alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### ARISON SHIPPING COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, Ted Arison, Harvey Levinson, Mr. Brain, Inc., a Florida Corporation and Georgian Bay Lines, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Appellants, v. Milton H. HATFIELD, Individually and Milton H. Hatfield, and James W. Kindelan and Others d/b/a Coopers and Lybrand, a Partnership f/k/a Lybrand, Ross Brothers & Company, Appellees.

No. 76-1632.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 22, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 21, 1977.

Law Offices of Howard W. Mazloff, Coral Gables, for appellants.

Paul & Thomson and Sanford L. Bohrer, Miami, for appellees.

Before HENDRY, C. J., and PEARSON and HUBBART, JJ.

HENDRY, Chief Judge.

Appellants/plaintiffs appeal from an order dismissing their amended complaint for malicious prosecution.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether a dismissal “for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter” in a prior civil lawsuit filed against the present plaintiffs is a bona fide termination of the lawsuit sufficient to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution. We hold that it is not.

There are six elements needed to be established by a plaintiff to sustain a cause of action based upon malicious prosecution: first, the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding; second, its legal causation by the present defendant against the present plaintiff; third, its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; fourth, absence of probable cause; fifth, presence of malice; and sixth, damage conforming to the legal standards resulting to the plaintiff. *Applestein v. Preston,*335 So.2d 604 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). Such a “bona fide termination” of the prior civil suit must be an *adjudication on the merits*in a judicial proceeding. *Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center, Inc.,*347 So.2d 721 (Fla.3d DCA 1977).

*540It is our opinion that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits and thus, not a bona fide termination of the prior civil suit. See *Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc.,*540 P.2d 535 (Wyo.1975); *Heaney*v. *Purdy,*29 N.Y.2d 157, 324 N.Y.S.2d 47, 272 N.E.2d 550 (1971); *Roy v. Landers,*467 S.W.2d 924 (Mo.1971); *Siegel v. City of Chicago,*127 Ill.App.2d 84, 261 N.E.2d 802 (1970).

Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### Thomas SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 77-1224.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 18, 1978.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Thomas G. Murray, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before HAVERFIELD, C. J., and PEARSON and NATHAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals an adjudication of guilt of the crimes of aggravated assault and the unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense. The judgment was entered on a jury verdict. The single point presented urges that the court erred in denying defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the State’s case and at the conclusion of all the evidence.

The burden of defendant’s argument is that there was no proof of criminal intent sufficient to sustain the conviction. Defendant confessed and later testified that he shot the victim during a domestic argument. His testimony was that he was only trying to scare the victim and that he shot her accidentally. Proof of intent may be supplied by the circumstances. *Skold v. State,*263 So.2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Cf. *DuPree*v. *State,*310 So.2d 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1


                                  CERTIFICATION
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002  (subsection (a) and
(b)  of  Section  1350,  Chapter  63 of  Title  18,  United  States  Code),  the
undersigned officer of The Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. (the "Company")  certifies
to his knowledge that:

     (1)  The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended
          September  6,  2003  (the  "Form  10-Q")  fully   complies   with  the
          requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act
          of 1934 (the "Act"); and

     (2)  The  information  contained in the Form 10-Q fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial conditions and results of operations
          of the Company as of the dates and for the periods  referred to in the
          Form 10-Q.


                                                   /s/ John T. Cahill
                                                       --------------
                                                       John T. Cahill
                                                       Chief Executive Officer
                                                       October 17, 2003

The foregoing  certification  (the  "Certification")  is being furnished  solely
pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002  (subsection (a) and
(b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code).

A signed original of the Certification has been provided to the Company and will
be retained  by the Company in  accordance  with Rule  12b-11(d)  of the Act and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PIERRE JULES, :

:

Petitioner : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-04-2429

:

v. : (Judge Jones)

:

DONALD MONICA, District Director, :

et al., :

:

Respondents :

ORDER

June 2, 2005

Petitioner, Pierre Jules (“Jules” or “Petitioner”), filed this Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“the Petition”) on November 8, 2004, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

He challenges an order of removal issued by an Immigration Judge, ordering Jules

removed from the United States to Haiti. (See Rec. Doc. 1). Presently pending before

the Court is the Respondents' Motion to Transfer the Petition to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“the Motion”), pursuant to the REAL ID Act

of 2005, H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. (2005). (See Rec. Doc. 8). 

For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted and the Petition will be

transferred to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Case 4:04-cv-02429-JEJ-DB Document 10 Filed 06/02/05 Page 1 of 3
2

Respondents contend that “Section 106 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 amended

section 242(a) of the INA to provide that the sole and exclusive means to review an

order of removal shall be by petition for review in the applicable court of appeals. 

