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NATO: REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 20, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Albright, Hon. Madeleine, former Secretary of State, Principal, Albright 

Stonebridge Group, Washington, DC ................................................................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

(III)

(1) 

NATO: REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS 

THURSDAY, MAY 20, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Shaheen, Kaufman, and Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

We are very fortunate today to be joined by one of America’s 

leading diplomats. And as we begin this hearing, I’m reminded of 

an event just the other day to celebrate Madeleine Albright’s work, 

with a number of distinguished participants, including the current 

Secretary of State, who spoke about Secretary Albright’s accomplishments. And I had the privilege of saying a few words, and I 

mentioned that she once was asked who the toughest negotiating 

partner she had in all her years as U.N. Ambassador and as the 

Secretary of State. Senator Lugar, I want you to know, she didn’t 

miss a beat. She said, ‘‘That’s easy. Foreign Relations Committee 

Chairman Jesse Helms.’’ [Laughter.] 

I promise you, Madam Secretary, this is not going to be that kind 

of session. We are very appreciative for your willingness to come 

back here today and testify before the committee on the important 

topic of NATO. 

Last year, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen asked Secretary 

Albright to chair an expert group responsible for guiding NATO’s 

2010 Strategic Concept. And today she’s here to offer her findings 

as part of the ongoing discussion on NATO’s future, a topic of considerable concern to all of us, given the changing nature of the 

challenges to NATO and, indeed, to the European community and 

to all of us together. 

Like a lot of international institutions that defined the second 

half of the 20th century, NATO needs to struggle, and is struggling 

a little, with the changes of the 21st century. In many ways, we 

continue to wrestle with a similar question to the one with which 

the Clinton administration wrestled, which is: How can alliance 

built in the middle of the 20th century, in the context of the cold 

war, evolve to meet 21st-century threats? 

Obviously, a strong alliance of like-minded democracies grounded 

in mutual defense is a major strategic asset in confronting different 

2 

global problems. NATO’s 28 member states represent some 840 

million people who, collectively, account for nearly half of the 

world’s GDP. 

But unless we actively shape the institution to match new challenges, we simply can’t take for granted that NATO is going to perform the role that it was created for: the protection of its member 

states. 

Our definition of security is now expanding to include new challenges, the obvious ones of the post-9/11 world: terrorist networks, 

but many others, including cyber crime, energy security, the security consequences of climate change, and the struggle of religious 

radical fanaticism. These are just a few of the many issues on 

which member countries are seeking greater cooperation. And each 

deserves further exploration from NATO. 

In Afghanistan the alliance has taken on a new and very challenging mission, its first outside Europe. And while we mourn the 

death, now, of some 1,000 American service men and women— 

there’s a poignant 2-page example of that cost in the Washington 

Post today, where you see the photographs and small bios of each 

of the most recently fallen soldiers—we have to recognize that our 

NATO allies, too, are serving heroically and are experiencing 

losses. 

As we contemplate future NATO missions, we need to have 

processed and thoroughly understood the military and political lessons of Afghanistan. One of them is that a modern military mission 

needs to be fully integrated with a civilian effort, and that security 

within NATO is sometimes going to mean acting beyond its 

boundaries. 

In addition, whatever missions we undertake have to be formulated in a way that continues to attract the support of membercountries’ citizens, ours included. 

Reinventing NATO also means building stronger, more stable relations with our former enemy, Russia. It is encouraging that both 

the United States and NATO have made significant progress. And 

we’re very optimistic that we can deepen this cooperation, with the 

signing of the New START Treaty. I believe that we need to carefully balance our improved relations with Russia with strategic 

reassurances that our Eastern NATO allies can depend on and 

deserve. 

We also need to address a series of practical challenges that have 

become apparent since the last Strategic Concept was drafted in 

1999. 

First, it’s clear that the European Union’s foreign policy responsibilities have multiplied, and the two organizations have to find a 

way around the existing impasse in order to improve cooperation. 

Second, NATO needs to improve its decisionmaking ability, while 

preserving the principle of consensus. 

Third, members of the alliance should continue to pool resources 

under joint commands—and eliminate those commands that are no 

longer necessary. We all know that we’re struggling right now to 

get some member countries to ante up to the challenge that NATO, 

by consensus, has accepted. And it’s proving very difficult—to get 

either troops or resources in some cases. 

3 

Fourth, NATO must do more to protect its own infrastructure 

and critical systems against cyber attacks, and consider how the 

alliance is going to respond to this very new and very dangerous 

threat. 

Finally, we need to address the difficult question of tactical 

nuclear weapons. NATO’s agreement to discuss this question as an 

alliance is a good one. We shouldn’t be negotiating piecemeal what 

is, at core, a question of collective security. There’s a great deal of 

interest in these questions on the committee, and they’ve already 

been proffered in the course of a number of hearings on the New 

START Treaty with respect to Russia’s tactical weapons and with 

respect to Europe. 

These aren’t easy questions. The dangers present at the creation 

of NATO have now largely been supplanted by a new set of urgent 

concerns. But NATO has often been described as a ‘‘living alliance.’’ 

And the proof will be in what we succeed in defining, in terms of 

NATO’s mission, over the course of these next years. 

As Secretary of State during the second half the Clinton administration, Madeleine Albright already presided over two pivotal moments in NATO’s history: NATO’s decision to use military force to 

end the genocide in Kosovo; and the admission of Poland, Hungary, 

and the Czech Republic into the alliance. Secretary Albright has 

already played a profound role in shaping NATO’s present, and 

now she’s been asked by NATO to help shape its future. 

Last October, Secretary Albright appeared before the committee 

to discuss this ongoing work. And now she and a group of distinguished experts from allied countries have released the finished 

product, ‘‘NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement.’’ 

And we look forward to discussing that here this morning. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished witness. And I was relieved, as you were, that neither 

one of us were named as the more difficult negotiator. [Laughter.] 

But, leaving that aside for the moment, we look forward to hearing the details of the report on the future of NATO issued on Monday by Secretary Albright and the Group of Experts. This report 

will serve as a key contribution to ongoing discussions on the new 

NATO Strategic Concept that will be adopted this fall by NATO 

heads of state. 

In particular, I am hopeful that today’s hearing can contribute to 

deliberations on several questions about the direction of NATO’s 

defense plans. 

First, before we can chart a course forward, the alliance must 

ask what the NATO strategic review is intended to achieve. In response to the new threat environment that has emerged since the 

previous Strategic Concept, written in 1999, the alliance has 

fielded more than 100,000 troops and 27 Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams in Afghanistan and has undertaken new missions in the 

realm of energy security, cyber defense, antipiracy, and WMD 

interdiction. In other words, the alliance’s conceptual thinking has 

already evolved significantly. The new NATO Strategic Concept 

4 

should not only solidify this evolution, it should create momentum 

for addressing national deficiencies with regard to public opinion, 

defense reform execution, and budgeting, which remain the most 

difficult obstacles to alliance success. 

Second, what role should nuclear weapons play in NATO’s strategic posture? While some allies have made unprecedented calls for 

the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, the 

planned sharing of these weapons on allied aircraft still is a key 

element of NATO’s defense plans. The new Strategic Concept must 

consider the consequences that altered nuclear planning would 

have on the security of Eastern European states. It also must consider how NATO’s nuclear planning will affect proliferation decisions of allies, especially those proximate to Iran, such as Turkey. 

