REVISED, November 19, 1998

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-21045

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

VERSUS

WILLIAM T SCOTT; LINDA D SCOTT; RALPH BEN-SCHOTER,

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

October 29, 1998

Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges

JOHN M. DUHÉ, JR., Circuit Judge:

A jury found Defendants-Appellants William T. Scott (“Mr. Scott”), Linda D. Scott (“Mrs.

Scott”), and Ralph Ben-Schoter (“Ben-Schoter”) guilty of one count of conspiracy (18 U.S.C.A. §

3 71), three counts of transferring false obligations of the United States (18 U.S.C.A. § 473), one

count of bank fraud (18 U.S.C.A. § 1344), two counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C.A. § 1343), and one

count of interstate transportati on of stolen money (18 U.S.C.A. § 2314). Additionally, the jury found

Ben-Schoter guilty of six counts of money laundering (18 U.S.C.A. § 1956). On this direct appeal,

they challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting their convictions for bank fraud and transferring

false obligations and the propriety of the district court’s instruction on deliberate ignorance. They

also argue t he district court incorrectly calculated their sentences and improperly denied four

challenges for cause of prospective jurors. Finally, the Defendants assert they were denied effective

assistance of counsel. We reverse the Defendants’ convictions for transferring false obligations of2

the United States, affirm their remaining convictions and remand to the district court for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

The De f endants’ convictions arise from three “credit enhancement” transactions in which they

purported to lease United States Treasury Notes (“treasury notes”) owned by the Delmarva Timber

Trust (“Nevada Trust”) to borrowers enabling them to obtain large loans for various purposes. The

Defendants formed the Nevada Trust, of which Mrs. Scott was President and CEO and Mr. Scott and

Ben-Schoter were consultants, and created documents entitled “Registered Owner of Treasury Note

Certificates” (“Certificates”), which fraudulently reflected the Nevada Trust’s ownership of millions

of dollars in treasury notes. In reality, the Nevada Trust did not own any treasury notes. The Nevada

Trust would purport to lease the treasury notes to borrowers for a flat fee, and sometimes a

percentage of the development deal, to enhance the borrowers’ creditworthiness. The prospective

borrowers would receive the Certificates from the Nevada Trust and use them as collateral to secure

large loans.

All three transactions were real estate deals. In the first transaction, the Defendants, through

t he Nevada Trust, leased the Certificates to Michael Douglass, who used them as collateral in

connection with the sale of a ranch owned by a trust benefitting a widow, Lavern e Shiflett. After

Douglass defaulted on the $3,050,000 note he gave for th e purchase price, Shiflett attempted to

foreclose on the treasury notes the Certificates had purportedly evidenced as collateral and failed.

In t he second transaction, the Defendants, again through the Nevada Trust

, leased t he

Certificates to Richard Montgomery to enable him to receive a $6,000,000 loan from Citibank,

London, England to purchase an office building. Montgomery did not complete the sale because the

participants were arrested by Scotland Yard at the loan closing.

In the third transaction, the Defendants leased the Certificates in the same manner to Thomas

Brennan to enable him to obtain a loan to purchase landfills for New York City garbage. The loan

never closed because Brennan was unable to obtain financing with the Certificates.3

The Secret Service unearthed the Defendan t s’ scheme through a thorough investigation.

Secret Service Agent Tim Gobble interviewed the Defendants on several occasions prior to their

indictment. During these interviews, the Defendants explained how they became involved with the

Nevada Trust and the Certificates. Ben-Schoter claimed he became involved through Don and Owen

Meddles. He explained he was a former trustee o f ano t her trust, the Delmarva Timber Trust

organized in Maryland (“Maryland Trust”), and that Don and Owen Meddles instructed him to form

the Nevada Trust to lease the Certif icat es. All of the Defendants asserted they relied on others in

believing that the Maryland Trust owned millio ns of dollars in assets and that the Maryland Trust had

granted the Nevada Trust permission to use the Certificates in these transactions.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of evidence

The Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions. The

standard of review for a sufficiency of evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence and the

reasonable inferences which flow therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. S ee United

States v. Kindig

, 854 F.2d 703, 706-07 (5th Cir. 1988); s ee also United States v. Mulderig

, 120 F.3d

534, 546 (5th Cir. 1997). We review the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict. S ee United States

v. Salazar , 958 F.2d 1285, 1291 (5th Cir. 1992).

