2024 IL App (4th) 230415-U 

NO. 4-23-0415 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DWAYNE BRANDON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Adams County

No. 17CF772

Honorable 

Scott D. Larson, 

Judge Presiding.

 JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the State’s conduct did not constitute error. 

¶ 2 In October 2017, the State charged defendant, Dwayne Brandon, with attempt 

(first degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)) and aggravated domestic 

battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a), 12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2016)). Following a January 2018 jury trial, 

defendant was convicted on both counts. After a Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 

2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)) and the appointment of Krankel counsel, the trial court denied 

defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence and motion for a new trial.

¶ 3 Defendant appealed, arguing one of the State’s lay witnesses improperly offered 

an expert opinion, the State made improper comments during its closing argument, and the State 

violated the advocate-witness rule and presented cumulative evidence. We affirm.

FILED

July 30, 2024

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In October 2017, officers responded to a call at a residence in Quincy, Illinois. At 

the scene, a female, later identified as T.N., lay on the ground, receiving assistance from 

emergency medical technicians (EMT). T.N. had two stab wounds, one on the left side of her 

neck and one close to her left shoulder. Officers observed defendant at the scene with blood on 

his pants. When asked who stabbed her, T.N. responded that defendant stabbed her. Officers then 

placed defendant under arrest. As a result of the incident, the State charged defendant with

attempt (first degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)) and aggravated 

domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a), 12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2016)).

¶ 6 In January 2018, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The State called Officer 

Mike Cirrincione, who testified about his observations and actions upon arriving at the scene. He

testified defendant said, “I tried to kill that bitch. I tried to take that bitch out. Write that down.”

¶ 7 The State next called T.N., who testified she married defendant in August 2017.

They had been drinking on the day of the incident and got into an argument, which escalated to 

the point where defendant grabbed a kitchen knife and said, “I’m gonna kill you, bitch.” Then, 

defendant stabbed her. T.N. managed to flee to a neighbor’s house. After being transported to the 

hospital, T.N. made a video-recorded statement to the police. The State first played the recording 

without audio and admitted it into evidence. T.N. acknowledged she wrote a letter to the State 

upon defendant’s request because she did not want her husband to go to jail. In the letter, T.N. 

claimed “that [she] had tripped” and she was “a hundred percent sure” she was “accidentally 

poked in the neck” by the knife. To impeach T.N., the State played the recording again, this time

with audio. In the recording, T.N. told the police defendant stabbed her and tried to kill her.
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¶ 8 The State called Ryan Bowers, an EMT who treated T.N. at the scene. Bowers 

first testified about his training and experience. As a paramedic, Bowers responded to medical 

and trauma calls, and he provided care to sick or injured people. Bowers completed a two-year 

special training program at Blessing Hospital and John Wood Community College. Bowers

stated he was familiar with medicines and certain medical procedures and he had experience with 

life-threatening injuries. Bowers had been a paramedic for nine years, and he responded to 

approximately 500 calls per year. Bowers testified T.N. had significant blood loss, which 

concerned him because it could lead to shock, loss of consciousness, altered mental status, and

even death. Bowers explained shock is “a reaction that your body compensates when you have a 

traumatic experience, whether it be blood loss or other injury of some sort.” He testified T.N.’s 

shoulder wound could have penetrated her lung and caused death, depending on the angle. He 

testified T.N.’s neck wound could have damaged her spinal cord and led to paralysis or death. He 

also testified T.N.’s neck wound could have severed the arteries in her neck and resulted in rapid 

blood loss or “exsanguination.” When Bowers asked T.N. what happened to her, T.N. responded 

her husband stabbed her and tried to kill her.

¶ 9 Defendant chose to testify in his defense. Like T.N., defendant testified they had 

been drinking when they began to argue. Defendant then offered a different reason for T.N.’s 

stab wounds. He testified he approached her while holding the knife, they began to fight, and 

they fell to the floor. He then grabbed the knife by the blade and just “poked her.” On 

cross-examination, the State confronted defendant with comments he made to officers that he 

tried to kill T.N. Defendant insisted he did not remember them. After the eighth, “No, I don’t 

remember,” the State said, “That’s a good thing [Officer Cirrincione] wrote it down because I 
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guess you can’t remember a lot.” Upon the ninth, “No, I don’t remember,” the State commented, 

“It’s amazing how memory works, isn’t it?” and concluded the cross-examination. 