And, third, how can we strengthen conventional Article 5 deterrence? Following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, many have rightly 

called for measures to reassure Eastern European allies. The reality is that most allies view the presence of United States troops 

and hardware as the ultimate guarantor of their security. Failing 

an alliance consensus on the role new allies may play in hosting 

NATO infrastructure, the implementation of reassurance measures, 

including missile defense plans, infrastructure upgrades, and troop 

deployments, will continue to be hampered. 

Fourth, what constitutes an attack under Article 5 in today’s 

strategic environment? The decline in the deterrent value of Article 

5 became most apparent with the onset of a string of energy crises 

in Europe and the adoption by several West European governments 

of ‘‘beggar-thy-neighbor’’ policies with respect to oil and natural gas 

arrangements with the Russian Federation. When I speak with 

leaders from Eastern European countries, they are especially concerned with the threats posed by cyber war, energy cutoffs, and 

hazardous materials. Since 2006, I have advocated that energy security be incorporated into Article 5, and I continue to believe that 

the alliance must undertake planning to establish a credible deterrent against emerging unconventional threats. 

I thank the chairman again for calling this hearing, and we look 

forward very much to discussions of these matters with our distinguished witness. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. No; thank you, Senator Lugar. 

And I appreciate the presence of the chair of our Subcommittee 

for Europe, Senator Shaheen. 

Also, Ambassador Kutelia, of Georgia, is here. And we welcome 

you back to the committee. Thank you. 

So, Madam Secretary, we look forward to your testimony. You 

can summarize or put the whole statement in the record, whatever 

you prefer. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, PRINCIPAL, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE 

GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Lugar, Senator Shaheen. 

5 

It’s a pleasure to be with you. And thank you very much for inviting me. 

When I came here last fall—that NATO group of experts—we 

were just beginning our work. And now that we’ve finished, I really 

am very pleased to present the recommendations to you. 

As you know, the group was conceived a little bit more than a 

year ago at the alliance summit at Strasbourg-Kehl. And its mandate—and I have to—we have to make this very clear—its mandate 

was to provide analysis and recommendations to NATO’s Secretary 

General as he prepares the Strategic Concept for allied consideration in November in Lisbon. 

The experts group, just like NATO, is diverse. So, we had some 

fairly spirited internal debates. But, also like the alliance at its 

best, we were able to end up speaking with a single voice. So, this 

is a consensus report. 

In fact, most of our recommendations flow from two basic conclusions: first, that the alliance has an ongoing duty to guarantee the 

safety and security of its members; and, second, that it can achieve 

that objective only if it engages dynamically with countries and 

organizations outside its boundaries. 

So, to safeguard security at home, the alliance has to continue 

to treat collective defense as its core purpose. And this does reflect 

the primacy of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and our belief 

that the security of each ally cannot be separated from that of all. 

Accordingly, NATO has to maintain a flexible mix of military 

capabilities, including conventional, nuclear, and missile defense. 

And it has to conduct appropriate contingency planning and military exercises so that allies may feel confident that their borders 

will indeed be protected. 

These measures are fundamental to NATO’s identity and purpose, but they aren’t sufficient. Between now and 2020, the alliance 

will face a new generation of dangers from sources that are geographically and technologically diverse. And some—you have both 

mentioned some of these. These include violent extremism, nuclear 

proliferation, cyber assaults, and attacks on energy infrastructure 

and supply lines. 

Because such perils can arise rapidly and from any direction, the 

alliance has to be much more versatile. And to this end, we have 

the following suggestions: It should accelerate transformation 

through the development of military forces that are sustainable, 

deployable, and interoperable; it should improve its capacity for 

rapid response; it should attach a high priority to shielding information from cyber attacks; and with resources tight, it should allocate defense funds wisely by increasing its commitment to joint 

procurement and specialized needs. 

All this is vital, for NATO’s good intentions have to be matched 

by its capabilities. 

The alliance has to be strong, but it also must be smart. And in 

our era, nothing is smarter than having capable partners. I think 

this is one of the most interesting innovations that we talked 

about. The Group of Experts was united in its view that partners 

should play an increasing role in NATO activities, and that the 

alliance should explore every opportunity for strengthening its 

6 

partnership ties, both as a pragmatic means for solving problems 

and as an instrument of political dialogue. 

Accordingly, NATO should improve its ability to work with other 

countries and organizations, especially in situations where a blend 

of military, economic, and political measures are required. And this 

principle applies to countries that are part of a formal partnership 

arrangement with NATO and those that are not. 

So, for example, Australia and New Zealand have contributed 

troops to Afghanistan, and the Republic of Korea intends to send 

troops, and Japan has supplied money for fuel. One of our recommendations is that such operational partners be given a significant role in planning and shaping the missions to which they 

contribute. 

Another partnership that attracted discussion within our group 

is that between NATO and Russia. For reasons of history and geography, some allies are more skeptical than others about Russia’s 

commitment to a positive relationship. And this divergence was reflected among the experts. But there was no disagreement about 

what NATO’s policy should be. It is clearly in NATO’s best interest 

to work with Moscow to build a cooperative Euro-Atlantic security 

order, and to respond to such shared concerns as terrorism, nuclear 

proliferation, piracy, and drug trafficking. Partnership, as we 

know, is a two-way street. But, from the alliance perspective, the 

door to cooperation with Moscow should remain open at all levels. 

NATO can also influence its security environment by continuing 

its policy of gradual enlargement. Prospective NATO members in 

the Western Balkans and elsewhere in the Euro-Atlantic region 

have a right to fair consideration, based on the same guidelines 

that steered decisions about new members in the past. 

NATO today is busier than ever, but this does not mean that the 

alliance must go everywhere and do everything. There are limits to 

its resources and responsibilities. Indeed, the new Strategic Concept should propose criteria for making wise decisions about when 

and where to commit NATO resources beyond its boundaries. 

In addition, alliance leaders should learn from the experiences in 

Afghanistan by recognizing the imperative of political cohesion, the 

desirability of a unified command, the value of effective planning, 

the importance of public communication, and the need to deploy 

forces at a strategic distance for an extended period of time. 

There should be no question that NATO’s fundamental purpose 

is to protect the security of its members, but providing security is 

a more complicated proposition than in the past. Thus, NATO 

should consider the possibility, when resources are sufficient and 

legal authority is clear, of helping the world respond to catastrophic emergencies, whether caused by nature or by human 

beings. 

Further, we should recognize that NATO is more than just a 

military alliance. It is also a political community and should therefore make more regular and creative use of the mechanism for consultations under Article 4. 

All of these measures should be accompanied by a commitment 

to organizational reform. The Secretary General must have the 

authority and mandate to streamline decisionmaking, prune the 

7 

bureaucracy, and identify savings that can be used for military 

transformation. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in the past 8 

months, the Group of Experts has had to think deeply about the 

issues that some fear could undermine the future cohesion of the 

alliance. And these include the apparent tension between homeland 

defense and expeditionary missions, the difference in attitudes 

toward Russia, the imbalance in military expenditures, and the nuclear question. 

And when we started out, I have to confess to harboring some 

doubts about whether we would be able to define a common 

approach toward these and other issues. But, as we went along, I 

really found that there was such a desire for agreement, and that 

that outweighed the dubious pleasures of argument, and that, with 

sufficient patience, the basis for a common approach could be 

found. 