1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 473

The Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions for1 § 473 provides:

Whoever buys, sells, exchanges, transfers, r eceives, or delivers any false, forged,

count erfeited, or altered obligation or other security of the United States, with the intent that the

same be passed, published, or used as true and genuine, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned

not more than ten years, or both.

18 U.S.C.A § 473 (West Supp. 1998)

2 The treasury notes were purportedly kept at Chemical Bank in New York or in the Cayman

Islands.

4 transferring false obligations of the United States under § 473. 1 They argue their convictions should

be reversed because the Certificates are not obligations or secu rities of the Uni ted States, the

Defendants never suggested to anyone that the Certificates were obli gations or securi ti es of the

United States, and none of the vict ims believed the Certificates were obligations or securities of the

United States. The government argues the Defendants intended to lead the vict ims t o believe the

Certificates were issued or approved of by the United States government, and that, therefore, they

satisfy § 473.

A do cument is considered a counterfeit obligation or security of the United States if the

fraudulent o bligation bears such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or

securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to de ceive an honest,

sensible and unsuspecting person of or dinary observation and care dealing with a person who is

supposed to be upright and honest. U nited S tates v. Turner , 586 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1978)

(citing United States v. Smith , 318 F.2d 94, 95 (4th Cir. 1963)).

Section 473 expressly requires the involvement of an obligation or securi ty of the United

States to support a conviction, rather than a document evidencing the ownership of that obligation

or security which is contained at another location. 2 The Certificates do not say they were issued by

the United States, are not signed by a United States o fficial, and do not bear an official seal of the

United States. The Certificates do st at e they were issued by an officer of the Nevada Trust who

states he received delivery of particular tr easury no tes on behalf of the Nevada Trust. The3 § 1344 provides:

Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice ---

(1) to defraud a financial institution; or

(2) t o o btain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other

property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or

fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;

shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned more than 30 years, or both.

18 U.S.C.A § 1344 (West Supp. 1998)

5 Certificates were meant to evidence the Nevada Trust’s ownership of treasury notes w h ich are

actually electronic documents.

Even if the evidence did support that the Certificates purported to be approved of or issued

by the United States government, the transfer of the Certificates would not violate § 473 because the

Certificates are not the actual obligation or security. They merely represent ownership of t he

obligation or security kept at another location. The government presented no evidence that any of

the victims believed these certificates were treasury notes. All of the vicitms testified they believed

the Certificates were backed by treasury notes owned by the Nevada Trust. We conclude a rational

juror could not find the government proved the essential elements of § 473, even when construing

the evidence in

t he light most favorable to the verdict. Therefore, we reverse the Defendants’

convictions for trans fer o f false obligations of the United States under § 473 and vacate their

sentences imposed for those convictions.

2. 18 U.S.C.A. 1344

The Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions for

bank fraud under § 1344. 3 They argue the government did not prove the Citibank’s London branch

i nvo lved in this transaction was insured by the FDIC. Proof of FDIC Insurance is an esssential

element of the crime of bank fraud, as well as essential to establish federal jurisdiction. U nited States

v. Schultz

, 17 F.3d 723, 725 (5th Cir. 1994). Failure to prove the jurisdictional element of FDIC

Insurance requires reversal of a bank fraud conviction. I d. at 727. The governm ent argues the

“Certificate of Proof of Insured Statu s” fro m FDIC officer Patti C. Fox establishes the Citibank’s6

London branch involved in this case was insured by the FDIC. The Defendants argue this certificate

merely states that Citibank, N.A. is insured by the FDIC and that Citibank, N.A. has a London branch

which is also insured by the FDIC. They argue the government introduced no evidence to prove the

branch involved in this case was, in fact, Citibank, N.A.’s London branch.