¶ 10 During its closing argument, the State quoted defendant’s statement, “I tried to 

kill the bitch,” and asserted:

“In Adams County, in our county, when you do what he did, when 

you try to kill someone, we don’t look the other way. We charge 

you with attempt first-degree murder. And the Judge is going to 

tell you that attempt first-degree murder, to prove that, the People 

have to prove two propositions and we have to prove them beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” 

After additional argument and playing the video of T.N.’s statement again, the State 

continued: 

“In Adams County, you don’t get to do that. In Adams County, if 

you do those things, you will be charged. You will be arrested and 

you will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. And now we 

rely on you, members of the community to look at that person and 

say no, you don’t get to do it. This case has been proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt in our minds and you, sir, are guilty. You are 

guilty of attempt first-degree murder to T.N., and you are guilty of 

aggravated domestic battery. Find just that.” 

The State then concluded its closing argument.

¶ 11 The jury found defendant guilty on both counts. During the March 2018 

sentencing hearing, the State dismissed the aggravated domestic battery count because it “fairly 
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and appropriately merges into the attempt (first degree murder) charge.” The trial court 

sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison. 

¶ 12 In July 2018, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in

defendant’s pro se motion for a new trial, the trial court held a Krankel inquiry and appointed 

counsel. Krankel counsel then filed a motion to reconsider the sentence and a motion for a new 

trial based on the ineffectiveness claims. The court denied both after a hearing. 

¶ 13 This appeal followed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues the State committed “many and varied errors and 

misconduct,” identifying three specific purported errors and the cumulative errors therein. 

Defendant contends the State elicited improper opinion testimony from Bowers, made improper 

statements and created an “us-versus-them” mentality during closing argument, improperly

repeated defendant’s responses during cross-examination before asking its next question—a 

process the State initially referred to as “looping”—and offering cumulative, prejudicial

evidence. Defendant also argued the cumulative errors committed by the State denied him a fair 

trial and amounted to plain error.

¶ 16 We start by noting defendant correctly acknowledges the forfeiture of the issues

in his brief. Plain error is a well-established exception to forfeiture. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 

119445, ¶ 48, 89 N.E.3d 675. Reviewing courts find plain error (1) when “a clear or obvious 

error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the 

scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,” or (2) when “a 

clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the 

defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness 
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of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. The threshold 

determination “under either prong of the plain error doctrine is determining whether there was a 

clear or obvious error at trial.” Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49. Defendant relies on second-prong 

plain error here. We take each argument in turn.

¶ 17 A. Lay Witness Opinion Testimony

¶ 18 Defendant claims Bowers’s testimony about T.N.’s injuries and how those 

injuries could cause death, as well as defining and describing two advanced medical terms, 

“shock” and “exsanguination,” amounted to improper lay witness opinion testimony. Defendant

acknowledges “the State inadvertently laid proper foundation for him to testify as an expert” but 

contends Bowers did not in fact possess the relevant qualifications to offer expert testimony. 

¶ 19 Illinois Rule of Evidence 701 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) sets forth the foundational 

requirements for lay witness opinion testimony. People v. Loggins, 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, 

¶ 79, 130 N.E.3d 432. In order to offer opinion testimony (1) a lay witness must have 

“ ‘personal knowledge of the matter,’ ” (2) “[t]he opinion or inference must also be ‘helpful to a 

clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue,’ ” and 

(3) the opinion or inference should “ ‘not [be] based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.’ ” Loggins, 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, ¶ 79 (quoting 

Ill. R. Evid 701 (eff. Jan 1, 2011)). “Lay witness opinion testimony is admissible where the facts 

could not otherwise be adequately presented or described to the fact finder in such a way as to 

enable the fact finder to form an opinion or reach an intelligent conclusion.” People v. Novak, 

163 Ill. 2d 93, 102, 643 N.E.2d 762, 767 (1994), abrogated on other grounds by People v. 

Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d 353, 848 N.E.2d 950 (2006). 
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¶ 20 On the other hand, “[a]n individual will be permitted to testify as an expert if that 

person’s experience and qualifications afford him or her knowledge that is not common to 

laypersons, and where such testimony will aid the fact finder in reaching its conclusion.” Novak, 

163 Ill. 2d at 104. “The expert may gain his or her knowledge through practical experience rather 

than scientific study, training, or research.” Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 104. “There is no precise 

requirement as to how the expert acquires skill or experience.” Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 104. “The 

burden of establishing the qualifications of an expert witness is on the proponent of the expert’s 

testimony.” Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 104. It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine 

whether a witness has been qualified as an expert. People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 208, 469 

N.E.2d 569, 576 (1984). 

