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National Waterways Study 0 U.S. Army Engineer Water Resources Support Center 0 Institute for Water Resources 
THE NATIONAL WATERWAYS 

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HISTORY OF 

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LOWER 

MISSISSIPPI 

Floyd M. Clay 

January 1983 

Navigation History NWS-83-8 

National Waterways Study o U.S. Army Engineer Water Resources Support Center o Institute for Water Resources 
AUTM3RITY FOR THE NATIONAL WATERWAYS STUDY 

The Congress authorized the National Waterways Study (NWS) and provided the 

instructions for its conduct in Section 158 of the Water Resources Development 

Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-587): 

The Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief 

of Engineers, is authorized and directed to make a 

comprehensive study and report on the system of 

waterway improvements under his jurisdiction. The 

study shall include a review of the existing system 

and its capability for meeting the national needs 

including emergency and defense requirements and an 

appraisal of additional improvements necessary to 

optimize the system and its intermodal 

characteristics. The Secretary of the Army, acting 

through the Chief of Engineers, shall submit a 

report to Congress on this study within three years 

after funds are first appropriated and made 

available for the study, together with his 

recommendations. The Secretary of the Army, acting 

through the Chief of Engineers, shall upon request, 

from time to time, make available to the National 

Transportation Policy Study Commission established 

by Section 154 of Public Law 94-280, the information 

and data developed as a result of the study. 
JOHN T. GREENWOOD 

Chief, Historical Division 

PREFACE 

This pamphlet is one of a series on the history of navigation done 

as part of the National Waterways Study, authorized by Congress in 

Public Law 94-587. The National Waterways Study is an intensive review 

by the Corps of Engineers' Institute for Water Resources of past, present, 

and future needs and capabilities of the United States water transportation network. The Historical Division of the Office of the Chief of 

Engineers supervised the development of this pamphlet, which is designed 

to present a succinct overview of the subject area. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chapter I. EVOLUTION, DISCOVERY, AND EXPLORATION 1 

Chapter II. NAVIGATION DURING THE STEAMBOAT ERA 9 

Chapter III. GETTING ORGANIZED 17 

Chapter IV. THE MASTER PLAN 31 

Chapter V. NEW DEVELOPMENTS 41 

CHRONOLOGY 53 

FOOTNOTES 57 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 65 
THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI 

Floyd M. Clay 

Chapter I 

EVOLUTION, DISCOVERY, AND EXPLORATION 

The formation of the lower Mississippi dates from the end of the 

last Ice Age. As the climate warmed, the ice melted and runoff created 

rivers such as the Ohio and the Missouri. Those rivers, in turn, merged 

into one great shallow swamp, whose waters moved southward depositing 

rich topsoil in what came to be the Mississippi delta. 1Slowly, a riverbed formed. The water, however, obeying geological principles, meandered throughout its length, as its own deposits and erosions constantly 

formed new routes to the sea. This process created land of modest 

elevation throughout the valley but swampy at the river's mouth, where 

the already ill-defined channel separated into several smaller flows, 

each seeking its own route to the Gulf. Today, the Mississippi continues 

to meander, causing man constantly to be on his guard against the 

shifting waters. 

DISCOVERY AND EXPLORATION 

In 1519 the Mississippi valley was bracketed by the Spanish 

explorers, with Juan Ponce de Leon exploring and mapping in Florida and 

Herndh Cortes beginning his plunder of Mexico. In that same year the 

Governor of Jamaica sent out Alonzo Alvarez de Pineda to explore and to 

chart the shores between Mexico and present-day Florida. Alvarez 

described the mouth of a large river which he named "Rio del Espiritu 

Santo," but it now seems that he was referring to the Mobile Bay outlet 

rather than the Mississippi. In 1582 a more reliable account by Cabeza 

de Vaca reported that he and the desperate remnants of his tragic expedition had been shipwrecked near the outlet of a major river, which from 

his description may have been the Mississippi. 2 

After the Spaniards had established a base in Florida a fully 

manned expedition, under Hernando de Soto, was dispatched into the 

interior of the Gulf coastal region. That 1541 expedition ranged 

through the interior until they encountered a large river, which 

they named the "Rio Grande." Their crossing of the Mississippi is 

assumed to have occurred somewhere between Memphis and Baton Rouge, 

perhaps at what is now Helena, Arkansas. Coincidentally, the expedition also recorded the first account of a major flood in the 

Mississippi valley. 
Even though there was now clear proof of a major river leading to the 

center of North America, the Spaniards were still too preoccupied with 

Central and South America to divert their energies to securing the 

river. Thus interest in the Mississippi remained dormant for more than 

two centuries after de Soto's posthumous report. 

It was not the Spaniards who capitalized on the existence of the 

river, but the French, who moved into the Great Lakes region via the 

St. Lawrence River. After hearing a report from trappers in 1655, the 

Governor at Quebec, the Compte de Frontenac, sent out Marquette and 

Jolliet to confirm the existence of a major river beyond the Great Lakes. 

On June 17, 1663, the little expedition entered the Mississippi headwaters. The explorers followed the downstream course as far as the mouth 

of the Arkansas River and then returned. 

Unlike their Spanish counterparts, French authorities truly appreciated the value of the discovery, and prepared for a thorough exploration of the river. In August of 1678 Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle, 

led a well-equipped expedition which descended the river nearly to the 

Gulf. Near the Head of Passes, where the Mississippi divides into 

separate channels to the Gulf, he erected a cross and claimed the river 

and the entire valley. In honor of his king, Louis XIV, La Salle named 

the land Louisiana, and the river became "River St. Louis." Other 

names for the river included "Colbert," after Louis XIV's illustrious 

Finance Minister, and even "La Salle." All of these attempts to name 

the river came to nothing, however, for the quaint-sounding Indian name 

prevailed. The theory today is that the name "Mississippi" probably 

derives from the Chippewa term "mid i zibi," meaning "large river." The 

French apparently understood the meaning to be "Father of Waters." 

That misinterpretation survives. 3 

To secure their claim the French erected outposts throughout the 

interior. In 1699 they established a colony at Biloxi, which they mistakenly believed to be near the mouth of the Mississippi. After the 

French found the actual outlets of the river, they despaired of establishing any settlement at the mouth at all; snakes, mud, mosquitoes, 

alligators, crawling insects, and oppressive heat and humidity proved 

too formidable obstacles. It was not until 1718, under pressure from 

authorities in France, that the Governor reluctantly chose an appropriate 

site. Workers cleared vines, brush, palmettoes, and other trees for 

the site, filled in some mud holes, and constructed a blockhouse so that 

a French flag could proclaim French presence near the outlets of the 

Mississippi. The New Orleans site was actually some 90 miles upriver, 

but was the only strategically located point from which both the Missis.- 

sippi River and Lake Pontchartrain could be protected from foreigd intrusion. 

2 
The establishment of New Orleans, however miserable the location, confirmed actual ownership and control of the river and lands claimed by 

La Salle. 

Early Mississippi Navigation 

Commerce advanced. Even before New Orleans was established as a 

port of deposit and entry, trappers of the western Great Lakes area, 

as well as those of the Ohio and Illinois regions, used .the Mississippi to ship goods to market. As early as 1705 the first recorded cargo, 

a load of 15,000 bear and deer hides, was rafted down the Mississippi, 

signalling what could become the opening of one of the major trade 

routes of the world. 4 

The passage of time confirmed the importance of the Mississippi. 

Along with its tributaries the Mississippi drained approximately 40 

percent of the interior of the contiguous United States, and about 13 

percent of Canada. The major tributaries of the Mississippi rank as 

major rivers in their own right--especially the Ohio, Missouri, and 

Arkansas. The statistics are impressive; the river empties into the Gulf 

of Mexico at the average rate of 785,000 million cubic yards a year, and 

delivers three times as much water as the majestic Rhine and a whopping 

338 times as much as the Thames. The Mississippi is a breathtaking 

2,340 miles long and has over 100,000 tributaries, large and small, 

throughout a watershed of about 1,245,000 square miles. 5With its tributaries, the Mississippi ultimately provides over 15,000 miles of inland 

navigation. In addition to its critical role as a primary trade route, 

the Mississippi assumed increasing importance as a source of fresh water. 

It is said that enough fresh water flows past New Orleans daily to provide the entire United States with three days' supply. The great river 

accounts for about one-tenth of the world's daily supply of fresh water. 6 

The lower Mississippi begins at the point where the Ohio empties 

into the Mississippi at present-day Cairo, Illinois. Although the Ohio 

River delivers a relatively clean flow, the muddy Missouri dumps an 

excessively silt-laden load into the upper Mississippi. The Mississippi 

takes on its muddy character within a mile or two below Cairo. The silt 

burden of the Mississippi runs to about 50 pounds of mud for each 1,000 

cubic feet of water, a fact early river travelers noticed. The muddy 

character of the Mississippi became part of the river's legend. 'It was 

considered almost unpatriotic not to assume that the river was the 

muddiest in the world: "too thick to drink and too thin to plow." 7The 

legend is a fallacy, however, as the silt level cannot compare with that 

of certain other rivers, even those in the United States. Both the 

Missouri and the Colorado rivers carry about ten times more silt than 

does the Mississippi. 8 

3 
With the establishment of French colonies in the Gulf region, river 

trade started not only for westerners; but for Indians as well. As early 

as 1706 English traders tried to undercut the incipient trade between the 

French and the Natchez Indians. They could make occasional forays upriver as long as the French had no settlements along the Mississippi itself. They tried to win the favor of the Natchez by giving them more 

presents than did the French, apparently the only real consideration of 

the time. After the French established their dominance in New Orleans, 

thus excluding the English, the Natchez began to cultivate tobacco on a 

commercial basis. By 1729 the Natchez were supplying a good portion of 

the 300,000-pound tobacco crop which was shipped from New Orleans that 

year. 9 

In the upper reaches of the Ohio the French found it almost impossible to stem the flow of English frontiersmen pushing into the valley. The 

French stoutly resisted this intrusion, but apparently raised no sustained 

objection to the use of the Ohio and the Mississippi for shipping goods 

downriver. That commerce, after all, would bring some prosperity to the 

thinly settled regions of the West, and especially to New Orleans. Thus 

New Orleans became the principal port of deposit for the English colonial 

frontier as well as for the French settlers in the western provinces. 

Early River Craft 

Several conveyances were suitable for taking bulk cargoes downriver. 

The canoe, adopted by fur trappers and traders, could be as large as 18 

feet long and 3 feet in the beam, and might even use a crude sail to take 

advantage of favorable winds. The maneuverability of the canoe, and its 

cousin the pirogue, was especially suitable for the smaller tributaries. 

Once the cargo had been carried to the larger tributaries, or the Mississippi itself, it was practical to combine cargoes into one major shipment on a more stable craft. 

The bullboat was the first of these major downriver carriers. Constructed of buffalo hide stretched over an oval sapling frame, it could 

carry a cargo of three tons while drawing only ten inches of draft. The 

bullboat was guided and aided by a crew of polemen. 

Another similar conveyance was the Mackinaw, commonly used to transport fur pelts from the Missouri valley. The Mackinaw was constructed 

of hand-hewn planks pegged together. An average-sized craft was approximately 50 feet long and 12 feet in the beam. The Mackinaw was flat-bottomed 

and pointed at either end. A crew of four men could transport a load of 

15 tons a distance of 75 to 150 miles in a time span of 15 to 18 hours. 10 

4 
The flatboat was another common downstream conveyance found in the 

Mississippi valley. Flatboats, also known as broadhorns, carried passengers as well as cargo. Emigrants from the middle-state colonies came 

into the headwaters of the Ohio River, bought'or constructed flatboats, 

and moved westward with provisions and homesteading essentials. Craftsmanship was not a major factor, for once these conveyances had fulfilled 

their function their owners dismantled them and either sold the lumber 

or used it to construct a homestead. The average flatboat was about 40 

feet by 12 feet, and 8 feet deep. The cargo was solidly stowed except 

for a center aisle, and there was a cabin astern for the family. The 

cabin itself, a small house, contained the bare essentials--bunks, table, 

and a brick fireplace. The pilot steered the craft through vigorous 

control of a 40- to 50-foot sweep in the tiller. 11 

The more versatile keelboat allowed upstream movement, however 

laborious. Pointed at both ends, the keelboat averaged 60 to 70 feet 

,in length, was about 18 feet wide, and had a slightly rounded bottom. 

These craft were distinguished by a heavy timber keel which served as a 

shock absorber in frequent encounters with floating trees or sandbars. 

Like the aforementioned craft, the keelboat floated downstream with the 

current, but it could be poled upstream by a crew of boatmen wielding irontipped poles. If the river bottom was too soft, or the current too 

swift, the keelboat could be winched forward by a method called cordelling. 

The crew tethered a rope to the craft, then carried the other end of the 

rope for a short distance upstream and anchored it to a tree on the bank. 

The craft could then be warped forward by hand or by means of a capstan. 

"Bushwacking" was a third way of moving against the current. This technique involved nothing more than moving the keelboat by means of 

grasping branches and pulling the boat forward. From all accounts, more 

muscle than skill was involved in moving a keelboat and its cargo upstream. 

The sugar, molasses, and groceries carried into the hinterland 

represented the essential luxuries of the frontier, easily worth the four 

months or more that were necessary to get them from New Orleans to 

Pittsburgh. The riverboatmen rewarded themselves with fighting and debauchery at each opportunity along the way, and Natchez seemed to gain a 

reputation second only to that of New Orleans. 12 

Moving the cargo upstream on crude craft was an exercise in strength 

and endurance, but the alternative was even less attractive. Any attempt 

to punch through the wilderness with more than a backpack invited disaster 

by exhaustion, Indians, bandits, bears, or snakes. Those who were returning 

home by way of land usually traveled in heavily armed groups unencumbered 

by excess baggage. The primitive river craft were the least dangerous 

5 
alternative, and up until the 1780s represented the best means of inland 

navigation despite being essentially one-way conveyances. Their major 

advantage was that they required neither deep water nor a cleared channel. 

Like the frontiersman themselves, the craft were rough and ready and got 

the job done with the fewest complications. 

The Mississippi Becomes American 

After the French and Indian War ended in 1763, defeated France deeded 

the Louisiana territory, including New Orleans, to Spain. The Mississippi 

became the dividing line between English and Spanish territory. BenevolentSpanish rule greatly enhanced commerce on the Mississippi. While the 

mother country had stringent and ill-devised commercial regulations 

regarding trade with foreign nations, the Spanish governors connived to 

violate those rules. This fact was particularly true after a major fire 

nearly wiped out New Orleans in 1788. In the interests of a quick 

recovery Governor Estevan Miro opened trade, not only to the Americans 

but to other nations which would trade through New Orleans. The venture 

was such a success in rebuilding the financial vitality of New Orleans 

that even the King of Spain congratulated the local governors on their 

violation of Spanish regulations. 13 

American deposits at New Orleans were significant, including expensive cargoes which often represented the sole cash crops of interior 

settlers. The warehouses at New Orleans bulged with tobacco, cider, and 

fur--and their quantities grew with each passing year. 14 

New Orleans had became too vital to the Americans to be left in 

foreign hands. Americans were dissatisfied with the status quo, for 

the privilege of navigating the western waters and of using New Orleans 

could be withdrawn. The situation became critical in 1800 with the 

news that Louisiana had been retroceded to France. Americans feared 

that France, under control of Napoleon Bonaparte, might capriciously 

withdraw the "Right of Deposit" Which Spain had guaranteed: That 

prospect moved westerners to demand that New Orleans be secured for the 

United States. In that atmosphere American political leaders found it 

popular to advise westerners to "take redress into their awn hands" if 

the foreigners dared try to close off New Orleans to American use. 

Secretary of State James Madison fairly well assessed the value of the 

Mississippi to western citizens when he said: 

The Mississippi to them is everything. It is 

the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomac, and all 

navigable rivers of the Atlantic states, formed 

into one stream. The produce exported through 

6 
7 

that channel, last year (1802) amounted to 

$1,622,672 from the districts of Kentucky and 

Mississippi only, and will probably be 50 

percent more this year, from the whole of the 

western country. Kentucky alone has exported, 

for the first half of this year, $591,432 

in value, a great part which is now, or will 

shortly be, afloat for New Orleans and 

consequently exposed to the effects of this 

extraordinary exercise of power (possibility of 

cutting off a port vital to Americans). 15 

Senator Ross of Pennsylvania added, "To the free navigation of the 

Mississippi we had an undoubted right, from nature and from the position 

of Our western country :116 

The worst fear of the westerners was realized when France withdrew the 

Right of Deposit at New Orleans. Americans talked wildly of taking New 

Orleans by force. In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson responded by 

sending James Monroe to Paris to negotiate the purchase of New Orleans 

and its surroundings. Few anticipated that France would part easily with 

such a valuable possession, especially considering that the ministers were 

to offer only $2 million and to go no higher than $10 million. 

However, events favored the Americans. Napoleon's ambitions suffered some disastrous setbacks, and he decided to divest himself of the 

more troublesome elements of the empire. "Damn sugar, damn coffee, damn 

colonies!" 17 

The American ministers approached Napoleon's infamous minister, 

Talleyrand, with some trepidation, being aware of his crafty reputation 

and their own modest financial proposal. Talleyrand dumbfounded the 

ministers by offering to sell all of Louisiana for little more than 

they had been authorized to pay for the New Orleans area. After a week 

of nervous haggling a deal was struck, and all of Louisiana belonged to 

the United States for the bargain price of $15 million, which included 

some debt write-offs. Now the Mississippi was truly an American river. 18 
Chapter II 

NAVIGATION DURING THE STEAMBOAT ERA 

The flood of new immigrants into the Mississippi valley assured that 

river commerce would grow as never before, but not necessarily that the 

river would be improved for navigation. The coming of the steamboat 

created the demand for improved channel conditions. 

The first steamboat on the Mississippi, designed by Robert Fulton 

for Nicholas Roosevelt and built in Pittsburgh, was not well designed 

or suited for the shallow waters of the West, including the Mississippi. 

The ship was named for its destination, New Orleans. It was 148 feet 

long, sat deep in the water, had two auxiliary sail masts, a crew of 13, 

and looked more like an ocean-going vessel. Roosevelt, however, was a 

thorough man and had meticulously planned for the initial voyage. He 

arranged for fuel and supply stops along the route, picked a time 

when the river would be running high, and allowed time to stop at all 

major cities en route. At each of these stops he gave local dignitaries 

a short upriver ride to demonstrate the capabilities of his ship and to 

alert them to the steamship era about to begin. 

The only major incident on the downriver trip occurred when the 

New Orleans was midstream during the famous New Madrid earthquake. As 

the river heaved and land sloughed away from the bluffs, the citizens 

of New Madrid spotted the strange, smoke-belching, fire-spitting contraption in the river. Roosevelt stopped and offered to take on the citizens 

for safety, but many apparently thought the apparition to be more of a 

menace than the earthquake. Perhaps, in their confusion the citizens 

even ascribed the earthquake to the presence of the strange craft. 1 

The drama of the first Mississippi steamboat was fully equal to the 

competition of an earthquake--and certainly of more consequence to the 

people of the Mississippi valley. The historic significance was not lost 

on the citizens of New Orleans, for they followed the news of the voyage 

with consuming curiosity. When the New Orleanslanded in that city in 

January of 1812, it was greeted with a thunderous roar of cannon salutes, 

firework displays, and all the usual forms of public celebration. The 

trip from Pittsburgh had taken three and a half months, but when the 

New Orleansnosed upstream to begin its regular run to Natchez the steady 

three mph headway brought a gasp of approval. It was not the right ship, 

but it was the first ship. A new era had begun. 2 

The New Orleans provided the first steam-powered commercial route on 

the lower Mississippi, but within two years it also became the first 

9 
steamship lost to the river, suffering what became the most common end of 

a steamboat, death by snagging. The incident emphasized"thataf steamboat navigation and commerce signalled a new era, then a more efficient 

steamboat was necessary--and river improvement was a fundamental requirement. 

Within a few years of the arrival of the first steamboat there were 

hundreds and then thousands of steamboats operating on streams throughout 

the Mississippi valley. Their design differed radically from that of 

Fulton's New Orleans, due primarily to the innovative genius of Captain 

Henry Shreve. 

A man of limitless energy, Shreve was "unencumbered by book learning, 

and ready to dare anything."3 He learned his river craft in the hard 

school of keelboating, and quickly applied his logical mind and facile . 

imagination to developing a steamboat more appropriate for western waters. 

While forming his ideas he became the captain of the Enterprise, launched 

just two years after the historic arrival of the New Orleans. The 

War of 1812 gave additional opportunity to Shreve. He ignored the monopoly 

on river traffic which Louisiana had granted to Robert Livingston and 

Robert Fulton. Transporting arms and supplies to Jackson, and defending 

New Orleans in an epic confrontation, gave Shreve the kind of publicity 

and contacts which served him well. After the war Shreve continued to 

defy the Fulton-Livingston monopoly and eventually broke its legal 

status. 4 

Shreve's new steamboat design quickly became the standard of western 

ship design and it was incorporated in his first boat, the Washington, 

launched in 1816. The hull, which was only a shallow barge, was a 

striking departure from conventional design. Shreve reasoned that there 

was no need to have the engine mounted below deck, as there would be no 

great waves or hurricane force winds to threaten the craft's stability. 

Rather, he mounted his engine on the deck and in the process created 'a 

craft requiring only one to 2 feet of water for navigation, as opposed 

to the customary 8- to 12-foot draft of conventional craft. Second, 

Shreve used a high-pressure engine which was both lighter and more 

powerful than the law-pressure model used in the Fulton-designed craft. 

Shreve's engines also had horizontal rather than vertical cylinders, 

contributing to better configuration of the ship. His new engines 

proved to be twice as fuel efficient as then-standard types. 5 

Shreve's new approach to river craft design resulted in a boat that 

drew less than two feet of water, carried a larger cargo, and was fuel 

and design efficient. Its shallow draft enabled it to float over sandbars and to travel shallow streams, bayous, and harbors. This highly 

10 
successful design was as great a step in the growth of river commerce 

as the original steamboat. Combined with Shreve's successful challenge 

of the river monopolies, it brought a new surge of interest in river 

commerce. By 1818 there were as many steamboats built to the new design 

specifications as had been built in all the previous years. 6 

Improvements to Navigation 

The steamboats brought a new era of prosperity into the valley. 

New settlements sprang up along the length of the river as trappers and 

farmers expanded their activities. The standard of living on the frontier leapt forward from the days when the most basic commodity was considered a luxury. 

Increasingly heavy traffic on the Mississippi caused greater losses 

because of navigational hazards. Profits were high enough that shipping 

interests could sustain the losses, but the better solution was to remove 

dangerous obstructions from the river. 

Although a community might assume responsibility for eliminating 

obstructions from its own harbor, no private interest could undertake 

clearing the entire Mississippi. Thus commercial interests, shippers, 

local officials, and port authorities appealed to Congress for help in 

improving river conditions on this vital national artery. These demands 

occurred after the War of 1812, when interest heightened in improving 

the nation's road and waterway system. Congress, responding to a report 

by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, finally agreed that maintaining 

inland navigation was in the national interest. Therefore in 1824 it 

enacted the first of many Rivers and Harbors bills. The 1824 bill 

authorized the President to spend $75,000 for the removal of trees 

which had lodged in the navigational streams of the Ohio River and the 

Mississippi. The Corps of Engineers was directed to carry out the congressional mandate. 7 

Snags 

To the westerner, "river improvement" meant nothing more than removing 

dangerous obstructions from the main channel. Many of these obstructions 

were manmade, often the wreckage of a ship or other river craft. Other, 

and more common, obstructions were known as "snags," "sawyers," or "planters." 8 

A snag was a tree which had broken loose from an eroding bank and 

floated into the navigation line of the river. There, the base of the 

tree would settle to the bottom of the channel and the trunk would project above the water line. Within a few weeks the upper or exposed part 

of the tree would disappear, leaving only the shaft of the tree as a 

11 
lethal spike capable of puncturing a moving craft without warning. Once 

the ship was caught, its weight and speed would impale the vessel on 

the tree trunk. So violent were these encounters that on many occasions 

. the tree shaft penetrated not only the hull of the craft, but the upper 

decks and even the pilot's house as wel1.9 

A sawyer was similar to a snag in that it was a displaced tree resting on the bottom of the navigational channel. But it differed from the 

snag in that it was less rigidly affixed at the base, and tended to bob 

up and down ("saw") with the action of the current or waves. The sawyer 

was just as dangerous as the snag, but a bit more capricious. ]- 0 

A planter was usually a tree that remained as an obstacle when the 

river was cutting a new chute. The chute was the first indication that 

the river was going to cut across a bend, but often the process of cutting 

a new channel would occur so quickly that the better rooted trees would 

resist the attack of the new channel for many months. As they lost their 

protruding foliage and the channel became more navigable, the planters 

became a formidable obstacle to an unsuspecting pilot. 1] 

The process of clearing all these obstructions, including old wrecks, 

was called "snagging." An onerous job, snagging involved attaching a rope 

or chain to the obstacle and jerking it out of the main channel. A process of jerking, dragging, and winching continued until the massive and ungainly object had been pulled off toward the bank. All too often the snag' 

would refloat itself during the next high water and resume its guarding of 

the channel, and the same snag would have to be removed once again the 

following year. The task of clearing thousands of snags as thousands 

more drifted into the river was overwhelming, particularly when there 

was more river traffic on western waters than on the Great Lakes and the 

Atlantic Coast combined?- 2 

The commercial interests along the lower Mississippi were understandably preoccupied with navigation. The 1840s and the 1850s marked frequent 

so-called river conventions, invariably held in one of the major cities 

benefiting from river trade. The conventions always culminated in a call 

for more federal concern (read: funding) for river improvements and 

occasionally voiced demands for flood control. The principal contention seemed to be that the river served the national interest, and that 

it would be unfair for the bordering states to assume the entire burden 

of its improvement. Accepting that argument, in 1844 President Tyler told 

Congress that the Mississippi River was a "unique highway" serving the 

commerce of the whole country, and that the United States should not 

expect the bordering states to bear the national burden any more than 

the bordering states should control commerce on the river. 13 

12 
Congress was not impressed and several times failed to make necessary 

appropriations even for routine work. The strain of national tensions 

and sectionalism tended to make all else seem unimportant. The decade 

of the 1850s riveted national attention on the question of possible 

southern secession. In this mood of growing sectionalism it was not 

surprising that the lower Mississippi, flanked on both sides by slave 

states, would be neglected by Congress. In 1855 the government sold the 

snagboats and abandoned the lower Mississippi to nature; the only exception was a bill Congress passed in 1856, over a presidential veto, 

appropriating $330,000 to maintain ship channels at the Mississippi's 

mouth. 14 

Southerners undoubtedly thought the abandonment inexcusable, but 

northern legislators argued that further work must await the results of 

some major surveys. The 1850 Congress had authorized a complete survey of 

the lower Mississippi River, with a view toward a plan of improvement 

for navigation. The Secretary of War authorized both the Army Corps of 

Topographical Engineers and Charles Ellet, Jr., a well-known civil 

engineer, to make reports. Ellet's report gained attention because of 

Its recommendation to build flood control reservoirs, a very controversial idea at the time. Captain A.A. Humphreys and Lieutenant 

Colonel Stephen H. Long of the Topographical Engineers began a separate 

report as part of a topographic and hydrographic survey of the Mississippi 

delta. Lieutenant Henry L. Abbot was later detailed as an assistant to 

Humphreys, while Long was assigned elsewhere. When the report was completed in 1861 it was known by eithiqx of two names; the Delta Survey 

or the Humphreys and Abbot Survey." 

Humphreys and Abbot suggested ehat navigation could be improved and 

floods minimized mainly by constructing levees. The report was a comprehensive examination of the Mississippi, employing both new research and 

new theory. Its impact on the development of river engineering in the 

United States can hardly be exaggerated. For the time being, however, 

the implementation of any new river engineering concepts was delayed by 

the Civil War. 16 

The Civil War 

The Civil War not only postponed river Improvement, it accelerated 

the deterioration of the channel. Frequent gunboat sinkings, mining of 

waterways, placing of manmade obstructions, and cutting of levees all made 

the waterway increasingly dangerous. At one point in the war General U.S. 

Grant attempted to divert the river so that it would bypass Vicksburg, 

but he found that more than pick and shovel would be required. Nearly 

ten years of neglect and five years of destruction negated previous gains. 

13 
Post-Civil War 

Soon after the Civil War, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton sent 

Humphreys, then a brevet major general, to the lower Mississippi valley 

to inspect and repair the war-damaged levees. Though neither sufficient 

funds nor manpower were found to repair all the levees, Humphrey's report 

served as a guide to further action. Humphreys once more stressed the 

importance of levees for flood control; and, in the 1870s, Congress 

appropriated money for emergency levee repair, justifying the 

appropriation as an aid to navigation. Meanwhile, Corps of Engineers 

dredge boats cleared the channels at the Head of Passes of both manmade 

and natural obstructions. 

The businessmen of the day were too impatient to await an "all 

clear" signal from the Corps, however. They put their ships back into 

operation as soon as they could be raised or refitted, launching their 

craft in snag-filled channels. 

The steamboats of the period continued the romantic tradition of the 

prewar era. Luxurious passenger cabins equal to any fine hotel, elegantly 

appointed dining rooms, huge ballrooms with live entertainment, sumptuous 

food, and endless gambling were all part of river travel. To all this 

was added the exciting element of danger, the real fear that the ship 

might be lost for any number of reasons: snags, collisions, fires, sandbars, or exploding boilers. More than 500 steamboats and thousands of 

passengers had become casualties of river traffic in the ten years before 

the Civil War. The odds increased of accidents occurring on the neglected 

and debris-choked river of the postwar period. 17 

The historic 1871 steamboat race between the Robert E. Lee and the 

Natchez demonstrated the adventurous nature of steamboat captains. More 

important, the race refocused the nation's attention on the viability of 

river commerce. Steamboat captains tried to capture the record for cargo 

tonnage by stacking cargo as high as the pilot house. The Mary Belle 

temporarily captured that record with a cargo of 7,829 bales of cotton 

and 19,000 sacks of cotton seed, for a total cargo of 3,300 tons. These 

records were important for the shippers. They brought attention to the 

fact that cargoes could be transported efficiently and helped steamboat companies compete with the emerging railroad industry. The size cargo 

that the Mary Belle carried, for instance, would have required 110 cars 

on the trains of the period; and, of course, the expense would have been 

much greater. 18 

Heavy river traffic meant heavy commercial interests were lobbying 

in Washington. In June of 1874 Congress authorized a new survey of the 

14 
lower Mississippi, with a view toward maintaining a guaranteed channel 

eight to ten feet deep. This work was greatly aided by new gages that 

had been set on the river in 1871, the beginning of systematic and continuous river gaging on the Mississippi. The new survey undertaken 

under the direction of Major Charles R. Suter, Corps of Engineers, was one 

of the most significant evaluations of the river. His reconnaissance 

resulted in a map, published on a scale of one inch to one mile, showing 

the bank lines, the river channel, sandbars, known wrecks, islands, 

bluffs, tributaries, and all known obstructions to navigation. Suter's 

survey updated previous knowledge of the river and was remarkably 

detailed. Even uninformed congressmen had to be impressed with the 

overwhelming problems of navigation on our nation's major waterway. 

Suter's map, depicting thousands of towheads, islands, drybars, wrecks, 

and chutfR, clearly showed the problems of a twisting and convoluted 

channel.' 

With these facts, Congress became convinced of the need to correlate 

all known information and develop a systematized approach to river 

improvement. The massive project required that a commission be created 

to investigate appropriate procedures and to oversee the efforts. 

While Congress was studying the makeup of such a commission it 

authorized the formation of a Board of Engineers to help execute river 

improvements. More and varied information poured in, including new 

studies by Major C.B. Comstock to determine the amount of sediment 

in suspension. Congress became more convinced that river problems were 

too varied and complex to be approached piecemeal or to be handled by 

any one agency.20 Therefore, in June 1879, Congress passed a bill 

authorizing the establishment of the Mississippi River Commission (MRC). 

Composed of seven presidential appointees, the Commission consisted of 

three officers from the Corps of Engineers, one from the U.S. Coast and 

Geodetic Survey, and three civilians, of whom two had to be civil 

engineers. The law specified that the President of the Commission be 

a Corps officer. 21The MRC had a greater mass of accumulated river 

information than had ever previously existed, but funds were still 

scarce. The Commission clearly needed more congressional support if 

it ever was to fulfill its responsibilities to improve navigation and 

prevent disastrous flooding. 

15 
Chapter III 

GETTING ORGANIZED 

THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER COMMISSION 

At first the Mississippi River Commission, headquartered in St. 

Louis, tried to do all--gather facts, develop plans, and hire the 

labor. The job was impossible. Thus in 1882 Congress relieved the MRC 

of the work detail. Thereafter the Commission would do the planning 

and the Army Corps of Engineers would do the work. 

To facilitate the work on the river the MRC recommended and Congress 

authorized the establishment of Engineer Districts to handle projects 

within specific stretches of the river. The First District boundaries 

extended from Cairo southward to a point ten miles above Memphis. The 

Second District stretched from that point to the mouth of the White River. 

The Third District continued to about ten miles below Vicksburg, and the 

Fourth District reached from that point to the Head of Passes. These 

Districts were later supplemented by the creation of a Dredging District 

operating directly under the Commission.' 

The original subdivision of the Engineer Districts was cumbersome, 

and by 1885 the First, Second, and Third Districts were all headquartered 

in Memphis, while New Orleans was the home of the Fourth District. After 

some interim adjustments, there was a major overhaul of the subdivisions 

in 1928. The lower Mississippi was divided into four districts: St. 

Louis District, containing part of the old First District; Memphis 

District, essentially comprising what had been part of the First and most 

of the Second Districts; Vicksburg District (formerly the Third District); 

and New Orleans District (the old Fourth District). At the same time 

Congress directed the MRC to implement the flood control plans for the 

lower Mississippi proposed by Major General Edgar Jadwin, the Chief of 

Engineers. The headquarters was relocated in Vicksburg in order to be 

central to its jurisdiction. In an efficiency move, the President of 

the MRC was later given additional responsibility, by being named the 

Mississippi Valley Division Engineer. 

The act which created the Mississippi River Commission mandated the 

improvement of the river channel, but it also included a variety of other 

tasks and commitments. Commercial interests thought that the MRC was 

created to improve navigation on the river, but landowners hoped that the 

Commission might also provide flood protection. Many Congressmen, however, reinforced by public opinion, were firmly opposed to governmentsponsored flood control, arguing that the Constitution forbade the use of 

17 
federal funds to protect private property. Any flood protection measures 

were usually disguised as improvements to navigation. Not until 1917 

did Congress authorize federal funds for flood protection. 2 

Coinciding with the creation of the Mississippi River Commission 

and partly because of the support of that agency, new hydraulic research 

and experimentation began. The results revolutionized the science of 

river engineering--remarkable progress was made in the areas of bank 

protection, regulation of the river, and dredging. 

Bank Protection 

The immediate need was to clear the river of hazardous Obstructions 

(snags). Fortunately, the snagboat designed by Captain Shreve was up 

to the task, especially with the gradual introduction of steel hulls. 

Because the removal of snags was a routine matter, the Engineers were 

able to concentrate on the basic problem of snag prevention, that is, 

keeping trees and debris from collapsing into the river through bank decay 

and erosion. 

Willow Mat 

Bank protection was not a new idea. Man had long tried to keep the 

river from gnawing away at his property. By the nineteenth century the 

"science" of bank protection had evolved into a fairly routine system. 

The bank would be "prepared" by being cut to a slope of 45 degrees or less, 

then overlayed with some kind of protective covering extending above the 

high-water mark to well below the level of erosive turbulence. Up until 

the latter part of the nineteenth century there was only one abundant 

material for bank protection along the Mississippi banks--the ubiquitous 

willow tree saplings. 

Using a process brought over from Europe, workers cut the willow 

saplings into uniform lengths, cross-stacked them to a thickness of three 

to five feet, and then tied them together with wire. The mattress ("mat") 

was then securely anchored to the river bank. The mattress could be as 

long and as wide as needed, because the workers could build extensions 

both laterally and vertically. 

The upper bank portion of the mat would be constructed in place, 

but the subaqueous (underwater) section required a special technique. 

The subaqueous mats were built on the deck of a "mat launching barge 

anchored tightly to the bank. As the mat sections were completed the 

barge was pulled out from uder the mattress, leaving the mat to float on 

the water. Laborers then loaded the mats with large stones (riprap) 

until the mattress sank into position. 

18 
The process was arduous and seemingly endless. Often the mattress 

would be swept away and destroyed by the next high water, or the river 

might change and move a hard-won revetment miles away. The key to survival of the willow mat lay in its being undisturbed for the first few 

months, when the saplings would actually send out roots and became an 

integral part of the river bank. Many of the willow forests along the 

river have their genesis in just such a development. 

Bank revetment started with the protection of harbors, expanded to 

the protection of the most critical bends in the river, then on to protection of secondary reached of the river. In the process, revetment 

spread from a few thousand feet to hundreds of miles of protection. 

Concrete Mats 

Certain districts assumed responsibility for experimentation and 

deyelopment of answers to specific river problems. The Engineers at 

Memphis took the lead in experimenting on better methods of revetment. 

The experimentation led them through several unusual concepts, beginning 

with the substitution of lumber for willow saplings. That concept was 

quickly abandoned because the lumber was vastly inferior for many reasons, 

including rot and drift. The search then turned to large, heavy slabs 

which would anchor themselves to the banks by their own weight. After a 

brief fling with cinder slabs (for reasons of economy), the Engineers 

turned to concrete. Overlapping concrete slabs were the beginning of the 

answer. However, the slabs were not the best answer since they were 

difficult to place, could be undermined by eddy currents or backwash, and 

would often slide off in the muck. Lap-slab paving pointed directly 

to the need to have smaller slabs tied together so that they could conform to bank erosion. 

By 1916 the forerunner of today's standard articulated concrete 

mattress had evolved, and it was placed in Vicksburg harbor. The mat 

underwent some minor changes and it took a long time to develop the 

Immensely complex mat-laying plant of today. Still, the basic concept 

of a flexible concrete mattress, consisting of small blocks of concrete 

preformed and wired together as units which could in turn be connected to 

other units, evolved as the best answer to the age-old problem of how to 

protect a bank from erosion, especially at the subaqueous stage. 3 

The present design of the articulated mat consists of a section of 

20 blocks of concrete, linked together by a corrosion-resistant wire, and 

covering an area 4 feet by 25 feet (100 square feet). In the ultimate 

refinement of the placement process, the old method of derrick and crane 

has given way to a remarkably complex mat-laying plant (barge). This 

19 
complex of machinery takes the units from the supply barges, lays them in 

proper juxtaposition, ties them together, and lays them on the slope 

of the bank. The plant was developed by the Vicksburg District Engineers 

and remains a marvel of technology, capable of laying 330,000 square feet 

of articulated mat in a ten-hour work day. 4 

The creation of a better mattress, plus the innovative technique for 

laying that mat, allowed the Engineers to plan for the protection of more 

and more segments of troublesome banks, as well as to repair those sections 

which were lost or bypassed by the river. No longer does one measure revetment by the miles, but rather by the hundreds of miles. At the end 

of 1980 the Memphis District had completed 85 percent of the authorized 

340 miles of revetment within its district. The Vicksburg District had 

completed 241 miles of its authorized 289 miles (83 percent); and the 

New Orleans District had completed 206 miles of its authorized 325 miles 

(63 percent). 5 

Stabilizing the Channel 

Just as the search for effective bank protection advanced through 

several stages of experiments and failures, so did the search for effective 

ways to control channel width and meander. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 

1896 specified that the Engineers were to maintain a minimum depth of nine 

feet on the lower Mississippi, but that was not a goal easily attained. 

The problem lay in the characteristics of the riverbed. The river 

worked itself through such a soft meander belt, easily eroded, that it 

tended to widen itself and run shallow in the process. Protecting the 

banks assured that there would be some limit as to the width of the 

river, but the natural banks permitted the river to spread over too large 

an area. Furthermore, the thalweg (a line representing the deepest part 

of a channel) could and would meander within the meander of the riverbed 

itself, creating shoals where none had been the day before. The problem 

was especially acute at places like Plum Point Reach, about 50 miles 

above Memphis. At that point the river seemed to be virtually unconfined 

within the low mud banks of the floodplain. There the river spread 

itself thin, flowed turgidly, dropped out sediment, and allowed snags 

to anchor themselves anywhere. 

Because Plum Point was a particularly troublesome reach, the 

Engineers chose to fight the battle there, just as Shreve had chosen the 

same location to wage his war on snags. The solution for Plum Point, 

and for many other reaches of the Mississippi, was to constrict the water 

into a more manageable channel. Forcing the flow into a tighter, more 

20 
confined channel would cause the water to scour away sandbars and to dig 

a deeper channel for itself--a task not easily accomplished. 

Dikes 

It would not be necessary to wall in the Mississippi in order to 

constrict the channel, but only to extend a dam-like structure from the 

bank to a proposed channel line. These structures were called dikes, or 

wing dams. The dikes would naturally stop the flow of water through its 

normal spread, and thus force the water to take the path that was unobstructed. Since the water would be slack between the dikes, sediment 

would continue to build up until those areas would become reaaimed land 

and, in turn, create a continuous bank for the constricted channel. 

After much experimentation it appeared that's fundamental approach 

was best in constructing the dikes. A line of pilings (like telephone 

poles) would be driven along the line of the proposed dike, deep enough 

to assure stability. The pilings would be lashed together to form a continuous barrier. Willow mats were then lashed to the structure and 

anchored at the base by riprap. In theory, sediment would begin to 

accumulate between the dikes, displacing the water. So much for theory. 

More often than not the currents undermined the pilings and washed away 

the whole structure, no matter how deep the pilings or how well ballasted 

with stone. 

In the continuous effort to create a more stable structure, single 

pilings gave way to multiple pilings driven deeper and lashed with greater 

rigidity. But all to no avail. The river seemed to have all the tools 

it needed to fight the best efforts of man. Even if the Engineers succeeded in creating awing dam capable of withstanding the unrelenting 

force of the river, the next inspection would often show that the structure had been moved downstream while still intact. 

The science of dike construction and placement has not undergone a 

technical revolution as happened with revetment, but it does benefit from 

the accrued knowledge of previous experience. The Engineers have 

developed better pilings and lashings, and have more knowledge of what it 

takes to produce a desired effect. The trend on the Mississippi for 

many years has been toward an increasing dependence on heavy stone dikes. 

The Engineers are aware that in a whim of fury nature is capable of 

undoing whatever has been done. Persistence and determination are the 

only answers, and as yet they are only temporary answers. 

21 
ATTACKING THE PROBLEM OF THE PASSES 

The Problem 

Beneath the muddy waters of the Mississippi, sand is constantly drifting along the riverbed. This sand, or sediment, tends to fall out and 

compact whenever the current is slowed or stopped, creating sandbars or 

shoals. The process is constant, and sandbars are one of the hazards 

of navigating the Mississippi, particularly where the river runs wide. 

Nowhere is the problem more critical, however, than at the outlets of 

the Mississippi. Because the Mississippi empties into the Gulf through 

several outlets, the distributed water slows in velocity as it is divided 

at the Head of Passes, and then slows even more at the outlets where 

it meets the waters of the Gulf. At minimum velocity (at the outlets), 

the Mississippi will drop its load of heavy sediment, creating a shoal 

which can reduce the depth of navigable water at the most crucial point 

of the whole river system. In the nineteenth century, the fall-out was 

so heavy that the passes were often clogged to the extent that only a few 

feet of water flowed above the bars. 

The problem worried even the earliest settlers in the valley for 

even before the French established New Orleans they sometimes found 

that the passes were too shallow for their ocean-going craft. The old 

wooden-hulled sailing ships could wait for the next tide to float them 

free, but captains demanded that the French governor do something to 

alleviate the condition. In 1726, just a few years after the founding of 

New Orleans, French officials attempted to solve the problem by sending 

out ships that dragged iron harrows along the bottom of the outlets. The 

theory was that the harrows would break up the bars, and the river would 

carry the loosened material out into the Gulf. It was a good theory, and 

partially successful, but the sandbars quickly reformed. For the next 

few years emphasis was on piloting rather than on removal of the sandbars, 

with auxiliary vessels standing by to accept part of the cargo, and a 

winching process to warp across ships that became stuck on the bars. 

The first dredging of an outlet occurred in 1729, using a machine 

supplied by the Company of the Indies. Even though a channel depth of 17 

feet was achieved, there was some doubt about whether the dredge was 

responsible for that temporary condition. Balize Pass soon shoaled up 

again and was abandoned in favor of other passes. Once again the technique of scraping the bars was favored as the easiest and cheapest method 

of maintenance. Dredging was not resumed until 1838, when a Philadelphiabuilt, self-propelled ladder bucket dredge arrived on the scene. The 

Balizewas a working machine, with a set of five 27-cubic-foot-capacity 

buckets on each side. However, the dredge was plagued with mechanical 

22 
problems. After only a year the Balize was retired, but in the interim 

it dug a temporary channel 900 by 100 by 16 feet. Not until the 1850s 

would there be another attempt at channel improvement by dredging, but 

that decade produced many innovative concepts on removing the bars. The 

unusual ideas included a crude concept of a hydraulic dredge, several 

agitating screw dredges, the use of drydocks to carry ships across the 

bars, and a proposal that all but one of the outlets be sealed. Nevertheless, harrowing, scraping, blasting, and dipper dredging seemed to 

offer the most hope although some unique, experimental dredges were 

appealing in concept. The firm of Craig and Rightor received a government 

contract and began a short-lived experiment at constricting Southwest 

Pass through the construction of jetties, with the goal of providing a 

channel 20-feet deep. The jetties were too flimsy to work, were not 

accepted by the Corps, and were soon abandoned. To compound the problem, 

the work of Craig and Rightor seemed to accelerate the shoaling of the 

pass, and on the eve of the Civil War the outlet was in worse shape than 

ever. 6 

Improved Dredging 

In 1866 a private engineer, Horace Tyler, developed a steamboat 

which featured forward thrusting conical propellers. When driven into 

a sandbar the propellers acted as gigantic drills, ripping and tearing 

apart the bar. The screws were amazingly successful at breaking up 

the bars, but the whole rig was improvised and prone to frequent failure. 

The lesson was not lost, however. 

In 1867 the Corps of Engineers submitted plans for a much-improved 

version of the Tyler dredge. The new ship, called the Essayons (the Corps 

motto, meaning "Let Us Try"), started work in the summer of 1868 and 

was declared a success. Within a few years disappointment set in, for the 

bars reformed and again the machinery was prone to failure. No matter 

how successful such a craft might be, the river seemed even more 

successful in replenishing the dislodged sediment. The temporary 

advantage had to be weighedl against the constant breakdown of equipment 

and the expense of repair. ' 

The Chief of Engineers, Brigadier General Andrew A. Humphreys, 

energetically supported the construction of a ship channel which would 

connect the Mississippi to the Gulf at a point near Fort St. Philip. 

His record, submitted to Congress in 1873, generally was favorably 

received, although some politicians worried about the high cost. There 

was an alternative, however, one which the Corps did not accept, and 

that was to construct jetties from one of the channels at the Head of 

Passes, past the sandbar, and into the Gulf. The idea was to constrict 

23 
the channel, thereby increasing the velocity of the water. The faster 

current would take more sediment into the Gulf and prevent further sediment deposits. The man who turned this theory into reality was James B. 

Eads. 

James B. Eads and the Jetties 

James B. Eads, like Henry Shreve, was a colorful, willful, innovative genius, already famous for his ability to get things done no 

matter how difficult the task. He invented the diving bell, used to 

salvage so much cargo from sunken steamboats. He designed, built, and 

delivered armor-plated gunboats to the Union in just 65 days, thereby 

assuring Union control of the Mississippi during the Civil War. 

Finally, he built the first iron bridge across the Mississippi at St. 

Louis in 1874.8 

It was obvious that Eads was not a man to be taken lightly. Yet 

when he stepped forward with an offer to open Southwest Pass to a 

guaranteed depth of 35 feet (for a payment of $10 million), he was met 

with skepticism, particularly from the Chief of.Engineers, who was 

still advocating his own plan. Eads was determined, however, and 

brashly told Congress that he would "get results first and charge the 

government later." 9 He planned to constrict the pass by walling it in 

with a jetty system. 

The concept of constricting the outlets, or at least one of the 

outlets, was an often proposed remedy. But the nation had always lacked 

the will and the funds to built a jetty system of sufficient durability. 

The failure of the Craig and Rightor jetties in the 1850s had proved 

nothing except their own inadequacy. Eads' plan, then, some considered 

theoretically good, but impractical for the passes. 1° 

Eads' boundless self-confidence offended many, especially the conservative hierarchy of the Corps. However, Congress found his offer 

too irresistible to reject, especially after Congress lowered his price 

and insisted that the work be applied to the South Pass rather than the 

Southwest Pass. The Southwest Pass was the most naturally useable outlet, 

whereas the South Pass was "entirely worthless" as it stood. 11 

The genius of Eads prevailed over the ageless problem of South 

Pass. A parallel line of levee-like structures, consisting of laminations 

of willow mats and layers of stone capped by concrete and superimposed by 

a railroad bed on one of the extensions, created a new, narrower channel 

for South Pass. The current now had to pass through a channel that was 

but 350 feet wide, and thus began to scour a deeper bed for itself. 

24 
General Humphreys was sure the jetties would not work, at least in 

the long run, and awaited news of Eads' failure. By 1877, however, 

success seem assured as the largest ships were entering the river through 

South Pass, the smallest of the major passes. The project was certified a 

success two years later, and Eads began to receive incremental payments as certain channel depths were achieved. With the success of Eads' 

jetties, the viability of the Mississippi as a major, inland waterway, and 

of New Orleans as a major world port, was secured. 12 

Using the same technique developed by Eads, the Engineers later 

opened Southwest Pass with a jetty system of much larger dimensions. 

Whereas South Pass had not contained a flow adequate for a larger system, 

it was possible for the Engineers to create a jettied channel 35 feet by 

1,000 feet with the better natural conditions of Southwest Pass. Although 

authorized in 1902, the work was delayed by economic conditions and then 

by the vv. . It was not until 1932 that Southwest Pass had its jetty 

system.' 

DREDGING ON THE MISSISSIPPI 

If the Tyler dredge and its successor, the Essayons, had failed to 

deal adequately with the problem of the passes, they had at least demonstrated a new and promising solution to the dredging of shallow crossings 

in the river. By the early 1890s the science of dredging had progressed 

to the point where cutter heads eliminated bars, and giant hydraulic 

vacuums sucked up sediment which the dredge boats carried to dump sites 

Dredging had become such an efficient and effective method of maintaining 

a minimum channel that the Mississippi River Commission began to advocate 

that method above others. 

The suction/cutter dredge provided several options. Sediment could 

be dumped in midstream to be carried off, it could be loaded onto 

barges and dumped elsewhere, or (as an expanded technique) it could be 

directly transported by huge discharge pipes to nearby lowlands. 

The efficiency of the new suction dredges was phenomenal, especially 

compared to the old dipper dredges. Whereas the dipper dredge could 

usually handle a cubic yard per scoop, and about 1,000 yards per day, the 

27-inch suction dredge could handle 1,500 cubic yards of material per 

hour, and could work day and night while programmed to move forward at a 

predetermined pace. Even so, improvements were made frequently. By 1900 

most of the suction dredges were being built with 32-inch capacity and 

with much greater reliability. The dredge B.M. Harrod, with its 36- 

inch capacity, finally proved that a slightly lesser capacity was more 

practical in application. 14 

25 
By 1901 the Mississippi River Commission had a total of nine dredges 

in its fleet, Including cutter-head dredges capable of ripping through 

manmade debris as well as hardened and impacted bars. 

DECLINE OF RIVER COMMERCE 

Ironically, just as the river was being transformed into a more 

efficient commercial highway, river commerce started to decline. The 

principal cause was the accelerating expansion of the railroad systems. 

The railroads, celebrating a heyday, offered swift and direct service 

and could reach areas never before served by water commerce. Even in 

communities directly served by river traffic, commercial interests tended 

to use the faster railroads. The cost was greater, but commercial 

interests were willing to pay the price. 

Commerce on the Mississippi did not suffer as much as commerce on 

lesser rivers. The Mississippi was a central artery and large enough to 

discourage bridge building. However, smaller - rivers, streams, and bayous 

were drastically affected by low-level bridge crossings. Once a low 

bridge was in place, river commerce beyond that point was impossible. 

As the railroad network spread into sparsely settled areas, river interests 

were driven out. On the lower Mississippi many river towns depended on 

river commerce for continued prosperity, and they awaited the return of 

renewed interest in cost-efficient shipping. River conventions, usually 

held at Memphis because of its central location, called for federal help 

for navigational and harbor improvements. 

In attempts to show good faith, many municipalities took the lead 

in improving their own harbor facilities. Usually these improvements 

involved building dikes, which would extend into the river and both 

protect the river frontage of the town and provide mooring facilities 

for steamboats. These dikes were usually constructed of huge wooden 

cribs which were floated into position andsunk in place by being filled 

with huge stones. Once in place the cribs were capped with additional 

stones, perhaps concrete, to create a "permanent" landing. These "citizen" 

dikes, as they were called in honor of their private funding, were often 

completed and maintained by the Corps. The dikes worked well and were 

easily replaced by the same technique. 15Following the success of the 

citizen dikes at Memphis, other river towns above Memphis started their 

awn harbor improvement programs. 

Defying the trend of decline in river traffic, the giant sternwheeler Sprague set all-time record tows in 1907 and again in 1908. In 

1907 the Sprague transported a tow of 60 barges of coal, with the tow 

covering a 6.5-acre area. In 1908 the Sprague transported a lashed tow 

26 
of 361 feet by 1,160 feet. "Big Mama" came to be a legend in her own time. 

She was later retired to show business, sank in Vicksburg harbor several 

years ago, was dry-docked, and is awaiting possible restoration as a 

river museum. 16 

Viewpoints 

While flood control cannot be the focus of this short history of 

navigation on the lower Mississippi, it should be pointed out that major 

floods always drew attention to the river. On constitutional grounds, 

popular opinion still resisted the use of public funds to protect private 

property. Levees were a case in point. They obviously protected land 

from flooding. But they could also be justified as navigational aids 

in that they.kept the water in the channel and sealed the river from 

runoffs which dumped snags and debris into the channel. 

The period 1896-1927 witnessed the development of a "classical form 

of federal river policy." 17That policy consisted of defining and elaborating existing policy rather than introducing new concepts. The District 

Engineers were to maintain and build levees to specifications. Dredging 

was to provide a nine-foot all-year channel. That abandonment occurred 

after the failure of the Plum Point experiments in the 1890s. For nearly 

three decades thereafter the Engineers relied almost entirely on the 

dredging fleet. 18 

Cutoffs Considered 

In a search for channel improvement ideas, some people advocated 

cutting through the great bends of the Mississippi. The logic of the 

suggestion was that at least three benefits would accrue: (1) the commercial route would be shortened with each bypass, (2) the river would 

flow more swiftly, thereby scouring a better channel, and (3) floodwaters 

would move more quickly to the sea, thereby reducing both the size and 

duration of the inundations. 

Cutoff was not an original idea. Nature itself had always cut 

through bends and loops in an effort to find a shorter route to the 

sea. Thus the idea of "assisting nature" was met with great favor by 

some river interests. The MRC, however did not approve the idea in the 

early twentieth century, since it erroneously argued that cutoffs would 

hinder a major navigational objective, that is, keeping enough water in 

the channel to assure a nine-foot channel during the low-water season. 

Because of this all-important consideration based on past hydraulic 

theory, the idea of creating cutoffs was temporarily abandoned. Every 

27 
effort was made to prevent the river, from forcing its own cutoffs by heavy 

reveting (paving) of bends where chutes were likely to occur. 

World War I and a New View 

Public opinion regarding the value of a river system underwent a 

drastic re-evaluation with the coming of World War I. The mobilization 

of resources and transportation put the river system back in the public 

eye. The need to get material and parts from the heartland of America 

to a major seaport, and vice versa, combined with the mounting expenses of 

the war, proved once again just how economical, advantageous, and vital a 

waterway system could be. Seizing the moment, river conventions again 

sprang to life, demanding governmental leadership in the maintenance 

and expansion of the underdeveloped system. River towns everywhere 

lobbied for specific goals. By this time there was a new demonstration 

of the viability of inland water commerce--the beginning of an east-west 

intracoastal canal system at New Orleans. 

THE GULF INTRACOASTAL WATERWAY 

The idea of creating a coastal waterway system of inland channels 

had long been considered. In the early days of the nation when a small 

navy was inadequate to protect our extensive coastline, much thought 

was given to the protection of coastal traffic. The War of 1812 revealed 

the vulnerability of coastal traffic to enemy warships. Therefore, by 

the 1820s military planners had designed a coastal route protected by 

natural features. 

The Army Engineers believed that it would be practical to create a 

part natural, part manmade route extending from Florida to New Orleans. 

Throughout the antebellum period, coastal defense officers fought for 

the project. The Civil War brought a halt to such dreams. By the 1870s 

the idea was revived,and expanded to include a western extension which 

would connect New Orleans with Texas coastal regions. 

The project was partially authorized in 1905, and segments of the 

canal were completed by the time of World War I. The original authorization called for a channel only 5 feet deep by 40 feet wide. Immediate 

and heavy use of the route showed that those dimensions would be inadequate 

for the projected use. In time the channel dimensions were expanded to 

Its present-day 12 feet by 125 feet. The digging of the manmade portions 

of the route was largely the work of dipper dredges, because the "gumbo" 

clay-mud of the coastal regions was too solid for suction dredges. 

28 
In its final form the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway is 1,300 miles of 

protected waterway stretching from the Mexican border at Brownsville, 

Texas, to St. Marks, Florida. Since the system intersects the 

.Mississippi River at New Orleans, it has often been called the "Crossing 

of the T," with each system enhancing the other. 

Most of this new water highway has been an unqualified success. The 

waterway has carried 42 percent as much cargo as the entire Mississippi 

River. Heavy use has created a demand that the canal dimensions be 

increased to 16 feet by 200 feet--the ultimate dimensions of the New 

Orleans District segment. 19 

29 
Chapter IV 

THE MASTER PLAN 

With the passing of each decade of the twentieth century, congressional hostility toward federal flood control softened. The floods in 

the valley contributed to this gradual change, particularly the catastrophic flood of 1927. That flood created the demand for federal intervention, as well as for a major commitment to a comprehensive flood 

control system in the Mississippi valley. 

The flood inundated parts of seven states; drove 600,000 men, women, 

and children from their homes; destroyed or damaged about 25,000 homes; 

killed hundreds of thousands of livestock; ripped away revetment and 

dikes; and created damage totaling $300 to $400 million. Secretary of 

Commerce Herbert Hoover, on inspecting the valley desvibed the flood 

as "The greatest peace-time disaster in our history."'" 

Even before the 1927 floodwaters of the Mississippi had subsided, 

President Coolidge called for flood control measures to prevent such 

future disasters. Within a few months two plans were submitted, one 

by Major General Edgar Jadwin, the Chief of Engineers, and the other by 

the , JMississippi River Commission. Both plans proposed abandoning the 

"levees only" policy of previous years, and suggested a mixture of 

levees, floodways, and spillways. While the two plans were similar, 

the plan suggested by the MRC Included more tributaries, and thus was 

more expensive. 2 

Lobby groups seized the moment. Organizations such as the Chicago 

Flood Control Conference and the Mississippi River Flood Control 

Association formed. Civil and political parties favoring each one of 

the plans pressured Congress, but the President and uninvolved congressmen favored the Jadwin plan because of its lower costs. 

By late 1927 President Coolidge submitted the Jadwin plan to 

Congress and recommended appropriate legislation. The President, however, 

believed that local interests should provide at least 20 percent of the 

costs because they would be receiving the primary benefit of flood control. At this hint of hesitance, the House Committee on Flood Control 

turned its attention to the MRE plan. 3 

General Jadwin was incensed by the committee's vacillation. In turn, 

the committee was offended by his attitude. Many southern congressmen 

pressured the committee to consider the more comprehensive plan submitted 

by the MRC, for it offered greater long-range benefits in the Mississippi 

31 
valley. The stalemate was not broken until the bill was taken up and 

superficially amended by members of both the Senate and the House. As 

the Jones-Reid Bill, it was approved by the Senate and House in March and 

April of 1928. At last the salient points of the Jadwin plan were 

approved as the Flood Control Act of 1928. 

The Jadwin plan called for raised levees, with all levees to be 

brought to grade and specifications. The plan also included lateral 

floodways and spillways which could be opened in times of high water. 

Navigation Was to be improved through bank stabilization and training 

structures (dikes and wing dams), as well as improved dredging. The 

Jadwin plan represented a fundamental departure from past simplistic 

answers. Accordingly, qt has to be recognized as a significant 

milestone in river engineering. Even though the original plan has not 

been completed, the success of the project has sparked constant demands 

that the plan be expanded to encompass areas and features not originally 

included .4 

THE CUTOFF ERA 

There was a reassessment during this period of the idea that cutoffs 

should be prevented. In 1933 the MRC entered a new era under the 

innovative guidance of the Commission President, Brigadier General 

Harley B. Ferguson. Basing his conclusions on test results from the 

Waterways Experiment Station (WES) at Vicksburg, General Ferguson felt 

that the turbulence of a newly opened cut might be minimized by dredging 

only a small pilot. cut across the neck of a bend. He thought the small 

pilot cut would allow the river gradually to expand the cut to its 

full dimensions. This scheme would provide better regulation of the 

opening and llow the Engineers to make longer cuts to create better 

flow design.' 

The concept of a pilot cut to help the river secure a better flow 

line was cost-efficient but not easy. Trees and other growth had to 

be removed from the designed channel path. Massive dredges had to excavate the cut line, each working at opposite ends of the proposed cut. 

Even in the depression years a pilot cut was an expensive undertaking; in 

1933 the 3.8-mile cut at Worthington Point (mile 505-513) cost more than 

$303,000. Also, the amount of material removed, while only a portion 

of what the river itself would carry away, was still significant. The 

Jackson Point-Sunflower cutoffs required the removal of approximately 

14 million cubic yards of materia1. 6 

Once the pilot cut was made, the Engineers awaited the proper time 

before removing the "plus," the last few feet of earth remaining at the 

32 
center of the cut line. When river conditions were right, the plug 

would be blasted away with dynamite, and water would begin rushing 

through to scour away the rest of the plug and to start the process of 

eating away at the narrow pilot channel. It was a dramatic moment, but 

because the pilot channel was small and the water was turbulent it 

usually took several months before ships were able to use the new 

channel. 7 

By 1942, 16 bends in the river were eliminated through cutoffs. 

While the river had been shortened by more than 150 miles it was found that 

each new cut required attention (usually dredging or revetting), thus 

creating new problems as quickly as old ones were solved. The program 

had not been without its successes, but the advantages were often offset 

by the disadvantages. 8 

WORLD WAR II 

The 1940s opened up yet another period of wartime testing of river 

capabilities. Improved navigation was evident despite a wartime curtailment of projects involving materials, men, and machinery. During 

this period the Engineers temporarily returned to the old willow mat 

for revetment purposes, and the process worked well. Contraction works 

(works constricting the width of the river) were suspended for the most 

part, and dredges kept the river at navigational depth. Some civilians 

were drafted into the military so that they could continue to do their 

essential work on the river, but the various Districts were heavily 

engaged in the construction of military airbases, camps, depots, coastal 

fortifications, and barges. 

On several occasions the capabilities of the river were demonstrated 

with the passage of unusual craft. A fleet of 78 Army tugs, with 16-foot 

drafts, was muscled through, as were submarines and even a locking gate 

destined for the Panama Canal. 9 

During World War II the principal cargoes on the lower Mississippi 

were gasoline, oil, sulphur, and other products and materials vital to the 

war effort. The river served almost 4,000 Army and Navy craft and other 

vessels--destroyer escorts, fleet submarines, landing craft, freighters, 

tankers, and ocean-going tugs. 10 

The demonstrated utility of the river brought renewed demands that 

the government improve and extend the national river systems. Lower 

Mississippi interests urged Congress to authorize a deeper channel 

between Cairo and Baton Rouge. After almost a year of debate, the Flood 

Control Act of 1944 became law. The act authorized a channel of 12 feet 

33 
in the Cairo-to-Baton Rouge reach. According to estimates, 600 miles of 

revetment, 100 miles of dikes, and 175 months of dredging were needed to 

accomplish the goal. 11The project was enormous. Even the 9-foot 

channel required constant attention and massive application of supplies, 

men, and technology. 

Changes in the demands on the river made the original 12-foot channel 

estimates invalid in terms of both time and material and the Engineers 

have not yet achieved the goal. Also, at present the existing river 

barges can be accommodated by the presently maintained channel. 

Increased shipping demands may create a fleet of new, larger barges, and 

at such time the 12-foot channel may be needed more urgently. In the 

meantime the 9-foot channel is serving the nation well. 

RENAISSANCE OF RIVER TOWNS 

The wartime attention to the importance of river traffic was. 

naturally shared by the old river towns. Petitioners besieged Congress 

for aid in either establishing or re-establishing ports. The anticipation of a 12- or even 14-foot channel from Cairo to Baton Rouge, and 

deep-port facilities from that point through the passes, encouraged 

commercial interests to develop inland port facilities as soon as possible. 

Some former river towns were lost to commerce forever, of course, being 

abandoned by the river in one of its frequent meanderingd. Towns like 

Tiptonville, Tennessee; Grand Gulf, Mississippi; and St. Joseph and Port 

Hudson, Louisiana, could only look back on the days of being river ports. 

Others were more fortunate. 

Memphis 

At Memphis, river traffic had never been extinguished, but the 

average yearly tonnage of 1.5 to 2 million in the prewar era had not 

satisfied city fathers. Port facilities were strained by the wartime 

burden of nearly 4 million tons per year. The existing 36 port terminals 

simply were inadequate in view of the anticipated growth of river traffic, 

and there was no logical way to extend the terminals without future 

problems. 

General Max Tyler, President of the Mississippi River Commission, 

presented a plan which was not only feasible, but a forerunner of 

developments for other communities. The "Tyler plan" suggested that a 

chute winding around President's Island, just south of Memphis, be blocked 

off at the upper end, and that the chute be dredged out as a slackwater harbor 

for Memphis. The enlarged chute could be designed for maximum convenience, 

34 
with port facilities situated for optimum efficiency. The cost of the 

port facilities would be borne by city and private interests. 12 

The project was authorized in 1946 and started in 1948. Work was 

slow because of budgetary cutbacks by various administrations and the 

Memphis Harbor Project was not completed until 1967. But the project's 

effectiveness was proved even before its completion. By 1960 Memphis 

harbor was handling more than 6 million tons of cargo per year on a 

regular basis. With completion, harbor tonnage was up to 8 million by 

1969. Ten years later tonnage was up to almost 15 million. 

Memphis harbor was enhanced when the Engineers diverted Wolf River 

through Mud Island (a bar of longstanding contention in front of Memphis). 

The flow of Wolf River scoured out a natural channel between the riverfront and Mud Island, creating a natural harbor with obvious benefit to 

local citizens. The lower 3.5 miles of channel, parallel to the Mississippi 

River, became a slackwater harbor that was naturally maintained as part 

of Wolf River's inclusion in the flood control program. While local 

citizens still call it Mud Island harbor, it is within the reach called 

Memphis harbor. The channel is maintained at 9 feet with a bottom width 

of at least 200 feet upriver as far as mile 3. Mud Island harbor is 

heavily used by private craft, and the island itself is being developed 

by Memphis as a recreational and cultural center. 13 

Baton Rouge 

Another major project was the Baton Rouge harbor, better known as 

Devil's Swamp harbor, named for the area out of which it was carved. Because Baton Rouge represented the upper end of a concentration of heavy 

industry flanking the river south to a few miles below New Orleans, 

developers correctly assumed that Baton Rouge should be an inland deepwater port, with harbor facilities to match. 

Devil's Swamp, just above Baton Rouge and a former chute of the 

Mississippi, was a logical site. The harbor, authorized in 1948, 

called for an eventual 5 miles of dredged channel, to be accomplished 

in two increments of 2.5 miles each. Construction of the first 2.5 miles 

of the channel started in January of 1958, and was completed in July of 

1959. Approximately 7.5 million cubic yards of material was excavated 

for that portion of the project. 

Building the harbor was easily justified, for within ten years 

harbor tonnage went from about 26 million annually to almost 41 million, 

and in another ten years tonnage reached almost 77 million. Baton Rouge 

now ranks as the nation's seventh largest port. Despite the considerable 

35 
increase in tonnage the remainder of the proposed five miles will not 

be dredged until justified bydevelopment of the existing 2.5 miles of 

channe1. 14 

Hickman, Kentucky 

As part of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1960, the Army Corps of 

Engineers completed a harbor project at Hickman, Kentucky, in 1963. The 

harbor was created by using the former city waterfront for a 1.1-mile 

reach, and dredging to specifications. Local interests created an industrial port of about 130 acres, including termin#1 facilities to handle 

grain, sand and gravel, and petroleum products. i5 

Osceola, Arkansas 

Authorized under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1960, the Osceola 

harbor project was not recommended by the Chief of Engineers until 1971. 

In creating the harbor, the Engineers used the old chute of Island Number 

30. The new harbor was 6,500 feet long, with a 250-foot-radius turning 

basin at the upstream end of the harbor channel. The material excavated 

for the channel was placed on the top bank to form a flood-free industrial 

park which will be developed by local interests. The engineering aspects 

of the project are complete, but further dredging is required)- 6 

New Madrid, Missouri 

New Madrid originated as an entrepreneur's dream to create a vast 

personal empire under Spanish sponsorship. The scheme failed in all respects except to establish the name of the proposed settlement. Misfortune 

seemed to plague the community. During the colonial period large chunks 

of the village periodically caved into the river to the extent that some 

buildings were built on wheels or sleds so they could be pulled back 

as the bluff sloughed off. On one spectacular occasion New Madrid was 

the center of an epic earthquake. At times it seemed that the town would 

be overcome by misfortune, and little of the original settlement remains. 

However, the town survived and is even enjoying something of a revival. 

The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1960 called for the creation of a harbor channel along the city waterfront downstream for a distance of 9,400 

feet. Work began in 1968, and the project was completed in 1970. Local 

interests have created a 200-acre industrial park. Three terminals 

handle petroleum products, grain, and sand and gravel)- 7 

36 
Helena, Arkansas 

Helena, which was plundered by 

found its harbor being blocked by a 

several decades the Engineers tried 

revetment, but finally accepted the 

allowed to fill in as the Engineers 

Union troops during the Civil War, 

relentless accretion of sand. For 

to protect the harbor with dikes and 

inevitable. The old harbor was 

created a new harbor to the south. 

The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1960 approved the construction of the 

Helena harbor, and the project has since been completed. Local interests 

have set up industries and have built ten terminals to serve the harbor. 

The terminals handle petroleum, grain, and chemicals used in both agriculture and industry. Local initiative, combined wip the harbor, has 

brought a new vitality to an old, major river port?' 

Greenville, Mississippi 

The first attempt to establish a town in the area failed because of 

the strong river current. Old Greenville was abandoned and the citizens 

moved a few miles up the river to a location that was considered safer. 

The new town was burned by the Union troops during the Civil War, but 

determined settlers rebuilt it. 

It seemed that the Engineers condemned Greenville to oblivion when 

one of General Ferguson's cutoffs bypassed Bachelor Bend, where the town 

was located. Leland cutoff, as it was known, left Greenville on an 

oxbow lake, appropriately called Lake Ferguson. Normally the ends of 

Lake Ferguson would have silted over to the extent that river traffic 

would be eliminated. But what the Engineers took away they gave back with 

the Greenville Harbor Project. The project restored Greenville's status 

as a river town, with a much better harbor than before. 

Completed in April of 1963, Greenville harbor has since enjoyed 

steady growth. By 1969 the harbor accounted for over I i„.5 million tons 

of shipping. In 1979 that figure had almost doubled. 19 

Lake Providence, Louisiana 

An old river town, Lake Providence was a center of brisk trade in 

cotton and plantation supplies before the Civil War. During the War 

General Grant attempted to reconnect the adjacent oxbow lake with the 

Mississippi, as a means of bypassing the devastating Confederate batteries 

at Vicksburg. The effort failed, and Grant's canal remained halfcompleted well into the twentieth century. After the Civil War the town 

gradually declined, as portions of it eroded into the river. By the 

twentieth century the community had spread away from the old location. 

37 
The 1953 Rivers and Harbors Act authorized a new harbor at Lake 

Providence as part of commercial renewal on the Mississippi. The 

new harbor was created through the use of the former Hagaman Chute. 

Local interests dredged Hagaman Chute and built terminals and a 248- 

acre industrial park. In 1969 the Port of Lake Providence handled 

almost 624,000 tons of merchandise, mostly corn, soybeans, iron, - 

steel, wood, paper, lime, and sand and gravel. Annual tonnage has 

leveled out at around 500,000 tons per year. 

Vicksburg, Mississippi 

One of the oldest settlements on the Mississippi, Vicksburg was the 

site of a port and fortress predating even New Orleans. A thriving 

steamboat river town, Vicksburg suffered heavy damage during the Civil 

War. The town seemed doomed as a river port when the 1876 Centennial . 

 Cutoff left the old harbor area out of the mainstream of the river. 

Vicksburg, however, was far from through, especially after 1928. The 

little city became headquarters for both the Mississippi River Commission, 

Vicksburg District, as well as the site of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers Waterways Experiment Station. 

Vicksburg harbor was included in those post-World War II projects 

designed to restore commercial viability to the river. The Corps of 

Engineers designed and built a first-rate slackwater harbor, which opened 

in 1960. The 245-acre industrial park, combined with the harbor, has contributed to a steady growth of river-based commerce. 

Before the creation of the harbor, Vicksburg handled 300,000 to 

400,000 'tons of cargo per year. In 1960 that figure rocketed to more 

than 925,000 tons. By 1978 tonnage was reported at almost 3,500,000. 21 

Natchez, Mississippi 

The citizens of Natchez can boast that the first steamboat on the 

Mississippi stopped at Natchez before proceeding to New Orleans. The 

city was further distinguished by being designated the original port 

of call for the regular run of that first steamer, the New Orleans. 

In 1968 the Corps of Engineers installed facilities to protect the 

port areas from flooding. The port is served by an industrial park which, 

like the port, was established by local interests. 

In 1960 the port handled 615,000 tons of cargo, and in 1978 tonnage 

was almost 912,000. 2 ' 

38 
Some Results of The Renaissance 

By 1980 the other Mississippi ports were all reporting dramatic increases over the 1960s. New Orleans, as expected, was the leading port 

on the river, handling more than 167 million tons in 1979 (as compared to 

113 million tons in 1959). The other harbors, aside from those already 

mentioned, averaged from just under a million tons to about 3.5 million 

tons annually. 23 

Other than normally evolving economic conditions, one of the reasons 

why the lower Mississippi has developed so rapidly in the post-World War 

II era is the careful long-range planning to accommodate new shipping 

patterns. Nowhere is the point better illustrated than in the 1945 

decision to create an ocean-going channel all the way to Baton Rouge. 

The combination of projects authorized in March of 1945 included 

Baton Rouge to New Orleans, the Harbor of New Orleans, New Orleans to 

Head of Passes, South Pass, and Southwest Pass. The single project 

was called "Mississippi River, Baton Rouge to the Gulf of Mexico." The 

plan was to enlarge the channel and outlets to dimensions which would 

allow all ocean-going vessels to use the river all the way to Baton 

Rouge. The original channel dimensions were dredged to 33 by 500 feet 

from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, 35 by 1,500 feet through New Orleans, 

40 by 1,000 feet from New Orleans to the Head of Passes, 40 by 800 feet 

through Southwest Pass, and 30 by 450 feet through South Pass. The project was so successful, however, that in 1962 the original act was amended 

to provide that the Baton Rouge to New Orleans channel dimensions be increased to 40 by 500 feet. There is at present a growing demand for even 

greater guarantees. As a result of this project the United States has 

what is in effect the single, largest deep-water port in the world, 

capable of handling the needs of the nation for generations to come--and 

the backbone of an industrial heartland. 24 

39 
Chapter V 

NEW DEVELOPMENTS 

THE ATCHAFALAYA 

The Problem 

In the post-World War II period the Atchafalaya River has occupied 

a unique and ominous position in the future of navigation on the lower 

Mississippi. Simply put, the Mississippi, following normal river patterns, threatened to divert its main flow into the Atchafalaya, thus 

cutting a shorter channel to the Gulf. 

At the time of the Louisiana Purchase the Atchafalaya was no more 

than a log-choked distributary of the Red River, and only occasionally 

a natural spillway for the Mississippi when in flood. Not only was the 

Atchafalaya choked, but the two rivers which fed it, the Red and the 

Ouachita, were also clogged. Therefore,turt!id water fed the system. 

These conditions revealed no threat of the Atchafalaya "capturing" the 

Mississippi. 

Shortly after the War of 1812, settlers at the upper end of the 

Atchafalaya observed that a river would be a much shorter route to 

the Gulf. Therefore, they began trying to clear the river of its obstructions. In 1831, however, the irrepressible Captain Henry Shreve cut off 

Turnbull Bend as a way of straightening out the Mississippi. The abandoned 

bend began to silt up in both the upper and lower reaches. It appeared 

that the Mississippi would no longer dump its overload into the Atchafalaya--at least not on a regular basis. 

In 1839 confident settlers, determined to have a navigable river, set 

fire to the log raft on the upper reach of the Atchafalaya, and burned it 

. to the waterline. Later the state of Louisiana cleared out the remainder 

with snagboats. It seemed that the Atchafalaya, with its direct route to 

the Gulf, was just too attractive a possibility to leave untried. 1 

The log raft periodically reformed and was just as frequently dislodged, until by 1880 the Atchafalaya was permanently clear and rapidly 

enlarging because of the increased flow from the Mississippi. Unfortunately, the enlargement of the Atchafalaya brought misery to the people at 

the lower end of the system, because it created floodwaters in an area 

which measured "dry" land by an elevation of one or two feet. 

41 
LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER 

0. ....70:11110•11111111 

•

i, PAIsSissIPP . 

, •..Oxman 1 

12 7 \ 

• iMatlart 

Ca...fli. 

I 

I 

' t(' MISSISSIPPI R I 

ILL\ NA •.9 lc, I. 

....■., 

, s , 

:III( - P. - "."4. ------ 

..t 7 - ---- '- 

.:`■ A ,,t46-44'=j1— 

4. . 141:!1 .10* ^ Ia.— t.• 
The natural development from that time dictated that the RedAtchafalaya would form a single river running parallel to the Mississippi. 

But man again intervened by dredging the lower arm of the old Turnbull 

Bend as a way of maintaining a navigation link between the two systems. 

For several decades there seemed to be no major problem, for the 

lower Old River, as it came to be known popularly, acted as both a navigation channel and a water diversion system in which the current flowed 

west or east according to the relative stages on the Mississippi and on 

the Red. In 1881 it was recorded that the current flowed eastward for 

56 days, westward for 56 days, and was still for 13 days. 2 

The possibility of the Atchafalaya capturing the Mississippi was 

discussed periodically throughout the nineteenth century, and Congress 

even solicited expert testimony about it after the disastrous Mississippi 

floods in 1912 and 1913. However, it was only in the 1928 Jadwin plan 

that the Atchafalaya became a major flood control component. The Jadwin 

plan assumed protection for a "project flood" 20 percent greater than 

the record flood of 1927. This "project flood" could carry a flow of 

3,000,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) at Red River Landing, the point at 

which the Mississippi connects with the Atchafalaya system. Under this 

plan, the Atchafalaya would be used to divert exactly half, or 1,500,000 

cfs, of that "project flbod" into its system. 

To assure the proper functioning of the Atchafalaya as a floodway, 

the design called for dredging and straightening the river In order 

that it could accommodate its design flow without needlessly overflowing 

surrounding land. Within a decade the Atchafalaya was adjusting its own 

channel, always seeking the shortest route to the sea. The Atchafalaya's 

route to the Gulf was not only about 75 miles shorter than the Mississippi's, it had a 3-to-1 advantage in slope. Unchecked, the main flow of the 

Mississippi would have shifted from its own channel to that of the 

Atchafalaya. The Atchafalaya would "capture" the main flow of the 

Mississippi, a potential disaster to the heavily industrialized Mississippi 

valley south of Baton Rouge. In order to prevent that radical change 

in the behavior of the river, Congress in 1954 authorized the Engineers 

to construct a control system to mechanically divert water from the 

Mississippi to the Atchafalaya. The Corps' plans called for utilizing 

both the upper and lower arms of the old Turnbull Bend, the upper arm 

to control water flow and the lower arm (Old River) to accommodate navigation. 

Old River Control Structures 

The Corps decided to use the old channels, but not exactly where 

they had been. Thus the dredging considerably realigned the channel to 

improve design conditions. Construction began in September of 1955, with 

43 
building of the low-sill structure, which was designed to maintain the flow 

considered normal at the time the structure was completed in June 1959. 

The overbank structure, added to take care of excess water in times of 

major floods, was finished in October 1959. The inflow and outflow 

channels were completed two years later. 

The Corps finished the navigation lock in December 1962. It is of 

"U"-frame construction, reinforced concrete with steel miter gates; and 

has a useable length of 1,185 feet and a width of 75 feet. Sill elevation is minus 11 feet (-11 ft.) mean sea leve1. 3 

Once these structures were operating, Old River was closed by an 

earthen dam 1,500 feet wide and 60 feet high. Finally, the Mississippi 

levees between Shaw and Torras were strengthened, and the banks were reinforced and stabilized along the Atchafalaya and Red rivers from the 

outflow channel to Simmesport, Louisiana."' 

Almost from the opening of the navigation lock, annual tonnage has 

averaged three million tons, with a high of more than six million tons 

recorded in 1971. The navigation feature enables traffic to move from 

the Mississippi to either the Red River or the Atchafalaya River, and vice 

versa, creating an unusual triple water connection. 

From the juncture at the Mississippi, the Atchafalaya is a significantly shorter route for those barges moving between the Mississippi and 

the westbound Intracoastal Waterway, but there are problems. Because 

the Atchafalaya is a shorter route with a steeper slope, the water flows 

more swiftly and with great turbulence. Those problems, combined with 

the fact that there are few port facilities or industries along the 

route, have limited the growth of traffic on that stretch. 

New Problems 

For about ten years after the Old River control structures were in 

place there were no unusual flood conditions to test them. The hiatus 

came to an abrupt end in 1973. Prolonged, extremely heavy rainfalls in 

the fall of 1972 and the winter and spring of 1973 saturated the central 

plains and the Mississippi and Ohio valleys, and caused many tributaries 

of the Mississippi to exceed flood stage. The Mississippi crested 

several times that spring, and a prolonged battle with the flood raged 

up and down the big river, its tributaries, and its distributaries. 

The most significant gage on the lower Mississippi is that at the 

confluence of the Ohio, for it (the Cairo gage) reflects not only the 

water entering the lower Mississippi from the Ohio, but also the water 

44 
entering from the upper Mississippi and Missouri rivers and their tributaries. The Cairo gage gave early warning that a situation was 

developing similar to that which led to the flood of 1927. 5 

As the floodwaters crested again and again the sheer volume of water 

passing through both Old River structures was awesome, but it was the lowsill structure that bore the brunt. The flood itself revealed changes 

in the behavior of the river, and the Mississippi could not handle as much 

water as it had in the last major flood. The Atchafalaya, on the other 

hand, had been deepening and flowing faster, thus demanding even more 

water. The low-sill structure was designed to curb that flow, and 

it did so, but was taking a terrible battering in the process. As the 

Engineers watched apprehensively, they saw a wing wall groan, tear . loOse, 

and tilt out of position. The force of the water can be gaged by the fact 

that it moved a massive concrete wall which was 80 feet high, 80 feet 

wide, and 100 feet wide at the base. 

With the loss of the wing wall, the entire structure began to shudder 

and shake not only because of the absence of the wall, but from the new 

turbulence created by the displaced wall. Here, it seemed, was the event 

that would signal the victory of the river in its effort to divert into 

the Atchafalaya basin. The crisis had come. 

The Engineers responded to the emergency with speed and skill. 

The New Orleans District Engineer received permission from the MRC President, 

Major General Charles C. Noble, to reduce the river head by opening the 

overbank structure and the Morganza Floodway (another feature of the 

Jadwin plan located to the south of the Old River structures). The 

decision not to close the low-sill structure was, in view of postflood 

observations, fortunate. Inspection showed the whole south side of the 

structure had been undermined and was supported on the telephone poletype . piles which formed the foundation. The poles, which had originally 

been driven 100 feet deep, were now anchored only on the bottom 30 feet 

of their length. The closing of the structure would have created more 

pressure than could be sustained, threatening disaster. Although the 

structure was seriously impaired, it did not collapse. 6 

After the flood crisis the scour hold under the low-sill structure 

was filled in by anchoring an "upper set" barge several hundred feet upstream. Seven-ton quarry stone was bulldozed from the barge into the 

stream, with the force of the current carrying this heavy stone to its 

intended point of placement. Eventually some 115,000 tons of stone were 

required to fill in the scour which had been eaten out under the structure. 

Additionally, holes were drilled through the cement top of the structure, 

and a special grout-like mixture was pumped in under pressure to fill the 

45 
cavity now closed off by the stone. Further investigations revealed 

still more scours in front of the structure, and they were filled in as 

well. The crisis was even greater than thought, but the structure had 

held and the battle was won, at least for the time being. 

In order to handle such future crises the Corps has recommended 

installing an auxiliary structure, with the new inflow channel to be 

built near the present ones. The Chief of Engineers has approved, con- 

' struction has started, and, the structure is expected to be operating 

sometime in 1985. The new structure will operate in conjunction with 

the previous ones, and will reduce significantly the water flow through 

the low sill. Water pressure and current and, in turn, destructive 

turbulence, will be reduced. Furthermore, in case of accident, Other 

the auxiliary structure or the low-sill structure can be closed. ' 

NEW FLOWLINE 

During the high-water crisis of 1973 a serious flaw in the project 

flowline was discovered. The flowline is, as the name implies, an assumed 

characteristic of the flow of the river, from which calculations and computations regarding navigation and flood control are made. Despite the 

existence and use of a highly sophisticated research facility such as 

the Waterways Experiment Station at Vicksburg, and information from hundreds of river gages, it is only during times of flood that one can 

gather absolutely accurate data on flood conditions. Since there had 

been no major flood for over two decades it could be presumed that the 

flowline had undergone some changes, but where and how much? 

General Noble of the MRC had already reported that the river functioned more efficiently after completion of the projects. However, 

transporting greater volumes of water through one reach was likely to 

create additional siltation problems in other reaches. Furthermore, 

the projects did not necessarily stabilize the river. Indeed, they could 

accelerate changes. A flow of 900,000 cfs passed Vicksburg at a stage of 

39.4 feet in December of 1972; in 1970 1,800,000 cfs passed with a stage 

of 43.7 feet; and in December of 1972 a flow of 1,100,000 cfs passed at 

a stage of only 34.2 feet. In April of 1973, the 1950 discharge rate was 

creating a stage of 50.6 feet, illustrating the problem and proving that 

the flowline would have to be revised upward. 

The 1973 flood also revealed that the river was not rising in a 

steady and predictable stage-discharge curve, but recorded new crests 

with each new rise, even though the discharge rate remained the same. 

Engineers knew that a rising river could carry more water at a lower 

stage than it could carry when it was falling, but the rating curve loop 

was now not as predictable as it had been before the flood. 

46 
The revised flowline was from 1 to 6 feet higher than the flowline 

on which the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project had been based. 

For the Mississippi River Commission the course of action was clear: 

locate those levees which did not meet new flowline specifications and 

rectify their deficiencies as quickly as possible. The work is well 

under way. 8 

LOCKS ON THE MISSISSIPPI 

Most of the structures locking into the Mississippi are related to the 

Intracoastal Waterway. Some are related directly such as the Inner Harbor 

Navigation Canal Lock and the Harvey Lock, which together route canal traffic across the Mississippi at New Orleans. Additionally, in 1956 an 

alternate lock was placed in the New Orleans vicinity on the west bank; 

the Algiers Lock serves to divert westside canal traffic to the south of 

New Orleans. 

The Atchafalaya Lock has already been noted. But in addition there 

has been an important lock constructed at Port Allen, just across the 

river from Baton Rouge. The Port Allen Lock and Canal was built to update and replace the obsolete Plaquemine Lock (1909-1961), one of the 

oldest locks in the vicinity. 

The Plaquemine Bayou was one of the original distributaries of the 

Mississippi, and an important navigational tie. The lock was a way of 

maintaining that navigational link while at the sane time preventing the 

unchecked flow of water from the Mississippi into the lowlands, behind the 

Mississippi levees. With the deep-channel "Mississippi River, Baton 

Rouge to the Gulf" project, however, there was the feeling that barge 

traffic would be better served by a river entry closer to Baton Rouge. 

Congress approved a Corps recommendation not to replace the Plaquemine 

Lock but to construct a new lock at Port Allen and link it to the old 

Plaquemine system by a manmade canal. 

The Port Allen Lock and Canal was built in the years 1955 to 1961. 

With a lift of 45 feet, a cross-section of 12 feet by 125 feet, and a 

1,200-foot useable length, the canal had an immediate impact on barge 

traffic and on the Mississippi. By using the Port Allen Lock and Canal, 

shippers cut the distance from the Mississippi to the western segment 

of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway by approximately 160 miles. With the 

new route the distance to Morgan City is now only 64 miles. 

In 1974 traffic through the Port Allen Lock totaled 16.3 million 

tons, far greater than many harbors handle. 9 

47 
THE MISSISSIPPI-GULF OUTLET 

The Louisiana inland waterway system of locks across the Mississippi 

through New Orleans was a significant achievement in its own right. 

Without federal assistance, the Dock Board of New Orleans had constructed 

a canal connecting the Mississippi to Lake Pontchartrain. The Inner 

Harbor Navigation Canal, better known as the Industrial Canal, was added 

to the Intracoastal Waterway after World War I. 

In 1942, concerned with the menace of German submarine activity in 

the Gulf, Congress eliminated the Pontchartrain segment of the waterway 

system by providing for a land cut from the Rigolets (the outlet of Lake 

Pontchartrain) to the inner harbor. Having created a new dimension .In 

commercial routine, engineers and politicians reopened the question of 

developing a direct, deep-water ship channel connection between New 

Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. 10 

A direct connection between the Mississippi at New Orleans and the 

Gulf was an old dream. To reach the Gulf via the Mississippi it was 

necessary to cover approximately 95 miles of main stem to the Head of 

Passes, plus 15 to 20 miles of outlet to the Gulf. Many commercial 

entrepreneurs had projected a route that would be shorter and easier to 

maintain--a channel directly to the Gulf from New Orleans. 

Because New Orleans was so close to sea level, the idea of constructing a sea-level channel was quite feasible. The area southeast of 

New Orleans presented a likely site for such a project, with largely 

uninhabited marshes, bayous, inlets, and estuaries. 

Funding, as always, was the major obstacle, even though investigation showed the practicality of the venture. Congressional response 

seemed to focus on the undeniable fact that the immediate and tangible 

benefits of the projects would accrue to local interests. The Louisiana 

congressional delegation argued that New Orleans served the vast interior 

of the nation, and that the systematic development of the Mississippi 

and its trl.butaries logically demanded that the system's outlet be fully 

developed. '1 

Gradually, political support developed. Authorization finally came 

with tba Rivers and Harbors Act of 1956. Funding was to be a joint venture, however, considering the local benefits, and it. was up to local 

interests to generate the financial support needed to win federal participation. Those commitments, along with the original assurances, were made. 

The project was set. 12 

48 
The project design resembled older concepts. The slackwater canal 

would provide a direct water route from the Gulf to the "back door" of 

New Orleans, the inner harbor. That juncture would represent another new 

commercial crossroad, joining the Mississippi, the Intrqcoastal Waterway, 

the inner harbor, and the new direct link to the Gulf. 1 ' 

Dredging was started in March of 1958. The canal was to be 36 feet 

deep and 500 feet wide, expanding to 38 by 600 feet in the Gulf. The 

completed project would be a 76-mile land-and-water cut. 

The partially completed channel opened to navigation in July of 

1963 and was completed in July of 1968. The canal dimensions are being 

maintained through systematic dredging. While the canal is still in a 

stage of evolving use, additional inner harbor facilities will bring 

dramatic increases in tonnage. As the channel develops economically, 

there is a provision for constructing a lock to connect the channel to 

the Mississippi River in the vicinity of Meraux, Louisiana. In 1979 

annual tonnage on the Mississippi-Gulf outlet was approximately 8,200,000. 14 

RIVER COMMERCE TODAY 

The proven efficiency of river transport, as compared to railroad 

or truck transportation, would have been enough to assure the steady 

growth of the river system. The energy crisis of the 1970s, therefore, 

only added emphasis to the movement. Grain shippers benefited most in 

terms of the new growth. In 1950 the nation had exported only 15 

million tons of grain, but by 1980 the figure rose to more than 119 

million tons. In fact, the United States has reached the point where 

it cannot only feed itself, it can export more than 60 percent of its 

wheat, 50 percent of its soybeans and rice, and about 33 percent of its 

corn. The key grain export region of the world is that segment of the 

Mississippi from Baton Rouge to the outlets. Within that reach of the 

river, actually one deep harbor, there are ten grain elevators, with 

another under construction. Those facilities alone move about 40 percent 

of the nation's grain exports. 15 

Reflecting a common procedure, grain shipping on the Mississippi entails two stages. The grain must reach the Baton Rouge-New Orleans area 

by barge, because the river above Baton Rouge is too shallow for oceangoing vessels. Barges not only require less river depth, they can be 

lashed together to create "tows" that are immense in both surface area and 

tonnage. Barge traffic is practical, efficient, and profitable on all 

inland river and waterway systems. Overseas transport, on the other hand, 

demands ocean-going craft; when the barged product reaches a deep harbor 

it must be transferred. Sometimes a product can be transferred directly 

49 
from the barge to the ship, but most frequently the product must be unloaded, stored briefly in a warehouse, then reloaded onto the ship. 

One interesting development in eliminating a significant part of 

expensive and time-consuming cargo handling is a system whereby special 

barges are floated to the ships, then hoisted aboard directly and intact. 

The vessels are called LASH craft, an acronym for "Lighter Aboard Ships." 

Designed by Jerome L. Goldman, the 859-foot freighters carry their own 

cranes for hoisting these special river barges, or lighters, aboard. 

Filled with cargo, the barges weigh up to one million pounds each, and 

are stacked 4 deep in the hold and 2 deep on deck, up to a total of 80. 

This system not only makes shipping more efficient, the reversal of the 

process at the destination allows shipments to many developing nations 

which have few or inadeq ate port facilities. 16 

The increasing growth of river traffic may be traced to many interdependent factors; improvement of the river, new port facilities, innovative handling techniques and, not the least, the improvement in barges 

and towboats themselves. Modern steel barges have a capacity of three 

to four times that of a turn-of-the-century packet. A single barge 

usually holds as much grain as 15 railroad cars, or 57 trucks, and a 

modern steam or diesel towboat may push as many as 40 of these huge barges. 

Furthermore, the idea of integrated tows is no longer considered unusual. 

Assembled as a bowpiece, a number of square-end barges, and a towboat, 

the entire unit is lashed together to form one streamlined vessel. 

An integrated tow may be as much as 1,200 feet long--longer than 

the largest ocean liner afloat. With today's increasing concern for 

efficient use of energy, it is significant that a single tow can carry 

some 200,000 barrels of petroleum products to their destination in the 

most efficient and economical way. 17 

Towboats have kept pace with barge technology. Whereas the older 

towboats operated with about 500-horsepower plants, the modern towboat 

average is more like 3,000 horsepower, and some towboats operate with more 

than 10,500 hp. Such towboats are needed to work the great tows which 

are found on the sometimes treacherous reaches of the lower Mississippi 

and the Atchafalaya. In a search for maximum efficiency it is becoming 

customary to lash together even those large barges with heavy cargoes of 

steel, ores, grain, petroleum products, and chemicals: 18 

Because of their increasing efficiency, barge shipments are expected 

to recapture their share of the transport that was being lost to the rails 

before the energy crunch. The traditional barge share of grain shipment 

was once approximately 60 percent, but dropped to about 50 percent in the 

50 
1970s before beginning to reclaim its dominance. In 1977 calculations 

indicated that transportation of corn from Minnesota to the Gulf cost 

only 17.5 cents per bushel, as compared to 54.5 cents by rail. The 

figure is somewhat misleading, however, because one has to consider the 

overland cost of getting the grain to the river. An interesting comparison can be made with the pre-Civil War era freight rates on the 

Mississippi of 37.5 cents per hundredweight downstream and 62.5 cents 

upstream. 29 

Navigation on the lower Mississippi reaches a new high with each 

passing year, both in number of vessels and in tonnage. In 1980 there 

was a record-breaking tonnage for agricultural exports despite an embargo against increased shipments to the Soviet Union. 20The evolution 

of larger ocean-going vessels is a natural corollary to increased emphasis 

on river commerce. Subseqbently, there is demand for deeper channel 

access to the seaport segment of the Mississippi. Grain and coal are 

the major exports contributing to this situation. 

Grain, as a growing commodity item has resulted in bulk cargoes of 

150,000 pennyweight. But because of the energy crisis, the United States 

has become a major coal exporter with harbors inadequate to the anticipated demands for coal. On the Mississippi the present 40-foot harbor 

deptHs no longer seem capable of handling some of the major ocean-going 

ships which are evolving to handle the international coal trade. To 

meet specifications demanded by the great ships, there is at present a 

demand for a minimum 55-foot depth through the passes to Baton Rouge, 

or at least to New Orleans as an interim goal. One report shows that 

for every $1 invested in a deeper channel, approximately $9 in benefits 

will return. In support of the demand, shippers point out that the 

export of coal alone has increased 142 percent from the 1979 volume of 

1,367,000 tons to 3,313,000 tons in 1980. They also point out that 

this rapid increase in coal shipments has helped mitigate the gradual 

decline in foreign imports. In New Orleans the trend was more than 

offset by the fact that exports climbed to 24.1 million tans in 1980 over 

1979's total of 18.6 million tons, an increase of 30 percent. It is 

estimated that coal may be providing as much as 66 percent of the world's 

energy needs by the year 2000. Thus an annual export goal of 100 million 

tons by 1990 is realistic. Even that figure could double by the year 

2000. In the same period, grain exports are expected to reach 150 million 

tons. 21 

Navigation on the Mississippi was always feasible and profitable, 

even in the era of rafts and keelboats. But increasing use of the 

Mississippi in the nineteenth century created a demand for federal 

assistance in improving navigation and in guaranteeing a channel depth 

51 
throughout the year. The success of that assistance spurred the growth 

of river traffic, the importance of which has been affirmed by national 

emergencies. 22 

The importance of the lower Mississippi cannot be overestimated. 

It is the main stem of a network of inland navigable waterways serving 

40 percent of the nation's interior. The prospect is that the river will 

be ever more important to the nation. Its potential is greater than 

ever. 

52 
CHRONOLOGY 

1519 - Spanish expeditionary leader, Alonzo Alvarez be Pineda, sights the 

mouth of a great river, which he names "Rio - del Espiritu Santo." 

1541 - Spanish explorer Hernando de Soto, while on an inland expedition, 

reaches the Mississippi somewhere below present-day Memphis. 

1655 - The French Governor at Quebec, the Compte de Frontenac, hears 

report of a great river to the west, and sends out an exploration 

team to confirm that report. 

1673 - French team of Marquette and Jolliet follow the downstream course 

of the Mississippi as far as the mouth of the Arkansas River. 

1678 - Under Governor Frontenac's orders to follow the river to its 

mouth, Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle, descends the length 

of the river to the Head of Passes, claiming for the King of 

France the river and all the lands drained by the river. 

1699 - French settlers arrive by ship to establish a colony showing 

French presence and control of the river. The settlers are 

unable to locate the mouth of the Mississippi, and a colony is 

established at Biloxi. 

1705 - The first recorded cargo is floated down the Mississippi by 

westerners. The cargo consists of bear and deer hides. 

1706 - English traders, ignoring French claim, attempt to set up trade 

with the Natchez Indians. 

1718 - In order to secure their claim to the Mississippi, the French 

establish New Orleans at a spot calculated to control both the 

Mississippi and Lake Pontchartrain. 

1763 - The Spaniards take control of the Louisiana territory, relaxing 

trade restrictions and encouraging Americans to use the Mississippi. 

1800 - France, under Napoleon Bonaparte, reclaims Louisiana, arousing 

fears that France may cut off use of the river to the Americans. 

1803 - The Louisiana territory is purchased from the French to assure 

permanent American control of the Mississippi. 

53 
1812 - The first Mississippi steamboat arrives at New Orleans, ending a 

downriver trip from Pittsburgh. The New Orleans then starts the 

first regular steam-powered service in the valley, with Natchez 

as its northern terminus. 

1816 - Captain Henry Shreve unveils his new design for steamboats better 

suited to the shallow waters of the interior, The Washington, 

with its shallow hull and improved steam engines, is so successful 

that it establishes a new standard for steamboats. 

1819 - Congress, recognizing the importance of rivers in the West, 

approves a law calling for a survey of the Mississippi River and 

Its tributaries, to be undertaken by the Corps of Engineers. 

1824 - Congress enacts the first of the Rivers and Harbors acts, which 

authorize the Corps of Engineers to clear certain important rivers 

of navigational obstructions. 

1844 - President Tyler asks Congress to accept responsibility for improving 

navigation on the Mississippi, considering its unique importance 

to the nation. 

1850 - Congress appropriates $50 thousand for a survey of the Mississippi 

delta. 

1852 - Pursuant to the 1850 congressional authorization, the Corps of 

Topographical Engineers submits two reports to Congress. Charles 

Ellet, Jr., a civil engineer, recommends flood control reservoirs. 

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen H. Long submits only a preliminary 

report because Captain Andrew A. Humphreys' sickness has delayed 

completion of the work. 

1855 - In fear of a possible war, Congress sells its river equipment and 

craft, allowing the river to return to nature. 

1861 - Hymphreys and Lieutenant Henry L. Abbot publish their Report upon 

the Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River; Protection of 

the Alluvial Region Against Overflow; and upon the Deepening of the 

Mouths. The study is immediately recognized as a significant contribution to hydraulic engineering, and it influences the Corps of 

Engineers for years to come. 

1865 - The end of the Civil War finds the lower Mississippi clogged with 

wrecks, snags, and shallow sandbars. 

54 
1871 - The historic steamboat race between the Robert E. Leeand the 

Natchezserves to refocus national attention on the river and 

its usefulness. 

1874 - Congress authorizes a new survey of the lower Mississippi. 

Colonel Suter's survey and maps update previous knowledge of the 

river, and pinpoint major problems. 

1877 - South Pass is opened to the largest ships as a result of the 

jetty system devised and constructed by James B. Eads. 

1879 - The Mississippi River Commission is created, signaling federal 

commitment to a systematic effort to solve the problems of the 

river. 

1895 - MRC decides to maintain the navigation channel depth principally 

through use of suction dredges rather than training works. 

1908 - The giant sternwheeler Spraguebreaks its own 1907 record with an 

even larger tow. 

1912 - In both years disastrous floods inundate the lower Mississippi 

1913 valley. Congress hears many pleas for financial aid to relieve 

the distress and for revised plans to contain the floodwaters 

more effectively. 

1918 - The crisis of World War I having affirmed the value of a waterway system, the federal government creates a barge line as an 

example for the private sector. The Federal Barge Lines demonstrates the practicality of combining the advantages of river 

transport with the rail system. 

1927 - The record flood of 1927 proves the need for a comprehensive 

flood control system, as well as a comprehensive navigational 

program. 

1928 - The Jadwin plan is accepted. 

1933 - The era of the cutoffs begins under the leadership of General 

Harley B. Ferguson. By 1942, 16 bends in the river are eliminated, 

with mixed results. 

1944 - The Flood Control Act of 1944 approves a 12-foot channel, but a 9- 

foot channel proves to be adequate for existing barges. 

55 
1945 - "Mississippi River, Baton Rouge to the Gulf of Mexico" deep-water 

channel is approved. 

1946 - The Memphis Harbor Project is authorized. 

1948 - "Devil's Swamp" Harbor (Baton Rouge) is.authorized. 

1959 - Low-sill and overbank control structures at Old River are completed. 

1960 - Rivers and Harbors Act of 1960 authorizes federal assistance in 

the creation and maintenance of several additional harbor projects 

on the lower Mississippi. 

1961 - Port Allen Lock and Canal is completed. 

1962 - The deep-water channel from Baton Rouge to the Gulf is modified 

- to provide for a channel depth increase from 35 feet to 40 feet. 

1963 - Navigation lock is completed at Old River, to provide for traffic 

between the Atchafalaya-Red rivers and the Mississippi. 

1963 - Mississippi-Gulf outlet is opened. 

1973 - The massive flood of 1973 threatens to take out the low-sill 

structure at Old River, with possible diversion of the Mississippi 

main flow into the Atchafalaya channel. 

1973 - The flood of 1973 reveals that the river has undergone a transformation and has a new flowline. 

1980 - Shipping interests intensify their lobbying for a deeper 

channel through the passes to Baton Rouge to accommodate the 

new, giant ships being built to transport grain and coal. 

1981 - Work starts on an auxiliary control structure at Old River. 

56 
FOOTNOTES 

Chapter I 

1. Peter Farb, The Face of North America: The Natural History of a 

Continent(New York, 1963),pp..7-12; Carl O. Dunbar, Historical 

Geology(New York, 1964), pp. 387-90; Harold N. Fisk, Geological 

Investigation of the Alluvial Valley of the Lower Mississippi River 

(Vicksburg, MRC, 1944), pp. 67-69. 

2. Edwin A. Davis, Louisiana(Baton Rouge, 1971), P. 27. 

3. Thomas H. :Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Companion to American 

History(New York, 1966), p. 535; Joseph Tregle, Jr., "The Lower 

Mississippi," The Rivers and Bayous of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 

1968), p. 146; Major D.O. Elliott, The Improvement of the Lower 

Mississippi for Flood Control and Navigation (Vicksburg, 1932), 

I, pp. 1-4. 

4. Mississippi River Commission (MRC), Mississippi River Navigation (Vicksburg, 1971), p. 3; Willard Price, The Amazing Mississippi 

(New York, 1963), pp. 376. The length proclaimed on a marker at 

Lake Itasca, Minnesota. Actual length today is approximately 

2,400 miles. 

5. Elliott, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi,I, p. 93; 

Price, Ibid.; A. Water Policy for the American People(GPO, 1950). 

Interpolating from the statement that the total daily supply is 

4,300 billion gallons daily, "about 10 times the average flow of 

the Mississippi River," p. 109. 

6. MRC, Mississippi River Navigation(Vicksburg, 1971), brochure. 

7. Bern Keating, The Mighty Mississippi (National Geographic 

Society, 1971), p. 11. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Patricia D. Woods, "The French and the Natchez Indians in 

Louisiana: 1700-1731," Journal of Louisiana Historical Association 

(Fall 1978), 19, pp. 416, 417, 431. 

10. n.a., "Ship Sinkings," unpublished manuscript found ih 

library of New Orleans District; Herbert Quick and Edward Quick, 

Mississippi Steamboatin i : A History of Steamboating on the Mississippi and Its Tributaries(New York, 1926), pp. 8, 22, 25. 

57 
11. Ibid., pp. 20, 22. 

12. Frank Donovan, River Boats of America (New York, 1966), 

p. 25; Keating, Mighty Mississippi, p. 14. 

13. Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana: The Spanish Domination 

(New Orleans, 1903), pp. 325-26. 

14. Ibid., pp. 436, 437. 

15. Ibid., p. 478. 

16. Ibid., p. 480. 

17. Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant: A History of the 

Republic (Lexington, Mass., 1971), pp. 200, 201. 

18. Ibid.; Thomas H. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Companion to 

American History (New York, 1966), pp. 478, 488. 

Chapter II 

1. Ralph K. Andrist, Steamboats on the Mississippi (New York, 

1962), p. 12; Floyd M. Clay, A Century on the Mississippi: A 

History of the Memphis District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

1876-1976, pp. 5, 6; Davis, Louisiana, p. 174. 

2. Ibid. 

3. Albert E. Cowdrey, The Delta Engineers: A History of the 

United States Army Corps of Engineers in the New Orleans District 

(New Orleans, 1971), pp. 16, 17. 

4. n.a., "Ship Sinkings"; Emerson W. Gould, Fifty Years on 

the Mississippi (Columbus, Ohio, 1880), p. 156; Quick and Quick, 

Mississippi Steamboatin', p. 89; Harry Drago, The Steamboaters 

(New York, 1967), p. 12. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats of the Western Rivers (Cambridge, Mass., 

1949), P. 14. 

58 
7. Elliott, The Improvement of the Lower Mississippi,I, pp. 7, 

27; Clay, A Century on the Mississippi,p. 8. 

8. Ibid., pp. 8-10. 

9. Ray Samuel, et al., Tales of the Mississippi (New York, 1955), 

p. 49. 

10. Ibid.; Hunter, Steamboats,p. 102; Donovan, River Boats of 

America,p. 104; Clay, A Century on the Mississippi,p. 10; 

"Ship Sinkings," pp. 47, 48. 

11. Donovan, River Boats of America, p. 104. 

12. Robert R. McCormick, "Steamboat Years," reprint of an address 

given over the Mutual Broadcasting System, November 13, 1948; 

Andrist, Steamboats,p. 57. 

13. U.S. House of Representatives, Floods and Levees,1914; Clay, 

A Century on the Mississippi,p. 11. 

14. Cowdrey, The Delta Engineers,p. 14. 

15. Elliott, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi,pp. 9, 10; 

Clay, A Century on the Mississippi,p. 14. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Chris Markham, Mississippi Odyssey (Stafford, Va., 1980), 

pp. 99, 100. 

18. Clay, A Century on the Mississippi,p. 16; Memphis Commercial 

Appeal,May 7, 1921. 

19. Laws Relating to Rivers and Harbors, I, p. 226; Water Resources 

Activities in the United States, p. 11; Annual Report,1875, p. 948; 

MRC,"History of the Mississippi River Commission," 1973; Elliott, 

Improvement of the Lower Mississippi, I, p. 13. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Elliott, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi, I, p. 14. 

59 
Chapter III 

1. Ibid., pp. 14, 15. 

2. Water Resources Activities in the United States, p. 11; 

Proceedings of the Mississippi River Commission, I, pp. 1-3. 

3. Clay, A Century on the Mississippi,pp. 22-59, 73-76, 124-25, 

137, 197. 

4. Ibid. 

5. Figures furnished by Pat Glynn of the Waterborne Statistical 

Unit, New Orleans District Headquarters, October 1981. 

6. Cowdrey, Delta Engineers, p. 37. 

7. Ibid., pp. 38, 39. 

8. Webster's Biographical Dictionary (Springfield, Mass., 1966), 

p. 460. 

9. Cowdrey, Delta Engineers, pp. 42, 43. 

10. Ibid., pp. 38, 39. 

11. Ibid., p. 43. 

12. Ibid.,pp. 42, 43, 104; Keating, Mighty Mississippi, pp. 175, 

176; 

13. Elliott, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi,I, p. 12. 

14. Clay, A Century on the Mississippi,pp. 39, 50, 106; Clay, 

A History of the Little Rock District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

1881-1979, 2d edition (Little Rock, 1979), p. 75. 

15. Clay, A Century on the Mississippi,pp. 34-36; Ibid., p. 54. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Cowdrey, Delta Engineers, p. 67. 

18. Ibid., p. 67; Clay, A Century on the Mississippi,p. 52. 

60 
19. Cowdrey, Delta Engineers, pp. 106-13; U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers brochure, "Your Gulf Intracoastal Waterway"; Major 

Edward H. Schulz, "Remarks on Intracoastal Waterway of Louisiana," 

Professional Memoirs, USCE, VIII (May-June 1916), pp. 297-300. 

Also, see Lynn M. Alperin's detailed development of the Intracoastal Waterway. 

Chapter IV 

1. U.S. House Doc. 90, p. 13; Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 15, 

1927; Ibid., Oct. 23, 1927; Ibid., November 27, 1927; Ibid., 

March 28, 1943. 

2. Clay, A Century on the Mississippi, pp. 99, 100. 

3. Ibid., pp. 104, 105. 

4. Ibid., pp. 99-122; Elliott, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi, 

II, pp. 268-86. 

5. Clay, A Century on the Mississippi, pp. 130-33. 

6. Ibid., p. 170. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Ibid., pp. 130-33. 

9. Ibid., pp. 174-76. 

10. Public Affairs Office, MRC (Vicksburg, 1979), "Mississippi 

River Navigation" brochure. 

11. Annual Report, 1946, p. 6. 

12. Clay, A Century on the River, pp. 185 ff. 

13. Annual Report, 1958, pp. 605-07; Ibid., 1962, pp. 702-05. 

61 
14. Annual Report, 1975, II, p. 42-47; Ibid., 1980, pp. 42-6, 

42-23; Marion Bragg, Historic Names and Places on the Lower 

Mississippi River (Vicksburg, MRC, 1977), pp. 210, 211; Tonnage 

figures through the Waterborne Statistical Unit, New Orleans 

District Headquarters, October 1981. 

15. Annual Report, 1980, p. 13-2; Bragg, Historic Names, 

PP. 21, 22. 

16. Annual Report, 1980, p. 13-2. 

17. Annual Report, 1980, P. 13-2; Bragg, Historic Names, 

pp. 29-33. 

18. Bragg, Historic Names, pp. 131, 132; Waterborne Commerce of 

the United States, "Mississippi River System," 1952, p. 1768; 

Ibid., 1963, p. 209; Ibid., 1969, p. 148. 

20. Bragg, Historic Names, P. 144; Annual Report, 1980, p. 12-1; 

Waterborne Commerce of the United States, "Mississippi River System," 

1970, pp. 124, 125. 

21. Bragg, Historic Names, pp. 159-63; Annual Report, 1980, 

p. 42-12; Waterborne Commerce of the United States, "Mississippi 

River System," 1960, p. 193; Ibid., 1978, p. 143. 

22. Bragg, Historic Names, pp. 185-87; Waterborne Commerce of 

the United States, "Mississippi River System," 1960, p. 193; 

Ibid., 1978, p. 143. 

23. Waterborne Commerce Statistics reports. Figures for waterborne statistics are compiled annually by direction of the specific 

Division Engineers, and published annually by the Divisions under 

the comprehensive title of Waterborne Commerce of the United States, 

which includes all the various individual Division reports. 

24. Annual Report, 1980, pp. 11-42, 11-43. 

62 
Chapter V 

1. Cowdrey, Delta Engineers, pp. 94-96. 

2. Ibid., H. Fisk, Geological Investigation of the Atchafalaya 

Basin and the Problem of Mississippi River Diversion (Vicksburg, 

MRC, 1952), p. 122. 

3. Annual Report, 1975, II, p. 42-8; Ibid., 1980, p. 42-7; MRC, 

Flood Control and Navigation of the Mississippi River (1978 

edition). 

4. Ibid.; MRC, "Old River Control Structure," (1981). 

5. Major General Charles C. Noble, testimony before the House 

Public Works Committee for Water and Power Development and Atomic 

Energy Commission Appropriations Bill, March 12, 1973, I, p. 1064. 

6. Senate Appropriations hearing for fiscal year 1975, 93d Cong., 

2d sess., H.R. 15155, pt. I, p. 665; PAO, "Old River Control 

Structure," (Vicksburg, MRC, 1981), brochure. 

7. MRC, "Old River Control Structure." 

8. Annual Report, 1974, II, pp. 42-2, 42-3. 

9. Bragg, Historic Names, p. 209; Waterborne Statistics; Annual 

Report, 1962, II, p. 610. 

10. Cowdrey, Delta Engineers (2d ed.), pp. 29, 30. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Ibid.; Elliott, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi, I, 

p. 15; House Doc. 245, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 

14. Annual Report, 1975, II, p. 13-2; Ibid., 1979, pp. 11-16, 

11-44; Latter statistic yet unpublished but provided by the 

Statistical Unit of New Orleans District Headquarters. 

15. n.a., "Grain Export," International, vol. IV, no. 4, 1981, 

p. 14; PAO, "Mississippi River Navigation" brochure. 

63 
16. Keating, Mighty Mississippi, pp. 171, 172. 

17. PAO, "Mississippi River Navigation" brochure; Terri Minsky, 

"Drought in Mississippi River Basin Reduces Flow of Vital Commodities," 

The Wall Street Journal, January 29 ;1981. 

18. Ibid. 

19. n.a., "One Hundred Years War: Controversy Between Barges 

and Railroad Transportation in Mississippi Valley," Forbes, 

January 15, 1977; Quick and Quick, Mississippi Steamboatin', p. 172. 

20. "Grain Export," rnternational, 1981, p. 19. 

21. Ibid., Port of New Orleans, 85th Annual Report, Fiscal 1981; 

Edgar Poe, "Coaling Down the Mississippi," New Orleans Times-Picayune-- 

States Item, May 2, 1981, and January 21, 1982. 

22. MRC, "Mississippi River Navigation" brochure. 

64 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Amb, Thomas M. America and the Mississippi River. Minneapolis: T.S. 

Danison, 1973. 

Andrist, Ralph K. Steamboats on the Mississippi. New York: American 

Heritage, 1962. 

Botkin, Benjamin Albert. Mississippi River: A Treasury of Mississippi 

River Folklore. New York: Crown, 1955. 

Clay, Floyd M. A Century on the Mississippi: A History of the Memphis 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1876-1976. Memphis: 

USCE, 1976. 

. A History of the Little Rock District, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, 1881-1979. Little Rock: USCE, 1979 (2d printing). 

Corthell, E.L. A History of the Jetties at the Mouth of the 

Mississippi River. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1881. 

Cowdrey, Albert E. The Delta Engineers: A History of the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers in the New Orleans District. New Orleans: 

New Orleans District, 1971. 

Davis, Edwin A. (ed.). The Rivers and Bayous of Louisiana. Baton Rouge: 

Louisiana Educational Research Association, 1968. 

Dorsey, Florence. Road to the Sea: A Biography of James B. Eads. New 

York: Rinehart, 1947. 

Dunbar, Carl O. Historical Geology. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959. 

Elliott, Major D.O. The Improvement of the Mississippi River for Flood 

Control and Navigation. 2 vols. Vicksburg: U.S. Waterways Experiment Station, 1932. 

Farb, Peter. The Face of North America: The Natural History of a 

Continent. New York: Harper Colophon, 1963. 

Ferguson, Harley B. History of the Improvement of the Lower Mississippi 

River for Flood Control and Navigation, 1932-1939. Vicksburg: MRC, 

1940. - 

65 
Fisk, Harold N. Geological Investigation of the Atchafalaya Basin and 

the Problem of Mississippi River Diversion.Vicksburg: MRC, 1952. 

. Geological Investigation of the Mississippi Alluvial Valley. 

Vicksburg: MRC, 1944. 

Humphreys, Andrew A., and Henry L. Abbot 

Hydraulics of the Mississippi River 

• Report Upon the Physics and 

. Washington: GPO, 1876. 

Keating, Bern. The Mighty Mississippi. 

Society, 1971. 

Washington: National Geographic 

Latimer, Rodney A., and Charles W. Schweizer. The Atchafalaya River 

Study.3 vols. Vicksburg: MRC, 1951. 

Markham, Chris. Mississippi Odyssey. Stafford, Va.: Northwoods Press, 

1980. 

Mississippi River Commission. The Mississippi River Commission Reports 

to Mississippi.Vicksburg: MRC, 1954. 

Moore, Norman R. Improvement of the Lower Mississippi River and 

Tributaries, 1931-1972.Vicksburg: MRC, 1972. 

Parkman, Francis. The Discovery of the Great West. La Salle, N.Y.: 

Rinehart, 1956. 

Price, Willard. The Amazing Mississippi.New York: The John Day 

Company, 1963. 

Quick, Herbert, and Edward Quick. Mississippi Steamboatin i : A 

History of Steamboating on the Mississippi and Its Tributaries. 

New York: H. Holt and Co., 1926. 

Samuel, Ray, Leonard V. Huber, and Warren C. Ogden. Tales of the 

Mississippi.New York: Hastings House, 1955. 

Sorden, Leland, and Louise Miller. I Am the Mississippi.Madison, 

Wisc.: Wisconsin House, 1974. 

Soverin, Timothy. Explorers of the Mississippi. New York: Alfred A. 

Knopf, 1968. 

USCE. Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1945-80. 

66 
U.S . Government. Laws of the United States Relating to the Improvement 

of Rivers and Harbors. 3 vols. Washington: GPO, 1940. 

Watkins, T.H. Mark Twain's Mississippi: A Pictorial History of America's 

Greatest River. Palo Alto, Calif.: American West Publishing 

Company, 1974. 

67 

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