H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. (2005)(enacted), Pub.L.No. 109-13, Div.B, 119 Stat. 231.” 

(See Rec. Doc. 9, at 3). The amendment became effective on May 11, 2005. Section

106(c) provides that “[i]f an alien's case, brought under section 2241 of title 28, United

States Code, and challenging a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or

exclusion, is pending in a district court on the date of the enactment of this division,

then the district court shall transfer the case (or the part of the case that challenges the

order of removal, deportation, or exclusion) to the court of appeals for the circuit in

which a petition for review could have been properly filed under section 242(b)(2) of

the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252), as amended by this section, or

under section 309(c)(4)(D) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note). The court of appeals shall treat the

transferred case as if it had been filed pursuant to a petition for review under section

242, except that subsection (b)(1) of such section shall not apply.” As Jules is

challenging a final administrative order of removal, Section 106(c) mandates transfer of

Case 4:04-cv-02429-JEJ-DB Document 10 Filed 06/02/05 Page 2 of 3
the matter to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Respondents' Motion to Transfer (doc. 8) is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to TRANSFER the

instant action to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit. 

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02429-JEJ-DB Document 10 Filed 06/02/05 Page 3 of 3
#### Morton A. CORN, Appellant, v. Irving HOFFMAN, Appellee.

No. 2284.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Jan. 14, 1970.

Carl Schuster, of Ruden, Barnett, Mc-Closky & Schuster, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Harvey Ford, Hollywood, for appellee.

McCAIN, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from final judgment for defendant in a suit for contribution. We reverse.

The parties stipulated these essentials: In 1961 an internal revenue lien was filed and assessed jointly against plaintiff, defendant and two other persons; the lien with accrued interest totaled $25,103.22; *189these four individuals had shared equally in the profits upon which the lien was based; in 1964 a suit between plaintiff and defendant over their businesses and affairs was disposed of by judgment which accepted an agreement between these parties, the material portion of which reads:

> “The object and purpose of this settlement is to amicably adjust all of the affairs between MORTON A. CORN and IRVING HOFFMAN and that upon transfer of these eight and one-half (8J4) shares by MORTON A. CORN to IRVING HOFFMAN, said parties are then quit, each from the other, in any of their principal objectives or in any of their business enterprises whatsoever.”;

the tax lien was paid and discharged in 1966 with plaintiff paying $1,681.76 over his one-quarter share and with defendant paying at least $1,681.76 less than his one-quarter share.

This action by plaintiff against defendant for contribution in the amount of $1,-681.76 followed. The stipulation established the sole issue to be the effect of the cited agreement. The judge found for defendant and dismissed the cause with prejudice.

Defendant, while candidly admitting that mutual release and res judicata are not applicable, contends that estoppel by judgment is. This assertion is grounded on the premise that the judgment in the earlier action by accepting the mutual release institutes an estoppel to any claim for contribution involving the tax lien. We cannot agree.

Estoppel by judgment is available as a defense in a suit to those matters actually litigated and determined in an earlier action. It is not available to those matters which might have been litigated but were not.1

Moreover, the party asserting this doctrine has the burden to show that the matters in dispute were previously litigated and determined.2

This record does not disclose the tax lien was in any way involved in the 1964 suit between these parties or that the court even considered it. If the lien was involved in that action, defendant failed to establish it and thereby failed to meet his burden.

Accordingly, the final judgment appealed from is reversed and this cause is hereby remanded for entry of judgment for plaintiff.

REED, J., concurs.

CROSS, C. J., concurs in conclusion.

1

. Gordon v. Gordon, Fla.1952, 59 So.2d 40.

2

. Hohweiler v. Hohweiler, Fla.App.1964, 167 So.2d 73.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1820 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 332
109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1820

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 6110 East 51st Place in Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the ``Dewey F. Bartlett 
                             Post Office''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 5, 2005

Mr. Inhofe (for himself and Mr. Coburn) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

                           December 16, 2005

               Reported by Ms. Collins, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 6110 East 51st Place in Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the ``Dewey F. Bartlett 
                             Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEWEY F. BARTLETT POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 6110 East 51st Place in Tulsa, Oklahoma, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Dewey F. Bartlett Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Dewey F. 
Bartlett Post Office''.
                                                       Calendar No. 332

109th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1820

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 6110 East 51st Place in Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the ``Dewey F. Bartlett 
                             Post Office''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           December 16, 2005

                       Reported without amendment
```
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

JERMALL JOHNSON,

Petitioner

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 5 WM 2017

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 28th day of March

, 2017, the Application for Leave to File

Original Process is GRANTED , and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED

.
```
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 176 (Thursday, September 11, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 47821]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24051]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health