Now, no one can expect an alliance of 28 members to function 

without occasional grumbling and dissent. But I did arrive, at the 

conclusion of this process, with more optimism about NATO’s continued unity and future success than when I began. And I have to 

say, I was truly honored to chair this very interesting Group of 

Experts, and to have something to do with making NATO a 

versatile and agile instrument in a period of great unpredictability. 

Thank you all very much. And I look forward to answering 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Albright follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, PRINCIPAL, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and thank you for 

inviting me. 

When I came before you last fall, the NATO Group of Experts was just beginning 

its work. 

Now we have just finished and I am pleased to share with you our recommendations. 

As you know, the Group of Experts was conceived a little more than a year ago 

at the Alliance summit in Strasbourg-Kehl. 

Its mandate was to provide analysis and recommendations to NATO’s Secretary 

General as he prepares a new Strategic Concept for Allied consideration in Lisbon 

this coming November. 

The Experts Group, like NATO, is diverse—and so we had spirited internal 

debates. 

But also like the Alliance at its best—we were able in the end to speak with a 

single voice. 

In fact, most of our recommendations flow from two basic conclusions. 

First, the Alliance has an ongoing duty to guarantee the safety and security of 

its members. 

Second, it can achieve that objective only if it engages dynamically with countries 

and organizations that are outside its boundaries. 

To safeguard security at home, the Alliance must continue to treat collective 

defense as its core purpose. 

This reflects the primacy of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and our belief 

that the security of each ally cannot be separated from that of all. 

Accordingly, NATO must maintain a flexible mix of military capabilities, including conventional, nuclear, and missile defense. 

It must also conduct appropriate contingency planning and military exercises so 

that allies may feel confident that their borders will indeed be protected. 

These measures are fundamental to NATO’s identity and purpose—but they are 

not sufficient. 

Between now and 2020, the Alliance will face a new generation of dangers from 

sources that are geographically and technologically diverse. 

8 

These threats include violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, cyber assaults and 

attacks on energy infrastructure and supply lines. 

Because such perils can arise rapidly and from any direction, the Alliance must 

become more versatile. 

To this end: 

• It should accelerate transformation through the development of military forces 

that are sustainable, deployable, and interoperable; 

• It should improve its capacity for rapid response; 

• It should attach a high priority to shielding information from cyber attacks; and 

• With resources tight, it should allocate defense funds wisely, by increasing its 

commitment to joint procurement and specialized needs. 

All this is vital—for NATO’s good intentions must be matched by its capabilities. 

The Alliance must be strong, but it must also be smart and—in our era—nothing 

is smarter than having capable partners. 

The Group of Experts was united in its view that partners should play an increasing role in NATO activities, and that the Alliance should explore every opportunity 

for strengthening its partnership ties both as a pragmatic means for solving problems and as an instrument of political dialogue. 

Accordingly, NATO should improve its ability to work with other countries and 

organizations, especially in situations where a blend of military, economic, and political measures are required. 

This principle applies to countries that are part of a formal partnership arrangement with NATO and those that are not. 

For example, Australia and New Zealand have contributed troops to Afghanistan, 

the Republic of Korea intends to send troops, and Japan has supplied money and 

fuel. 

One of our recommendations is that such operational partners be given a significant role in planning and shaping the missions to which they contribute. 

Another partnership that attracted discussion within our Group is that between 

NATO and Russia. 

For reasons of history and geography, some allies are more skeptical than others 

about Russia’s commitment to a positive relationship. 

This divergence was reflected among the experts, but there was no disagreement 

about what NATO’s policy should be. 

It is clearly in NATO’s best interest to work with Moscow to build a cooperative 

Euro-Atlantic security order and to respond to such shared concerns as terrorism, 

nuclear proliferation, piracy, and drug trafficking. 

Partnership, as we know, is a two way street—but from the Alliance perspective, 

the door to cooperation with Moscow should remain open at all levels. 

NATO can also influence its security environment by continuing its policy of gradual enlargement. 

Prospective NATO members in the Western Balkans and elsewhere in the EuroAtlantic region have a right to fair consideration based on the same guidelines that 

steered decisions about new members in the past. 

NATO today is busier than ever, but this does not mean that the Alliance must 

go everywhere and do everything—there are limits to its resources and to its responsibilities. 

Indeed, the new Strategic Concept should propose criteria for making wise decisions about when and where to commit NATO resources beyond its boundaries. 

In addition, Alliance leaders should learn from its experiences in Afghanistan by 

recognizing the imperative of political cohesion, the desirability of unified command, 

the value of effective planning, the importance of public communications, and the 

need to deploy forces at a strategic distance for an extended period of time. 

There should be no question that NATO’s fundamental purpose is to protect the 

security of its members. 

But providing for security is a more complicated proposition than in the past. 

Thus, NATO should consider the possibility, when resources are sufficient and 

legal authority is clear, of helping the world respond to catastrophic emergencies, 

whether caused by nature or by human beings. 

Further, we should recognize that NATO is more than just a military alliance; it 

is also a political community, and should therefore make more regular and creative 

use of the mechanism for consultations under Article 4. 

All of these measures should be accompanied by a commitment to organizational 

reform. 

The Secretary General must have the authority and the mandate to streamline 

decisionmaking, prune the bureaucracy, and identify savings that can be used for 

military transformation. 

9 

Mr. Chairman, in the past 8 months, The Group of Experts has had to think 

deeply about issues that some fear could undermine the future cohesion of the 

Alliance. 

These include the apparent tension between homeland defense and expeditionary 

missions; the difference in attitudes toward Russia; the imbalance in military expenditures; and the nuclear question. 

When we started out, I confess to harboring doubts about whether we would be 

able to define a common approach toward these and other issues. 

But as we went along, I found that the desire for agreement outweighed the dubious pleasures of argument and that, with sufficient patience, the basis for a common 

approach could be found. 

No one can expect an Alliance of 28 members to function without occasional grumbling and dissent. 

However, I arrive at the conclusion of this process with more optimism about 

NATO’s continued unity and future success than when I began. 

Thank you; and now I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might 

have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

If all those things can work, it sounds very encouraging and 

positive. 

I want to try to press you, in terms of the experience that we’ve 

been through, and measure it a little. 

Can you share with us how people dealt with the reality of the 

divisions that exist today over participation in Afghanistan as people look at the spotty record of some in participation—the ‘‘very tailored’’ or ‘‘carved out’’ special approaches that other nations have 

chosen; i.e., they won’t put in combat forces; they’ll provide police, 

or they’ll provide money, or else send certain kinds of assistance, 

but not any else. It’s such a tug-of-war to get people to understand, 

this is not about the United States. After all, Madrid was bombed, 

London was bombed. There have been other terrorist events in 

Europe. 

Is their attitude just different about this than ours regarding 

Afghanistan, and therefore, are we trying to fit NATO into an inappropriate challenge? And if there are other challenges, maybe there 

would be greater unity on them? How did you, as you talked this 

through, resolve these very obvious differences of approach to this 

threat? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, one of our real questions was: To 

what extent should we spend time on Afghanistan? And—because 

this is supposed to be a Strategic Concept for the next decade, not 

for the next year—and clearly, Afghanistan is a major issue. So, 

what we decided to do was, in our second seminar, we really looked 

at what the lessons learned were out of these out-of-area operations. And Afghanistan, obviously, was the major issue. 

