### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 18, 200 3 S es sio n
SAMUEL DAVID L AND v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty

No. 901-262 Tim othy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2003- 00468-CCA -R3-P C - F iled March 16, 2004

Pe tit ion e r, Sa mue l Da

vid L and , a

pp e a ls fr om the tr ia l c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of his pe tit ion for postconviction re l i ef

. Petitioner was convic ted by a jury for f elony evadingarr est and driving on a revoke d license, se cond off ense, a mi s d e me a

n o r. F or his felony

conviction, Petitioner was se ntence d
as a c are er of

fende r t o twelve y ear s in confine ment. Petitioner was sentenced to 11 months and 29 da y s fo r the mis de me ano r c on vic tio n. Th e se nte nc e s we re or de re d to be se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y wi th
eac h other, but conse cutive to a six-y ear sentenc e that Petitioner was a lrea dy servingas a r esult of
a pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n in a prio r ca se

. Th is Court a ff ir me d Pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio ns on dir e c t a pp e a l. State v. Land , 34 S.W .3d 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Following an evide ntiary hear ing, the trial court de nied post-conviction re lief. Having r eviewe d the re cord on a ppeal, the a

pplicable law , and the brief s of the par

ties, we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P .J ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., joined.

J . Timothy

Street, F ranklin, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Samuel David L and.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; P. Ro bin

Di xon, Jr., As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ronald L . Davis, District Attorney Gene ra l ; Mary

Kathar ine White, Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

A summary of the proce eding s prior to these post-convic tion procee dings, a s g leane d from the re c o r d

o na p p e a l i nt h i s c a s e , i s n e c e s s ar y

. O nJan u ar

y 2 6 , 1 9 9 3 , P e t i t i o n e r

p l e d g u i l t y to multipl e counts of a g g rav at ed burg lary and thef t. On Marc h 26, 1993, Petitioner rec eived
c on secu ti ve se nte nc e s f

or tho se c on vic tio ns of

six and fo ur y e ars to b e se rv e d in

Com mun ity Correc tions. No direct appe al was taken.-2-

On J une 18, 1993, a pr obation violation warra nt was i s s u ed

. On September 13, 1993, Petitioner’s Communit y

Correc tions sentenc e was revoke d and he was orde red to ser ve his orig inal six- y e ar s e nte nc e in t

he De pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio n, Spe c ia l A lte rn a tiv e I nc arc e ra tio n U nit Pr og ra m, or “boot c amp,” a

nd his origina l four-y ear

sentenc e wa s suspended a n d o rd er ed t o be ser

ved on
su pe rv ise d p ro batio n f

oll ow ing the six- y e ar se nte nc e

. Pe tit ion e r did no t a pp e a l th e re vo c a tio n o f h is Communi ty

Correc tions sentence. On September

23, 1998, following Petitioner’s arr est for the char g es that are the subject of this appeal, a

probation violation wa

rra nt w as issued. On Marc h 10, 1999, Petitioner was c onvicted by a jur y of fe lony e va din g arr e st and dr ivi ng on a re vo ke d li c e ns e , s e c on d o ff e ns e , th e c ha

rg e s in this case. On A

pril 23, 1999, Petiti oner w as sentenc ed as a car eer offe nder to twelve y ear s for the felony conviction and eleve n months a nd twenty -nine da

y s for the misdemea

nor convic tion, to be
serve d concur

rently . Those sente nces w ere order ed to be served consecutively with the sentenc es for Petitioner’s J an u ar y

26, 1993, convictions. On the same day Petitioner was sente nced f or the convictions in this ca se, he pled “true ” to the probation violation. A transcr ipt f rom the combined sentenc ing hear ing and probation revoc ation hear ing is not par t of the re cord be fore us. Petiti oner appea led his March 10, 1999, c onvictions, and this Court affirmed. State v. Land , 34 S.W .3d 516 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) . The supre me cour t denied applica

tio n for permission to appeal on Dec ember

11, 2000.

