter from the Office of the Attorney
General of the State of Texas (“ OAG ”). In August 2014, Peri Bluemer, Chief Human Resources Officer for Galveston County, acting at Judge Henry’s direction, publicly posted Quiroga’s position to

3 The Honorable Lonnie Cox, Judge of the 56th District Court and Local Administrative Judge; the Honorable Kelly Neves, Judge of the 10th District Court; the Honorable John Ellisor, Judge of the 122nd District Court; the Honorable Anne B. Darring, Judge of the 306th District Court; the Honorable Michelle Slaughter, Judge of the 405th Distri ct Court; the Honorable Jack D. Ewing, Jr., Judge of the County Court at Law No. 3; the Honorable Barbara Roberts, Judge of the County Court at Law No. 2; and the Honorable Kimberly Sullivan, Judge of the Galveston County Probate Court.4

solicit applications , conducted telephone interviews with candidates, and began scheduling interviews with the three “finalists

. ”
On September 24, 2014, the day that Bluemer had scheduled final interviews to begin, J udge Cox issued an order dire cting that Judge Henry and the

c ommissioners cease searching for a replacement for Quiroga. Cox concluded that Henry’s termina tion of Quiroga ’s employment as DJA was “void” because the judges, not Henry and the c ommissioners, had the authority to appoint and terminate the employment of court personnel ; Henry’s termination of Quiroga’s employment
and his proposed selection of a re placement violated the Separation of P owers P rov ision of the Texas Constitution 4 and infringed on the inherent powers of the Galveston County J udiciary; and Henry’s actions constituted an illegal attempt to influence the appointment of a person to a positi on authorized by the commissioners court for the department of another district, county or precinct officer in the county. 5 Days later, Judge Henry filed in this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus, requesting that this Court vacate Judge Cox’s order . After Henry notified the OAG of the filing of his mandamus petition, it declined to issue an opinion on the issue of Henry’s purported termination of the employment of Quiroga . And after this Court

4 See T EX
. C ONST

. art. II, § 1

. 5 See T EX
. L OCAL G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 151.004 (Vernon 2008).5

denied Henry mandamus relief, he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court, which also denied him relief

. Subsequently, OCA crafted a proposed compromise for the j udges to submit
to Judge Henry and the c ommissioners. Under the proposed compromise, t wo separat e positions would be crea ted: (1) “Director of Court Administration” (“DCA”) and (2) a “public safety position.” Judge Henry and t he c ommissioners requested that the judges submit a supplemental proposal regarding the salar y for the newly proposed DCA position. On May 12, 2015, the judges attended a “compromise meeting workshop,” at which they submitted their recommendation
that the newly proposed DCA position enco mpass certain duties and have an annual salary of no less than $85,000 and no more than $120,000. On May 29, 2015, after Judge Henry and the c o mmissioners had not acted, the j udges issued an order , concluding that it was “in the best interest of the Court system and the citizens of Galveston County to reinstate the position of Justice Administrator,” which was to be filled by Quiroga, effective June 8, 2015. And Judge Cox issued an order to “carry out the reinstatement of Quiroga,” directing Henry to provide her with a key to her office, a personal computer with employee email access, and an office t elephone. Cox further ordered that Henry direct “Human Resources to allow [Quiroga] to complete all paperwork necessary for her to be6

reinstated as a full time employee” and the “Treasurer to reinstate and pay [Quiroga].” However, when Quiro ga, accompanie d by some of the j udges an d Galveston County Sheriff H. Trochessett, arrived at the Galveston County Justice Center on the morning of June 8, 2015, they found that the lock on Quiroga’s office door had been changed. After the Sheriff used his own key to a dmit Quiroga to her office, she discovered that her personal computer and telephone had been removed. The next day, Quiroga arrived at the Justice Center to find that, once again, the lock on her office door had been changed and she had been locked out. After Judge Cox arranged for her to work on her personal computer in an empty office space, Judge Henry scheduled a me eting with the c ommissioners court to discuss the “[a]uthority of county and [d]istrict [c]ourt judges to a ppoint administrative employee s ” and the fi ling of litigation against the j udges and a judicial

- conduct complaint against Cox. Also on June 9, 2015, Judge Cox filed in the 405th District Court of Galveston County his original petition in the instant case, seeking injunctive relief

. T he district
court subsequently granted a tem porary restraining order , prohibiting Judge Henry and “all acti ng in concert with [him]” from taking any official action on the agenda posted for the s pecial meeting of June 9, 2015. In response, Henry tabled matters in the commissioners court until June 13, 2015. And, at a June 13, 2015 “special7

meeting,” Henry and the c ommissioners “authorized” a reduction in the salary for Quiroga’s position from $113,000 to $63,695. Even though , as noted by Cox, Henry and the commissioners, by comparison, had previously authorized a salary of $65,000 for a candidate who had been appointed to perform just “one” of Quiroga’s
former duties. In his amended petition , Cox sought temporary and perman ent injunctive relief and a declaration that the “purported firing of [Quiroga] on July 24, 2014 was void and is void at the present time”; “subsequent purported changes to the salary scale and administrative organization of the Galveston County Department of Justice Administration” are “void”; and Quiroga’s salary is “as of the date of final judgment
the same rate

. . . as was applicable on July 23, 2014.” In making his request for a temporary injunction, Judge Cox asked the district
court to preserve the “last, actual, peaceable noncontested status that prece ded the controversy.” He asserted that Judge Henry’s actions were causing harm to the Galveston County district and county courts , and he argued that the harm is

“ immi nent and ongoing” because Henry w as continuing to “reassign” department employees. Cox further sought “to invoke statutory rights of non

- interference” 6 ; “enforcement of constitutional rights and powers under the inherent power of courts

6 See T EX
. L OC

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 151.004.8

to demand and receive adequate funding, personnel, and facilities” 7 ; and to “enforce the separation of powers” and “supervisory control” of dist rict courts over Henry
and the c ommissioners court

. 8 And he requested an order enjoining “Henry and all those acting in concert with him” from:
1. Taking any action on the agenda items Nos. [enumerated], posted for the special meeting of June 9, 2015 and June 13, 2015, or any future action concerning those items[.] 2. Barring entrance by [Quiroga] to that portion of the Galveston County Justice Center previousl y occupied by her as [DJA.] 3. Preventing or impeding in any way the provision of computer services to [Quiroga]

. . . [.] 4. Instructing any employee of Galveston County to disregard any directive, instruction, or request of [Quiroga] relating to the ad ministration

. . . [.] 5. Appointing or employing any person other than [Quiroga] to perform the duties of specified above as the job descript i on of the [DJA .]

. . . . 7. Employing or authorizing any person to fill the duties of the posts purportedly cr eated and pertaining to justice administration in the meeting of June 13, 2015. 8. Reassigning or relocating any employee who occupies a position or duties which, as of July 23, 2014, reported to [Quiroga] as [DJA] , including but not limited to .

. . Graci a, and Deputy Clint Purcell.

7 See Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals , 755 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Tex. 1988); Vondy v. Comm’ r’ s Court of Uvalde C ty
. , 620 S.W.2d 104, 109

– 10 (Tex. 1981). 8 See T EX
. C ONST

. art. II, § 1, art. V, § 8.9

In his brief, filed in opposition to Judge Cox’s request for a temporary injunction , Judge Henry contended that Cox was seeking, “by way of temporary injunction,” the “very remedy (on many of the same grounds) ” that Quiroga seeks “in her earlier filed lawsuit.” 9 He asserted that if the district court granted Cox the temporary in

junction , it would be awarding Quiroga the ultimate relief that she
seeks , i.e., reinstatement of her employment . He nry further argued that Cox’s
la wsuit i s moot because the c ommissioners court had already “abolished” Quiroga’s
DJA position and , by order issued June 13, 2015, approved the j udges ’ application to appoint Quiroga to a new “court administrator position.” And he argued that Cox could not invoke the j udges’ statutory right of non

- interference because “Quiroga was never appointed to her position as Director ” pursuant to statute. 10 At the temporary

- injunction hearing, the district court admitted into evidence copies of a 1995 commissioners c ou rt meeting agenda and minutes , which included

“ authorizing the employment of a Professional Services Director and Justice Administration Directo r submitted by the County Judge ” ; a May 1, 2000 letter from the Honorable David E. Garner , Judge of the 10th Dis trict Court of Galveston County , to then Galveston Coun ty Judge Jim Yarborough; and a May 8, 2000 commissioner’s c ourt agenda.

9 Bonnie Quiroga v. Galveston C ty ., Tex ., No. 14

- CV

- 1289 (212th Dist. Ct., Galveston Cty., Tex., filed Dec. 9, 2014). 10 See T EX
. L OC

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 151.004.10

The minutes of the April 13, 1995 “Special Called Session” of the
commissioners court reflects that the then commissioners c ourt voted to appoint Ed Wells, who was then “employed as Court Administrator for the District Courts of Galveston County ,” to “ the Director of Just ice Administration. ” The commissioners agreed that “[t]he duties of the position will include co ntinuing he lping the District Courts Administration, but also broadening that responsibility to the County Courts at Law and also the current Justices of the Peace throughout the county.” The minutes do not reflect that Wells was to perform any duties for the commis sioners
court. After Wells had subsequently resigned his position, Judge Garner, the Local Administrative Judge, acting on behalf of three district court judges, two county court at law judges, and a probate judge, submitted to then County Judge Yarborough a May 1, 2000 letter , stating that “after careful consideration of the applications for the position of Director of Justice Administration for Galveston County,” the Galveston County judges collectively recommended that Bonnie Quiroga be appointed to fill the vacancy . T he y further requested that the “ matter be placed on the [c ommissio ners c ourt’s] agenda for action.” A nd th e May 8, 2000 commissioners c ourt agenda includes “Consideration of appointment of Director of
Justice Administration submitted by th e Administrative Law Judge .” T he commissioners c ourt subsequently ratified Quiroga’s appointment.11

T he district court also admitted into evidence a 2005 “ Job Description Certification , ” signed by Quiroga , and various excerpts of “Program Bud get[s]”
from fiscal years 2004 and 2009 through 2012. The excerpts contain , for each year, an organizational chart , which shows the “commissioners c ourt” in a position over the department of “Justic e Administration,” but includes in a position below the department onl y the duties of “Court Collections,” “Justice of Peace Task Force,” “Law Library,” and “Pre

- Trial Release.” The 2005 “Job Description Certification” reflects that Quiroga reported to the “County Judge.” However, t he “Position Summary , ” contained in the d escription, states that she “manages, coordinates, directs, and plans the operations and activities of all courts .” And it lists her “Essential Functions” as follows:

 Oversees the Texas Fair Defense Act

- Galveston County Plan to ensure compliance with all procedures.

 Prepares and presents monthly activity and status reports, as requested or required.

 Provides on

- call assistance to judiciary, county jail, and related county departments.

 Develops, implements, and oversees collection procedures for the county courts.

 Coordinates and schedules courtroom security.

 Plans, schedules, and implements requests by visiting judges, including courtroom space, lodging, and travel.

 Audits and processes claims for payment of indigent representation.

 Manages caseloads; develops and implements more efficient procedures for processing dockets and caseflow.12

 Determines eligibility of attorneys to serve under the Texas Fair Defense Act

- Galveston County Plan.

 Maintains statistical data and records on caseflow and case manageme nt.

 Develops and implements automated documents for use by the court.

 Provides for the comfort, convenience, and security of jurors.

 Develops and maintains court calendar.

 Plans and assigns space for court hearings and court

- related services.

 Assists in th e preparation, review, and implementation of legislation affecting the courts and related county departments.

 Assesses and analyzes the court’s current and future technology needs.

 Plans and coordinates training for court employees.

 Inspects property in co urt, arranging for maintenance, repairs, and replacement as necessary.

 Directs the administrative operations of the Justice Administration Department, including development of all department and court budgets, audit and approval of department expenditures and payroll, supervision and discipline of employees, and related duties.

 Performs other related duties as assigned. Judge Henry testified that he took office as Galveston County Judge on January 1, 2011 and is a member of the commissioners c ourt. 11 From 2000 to July 24, 2014, Quiroga was the DJA and reported to the county j udge and the

c ommissioners court . He explained that “b ecause it became convenient over time,”

11 The County Judge is the “presiding o fficer” of the County Commissioners Court. T EX
. C ONST . art. V, § 18(b).13

the DJA position had both judicial and non

- jud icial responsibilities. Henry admitt ed tha t on July 24, 2014, he terminated Quiroga ’s employment solely on his own
initia tive as county judge, and not on behalf of the commissioners c ourt. Although he had discussed terminating Quiroga’s employment with one of the other commissioners, he did not r aise the matter at a c ommissioners c ourt meeting , n or did
he confer with the j udges before terminating her employment . He nry also co nceded that neither he nor the commissioners c ourt had given Quiroga any prior job

performance reviews, nor had there been any documented dissatisfaction with her job performance. However, h e opined that it was “ in the public’s best interest ” to amend the 2015 fiscal

- year budget and res tructure and reorganize certain C ounty departments. He noted that after he had terminated Quiroga’s employment, “it was important to have that role filled, ” a nd he assigned Bluemer to “spearhead[] ” th e effort

. Judge Henry further testified that for “months” after he had terminated Quiroga’s employment, he and the judges had discussed the “pos sible mechanism by which [they] could appoint personnel.” And the judges “agreed” that the county
law l ibrary, building facilities, personal bonds, and collections were “exclusively in
the domain” of the commissioners court. In May 2015, after the j udges submitted an application to the commissioners c ourt seeking a “pay grade” for the new position of DCA in the range of $85,000 to $120,000 , Henry assigned his chief of s taff, Tyler14

Drummond, to “find internal and external comparable[]” positions. Based on Drummond’s research, Henry and the commissioners c ourt set an annual salary for
the new DCA position at $63,695. And t he district court admitte d into evidence a June 9, 2015 commissioners c ourt order , which shows that they set the salary range for the ne w DCA position at $57,705 t o $63,695. Although the commissioners c ourt had , prior to Judge Henry’s purported termination of Quiroga’s employment, approved her DJA salary of $113,000, it cut the salary for the new DCA position by $49,305 because, as per Henry, “all ” the

c ommissio ners court “functions” were removed. He claimed that the new DCA position would have “approximately 25 percent of the responsibility that the old [DJA] position had,” based on t he number of people reporting to the new DCA , although the number of judges to whom the DCA would report was not considered, nor was the gravity and time commitm ent of one duty over another. Henry noted that the “Pre

- Trial Release Department” had been ren amed the “Personal Bond Office.” And he had hired one of the September 2014 candidates at an annual salar y of $65,000 to perform pre

- trial bond requests

. Drummond testified that Judge Henry, in May 2015, asked him to assist in determining the salary range for the new DCA position . He explained that he based his research on the job description that the j udges had submitted in their May 12, 2015 application. And he noted that t he commissioners c ourt duties re moved from15

the new DCA position inc luded the law l ibr ary, personal bond o ffice, b uildi ng f acilities, and c ollections , which together had constituted a “significant portion” of
the duties of the DJA . In arriving at his salary recommendation for the new DCA position, Drummond utilized variou s online resources and census data from Galveston and Cameron counties, and he contacted three of the counties listed in the j udges’ salary survey, as well as others. He presented his findings to the

c ommissioners c ourt , and he drafted portions of their J une 9, 2015 order setting the salary range for the new DCA position

. Drummond explained that he graduated from Vermont Law School in 2012
and does not hold a Texas law license , has prior experience working for the Vermont Legislature , and took a statistics class and several economics classes in college

. Drummond admitted that, in determining salary ranges for Galveston County positions, he does not apply any methodolog y that is generally accepted by counties in setting such salary ranges. 12

12 During cross

- examination, the following discussion took place : THE COURT: I’m sitting here listening to this gentleman’s expert

testimony with absolutely no Daubert foundation at all. I have no idea if this man

— I know he has a law degree, but he’s never passed a Bar exam. He’s never practiced in a court. He’s never worked in a court. I haven’t heard anything yet that has told me that this gentleman has any concep t of how a court works, how court administration works, or how the laws of Texas impact on Judges requiring to do their job.

. . . If he has knowledge, if he studied, if he knows the laws,16

B luemer testified that in e arly August 2014, Judge Henry “ asked ” her “ to find candidates for [Quiroga’s] position as it stood, Director of Justice Administration.”
After she publicly posted the position, “probably a hundred, maybe 150” people applied for t he job. Bluemer selected the “10 to 15” candidates who “fit the role.”
She then con ducted telephone interviews, narrowed the field to “four,” and set up interviews with Henry and Ryan Dennard, Galveston County Commissioner,

and he has by training, experience, or background any expertise to provide tes timony on this, let me hear it. If not, let’s move on.

. . . . And if he’s saying that he has done a study that complies with any methodology that makes this a valid study, other than picking out the information he wanted in his presentation, I ’d be glad to hear his qualifications on being able to do that. I’ve heard he had statistics. I heard he had economics, but I’m an economics major. Okay? So let’s prove him up, or let’s move on.

. . . [Defense Counsel]: Mr. Drummond, what experience d o you have with

regard to reviewing salaries, in general, doing salary analysis? [Drummond]: I assisted the County

— actually, took the lead on

hiring our Chief Information Officer, Chief Human Resources Officer, our Chief Financial Officer, all of which wer e country searches, nationwide searches. [Defense Counsel]: In each of those job searches, in determining the

salaries, did you use [a] methodology that is generally accepted by Counties in trying to determine salary ranges for those individuals?

. . . . [ Drummond]: No.17

Precinct One . Ultimately, Hen ry and Dennard chose three “final” candidates , none of whom had experience in court administration. One candidate “had formerly been an attorney” and “had a very passionate story to tell about his [previous] drug addiction.” Bluemer noted, however, that he “had a very strong passion for the judicial system” and “knew some of our players.” She also noted that “two members of the [district attorney’s] offic e” had applied for the position, but were eliminated as “way underqualified.” And a former Galveston C ounty judge had applied , but d id not “make the cut” for “the final three.” On cross

- examination, Bluemer admitted that she was not familiar with the c ourt system and had no previous experience working in a courthouse or with any court administrator s . Judge Cox testified that up until July 2014, his and Quiroga’s offices were located one floor apart at the Justice Center, he “saw her almost every day,” and they “talk[ed] all the time.” And he testified at length about her many essential duties to the j udges in Galveston County

. For instance, Quiroga “did the budget for all of the Courts, except the Probate Court; and she did the budget for the Department of Justice Administration.” And she was “instrumental” in developing , and “responsible” for admini stering , the judiciary’s “Fair Defense Plan,” which provides counsel to indigent parties. A significant portion of her duties also involved the provision of interpreters. Noting that he was not warne d prior to the termination of her employment, Cox chron icled the events , as outlined in his amended petition,18

surrounding Judge Henry’s lock

- out of Quiroga from her office , removal of her personal computer and telephone, “filing [of] criminal trespass warnings o r notices” against her, and attempts to conduct i nterview s for her replacement

. Judge Cox explained that after he went to OCA for assistance with a compromise, the j udges submitted a prop osal to the commissioners court. And t he district court admitted into evidenc e the May 12, 2015 application submitt ed by the “Administrative Judges of the Galveston County District Courts, County Courts at Law, and Probate Court” to the c ommissioners, requesting approval to hire a “Dire ctor of Court Administration” with an annual salary range of $85,000 to $120,000. T he judges’ application includes a job d escription and a “Salary Survey, ” which provides the salary ranges, varying from a low of $ 45,894 to a high of $149,488, for court administrators in Bexar, Collin, Dallas, Denton, Tarrant, and Williamson counties. The survey also indicates the number of courts to which each administrator reports. Judge Cox noted that the court administrators in Lubbock and Montgomery c ounties have annual salaries of $110,000 and $100,000, respectively. Judge Cox further testified that at the May 12, 2015 workshop, Judge Henry expressly stated that “he would never pay” the new DCA in the j udges’ requeste d salary range of $85,000 to $120,000 . The j udges, who had not had a court

a dministrat or since the purported termination of Quiroga’s employment ten months earlier, then began their attempt to reinstate her. Cox explained that although the19

revised job description for the new DCA position does have fewer job duties with fewer employees repo rting to the director, the proposed salary range of $57,705 to $63,695 , based on his experience, is “ridiculously low.”
Commissioner Dennard testified that although “[t]he judges were the primary customer of the Depar tment of Justice Administration,” sta tutory amendments in 2005 and 2011 require that “Personal Bond, Building Security, Collections, and the
Law Library” be supervised by the commissioners c ourt. After the heari ng, the district court issued its temporary injunction order , finding , in pertinen t part , as follows :

[Judge Henry] intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County judiciary to p erform its judicial functions

. . . .

. . . . Galveston County created an administrative department to serve the administrative needs of it s courts and to assist county government in court related projects. Fourteen years ago, the judges selected Bonnie Quiroga as the second director of Judicial Administration , and such selection was approve d by the Commissioner’s Court. The testimony was that Ms. Quiroga had been employed by Galveston County for thirty years at the time [her employment] was terminated by [ Henry] on July 24, 2014, so [she] was well known by the other employees and elected of ficials. The director of th[e] hybrid judicial

- governmental administrative department, called Justice Administration, reported to the County Judge for the county government related duties and to the local Administrative Judge for the judicial administrativ e duties. The principal duties of Justice Administration are judicial administration. This department had a Director and other employ ees supervised by the Director. Offices for Judicial Administration are located in proximity to the Galveston County court s i n the Galveston Justice Center. The other employees’20

duties are judicial in na ture. The Director reported daily to t he local Administrative Judge. The Director also reported to the County Judge for the government related projects. On July 24, 2014, [ Henry] terminated the employment of the Director of Judicial Administration from both her governmental related responsibilities as well as her duties to the Galveston County judiciary. [Henry] did not consult with the judiciary, nor did he advise the judi ciary that he intended to terminate the Director of Judicial Administration’s duties performed for the Galveston County Courts. [Cox] disputes that grounds existed to terminate [Quiroga ’s employment ].

. . . .

. . . . [Henry] placed his HR employee Peri Blu emer in charge of choosing the replacement [DCA]. In her testimony, Ms. Bluemer demonstrated a lack of knowledge about courts, administrative duties of the court, and the nature of trust and confidence necessary in any person holding this sensitive court position

.

. . . [Bluemer] used standards she designed to limit the consideration to only three applicants, eliminating applicants familiar with the Galveston County courts and attorneys in good standing with the State Bar , while including a wholly unaccept able applicant who could not meet the standards of integrity necessary in such a sensitive position due to addiction to drugs and whose law license had been suspended by the State Bar.

. . . . The Court finds this qualification and interview process was designed to orchestrate the selection of the replacement administrator for the courts without

. . . the advice or consent of the judiciary

. . . . The Court finds that

. . . [Henry] abandoned his plan to force a hand

- picked candidate as the judiciary’s chie f administrative officer, yet, used the ability to set the salary for the new position at a sufficiently low salary to continue to control the hiring process

.

. . . . [Henry’s] staff member Tyler Drummond was assigned to determine the salary for the new ju dicial administrator. Mr. Drummond graduated from a Vermont law school two years ago and did not21

demonstrate knowledge about courts, administrative duties of the courts, and court administrators . He had prior experience working for the Vermont legislatur e.

. . . [Drummond] performed his salary search without including the salaries from other area counties and without input from the Galveston judiciary, or the judiciary in any of his comparative counties.

. . . .

. . . [And he] used standards he designed w ithout su fficient expertise to establish an appropriate salary range for such a position.

. . . [Drummond’s] salary survey process was arbitrary and designed to orchestrate the salary of the replacement administrator for the courts at the lowest possible l evel, improperly undermining the independence of the judiciary

.

. . . . [And] Henry’s attempts to force his will as to employment of the judicial administrator included the attempt to intimidate the Galveston judges by including filing complaints with the Judicial Conduct Commission as part of the Agenda for June 9 and June 13 Commissioner’s Court meetings. The Court finds that [Cox] has demonstrated irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not issued as shown by the conduct of [Henry , ] who attempted to stymie the effort of the judges to restore a judicial administrator by holding an emergency Commissioner’s Court meeting on June 13, 2015, to create a new judicial administrator position at the salary level [Henry] knew was at a salary level the judici ary considered arbitrarily low to attract a suitable candidate. (Emphasis added.)
The district court concluded, in pertinent part, as follows:

• [Cox] has the probable right to recover relief in his suit that [Henry] may not eliminate and attempt to co ntrol the replacement of the administrator for the courts in Galveston County and, then, manipulate employment terms and applicants to replace the administrator position to eliminate suitable applicants ;22

• [Cox] and the courts of Galveston County are irre parably injured by the acts committed by [Henry], and will be irreparably injured by further acts, to interfere with the administrative ability of the courts to perform their judicial functions ;
• the last peaceable status quo should be restored pending f inal trial in the case; and , • if not enjoined, [Henry] will continue to deny administrative support for the Galveston County courts, further interfering with the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial functions

. (Emphasis added.) Based on its findings and conclusions , the district court ordered Judge Henry , and “ his agents, servants, and representatives, and all th ose acting in concert with him” : [to] restore the employment of the Justice Administration Director [Quiroga] as an employee of Galveston County, under the same terms, judicial administrative organization, and salary scale of employment, as employed on July 23, 2014, to perform all administrat ive duties serving the courts of Galveston County as performed on July 23, 2014, which employment shall be supervised by the Galveston County local Administrative Judge.

. . .

. . . [And] perform all necessary actions to carry out the reinstatement of [Qui roga] to her position as Galveston County Justice Administrator, including, but not limited to:
a. issuing to [her] a key to her office in the Justice Center; b. directing IT to provide a computer and access to Galveston County Employee e

- mail and other systems necessary for the performance of her job duties;
c. providing [her] with a phone for her office;23

d. directing Human Resources to allow [her] to complete all paperwork for her to be reinstated, effective June 8, 2015, as a full time employee; and
e. directing the T reasurer to reinstate [her], effective June 8, 2015, and pay

. . . [her] her same salary as was paid prior to July 24, 2014. The district court further enjoined Henry, “ his agents, servants, and representatives, and all those acting in concert with him,” f rom: 1. Taking any action on the matters: (a) relating to [the] application by county and district court judges for authority to appoint administrative employees for the courts other than in compliance with this temporary injunction; (b) relating to justice administration other than in compliance with this temporary injunction; (c) relating to Galveston County staff and agents regarding [Quiroga] other than in compliance with this temporary injunction; (d) relating to Galveston County facilities u sed by Galveston County courts, court staff, and administrative staff other than in compliance with this temporary injunction; and (e) relating to applications to appoint court administrative employees other than in compliance with this temporary injunct ion.

. . . . 2. Barring entrance to the Galveston County Justice Center by Justice Administrat ion personnel, including [ Quiroga ]

. 3. Preventing or impeding in any way the provision of, and the use of, county equipment and furnishings necessary to Justice Administrat ion personnel, including [ Quiroga ] , to perform their administrative duties. 4. Instructing any Galveston County employees to disregard directives, instructions, or requests of Justice A dministration,24 including [ Quiroga ] , to perform the duties of Justice Administration. 5. Appointing or employing any person other than [Quiroga] to perform the duties of [DJA] as directed by [Cox]. 6. Reassigning or relocating any employee who was an employee of Justice Administration on July 23, 2014, including b ut not limited to [Quiroga], Monica Gracia, and Deputy Clint Purcell. 7. Taking any action to prevent or impede access by Justice Administration personnel, including [Quiroga], Monica Gracia, and Deputy Clint Purcell, to the offices occupied by Justice Adm inistration on July 23, 2014. The district court also ordered that Henry “his agents, servants, and representatives, and all those acting in concert with him,” restore Justice Administration under the same terms, judicial administrative organization, and salary scale of employment as existed on July 23, 2014, so that Justice Administration may perform all administrative duties serving the courts of Galveston County as performed on July 23, 2014, which duties shall be supervised by the Galveston County Adm inistrative Judge

. (Emphasis added.) And it ordered that Henry “immediately provide written notice” of the court’s order to each of the c ommissioners and all County “Department Heads” and employee s under the supervision of the commissioner’s c ourt. The
district court further noted that its temporary injunction did not include Quiroga “performing any duties relating to the law library, pretrial, or recovering costs.” And
it set the case for trial and set a bond.

Standard of Review25

The sole issue in a temporary injunction proceeding is whether the applicant may preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending trial on the
merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co ., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). The “status quo” is define d as “the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” In re Newton , 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004)

. To ob tain a temporary injunction, an applicant is n ot required to establish that he will prevail upon a final trial on the merits, but must plead and prove (1) a cause of action against the defendant, (2) a probable right to the relief sought, and (3) a probable, imminent, and irr eparable injury in the interim. Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 204; Occidental Chem. Corp. v. ETC NGL Transp., LLC , 425 S.W.3d 354, 363 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2011 , pet. dism’d )

. An irreparable injury is shown if there is no adequate remedy at law, i.e., the applicant cannot be adequately compensated in damages or damages cannot be measur ed by any certain pecuniary standard. Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 204.
We rev iew the district court’s order g ranting the temporary injunction for a clear abuse of discretion. Walling v. Metcalfe , 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993) ; Occidental Che m. Corp. , 425 S.W.3d at 363. Accordingly, we will not reverse the district court’s order unless it is “so arbitrary as to exceed the bo unds of reasonable discretion.” Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 211; Occidental Che m. Corp. , 425 S.W.3d at 363. Th e scope of our review i s limited to the validity of the temporary injunction26

order ; we do not review the merits of the underlying case. Walling , 863 S.W.2d at 58; INEOS Grp. Ltd. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co ., 312 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)

. We review the eviden ce in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling, drawing all legitimate inferences from the evidence, a nd deferring to the district court’ s resolution of conflicting evid ence. INEOS Grp. Ltd. , 312 S.W.3d at
848

. A court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law to established facts. Id. An abuse of discretion does not occur as long as there is some evidence that reasonably supports the court’s decision. Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 211.

The Inherent Powers of the Texas J udiciary At the outset, it must be noted that at the core of Judg e Cox and the judges’ complaint s against Judge Henry, and, thus, the resolution of most of the issues presented by Henry in his appeal of the district court’s temporary injunction, is the fundamental constitutional principle that the Texas Judiciary, as a separate, equal, and independent branch of governm ent, has certain well

- established inherent
powers. Texas courts “ derive ” their existence and “ judicial power directly ” from the
Texas C onstitution. Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals , 755 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. 1988) (Spears, J., concurring) (citing T EX
. C ONST
. art. V, § 1 ); see also Vondy v. Comm’ r ’ s Court of Uvalde C ty
. , 620 S.W.2d 104, 109

– 10 (Tex. 1981); Eichelberger v.27

Eichelberger , 582 S .W.2d 395, 398

– 99 (Tex. 1979). Indeed, t he “ judicial power ” of Texas is “ vested ” in our constitutionally established courts, which constitute and operate as a separate and equal branch of government. T EX
. C ONST . art. II, §1; id.
art. V, § 1. Moreover, t he Texas Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, contains a specific, strongly

- worded provision, entitled “The Powers of Government,” which mandates a strict separation of powers among the state’s Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departm ents. See T EX
. C ONST
. art. II, § 1. And the drafters of the Texas Constitution thought the provision so important that they placed it in article II, ahead of the separate articles establishing the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments of the s tate’s government. See id . arts. III, IV, V. Only the Texas Bill of Rights, contained in article I of the Constitution, precedes the Separation of Powers Provision in prominence of place. See id . art. I, §§ 1

– 34

. The p rovision exp ress ly states: The po wers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another[;] and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others , except in the instances herein expressly permitted. Id . art. II, § 1 (emphasis a dded).28

The j udicial power of the state is divided among the various constitutionally established courts “ by means of express grants of jurisdiction contained in the constitution and statutes.” Eichelberger , 582 S.W.2d at 398. In addition to these express grants of judicial power, courts have “inherent” and “implied” powers “ not expressly authorized or described by the constitution or statute. ” Id . (emphasis added). These powers are “woven into the fabric of the constitu tion by virtue of their origin in the common law ” and “ the mandate of

. . . the separation of powers between three co

- equal branches.” Id . (citing T EX
. C ONST . art. II, § 1 ). As explained by the Texas Supreme Court:
The i nherent judicial power of a court is not derived from legislative grant or specific constitutional provision, but from the very fact that the court has been created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities

. The inherent powers of a court are those which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice , and in the preservation of its independence and integrity

. Inherent power of the courts has existed since the days of the Inns of Court in co mmon law English juris prudence.

. . . It also springs from the doctrine of separation of powers between the three governmental branches.

. . . This power exists to enable our courts to effectively perform their judicial functions and to protect their dignity, independence and integrity

. Id

. at 388

– 89 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In Vondy , the Texas Supreme Court further explained that Texas courts have the inherent power to compel payment of sums of money if they are reasonable and necessary in order to carry out the court ’ s mandated responsibilities. 620 S.W.2d at 109. This inherent power is “ necessary for the judiciary to carry out its functions,29

independently of the other branches of government ,” and “ protect and preserve the judicial powers from impairment or destruction. ” Id

. The court noted that courts
across the nation have employed their inherent power s to hire staff and require that salaries be paid for secretaries, probation officers, and assistants

. Id . at 110 (citations omitted). It also noted tha t in 1857, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania required a county to compensate a constable for his services because of the benefit derived by the county for such services in the preservation of order and administr ation of justice. Id . (citing Lancaster C ty
. v. Brinthall , 29 Pa. 38, 40 (1857) )

. Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court he ld that “ the county commissioners of Uvalde County must compensate the county ’ s constables ” because “[t] he judicial system of this state cannot function properly if those offic ials who are responsible for carrying out certain duties in that process are not properly compensated ” and “[i]t is the duty of the commissioners court to provide process servers as a necessary part of the proper administration of justice in this state, an d to compensate them adequately. ” Id . (citations omitted). The court noted the fact that the commissioner’s court “is also part of the judicial branch of this state.” Id . (citing
T EX
. C ONST . art V, § 1 ). But it concluded “ this fact does not alter our powers to protect and preserve the judiciary by compelling payment for process servers. ” Id

. I n fact , w hen making fiscal and budgetary decisions, a commissioner ’ s court30

exercises its legislative function. See Comm’rs Court of Titus C ty. v. Agan , 940
S.W .2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1997) . And, as emphasized by the court, The legislative branch of this state has the duty to provide the judiciary with the funds necessary for the judicial branch to function adequately. If this were not so, a legislative body could des troy the judiciary by refusing to adequately fund the courts. The judiciary must have the authority to prevent any interference with or impairment of the administration of justice in this state

. Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 1 10 (emphasis added)

. Again emphasizing that Texas courts derive their judicial power directly from the constitution and it “ expressly mandates a separation of governmental powers,” the Texas Supreme Court, in Mays , expressly stated that “ even in the absence of a statutory provision, a court has the inherent power to compel the expenditure of those public funds which are reasonably necessary for the court to efficiently fulfill its constitutional function. ” 755 S.W.2d at 80 (citing V ondy , 620 S.W.2d at 109

– 10 ; Eichelberger , 582 S.W.2d at 398

– 99 ). Thus, “[o] n this basis alone, a district judge may set a reasonable salary ” for c ourt staff. Mays , 755 S.W.2d at 80. Writing for the majority of the court in Mays , 13 Justice Franklin Spears further elaborated: Like the powe r to punish for contempt, a court’s inherent power to compel funding flows from the law of self

- preservation

. No legislative

13 We note that although Justice Spears’ opinion in Mays is labeled a concurring opinion, four ot her justices joined the opinion and, in it, the majority of the court simply elaborated on its previous discussion s of the inherent powers of Texas courts. See 755 S.W.2d at 80.31

authority, state or local, can so tighten the purse strings of the judiciary ’ s budget that it fails to provide the funds reasonabl y necessary for the court ’ s efficient and effective operation. To adhere to any contrary view would effectively concede to the legislature the power to render inoperative the judicial branch of government

. It could force the judiciary into the role of a subordinate and supplicant governmental service

— in effect, a mere agency. The judiciary is not an agency, but is a constitutionally established separate, equal and independent branch of government

. Id . (citing LeCroy v. Hanlon , 713 S.W.2d 335 , 338 (Tex. 1986) ) (emphasis added)

. Thus, the “ inherent power of the courts is necessary not only to preserve the judicial branch of government, but also to preserve for the people their security and freedom. ” Id . Indeed, The judicial power provides a check on t he abuse of authority by other governmental branches. If the courts are to provide that check, they cannot be subservient to the other branches of government but must ferociously shield their ability to judge independently and fairly

. This is the essence of our very existence; we owe the people of Texas no less than our unflinching insistence on a true tripartite government. It is the responsibility of this court to preserve this constitutional framework. The inherent power of the courts to compel fundi ng thus arises out of principles and doctrines that are so thoroughly embedded as to form the very foundation of our governmental structure. The judiciary may often be denominated as the “third” branch of government, but that does not mean it is third in importance; it is in reali ty one of three equal branches. As such, the judiciary is an integral part of our government and cannot be impeded in its function by legislative intransigence in funding

. Id

. at 80

– 81 (emphasis added). Again, the court in Ma ys noted that courts across the nation have used their inherent powers to compel funding for a wide variety of essentials , including32

janitorial serv ices, chairs and carpeting, tape recording equipment, telephone services, and air conditioning equipment. I d . at 80

– 82 (citations omitted). And “[n]umerous courts have held that the hiring of court personnel and the designation of staff salaries are matters over which courts may properly exercise their inherent
powers . ” Id . at 82 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). With this in mind, the court noted that the Supreme Court of Indiana had expressly recognized that th e “ power of the courts to employ necessary personnel and fix their salaries ” i s “ grounded on the most fund amental of constitutional principles .” Id . (citing Noble C ty
. Council v. State ex. Rel. Fifer , 125 N.E.2d 709 , 714 ( Ind. 1955 ) ). And it quoted the Indiana court’s reasoning:
These [constitutional] mandates necessarily carry with them the right to quarter s appropriate to the office and personnel adequate to perform the functions thereof. The right to appoint a necessary staff of personnel necessarily carries with it the right to have such appointees paid a salary commensurate with their responsibilities

. The right cannot be made amenable to and/or denied by a county council or the legislature itself

. Our courts are the bulwark, the final authority which guarantees to every individual his right to breathe free, to prosper and be secure within the framewor k of a constitutional government. The arm which holds the scales of justice cannot be shackled or made impotent by either restraint, circumvention or denial by another branch of that government

. Id

. (emphasis added) (quoting Nob le C ty
. Council , 125 N.E.2d at 714 )

. T he court in Mays also noted that many courts have “ expressly concluded that, as a matter of constitutional law, the judiciary must directly control court personnel. ” Id . (citations omitted).33

Moreover, t he court further explained that “ courts may even compel payment of those expenses which are reasonably necessary for the court to exercise its inherent powers. Thus, if it becomes necessary for a court to retain counsel in order to litigate an exercise of inherent powers, then payment of attorney fees may also be compelled. ” Id . (citation omitted). With these important constitutional principles in mind, we turn to the issues presented in this appeal. 14
Mootness In his first issue, Judge Henry argues that the district court’s temporary injunction h as become moot on appeal because the Texas Legislature recent ly

14 Our dissenting colleague asserts that the district court, in its temporary injunction order did not expressly “ rely on the judiciary’s inherent authority.” And we note that the district co urt did not make reference to the Separation of Powers Provision of the Texas Constitution. However, the district court, in issuing its temporary injunction, specifically found that Judge Henry had “intentionally interfered with the independence of the Ga lveston County judiciary” and its “ability” to perform its judicial functions, and he would “continue” to do so. As noted above, Texas courts have the inherent power to “protect and preserve” their “judicial powers from impairment or destruction , ” and thi s power is “necessary for the judiciary to carry out its functions, independently of the other branches of government.” Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 109. Although the district court did not expressly refer to its inherent power in issuing the temporary injunctio n order, this power necessarily formed the basis of the order , especially given the fact that Judge Cox invoked it and the Separation of Powers Provision in his request for the temporary injunction

. We note that Judge Henry, in his briefing to this Court, does not present an issue in which he challenges the inherent powers of the Texas Judiciary to protect and preserve the proper administration of the judicial system, nor does he contend that the district, in entering the temporary injunction, acted outsid e of the scope of its inherent power

.34

amended the Texas Government Code to, “ [f]or the first time ,” provide “ specific authority for the creation of a county

- funded court administrative system for the district courts collectively in counties like Galveston County ” and the amendment became effective on September 1, 2015. (Emphasis added.) See Act of May 27, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., S.B. 1913, ch. 966, §1

– 2 ( codified as an amendment to T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 75.401) (referred to hereafter as T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 75.401 (Vernon Supp. 2015 ) ). He further argues that because the “ new amendments to section 75.401” “ now give authority to the judges in Galveston County ” “to appoint Ms. Quiroga to the new Court Administrator position,” “ where she would be supervised by those judges and serve at their pleasure,” and “ now clearly gives ” the commissioners c ourt “ the authority to set the salary for that position,” the temporary injunction “does not have any practical ef fect on an existing
controver sy . ” (Emphasis added.) “[C]ourts have an obligation to take into account intervening events t hat may render a lawsui t moot.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty ., 369 S.W.3d 137, 166

– 67 (Tex. 2012). Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot controversies and render adviso ry opinions. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones , 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). A justici able controversy between the parties must exist at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal, or the case is moot. Williams v.
Lara , 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). “If a controversy ceases to exist

— the issues35

presented are no longer ‘liv e’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome

— the case becomes moot.” Id

. The sam e is true if an appellate court’ s judgment cannot have any practical legal effect up on a then existing controversy. Zipp v. Wuemling , 218 S.W.3d 71, 7 3 (Tex. 2007)

. A case may become moot by reason of new legislation or acts that supersede existing legislation. In re Gruebel , 153 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2005, orig. proceeding). However, a case is not moot if some issue is still in controvers y. Id. Section 75.401, as amended, provides : (a) In a county that has more than one district court or statutory county court, those courts may establish and maintain, on approval of the commissioners court, a court administrator system. (b) The judges of the district courts or the statutory county courts may by local rule designate local court divisions and the duties of the court administrator for each division, if applicable. The court administrator shall cooperate with regional, presiding, and local administrative judges and state agencies having duties relating to the operation of the courts to promote uniform and efficient administration of justice. (c) The court administrator is appointed by the judges of the district courts or the statutory coun ty courts served by the court administrator. The court administrator serves at the pleasure of those judges

. (d) A court administrator is entitled to reasonable compensation, as determined by the judges served and in the salary range for the position, as set by the commissioners court

. (e) The judges of the courts served by the court administrator, with the approval of the commissioners court, shall appoint appropriate staff and support personnel according to the needs of the local jurisdiction.36

(f) On order and directive of the judges, the commissioners court shall fund the court administrator system from fines collected by the courts served by the court administrator. If the fines collected are insufficient to provide the total funding for the program , the county shall provide the additional funds needed.
T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 75.401 (emphasis added)

. The legislature explained that it amended section 75.401 because “interested parties” had “contend[ed] that there [was] a need to clarify the statutory authority of judges to hire a county court administrator in a county served by multiple district
court s and statutory county courts.” House Comm. on Judi ciary & Civ. Jurisprudence , Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1913, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (emphasis added). The previous version of section 75.401 discussed the authority of courts in counties with “more than one” “county criminal court or more than one county court at law” “ to establi sh a court administrator system.” Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg.,
R. S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2015 (amended 2009). The amended version discusses the establishment and maintenance of a court administrator system by courts in counties that have “more than one district court or statutory county court.” T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 75.401(a)

. The current version of section 75.401 , as did the previous version, recognize s that the court administrator “is appointed by the judges” of the courts served by the administrator and “serves at” their “pleasure.” Compare T E X
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 75.401(b), (c) , with Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2015 (amended 2009).37

Moreover, the current ve rsion of section 75.401, as did the previous version, recognizes that a court administrato r “is entitled to reasonable compensation.” Compare T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 75.401(d) , with Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2015 (amended 2009). Judge Cox argues that the district court’s temporary injunction is not moot
because , regardless of the recent change s made to section 75.401, this case “directly involves the constitutional prerogative of the trial judges, who have a well

established right to select judicial personnel and to have them reasonably
compe nsated by the commissioners.” See Mays , 755 S.W. 2d at 80

– 82 ; Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 109

– 10. He asserts that these rights are “recognized” in section 75.401
and Judge Henry and the c ommissioners c ourt, relying on the fact that the legislature has recently amended the statute, are merely attempting “to rig” the compensation of the court administrator “so as to” illegally “control [the ] selection process.” Cox further asserts that Henry illegally “f ire[d] Ms. Quiroga,” “ar rogate[d] to himself and his staff the selection of a successor,” and “compounded the harm by attempting to cut the judges out of the selection process,” “ flimflam[ing] the system by a stacked salary review.” Judge Cox notes that at the time Judge Henry purportedly term inated Quiroga’s employment in July 2014, her compensation was set and approve d by the commissioners c ourt at $113,000. Henry then, based on Drummond’s unfounded38

“research,” recommended , and the commissioners c ourt approved, a salary range of $57,705 to $63,695 for the “new” court administrator position. And Cox asserts that
the j udges cannot hire a qualified court administrator at a salary within that range, nor can they set any level of compensation within that ra nge that would be “reasonable.” See T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 75.401(d). We first note that Judge Henry’s argument that the district court’s temporary injunction is moot is based entirely on the false premise that the “new amendments
to section 75.401 ,” “[f] or the first ti me,” gave the Galveston County J udiciary the authority “to appoint Ms. Quiroga to the new position of Court Administrator

. ” Henry, in making this assertion, ignores the fact, as found by the district cou rt, that the judges had “[f]ourteen years ago ” “selected” Quiroga as the second D JA

. And he ignores the well

- established constitutional principle that Texas judges have the “inherent power to act to protect and preserve the proper administration of the judicial system.” Vondy , 620 S.W.2d a t 109. As noted above, t his includes the inherent power to hire staff and “compel the payment of sums of money if they are reasonable and necessary in order to carry out the court’s responsibilities.” Id. at 109

– 10. The legislature, in amending section 75.401, did not, as Henry asserts, “[f]or the first time” give the Galveston County J udiciary the authority to appoint Quiroga to her position. It merely, in its own words, at the request of “interested parties,” “ clarified ” the judges’ “ statutory authori ty to do so. ” House Comm. on39

Judi ciary & Civ. Jurisprudence , Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1913, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (emphasis added). More important, the fact that the legislature amended section 75.401 does not in any way “moot ” the district court’s findi ngs that

• [ Judge Cox] has the probable right to recover relief in his suit that [ Judge Henry] may not eliminate and attempt to control the replacement of the administrator for the courts in Galveston County and, then, manipulate employment terms and applicants to replace the administrator position to eliminate suitable applicants ;
• [Cox] and the courts of Galveston County are irreparably injured by the acts committed by [Henry], and will be irreparably injured by further acts, to interfere with the administrative ability of the courts to perform their judicial functions ;
• the last peaceable status quo should be restored pending final trial in the case; and,
• if not enjoined, [Henry] will continue to deny administrative support for the Galveston County courts, further interfering with the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial functions

. (Emphasis added.) Specifically, in regard to Quiroga’ s position and salary as G alveston County
D JA, the district court found:

• [Judge Henry] intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial functions

. . . .

 Fourteen years ago , the judges selected Bonnie Quiroga as the second director of Judicial Administration, and such selection was approved by the Commissioner’ s Court.

. . .40  The director of th[e] hybrid judicial

- governmental administrative department, called Justice Adminis tration, reported to the County Judge for the county government related duties and to the local Administrative Judge for the judicial administrative duties

. The principal duties of Justice Administration are judicial administration.

. . . The Director rep orted daily to the local Administrative Judge . The Director also reported to the County Judge for the government related projects.

 On July 24, 2014, [Henry] terminated the employment of the Director of Judicial Administration from both her governmental re lated responsibilities as well as her duties to the Galveston County judiciary. [Henry] did not consult with the judiciary, nor did he advise the judiciary that he intended to terminate the Director of Judicial Administration’s duties performed for the Ga lveston County Courts.

. . .

 [Henry’s] qualification and interview process was designed to orchestrate the selection of the replacement administrator for the courts without

. . . the advice or consent of the judiciary

. . . .

 [Henry] abandoned his plan to f orce a hand

-

picked candidate as the judiciary’s chief administrative officer, yet, used the ability to set the salary for the new position at a sufficiently low salary to continue to control the hiring process.

 [Henry’s] staff member Tyler Drummond was ass igned to determine the salary for t he new judicial administrator. .

. .

 [Drummond’s] salary survey process was arbitrary and designed to orchestrate the salary of the replacement administrator for the courts at the lowest possible level, improperly undermi ning the independence of the judiciary.

 [And Henry] attempted to stymie the effort of the judges to restore a judicial administrator by holding an emergency Commissioner’s Court meeting on June 13, 2015, to create a new judicial administrator position at the salary level [Henry] knew was at a salary level the judiciary considered arbitrarily low to attract a suitable candidate. (Emphasis added.)41

The evidence presented at the injunction hearing supports the district court’s findings, which Henry does not c hallenge. Commissioner Dennard admitted that “[t]he judges were the primary customer of the Departm e nt of Justice Administration.” Regardless, Henry , himself , testified that on July 24, 2014, he terminated Quiroga’s employment solely on his own initiativ e as county judge. Although he had discussed terminating Quiroga’s employment with one of the county commissioners, he did not raise the matter at a c ommissioners c ourt meeting , nor did he confer with the judges before terminating her employment . He nry a lso

co nceded that neither he nor the commissioners c ourt had given Quiroga any prior job

- performance reviews, nor had there been any documented dissatisfaction with her job performanc e. H e simply opined that it was “ in the public’s best interest ” to amend the 2015 fiscal

- year budget and res tructure and reorganize certain County departments. He nry noted that after he had terminated Quiroga’s employment, “it was important to have that role filled,” and he then assigned , again without consulting Judge Cox and the judges , his own staff to “spea rhead[]” the effort and set a salary range for the new position . And although t he commissioners, in the June 9, 2015 order , set the salary range for the new DCA positi on at $57,705 to $63,695, Drummond admitted that, in determining salary ranges for County positions, he does not apply any methodology that is generally accepted by counties in setting such salary ranges.42

As noted above, Judge Cox te stified at length about Quiroga’s many duties to the Galveston County Jud iciary

. And the district court admitted into evidence Quiroga’s 2005 “Job Description Certification,” the “Position Summary” of which
states that she “manages, coordinates, directs, and plans the operations and activities of all courts ” and lists her nume rous “Essential Functions.” Cox explained that he was not warned prior to the termination of Quiroga’s employment, and he chronicled the subsequent e vents, including Judge Henry ’s lock

- out of Quiroga from her office , removal of her personal computer and telephone, “filing [of] criminal trespass warnings or n otices” against her, and attempts to conduct interviews for her replacement

. Cox further testified that, based on his experience, Drummond’s proposed salary range is “not an adequate sal ary for this position.” And the judges, in their May 12, 2015 application to the c ommissioners court to approve the hiring of a DCA at an annual salary of $85,000 to $120,000 , included a job description and a “Salary Survey.” T he Salary Survey includes t he salary ranges, which vary from a low of $45,894 to a high of $149,488, for court admini strators in Bexar, Collin, Dallas, Denton, Tarrant, and Williamson counties and indicates th e number of courts to which each administrator reports. Cox also testifi e d that Lubbock and Montgomery

c ounties reported court administrator annual salaries of $110,000 and $100,000, respectively.43

Judge Cox further explained that despite this evidence, Judge Henry, at the end of one of the May 2 015 “workshops,” stated that “ h e would never pay” the
director in the judges ’ requested salary r ange of $85,000 to $120,000

. And Cox noted that although the revised job description for the position of court administrator eliminates duties in regard to the l aw l ibrary, building faciliti es, p re - trial release, and

c ollections and has fewer reporting employees, Henry’s proposed salary range is, based on Cox’s experience, “ridiculously low.” Moreover, the judges have not had
a court administrator since Henry purportedly terminated Quiroga’s employment on July 24, 2014. Judge Henry did testify that he and the commissioners court reduce d the salary
range for the “new” DCA because “all ” of the commissioners c ourt “ functions” had
been removed from the duties of the position . And he asserted that the “ new ” DCA position has “approximately 25 percent of the responsibility that the old DJA position had,” based on the numb er of people reporting to the director. However, he conceded that he, in proposing the new salary range , did not c onsider the number of elected officials to whom the director reports , nor did he consider the importance of one duty o ver another

. A lthough Henry asserts that Judge Cox has not attempted t o hire a court administrator in the proposed salary range , this ass ertion wrongly presumes that Henry had the legal authority to terminate Quiroga’s employment, in regard to her duties to Cox and the judges , in the first place. This issue is yet to be44

decided by the district court. Moreover, the evidence reveals that Henry himself was unable to fill the position with a qualified candidate. Bluemer testified that after she
had publ icly posted the position, s he selected the “10 to 15” candidates who “fit the role,” conducted telephone interview s, narrowed the field to “four,” and set up interviews with Henry and Dennard. Ultimately, Henry and Dennard chose three “final” candidates, none of whom , according to Bluemer, had any experience in court administration. We defer to the district court’ s resolution of conflicting evid ence. See I NEOS Grp. Ltd. , 312 S.W.3d at 848

. T he district court was free to believe Judge Cox , and credit evidence in his favor, and to disbelieve Judge Henry , and dis credit evidence in his favor. Based on the evidence, t he district court could have reasonably concluded, as it did, that Henry , by purporting to unilaterally terminate Quiroga’s employment, had intentionally denied administrative support for Cox and the judges and interfere d with the indepe ndence of the Galve ston County J udiciary and its ability to p erform its judicial functions. And, based on the evidence, the district court could have reasonably concluded, as it did, that H enry would continue to do so. Thus , the district court’s issuance of the temporary i njunction was in accord with the valid exercise of its inherent power to act to protect and preserve the pr oper45

administration of justice. 15 And t he recent amendments to section 75.401 , which became effective on September 1, 2015, do not vitiate the district court’s findings
and conclusions

. Although section 75.401 recognizes that the commissioners court has the discretion to set a salary range for Quiroga’s position , this power cannot be used arbitrarily or unreasonably or in a manner that interfer es with Judge Cox and the judges’ inherent powers and abilities to perform their judicial functions effectively.
See Mays , 755 S.W.2d at 8 3 ; Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 109

– 10 ; E ichelberger , 582 S.W.2d at 39 8

– 9 9

. The ultimate r esolution of the salary dispute is yet to be decided by the district court and is outside the scope of our review, which is limited to the validity o f the temporary injunction

. 16 See INEOS Grp. Ltd. , 312 S.W.3d at 848. We conclude that there remains a justiciable controversy regarding Judge Henry’s purported termination of Quiroga’s employment and his attempts , as found by the district court, to influence the judges ’ decision to keep Quiroga as their administrator and interfere with the independence and ability of the judges t o

15 Of course, Judge Cox and the judges al so have the same inherent power

. See Mays , 755 S.W.2d at 80

– 83; V

ondy , 620 S.W.2d at 109.
16 Our dissenting colleague asserts that the district court “erred in setting a specif ic salary; instead, it should have instructed the commissioners court to set a new

— and reasonable

— salary for Quiroga’s new position.” However, the court has not set a permanent salary for Quiroga, nor has it permanently reinstated her to the DJA position. It merely entered the temporary injunction to preserve the status quo pending trial on these ultimate issues.46

perform their duties by setting a n “arbitrarily low” salary range for her p osition

. See Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 109

– 10; E ichelberger , 582 S.W.2d at 399; G riffin v. Birkman , 266 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2008, pet. denied); Hooten v. Enriquez , 863 S .W.2d 522, 528

– 29 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 1993 , no pet.)

. Accordingly, w e hold that the district court’s temporary injunction order is not moot.
We over rule Judge Henry’s first issue. Jurisdiction In his second issue, Judge Henry argues that the district court lacked subjec t
matter jurisdiction to issue the temporary injunction because Judge Cox “lack[s] standing to seek an injunction reinstating [Quiroga] to her old job at her old salary”; “[l]egislative immunity bars this suit

. . . as a matter of law”; and “ the other county commissioners are indispensable parties and their absence is jurisdictional.” Whether a district court has subject

- matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d
217 , 228 (Tex. 2004). Standing Judge Henry first argues that Judge Cox “lacked standing to seek an injunction” because “[t]he injury alleged in this case was suffered only by Bonita Quiroga

— being t erminated from her job” as DJA. He asserts that Cox “did no t demonstrate that he had standing ‘in his official capacity as Judge of the 56th District47

Court of Galveston County’ to seek an injunction reinstating Ms. Quiroga to her old job.” In response, Judge Cox asserts that “Quiroga was not the only party injur ed”; rather, “[a]nother distinct casualty was the constitutionally grounded ability of judges to select competent personnel and to have them adequately compensated.” Standing is implicit in the concept of subject

- matter jurisdiction, and subject

matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd ., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Thus, standing is

n ever presumed, cannot be waived, and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Id . at 443

–

44. The test for standing requires that there be a real controversy between the parties that will actually be determined by the judicial declaration sought.
Noot sie, Ltd. v. Williamson C ty. Appraisal Dist ., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996). Without a breach of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff, no cause of action can accrue to his benefit. Nobles v. Marcus , 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976). A plaintiff ha s standing when he is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether he is acting with legal authority. Nootsie, Ltd ., 925 S.W.2d at 661. He has standing if: (1) he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of which he complains; (2) he has a direct relationship between the alleged injury and claim sought to be adjudicated; (3) he has an individual stake in the controversy; (4) the challenged action has caused him48

some injury in fact; or (5) he is an appropriate party to assert the public’s interest in
the matter as well as his own interest. Lake Medina Conservation Soc., Inc./Bexar

Medina Atasc osa Cou nties WCID No. 1 v. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’ n , 980 S.W.2d 511, 515

– 16 (Tex. App.

— Austin 1998, pet. denied); Billy B., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees , 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
A plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that af firmatively demonstrate a court’s jur isdiction to hear a cause. Tex. Ass’ n of Bus. , 852 S.W.2d at 446 . And w e construe the allegations in the ple adings in favor of the pleader. Id

. A court deciding an issue of standing is not required to look solely to the pleadings, but may consider evid ence, and must do so when necessary, to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000); In re Shifflet , 462 S.W.3d 528, 537 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding). A challenge to standing cannot be used to require the party to prove his entire case but should be limited to facts that might be characterized as primarily jurisdictional. See Blue , 34 S.W.3d at 554; In re S hifflet , 462 S.W.3d at 537. Judge Henry’ s argument that Judge Cox lacks standing to seek injunctive relief from the district court is based on the false premise that “[t]he injury alleged
in this case was su ffered only by Bonita Quiroga

— being terminated from her job”
as DJA

. (Emphasis added.) In fact, Cox alleges t hat he suffers “imminent, “ongoing,” and “ irreparable” harm because Henry has interfered with the ability of49

Cox’s court to properly perform its judicial functions. And Cox seeks “enforcement of constitutional rights and powers under the inherent power of the courts to demand and receive adequate funding, personnel and facilities.” As noted above, the district court expressly found that Judge Henry “intentionally interf

ered with the indepe ndence of the Galveston County [J] udiciary” and its ability to “perform its judicial functions.” It further found that Henry “will continue to deny administrative support for the Galveston County courts, further interfering with the in depe ndence of the Galveston County [J] udiciary” and its ability to “perform its judicial functions.” In support of that finding , Judge Cox testified that Judge Henry, without notice
to Cox and the judges , had dismantled the Department of Justice Administ ration, unilaterally terminated the employment of Quiroga , and begu n reassigning court staff. And since September 24, 2014, Cox and his colleagues ha ve been without a
DJA , and , thus , without an executive to perform numerous “essential functions , ” includin g assisting with and managing caseloads and implementing efficient docket control; training court staff; arranging for personal bonds (pretrial); arranging for interpreters; determining the eligibility for and appo inting indigent defense counsel; and provi ding for the comfort, convenience, and security of jurors. Cox further
testified that the new salary range proposed by Drummond and Henry is so unreasonably low that the judges cannot fill it with a qualified candidat e.50

Accordingly, w e hold that Judge Cox has sufficiently alleged facts an d presented evidence af

firmatively demonstrating his standing to bring the instant suit against Judge Henry

. 17 See Tex. Ass’ n of Bus. , 852 S.W.2d at 443

– 44 ; see generally Cty. Comm’rs Court of Dall. C ty. v. Williams , 63 8 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (practicing attorney, “due to the special interest attorneys have in their profession,” had st anding to enjoin commissioners c ourt from enforcing order allocating courtroom and library space). Leg islative Immunity Judge Henry next argues that “legislative immunity bars Judge Cox’s suit against” him “as a matter of law” because Cox’s claims involve Henry’s

17 We further note, as discussed more fully above, that the district court itself possesses inherent powers upon which it may call “to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and integrity.” Eichelberger v. Eichelberger , 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979). In Vondy , the Texas Supreme Court further expl ained that Texas courts have the inherent power to compel payment of sums of money if they are reasonable and necessary in order to carry out the court’s mandated responsibilities. 620 S.W.2d at 109. This inherent power is “necessary for the judiciary to carry out its functions, independently of the other branches of government,” and “protect and preserve the judicial powers from impairment or destruction.” Id . “On this basis alone,” the district court has jurisdiction to decide the instant case and pro vide injunctive relief, including the reinstatement of Quiroga’s employment and the setting of a “reasonable salary” for her, pending the outcome of the trial on the merits. See Mays , 755 S.W.2d at 80. Moreover, although Judge Cox did not rely upon his ow n inherent powers as the judge of the 56th District Court to order Judge Henry to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of Cox’s September 24, 2014 and June 8, 2015 orders, Cox did invoke, as discussed below, the district court’s jurisdiction an d genera l supervisory control over the commissioners c ourt by filing the instant lawsuit. See T EX
. C ONST . art

. V, § 8; T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 24.020 (Vernon 2004 ).51

“ performance ,” as a member of the commissioners c ourt, of “ legislative functions and dutie s ” in “passing and effectuating [commissioners court] orders” terminating Quiroga’s employment as DJA, creating the “new administrator position,” and setting the salary range for the new position

. ”
Le gislative immunity protects individuals from “ personal liability ” for actions performed in their legislative capacity. In re Perry , 60 S.W.3d 857, 859 (Tex. 2001).

“ ‘ When officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may well be induced to ac t with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct.’” Id. (quoting Forrester v. White , 484 U.S. 219, 223, 108 S. C t. 5 38, 542 (1988)); see also Hays Cty . v. Hays Cty. Water Planning P’ ship , 106 S.W.3d 349, 359 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2003 , no pet. )

. Here, Judge Cox does not sue Judge Henry in his person al capacity; rather, Cox sues Henry in his official capacity as c o unty j ud ge. Moreover, although Henry
filed , in the district court, a plea to the jurisdiction, he did not raise an immunity defense, but instead advanced other grounds

. Immunity from liability does not affect a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones , 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). Like other affirmative defenses to liability, it must be pleaded or it is waived. Id. ; see T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 94.52

Accordingly, w e hold that Judge Cox’s suit is not barred by legislative immunity.

Indispensable Parties Judge Henry next argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction against him because Ju dge Cox did not join the county

c ommissioners , or the commissioners c ourt as a whole, as parties to the suit

. Henry asserts that the commissioners are “indispensable parties and their absence is a fatal jurisdictional defect.” Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disp osition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.

. . . (b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)

- (2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscien ce the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’ s absence m ight be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective53

provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in t he per son’ s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non - joinder.
T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 39(a)

– (b). “Although [rule 39] provides for joinder in mandatory terms, ‘there is no arbitrary standard or precise formula for determining whether a particular person falls within its provision.’” Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 255 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) ( quoting Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc ., 513 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. 1974)) ; see also Kodiak Res., Inc. v. Smith , 361 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 2012, no pet.). If a district
court determines that an absent person falls within the provisions of the rule, it has a duty to effect that person’s joinder. Longoria , 2 55 S.W.3d at 184 ; see T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 39(a). If a person required to be joined under subsection (a) cannot be joined, the district court must decide “whether in equity and in good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed” by considering the factors listed in subsection (b). Id. ; see T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 39(b); State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Herrera , 288 S.W.3d 543, 549 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2009, no pet.). “At one time, it was at least theoretically possible that t he joinder of a person could be so essential to a case that proceeding in the person’s absence would constitute fundamental error, which could be raised for the first time on appeal.” Onwudiegwu v. Dominguez , No. 14

- 14

- 00249

- CV, 2015 WL 4366213, at *4 (Tex

.54

App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] July 16, 2015, n o pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 106). However, the Te xas Sup reme Court has held that since r ule 39 was
amended , a party complaining of a nonjoined person’s absence waives that complaint by failin g to raise it in the district court, explaining that [h]enceforth, it will be rare indeed when an appellate court properly determines that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute when the nonjoining person’s absence is raised for the fi rst time on appeal by one of the parties in the trial court, at least insofar as the judgment affects parties who participated in the trial, directly or indirectly, or who purposely bypassed the proceedings. The doctrine of fundamental error should no lon ger protect persons from the binding force of judgments when they have had an opportunity to raise the absence of the nonjoined person and waived it. Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n , 141 S.W.3d 158, 162

– 63 (Tex. 2004) ( issue of suit dismissal because zoning board not joined as defendant constituted “prudential rather than jurisdictional question”); see also Trust Fund for Haynes v. Walde n on Lake Conroe Cmty. Imp. Ass’ n, Inc ., No. 09

- 04

- 374 CV, 2 006 WL 137434, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont Jan. 19 , 2006 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) ( issue of whether party indispensable waived by failure to raise it in trial court) ; Wilchester W. Concerned Homeowners LDEF, Inc. v. Wilchester W. Fund, Inc ., 177 S.W.3d 552, 558

– 60 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dis t.] 2005, pet. den ied) ( non - joinder not jurisdictional and waived because not raised in trial court). Courts have held that there are “rare cases in which failure to name an indispensable party will dep rive a court of jurisdiction,” i.e., “where a party55

responsible for enf

orcing a statute is not named in an action to declare that s tatute unconstitutional.” Motor Vehicle Bd. v. E l Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass’ n, Inc ., 37 S.W.3d 538, 540

–

41 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2001, pet. denied) ( trial cour t lacked jurisdiction because part y enforcing blue law not named in action to decla re statute unconstitutional) ; see also Herrera , 288 S.W.3d at 549 (affirming dismissal , where plaintiff failed to join one of two insurance carriers allegedly liable for payment of death claim and issue raise d in petition could not be joined ); Gilmer Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Dorfman , 156 S.W.3d 586, 588

– 89 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 20 03, no pet.) (holding commissioner of education indispensable and dismissing property owner’ s suit to
declare unconstitutional two cha pters of Education Code). Again, we note that Judge Henry did not raise his joinder issue in his plea to the jurisdiction. Judge Cox’s pleadings establish that he seeks to temporarily enjoin only “the acts of Mark A. Henry” and those whom he directs or controls , or those “acting in concert” with him. “[C]ourts have held that a party with rights to be preserved pending final trial need not join all necessary parties before obtaining interim orders, such as a temporary injunction.” Hyde v. Ray , No. 2

- 03

- 339

- CV, 2004 WL 1277869, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth June 10, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Speedman Oil Co. v. Duval C ty. Ranch Co ., 504 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.

— San Antonio 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Persons against whom no complaint of wrongdoing i s lodged and against whom no injunctive relief is sought56

are not indispensable parties (to a proceeding for temporary injunction).

. . . [I]t may well be that other parties will have to be brought into the suit.

. . . This, however is
not fatal to the te mporary equitable relief granted.” (internal citations omitted )). “B efore a case is called for trial, additional parties necessary or proper parties to the suit, may be brought in, either by the plaintiff or the defendant, upon such terms as the court may prescribe

. ” T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 37. “ Thus, on appeal of a preliminary matter, such as the issuance of [ th e ] temporary injunction, the question of necessary and indispensable parties [ to the suit ] is not reached. ” Hyde , 2004 WL 1277869, at
*2

– 3. Accordingl y, we hold that neither the Galveston County commissioners, nor the commissioners court as a whole, are indispensable parties to the district court’s temporary injunction. We overrule Judge Henry’s second issue.

Supervisory Jurisdiction In his third issue, Judge Henry argues that the temporary injunction is “void”
because the district court “exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction” over the
commissioners court. See T EX
. C ONST . art. V, § 8

. He further argues that the “district court’s exercise of its s upervisory jurisdiction is invalid” because (1) the

c ommissioners c ourt “ did not act beyond its jurisdiction or abuse its discretion by failing to perform a clear statutory duty when it (i) terminated [Quiroga’s] employment, (ii) created the new administra tor position, and (iii) set the sal ary for57

the new position ” and (2) the district court “had no authority to tell [him ] who to appoint or what salary to pay .” (Emphasis added.) He nry asserts that although a district court “may order a commissioners court to set a reasonable salary for a county employee,” it “cannot itself determine what that salary is or tell the commissioners court what salary to adopt.”
T he Texas Constitution provides that a county commissioners court “shall exercise such powers and j urisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed.” T EX
. C ONST . art. V, § 18 (b) . The powers and duties of a commissioners court include legislative, executive, adminis trative, and judicial functions. Id

. In exercising its powers and jurisdiction over county business, a commissioners court has implied authority to exercise broad discretion to accomplish the purposes intended. Griffin , 266 S.W.3d at 194 . Along with its constitutionally derived jurisdiction over “county business,” a commissioners court has specific statutory authority to oversee the fiscal operation of the county by approving and authorizing a budget. Id. (citing T EX
. L OC
. G OV ’ T C ODE A N N
. §§ 111.001

– .095 (Vernon 2008)). When making fiscal and budgetary decisions, a commissioners court exercises its legislative function. See Agan , 940 S. W.2d at 81 ; see also Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 110; Hooten , 863 S.W.2d at 528 . This legislative function, “ when properly performed , is protected from the scrutiny of the judicial branch by the58

constitutionally

- mandated separation of powers doctrine. ” Griffin , 266 S.W.3d at 195 (emphasis added); see T EX
. C ONST . art. II, § 1 (“[N]o person, or collection of
pers ons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted .” (emphasis added )). We note that the district court, in its order, did not expressly state the grounds upon which it relied in entering the temporary injunction against Judge Henry. Again, however, Judge Cox alleges, and the district court expressly found, that Henry had “intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston County [J]udi ciary and [its] ability to perform its judicial functions,” and, if “not enjoined,” he would “continue to deny administrative support for the Galveston County courts , further interfering” with their independence and ability to function. Thus, in
addressin g Henry’s first issue, in which he contends that the temporary injunction became moot on appeal, we noted that the district court’s issuance of the injunction
was in accord with the valid exercise of its inherent power to act to protect and preserve the pr oper administration of justice . On this ground alone, the district court has jurisdiction to address Cox’s complaints against Henry. See In re El Paso Cty. Comm’r’s Court , 281 S.W.3d at 27

– 28. And on this ground alone , the district court had the legal authority to issue the temporary injunction.59

As noted above, the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that Texas courts have certain inherent power s, including the inherent power to compel payment of sums of money from the other branches of government if they are reasonable and necessary in order to carry out the court’s mandated responsibilities. Mays , 755 S.W.2d at 80; Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 109. Again, as emphasized by the supreme court in Mays : Like the power to punish for contempt, a court’s inherent power to compel funding flows from the law of self

- preservation . No legislative authority, state or local, can so tighten the purse strings of the judiciary’s budget that it fails to provide the fu nds reasonably necessary for the court’s efficient and effective operation. To adhere to any contrary view would effectively concede to the legislature the power to render inoperative the judicial branch of government . It could force the judiciary into t he role of a subordinate and supplicant governmental service

— in effect, a mere agency. The judiciary is not an agency, but is a constitutionally established separate, equal and independent branch of government. 755 S.W.2d at 80 (emphasis added) (citatio n omitted )

. In Vondy , the Texas Supreme Court specifically held that where the law requires that compensation be provided, commissioners courts must set “reasonable”
salaries. 620 S.W.2d at 10 8

– 0 9. There, the applicable constitutional provision required that “all justices of the peace, constables, deputy constables and precinct law enforcement officers” be compensated on a salary basis. Id

. at 108 (quoting
T EX
. C ONST . art. XVI, § 61). The commissioners voted not to set a salary for a newly elected cons table, asserting that by setting “no salary,” it had set “a salary.” Id . at60

105, 108. The commissioners argued that because the constitutional provision at issue did not mandate that they set a “reasonable” salary, and no statute mandated a minimum salary, it had the discretion to set no salary at all. Id . at 108. The supreme court held that the commissioners were required to compensate the county’s
constables. Id . at 110. Noting that “[t] he judicial system of this stat e cannot function properly if those officials who are responsible for carrying out certain duties in that process are not properly compensated.” Id . The court explained: The legislative branch of this state has the duty to provide the judiciary with the funds necessary for the judicial branch to function adequately. If this were not so, a legislative body could destroy the judiciary by refusing to adequately fund the courts. The judiciary must have the authority to prevent any interference with or impai rment of the administration of justice in this state. Id

. It further explained that “[e]ven in matters involving some degree of discretion, the commissioners court may not act arbitrarily.” Id . at 109; see also Neeley v. W. Orange

- Cove Consol. Indep. Sc h. Dist. , 176 S.W .3d 746, 804 (Tex. 2005) ( Vondy demonstrates that “governmental discretion is circumscribed by the Constitution”). In addition to the general inherent powers that a court may exercise sua sponte, Texas district courts specifically have “a ppellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court, with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.” T EX
. C ONST . art. V, § 8; T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 24.020 (Vernon 2004)

. If a commission ers court “ acts beyond its authority in attempting to p erform its legislative function , the supervisory61

jurisdiction of the district court comes into play. ” Griffin , 266 S.W.3d at 195;
Hooten , 863 S.W.2d at 528. And a district court may reverse a commissioners court order if the latter has acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, collusively, fraudulently, or otherwise in abuse of its discretion.” Griffin , 266 S.W.3d at 195; Hooten , 863 S.W.2d at 528. Thus, “ a district cour t may enjoin a commissioners court from enacting a budget that fails to provide essential funding.” Randall Cty. Comm’rs
Court v. Sherrod , 854 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 1993, no pet.) (Poff, J., concurring) (“[I]t could be said that a budget tha t fails to provide such essential fundin g is not a reasonable budget.”); see also Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 109

– 10 (where law requires compensation be provided, commissioners courts mu st set “reasonable” salaries). However, a district court, in reviewing a com missioners court’s order under article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution , may not substitute its judgment and discretion for the judgment and discretion of the commissioners court. Ector
C ty
. v. Stringer , 843 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. 1992). If a commis sioners court acts illegally, unreasonably, or arbitrarily, a “court of competent jurisdiction may so adjudge, but there the power of the court ends.” Id

. Here, the district court’s issuance of the injunction was not only in accord with the valid exercise of its inherent authority to protect and preserve the proper administration of the legal system, but it was also in accord with its supervisory62

jurisdictio n under article V, sectio n 8 of the Texas Constitution. Again, the district court ruled that

• [ Judge Cox] has the probable right to recover relief in his suit that [ Judge Henry] may not eliminate and attempt to control the replacement of the administrat or for the courts in Galveston County and, then, manipulate employment terms and applicants to replace the administrator position to eliminate suitable applicants ;
• [Cox] and the courts of Galveston County are irreparably injured by the acts committed by [Henry], and will be irreparably injured by further acts, to interfere with the administrative ability of the courts to perform their judicial functions;
• the last peaceable status quo should be restored pending final trial in the case; and,
• if not e njoined, [Henry] will continue to deny administrative support for the Galveston County courts, further interfering with the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial functions

. (Emphasis added.)
A nd, a gain, in regard to Quiroga’s position as Galveston County D JA, the district court specifically found that Judge Henry had “ intentionally interfered with the indepe ndence of the Galveston County [J] udiciary ” and its ability “ to perfo rm its judicial functions.” It further found that the judges, “[f]ourteen years ago,” had

“ selected ” Quiroga as “ the second director of Judicial Administration, ” and the commissioners c ourt had approved their selection

. Although t he “ principal duties of Justice Administration are judicial administration , ” Henry unilaterally terminated Quiroga’s employment without regard to her duties to the Galveston County63

J udiciary and without consult ing with Judge Cox and the judges or advising them that he i ntended to terminate her employment. Henry then placed Bluemer in char ge of choosing Quiroga’s replacement, even though, as found by the district court, she

“ demonstrated a lack of knowledge about courts, administrative duties of the court, and the nature of trust and confidence necessary in any person holding this sensitive court position. ” And she “ used standards she designed to limit the consideration to only three applicants, eliminating applicants familiar with the Galveston County courts and attorne ys in good standing with the State Bar .” Henry also assigned Drummond “to determine the salary for the new” DJA. And, as found by the district
court, Drummond utilized a salary survey process that was “arbitrary and designed to orchestrate the salary of the replacement administrator for the courts at the lowest possible level, improperly undermining the independence of the judiciary.”
The district court further found that Judge Henry’s “ qualification and interview process was designed to orchestrate the s election of the replacement administrator for the courts without

. . . the advice or consent of the judiciary .” Although he “ abandoned his plan to force a hand

- picked candidate as the judiciary ’s chief administrative officer,” Henry “ used the ability to s et the salary for the new position at a sufficiently low sa lary to continue to control the hiring process. ” And
he “ attempted to stymie the effort of the judges to restore a judicial administrator by holding an emergency Commissioner’s Court meeting on Ju ne 13, 2015, to create a64

new judicial administrator position a t the salary level [Henry] knew

. . . the judiciary considered arbitrarily low to attract a suitable candidate. ” The district court’s general and specific findings support the ultimate conclusion that Judge Henry, in first purporting to terminate Quiroga’s employment, and then working to reduce her salary to “a sufficiently low” level “to continue to control the hiring process,” acted arbitrarily, capricious ly, and beyond his authority.
See G riffin , 266 S.W.3d at 195; Hooten , 863 S.W.2d at 528. And, as we noted in addressing Henry’s first issue, the evidence presented at the temporary injunction hearing supports the district court’s findings, which Henry does not challenge in his appeal . D eferring to the district court’s resolution of conflicting evidence, we
conclude that the evidence supports the district court’s issuance of the temporary injunction

. See INEOS Grp. Ltd. , 312 S.W.3d at 848; Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 211 ( abuse of discreti on does not occur where some evidence reasonably supports district court’s decision).
We note that the district court has not entered a ruling on a permanent injunction , but only on the temporary injunction. And the scope of our review is limited to the validity o f the temporary injunction

. See INEOS Grp. Ltd. , 312 S.W.3d
at 848. We further note that the district court, in its temporary injunction, did not purport to resolve the ultimate issues in this case. Rather, it simply ordered that the65

status q uo, that is, the “last, actual, peaceable noncontested status that preceded the controversy,” be maintained pending trial

. See I n re Newton , 146 S.W.3d at 651. Accordingly, to the extent that the district court relied upon its supervisory jurisdiction under article V, section 8, of the Texas Constitution in issuing its temporary injunction , we hold that it did not exceed that authority.
W e overrule Judge Henry’s third issue. Prior Orders In a portion of his fourth issue, J udge Henry argues that the temporary injunction is “void” because the underlying temporary restraining order and Judge Cox’s own prior orders are void.

“ ‘ A temporary restraining order is one entered as part of a motion for a temporary injunction, by which a party is restrained pending the hearing of the motion. A temporary injunction is one which operates until dissolved by an interlocutory order or until the final hearing. ’ ” Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez , 845 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex. 1992) (quoting B rines v. McIlhaney , 596 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. 1980)). Thus, a temporary restraining order restrains a party from acting only during the pendency of a motion for temporary injunction, i.e., until a full evidentiary hearing on the motion occurs. Id. ; see T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 680. The expiration of a temporary restraining order renders a challenge to it moot. See Hermann Hosp. v. Tran , 730 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1987,66

no writ). We do not review temporary orders that are moot because suc h a review would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’ n v. Jones , 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). Here, as Judge Henry himself points out in his brief, the subject of Judge Cox’s prior orders and the temporary restr aining order are subsumed in the temporary injunction. Thus, even were we to conclude that Cox’s prior orders and
the temporary restraining order were void, this would not void the temporary injunction because the district court’s issuance of the temporar y injunction was based on the evidence adduced at the temporary injunction hearing

. In support of his argument, Judge Henry relies on Ex parte Lesher , 651 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. 1983) (granting habeas relief after trial court held party in contempt for violating temporary restraining order , where trial court waived filing of bond), and Lodispoto v. Ruvolo , No. 05

- 12

- 01580

- CV, 2013 WL 3155000, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas June 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding trial court could not enforce void temporary injunction , where trial court did not set bond or trial date ). Here, however, the distr ict court did not issue the temporary injunction to enforce the temporary restraining order or Judge Cox’s prior orders; rather, the district court issued its temporary injunction after conducting its own evidentiary hearing.67

Accordingly, w e hold that Judge Henry’s challenges to the temporary restraining order and Judge Cox’s prior orders are moot. See Tran , 730 S.W.2d at
57

. Procedural Complaints In the remaining por tion of his fourth issue, Judge Henry argues that the temporary injunction is void because it does not set forth the “irreparable harm that Judge Cox will suffer absent its issuance” and the district clerk did not approve the
bond set by the district court

. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 683, 684. The procedural requirements of r ules 683 and 684 are mandatory. Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp ., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000). An order granting a temporary injunction that does not meet these requirements is “ subject to bei ng declared void and dissolved. ” Id

. Rule 683 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Ever y order granting an injunction

. . . shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail a nd not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or par ticipation with them who receive actual notice of the order

. . . . T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 683. The purpose of the rule is to “ ‘ adequately inform a party of what he is enjoined from doing and the reason why he is so enjoined. ’ ” In re Chaumette , 456 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Te x. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2015 , orig.68

proceeding) (emphasis omitted) (quoting El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc ., 356 S.W.3d 740, 744 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2011, no pet.) . A trial court must, in its order granting injunctive relief, set forth speci fic reasons why the court deems it proper to issue the writ to prevent injury to the applicant in the interim; that is, “the reasons why the court believes the applicant’s probable right will be endangered if the writ does not issue.” Id. Mere conclusory statements or recitals of harm are insufficient. Id

. at 305

– 06 (holding void temporary

- injunction order merely reciting : “The Court
finds

. . . Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury for which he has no legal remedy if this injunction is not granted”); see e.g ., El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc ., 356 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Tex . App.

— Dallas 2011, no pet.) ( conclusory statement plaintiff “will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no other adequate legal remedy” failed to explain probable, imminent, a nd irreparable harm absent injunction). Here, as discussed above, the district court’s order, which is nine pages in length, sets out in specific detail the reasons for its issuance. The order explains that Judge Henry has “interfered with” the “ability o f the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial functions” by “attempting to control the replacement of the
administrator for the cou rts in Galveston County.” And Judge Cox has

“ demonstrated irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not issued , ” in that Henry “after keeping the [court administrator] position vacant for over eleven months,” continues to “stymie the efforts of the judges to restore a judicial69

administrator.” And “if not enjoined, [Henry] will continue to deny administrativ e support for the Galveston County courts.” Because the order adequately sets out the reasons why the district court believed that Cox’s “probable rights [would] be endangered if the writ [did] not issue,” we hold that the distri ct court’s order complies with r

ule 683. See Chaumette , 456 S.W.3d at 305. Judge Henry next argues that the temporary injunction is void because the bond set by the district court was not approved by the district clerk. Rule 684 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: In the ord er granting any temporary restraining order or temporary injunction, the court shall fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant. Before the issuance of the temporary restraining order or temporary injunction the applicant shall execute and fi le with the clerk a bond to the adverse party, with two or more good and sufficient sureties, to be approved by the clerk , in the sum fixed by the judge, conditioned that the applicant will abide the decision which may be made in the cause, and that he wil l pay all sums of money and costs that may be adjudged against him if the restraining order or temporary injunction shall be dissolved in whole or in part.
T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 684 (emphasis added). The failure of an applicant to file such a bond
renders an i njunction void. Benavides Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Guerra , 681 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1984, writ refused n.r.e.). The record shows that the district clerk approved Judge Cox’s $100 deposit in
lieu of a bond that he file d in conjunction with th e temporary restraining order . The district court, in issuing the temporary injunction, stated:70

Bond for this temporary injunction is set at $100. Finding that [Cox] has previously posted bond in the amount of $100, such amount shall be posted as b ond for this injunction.

. . . On the approval of the bond, all writs are to issue. At the hearing, the district court explained: The bond

— there was previously a hundred

- dollar bond posted. The bond for the temporary injunction will be set at $100, and the prior bond posted will be accepted as that bond by the district clerk

. The district clerk will have to approve that bond, make sure that’s all done

. (Emphasis added.) Judge Henry complains that the clerk’s record does not show that the “district
clerk approve[d] the bond for the temporary injunction.” In support of his argument,
he relies on Ex parte Lesher , 651 S .W.2d at 736 ; MW Petroleum Corp. v. Exxon Corp ., No. 14

- 96

- 00040

- CV, 1997 WL 634159, at *7 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Oc t. 16, 1997, no pet.) ; and Diversified, Inc. v. Turner , 650 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th] 1983, no writ).
In Lesher , the court held that the district court erred in waiving the requiremen t of a bond prior to issuing a temporary restraining order. 651 S.W.2d at 736. Here,
the district court did not waive the posting of a bond. In Diversified , there was no bond on file whatsoever. 650 S.W.2d at 177. In Exxon , which seems to tangentially support Judge Cox’s opposing position, the court held that the district court did not err in ordering that only a single bond be filed to support an injunction in a case in which multiple parties had joined seeking the inju nction. 1997 WL 634159, at *7.
It explained that, “as a practical matter,” there was no need to secure separate bonds.71

Id. The court noted that the purpose of a bond is to protect the party against whom relief is granted for damages incurred as the result of the injunction. Id. And it “[could] not see how allowing a single party to provide this protection lessens its effect.” Id. As “ a legal matter, ” the court found no authority for the contention that a bond by a single plaintiff to secure an injunction for the benefit of several plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements of rule 684. Id.
As stated, the purpose of a temporary restraining order is to restrain a party from acting only during the pendency of a request for a temporary injunction, i.e., until a full evidentiary hearing on the temporary injunction occurs. Lopez , 845 S.W.2d at 809; see T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 680. Here, at the temporary injunction hearing , the purpose of the temporary restraining order having expired, the district court ordered that Judge Cox’s prior cash deposit made in lieu of a bond supporting the temporary restraining order be retained as the bond securing the temporary injunction. See Ex parte Coffee , 328 S.W.2d 283, 285, 291

– 92 ( Tex. 1959) ( trial court may authorize bond filed for temporary restraining order con tinued as bond supporting temporary injunction ). And th is is not a case in which a party sought
recovery on the bond given to support a temporary restraining order . We hold that the requisites of rule 684 have been satisfied. Accordingly, w e hold that the district court’s injunction order is not void on the grounds that it fails to comply with rules 683 and 684.72

We overrule Judge Henry’s fourth issue. Conclusion In sum, the district court, in entering the temporary injunction, found that Judge Henry had “intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston County judiciary ” and its ability “ to perform its judicial functions , ” and he would continue to do so. And the evidence presented at the temporary injunction hearing supports the district court’s findings. Thus, the district court had t he inherent power to enjoin Henry from further interfering with the independence of the Galveston County Judiciary and to order him to perform the actions necessary to reinstate Quiroga to her position as Galveston County DJA with her annual salary of $113 ,000, pending trial. The district court, in so enjoining Henry, also acted within it supervisory jurisdiction under article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution. Further, the district court’s temporary injunction has not become moot on appeal, the dis trict court has subject matter jurisdiction over Judge Cox’s claims, and the temporary injunction is
not void. We recognize that i t may seem somewhat counterintuitive to some members of the legislative and executive branches of our government that Texas courts have the inherent power to compel funding from them for essential court staff and facilities. And it may come as a surprise to some that the Texas Constitution73

specifically grants to Texas district courts supervisory jurisdiction over county commis sioners courts. However, as one of our sister court’s long ago noted, “[t]hat the judicial branch of government possesses inherent power to require the legislative and executive branches to provide essential staffing and facilities for it to properly
per form its judicial functions is no longer open to serious question .” Dist. Judges of 188th Judicial Dist. v. Cty. Judge and Comm’r s ’ Court for Gregg Cty. , 657 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (emphasis added). Indeed, as explained by the Texas Supreme Court, without such powers, “a legislative body could destroy the judiciary by refusing to adequately fund the courts.” Vondy , 620 S.W.2d at 110. Texas courts should of course exercise their inherent powers a nd their supervisory jurisdiction over commissioners courts sparingly and carefully. They should always be mindful that “t he process of allocating public resources is complex ” and “[b] oth state and local legislative bodies make difficult decisions when fa ced with competing priorities .” Mays , 755 S.W.2d at 82 . And the legislative and the executive branches should be mindful that “unl ike state agencies, courts cannot reduce services ”; “[t] he judiciary can only delay or postpone the disposition of justice .” Id

. T h us, th e judiciary simply canno t “ permit its efficiency and progress to be stymied ” by those who might “ misunderstand the constitutional role and function of the judiciary as a separate, independent and equal branch of74

government.” Id

. at 83. Alt hough “t he ‘ power of the purse ’ is a legislative power ,”

“ it is not an absolute power ” and “ may not be used to divest the court of its ability to function independently and effectively. ” Id

. Ultimately, as explained by the Texas Supreme Court:
A lthough the judiciary retains the inherent power to compel necessary funding, a spirit of mutual cooperation is unquestionably the people’s best guarantee of a constitutional government

. Rather than being a source of contention, the judiciary ’ s insistence on its own inherent powers can open an avenue for greater cooperation among the branches of government. Only by recognizing each other as equals can we effectively communicate

. Id

. (emphasis added). We affirm the order of the district court

. We dismiss all pending motions as
moot.

Terry Jennings Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Brown. Brown, J., concurring and dissenting

.