And there were a number of issues that came up with regard to 

that, that in many ways deal with the questions that you pose. 

And it requires a little bit of going back to how NATO got into 

Afghanistan. 

What happened, as you know, is that it was the first time that 

Article 5 was activated. After 9/11, one of the allies had been 

attacked, and others had a responsibility to respond. And they did. 

The problem was that, to some extent, there was a desultory—or 

I don’t know what the exact right word is—response to using 

NATO as the instrument, and there were ways that there were— 

putting together coalitions of the willing—various ways that the 

10 

United States decided to deal with that. And then we turned our 

attention to Iraq. 

So one of the questions was: How did this whole operation get 

put together in the first place? And, what was expected of the various allies? And how was the whole command pulled together? 

We took these questions as a lesson. And concluded that in the 

future there had to be some unity of command, that there shouldn’t 

be national caveats, that there had to be common planning, and 

that there had to be a way to obviate the very things that you 

spoke about, and in terms of understanding who contributes what. 

The other part—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that was achieved? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. No. Well, we were talking about the future. We 

met with the military authorities many times, and we obviously 

raised these issues when we were talking to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. Other experts. But we put it down as 

something that had to happen in the future if these kinds of expeditionary missions were to be undertaken—the lessons learned. 

The other part that came out and is now part of the vocabulary— 

what Afghanistan has taught is what we are calling ‘‘the comprehensive approach,’’ which is that maybe the future kinds of missions like this are not ones that can be only won by the military; 

there has to be a civilian and military component acting together. 

So, we recommended that a part of the NATO structure have a 

small civilian unit that could help coordinate the nonmilitary components of an international response to a complex situation. 

Another point is that we did not want to make Afghanistan the 

be-all and end-all of NATO. It is a mission, a very important mission, and lessons have to be learned from it, but the Strategic Concept has to go beyond just Afghanistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m a little either confused or troubled by the notion that they can deal with the future, but not the present, and 

I’m not sure what gets them to perform differently in the future if 

they’re unwilling to do so now. What if there’s the same desultory 

response to some particular challenge—if one other nation gets hit, 

and they say, ‘‘Well, now we all have to respond.’’ What is there 

to suggest that they will do so differently than they have in this 

particular instance? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I believe that they—from everything that I could tell in dealing with the people in NATO, they 

have taken on board what the problems have been in Afghanistan. 

The Secretary General has gone out there and really gotten additional troops, has made the point about the national caveats, has 

made the point about the sustainability of having deployed forces. 

He’s also made the point about countries contributing resources. 

And I think they have learned. They have been learning. There’s 

no question in my mind about that. And I didn’t mean to intimate 

that they were not learning on the job; I think they are. I think 

they’re trying to figure out how to make up for some of the problems that have existed for the last 7 years. 

For instance—it’s interesting. I was in Australia recently. The 

Australians have clearly contributed many forces to Afghanistan. 

11 

They were not involved in the original planning. They are now very 

much part of what is going on, in terms of the partnerships. 

So, I think a lot has been learned. There are a lot of NATO forces 

in there. But, I was speaking more to the point of what we were 

trying to do in the Strategic Concept, because we were not dealing 

specifically with instructions to NATO forces right now. But, having a civilian representative and a military representative—all 

those things, I think, are part of the learning process dealing with 

the U.N. and other organizations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me come back, in the next round, if I can. 

Thank you Madam Secretary. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Secretary Albright, several allies have called for 

withdrawal of the remaining United States tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, which are in the form of gravity bombs that can 

be deployed on allied dual-capable aircraft. As you know, these 

weapons were not included in the START Treaty negotiations, and 

have not been the subject of prior arms control agreements with 

Russia. The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal exceeds the NATO 

arsenal by nearly 10 to 1. And Russia is not only modernizing its 

tactical system, but is also placing greater reliance on nuclear 

weapons, as we heard from Secretary Gates on Tuesday. 

Now, my questions are: How do you view the role of NATO and 

Russian tactical weapons in Europe? And what strategy do you 

recommend for engaging Russia on reducing its tactical nuclear 

arsenal? And second, what approaches have the other nuclearweapon states in NATO, namely Great Britain and France, taken 

on the question of NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Senator Lugar, we spent quite a lot of time on this 

and, I think, had some of our livelier discussions on this particular 

issue. And we have written about this very specifically. Let me just 

go into this a bit and respond to what you asked. 

First of all, it’s very clear that NATO continues to rely on conventional and nuclear weapons. That is part of the deterrent posture. And we also believe that, as long as nuclear weapons remain 

a part of the system, that the alliance has to have a nuclear component. And we’ve tried to fit that in to the general discussion that 

it would be—the world will be better off without nuclear weapons. 

But, so long as they exist, NATO must take that reality into 

account. 

So, one of the aspects that we looked at was specifically—and 

this was not easy, because, as we were speaking about this, various 

Parliaments were making unilateral statements about what they 

desired to do, and also the fact that, when we were in Russia, there 

were discussions about what to do about the substrategic—and so, 

what we came up with was that we felt it was very important that 

as long as nuclear weapons existed, that whatever decisions were 

made on the tactical nukes had to be made as an alliance, which 

I think is a very strong statement, especially given what some of 

the political discussions were about. And I was very glad that we 

were able to get that kind of a consensus agreement. 

We also did believe that it was very important to have discussions with the Russians over this. As you know, there are some 

who believe that we should just do this unilaterally. We came up 

12 

with the idea that there be, in fact, talks, and that the special consultative group on arms control be reestablished in order to be able 

to have this kind of a dialogue both internally within the alliance 

and with the Russians on this issue. And I think that was a pretty 

good consensus approach to it, given what some of the political 

issues on all this are. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I thank you for that answer and likewise 

for citing specifically what is in the report that you have been 

authoring and will be considered by our NATO allies. 

Let me now address the issue of energy security. Energy security 

constitutes one of the often-mentioned 21st-century threats that 

many people, including myself, believe NATO must take a lead on. 

While some have argued that these tasks should be left to the 

European Union, the EU has, for a number of reasons, shown it’s 

not really up to the task. I’ve been encouraged that NATO has 

made energy security a part of its operational duties throught activities such as infrastructure protection and intelligence analysis. 

My question is: How do you believe energy security can be made 

a part of NATO’s core operation? And is this addressed in the report that you’re presenting? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Again, we had a very interesting discussion on 

this. And I know, Senator, this is one of the issues you’ve brought 

up when I was here before, and I specifically wanted to direct our 

discussions to deal with this issue. Also, the vice chair, selected by 

Secretary General Rasmussen, was Jeroen van der Veer, who had 

been the former CEO of Royal Dutch Shell. So, we had an energy 

expert. And it was very interesting, in terms of how we talked 

about what the issues were. And we tried to kind of unpackage the 

whole question. 

Clearly, one of the major issues to deal with energy security is 

for the various countries involved to try to find alternative sources 

and conservation. And we did talk about that. However, there’s no 

question that a certain number of the countries are dependent on 

imported energy supplies. And so, on—via pipelines and shipping. 

And the way that we parsed this—I know what you just said about 

the EU, but the bottom line is, in terms of some of the issues that 

have to do with diplomacy, that the EU should have a role in it. 

We also thought that, since we spent quite a lot of time talking 

about the potential uses of Article 4, which were consultative 

issues and make this a political community, that one could, in fact, 

raise issues of energy supply within NATO under Article 4, but 

that there was a partnership with the EU. We also did consider the 

fact that, if there were attacks or sabotage or something that involved the physical destruction of rigs or pipelines, that then 

NATO should have a role in dealing with that. 