The government’s proof was uncontroverted at trial on this issue. We believe a reasonable

juror could infer from the government’s evidence that the London branch referenced in the FDIC

“Certificate of Proof of Insured Status” was the branch where this transaction took place. Therefore,

we affirm the Defendants’ conviction for bank fraud under § 1344.

B. Deliberate Ignorance Instruction

The Defendants argue the district court erred in instructing the jury on deliberate ignorance

and base their objection on four grounds: 1) there was insufficient evidence of deliberate ignorance

to support the instruction; 2) the placement of the instruction; 3) the statutes’ requirement of both

knowledge and specific intent; and 4) the government’s theory of actual knowledge. The Defendants

argued only the first ground at the trial and argued the remaining grounds for the first time in their

briefs.

The district judge instructed the jury on deliberate ignorance as follows:

You may find that a defendant had knowledge of a fact if you find th at the defendant

deliberately closed his or her eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him or her.

Knowledge on the part of the defendant cannot be established merely by demonstrating that

the defendant was stupid, careless, negligent, or foolish. In other words, you may not find

the defendant had the requisite guilty knowledge merely by evidence that a reasonable person would have been aware of the illegal conduct. Knowledge can be inferred, however, if the

defendant deliberately blinded himself or herself to the existence of a fact.

1. Objection to Deliberate Ignorance Made at Trial

The standard of review applied to a defendant’s claim that a jury instruction was inappropriate

is “whether the court’s charge, as a whole, is a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly

instructs jurors as to the principle s o f t he law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.”

United States v. August

, 835 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court “may not instruct the7

jury on a charge that is not supported by the evidence.” U nited States v. Ortega

, 859 F.2d 327, 330

(5th Cir. 1988). Further, in determining whether the evidence reasonably supports the charge, the

evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it are viewed in the light most

favorable to the government. United States v. Lara-Velasquez

, 919 F.2d 946, 950 (5th Cir. 1990).

This standard applies to the first ground of the Defendants’ objection.

The Defendants argue the instruction was error because the government did not present

sufficient evidence of willfull blindness to support the instruction. The instruction is proper only

“when the defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the proof at trial supports a reasonable

inference of deliberate ignorance.” United States v. Soto-Silva ,129 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1997)

(citing United States v. McKinney

, 53 F.3d 664, 676-77 (5th Cir. 1995)). The evidence at trial must

raise two inferences: (1) the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence

of the illegal conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to a vo id learning of the illegal

conduct. S oto-Silva

, 129 F.3d at 345 (citing United States v. Ojebode , 957 F.2d 1218, 1229 (5th

Cir. 1992)).

We hold the go vernment presented sufficient evidence to support the deliberate ignorance

instruction. The Defendants claimed a lack of guilty knowledge, and the evidence presented at trial

warrants the inference of deliberate ignorance. All three Defendants claimed they relied on others

concerning the Maryland Trust’s ownership and the existence of the treasury notes. Ben-Schoter told

Secret Service Agent Tim Gobble he relied on Owen and Don Meddles assurances that the Maryland

Trust had millio ns of dollars in assets in Chemical Bank, that the Nevada Trust had the Maryland

Trust’s permission to use the treasury notes, and that the treasury notes existed at all. Mr. Scott tol d

Agent Gobble he relied on Ben-Schoter’s assurances, and Mrs. Scott told Agent Gobble she relied

on Ben-Schoter and Mr. Scott for the same issues. Although the Defendants did not testify at trial,

their statements to Agent Gobble and their attorneys’ opening and closing arugments su p port the

conclusion they asserted lack of guilty knowledge in these transactions.

