Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 29, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00331-CR

JEFFERY ANDRE MCDONALD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 232nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1599898

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant Jeffery Andre McDonald guilty of murder and found 

true appellant’s pleas of “true” to prior felony convictions for (1) delivery of 

cocaine and (2) possession with intent to deliver cocaine. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 

§§ 19.02(b)(1); Texas Controlled Substances Act, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 

§ 481.112. The jury assessed punishment at imprisonment for life. See Tex. Pen. 

Code Ann. § 12.42(d).

In a two issues on appeal, appellant argues (1) the trial court erred in 
2

denying his motion to suppress the search warrant because it was supported by 

probable cause and (2) he was harmed by the introduction of the cell phone 

geolocation data. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2018, appellant was dating Rebecca “Becky” Suhrheinrich, who lived in 

an apartment complex. On July 30, 2018, the apartment complex’s “courtesy 

patrol officer” received a welfare call to check on Becky.1 After knocking on the 

door and receiving no response, the “courtesy patrol officer” knocked down the 

locked door and saw “scattered blood on the wall.” The “courtesy patrol officer”

searched the apartment and did not find Becky.

On July 31, after news coverage of Becky’s disappearance, appellant’s sister 

gave detectives information that led them to Greens Bayou Bridge, where they 

found Becky’s torso wrapped in a bed sheet under the bridge. Becky’s head, arms, 

and legs were dismembered from her torso by what appeared to be a saw. Becky’s 

cell phone was later found in the landfill where her apartment complex dumped its 

trash.

On August 14, Investigator Crain applied for a search warrant directed at 

appellant’s cellular carrier to obtain the call records and geolocation data for 

appellant’s cell phone. In the search-warrant affidavit, Investigator Crain swore to 

the following:

• Crain spoke with Becky’s employer, Demetria Goode, who told 

him that Becky did not show up for work on July 27th or 30th.

Becky last left work at 5:07 p.m. on July 26, 2018, and was 

picked up by her boyfriend, known to Ms. Goode only as “Jeff” 

or “Jeffrey,” who was driving her black 2018 Ford Escape

SUV.

1

It is unclear from the record if the “courtesy patrol officer” is a peace officer.
3

• Goode contacted Becky’s apartment complex because it was 

unlike Becky not to show up for work. The courtesy patrol 

officer conducted a welfare check on Becky’s apartment and 

discovered the crime scene.

• Crain spoke with Becky’s upstairs neighbor Briana Talford, 

whom he found to be credible and reliable. Briana said she 

heard loud noises coming from Becky’s apartment the night of 

July 26th. Her roommate had also heard a female voice yell,

“Help me!”

• The GPS data for Becky’s cell phone, which Crain lawfully 

obtained, showed that at around 8:00 a.m. on July 28, Becky’s 

phone was in or near a landfill in Lake Jackson, Texas operated

by the same company that provided trash service to Becky’s 

apartment complex.

• Crain learned that appellant had been dating Becky and was the 

man who had picked her up from work on July 26th and had 

been driving her SUV.

• Crain interviewed Felicia Fuller, who lived in the same 

apartment complex as Becky and had previously dated 

appellant. She said that appellant visited her apartment on July 

30th and was acting “very strange.” She also claimed that 

appellant had his cell phone with him when he left her 

apartment.

• On July 31st, Crain interviewed appellant’s sister, Roshawnda, 

who told Crain that on July 28th, she picked up appellant from 

a park and gave him a ride to her sister’s house. There, 

appellant acted “very peculiar” and asked Roshawnda for a

Clorox wipe, bleach, and latex gloves. Roshawnda said 

appellant poured bleach into two water bottles and asked her to 

drive him back to the park. While on the way, appellant asked 

her to stop the car; appellant exited the car and walked under 

the bridge that crosses Greens Bayou. After a few minutes, 

appellant returned, and she drove him to the park. Roshawnda

recognized Becky from a television news report as the woman 

appellant had been dating and worried that appellant might be 

responsible for Becky’s disappearance. Roshawnda told Crain 

that appellant generally owned and used a cell phone.
4

• After speaking with Roshawnda, Crain went to the bridge and 

discovered a white female’s torso under the bridge wrapped in a 

bed sheet. The remains had not yet been identified.

• Crain swore that appellant’s cellular site data records and

geolocation information from the dates of July 1, 2018 to 

August 1, 2018 would “constitute evidence of the offense of 

Murder.”

• Specifically, Crain claimed that the records “may show contact 

with someone who may have been present as a witness at the 

time of this murder, and/or have information currently unknown 

to law enforcement about this murder.” Additionally, he 

asserted the records would show “the calls to and from 

[appellant’s] cellular phone during and immediately after the 

incident under investigation.”

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the geolocation data from his cell 

phone, arguing that the search-warrant affidavit did not provide sufficient facts to 

support probable cause. More specifically, appellant argued that Crain’s affidavit: 

(1) failed to allege facts indicating that appellant was in possession of his phone 

when the offense was committed and (2) did not set out why geolocation 

information would be relevant to the investigation.

During the trial, the trial court held a brief hearing on the motion to 

suppress. Appellant’s counsel expanded on the second argument:

[W]hen it comes to the [geolocation information, Crain] does not 

provide any information within the four corners as to what that is 

supposed to show. . . .