¶ 21 Our supreme court in Novak concluded the testimony of two witnesses was 

admissible as expert testimony despite being inadmissible as lay witness opinion testimony, even 

when the State did not call the witnesses as experts. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 99, 102. In Novak, 

which involved an aggravated criminal sexual assault charge, the defendant lured a victim under 

the pretenses of improving the victim’s baseball skills and then committed the offense. Novak, 

163 Ill. 2d at 97. To rebut the defense’s position “that defendant only applied various sets of 

muscle strength and flexibility exercises to the victim’s neck and shoulders,” the State called two 

witnesses. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 98-99. The two witnesses had been professional athletes and 

trainers and testified to their opinions concerning the defendant’s alleged training methods. 

Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 99-101. The supreme court found no error in the witnesses offering expert 

testimony, finding that “[t]hrough education, training, experience, or a combination of each, 

these witnesses possessed knowledge that is not common to the average citizen” and “this 

knowledge aided the jury in reaching its conclusion.” Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 104.
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¶ 22 Here, defendant contends Bowers lacked the qualifications to provide expert 

testimony that the wounds of T.N. and the blood loss were life-threatening. Even if we found 

testimony about stab wounds on the neck and left shoulder and the fact substantial blood loss 

could cause death was beyond the knowledge of a lay witness, it was not an abuse of discretion

for the trial court to conclude Bowers did possess the relevant qualifications as an expert. Bowers 

received training and education from Blessing Hospital and John Wood Community College. He 

had nine years’ experience as a paramedic, and he responded to almost 500 calls each year.

Bowers was familiar with medicines and certain medical procedures and has seen lifethreatening injuries. Recall, “[t]here is no precise requirement” for how a person attains the 

requisite skill or experience to offer expert testimony. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 104. Even though the 

State did not formally offer Bowers as an expert witness, as in Novak, the State provided 

sufficient evidence to show Bowers possessed the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training 

or education to opine on T.N.’s injuries. Specifically, Bowers’s nine years of experience and 

training as a paramedic qualified him to testify regarding the seriousness of stab wounds to 

T.N.’s neck and shoulder and her substantial blood loss. Therefore, the court did not abuse its 

discretion by allowing Bowers to testify accordingly. Since there was no error, there can be no 

plain error. See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶¶ 48-49. 

¶ 23 Defendant cites People v. Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 142879, 82 N.E.3d 194, 

where the court applied Novak but found the two paramedics’ testimony inadmissible. There, the 

defendant was charged with kicking a police officer in the shins when the police officer 

responded to paramedics who were tendering help to the defendant. Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 

142879, ¶ 1. As his defense, the defendant introduced evidence indicating he was having a 

seizure. Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 142879, ¶ 15. The paramedics, though unable to medically 
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examine the defendant, testified the defendant did not have a seizure. Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 

142879, ¶¶ 15-16. The court found the paramedics’ testimony inadmissible, concluding the 

paramedics were not trained to diagnose seizures. Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 142879, ¶ 52. 

¶ 24 Jackson is distinguishable. There, the paramedics essentially rendered a diagnosis,

which they were not qualified to do. Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 142879, ¶¶ 52-53. The 

paramedics never testified to any specialized training or experiences relating to seizures.

Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 142879, ¶ 52. Here, Bowers’s testimony on the seriousness of T.N.’s 

condition did not exceed his education and experience as a paramedic. Besides his training, 

Bowers testified that he provided care to sick and injured people and had seen life-threatening 

conditions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Bowers’s testimony. 

Consequently, there can be no plain error. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶¶ 48-49. 

¶ 25 B. “Us-Versus-Them” Mentality

¶ 26 Defendant next claims the State used an “us-versus-them” mentality during its

closing argument, highlighting two statements. The State began its argument by repeating 

defendant’s statement that he tried to kill T.N. and saying, “In Adams County, in our county, 

when you do what he did, when you try to kill someone, we don’t look the other way. We charge 

you with attempt first-degree murder.” In ending its closing argument, the State returned to this

theme: 

“In Adams County, you don’t get to do that. In Adams County, if 

you do those things, you will be charged. You will be arrested and 

you will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. And now we 

rely on you, members of our community to look at that person and 

say no, you don’t get to do it.” 
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¶ 27 “[P]rosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument and improper 

remarks will not merit reversal unless they result in substantial prejudice to the accused.” People 

v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 30, 670 N.E.2d 583, 597 (1996). “In reviewing a challenge to remarks 

made by the State during closing argument, the comments must be considered in the context of 

the entire closing statements of the parties.” People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 573, 736 N.E.2d 

1001, 1015 (2000). “A reviewing court will find reversible error only if the defendant 

demonstrates that the remarks were improper and that they were so prejudicial that real justice 

was denied or the verdict resulted from the error.” People v. Neal, 2020 IL App (4th) 170869, 

¶ 166, 150 N.E.3d 984. “Generally, arguments urging a fearless administration of justice or 

commenting unfavorably on the evils of crime do not constitute error.” People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 

2d 99, 128-29, 724 N.E.2d 920, 935 (2000). On the other hand, urging the jurors to send a 

message by their verdict is improper because it does not tend to make the fact of the defendant’s 

guilt more or less true. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 78, 803 N.E.2d 405, 420 (2003), as 

modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 26, 2004); Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 132. 

¶ 28 In Johnson, the State included the following remarks in its closing argument: 

“ ‘[T]hey think they run this society. Ladies and gentlemen, we are 

going to ask that you respond affirmatively that they do not. We as 

a society do not have to live in their twisted world. We do not have 

to accept their values. We don’t have to allow that to happen in our 

community. We don’t have to allow these guys blasting sawed off 

shotguns at other human beings. We as a people can stand together 

and say, no, you’re not going to do it here. And if you do, you have 
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the—you will be held responsible for your actions.’ ” Johnson, 208 

Ill. 2d at 77. 

There, our supreme court reasoned remediation of society’s ills distracted the jury from its 

responsibility to consider the guilt or innocence of an individual. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 77-78. 

There, the arguments by the State sought to engender an “us-versus-them” mentality that is 

“inconsistent with the inherent principles of the criminal trial process.” Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at

80. When the State, through “an extended and general denunciation of society’s ills,” incites the 

jury to act out of undifferentiated passion and outrage, rather than reason and deliberation, the 

comments are improper. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 79. 

¶ 29 However, the Johnson court acknowledged that “limited prosecutorial 

exhortations are proper where it is made clear to the jury that its ability to effect general and 

specific deterrence is dependent solely upon its careful consideration of the specific facts and 

issues before it.” (Emphases in original.) Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 79 (citing People v. Harris, 129 

Ill. 2d 123, 159, 544 N.E.2d 357, 372 (1989)). In Harris, the State remarked during its closing 

argument that the jurors enjoyed

“ ‘a unique opportunity *** to do something about crime. *** We 

listen to it on the news, in the newspaper ***. Everybody hears 

about crime. Nobody does anything about it. You have a unique 

opportunity to actually do something about crime on your streets. 

*** You are the only ones that sit between this man, this ticking 

bomb, and that door.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris, 

129 Ill. 2d at 159. 
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The court condoned such an argument because it “apparently intended to persuade the jurors to 

convict because by convicting they would prevent both crime in general, and further crime by 

this defendant.” Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 159.

¶ 30 Here, we cannot conclude the State’s closing argument ran afoul of the rule in 

Johnson. The State did say, “And now we rely on you, members of our community to look at 

that person and say no, you don’t get to do it,” like urging to send a message. However, the State 

made no mention of “society’s ills.” Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 79. Rather, the State’s argument 

focused more on defendant as an individual by referring only to him and his conduct. By 

recounting the specific facts of this case in painstaking detail, the State couched the jury’s charge 

in relation to defendant specifically, and not to deterring crime generally. See Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 

at 159. The State did not mention society’s problem with violence or urge the jury to “send a 

message” responding to that problem, like it did in Johnson. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d. at 78. The 

State spoke only of defendant and the legal repercussions he would face. It was a statement about

the consequences of committing attempt (first degree murder) and aggravated domestic battery, 

including prosecution “to the fullest extent of the law.” The State also restated the burden of 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt following both the consequence of committing a crime and a 

similar statement under the same theme during the closing argument. We do not find an “usversus-them” mentality engendered in the context found in Johnson to incite the jury to act out of 

undifferentiated passion and outrage. Therefore, in this context, in light of the entire closing 

argument, we do not believe the two statements referencing Adams County were improper. See 

Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573. 

¶ 31 Defendant directs our attention to People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 129, 871 

N.E.2d 728, 748 (2007), where our supreme court held, “The prosecutor’s closing argument *** 
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appears deliberately designed to forge just the sort of ‘us-versus-them’ mentality decried by this 

court in Johnson and foster a situation where jurors might feel compelled to side with the State 

and its witnesses in order to ensure their own safety.” There, the prosecutor framed himself as 

the underdog and the only person seeking justice for the victim, disparaged the defense attorneys,

compared a sitting trial judge’s testimony to former United States President Bill Clinton’s 

evasive, perjured testimony about Monica Lewinsky, bolstered police officer testimony, posed a 

hypothetical where the jurors call 9-1-1 but have to hold because police could not respond to 

their emergencies because they were writing reports, and generally instilled fear into the jurors. 

Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 107-113, 129. The State’s two comments about Adams County here do 

not compare to those statements in Wheeler. There were no personal attacks. The State did not 

frame itself as a lone underdog seeking justice for the victim. Nor did the State appeal to the 

jurors’ fears by asking them to imagine themselves as victims. The State asserted Adams County 

does not tolerate defendant’s conduct, prosecutes such conduct, and asked the jury to convict 

defendant. These comments did not create an “us-versus-them” mentality like the comments did 

in Wheeler. 

¶ 32 We do not find the State’s statements during closing argument improper. They did 

not result in prejudice to defendant, let alone substantial prejudice, nor did the verdict result from 

them. Neal, 2020 IL App (4th) 170869, ¶ 166; Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 30. The victim, although 

unwilling, provided substantial evidence of defendant’s intent, and defendant’s own statements 

did as well. Again, because no clear, obvious error occurred, there can be no plain error. See 

Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶¶ 48-49. 

¶ 33 C. Other Errors
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¶ 34 Finally, defendant argues the State violated the advocate-witness rule by 

commenting, “That’s a good thing [Officer Cirrincione] wrote it down because I guess you can’t 

remember a lot,” elicited prior consistent statements by constantly “looping” testimony when it 

incorporated the last answer given into the subsequent question, and presented cumulative 

evidence by repeatedly playing the recording of T.N.’s statement. We review each allegation in 

turn. 

¶ 35 To support his claim the State violated the advocate-witness rule, defendant points 

to a series of questions asked by the State during cross-examination of defendant about whether 

he made a statement about his intention to kill T.N. After defendant responded to all of the 

questions with, “No, I don’t remember,” the State commented, “That’s a good thing [Officer 

Cirrincione] wrote it down because I guess you can’t remember a lot. *** It’s amazing how 

memory works, isn’t it?” “The advocate-witness rule precludes an attorney from acting as 

advocate and witness in the same case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Koen, 

2014 IL App (1st) 113082, ¶ 39, 6 N.E.3d 354. Here, the State did not act as a witness rebutting 

defendant’s testimony. The assistant state’s attorney did not take the oath and the stand as all 

other witnesses did. The jury instruction clearly admonished the jury that “[t]he evidence which 

you should consider consists only of the testimony of the witnesses and exhibits which the Court 

has received,” and “[n]either the opening statements nor closing arguments are evidence and any 

statement or argument made by the attorneys which is not based on the evidence should be 

disregarded.” Therefore, we observe no violation of the advocate-witness rule.