There is also sufficient evidence allowing a reasonable inference of deliberate ignorance for8

all the Defendants. The following evidence establishes that the Defendants were subjectively aware

of a high probability of the existence of the ille gal conduct : (1) Ben-Schoter was imprisoned for

contempt in a previous lawsuit for failure to produce notes involved in similar transactions with the

Maryland Trust, and both Mr. and Mrs. Scott were aware of his involvement; (2) a Dun & Bradstreet

report revealed the assets of the Maryland Trust were merely $5260.00 in cash; (3) Mr. Scott was

told he wo uld have to sue to get the identification number for the treasury notes when Laverne

Shiflett attempted to collect on the notes as collateral; and (4) Mrs. S cott signed 112 docum ents

invo lving millio ns of dollars of treasury notes while they were having trouble paying their household

bills.

Additionally, the following evidence establishes the Defendants purposefully contrived to

avoid learning of the illegal conduct: (1) the Defendants never attempted to verify the existence of

the treasury notes or the millio ns of dollars of assets in Chemical Ba nk; (2) the Defendants never

at tempted to verify the existence of the treasury notes with a Federal Reserve Bank; (3) and Mrs.

Scott never questioned anyone conerning her signature required on 112 documents invo lving millio ns

of dollars in treasury notes.

2. Objections to Deliberate Ignorance Made on Appeal

The remaining grounds are analyzed using a plain error standard because the Defendants did

not raise them below. We may correct forfeited errors only when the appellant shows (1) there is an

error, (2) it is clear or obvious, and (3) it affects his substantial rights. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);

see also United States v. Calverley

, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing U nited

States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 730-37 (1993)). Even when these three factors are present, the

decision whether to correct the forfeited error remains with the sound discretion of the appellate

court, which will not exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Hawkins , 87 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir.

1996) (citing Olano , 507 U.S. at 735-36).4 The crime of transferring counterfeit securities or obligations of the United States requires

the intent to cheat; bank fraud requires the intent to defraud; inter state tr avel in furtherance of a

scheme requires the defendant to have devised a scheme to defraud and act in e x ecution of that

scheme; wire fraud requires an intent to defraud; money laundering requires the intent to prom ote the

specified unlawful activity; conspiracy requires the intent to further the object of the conspiracy.

9 a. Placement of the Instruction

The Defendants argue the instruction was error because of its placement immediately before

the definition of “willfully”, requiring the defendant to have acted with the specific purpose to disobey

the law, and immediately after the requirement of the necessary intent to defraud. They argue the

placement of the instruction allowe d t he jury to infer not only knowledge, but intent. The

Defendants’ argument fails for two reasons. First, we find no cases, and the Defendants cite none,

which hold it is error to place a deliberate ignorance instruction as it was in the instant case. Thus,

it was not plain error to arrange the instruction in that manner.

Second, while we recognize that the deliberate ignorance instruction can create the risk that

a jury might convict the defendant on a lesser negl igence st andard, this risk is not present in the

instant case. See United States v. Gray , 105 F.3d 956, 957 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States

v. Lara-Velasquez

, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990). The instruction is appropriate despite this risk

when the evidence satisfies the M cKinney two-pronged standard. Because we find the evidence

meets this standard, the instruction was proper.

b. Knowledge and Specific Intent Requirements

The Defenda nt s also argue the instruction was improper because all of the crimes they are

convicted of require that the de fendant act knowingly and with specific intent or purpose. 4 The

Defendants rely on United States v. Chen

, 913 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990), where the court held “one

cannot be deliberately ignorant (in order to convict for the knowledge element) and st ill have the

purpose of engagi ng in illegal activities,” therefore “the [deliberate ignorance] instruction was

inappropriate for an offense which requires a specific purpose by the defendant.” Id. at 190.5 Section 856(1)(a) makes it unlawful to knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose

of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance. 21 U.S.C.A § 856(1)(a) (West

Supp. 1998)

6 See United States v. Gray

, 105 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997) (mail fraud, conspiracy); s ee also

United States v. McKinney

, 53 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 1995) ( co nspiracy); s ee also United States v.