On September 7, 2001, Petitioner f iled a pr o s e petition for post-c onviction relief, e ntitled “Nunc Pro Tunc Motion for Sentenc e Modification and Alternatively Petition For Post-Convi ction Relief,” r equesting a sentence modification beca use, P etitioner arg ued, the total ef fec tive sentenc e resul t ing f

rom the judg ments of April 23, 1999, wa s eig hteen y ear s, but the Depa rtment of Cor re c tio n h a d d e te rm ine d h is s e nte nc e to be tw e nty -t wo y e ars . Pe tit ion e r a lso argue d th a t hi s counsel wa s ineffe ctive for failing to inform him of his rig ht to appea l his classification as a car eer offe nder, pur suant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-108(5) (d).

I n a n o rd e r d a te d O c tob e r 1 2, 20 01 , th e tr ia l c ourt ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s:
“To the e x tent that this P etition is an at t ac k on the convictions re ceive d on J anuar y 26, 1993, pursuant to the Post-Conviction P roce du re Act found at Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 40-30- 201, the Petition is untimely .”

* * * *

“ To the e xtent th e Pe tit ion is a re qu e st f or re du c tio n o f s e nte nc e , . . . the Cou rt is without authority

to gr ant such a

reque st.”

* * * *-3-

“To the e x tent that this Petition is an attack on the convictions re ceive d on Marc h 10, 1999, . . . the Petition presents a c olorable cl ai m for post-c onviction relief (ef fec tive assistance of counse l).
By the orde r dated October 12, 2001, the trial court appointed counse l and orde red Petitioner to file an amended pe tition for post-conviction relief

. On November 8, 2001, Petitioner filed a pr o se a me nd e d pe tit ion fo r po st- c on vic tio n re lie f, a lle g ing , a mon g oth e r g ro un ds , th a t: ( 1) tr ia l c ouns e l, Er ic Da vis , r e fu se d h is r e qu e st t o f ile a mot ion fo r re c us a l of the tr ia l ju dg e ; and (2 ) t ri a l c ouns e l “ did not find out that [ Petitioner] was techn i ca l l y o ff of probation at the time of [his] arr est [for the char g es in this case].”
On November 28, 2001, P etitioner filed a pr o s e “M o t i o nfo r R ec u s al , ” r eq u es t i n g t h at J u d ge Timothy Easter rec use himself fr om Petiti oner’ s case . After being appointed counse l, Petiti oner subsequently

filed anothe r “Motion to Recuse” and an a mended petition f

or post-conviction re lief. I n an orde r date d J uly

12, 2002, the trial cour t denied the motion, finding that “this Court’s involvement as an A ssistant District Attorney involved matters fo r which the Petitioner wa s convicted in January

1993.” The trial court f ou n d t h at t h e convictions that wer e the ba sis for Petitioner’s claims in the post-conviction petition occur red ove r six y ear s after the matter in which J udg e Ea ster wa s involved as an Assistant District Attorney

. Petitioner’s second a

mended petition f

or post-conviction relief alleg es that his counsel, who
re pr e se nte d Pe tit ion e r a

t th e tr ia l and

se nte nc ing , at th e pr ob a tio n r e vo c a tio n h e ari ng , a nd on a pp e a l, was inef fec tive for: (1) failing to file a motion to recuse the trial judg e; and (2) advising Petitioner to plead true to the probation violation.

P os t- Co nvi c ti on H e ar ing

An e vid e nti ary

he ari ngwa s c on du c te d o n N ov e mbe r 8 , 200 2. At the he ari ng , Ro be rt a Ander son, of the De partment of Corr ection, testi fied that Petitioner was ser ving a twenty -two y ear sentenc e. On Ma

rch 26, 1993, Petitioner r ece ived a total e ffe ctive sentenc e of ten y ear s to be serve d on Communi ty

Correc tions. On J une 18, 1993, a pr obation violatio n wa rr an t wa s issued. On September 13, 1993, Petit i o n er ’s Communit y Correc tions sentence w as re voked. The trial court order ed Petitioner to se rve his or igina l six-y ear sentenc e in c onfinement and his orig inal four- y ear sentenc e to be se rved on pr obation. P eti tioner re ceive d 186 day s of pre trial jail cre dit; 48 day s of pretria l b ehavior cre dit; and 84 day s of cr edit for time ser ved on Community

Correc tions. On Fe bruar y 10, 1994, Petitioner was re lease d on probation. Camille Chester, a pr obation office r, issued the wa rra nt for violation o f p robation on September 23, 1998. M s

. C h es ter testified that Petiti oner’ s TOMAS repor t orig inally

indicated a sentenc e ef

fec tive date of

October 31, 1992.

