IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON MOHAMED ABDELKADIR, Appellant,

v. SHORELINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent. DIVISION ONE No. 73920-4-1 (consol. with No. 74031-8-1) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: July 25, 2016 

### Dwyer, J. —Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 

### RCW, a party seekingjudicial review of a decision made by an Administrative 

### Law Judge (ALJ) mustcomplywith the service of process requirements setforth in RCW34.05.542. Ifsuch compliance is not shown, the case is not properly 

### before the superior court and must be dismissed. In this case, Mohamed Abdelkadirfiled an administrative appeal in the superior court. However, he did 

### notcomply with the service of process requirements set forth in the applicable statute. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's dismissal of hisadministrative appeal.
I 

### In this consolidated case, Abdelkadir brings two appeals to us stemming 

### from his dispute with the Shoreline School District (the District). 

### Abdelkadirfiled an appeal with the Office ofSuperintendent of PublicNo. 73920-4-1 (consol. with 74031-8-l)/2


### Instruction (OSPI) pursuantto former WAC 392-190-075 (2011).1 The administrative appeal was continued for more than one year due to Abdelkadir's delay. After Abdelkadir did not appear at a prehearing conference, the ALJ 

### issued a default order, dismissing the case without prejudice. Thereafter, Abdelkadir appealed the ALJ's decision to the KingCounty Superior Court 

### pursuantto the Administrative Procedure Act. The superior court dismissed Abdelkadir's administrative appeal with prejudice. The firstappeal is from this
order. 

### The second appeal is from the superiorcourt's imposition of CR 11 sanctions on Abdelkadir. His subsequent motion to reconsiderthe sanctions
ordered was denied.
II 

### Abdelkadirfirst contends that the superiorcourt improperly dismissed his 

### administrative appeal. This is so, he asserts, bothbecause he properly perfected service and because such service was timely. He is wrong. The relevant statute provides: 

### Subject to other requirements of this chapteror ofanother statute: 

### (1) Apetition forjudicial review of a rule may be filed at any time, except as limited by RCW 34.05.375. 

### (2)Apetition for judicialreview of an ordershall be filed with the court and served on the agency, the office ofthe attorney 

### general, and allparties ofrecord within thirtydays afterservice of the final order. 1The OSPI's procedure for addressing such appeals is governed by variousprovisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,chapter 34.05 RCW. See former WAC 392-190-075(1) (2011); former WAC 392-190-079 (2011).No. 73920-4-1 (consol. with 74031-8-1)73

(3) A petition forjudicial review of agency action otherthan the adoption of a rule or the entry of an order is not timely unless filed with the court and served on the agency, the office of the attorney general, and all other parties of record within thirty days after the agency action, but the time is extended during any period that the petitioner did not know and was under no duty to discover or could not reasonably have discovered that the agency had taken the action or that the agency action had a sufficient effect to confer standing upon the petitioner to obtainjudicial review under this chapter. (4) Service ofthe petition on the agency shall be by delivery ofa copy ofthe petition to the office ofthe director, orotherchief administrative officerorchairperson ofthe agency, at the principal office ofthe agency. Service of a copy by mail upon the other parties ofrecord and the office ofthe attorney general shall be deemed complete upon deposit inthe United States mail, as evidenced by the postmark. (5) Failure to timely serve a petition on the office ofthe 

### attorney general is not grounds for dismissal ofthe petition. (6) For purposes of this section, service upon the attorney of record of any agency or party ofrecord constitutes service upon the agency or party of record. RCW 34.05.542 (emphasis added). 

### The superior court's dismissal ofAbdelkadir's administrative appeal was 

### proper both because he failed to properly perfect service and because such service was not perfected in a timely manner. The relevant statute required Abdelkadirto file and personally serve, "by 

### delivery," the statutorily-designated agent of the organization.2 RCW

2In his brief, Abdelkadir asserts both that "[t]he [Administrative Procedure Act] does not require personal service pursuantto RCW 34.04.542(4)" and that he was not required to serve OSPI because "OSPI was not identified as a party to the hearing." Br. ofAppellant at 9. He is wrong. -3-No. 73920-4-1 (consol. with 74031-8-l)/4 34.05.010(19); see, e^, Diehl v. W. Wash. Growth Mqmt. Hearings Bd., 153 Wn.2d 207, 217, 103 P.3d 193 (2004) (finding that the appellant "was required to file and serve his petition on the agency at its principal office"); Sprint Spectrum, 

### LP v. Dep't ofRevenue, 156 Wn. App. 949, 963, 235 P.3d 849 (2010) (dismissal 

### properwhere statutorily-designated agent not personally served). Additionally, Abdelkadirwas required to serve, by mail, if he chose, both the office ofthe 

### attorney general and "the other parties of record." RCW34.05.542(4). In fact, Abdelkadir sent the petition for review by certified mail to OSPI's Equity and Civil 

### Rights Office, the District's superintendent, and the superior courtclerk. None of those to whom the mailingwas addressed were the statutorily-designated agent of OSPI. Moreover, the service on OSPI was performed by mail, not by personal 

### delivery as mandated by statute. Finally, none ofthose to whom the mailing was addressed was the office of the attorney general, despite the statute's mandate. The relevant statute also required Abdelkadir to complete service within 

### 30 days after service of the final order being appealed. In this case, that date
was December 1, 2014.3 See RCW 34.05.542(2). Abdelkadir asserts that the 

### petition could have been served onOSPI through December7,2014.4 In response, the District correctly states thatAbdelkadir did not assign error to the The relevant statute clearly differentiates between service on the agency "bydelivery" and service "by mail" upon the office of the attorney general and all other parties ofrecord. RCW 34.04.542(4). Where, as here, the legislaturedictates that service to the agency be "by delivery

... at the principal office of the agency," the method ofdelivery must be by personal service. Moreover, because OSPI's decision regarding his complaintwith the District was the decision appealed to the superior court, service on OSPI was required. 3The ALJ's final order was entered on October 31, 2014. Thus, the superior court found thatAbdelkadirhad 30 days from thisdate—that is, until December 1,2014—to perfectservice of the petition. 4The superior court found that OSPI received the petition on December 2, 2014.No. 73920-4-1 (consol. with 74031-8-l)/5 superior court's finding offact on this issue. As a result, the District urges us to consider this finding a verity on appeal. We do not need to do so. Whether we accept December 1 or December 7 as the applicable deadline, it is clearthat 

### Abdelkadir did not comply withthe statutorily-mandated service requirements by
either date. For each ofthese reasons, the superior court's dismissal ofthe 

### administrative appeal was proper. Skagit Surveyors &Eng'rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wn.2d 542, 556, 958 P.2d 962 (1998); Union Bav Pres. Coal,

v. Cosmos Dev. &Admin. Corp., 127 Wn.2d 614, 620, 902 P.2d 1247 (1995); Tech. Emps. Ass'n v. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 105 Wn. App. 434, 438, 20 P.3d 472 (2001).
Ill 

### Abdelkadir next contends that the superior court improperly imposed CR 

### 11 sanctions on him. In response, the Districturges us not to consider 

### Abdelkadir's argumentforthree reasons. First, he did notassign error to the 

### superior court's order wherein it imposed the sanctions. RAP 10.3(a)(4); Valente v. Bailey, 74 Wn.2d 857, 858, 447 P.2d 589 (1968); Escude v. King County Pub. 

### Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 117 Wn. App. 183, 190 n.4, 69 P.3d 895 (2003). Second, he 

### fails to provide sufficient argument, citations to legal authority, or citations to the record to support his assertion. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Valente, 74 Wn.2d at 858; Escude, 117 Wn. App. at 190 n.4. Third, his passing treatment of the sanctions order is insufficient to warrant appellate review. West v. Thurston County, 168No. 73920-4-1 (consol. with 74031-8-l)/6 Wn. App. 162, 187, 275 P.3d 1200 (2012). Each ofthe District's contentions has merit. Accordingly, we decline to address or disturb the court's CR 11 order.
IV Finally, the District requests that we impose sanctions on Abdelkadirfor filing a frivolous appeal. See RAP 18.9(a). "Anappeal is considered frivolous when itpresents no debatable issues and is so devoid of merit that there is no 

### possibility ofreversal." Griffin v. Draper, 32 Wn. App. 611, 616, 649 P.2d 123 (1982); Escude, 117 Wn. App. at 194-95. Here, there is no debatable issue 

### regarding Abdelkadir's failure to effect proper service pursuantto RCW 34.05.542. Nor does Abdelkadir present a debatable issue on the merits ofthe 

### superior court's decision to impose CR 11 sanctions on him. Accordingly, 

### Abdelkadir's appeal isfrivolous. An award ofattorney fees will be made in favor of the District. Upon proper application, a commissionerof our court will determine the appropriate amount ofthe award.
Affirmed.

We concur: 

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