Cavin

, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994) (conspiracy); see also United States v. Faulkner

, 17 F.3d 745

(5th Cir. 1994) (conspiracy, wire fraud, and RICO charges); s ee also United States v. Wisenbaker

, 14 F.3d 1022 (5th Cir. 1994) (tax evasion); s ee also United States v. Breque

, 964 F.2d 381 (5th Cir.

1992) (conspiracy); see also United States v. Fuller

, 974 F.2d 1 474 (5t h Cir. 1992) (conspiracy

, money laundering).

10 The government argues the i nst ruction was proper relying on U nites States v. Investment

Enterprises, Inc.

, 10 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1993). There, the court concluded the instruction serves to

inform the jury of ignorance as circumstantial proof o f guilty knowledge. I d. at 269. The court

considered the deliberate ignorance instruction a particularized circumstantial evidence instruction.

“To the extent that the instruction is merely a way of allowing the jury to arrive at the conclusion the

defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy, it is hardly inconsistent with a finding that

the defendant intended to further the unlawful purpose.” Id.

Chen held only that the instruction is error when given for § 856(a)(1). 5 This case does not

involve a violation of § 856(a)(1). Additionally, the court in C hen acknowledged that the requirement

of specific intent or specific purpose in a statute does not necessarily prevent a deliberate ignorance

charge. C hen

, 913 F.2d at 192 n. 11. We have consistently held the deliberate ignorance instruction

is prope r when supported by sufficient evidence, including when used with many of the crimes of

which t he Defendants are convicted. 6 Even assuming the district court did err in giving t he

instruction, it was harmless error because the government presented sufficient evidence of ac tual

knowledge to satisfy the knowledge and specific intent requirements for all of the Defendants. S ee

United States v. Soto-Silva , 129 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1997). Because we conclude the district

court did not err in giving the instruction, the Defendants’ argument fails the plain error analysis.

c. Actual Knowledge7 Our decision not to review the Defendants’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel does

n ot prejudice their right to raise the issue in a habeas corpus proceeding. S ee 28 U.S.C.A § 2255

(1994); see also United States v. Ugalde , 861 F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 1988).

11 Finally, the Defendants argue the district court erred in giving the instruction because t he

government presented evidence of actual knowledge. This argument has no merit and fails the plain

error revi ew. C hen held “even if the government’s case was actual knowledge, the defendant’ s

testimony raised the issue of deliberate ignorance. Needless to say, the court is required to ‘instruct

the jury on all aspects of a case in order for them to reach a fair and proper verdict.’” C hen

, 913 F.2d

at 192 (quoting Unit ed States v. Leon , 679 F.2d 534, 541 (5th Cir. 1982)). For the foregoing

reasons, we find the district court did not err in giving the deliberate ignorance instruction.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Defendants argue they were denied effective assistance of counsel because Mrs. Scott’s

attorney did not introduce evidence concerning forgery of her signature, and all of the Defendants’

attorney s did not challenge the government’s evidence that Citibank, London, England was insured

by the FDIC.

Ordinarily, we do not review a claim of ineffe ct ive assistance of counsel on direct appeal

unless the district court has addressed it. See United States v. Rosalez-Orozco

, 8 F.3d 198, 199 (5th

Cir. 1993); s ee also United States v. Armendariaz-Mata

, 949 F.2d 151, 156 (5th Cir. 1991). We will

only determine the merits of the claim on direct appeal when the record is suffi ciently developed.

United Stat es v. Freeze , 707 F.2d 132, 138 (5th Cir. 1983). “This is not merely a procedural

technicality. Unless the district court has developed a record on the defendant’s allegat io ns, we

cannot fairly evaluate the merits of the claim.” U nited States v. Bounds

, 943 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.