At the post-conviction hear ing, testimony was elicited from Ms. A nderson a nd Ms. Chester
conce rning Pet i t i o n er ’s s entenc es for prior convic tions in cases unre lated to the ca se that wa s the-4-

su bje c t of the po st- c on vic tio n pe tit ion . F oll ow ingan e xami natio n o f M s. An de rs on by the tr ia l c ourt , the cour t stated:

I ’m c on sid e ri ng[thi s is su e ] onl y for the purp os e of wh e the r o r n ot i t su

pp or ts [P etitioner’s] claim that Mr. Davis was somehow ineffe ctive for not having g one thr ou g h – Ig ue ss a nd do ne wh a t we ’r e tr

y ing to d o h e re tod ay

and un tie thi s k

no t.

Eric Da vis testified that he represe nted Petitioner at the trial on the c harg es of f elony evading
arr est and drivingon a re voked license, s ec o n d o ffe nse, the c harg es in this case, a nd in the direc t appea l from those convictions. Mr. Davis testified that he for merly worke d as an A ssistant District Attor ne y . H e te sti fi e d th a t Pe tit ion e r h a d “ c omp ro mis e d” a pp ro xima te ly tw e nty

c a se s a s a confide ntial informant for the DrugTask F orce . Mr. Davis testified that J udg e Timothy Easter , who pr e sid e d o ve r P e tit ion er’s tr ial, se nte nc ing , a nd po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s in thi s c a se , a lso former ly wo rk ed as an A ssistant District Attorney . J udg e Ea ster prose cuted a case in which Pe tit ion e r a

nd his br oth e r we re c o- de fe nd ants

. Pr ior to the tr ia l in thi s c a se , Pe tit ion e r e xpre sse d to Mr . D a vis that he did no t want Judg e Ea ste r t o p re sid e ov e r h is c a se be c a us e ano the r j ud g e wo uld be more lenient. Mr. Da

vis did not file a motion to recuse Judge Easter beca us e h e b el i eved that
su c h a mot ion , ba se d on the fa c t that ano the r jud g e ha d a re pu ta tio n f

or le nie nc y , w ou ld b e fr ivo lou s.
Mr. Davis filed a m o tion to suppress a statement made by Petitioner to Detec tive Richard Br own. Mr. Da

vis also filed a motion for mistrial a fter the trial cour t made a c omment to the jury that defe nse counse l had filed late notices, i ndicating that Def endant wa s unprepa

red. A t trial, the trial court a dmitted into evidence a statement made b y P et i t i oner’ s mother to Trooper Cash, over de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s obj ect io n, a s an e xcit e d u tte ra nc e . O n a

pp e a l, t he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls conclude d that the statement, a lthough a n excited utteranc e, was admitted in error beca use Ms. L and did not have per sonal knowledg e of the matter of w hich she spoke. T he Court conc luded, howeve r, that th e state me nt’ s a dmi ssi on wa s h arm le ss er

ro r. Mr . Davis te sti fi e d at th e he ari ngthat “ it c ou ld appea r” that Petiti oner w as denie d a fa ir trial.

Mr. Davis also repr esente d Petitioner at t he probation revoc ation hear ing. Mr. Davis advised Petitioner to plead true be cause he had alrea dy been c onvicted of the offe nses that wer e the ba sis of the pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n. Th e pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n w arr ant a lle g e d a six- y e ar se nte nc e , b ut, Mr . D a vis testified, Petitioner was actua lly serving a ten-y ear sentenc e. The order revok i n g P eti tioner’s Com mun ity

Cor re c tions sent e nc e or de re d th a t Pe tit ion e r s e rv e the or ig ina l si x-y e ar s e nte nc e in confine me n t an d r e c o mm e n d e d “ b o o t c a mp , ” f o ll o w e d b y th e o r ig in a l f o u r
- y e ar s e n te n c e to be
su pe rv ise d o n p ro batio n. Mr . D a vis te sti fi e d that the pr ob a tio n vio la tio n wa rr ant wa s iss ue d w ith in Petitioner’s probationar

y period.

