1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANTWONE WALKER, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-05-2355

:

RONNIE HOLT, :

: (Judge McClure) 

:

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

May 9, 2006

Background

Antwone Walker (“Petitioner”) initiated this pro se habeas corpus petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while confined at the Schuylkill Federal Correctional

Institution, Minersville, Pennsylvania (“FCI-Schuylkill”). Named as Respondent is

FCI-Schuylkill Warden Ronnie Holt. Service of the petition was previously ordered. 

Petitioner pled guilty to charges of robbery and conspiracy in the Superior

Court for the District of Columbia. On January 17, 1996, he was sentenced to a ten

(10) year term of imprisonment. Walker was paroled from that sentence on February

17, 2002. In his present action, Petitioner initially claims that he was not afforded a

probable cause hearing within five (5) days with respect to a parole violator warrant

executed by the United States Parole Commission (“Parole Commission”) on August

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1 Petitioner indicates that he did not become aware of the dismissal of his

criminal charge until September 25, 2005.

2 A federal prisoner's salient factor score and along with an offense severity

rating are used in conjunction with a matrix chart to form a suggested period of

incarceration for each inmate. 

2

26, 2004. Walker states that the alleged possession of cocaine with intent to distribute

charge set forth in the parole violation warrant coincided with his arrest that same day

on a criminal charge of possession of cocaine in the District of Columbia.

Walker’s second claim maintains that the Parole Commission violated his due

process rights by not holding his “parole hearing/probable cause hearing” in abeyance

pending final disposition of his criminal case. Petitioner notes that his District of

Columbia charge of possession of cocaine was ultimately dismissed for lack of

prosecution on or about April 13, 2005.1 See Record document no. 1, Addendum, p.

3. He next asserts that the Parole Commission mis-characterized his drug offense as

being one of possession with intent to deliver which caused an erroneous increase in

his salient factor score2. Walker further claims that his attorney provided him with

ineffective assistance and that he was improperly denied permission to subpoena his

girlfriend as a witness.

According to the Respondent, the Parole Commission issued a warrant charging

Walker with violating the terms of his parole on August 18, 2004. Specifically, the

warrant alleged that Petitioner: failed to report a change in residence; falsified

supervision reports; possessed crack cocaine with an intent to distribute; and operated

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a motor vehicle without a permit. On August 27, 2004, Walker was arrested pursuant

to the warrant. Four days later, on August 31, 2004, the Petitioner was given a

probable cause hearing.

During the course of his probable cause hearing, the Respondent asserts that

Walker admitted to failing to report his change in residence, falsifying supervision

reports, and driving without a permit. However, Petitioner denied the drug charge,

stating that he had only been criminally charged with possession of cocaine. The

Parole Commission ordered a local revocation hearing.

Petitioner’s local revocation hearing was convened on January 13, 2005. 

Walker was represented by counsel. Testimony was given by a District of Columbia

Park police officer who arrested Petitioner on the drug charge and by Walker’s

supervising parole officer. The police officer testified that he approached the

Petitioner in a park and upon further investigation found him to be in possession of

fifteen (15) bags of crack cocaine and eight (8) Ecstasy tablets. Petitioner maintained

that the drugs were for personal use. However, the parole officer gave testimony that

Petitioner had never tested positive for drug use during one year of supervision. 

Following the hearing, the Parole Commission concluded that Petitioner had violated

the terms of his parole and ordered that he be recommitted to serve a twenty (20)

month term. The National Appeals Board affirmed the decision on direct

administrative appeal.

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3 Although Petitioner was granted until February 10, 2006 in which to file a

reply, one was not submitted.

4

Discussion

Walker filed his present habeas corpus petition on November 14, 2005. By

Order dated November 22, 2005, Petitioner’s motion to waive the filing fee

requirement was denied and he was directed to either pay the required filing fee or

submit an in forma pauperis application. The required filing fee was paid on

December 8, 2005. Service of the petition was ordered on December 19, 2005.

After being granted an enlargement of time, the Respondent filed an answer to the

petition on January 24, 2006.3

The Respondent’s response indicates in part that Walker was eligible for

reparole on April 16, 2006. See Record document no. 12, p. 4. Upon further

investigation via the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Locator website,

www.bop.gov., this Court confirmed that Petitioner was reparoled from a halfway

house on April 14, 2006.

 The case or controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the United States

Constitution subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. Parties must

continue to have a 'personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit." Lewis v.

Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S.

395, 401 (1975). In other words, throughout the course of the action, the aggrieved

party must suffer or be threatened with actual injury caused by the defendant. Lewis,

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4 In Spencer, an attack to a parole revocation by a prisoner who had gained

his release was deemed to lack any collateral consequences.

5

494 U.S. at 477.

A habeas petitioner like Walker who challenges the validity of a parole

revocation always satisfies the case or controversy requirement by the mere fact of his

incarceration. The existing incarceration constitutes the injury, and both may be

redressable by the invalidation of the conviction or parole determination. However, in

a case like the present, where the incarceration has ended, ". . . some 'collateral

consequence' of the conviction (or parole) -- must exist if the suit is to be maintained." 

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1998).4

Petitioner’s present action alleges that he was denied due process during his

parole revocation. As relief, Walker seeks either his immediate release from

incarceration or that he be afforded a special reconsideration hearing. See Record

document no. 1, Addendum, p. 6. As previously noted, the Petitioner was released

from a halfway house on April 14, 2006.

 Based on the rationale set forth by the Supreme Court in Spencer, in order for

Walker to maintain this action, continuing collateral consequences must exist or be

presumed. Id., 118 S. Ct. at 983. It has been held that most criminal convictions do

involve adverse collateral legal consequences. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,

55 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968). However, the same

presumption of collateral consequences has been found not to extend to the situation

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of parole revocation. See Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1982); United

States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2002).

Petitioner has failed to assert or demonstrate any collateral consequences which

may be attributable to his instant claim of improper parole revocation. As such, under

the principles set forth in Spencer, Lane, and Kissinger Walker’s release from

incarceration has caused his instant petition to become moot since it no longer

presents an existing case or controversy. Consequently,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as moot.

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.

3. Based on the Court’s decision herein, there is no basis for the

issuance of a certificate of appealability.

 s/ James F. McClure, Jr. 

 JAMES F. McCLURE, JR.

United States District Judge

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