1991). 7

We decline to review this claim beca use t he Defendants did not adequately raise this issue

before the district court. Prior to trial, Mr. Scott wrote a letter to his attorney and the district court12

judge expressing his dissatisfaction with his at t o rney and requesting his attorney’s removal. The

district court judge briefly questioned Mr. Scott about his concerns and determined his dissatisfaction

was largely due to a personal dispute rather than ineffective representation. The record is insufficient

for review because it only contains this brief questioning by the judge and contains no discussion of

the issues raised on appeal regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.

The only other attempt to raise this issue below was by Mrs. Scott in her Moti on for New

Trial based on the discovery of new evidence. The Defendants argue in their briefs that ineffective

assistance was raised in the district court because Mrs. Scott’s Motion for New Trial was based on

both grounds of discovery of new evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. Her motion in the

record only addresses the discovery of new evidence. However, in her Reply to the Government’s

Response to Moti on for New Trial, Mrs. Scott stated, “[t]he information gathered after trial is either

newly discovered evidence or evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.” She stated further,

“[t]his approach was also strategically chosen to avoid the seven day deadline under Rule 33.” Mrs.

Scott’s motion did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, because even if her initial

motion had raised th e issue, her motion was untimely. A motion for new trial based on any other

grounds than newly discovered evidence must be made within seven days after verdict or finding of

guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. Mrs. Scott moved for a new trial on April 1, 1997, almost one year after

her guilty verdict was returned on June 12, 1996. “In this circuit, a Rule 33 motion, filed more than

seven days after the verdict and premised on ‘newly discovered evidence,’ is an improper vehicle for

raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” U nited States v. Medina

, 118 F.3d 371, 372 (5th

Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Ugalde

, 861 F.2d 802, 807-09 (5th Cir. 1988)). We decline to

review this issue because the Defendants failed to adequately raise it at the district court level.

D. Denial of Challenges for Cause

The Defendants argue the district court abused its discretion in denying their challenges for13

cause to excuse four prospective jurors. A prospective juror may be excluded for cause where his

or her views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in

accordance with his or her instructions and oath. W ainwright v. Wit t , 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985);

Nethery v. Collins , 993 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1993). The Defendants must show t he dist rict

court’s conclusion that the prospective jurors in question could perform their duties as jurors was

manifest error. See United States v. Dozier , 672 F.2d 531, 547 (5th Cir. 1982).

Two of the prospective jurors in question indicated they would draw negative inferences from

a defe ndant ’s failure to testify. Upon questioning and instruction by the court, however, both

prospective jurors indicated they would be able to put aside suc h inferences and consider only the

evidence presented by the government. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the

Defendants’ challenge for cause. I d. at 549 (district court did not err in denying challenge for cause

where prospective juror agreed to put aside prior impressions as far as “humanly possible”).

Two other prospective jurors indicated that they would t end to believe the testimony of a

government agent. Upon questioning by the court , one of the prospective jurors, Mr. Cook,

acknowledged that he did not believe someone else would be less likely to tell the truth. The other

prospective juror, Mrs. Petrowski, stated she would try to set aside her bias. Such a promise is all

that can be required of a j uror. I d. (“We can ask no more of those who must assume, for the

duration of a trial, the almost superhuman posture of complete impartiality.”). Thus, the district court

did not err in denying the Defendants’ challenges for cause as to these prospective jurors.

E. Sentencing Guideline Issues

The Defendants make several arguments c o ncerning the propriety of their sentences under

the guidelines. Because we reverse the Defendants’ convictions for transfer of false obligations of

the United States under 18 U.S.C.A. § 473 and vacate their sentences, we remand this case to the

district court for resentencing consistent with their remain ing convictions and do not reach the

Defendants’ arguments concerning the sentencing guidelines.14 III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoin g reaso ns, we reverse the Defendants’ conviction for the false transfer of

obligations of the Untied States under 18 U.S.C.A. § 473, affirm the remaining convi ctions and

remand to the district court for resentencing.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED.