UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ELIAS JIMENEZ, :

:

Plaintiff : No. 4:CV-05-1029

:

vs. : (Complaint Filed 05/19/05)

:

: (Judge Muir)

YORK CITY POLICE DEPT., et al.,:

:

Defendants :

ORDER #2 of

February 10, 2006

Background

Plaintiff, an inmate at the York County Jail, York,

Pennsylvania, filed the instant pro se civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as defendants in the

complaint are the York City Police Department, Detective

Jeff Spence and the Quick Response Team.

Jimenez alleges that the named defendants subjected him

to excessive force in effectuating his arrest. Specifically,

with respect to the Quick Response Team, plaintiff alleges

that on January 10, 2005, he was arrested by the Quick

Response Team. (Doc. No. complaint at p. 2, ¶ 1). He

states that “as [he] was being handcuffed by the Quick

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Response Team [he] layed there unarmed, [he] was being

kicked in the head by the officers that initially came into

the residence.” Id. He further claims that “the force of

their kicks were so strong that each time [his] head hit the

concrete doubling the impact, they kicked [his] head with

their boots multiple times, so many times for [plaintiff]

even to remember the count.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he

was “semi-unconscious, simultaneously [he] was being

stripped of [his] clothing by an officer, the only clothing

he did not strip [plaintiff] of was [his] shirt and socks.”

Id. at ¶ 2. Allegedly, the Quick Response Team then

“apprehended [plaintiff] and threw him into the cold night

like a hog (semi-naked), before hitting [him] in the back of

[his] head by an officer [with] what felt like a rifle butt,

straight shot to the back of [his] skull, in such a force,

leaving [plaintiff] unconscious.” Id. at ¶ 3. 

Plaintiff further contends that his “pants disappeared

with $635.00 U.S. currency, all [his] identification” and a

“pocket phonebook.” Id. Plaintiff states that he does not

“remember a thing on how [he] got to the York County Police

Station.” Once at the police station, Jimenez states that

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he was awaken “by them officers throwing paper and urine at

[him] as [he] layed there in a cold holding cell in the

nude.” Id. Plaintiff was then taken to Memorial Hospital,

where he was treated and released. 

On May 19, 2005, plaintiff filed the instant action in

which he claims that “since the beating [he] received from

the Quick Response Team, [he's] been having pain in [his]

head, neck, the right side of [his] ribs, hard for [him] to

breath, [his] shoulder blade.” (Doc. No. 1, complaint,

attachment). Jimenez also claims that he has “been having

faint (sic) spells, the inside of [his] neck is injured in

such a way that [he] cannot feel the right side of [his]

lower leg (below the knee) it's numb.” Id. For relief,

plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well

as injunctive relief. Id. 

Presently before the court is a motion to dismiss, filed

on behalf of defendant, York County Quick Response Team.

(Doc. No. 16). The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for

disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the motion

will be denied. 

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Discussion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for

the dismissal of claims that fail to assert a basis upon

which relief can be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

When deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, the court is required to accept as true all of the

factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Langford vs. City

of Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845, 847 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing

Nami vs. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)). “The

complaint will be deemed to have alleged sufficient facts if

it adequately put[s] the defendant on notice of the

essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id.

The court will not dismiss a complaint for failure to state

a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that “no relief

could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz vs. Sorema

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Consistent with these

principles, the court must grant leave to amend before

dismissing a claim that is merely deficient. See Shane vs.

Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). 

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In its motion to dismiss, the Quick Response Team states

that the Quick Response Team “does not employ police

officers”, instead, the Quick Response Team “is comprised of

officers of various police departments around York County,”

including officers from the York County Police Department.

(Doc. No. 16). As such, defendant argues that “absent proof

of an employment relationship (or even an allegation of an

employment relationship), neither York County nor YCQRT has

any vicarious liability for the alleged actions of

[defendants] YCPD or Spence.” Id. Thus, the Quick Response

team believes that because “plaintiff designated the 'Quick

Response Team' as a York City entity,” it is to be

considered a “municipal organization” and “cannot be held

vicariously liable for constitutional violations.” (Doc.

No. 16). 

In opposing defendant's motion, the plaintiff argues

that “one of the main functions of a complaint is to put

parties on notice of a lawsuit...clearly, this complaint has

placed all of the proper parties on notice” and “only

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through discovery it is possible for a plaintiff to

understand the complex interrelations of the parties and

other necessary parties.” (Doc. No. 19). He further argues

that “...all named parties are accused of illegal conduct”

and “all parties are jointly and severally liable for

conduct they all participated in collectively.” Id. 

Thus, it is apparent from the allegations in the

complaint and plaintiff's opposing brief, that plaintiff is

not attempting to impose municipal liability on the Quick

Response Team, but is attempting to impose liability on the

individual team members in their personal and, or, official

capacities. This is further supported by plaintiff's recent

discovery requests, in which he is attempting to uncover the

names of the officers of the Quick Response Team who were

involved in his arrest. (See Doc. Nos. 25, 26). 

The Court finds that plaintiff's claims are grounded in

the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable

seizures of the person. A claim of excessive force used to

effect an arrest is to be analyzed under a Fourth Amendment

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1. This is so in that the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit

textual source of constitutional protection against such

intrusive governmental conduct and thus should be the guide

for analyzing such claims as opposed to the generalized idea

of substantive due process. Graham vs. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

394 (1989). A claim of excessive force to subdue a convicted

person, however, is analyzed under a less protective Eighth

Amendment standard which applies only after the State has

complied with the constitutional guarantees associated with

criminal prosecutions. If, at the time, plaintiff was not an

incarcerated person, his complaint of excessive force would

not arise under the Eighth Amendment. 

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standard. Tennessee vs. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).1 In

particular, in Graham vs. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the

Supreme Court held that all claims asserting that law

enforcement officers have used excessive force, either

deadly or non-deadly, in the course of an arrest,

investigatory stop, or the seizure of a free citizen should

be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective

reasonableness standard rather than under a substantive due

process analysis. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394; see also In re:

City of Philadelphia Litigation, 49 F.3d 945 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 176 (1995). 

Thus, the allegations viewed in the light most favorable

to plaintiff, provide adequate notice of a valid claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment.

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Sharrar vs. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997). As

such, the motion to dismiss, filed on behalf of the Quick

Response Team, will be denied. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The motion to dismiss, filed on behalf of

defendant, the Quick Response Team (Doc.

No. 14) is DENIED.

2. Defendant, the Quick Response Team, is

directed to file an answer to the

complaint or other responsive pleading

within twenty (20) days of the date of

this order

s/Malcolm Muir 

MUIR

United States District Judge

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