I n its written order f

iled afte r the c onclusion of the post-convic tion hearing , t h e t ri al cour t addre ssed four g rounds for post-c onviction relief:

The petitioner claims that [counsel] was ineffe ctive by (1) allowing him to plea d tr ue to a pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n w arr ant wh ic h re su lte d in con se c uti ve se nte nc ingto-5-

the ca se under

attack, ( 2) allowing t h e petiti oner to plea d true to the proba tion violation warra

nt when the pe titioner had a me ritorious defe nse to the war rant, (3) failing to f

ile a motion to rec use the trial judg e in violation of the petitioner’ s rig ht of the S ix th Amendment of the United States Constit ution and Article I , Section 9, of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion , a nd (4 ) w a s it

ob lig a tor y on the Tr ia l Co ur

t to
su a s po nte raise the issue of recusal, and if so, what evide nce is ther e to support the alleg ation that the Trial Judge ’s impartiality can r easona

bly be questioned.

The trial c ourt stated, “[t] he four issues ra ised by the petitioner at the evidentiar y hear ing a re iss ue s w hic h thi s Court fi nd s to be a lle g a tio ns su pp or tin g his c la im o f t

he ine ff e c tiv e ne ss o f D a vis
a s th e pe tit ion e r’ s tria l and a pp e lla nt [sic ] a tto rn e y .” I n o the r w or ds , th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a dd re ss the par ticular issue of w hether

Petitioner’s sentenc e ac tually expir ed p ri o r to the initiation of the
revoc ation proce eding s. T h e co u rt ref err ed to its order dated Octobe r 12, 2001, which dismissed Petitioner’s attac k on the prior convictions as unt imely

. The trial c ourt furthe r found that, pur suant to Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-30-204(c ), a pe tition for po s t -c onviction relief sha ll be limit ed to the asse rtion o f cl ai ms for re lief fr om the judgme nt(s) ente red in a single trial or proce eding . The trial c ourt noted, howe ver, that wh i le Petitioner’s cha lleng e to the probation
revoc ation war

rant from a prior c ase w as not a prope r g round for relief under the Post-Convi ction Procedur e Ac t, it “may

constitute g rounds for the g ranting of a w rit of habe as cor pus.”

The trial court found that the alleg ation that counsel was ineffe ctive for a dvising Petitioner to ple a d tr

ue to the pr ob a tio n vio la tio n wa s no t an a pp ro pr ia te g ro un d fo r re lie f un de r t he PostCon vic tio n Pr oc e dure Ac t. T he c ourt state d in its or de r: [E]ve n if thi s Court be lie ve d that th e se c la ims we re pr op e rl y be fo re the Cou

rt , th is Court finds that alleg ations of ineff ective assistance of

counsel at a probation violation hearingare not a ppropriate g rounds for r elief unde r the Post-Conviction Act in th is c a s e

. T h e Co u rt f in d s th a t D a v is ’ p e r f

o r ma n c e a s c o u n sel for the Petitioner at his probation revocation hearing was a perf ormanc e that in no way violated any constitutionally g uara nteed rig hts a ffor ded Petitioner. The Petitioner ha s f a ile d to sh ow by c le ar and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that Da vis ’ p e rf or manc e in repr esenting the Petitioner at th e re v o cation hearing on April 23, 1999, was not within the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s. Additionally , the trial cour t found t hat trial counse l was not ineff ective f or fa iling to file a mot ion to re c us e

. Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d that Mr

. Da vis , “ an e xpe ri e nc e d tr ia l a tto rn e y of near ly thirteen y ear s at t he ti me of this trial, six of which as an assistant district attorney , did file motions for discove ry , to suppr ess, for mistrial, f or new trial and proper ly perf ecte d an appe al to the Court of Criminal Appea ls on behalf of the Petitioner.” The trial court a lso found t h at the evidenc e prese nted at the post-c onviction hear ing e stablished that J udg e Easter , while working as an A ssistant District Attorney , prosec uted a c ase a g ai n st Petit ioner’s br other, Chris L and, and that the prosec ution
occur red six y ear s prior to the trial in this case.-6-

The trial c ourt found that the f act that it made r

ulings a dverse to Petit ioner did not requir e rec usal. The c ourt noted that its prior ruling s involving the motion to suppress, the admission of he ars ay e vid e nc e , and

the mot ion

fo r m istri a l ha d b e e n r e vie we d b y the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls. The c ourt conc luded that the re cord did not establish any prejudice or bias as a r esult of the cour t’s presiding over Petitioner’ s trial.

Issues Pr esente d f

or Re view

I n this appea l from the trial c ourt’s denia l of post-conviction re lief, Petitioner cha lleng es: (1) the va lid ity of the pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n w arr ant i ssu e d o n Se pte mbe r 2 3, 19 98 ; ( 2) the e ff e c tiv e ne ss of trial counse l in advising Petitioner to plead tr u e to the probation violation warrant; (3) the eff ectivene ss of t ri al counsel in failing to file a motion to recuse the tr ial judge ; and (4) the trial court’s f ailure to su a s

po nteraise the issue of re cusal.

P r oba ti on V iol at ion Wa r r ant

The fir st issue presente d for our revie w is whether Petitioner’s sentenc e should be re duced beca use, P etitioner allege s, the S eptember 23, 1998, probation vi olation war rant was issued afte r the expiration of the underlying se ntence s. The convic tions that are the bas is of the re vocation pr oc e e din g that Pe tit ion e r c ha lle ng e s are fr om p ri or un re la te d c a se s, and

a s th e S tate c or

re c tly observe s , ar e n o t t

h e s u b je c t o f r e v ie w in

th is c a s e

. T h e r e c o r d

d o e s n o t i n d ic a te th a t P etitioner appea led his convictions or sentenc es i n those case s. Petitioner also did not pursue a dir ect a ppeal fr o m t h e r ev o ca t i o n h ea ri n g. “A gro u n d fo r re l i ef i s wa i v ed i f th e pe t i t i o n er p er s o n al l y

o r t h ro u gh an attorne y

failed to pre sent it for dete rmination in any proce eding befor e a cour t of compete nt j u ri s d i ct i o n i n wh i ch t h e gro u n d co u l d h av e be en p re s en t ed

. ” T en n

. C o d e An n

. § 4 0 -3 0 -1 0 6 (g) (2003). More over, this Court rec ently held in Y ou ng v . S tat e , 1 01 S .W .3 d 43 0, 43 1 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p

. 2 0 0 2 ) , th a t th e Po s t- Co n v ic ti o n Pr o c e d u r e A c t d o e s n o t p r o v id e a c a u s e o f a c ti o nfor a
c oll a te ra l a tta c k o n a

pr ob a tio n r e vocat io n proc e e din g . Pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.

Ineff ect ive Assistance of Counsel Petitioner argues that trial counse l was ineff ective f or allowing Petitioner to plead true to the September 23, 1998, pr obation violation warra nt.

Th e tr ia l ju dg e ' s f

ind ing s of fa c t on

po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng s are c on c lus ive on a pp e a l un le ss the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise

. State v. Burns , 6 S.W. 3d 45 3, 46 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . O n a pp e a l, this Court may not rew eig h or re evaluate the evide nce, nor substitut e its infere nces f or those dra

wn by the trial judg e. Sta te v . H on e y c utt , 54 S.W .3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2001)

. Questions conce rning the
cre dibilit y of wit nesses and the weight and value to be given to their t estimony are resolved by the trial court, not this Court. Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 461. The burden of establi s h i n g t h at t h e evidence preponde rate s otherwise is on petitioner. He nle yv . S tat e , 960 S.W .2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997) . The-7-

t r i a l c o u rt ’ s c o n c l u s i o n s o f l aw , h o w e v e r , ar e r e v i e w e d u n d e ra p u r e l y de novo standard w ith no presumption of cor

rec tness. Fi e lds v . S

tat e , 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)

.
We r eview a claim of inef fec tive assistance of counse l under the standa rds of Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930 (Tenn. 1975) , and Strickland v. W ashington , 4 6 6 U

. S

. 6 6 8 , 1 0 4 S

. C t

. 2 0 5 2 , 8 0 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The petitioner has the burden to pr ove that (1) the a ttorney ’s per formanc e wa s defic ient, and (2) the defic ient perf ormanc e resulted in prejudice to the defe ndant so as to depr ive him of a fa ir trial. Strickland , 46 6 U. S. a t 68 7, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 20 64 ; Go ad v . S tat e , 938 S.W .2d 363, 36 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Bu tle r v . S tat e , 789 S.W .2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990). The f ailure to prove either de fi c ie nc y

or pr e jud ic e jus tif

ie s d e nia l of re lie f; the re fo re , th e c ourt ne e d n ot a dd

re ss t he c omp on e nts in a ny particula r orde r or e ven addr ess both if one is insufficie nt. Goad , 938 S.W .2d at 370. I n order to establish prejudice , the petitioner must establish a “re asonable probability that, but for counse l’s
un pr of e ssi on a l e rr or s, the re su lt o f t he pr oc e e din g wo uld

have be e n d if

fe re nt. A r e a so na

ble probability is a probability sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

The State a

rg ues that this Court’s holding in Y ou ng v . S tat e do e s n ot a llo w Pe tit ion e r t o collater ally

attack the validity of a r evocation procee ding. We a g ree . As previously stated, in Y

oung v . S tat e , th is C ourt

he ld t hat a pe tit ion e r i n a

po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g ma y no t a tta c k c oll a te ra lly any alleg ed constitutional de privation that occur red at a pr obation revoc ation hear ing. 101 S.W.3d at 433.

Fur

thermore , Petitioner’s claim would be time-ba rre d. A petitio n er h as one y ear from the date the judgme nt be came final in w hich to timely file a pe tition for post-conviction relief . Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 40 -3 0- 10 2( a ) (2 00 3)

. Pe tit ion e r ple d tr ue to the pr ob a tio n r e vo c a tio n w arr ant o n Apr il 23 , 1 99 9, the same da

y he wa s se nte nc e d in thi s c a se

. No a pp e a l wa s ta

ke n. Pe tit ion e r f

ile d th e fi rs t petition for pos t-conviction relief on September 7, 2001, afte r the statute of limit ations had expired. Petitioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.

Rec usal Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffe ctive for failing to se ek rec usal of the trial judg e. Petitioner al s o ar gues that the trial c ourt should have su a s po ntere c us e d it se lf

fr om t he se proce eding s. Petiti oner ha s waived the latter issue by not asserting this iss ue on dire ct appe al. I f a petitioner for p o s t -c o n v i ct ion relief f ails to present a

g round for

relief to a cour

t of compete nt jurisdiction, the pe titioner has waive d that g round for relief

. See T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4 0 -3 0 -1 0 6 (g) (2003). More over, if a

petitioner’s c ounsel dec ides not to pursue an issue r eg ardingjudicial bias on direc t a ppeal, the petitioner is bound by that decision. State v. Be nson , 973 S.W .2d 202, 207 (Tenn. 1998).

The waiver

of the substantive issue of w hether the trial cour

t should have su a s

po nterec used itself, howeve r, does not pre clude a ddressing the issue of wh et her c ounsel was inef fec tive for not
re qu e sti ng re c us a l a t tr ia l and on a pp e a l. Th is Court wi ll de fe r to c ouns e l’ s ta c tic a l and str a te g ic-8-

choice s where those choice s are informed ones predic ated upon a dequate prepa ration. Goad , 938 S.W. 2d a t 36 9; He lla rd

v . S tat e , 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)

.
J udg e Ea ster pre sided over Petitioner’ s trial and sentencing hear ing and the post-convic tion proce eding s in this case. Petitioner as s er t s t h at J udg e Ea ster prose cuted a prior ca se in which Petitioner and his brother w ere co-de fenda nts. The fa ct that a tria l judge was a prosec uting attorney in a trial which le d to a prior conviction does not e ntitle a defe ndant to r ecusa l where the re cord doe s not indicate bias. State v. Conway , 77 S.W .3d 213, 225 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The Commentary to t he re le va nt s e c tio n o f t

he Cod e of

Judic ia l Co nd

uc t st a te s, A lawy er in a g overnme nt ag ency does not ordinarily have a n association wi t h o t h er la

wy ers e mploy ed by

that ag ency

within the meaning of Section 3E (1 )( b) ; a judg e fo rm e rl y e mpl oy e d b y

a g ov e rnme nt a g e nc y , h ow e ve r, sh ou ld disqualify himself or her self i n a proce eding if the judg e’s impar tiality might
rea sonably

be questioned be cause of such a ssociation.
Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 10, C anon 3(E) (1)( b) (Commentary ). At the post-conviction heari n g, trial counsel testified that Petiti oner ha d expressed a pref ere nce f or Judge Dona ld Harr is to preside over his trial and sentencing beca use Judge Ha

rris had
a re putation for beingmore lenie nt that J udg e Ea ster. Tria l counsel testified that h e d i d n o t fi le a mot ion to r e c us e on

that ba sis , b e lie vin g it t o b e fr ivo lou s. Tr ia l c ouns e l pr op e rl y e xer c ise d h is discretion base d upon his professional judg ment and ade quate prepa ration. Counsel’s perf

ormanc e was not def

icient.