¶ 36 Defendant relies on Blue to support his claim the State violated the 

advocate-witness rule, but we find it inapplicable. In Blue, before trial, two assistant state’s

attorneys interviewed a witness after a warrant was issued for her arrest. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 134. 
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During cross-examination of that witness, the assistant state’s attorneys who interviewed the 

witness repeatedly interjected testimony of their own through thinly veiled “objections,” 

especially about the contents of the interview. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 135. For example, one of the 

assistant state’s attorneys objected, calling the witness’s testimony a lie. Then, on redirect 

examination, the other assistant state’s attorney argued with the witness about what he previously 

said to the witness and the witness’s condition at the time of the interview. Our supreme court 

determined the State’s objections and questioning “offered the jury a simultaneous rebuttal to 

[the witness’s] account of an event where both [assistant state’s attorneys] were present.” Blue, 

189 Ill. 2d at 137. This case is distinguishable. Here, the State’s comment, “That’s a good thing 

[Officer Cirrincione] wrote it down because I guess you can’t remember a lot,” while certainly 

sarcastic commentary not to be encouraged, did not serve to rebut defendant’s testimony. The 

rebuttal came from the testimony of the police officers rather than the testimony of the attorney.

This record does not present a situation analogous to Blue. 

¶ 37 Defendant also contends the State’s constant “looping” was an improper 

admission of prior consistent statements from the witness. Defendant describes “looping” as the 

State repeating a witness’s answer to one question at the beginning of the next question. For 

example, from Bowers’ testimony, he answered one question with “She kept repeating that, ‘He 

tried to kill me,’ ” and the State phrased the next question as follows: “She kept repeating, ‘He 

tried to kill me.’ How long did it take to get to the hospital?” The non sequitur is obvious. 

Essentially, defendant argues the State repeated the testimony the jury just heard by “looping,” 

which constituted an admission of the prior consistent statements. We find defendant’s argument 

misplaced. “As a general rule, proof of statements made by a witness out of court harmonizing 

with his theory is inadmissible.” People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 501, 455 N.E.2d 41, 47 
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(1983). “A witness may not testify in court as to statements made out of court for the purpose of 

corroborating his trial testimony concerning the same subject.” People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210, 

216, 775 N.E.2d 921, 925 (2002). The rule is not applicable here because the “looping” was 

based on an immediately preceding in-court statement and thus could not be an out-of-court 

statement. Also, as discussed above, the State’s questioning during its direct examination was not 

evidence. Therefore, although we might question the practice—undoubtedly the prosecutor 

believed the technique was clever, but the jury listening to the repetition ad nauseum could very 

well find it irritating—we do not find it to be error.

¶ 38 Defendant contends testimony from officers that he said he intended to kill the 

victim on the day of the incident and the recording played multiple times at trial was cumulative 

evidence. We disagree. “Cumulative evidence and extensive evidence are not the same thing.” 

People v. Jones, 2020 IL App (4th) 190909, ¶ 150, 173 N.E.3d 978, 996. Cumulative evidence 

“adds nothing to what was already before the jury.” Jones, 2020 IL App (4th) 190909, ¶ 150. At 

first blush, it may appear the recording added nothing to what was already presented to the jury. 

However, the State replayed it after first publishing it to the jury to either impeach T.N. or rebut 

the defense’s theory. Further, the video was originally shown without sound, and only to show 

the extent of T.N.’s injuries. Once T.N. testified, the actual sound recording was published for 

proper impeachment. Therefore, it added to what the jury heard. The recording was extensive 

evidence, not cumulative. See Jones, 2020 IL App (4th) 190909, ¶ 150. 

¶ 39 Defendant also contends testimony from officers about his statement he intended 

to kill the victim on the day of the incident was cumulative. We note this testimony was elicited 

in rebuttal. When testimony might have been offered during a party’s case in chief, the question 

of whether it should be admitted in rebuttal is discretionary with the trial court. Kupcikevicius v. 
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Fitzgibbons, 41 Ill. App. 3d 405, 413, 354 N.E.2d 434, 441 (1976). Here, defendant on crossexamination denied knowledge of having told the officers he intended to kill the victim, saying, 

“I don’t remember.” In rebuttal, the State called officers to testify to defendant’s statement. Thus,

the State had good reason to present more evidence of what defendant said that night. We 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. Having found that 

none of defendant’s allegations constituted error, there was no cumulative error. See People v. 

Green, 2017 IL App (1st) 152513, ¶ 118, 100 N.E.3d 491. 

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 42 Affirmed.