National Institute of Child Health and Human Development; Notice 
of Meeting

    Pursuant to Pub. L. 92-463, notice is hereby given of the meeting 
of the Alternative Medicine Program Advisory Council on September 22-
23, 1997, Natcher Conference Center, 45 Center Drive, 9000 Rockville 
Pike, Conference Room D, Bethesda, Maryland 20892.
    The two-day meeting will be open to the public from 7:30 a.m. to 
4:30 p.m. on September 22 and 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. on September 23. 
Attendance by the public will be limited to space available. The 
purpose of the meeting will be to update and review the progress of the 
Office of Alternative Medicine and obtain Council's advise on research 
activities. Additional agenda items include: (1) Orientation and 
introduction of new members; (2) a presentation on ``Homeopathic 
Treatment of Traumatic Brain Injury''; (3) a presentation on 
``Protopine from Corydalis Ternata'' has Anti-cholinesterase and Anti-
Amnesic Activities; (4) discussion of the strategic plan; and (5) other 
activities of the Council.
    Ms. Mary Plummer, Committee Management Officer, Office of 
Alternative Medicine, 6100 Executive Boulevard, 6100 Building, Room 
5E01, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland 20892-7510, 
Area Code 301-594-7232, will provide a summary of the meeting and a 
roster of Council members as well as substantive program information. 
Individuals who plan to attend and need special assistance, such as 
sign language interpretation or other reasonable accommodations, should 
contact Ms. Plummer no later than September 15, 1997.

    Dated: September 4, 1997.
LaVerne Stringfield,
Committee Management Officer, NIH.
[FR Doc. 97-24051 Filed 9-10-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
```
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Michael R. Robinson, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer,certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Life TimeFitness, Inc.;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theCompany as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
     4. The Company’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and we have:
     a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;
     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Company’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as ofthe end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;and
     c) disclosed in this report any change in the Company’sinternal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) that occurred during the Company’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the Company’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case ofan annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likelyto materially affect, the Company’s internal control over financialreporting; and
     5. The Company’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the Company’s auditors and the audit committee of the Company’sboard of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
     a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reporting whichare reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and
     b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in theCompany’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: November 4, 2004                                      /s/ Michael R. Robinson   Michael R. Robinson   *Executive Vice President and Chief FinancialOfficer*
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION**





Certification
      Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a)
      and
      (b) of


Section
      1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)




Pursuant
      to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
      section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the
      undersigned officers of Innocom Technology Holdings, Inc., a Nevada corporation
      (the "Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge,
      that:




The
      Annual Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2008 (the "Form 10-Q")
      of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-Q
      fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
      of operations of the Company.




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      Innocom Technology Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by Innocom Technology
      Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
      staff upon request.





Date:
                May 14, 2008
            /s/
                Cheung Wai Hung, EddieCheung
                Wai Hung, Eddie , Chief Financial
                Officer
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-30181

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RONNY OSBIN CUMMINGS,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CR-45D

- - - - - - - - - -

December 18, 1996

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ronny Osbin Cummings appeals from his conviction and

sentence for carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. He

argues that his conviction is unconstitutional because it is

based upon an insufficient nexus with interstate commerce, that

he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the district

court’s assessment of a two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2B3.1(b)(1)(B) violated principles of double jeopardy, and that
No. 96-30181

- 2 -

the district court erred by increasing his offense level by two

pursuant to § 3A1.1 because his victim was unusually vulnerable. 

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. The

factual resume provides that the vehicle had moved in interstate

commerce, and Cummings does not challenge the sufficiency of the

factual resume on appeal. The district court did not err by

increasing Cummings’ offense level pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(1)(B). 

See United States v. Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722, 724-28 (5th Cir.

1996). Neither did the district court err by increasing

Cummings’ offense level by two pursuant to § 3A1.1 because his

victim was unusually vulnerable. See United States v. Kuban, 94

F.3d 971, 975 (5th Cir. 1996). Finally, the court declines to

address Cummings’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

although without prejudice to Cummings’ right to raise the issue

in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Accordingly, the judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.
#### Howard CRAFT, Mayor of the City of Lauderdale Lakes, Alfonso Gereffi, Jerome Cohan, Harry Kaufman, Louis Greenwald, Morris Klein and Lyman Allen as and constituting the City Commission of the City of Lauderdale Lakes, and Sam Kaplan, Milton Scheingarten, Jim Manes, John Communale and William Palladino, as and constituting the Planning and Zoning Board of the City of Lauderdale Lakes, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida ex rel. Richard S. KING and Patrici K. King, Appellees.

No. 77-1665.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 20, 1977.

James C. Brady, City Atty., Margate, for appellants.

No appearance for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The appellees by motion having confessed error the order appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

ALDERMAN, C. J., and DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.