Fu rt h er m o re , P et i t i o n e r h a s n o td em o n s tra t edp re j u d i ce

. At t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g, Petitioner’s counsel testified that J udg e Easter, a former A ssistant District Attorney , had prose cuted
a c a se in wh ic h Pe tit ion e r and his br oth e r we re c o- de fe nd ants

. A j ud g me nt o f c on vic tio n, wh ic h is included in the re cord on a ppeal, indicates t h at Petitioner’s brother , Chris L and, pled guilty to a
c h ar g e o f t h e f

t o n J an u ar

y 2 6 , 1 9 9 3

. T h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y i n t h a t c a s e w a s T i m o t h y E a s t e r

. In its order de ny ing post-c onviction relief , the trial cour

t found that there was “ no evidenc e in the
rec ord that the Tr ial J udg e (this Court) wa s ever inv o l v ed in t he prose cution of ca ses ag ainst the Petitioner as an a ssistant dist rict attorne y .” In its order de ny ing r elief, the trial court f urther stated, “The Petitioner has failed to point out any information that the Tria l Court learne d throug h the 1993 prosec ution of the Petitioner’s brother or the 1993 prose cuti o n of the Petitioner that af fec ted the outcome of the Petitioner’s jury trial in 1999.”

Pe tit ion e r a lle g e s th re e inc ide nts duri nghis tr ia l in wh ic h th e tr ia l ju dg e sh ow e d b ia s. Petitioner argues that the trial court showed bias by denying a motion to suppress a stateme nt made by Petitioner to Detec tive Ricky Br own. On appe al, this Court found that the trial court a ccr edited Detec tive Br own’s testimony at the suppre ssion hearingthat the s t at ement wa s unsolicited and conclude d that the t rial court properly denied the motion. Land , 3 4 S

. W

. 3 d a t5 2 4

- 2 5

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, P e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e s b i a s i nt h e f

o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n tm a d e b y t h e t r i a l c o u rtt o t h e j u r y:-9-

L a die s and Ge ntl e me n, the c a se Ianti c ipate tr y ingtod ay

is State of Tennessee v

. David Land

. The defenda nt has filed some late-f

iled notices this morning, w hich is goingto cause us to take a short rec ess and a delay . Ido not anticipate our de lay wi ll b e ov e r 1 0 mi nu te s. Following that statement by the t rial court to the j ury , Petitioner moved for a mistrial, which the tr ia l c ourt

de nie d. On dire c t a

pp e a l, t his Court fo un d th a t “ the c omm e nts [of the tr ia l c ourt ] could be c onstrued as a

criticism of def

ense c ounsel,” but the t rial court did not err by not gr anting a mistrial. Land , 3 4 S. W.3 d at 527. Pe tit ion e r al so a lle g e s bia s in the tr ia l c ourt ’s a dmi ssi on int o e vid e nc e of

state me nt m a de by Pe tit ion e r’ s mot he r. Th is iss ue wa s a lso a dd re sse d b y thi s Co ur t in the direc t appea l. This Court held that the statement, althoug h an excited utter ance , was a dmitted in error beca use Ms. L and did not have personal knowle dg e of the fac ts about which she spoke , but the er ror wa s harmless. Id . at 530.

Adver se ruling s by a trial court are not usually sufficie nt gr ounds to establish bias. Alley v

. Sta te , 8 82 S.W. 2d 81 0, 82 1 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). “ Rul ing s o f a tr ia l ju dg e , e ve n if

e rr on e ou s, numerous and continuous, do not, without m ore, justify disqualification.” Id

. There is no indication in the rec ord of a

ny persona l bias ag ainst Petiti oner by the trial cour

t.

Petitioner has not established that counsel was ineffe ctive or that Petit ioner wa s prejudice d. Petitioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.

CO NC LU SION The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL L , J UDGE