So, we kind of unpacked all this. And we did say—and again, the 

recommendation that we made, if I might just cite it, is, ‘‘The potential for major energy supply disruption should figure prominently in NATO’s strategic assessment and contingency planning 

activities. Thought should be given in advance to how the alliance 

might work with partners in an emergency situation to mitigate 

harm to its members and find alternative sources.’’ So, we did consider this at some length. 

13 

There was also the issue of the High North, what would happen 

there. And what really happened was, countries thought that they 

should deal with it on a national basis. 

So, definitely on the agenda, and unpacked in a way that I think 

provided some guidance for the Secretary General on this. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I understand Senator Kaufman has a pressing engagement, and 

Senator Shaheen is allowing him to go ahead with his remarks. 

So, thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

And, Senator Kaufman, you’re recognized. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing. 

And thank you, Senator Shaheen. One of the bad sides of being 

a Senator. 

We had a good discussion before you kind of went off and solved 

these problems. 

First, I want to thank you for your service. Your service is incredible, what you do. And what you bring to our whole effort is 

just wonderful. 

And I want to, kind of, take a little, slight divergence to what 

Senator Kerry said. I agree totally with what he said. But, you 

know, the problem here—and I agree with—totally what—everything he said. If we can’t do it in Afghanistan, what makes us 

think you’re—we’ll be able to do it down the road? But to get back 

to what—the discussion we had before you left, and that is, you’ve 

got an organization here that’s done incredible good for the world— 

for Europe and for the world—NATO—which I have been a very 

strong supporter, and everybody I’ve ever worked with has been a 

strong supporter for, and I know you’re a strong supporter—as a— 

it’s changed the face of Europe. By forcing people to change their 

internal governance in order to be members of NATO, the impact 

has been incredible. 

But, now we find ourselves with an organization that has 28 

members. How does it ever—I know we’ve talked about this 

before—how do you ever operate, in a military situation, with 28 

members? And I think what the chairman’s talking about is—in 

Afghanistan—is an example of how difficult it is to operate militarily, with 28 folks. So, can you—the Group of Experts—kind of, 

what do they see, in terms of the actual NATO, totally as a military operation, trying to operate with 28 members? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I went over my testimony from last time, and your 

questions, and that you had doubts. But, I think what is interesting is that, in some ways, NATO—the way you posed the question—is the victim of its own success. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Because, it is an organization that people—countries want to be members of. And it does have that catalytic effect 

of producing democratic governments and governance and resolving 

interethnic strife, or they can’t get in—various issues like that. 

We spent a lot of time on the question that you’ve asked. I mean, 

there’s the whole issue about whether an operation like this can 

operate by consensus. It is very hard, again. And I just described 

14 

what happened in our group is that we went and had an ‘‘away 

day’’ with the NAC—we met with the NAC, officially and unofficially. And there is no way that the consensus concept is going to 

disappear at the NAC level. Countries are asked to contribute 

troops. And I think the United States wouldn’t want to be without 

that. 

So, what we began to look at was whether there were ways that 

the bureaucracy—military, as well as the civilians—could be 

pruned, and how to ensure that decisions could be made in a more 

rational way. We also said that decisions reached by NAC shouldn’t 

be undermined at lower levels. 

We spent a lot of time with the military authorities, in terms of 

their looking at how to do more common planning, common procurement, more specialization, and put on the table ways that we 

thought that a big alliance could, in fact, operate together more 

rationally. 

But, here the issue is—and I really do believe that major mistakes were made on how we pursued the Afghan campaign, early 

on, and that we have to learn from those mistakes. And what I find 

interesting is the way that the Secretary General is pushing countries to be more respectful of the common command; of giving 

troops and having them do what they’re supposed to do in the region where they are. I am the Secretary of State that first took 

NATO to war. And we saw what the problems were, in terms of 

doing that in the Balkans. 

Yesterday, I appeared with Admiral Stavridis, the SACEUR, who 

gets this, totally, and also General Abrial, who is in ACT, which 

is the forward-looking aspect of this, with the French. They are 

looking at exactly the issues that you’re talking about. And I think 

it is worth pursuing, and our military authorities are working with 

them, and the CHODs have their role. It is not—we raised the 

issues, and we put some ideas on the table, but this is the ongoing 

reform that the Secretary General is going to push with Admiral 

Stavridis. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. Thank you. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good morning. 

I want to echo my colleagues in thanking you for the work that 

you’ve done on the Strategic Concept and, of course, all of your 

service to this country. It’s very nice to have you here. 

I had the opportunity to hear firsthand and really see the impact 

of the stability that NATO can provide to countries in Europe, 

when I visited the Balkans last February with Senator Voinovich. 

And what we heard—we visited most of the countries in the western Balkans—and what we heard, without exception, was the importance of providing MAP for Bosnia, because of the stabilizing effect that would have. And I was very pleased to see that NATO did, 

in fact, provide that, with conditions, for Bosnia. And hopefully it 

will have the kind of stabilizing effect that people talked about. 

One concern that we heard from some of the countries that we 

visited was that there is enlargement fatigue and that there will 

be obstacles to allowing countries into NATO as we go into the future. Can you talk about the extent to which that might exist, and 

how the Strategic Concept addresses that issue? 

15 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I’m glad you went to the Balkans, because I do think that the role that NATO has played there 

has been, obviously, crucial and instrumental in getting any 

change. The points that you made, in many ways, address the issue 

of the catalytic effect of holding out that a country will be a member of NATO. I think that is a very important part. 

We did address the whole issue of the open door and enlargement, and felt that there needed to be the continued holding the 

door open, according to Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and 

that that should be pursued, and that there had to be guidelines 

that follow on Article 10, to make clear that joining NATO is not 

just a privilege, it is a responsibility. And that does entail having 

democratic governance, civilian control over the military, a general 

way of being able to run a country without disputes. And so, I 

think it’s important to keep that there. 

And also, what’s been very interesting, Senator, is the way that 

various glide paths have been kind of expanded and subdivided. I 

mean, when I first started out on this, I was U.S. Ambassador to 

the U.N. I went with General Shalikashvili to explain what Partnership for Peace was about. That was the initial glide path. And 

then there were—how that worked—and then the MAP, and then 

the pre-MAP. And so, there are different ways that countries are 

prepared for their membership. 

So, I think that path is there. Article 10 is there. And we wanted 

to make sure that that would happen. It is a large alliance. But, 

I think that it should have members in it that are prepared to 

carry out their responsibilities and then be able to live up to what 

they promise. So, that’s where we left that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

You talk, in your testimony, about the Strategic Concept proposing criteria for making decisions about when and where to commit NATO resources beyond its boundaries. Can you talk about 

what that criteria should be? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. And if I might, specifically—because I 

think—and it goes a little bit to the question that Chairman Kerry 

asked—is—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. We are in Afghanistan. How is it— 

what are the lessons learned out of it? 

First of all, let me just say this. We do believe that NATO is the 

premier military alliance that exists. But, it isn’t the only way that 

one can answer every problem. And one of the—there were great 

images that came up. When we had our first meeting, we put all 

the problems on the table—kind of, the horrors of the world. And 

then we began to think: How could NATO deal with these issues? 

