J udg e Peter W. Hall, origina lly

a member

of the pa nel, re cused himself subse quent 1 to oral ar gument. Be cause the re maining me mbers of the Panel ar e in agree ment, we have de c ide d th is c a se in a c c or da nc e wi th § 0. 14 (b ) o f t

he ru le s o f t

his Court

. 05- 5255- cr ( L) U n i t ed St at es v . Rodr i g u ez ( T odd)

1 AMENDED OPI NI ON 2 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 3 F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT 4 August Term 2007 5 Argued: May

12, 2008 Dec ided: J une 5, 2008 6 Amended: July 1, 2008

7 Docke t Nos. 05-5255-c r(L ); 05-5258-c r(c on); 05-5260-c r(c on); 05-7023-c r(c on); 8 06-1210-c r(c on); 06-1219-c r(c on); 07-2966-c r(c on) 9

______________________________________________________________________________ 10 UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, 11 Appellee, 12 v. 13 PAULTHOMPSON, TYRONE KI NDRED, DAMI ON HEN RY, STEPHEN REI D, 14 De fe nd ants , 1 5 T AI TO DD , OT I S FI S HE R , J UN I ORR OB I NS ON , J AS ON R OS E , R I C AR DO R OD R I GU E Z, 16 De fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts

. 17

______________________________________________________________________________ 18 B e fo re : F EI

NB ERGand

MI NE R, C ir c uit

Judg e s. 1 19 Appea ls from judg ments of conviction and se ntence enter ed on September 27, 2005, 20 Dec ember

27, 2005, and Jul y

2, 2007 in the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict 21 of Ne w York ( Scheindlin, J .) convic ting de fenda nts-appellants for

various off

enses r elated to a 22 na

rc oti c s tr a ff

ic kin gc on sp ir a c y

and (e xce pt a s to To dd ) t

he us e and

po sse ssi on

of fi re arm s in 2 3 co nn ec t i o nth er ew i th

. Be fo re u s o nap p ea l ar e c h al l en ges t o th e s ea t i n g o f t h e j ury , i n cl u d i n g a 24 reve rse- Ba

tson challeng e; suffic iency of the e vidence ; the introduction of a tape rec ordingof an2 1 atte mpt e d s a le of

c ra c k; c e rt a in e vid e nti ary ru lin g s; t he a lle g e d w ithho ldi ngof B ra dy mate ri a l; a 2 findingof compe tency to stand trial; and sentenc ing. 3 4 The judg ment of the District Court is aff irmed with respe ct to the convictions and 5 rema

nded in ac corda

nce w ith United States v. Rega lado , 518 F.3d 143 ( 2d Cir. 2008) (per 6 curiam), with respe ct to the sentenc e imposed on def endant- appellant F isher. 7 E L L YN I. B ANK , New Y ork, Ne w York, f or 8 Def endant- Appellant Ta i Todd. 9 T I MOTHY J. M C I N N IS , L awO f

f i c e o f T i m o thy J. 10 Mc Inn is, Ne w Y or k, Ne w Y or

k, fo r D e fe nd ant11 Appellant Jason Rose. 12 F R ANC I S C O E. C E LE D O N IO , L aw Of fice of F ranc isco 13 E. Ce le do nio , N e w Y or k, Ne w Y or

k, fo r D e fe nd ant14 Appellant Otis Fisher

. 15 S TEVE N A. F EL DMAN , Fe ldman and F eldman, 16 Uniondale, Ne w York, f or De fenda

nt-Appellant 17 J unior Robinson. 18 M AR TI N J. S I EGEL , L aw Of fice of Jos hua L . Dratel, 19 New Y ork, Ne w York, f or De fenda

nt-Appellant 2 0 Ri c ar d o Ro dr igu e z. 21 LAURI E A. K OR EN B AUM , Assistant United States 22 Attorney (Celeste L . Koeleve ld, Assistant United 23 States Attorney , on the brief ), for Michae l J . Gar cia, 24 United States Attorney , Southern District of Ne w 25 York, Ne w York, N ew Yor k, for Appe llee. 26 PER

CU RIAM : 27 Def

endants-a ppellants, Tai Todd, Jason Rose, Otis Fisher, Juni or Robinson, and Ricardo 28 Rodrigue z (collectively , the “De fenda nts”), appe al from judg ments of conviction and se ntence 29 enter ed, followinga jury trial, in the United States District Court for the Souther n District of 30 New Y ork (Sche indlin, J .) on September 27, 2005 (Todd, F isher, and Robinson), De cembe r 27, 31 20 05 (R os e ), and July 2, 20 07 (R od

ri gue z). To dd

wa s c onvic te d o f o ne c ount o f c on sp ir a c y to3 1 possess with intent to dis tribute betwe en 5 and 50 grams of c ocaine base a nd an unspec ified 2 amount of marijuana , in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1) (A) a nd 3 84 1( b) (1 )( D) . T he re ma ini ngDe fe nd ants we re c onvic te d o f c on sp ir a c y to p os se ss w ithint e nt t o 4 distribute 50 gr ams or more of coc aine ba se as we ll as an unspec ified amount of marijuana and of 5 us ingand

po sse ssi ngfi re arm s in

fu rt he ra nc e of the c on sp ir a c y , in

vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. 6 §§ 924(c) (1)( A) a

nd 924 (c) (2). The District Court sentence d Todd to a term of imprisonment of 7 60 months and Fisher to consec utive terms of imprisonment totaling 211 months. The r emaining 8 Def

endants e ach r ece ived conse cutive sente nces totaling300 months. Bef ore us on a

ppeal a re 9 challeng es to the seating of the jury , including a

reve rse- Batson challeng e; suffic iency of the 10 evidenc e; the introduction of a tape r ecor ding of

an attempted sa le of c rac k; cer tain evidentiar

y 11 ruling s; the alleg ed withholding of Br ady materia l; a findingof compe tency to stand trial; and 12 sentenc ing. F or the re asons that follow, we aff irm the Def

endants’ c onvictions and rema nd to the 13 District Court for re consideration of the sentenc e imposed on def endant F isher in ac corda

nce 14 with United States v. Reg alado , 518 F.3d 143 ( 2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 15 BACK GR OUND 16 The e vidence at trial established that betwee n 1998 and 2003, Rodriguez and Thompson 17 ran a

cra ck coc aine a

nd marijuana

distribution orga

nization t hat oper ated in the B ronx and 18 Ver

mont. Rodriguez and Thompson we re the org anizers and lea ders of the org anization, which 19 sold its crack a

nd marijuana

on the stree ts and from inside various stash houses. Rose, Fisher , 20 Robinson, and Todd helped mana g e the ope ration and sold its cra ck coc aine a nd marijuana

. 21 Members of

the conspira cy

used, ca rried, a nd possessed fire arms in furthe ranc e of the cra ck 2 2 c o c a i n e an d

m ar i j u an a c o n s p i r a c y.4 1 The Gove rnment’s proof included the testimony

of coope ratingwitnesses who wor ked for 2 or with Rodriguez and Thompson betwee n 1998 and 2003 in the B ronx and Vermont, as we ll as 3 an indepe ndent and at times competing dr ugdeale r who witnesse d the oper ation of the drug 4 org anization in the Bronx. These witnesses de scribed how and whe re the cra ck coc aine a nd 5 marijuana

distribution orga

nization operated; the qua ntities of cra ck coc aine its members 6 distributed; and the wea pons its members used, ca rried, a nd possessed to protec t the org anization 7 fr om r iva ls. 8 Th e te sti mony of the c oo pe ratin gwi tne sse s w a s c or ro bo rate d b y

qu anti tie s o f n arc oti c s, 9 cash, w eapons, a

nd narc otics para

pherna lia seized from the org anization’s stash houses in the 10 Br onx , as we ll as from the stre et and a utomobiles in t he B ronx and Vermont. The G overnme nt 11 also offe red the testimony of off icer s from the Ne w York City Police Depa

rtment (“N YPD”) 1 2 Ga n g S qu ad , wh o o b s erv edth e D ef en d an t s o v er

a p er i o d o f ap p ro x i m at el y

fi v e m o n th s s el l i n g, 13 mostly

in combination, cra ck coc aine a nd marijuana

on East 228th Street in the B ronx. 14 DI SCU SSIO N 1 5 I. 16 After

jury selec tion the Governme nt alleg ed, pursua nt to Batson v. Ke ntucky , 476 U.S. 79 17 (1 98 6) , th at de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s u se of pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e s d

ur ingvo ir dir e wa s r a c ia lly 18 motivated. In Batson, the Supreme Court prohibited prose cutors fr om exercising pe remptory 19 c ha lle ng e s to pr os pe c tiv e jur or s b a se d o n r a c e . I d. at 87 (“ [B ]y de nyinga

pe rs on pa rt ic ipatio n in 20 jury

service on acc ount of his rac e, the State unc onstitut ionally discriminate[s] ag ainst the 21 excluded juror.”) . The Supreme Court later e x tended B atson, prohibiting de fense counsel fr om 22 exercisingrac ially motivated pere mptory

challeng es. See G eorg ia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 595 1 (1992). An a ccusation by the Gover

nment that defe nse counse l has eng ag ed in such 2 discriminatory

conduct ha s come be known as a “re verse -B atson” c halleng e. 3 Her e, the District Court grante d the g overnme nt’s reve rse- Batson challeng e and r e-se ated 4 J uror Tw o. In assessinga par ty ’s claim that its opponent has exerc ised its peremptory challeng es 5 in a discriminatory manner , a trial c ourt eng ag es in a thre e-step a naly sis, under which the court 6 must: (1) determine whether the moving pa

rty has made a prima f

acie showingthat the other 7 pa rt y ha s e xer c ise d a

pe re mpt or

y str ike on the ba sis of

ra c e ; ( 2) if

so , d e c ide wh e the r t

he pa rt y 8 exercisingthe cha lleng ed strike ha s satisfied the burde n of off eringa ra ce- neutra l expl anation for 9 the str ike ; and

(3 ) i f s o, make a

de te rm inatio n whe the r t

he c ha lle ng ingpa

rt y ha s c arr ie d h is 10 burden of

provingpurposef

ul discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98. W e have held that 11 the third step of the B atson inquiry require s a trial judg e to make “ an ultimate deter mination on 12 the issue of discr iminatory intent based on a ll the fac ts and circ umstances.” United States v. 13 Alvara do , 923 F.2d 253, 256 ( 2d Cir. 1991). We have a lso held that “the ultimate question of 14 discriminatory

intent repre sents a findingof fa ct that will be set aside only if clea rly err oneous.” 15 United States v. Tay lor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1326 ( 2d Cir. 1996). 16 Duringjury selec tion, the defe nse exercise d fourtee n pere mptory challeng es, twelve of 17 wh ic h w e re a g a ins t whit e jur or s and tw o o f whic h w e re a g a ins t L atin o ju ro rs . Six ty -five pe rce nt 18 of the orig inal members of the pane l were white. In response to the Gover nment’s re verse 19 Batson challeng e, the District Court dete rmined that there was a prima fa cie c ase of 20 dis c ri min atio n b e c a us e ov e r 8 5% of

the c ha lle ng e s e xer c ise d b y de fe ns e c ouns e l w e re a g a ins t 21 white jurors while no c halleng es we re e x erc ised ag ainst Afric an American juror s. After a 22 he ari ngat whic h th e de fe ns e wa s g ive n a n o pp or tun ity to o ff e r r a c e -n e utr a l r e a so ns fo r i ts6 1 pere mptory

challeng es, the District Court re -seated J uror Tw o. Def ense c ounsel offe red the 2 followingrac e-ne utral re asons for e x erc ising the c halleng e ag ainst J uror Tw o: (1) the br other of 3 Juro r T wo ’s fi anc e wa s a po lic e of fi c e r; (2 ) s he wa s a

lon g -t e rm

re sid e nt o f We stc he ste r C ounty 4 (Yonke rs); (3) she lives with her pa rents and pr esumably

was “ sheltere d”; and ( 4) she taught 5 second grade at a sc hool in the Bronx. The District Court doubted the de fense ’s theory that J uror 6 Tw o w ou ld b e inf lue nc e d b y

the fa c t th at he r f

utu rebr oth e r- in- law w a s a

po lic e of fi c e r i n a sma ll 7 town. Mo re ov e r, the Di str ic t Co ur t do ub te d th e re le va

nc e of Juro r T wo ’s po sit ion

a s a te a c he r i n 8 the B ronx because a n Afric an Amer ican juror who also had be en a te ache r in the B ronx, J uror 9 Thirty , was sea

ted with no challeng e fr om the defe nse. The D istrict Court stated: “Other tha n 10 rac e, I

rea lly don’t see a

leg itimate differ ence betwee n [J uror Thirty], who spent a car eer teac hing 11 kids in the Bronx, who[m ] y ou chose to ke ep, and [J uror Tw o]. . . . That is why Ithink [ J uror 12 Two] is t he we akest of the challeng es.” 13 The De fenda nts argue that their pr offe red r easons f or the strike w ere leg itimate and 14 sufficie nt to allow the pere mptory challeng e of Juror Two to stand. While it is true that the 15 Di str ic t Co ur

t g e ne ra lly

c on sid e re d c e rt a in o f t

he pr of fe re d r e a so ns a s a

pp lie d to oth e r d e fe ns e 16 strikes to be suffic iently rac e-ne utral, the c ourt reje cted those r easons a s pretext for ac tual 17 discrimination in the challeng e of Juror Two. This Court g ives defe renc e to a district cour t’s 18 de te rm inatio n a s to wh e the r p ro ff e re d r e a so ns fo r a

pe re mpt or

y str ike are pr e te xtua l, a

nd in t his 19 case nothing in the r ecor d sug g ests that the District Court’s finding s were clea rly err oneous. 20 Wit h reg ard to the f act that Juror Two’s f

iance ’s brother

is a police off

icer , the cour

t 21 no te d th at Jur or

Tw o h e rs e lf

did no t e mph a size that f

a c t — s he ha d o nly

me nti on e d it

in r e sp on se 22 to the court’s que stion about contacts with law e nforc ement. The District Court called Juror Two7 1 back into the box to question her further , and Juror Two explained that she did not think her 2 futur e br oth e r- in- law’ s li ne of wo rk wo uld a ff e c t he r, in p art

be c a us e sh e ne ve r t a lke d a

bo ut h is 3 work with him. Moreove r, the District Court obser ved that the de fense had seated a L atino juror 4 whose brothe r wa s a re tired under cover police off

icer . The c ourt noted: “[D]efense ha s to be 5 cautious. I f they

start saying some body

has a lot of f

riends in the NYPD, we ll, if seated juror s 6 have a

lot of friends in the NY PD, it kind of drops away as a r eason f

or the strike.” 7 Withre g a

rd to Jur or Tw o’ s c ounty

of re sid e nc e , th e Di str ic t Co ur t f ound that, a lth ou g h it 8 had ac cepte d residenc e in Westchester County as a le g itimate basis for cha lleng es, Juror Two’s 9 residenc e in Yonker s was not equa lly leg itimate beca

use, as de fense counsel ha d conce ded, 10 Yonker s is more like the B ronx t han Westchester . Moreove r, the de fense had seated two L atino 11 jurors fr om Westchester. The court a lso did not find, based on its observation of he r, that Juror 12 Two see med “she ltered.” Finally , the District Court did not find credible the defe nse’s c oncer ns 13 wi th Jur or

Tw o’ s o c c up atio n a s a

sc ho ol t e a c he r i n th e B ro nx, p ri mari ly be c a us e the de fe ns e 14 seate d an Af

rica n Americ an juror who also had be en a sc hool teache r in the B ronx for many 15 y ear s befor e re tiring. 16 The District Court made “an ultimate de termination on the issue of discr iminatory intent 17 based on a ll the fac ts and circ umstances,” Alvara do , 923 F.2d at 256, and we f ind no error

in the 18 District Court’s deter mination. See Sny der v. L ouisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1210–11 (2008) 19 (findingthat prosec utor’s fa cially implausible ex planation for c halleng ing a n Afric an American 20 juror base d on juror’s c onflictingobligations was “re inforce d by the prosec utor’s ac cepta

nce of 21 wh ite jur or s who dis c los e d c on fl ic tin gob lig atio ns that a pp e ar t o h ave be e n at le a st a s se ri ou s a s” 22 [t hat of the c halleng ed juror]).8 1 The De fenda nts also claim that the District Court failed to make an explicit determination 2 that the def

ense ha d exercised the pe remptory challeng e in an intentionally discriminatory 3 mann e r. Th e purp os e of thi s Co ur t’ s r e qu ir e me nt t

hat a dis tr ic t c ourt

make e xplic it f

ind ing s w ith 4 re sp e c t to e a c h o f t he thr e e ste ps pr e sc ri be d in B atso n is to a

vo id a n in c omp le te re c or d th at w ill 5 preve nt “a mea

ningf ul determination on the que stion whether the c halleng es demonstrated 6 discriminatory

intent.” J ordan v. L efe vre, 206 F .3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2000). In this case, the 7 District Court elicited the De fenda nts’ explanations for the per emptory challeng e of Juror Two, 8 e xami ne d th os e e xplanatio ns thr ou g h q ue sti on ingand

c oll oq uy , a nd state d o n th e re c or d th at it 9 found the e x planations not cre dible and “w eak.” Acc ording ly , the District Court’s findingof 10 purp os e fu l di sc ri min atio n a nd the re c or d s up po rt ingthat f ind ingare su ff

ic ie nt t o a llo w this 11 Court’s revie w of the issue. 12 Th e De fe nd ants fu rt he r c la im that be c a

us e the y e xer c ise d th e ir

pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e s a s a 13 g roup, the District Court could not prope rly discern whether

an individual Def

endant ha d acte d 14 with discriminatory intent. In raisingthis claim, however , the Def endants ove rlook the fa ct that 15 afte r the Gove rnment ra ised its rever se-B atson c ha lle ng e , e a c h d e fe ns e c ouns e l w a s p e rm itt e d to 16 of

fe r r a c e -n e utr a l r e a so ns fo r t he str ike . T he re c or d d e mon str ate s th at mo re tha n o ne de fe ns e 17 counsel off

ere d an explanation for the strike , and ther e is no evidenc e that any attorney was 18 prohibited from pa rticipatingin the District Court’s examination of the strike. Ba tson “was 19 desig ned to serve multipl e ends, only one of which was to prote ct individual defe ndants from 20 dis c ri min atio n in the se le c tio n o f j ur or s. . . . B atso n . . . is d e signe d to re me dy the ha rm do ne to 21 the dig nity

of per sons and to the integ rity of the c ourts.” McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48 (internal 22 quotation marks omitted). The Supre me Court has re cognized that “denying a person9 1 participation in jury service on acc ount of his rac e unconstitutionally discriminates ag ainst the 2 excluded juror.” I d. In this case, the D istrict Court properly evaluated the re asons g iven by eac h 3 Def

endant who a

rgued in support of the pe remptory challeng e bef

ore a rrivingat its finding of 4 discriminatory

intent. 5 Finally , the Def endants a rgue that “a

black c riminal defe ndant should not be subject to a 6 Batson challeng e for exercisinghis peremptory strikes with respe ct to white jurors” beca use “the 7 potential social har ms identified in ‘rac e-r elated’ case s involving ra cial minorities . . . are not 8 implicated” whe re a n Afric an Amer ican de fenda nt seeks to strike white juror s from the jury 9 panel. This ar gument must be rejec ted in light of Mc Collum , which held that a defe ndant’s 10 discriminatory

use of a pere mptory

challeng e violates the e qual protec tion right of the challeng ed 11 juror. See 505 U .S. at 49 (“Reg ardle ss of who invokes the discr iminatory challeng e, ther e ca

n be 12 no doubt that the harm is the same — in all case s, the juror is subjecte d to open and public r acia l 13 dis c ri min atio n. ” ); se e a lso Pow e rs v. Oh io , 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“ [A] member of the 1 4 c o m mun i ty m ay n o tb e e x c l u d e d f r o mj ur y s e r v i c e o na c c o un to f

h i s o r h e r r a c e . ” )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, 15 the Def

endants’ a

rgument that Batson does not apply wher e an A frica

n Americ an def

endant 16 se e ks to e lim inate wh ite jur or s is e nti re ly wi tho ut m e ri t. 17 I I

. 18 Ea c h o f t

he De fe nd ants c ha lle ng e s th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e in s up po rt

of his 19 conviction. This Court has noted that “[a] defenda nt who seeks r ever sal of his conviction on the 20 g round of insuff

iciency of the e vidence bear s a hea vy burden.” United States v. Concepc ion, 983 21 F.2d 369, 382 ( 2d Cir. 1992). In consideringa def endant’ s challeng e to the suff iciency of the 22 e vid e nc e in s up po rt of his c onvic tio n, thi s Co ur t r e vie ws the e vid e nc e in t he light m os t f

avo ra ble10 1 to the Gover

nment and dra

ws eve ry infere nce in the G overnme nt’s favor . See United States v. 2 Sa lame h, 15 2 F .3 d 8 8, 15 1 ( 2d Cir . 1 99 8) (p e r c ur iam) . T he jur y ’s ve rd ic t “ mus t be su sta ine d if 3 any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be yond a 4 rea sonable doubt.” I d. (interna l quotation marks omitted). In this case, the e vidence prese nted at 5 trial when vie wed in the lig ht most favorable to the Gover nment was suff

icient to support the 6 c onvic tio ns of

e a c h o f t he De fe nd ants

. 7 Todd, Rose, and F isher ar gue that the Gove rnment pre sented insuffic ient evidenc e that 8 they

participated in the conspira cy alleg ed in the indictment. The a naly sis of this is sue is two9 fo ld. F ir st, thi s Co ur t a sk s whe the r t

he Go ve rnme nt p ro ve d th e de fe nd ant’ s inte nt t o e ng a g e in 10 the cha

rg ed sche me. See Un ite d St ate s v . Re y e s, 30 2 F .3 d 4 8, 53 (2 d Ci r. 20 02 ). Se c on d, we a sk 11 whether

the Gover

nment proved that the defe ndant had some know ledg e of the unlawful a ims of 12 the conspira cy . I d. In this case, the r ecor d is replete w ith evidence that would have pe rmitted the 13 jury

to determine that Todd, Rose, and F isher ea ch intended to e ng ag e in the conspira cy and we re 14 also fully

awa re of its unlawful aims. Wi th respec t to Todd, two cooperating witnesse s testified 15 that he fr equently sold crac k coca ine in the vicinity of East 228th Street in the B ronx. One 16 witness testified that Todd per formed “ hand-to-ha nd” sale s after

rec eivingpacka g es of c rac k 17 coca ine from Thompson and Rodriguez. Another witness testified that he had obse rved Todd 18 selling c rac k coca ine with Thompson and Rodriguez. L aw e nforc ement off icer s testified that 1 9 T o d d

f un c t i o n e d a s a “ l o o k o ut ” d ur i n gatl e a s to n e n ar c o t i c s s a l e b y m e mb e r s o f th e c o n s p i r a c y, 20 that in J anuar

y 2003 he wa s arr ested with Rose and Rodriguez after selling c rac k coca ine to an 21 underc over of

fice r, and that Todd’s ce ll phone direc tory contained the telephone numbe rs of the 22 other membe rs of the c onspiracy

.11 1 Ros e argue s th at th e Go ve rnme nt f a ile d to de mon str ate that hi s c on du c t amou nte d to 2 any

thing more than isolated sales of narc otics unrelate d to the conspirac y alleg ed in the 3 indictment. The evide nce at trial, howeve r, viewe d in the light most favor able to the 4 Gover

nment, permitted the jury to conclude that Rose sold narcotics with the other members of 5 the c on sp ir a c y . Po lic e of fi c e rs te sti fi e d th at in

Se pte mbe r 2 00 1 Ro se and Rob ins on

so ld c ra c k to 6 an under cover

office r and that in J anuar y 2003 Rose was a

rre sted with Todd and Rodriguez after 7 se lli ngc ra c k to an N YPD de te c tiv e . O ff ic e rs a lso te sti fi e d th at Ro se wa s o bs e rv e d w ith 8 Rod

ri gue z an d Ro bin so n in

fr ont of on e of the c on sp ir ator s’ sta shho us e s o n E a st 2 28 th S tr e e t in 9 the B ronx and that Rose wa s seen e x chang ing sma ll objects for money on East 228th Street 10 shortly

afte r speaking w ith Rodriguez. 11 The e vidence at trial wa s also sufficie nt to demonstrate that F isher par ticipated in the 12 c on sp ir a c y . Apo lic e wi tne ss t e sti fi e d th at F ish e r w a s a rr e ste d in Ap ri l 20 01 fo r s e lli ngc ra c k to 13 an under cover

office r on East 228th Street. A c ooperating witnesse s testified that Fisher g ave 14 money

to and re ceive d drug s from Rodriguez and Thompson on a daily basis. Another 15 cooper atingwitness testified that Fishe r, alongwith other member s of the conspira cy , moved the 16 op e ratio n f

ro m th e B ro nx to h e r h ome in V e rm ont. O n a pp e a l, F ish e r c ha lle ng e s th e c re dib ili ty 17 of

the c oo pe ratin gwi tne sse s. Ho we ve r, in a sse ssi ngwh e the r t he re wa s su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to 18 su

pp or t a de fe nd ant’ s c onvic tio n, thi s Co ur t “ wi ll n ot a

tte mpt to s e c on d- gue ss a

jur y ’s c re dib ili ty 1 9 d e t e r

m i n at i o n . ” U n i t e d

S t at e s v . F l o r e z , 4 4 7 F

. 3 d 1 4 5 , 1 5 6 ( 2 d

C i r . 2 0 0 6 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, 20 Fisher ’s cha lleng e to the cr edibility of the prose cution’s witnesses pre sents no basis to disturb the 21 District Court’s judgme nt in this case . 22 Rose and F isher also a rgue that ther e wa s insufficient evide nce to support the jur y ’s12 1 deter

mination that they

wer e re sponsible for distributing more than 50 grams of c rac k coca ine. 2 Th is C ourt

ha s d e te rm ine d th at, whe re an in dic tme nt a lle g e s a c on sp ir a c y

inv olv ingthe we ight3 related provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841, the Governme nt’s burden of proof “ includes the 4 require ment that a co- conspirator defe ndant at lea st could have r easona bly fore seen the ty

pe and 5 quantity

of the substanc e about whic h [he] conspired.” United States v. Adams, 448 F .3d 492, 6 500 (2d Cir. 2006). He re, the re w as suffic ient evidenc e for the jury to conclude that Rose and 7 Fisher

could have rea sonably

fore seen that the conspirac y would involve distribution of more 8 than 50 g rams of c rac k coca ine. Ther e wa s ample testimony descr ibing f

reque nt narc otics sales 9 by me mbe rs of

the c on sp ir a c y , a

nd wi tne sse s te sti fi e d th at Ro se and F ish e r p art ic ipate d in

da ily 10 sales of nume rous small packe ts of cra ck coc aine. 11 Rose, Rodrigue z, and Fisher a lso challeng e the suff iciency of the e vidence supporting 12 their convic tions under 18 U.S.C. § 924 for use of firea rms in further ance of the na rcotics 13 c on sp ir a c y . In o rd e r t o s us ta in a c onvic tio n und e r 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4, the Go ve rnme nt m us t 14 demonstrate “ some nexus between the f irea rm and the dr

ugselling ope ration.” United States v. 15 Finley , 245 F.3d 199, 203 ( 2d Cir. 2001). We have note d that “[u] ltimately , the test is whether a 16 rea sonable jury

could, on the evide nce pr esente d at trial, find beyond a re asonable doubt that 17 possession of the fire arm fa cilitated the drugtraff ickingcrime . . . ; ‘in f

urthera nce’ means that 18 the gun aff

orded some a dvantag e (a ctual or pote ntial, rea l or conting ent) re levant to the 19 vicissitudes of drugtraff icking .” U n i t e d

S t at e s v . Le w t e r , 4 0 2 F

. 3 d 3 1 9 , 3 2 2 ( 2 d

C i r . 2 0 0 5 )

. In 20 L ewter , we c oncluded that “ [p] ossession of a fir ear m to defend a

drugstash clea

rly further s the 21 crime of

possession with intent to di stribute the contents of that stash.” I d. 22 In this case, c ooperating witnesse s testified that there wer e we apons in at lea st two of the13 1 locations wher e the membe rs of the c onspiracy stored and pr epar ed the na rcotics. The re w as 2 e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d th at th e De fe nd ants c arr ie d w e a po ns duri ngna

rc oti c s sa le s o n E a st 2 28 th 3 Street and that they hid numerous fire arms in the vicinity of the locations where the y sold crac k 4 coca ine. One w itness testified that he had obse rved Rose r etrieve hidden wea pons on two 5 occa sions when the conspira tors expected violence from riva l drugdeale rs. Police testimony 6 de sc ri be d F ish e r s ta sh inga ha nd gun in a tr a shc an n e ar whe re he so ld c ra c k c oc a ine . Witne ss 7 testimony

connec ted Rodriguez to severa l weapons a nd descr ibed him firinga we apon into the 8 air in re sponse to a compe titor’s sale of c rac k coca ine on East 228th Street. The evidenc e cr eate d 9 the pe rm iss ibl e inf e re nc e that th e me mbe rs of the c on sp ir a c y

po sse sse d a

nd us e d f ir e arm s in 10 fu

rt he ra nc e of the dr ugdis tr ibutio n a lle g e d in the ind ic tme nt. 11 I I I

. 12 Rose alleg es that the Gove rnment violated his Fif th Amendment rights by

introducing 13 into evidence the tape r ecor ding of an attempted c rac k coca ine sale be tween Rose a nd an 14 un de rc ov e r p oli c e of fi c e r d ur ing wh ic h th e of

fi c e r a lle g e dly

g ave Ros e a lc oh ol a

nd Ros e be c ame 15 intox icated. We r eview a district court’s e videntiary decisions for a

buse of discr etion. See 16 United States v. Schultz , 333 F.3d 393, 415 ( 2d Cir. 2003). Althoug h this Court has not 17 addre ssed the issue of whether a def endant’ s intox ication re nders his statement inadmissible, one 18 court in this Circuit has determined, in the c ontextof a ha beas pe tition, t hat wher e a de fenda nt’s 19 in to x ica ti onis po li ce-i nduced , h is st ate men t i s “au to mat ica ll y ex clu ded .” D avi s v . Bara, 54 2 F. 20 Supp. 743, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) . Howeve r, the District Court found no c onclusive evide nce that 21 the under cover

office r either

provided Rose with the a lcohol or induce d his intox ication, and we 22 fi nd

no e rr or in t he Di str ic t Co ur

t’ s f a c tua l de te rm inatio n o r a

bu se of dis c re tio n in

its de c isi on

to14 1 admit the tape of

the conve rsation. 2 Ros e a lso a lle g e s th at r e ve rs a l is wa rr ante d b y

the c umu lativ e e ff

e c t of : e vid e nti ary

e rr or s, 3 prosec utorial misconduct duringsummation, the Government’ s use of witnesse s who lacke d 4 cre dibilit y , and the Gove rnment’s fa ilure to timely disclose B rady materia l. Accor ding to Rose, 5 the District Court err ed in fa iling to g rant his motion for a mistrial on the basis of the se er rors. 6 Wit h respe ct to the claimed e videntiary err ors — witness testimony ref err ing to his prior 7 incar cer ation, the admission of “e x cessive” evidenc e of na rcotics tra nsactions not related to the 8 char g ed conspira cy , and the display of his arr est photographs to the jury — the trial transc ript 9 demonstrates that the District Court provided appr opriate limiting instructions to the jury

. 10 F ur

the r, the Di str ic t Co ur

t of fe re d a str on gc ur ativ e ins tr

uc tio n a dd

re ssi ngthe Go ve rnme nt’ s u se 11 of Rose’s nickna me “Murda ” in its closing a rgument. 12 Th e re c or d d oe s n ot s up po rt Ros e ’s c la im that, d

ur ingtr ia l, a

c oo pe ra tin gwi tne ss 13 “blurted out” that Rose had par ticipated in a shootingnot char g ed in the indictment. While the 14 wi tne ss d id r e fe r t o a sh oo tin gthat ha d o c c ur

re d in Au gus t 20 01 , th at w itn e ss d id n ot n ame Ros e 15 or

any oth e r D e fe nd ant a s th e ind ivi du a l who ha d b e e n invo lve d in the sh oo tin g . F ur

the r, the re is 16 no merit to Rose’s claim that the Gove rnment improper ly relied on the testimony

of witnesses 17 wh o w e re no t c re dib le . It is we ll e sta bli sh e d th at “ [b]e c a

us e the c ourt s g e ne ra lly

mus t de fe r t o 18 the jur

y ’s re so lut ion

of c on fl ic tin ge vid e nc e and a sse ssm e nt o f w itn e ss c re dib ili ty , it is o nly 19 wher e exceptional cir cumstance s can be demonstrated that the trial judg e may intrude upon the 20 jury

function of c redibility

assessment.” United States v. Fe rguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133–34 (2d 21 Cir. 2001) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Here , Rose has off ere d no evidenc e that the 22 wi tne sse s’ te sti mony e ith e r w a s p e rj ur iou s o r “ pate ntl y inc re dib le or

de fi e [d] phy sic a l r e a lit ie s”15 1 to warr ant a mistrial. United States v. Sanche z, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir. 1992). 2 As to t

he a lle g e d B ra dy

vio latio n, Ros e fa ils to d e mon str ate that th e inf or matio n a lle g e dly 3 withheld by

the Gover

nment was mate rial to his defe nse as e ither exculpatory or impeac hment 4 evidenc e. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (“I nformation coming 5 within the scope of [Br ady] i ncludes not only evidenc e that is exculpatory . . . but also evidenc e 6 that is useful for impea chment . . . .”) . The purpor ted B rady materia l included a de tective’ s notes 7 fr om i nte rv ie ws wi th t wo wi tne sse s who bo th o mitte d Ro se ’s name wh e n d isc us sin gme mbe rs hip 8 in a

g angthat me mbe rs of

the c on sp ir a c y

be lon g e d to . A s th e Go ve rnme nt a rgue s, me mbe rs hip 9 in that ga

ngwas not a pr ere quisite for member ship in the conspirac y . The other purported B rady 10 materia l consisted of alleg ed stateme nts by a coope ratingwitness that Rose had g iven cr ack 11 coca ine to another individual in ex chang e for a gun. Rose fails to demonstrate how this alleg ed 12 statement — which w as neither written nor r ecor ded and the ref ore not e ven conside red a 13 “stateme nt” re quired to be disclose d pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3500 — was exculpatory . We find 14 no ba sis to d ist

ur b th e Di str ic t Co ur

t’ s r uli ngthat th e inf

or matio n th at w a s a lle g e dly imp ro pe rl y 15 withheld had no exculpatory or impeac hment value. 16 IV. 17 Robinson argues that the District Court er red in dismissing a se ated juror and re placing 18 her w ith an alternate without further inquiry into the juror’s explanation that she could not 19 c ontin

ue to s e rv e at tr ia l. R

ule 24 (c ) o f t

he F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure pr ov ide s th at a 20 dis tr ic t c ourt

may “ imp ane l up to 6 a lte rn ate jur or s to re pla c e any jur or s who are un a

ble to 21 perf

orm or who a

re disqualifie d from per formingtheir duties.” This Court has he ld that district 22 courts have “broa d discretion under [Rule 24(c )] to replace a juror at any time before the jury16 1 retire s if there is reasona ble ca use to do so, and a r eviewingcourt will only find abuse of

that 2 discretion whe re the re is bias or pr ejudice to the de fenda nt.” United States v. Purdy , 144 F.3d 3 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1998) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). He re, Robinson offe rs no evidenc e 4 demonstratingthat the District Court abused its discre tion in subst ituting the juror w ith the 5 alternate juror. The court e x plained that the juror had cla imed that her “ nerve s [were] shot” and 6 that she planne d to seek medic al attention. The substitution occurr ed at the be g inning of the 7 second da

y of a multi-wee k trial. Robinson point s to no evidence that the substituti on cre ated 8 bias or pre

judiced his defe nse. Ac cording ly , this claim presents no basis for reve rsal in this case. 9 V. 10 Rodrigue z argues that the District Court violated his Six th Amendment rights by 11 proce edingto trial where there was re asonable cause to believe that he was not compe tent to do 12 so. I t is well established that due proc ess “pr ohibits t he criminal prosecution of a defe ndant who 13 is not competent to stand trial.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992) . The 14 “[d] eter

mination of whether

there is ‘rea sonable c ause’ to believe a defe ndant may

be 15 incompetent re sts in the discretion of the district cour t.” United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 16 1150 (2d Cir. 1986). He re, Rodriguez points t o repor ts of evaluations performe d by Dr. Andr ew 17 Capruso, a ne uropsycholog ist, as evidence that he wa s not competent to stand trial and that the 18 District Court abused its discretion by failingto conduct a c ompetency hearing pr ior to trial. 19 Al tho ugh Ca

pr us o c on c lud e d th at at th e tim e of tr ia l Ro dr igue z la c ke d th e c a pa c ity to r atio na lly 20 consult with his attorney and assist in the prepa

ration of his def

ense, Capr

uso made that 21 conclusion we ll after the trial had e nded and ba sed only on his review of

Rodrigue z’s medical 22 rec ords and the de scriptions of Rodriguez’s behavior by his trial counsel. Prior to trial, two17 1 psycholog ists, including one r etained by the def ense, c oncluded in re ports provided to the 2 District Court that Rodrigue z was competent to stand trial. Ea ch of the se psycholog ists had 3 examined Rodrigue z at least twice be fore the trial commenc ed. We ar e not per suaded that the 4 District Court had any rea son to doubt the conclusions of these psycholog ists. Moreover, othe r 5 tha

n h is o wn c on c lus or

y a sse rt ion , Ro dr igue z of

fe rs no e vid e nc e that th e Di str ic t Co ur t sh ou ld 6 have r ealized at some point duringtrial that Rodriguez had bec ome incompetent to proc eed. 7 Acc ording ly , this claim presents no basis to direc t a new tr ial in this case. 8 VI

. 9 After

all of the pa

rties had f

iled their brief

s in this C ourt, the Supreme Court issued 10 Ki mbr ou g h v . Unit e d St ate s, — U .S. —, 12 8 S. Ct. 55 8, 16 9 L . E d. 2d 48 1 ( 20 07 ), wh e re it h e ld 11 that district courts “may consider the disparity

betwee n the Guidelines’ tr eatment of cra ck and 12 po wd e r c oc a ine of fe ns e s” in d e c idi ngif

a se nte nc e is gre ate r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry to a c hie ve the g oa ls 13 of

se nte nc ing . I d. at 56 4. Al l of the de fe nd ants , w iththe e xce pti on of F ish e r, we re se nte nc e d to 14 statutorily

mandated minimum sentence s. Fisher ’s sentenc e excee ded the statutory minimum by 15 31 months . A c c or din g ly , p ur su ant t o Re g a la do , w e mus t r e mand de fe nd ant F ish e r’ s se nte nc e so 16 that the District Court can de termine whe ther it would have imposed a non-trivially differ ent 17 sentenc e had it under stood the full scope of its authority

. 1 8 V II. 19 For

the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the District Court as to the 2 0 co n v i ct i o n s o f D ef en d an t s , an d

we re m an d

d ef en d an tFi s h er ’s s en t en ce fo r f urt h er p ro ce ed i n gs 21 consistent with Reg alado.