[Cite as State v. Bostick, 2013-Ohio-5784.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

ALVIN BOSTICK, SR. 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 26880 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 10 11 3115 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 31, 2013 

 

WHITMORE, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Alvin Bostick, appeals from his convictions in the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms. 

I 

{¶2} This Court set forth the facts underlying this matter in State v. Bostick, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 25853, 2012-Ohio-5048. After Bostick was convicted of felonious assault, two 

counts of domestic violence, and a repeat violent offender (“RVO”) specification, he appealed 

and argued that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense 

of aggravated assault. This Court agreed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. 

Bostick at ¶ 12-14. Upon remand, a second jury trial was conducted solely on the charge of 

felonious assault. The jury rejected the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault and found 

Bostick guilty of felonious assault. The court then held a hearing on Bostick’s RVO 
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specification and found him guilty of the specification. The court sentenced him to a total of 18 

years in prison. 

{¶3} Bostick now appeals and raises three assignments of error for our review. For 

ease of analysis, we consolidate two of the assignments of error. 

II 

Assignment of Error Number One

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY 

OVERRULING HIS FIRST OBJECTION TO THE STATE’S USE OF ITS 

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO EXCLUDE FEMALES AND NOT 

FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN BATSON V. KENTUCKY 

IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 

THE UNITED STATES CON-SITUTION (sic) AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I 

OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

Assignment of Error Number Two

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY 

OVERRULING HIS SECOND OBJECTION TO THE STATE’S USE OF ITS 

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO EXCLUDE FEMALES AND NOT 

FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN BATSON V. KENTUCKY 

IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 

THE UNITED STATES CON-SITUTION (sic) AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I 

OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

{¶4} In his first and second assignments of error, Bostick argues that the court erred by 

overruling his objections to the State’s exercise of its peremptory challenges. Specifically, he 

argues that the trial court failed to properly analyze the State’s proffered rationale for excusing 

several female jurors. We disagree. 

{¶5} “Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory 

challenges for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to [her] view concerning the 

outcome of the case to be tried, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge 

potential jurors solely on account of their race[.]” State v. Payne, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26655, 
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2013-Ohio-5230, ¶ 19, quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). “[G]ender, like 

race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.” J.E.B. v. Alabama ex 

rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). Accordingly, the three-part test that the United States 

Supreme Court devised in Batson to address race discrimination in jury selection has been 

extended to gender discrimination as well. Id. at 144-145. Accord State v. Gowdy, 88 Ohio 

St.3d 387, 392 (2000), fn. 2. 

{¶6} “As with race-based Batson claims, a [defendant] alleging gender discrimination 

must make a prima facie showing of intentional[]discrimination.” J.E.B. at 144. After the 

defendant does so, the prosecution must provide a gender-neutral explanation for the peremptory 

challenge. Id. at 144-145. The explanation “need not rise to the level of a ‘for cause’ challenge; 

rather, it merely must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and the proffered 

explanation may not be pretextual.” Id. at 145. See also Payne at ¶ 21, quoting Purkett v. Elem, 

514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (“[T]he prosecution does not have to provide ‘an explanation that is 

persuasive, or even plausible.’”). The court then “must determine whether, under all the relevant 

circumstances, the defendant has met his burden of proving purposeful [gender] discrimination.” 

Payne at ¶ 22, citing Batson at 96-97. 

{¶7} Bostick acknowledges that the prosecutor provided the court with gender-neutral 

explanations for the peremptory challenges she exercised, but argues that the court failed to 

analyze the gender-neutral justification that the prosecutor offered. Specifically, he argues that 

the court simply overruled his objections without “mak[ing] a deliberate decision whether 

purposeful discrimination [had] occurred.” 

{¶8} After a trial court receives a gender-neutral explanation from a prosecutor 

regarding the exercise of a peremptory challenge, the trial court: 
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must consider the persuasiveness and credibility of the justification offered by the 

prosecution. It must determine whether the neutral explanation offered by the 

prosecution is credible or is instead a pretext for unconstitutional discrimination. 

The trial court’s finding turns largely on evaluations of credibility and is given 

great deference. 

(Internal citations omitted.) Payne at ¶ 22. “A trial court’s finding that there was a lack of any 

discriminatory intent on behalf of the State will not be reversed on appeal unless it was clearly 

erroneous.” State v. Sykes, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25263, 2011-Ohio-293, ¶ 5. 

{¶9} The prosecutor in this case exercised her peremptory challenges to remove three 

women from the jury: Juror Number 5, Juror Number 9, and Juror Number 14. After the 

prosecutor sought to excuse the second woman, Bostick objected on the basis that the prosecutor 

was “systematically excluding women for no reason at all.” The prosecutor responded that she 

had challenged the first juror, Juror Number 9, because that juror previously had been on a jury 

she prosecuted and she could not remember if the trial had resulted in a not guilty verdict. The 

prosecutor further responded that she had challenged the second juror, Juror Number 14, because 

that juror “seemed very eager” toward defense counsel during voir dire and was “gushing all 

over him” when he asked questions of her. The judge then indicated that Bostick’s objection did 

not “resonate with [her]” and overruled it. Both Juror Number 9 and Juror Number 14 were 

excused. 

{¶10} Bostick objected again when the prosecutor sought to excuse Juror Number 5. 

The prosecutor responded that Juror Number 5 had said she was “a speech and language person,” 

and it was her general practice to challenge “anyone who teaches or anyone in that field because 

[she] [did not] want them judging how [she] talk[ed] at any time in [the] trial.” The judge then 

once again indicated that Bostick’s objection was not “resonating with [her].” When Bostick 

pressed the judge on the objection, the following exchange took place: 
5 

 

THE COURT: She gave – she gave [a reason]. And she may not want someone 

judging her voice which does, at times, get rather loud. 