And then somebody said, ‘‘We can’t have NATO be like a Swiss 

army knife with all the blades extended, because when that happens, you can’t even pick it up.’’ And so, you have to figure, what 

is the appropriate instrument? What are the partnerships? 

And NATO, we said, was a regional organization, not a global 

organization. It expands its power by having partnerships with 

countries and organizations, but it can’t do everything. 

But, what we did say was that—when the issue came up, on a 

case-by-case basis, that deliberations within the NAC should give 

16 

weight to such factors as—and if I might actually list them—the 

extent and imminence of danger to alliance members; the exhaustion or apparent ineffectiveness of alternative steps; the ability and 

willingness of NATO members to provide the means required for 

success; the involvement of partners in helping to ensure an effective and timely remedy to the problem at hand; the collateral impact on other NATO missions and needs; the degree of domestic 

and international public support; conformity with international 

law; and the foreseeable consequences of inaction. 

So, we really put down quite a lot of guidelines that create a 

kind of sieve that the NATO members really have to think about: 

What other organizations are there? What partnerships? 

So, I think we were pretty careful about this, because—back to 

what the chairman said—we could not spend all our time on 

Afghanistan, but we did want to draw the lessons from the Balkans 

and Afghanistan for future guidelines. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

When you were here last year, as you were starting this process, 

one of the questions that came up was the concern about burdensharing and how—given the different capacity and resources of the 

members of NATO, how resources could be shared in a way that 

had everybody participating and taking responsibility, but that recognized that some people didn’t have the same capacity as other 

members, to participate. So, can you talk about how much of an 

issue that was, and how you think the Strategic Concept has 

resolved that? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. Well, first of all, we believed, and we said, 

that countries needed to live up to their responsibilities. Unfortunately, many of them are not. Each country is supposed to devote 

2 percent of their budget to defense, and only six are actually doing 

that. So, that—it is a real problem. 

We were also doing all this in the middle of a financial crisis, 

and one of the issues that we talked about is, What happens now? 

Most of the countries in NATO have a sizable deficit, and the question is, How do they now come up with this? 

I did a number of interviews earlier this week in Brussels with 

the Secretary General, who emphasized that NATO contributes to 

stability without which countries would have even deeper economic 

problems than they do. 

Yesterday, Admiral Stavridis made a very important point in a 

discussion that we had—which is that as budgets fall the 2 percent 

actually becomes a smaller number. There’s not an absolute number of what countries have to invest. But the fact remains that 

countries had to live up to their obligations. 

Now, we also tried to look at the cost-saving aspects of common 

funding and similar measures. We also recommend giving the Secretary General more authority to find ways to save money through 

reforms, common procurement practices and common funding. So, 

we hit this on all levels. There has to be living up to responsibilities, there has to be smarter spending, and you can’t ask an alliance to do more with less. So, there has to be smarter spending, 

and that’s what we were looking at. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

17 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator 

Shaheen. 

I know our chairman will be back in just a moment. But, let me 

continue the questioning, sort of, carrying on the conversation on 

Senator Shaheen’s question. 

One of the criticisms of the NATO alliance over the last few 

years has been, essentially, the diminishing of defense budgets by 

most of our allies, across the board. Fewer and fewer dollars—or 

euros—and fewer people, and to a point where, even if NATO decided upon an expeditionary force in Afghanistan or elsewhere, 

there would be fewer and fewer personnel for that force, most of 

the objective being internal domestic boundary situations. That 

still seems to be continuing. 

And this, you know, leads to a question, I suppose, Can European countries, in particular, many of whom have a very strong social safety net—an allocation of more and more of their resources 

to pensions, or to education, or to internal transportation, or to 

other domestic situations—but are dependent upon the alliance, 

and maybe us, the United States and the transatlantic aspect—I’m 

just curious whether the Commission tried to get into this business 

of the values of expenditures and budgets, the trends of all of this, 

and whether this is going to work, in terms of the future. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I think, Senator, there obviously was a recognition 

of the fact that the United States is the big country with all the 

power in this, and provides the bulk of troops in Afghanistan and 

in other places. And what I think is evident here is, many of us 

have grown up with NATO, but there is a whole new generation 

of people, in Europe and in this country, who have no idea what 

this alliance is about. And so, one of the things that we felt was 

important, and will continue to be important, is the transparency 

of what we’ve been doing, and trying to get support for it, especially given the financial situation everywhere. 

And we talked about the fact that this was an alliance of 

equals—on the other hand, that there were some who did more 

than others, and that there had to be a way that there was a buyin by all the countries, in terms of their responsibilities. I think 

this is going to be the big push and the big issue. 

The Secretary General—a European—is very much aware of this, 

and has made this a cause, and, in fact, has already begun his 

arguments, including the fact that contributions to NATO provide 

for internal stability. 

So, it’s an argument that has to be made. We made it. I know 

that there’s a sense that there are those who are not doing their 

share. I think more and more are. I think the response to the Secretary General, as well as to President Obama and Secretary Clinton, on getting more support for Afghanistan is there. 

The thing that I found interesting—and we were never totally 

able to resolve, in terms of how one counts this—but, if one talks 

about the comprehensive approach of military and civilian, and the 

kind of work that has to be done in training forces, or training the 

police, or dealing on reconstruction teams, they—the allies are 

making a variety of very strong contributions. 

The question is, Do training and development contributions 

count toward an ally’s 2 percent? Not necessarily. So, these are the 

18 

kinds of issues we all have to continue to deal with. But, the Europeans on the Group of Experts understood fully the message that 

this was not just the United States bearing the burden, but that 

they had equal responsibility here. 

But, it’s hard—there’s no question—they have their economic 

problems, and that’s why it’s so important that we try to get the 

younger generations to understand the value of this alliance. 

Senator LUGAR. I would conclude by noting that perhaps by the 

time you come to the final conference with the allies, we will know 

more about whether the Greek economy has stabilized, and if the 

challenging situation facing the economies throughout the 

Eurozone is looking better in general. There are pessimists who say 

that this will not be resolved very soon, and could even put great 

pressure, regardless of intent, upon, not only those countries that 

are under much scrutiny, but all of the others in the alliance who 

are trying to support them and are trying to support the euro. 

This is a larger question than the ideas before us today specifically regarding NATO. But, your comments have underlined that 

a great deal of thought is being given, obviously, by the United 

States and our NATO allies, as to the impact these issues could 

have upon our economies and budgets. 

So, I know that you will be observant of this situation, as will 

those who are going to be around the table with you. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Let me just respond to this—not as the chair of 

this Group of Experts, but as a political scientist and observer of 

the international scene—there is a major shift going on here. The 

European Union was, in fact, with all the discussions over the Lisbon Treaty, was moving into a phase of more integrated institutional structures. And all of a sudden, with the financial crisis, 

there is a tendency to kind of go national again. 

We are watching what the trends are. There are certainly those 

within the European construct who are pushing very hard to make 

sure that the eurozone continues to work together. It’s very interesting to watch how the central banks are operating—whether 

they’re going to be able to get their monetary and fiscal policies together. To what extent is there dedication to the European experiment? And I think it’s a very important time. 

As an American, I want to see a strong Europe. I actually think 

we’re better off with it. And so, I’m hoping that that actually works 

and that the NATO part of this can help in terms of stability. Obviously we talked a lot about this because, except for the Canadian 

and me, all the other experts were Europeans. 

And if I just might say, back on Afghanistan—there are 40,000 

non-U.S. troops in that country. And although it’s not a great way 

to measure things, in terms of per-capita casualties, No. 1 is Estonia, second is Denmark, third is Canada, and the United States is 

fifth. In addition. Norway has 41⁄2 million people and they contribute 450 troops. So, if you think about 450, it doesn’t seem so 

big. But, it’s a pretty small population. And we have to look at the 

various aspects of how this is done. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

19 

Madam Secretary, I’m interested as to how you all approached 

this review. Was there an automatic assumption and agreement 

that NATO has a purpose that is defined for the 21st century? Or 

did you have to work your way to that? In other words, was there 

a challenge to whether or not NATO, in fact, ought to exist and has 

a relevance in the modern context, particularly given the EU 

issues, the AU, the regional defense discussions, and other things 

going on? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, we pulled that apart in many different ways. I think what is interesting is, there clearly is a default 

drive that says, ‘‘Once an institution exists, it ought to continue existing.’’ I mean, that’s a part of the system, in many ways. 

But, we went through two phases. One was, as I mentioned, that 

all of a sudden, NATO was supposed to do everything. I mean we 

put the horrors of the world on the plate and thought, ‘‘Well, NATO 

could do this. NATO could do that.’’ And we became, I think, much 

more surgical, in terms of the things NATO should be able to do. 

It was—it’s very interesting—we’re in the third phase of NATO. 

The first phase was very clear. It was an alliance against the 

Soviet Union, and we—in many ways, we knew how to do that. 

Then the second phase was the post-cold-war phase where there 

was clearly a desire from countries to join NATO, and it was what 

you were saying, Senator Shaheen and Senator Kaufman—and 

just, you know, ‘‘Here we are. Great club. We should—people 

should belong to it,’’ but a little unclear about how it should operate. And was it worth carrying on? And trying to persuade the Russians that it was not against them. 

I think we are now in the third phase of how this instrument, 

which really is quite remarkable, can be used for these new 

threats. And so, we then focused on how to make it more agile and 

versatile in a period of unpredictability, not saying that it had to 

do everything. But, from the perspective of a decisionmaker, you’ve 

got problems out there; which alliance or group are you going to 

pick up? And we felt that NATO still was the alliance that was 

able to deal with these issues, versus a coalition of the willing. And 

I know women are not great at sports analogies, but the bottom 

line is, it’s better to have a team that trains and operates together, 

and knows how to react in various situations, than just going to a 

pickup operation. 

So, I think that that’s where we came out; not NATO, everywhere, all the time, as a global organization, but a much more 

streamlined, clear, operational way of keeping together countries 

that have a commonality and that understand that their security 

depends on each other. So—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s helpful. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. We argued both, frankly. 

The CHAIRMAN. And, in the context of where you did land, you 

suggested that NATO would benefit with stronger partnerships 

with the entities that I mentioned—— 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The EU, the AU, Japan—— 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Russia, et cetera. But, you also 

pointed out that it suffers from this internal coordination problem 

20 

and insufficient capacity of the Article 4 consultation. Given that, 

how do you get from here to there? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. Well, first of all, I do think that the partnership part was a discovery, for many people. In our third seminar 

that we had, we had a discussion with partners. We found out 

there were more partners than allies. And so, there were a number 

of different types. There were those that were organizational ones. 

We did meet with the EU. I have to admit, it was at a moment 

when the EU was feeling more robust than later. It has to do with 

your question, Senator Lugar. And we felt that there were—obviously, the EU and NATO have a lot of overlapping members and 

taxpayers. And so, there—we felt that there needed to be a better 

way that those organizations work together. But that the partnerships—in order to be useful, there had to be a coordinating mechanism within the bureaucracy of NATO to be able to really interact 

with the various partners, and to be able to use them in a way to 

deal effectively with the different issues. 

So, I think that we did look at that. And the coordination is 

something that we said the Secretary General—the countries have 

to get their head around this; there’s just no question. And it 

doesn’t work by making one more committee. It actually works by 

trying to pair a lot of the committees. 

And what I find interesting—Secretary General Rasmussen is on 

the case. I mean, a lot of changes have happened already. They’re 

in the process of reform. I hope the United States and other countries will continue to push on this. The partnerships help extend 

NATO’s reach—I mean, look at Australia and New Zealand, various other countries—but they have to be part of the planning, 

early on. So, a lot of work has to be done on that score. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Madam Secretary, thank you. 

I need to go meet with President Calderon. 

I thank you for your expertise on this, which is really important 

and enormously helpful to the committee. 

I’d like to leave open the record. Although I don’t want to burden 

you with a lot of questions, there are a few additional ones that 

would help us. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. OK. Very happy to. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know you don’t have the State Department at 

your disposal to help you put them all—but, you’ve got—— 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Good volunteers. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Capable staffs there. So it would 

help us a lot. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. And I may say, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, I think that this is going to be an effort, a public effort. 

This is the most transparent working of a Strategic Concept, ever. 

And—partially at the direction of the Secretary General and partially my own instincts on it—I think it’s a treaty that is definitely 

viable and important for the 21st century. But it will not happen 

if the American people don’t understand it, and the publics in the 

other countries. So, while we have been officially disbanded as a 

group, we liked each other so much that—and everybody thought 

this was such a worthy project, that we’re going to keep talking 

about it. 

21 

But I think having your help in all of this is going to be absolutely essential. So, whatever you need, we’ll be very, very happy 

to provide. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think it’s key—— 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I thank you all. 

The CHAIRMAN. I was very struck by the point you made about 

the generational shift. You know, a lot of us take NATO for 

granted. But, it is true that probably three-quarters of the Nation 

doesn’t really have a sense—— 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. What it means. That’s a lot of folks 

who need to be reconnected to how it’s going to have an impact on 

their lives. That’s why I think the relevancy and the new definitions of threats, and how they’re going to act is going to be key. 

But NATO itself is going to have to define itself in ways that 

matter to the American people. And if they don’t show up, or hold 

back, or there is this division, it is inevitable that there will be a 

serious reevaluation in this country. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Absolutely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen, will you chair, at this point? 

Senator SHAHEEN. I’m actually going to go over to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you are—— 

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. See—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Going over also? Well, why don’t—— 

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. President Calderon. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. If you would—it’s your questions, 

until you feel compelled to go over. 

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. OK. 

I have just one question, and it speaks to the issue that you were 

just talking about, about transparency and how do we engage the 

next generation. 

One of the things that I was curious about was that you—I understand you actually set up a Web site where people could make 

comments about the Strategic Concept and ideas for the alliance, 

going forward. Did that work? And did it produce thoughtful comments and real ideas that could be used? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, everything is on—the report was made. And 

I think it’s interesting that a report that is a recommendation for 

the one that’s actually going to happen, that the Secretary General 

wanted that. Yes. I mean, there have been lots of different comments. There have also been various other organizations that have 

had kind of Web seminars on this. And there have been a lot of 

comments. We can let you know what—how many hits there really 

have been. And it’s been interesting. But there still is the issue out 

there of how to get people generated—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. And interested in it. And there are 

the kind of questions that you all have asked: Why? What? Who 

pays? Why are we in this at all? And the issue of how Afghanistan 

works. So, absolutely. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you—— 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you. 

22 

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. Again, very much. 

Senator KAUFMAN [presiding]. Madam Secretary, I’d just like to 

spend a few minutes because I think what the chairman said was 

right, in terms of selling this thing. I think, first off, ‘‘worthy 

project’’ doesn’t begin to state how good what you did and what 

your experts have done. And the fact that you’re staying together 

is wonderful. 

But, I really am struck, from my experience in Bosnia and 

Kosovo and Afghanistan, how difficult it is to operate a military operation, when you have to operate by consensus. And I think selling this is really, really important. So, I think we ought to—we’re 

going to have to sell it on what it is and all the good things it 

does—NATO. And I think trying to sell it as a military operation, 

going forward—because I think that 28 people sitting in a room— 

and these people are making great sacrifices, the NATO troops that 

are sent—but, when you sit—in not just—in all these operations 

with NATO that I’ve been involved in—just sit with the military 

people, and they don’t even complain. It’s kind of like—they look 

on it kind of like the weather. Trying to figure out how you have 

a united front in these very complex civilian-military operations, 

when you don’t know—you can’t get a commitment on how we’re 

going to provide—and you’re asking some people to go into harm’s 

way, and others won’t go into harm’s way—trying to, you know— 

I mean, it’s just a nightmare, from a standpoint of having a cogent, 

concentrated military operation to reach fairly fixed objectives. So, 

I’m a little concerned. 

And the thought I was thinking—what I was thinking was, these 

things are now—and I think it’s great—they’re now not military 

operations, they’re military-civilian operations. We now have 

counterinsurgency. I think this is a great opportunity to do things 

that I know you believe in, I believe in. And, you know, the military’s an important part—clear-hold. But, the build part is the essence to success. Can’t do it without clear and hold, but the build 

part—and then, transfer—is really the key to this thing. 

So, I mean, does NATO—did you talk at all about—you said 

there’s a small civilian unit being set up in NATO. I mean, I look 

out there, wherever I go where NATO’s involved, and civilian— 

everything from training the police, right on through. We need 

more people—administrators. We need more—to do more of these 

things—we don’t—our civilians serve—we have, like, less than 400 

people—United States people outside of Kabul in Afghanistan. And 

I don’t want to bring it back to Afghanistan, because I think this— 

but, I mean, just the idea that maybe the place to be, for NATO, 

in terms of the military operation and cooperation, is in the civilian 

area. Did you talk about that at all? Or what do you think about 

that? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, we did talk about it a lot, in terms of the 

whole enlargement, in certain ways, of the civilian component, and 

there are people who said, you know, ‘‘This alliance is only for classical warfare.’’ It was. It isn’t anymore. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I mean, it is really adapting, and in exactly the 

way you describe it. 

23 

The thing that I would—I’m speaking personally—that I would 

like to see is more credit given for the civilian part of this. The 

truth is that the civilians that are out there are exposed to danger. 

It isn’t as if they are, you know, just sitting at the beach. They 

really—have very difficult issues to deal with. And one of the problems—and maybe this is something that can be worked on—is how 

to quantify the quality of the work that is done. Because there’s a 

great deal in the reconstruction teams that has to be done, that 

countries are comfortable doing, and are good at, and are providing 

real added value. We talked about it. And I think it’s something 

that needs to be pushed within the system. 

The hard part—and I know exactly what you’re saying—when 

you think about how you get 28 countries—but how do you get 

away from the consensus part of this, in the military, if people are 

contributing? So, what we thought was, there was no way—absolutely no way to get away from consensus at the NAC level. But, 

we did think that there were ways that the lower-level committee 

decisions could be made in a quicker way. And so, I do think that 

was taken on board. 

We did meet with the military authorities—we went to SHAPE. 

We’ve spent a lot of time with the military committee, as well as 

with the SHAPE people. And I think people get it. I just think that 

attention needs to be paid and pushed. And we put out the guidelines for it. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I tell you, it’s really remarkable, in Afghanistan—to come back to Afghanistan—how much the military appreciates and now understands the civilian effort. I mean, it’s one of 

the great organizational, informational things I’ve ever seen. I 

mean, wherever you go—I’ve been there three times now— 

wherever you go, from the lowest soldier up to the four-stars, they 

all believe in counterinsurgency, and they all understand that a 

very important part of it is the civilians. And I think that, when 

you look at what’s going on over there, in RC East especially, and 

how the civilians are beginning to integrate themselves into what 

the Afghan Government’s doing, and also with the military—and 

the military’s right there. I mean, it’s really—so, I think there’s a 

real change coming, in terms of general understanding of how important the civilian piece of this is. And I think it’s in all our interest, all of us that believe we’ve shortchanged the diplomatic side 

of everything we do. Like—and Secretary Gates is incredible, in 

terms of talking about this. 

So, I think the time is coming when people will be—really will 

appreciate the civilian effort, because I think, in Afghanistan, it’s 

going to make a big difference, and it’s going to be—people are 

going to see it is, and the military is going to come back and say 

how helpful they were in organizing these different things, and 

how—Marjah—how difficult it is if you don’t have the right civilian 

people in Marjah—the military saying that. 

So, I really do think that, you know, this is coming. And I really 

would like you to think about it, because I have so much respect 

for you and for the other people in—the experts—to think about, 

maybe when we’re selling NATO, it is not going to be a classical 

military operation anymore. And selling it as a classical military 

operation leaves you open to just getting—you know, as the chairVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:07 Oct 14, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
24 

man said, as we introduce this thing, let’s not overpromise what it 

is. And the fact that we’ve changed, the world has changed—I just 

think that having, ready to go, in a time of a counterinsurgency— 

in the State Department, but also in NATO—the ability to put people on the ground as fast as we put combat troops on the ground, 

to handle not just AID and not just the agricultural, but administration, and all the other—what General McChrystal calls ‘‘government in a box.’’ But, all the different pieces, so, literally, when the 

military shows up, they have with them a group that’s as well 

trained as the military, as conversant in what’s going on as the 

military, that have been operating together, that can go—that are 

willing to make these—as you said, these absolutely incredible sacrifices. I just think that’s—you know, as we look down the road and 

beyond Afghanistan, this is the—we’re going to be doing these 

counterinsurgency things, unfortunately, for quite a while to come. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I fully agree with you. And I think that what has 

to happen is, there has to be thought given to it ahead of time—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. So that there is a comfort level for 

the civilians and the military operating together. And this whole— 

I mean, it—you know, how vocabulary kind enters international 

parlance—this comprehensive approach is the way that there is a 

blending of the civilian and military. But, there has to be planning 

in that, too, so that people from the various agencies know what 

each other is doing and how they’re operating and what they’re 

going to do. And I think—we did put this on the table—and I personally am going to keep talking and pushing about it—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. Because I understand how State and 

Defense need to work together on this. And I appreciate your role 

in this, because it is the way to sell it. And there are a lot of people, young people, who actually want to serve in that kind of an 

operation. 

Senator KAUFMAN. But, it goes back to recruiting. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I mean, you can’t—you know, people—the example I always use—people who join the Department of Agriculture are good people, but they didn’t join because they want to 

speak a foreign language—— 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right. 

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. Or go to a foreign country. I 

mean, they self-select to go to—— 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right? And so, there are plenty of people out 

there who want to make a difference, would love to be involved in 

agriculture as part of a team that would go to a country—— 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right. 

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. Once we’re involved with them. 

Thank you. 

25 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you for your service. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I guess that’s it. 

[Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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