[THE PROSECUTOR:] I learned that from someone who trained me, yes. 

* * * 

THE COURT: I’m telling you, [the objection is] not resonating with me, so 

overruled. 

[THE PROSECUTOR:] Just for the record, there would be one, two, three, four – 

five females on the jury left if this was followed through with this juror being 

struck. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It would [have been] eight. 

THE COURT: So we’ll note that. 

The court then excused Juror Number 5. 

{¶11} The record reflects that the prosecutor offered gender-neutral explanations for her 

peremptory challenges. Bostick has not argued that the record of the challenged juror’s answers 

during voir dire does not factually support the explanations the prosecutor offered. For example, 

Bostick does not argue that Juror Number 9 did not, in fact, state that she previously had been on 

a jury with the prosecutor. Instead, he argues that the court’s response to his objections was not 

sufficient to show that the court actually deliberated before ruling on whether purposeful 

discrimination had occurred. 

{¶12} Although the trial court’s responses to Bostick’s objections were brief, Bostick 

has not cited this Court to any law that requires a trial court to engage in an in-depth analysis on 

the record before overruling a Batson/J.E.B. challenge. See App.R. 16(A)(7). We have 

recognized that a “trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of [an] attorney during 

a Batson challenge.” State v. Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22231, 2005-Ohio-1275, ¶ 29. The 

prosecutor here gave specific, gender-neutral explanations for each of the peremptory challenges 

she made. See Payne, 2013-Ohio-5230, at ¶ 21. “Unlike challenges for cause, a peremptory 
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challenge may be exercised for any [gender]-neutral reason.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Moss, 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 24511, 2009-Ohio-3866, ¶ 12. The trial court had the opportunity to listen to 

the juror’s responses during voir dire and was in the best position to gauge the credibility of the 

prosecutor. See Jones at ¶ 29. Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the court 

failed to apply Batson/J.E.B. or that its ruling was clearly erroneous. Bostick’s first and second 

assignments of error are overruled. 

Assignment of Error Number Three

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND TO THE 

PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT’S RIGHT UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 

CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. 

CONSTITUTION BY ENTERING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND 

SENTENCE UPON HIM FOR BEING A REPEAT VIOLENT OFFENDER IN 

THE ABSENCE OF A FINDING BY THE JURY BEYOND A REASONABLE 

(sic) THAT THE APPELLANT HAD A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR AN 

OFFENSE OF VIOLENCE. 

{¶13} In his third assignment of error, Bostick argues that his constitutional rights were 

offended when the trial court, rather than the jury, found him guilty of his RVO specification. 

We disagree. 

{¶14} R.C. 2941.149(B) provides that “[t]he court shall determine the issue of whether 

an offender is a repeat violent offender.” If the court finds a defendant guilty of an RVO 

specification, R.C. 2929.14 authorizes, and in some cases mandates, the court to sentence the 

defendant to an additional definite prison term of one to ten years. R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a)-(b). 

This Court, relying upon a decision from the Ohio Supreme Court, has held that no constitutional 

violation occurs when a trial court, after “considering relevant information about the 

[defendant’s] prior conviction that is part of the judicial record,” finds the defendant guilty of an 

RVO specification and sentences him accordingly. State v. Dent, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23855, 

2009-Ohio-5153, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Hunter, 123 Ohio St.3d 164, 2009-Ohio-4147, paragraph 
7 

 

two of the syllabus. Bostick acknowledges that the Ohio Supreme Court has upheld a “trial 

court’s ability to find a defendant a repeat violent offender and enhance his penal sentence 

accordingly,” but argues that Hunter is no longer good law in light of the United States Supreme 

Court’s issuance of Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). 

{¶15} In Alleyne, the United State Supreme Court rejected a prior distinction it had 

made between mandatory minimum sentences and maximum sentences and held that “[a]ny fact 

that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury 

and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne at 2155, overruling Harris v. United States, 536 

U.S. 545 (2002). In doing so, the Court relied upon its rationale in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 

U.S. 466 (2000), a case in which the Court held that juries must decide facts that increase 

penalties beyond prescribed statutory maximums. Even in Apprendi, however, the Court 

specified that its holding did not encompass the fact of a prior conviction. Apprendi at 490 

(“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 

the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt.”) (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court has since continued to acknowledge that the fact 

of a prior conviction stands apart from other facts that may serve to increase a potential penalty. 

See Alleyne at 2168, quoting Apprendi at 490; Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 163 (2009). 

{¶16} The Ohio Supreme Court has yet to consider Alleyne’s impact on Ohio’s 

sentencing scheme. Our reading of Alleyne, however, leads us to conclude that a distinction 

continues to exist between the fact of a prior conviction and other facts that serve to increase 

criminal penalties. Under Hunter, “[a] trial court [does] not violate [a defendant’s] constitutional 

rights or decisions of [the Ohio Supreme Court] or the United States Supreme Court by 

designating him a repeat violent offender * * * and by imposing an enhanced penalty.” Hunter, 
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123 Ohio St.3d 164, 2009-Ohio-4147, at ¶ 40. “Unless and until the Ohio Supreme Court 

revisits and reverses its holding in [Hunter], we are bound to follow the law as it currently 

stands.” State v. Nieves, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009500, 2009-Ohio-6374, ¶ 52. 

Consequently, Bostick’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

III 

{¶17} Bostick’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 BETH WHITMORE 

 FOR THE COURT 
9 

 

CARR, P. J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

DAVID M. WATSON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.