What he would have to say is . . . There’s a cell tower. Phones connect 

to cell towers. That will give you locations and based upon that we 

can determine what the location of that phone’s going to be at 

different times. There’s your relevance. And that’s . . . what they want 

this evidence for, is to put the phone at the apartment where the 

complainant lived and to put the phone in the area where the torso was 

found. And that’s what they don’t provide, how you get to that point.
5

The trial court rejected appellant’s argument, reasoning:

[I]t sound[s] like he maybe [Crain’s] looking for corroboration as to 

whether or not Ms. Fuller was in contact with the defendant on July 

30th, may have been a witness to the murder or have information 

about the murder. . . . I think it does specify that location that could 

show contact with someone who may have been present as a witness 

at the time of this murder coupled with the fact that he said the 

defendant was in possession of a cellular phone on July 30th, 2018. I 

think it gets the State across the hurdle and it’s a fine line . . . And 

[geolocation,] I think it’s a common enough used term that I think it 

gets us there. . . [T]he way I read this in total I think it’s a close call. 

But I think it gets the State there to allow that information to come in 

based on the warrant. So I have to deny the motion to suppress and 

allow that to come in.

Appellant’s counsel objected and asked for a running objection to the 

geolocation evidence from his cell phone; the trial court did not explicitly rule on 

his objection. After trial resumed, appellant’s counsel stated, “we have no 

objections” when the geolocation data was introduced into evidence by Erin 

Havelka, a criminal intelligence analyst. At the beginning of the next day of trial, 

and outside the presence of the jury, appellant’s counsel asked the trial court to 

clarify for the record that there was a running objection to the geolocation 

evidence, “just for purposes of preserving that issue” for appeal. The trial court 

remarked:

It was the Court’s understanding that on Ms. Havelka’s testimony in 

regards to any location data of any cell phone, was objected to, and 

the Court did understand that that objection would be running 

throughout the entirety of Ms. Havelka’s testimony, and it was my 

opinion that was for expediency’s sake to not object during her 

testimony. So, I considered it as having been objected to based on the 

conversation we had previously.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
6

II. ANALYSIS

In two issues, appellant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress the search warrant because it was supported by probable cause 

and (2) appellant was harmed by the introduction of the cell phone geolocation 

data.

A. Preservation of error

Before we reach the merits of issue 1, we first address the State’s argument 

that appellant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review.

In General. As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate 

review, the record must show that:

(1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, 

objection, or motion that:

(A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining 

party sought from the trial court with sufficient 

specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, 

unless the specific grounds were apparent from the 

context; and

(B) complied with the requirements of the Texas Rules of 

Evidence or the Texas Rules of Civil or Appellate 

Procedure; and

(2) the trial court:

(A) ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either 

expressly or implicitly; or

(B) refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and 

the complaining party objected to the refusal.

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

Here, as outlined above, defense counsel objected—and asked for a running 

objection—to the geolocation data from his cell phone. The State cites to a case 
7

from our court for the proposition that even if a running objection has been 

requested, error can still be waived if the party affirmatively states “no objection”

when the evidence is later introduced. See Jones v. State, No. 14-08-00869-CR,

2010 WL 26527, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 7, 2010, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). However, in Jones, we noted an 

exception to that general rule, observing that error is not waived when the trial 

court expressly states on the record that it considers the issue to be preserved for 

appeal. See id. More importantly, the court of criminal appeals has explained that 

whether a statement of “no objection” waives earlier-preserved error is “contextdependent”:

[A]n appellate court should not focus exclusively on the statement 

itself, in isolation, but should consider it in the context of the entirety 

of the record. If the record as a whole plainly demonstrates that the 

defendant did not intend, nor did the trial court construe, his “no 

objection” statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error 

that he had earlier preserved for appeal, then the appellate court 

should not regard the claim as “waived,” but should resolve it on the 

merits.

Thomas v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Under the Thomas framework, it is clear appellant did not intend, nor did the 

trial court construe, appellant’s statement of “no objection” to constitute an 

abandonment of his claim of error regarding the motion to suppress. See id. Having 

concluded that appellant did not waive error, we now address issue 1.

B. Standard of review and applicable law

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a 

bifurcated standard of review. See Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2018). At a motion-to-suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier 

of fact and judge of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their 
8

testimony. See id. at 190. Therefore, we afford almost complete deference to the 

trial court in determining historical facts. See id.; State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 

270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A trial court’s ruling will be sustained if it is 

reasonably supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable 

to the case. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 

However, we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not rely on 

an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See id.

When the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, as in the case 

before us, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported by the 

record. See Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at, 190.

Because a cell phone’s geolocation data can contain “a detailed and

comprehensive record of [a] person’s movements,” the police must obtain a 

warrant, supported by probable cause, for seven or more days of such data. See 

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, n.3 (2018); see also Holder v. 

State, 595 S.W.3d 691, 703–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (applying Carpenter to 

Tex. Const. art. 1, § 9). The search-warrant application must “state the facts and 

circumstances that provide the applicant with probable cause to believe that:

(A) criminal activity has been, is, or will be committed; and (B) searching the 

telephone or device is likely to produce evidence in the investigation of the 

criminal activity described in Paragraph (A).” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 

18.0215(c)(5). “Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the 

circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 

will be found at a particular location.” State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 777 (2023). A reviewing court must 

“give great deference to a magistrate’s probable cause determination to encourage 
9

police officers to use the warrant process.” Id.

In determining whether an affidavit provides probable cause to support a 

search warrant, an issuing court and a reviewing court are constrained to the four 

corners of the affidavit. See State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). “While a magistrate may not baselessly presume facts that the 

affidavit does not support, the magistrate is permitted to make reasonable 

inferences from the facts contained within the affidavit’s ‘four corners.’” Foreman 

v. State, 613 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). However, “conclusory 

allegations alone are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” Baldwin, 

664 S.W.3d at 132. “Ultimately, the test is whether the affidavit, read in a 

commonsensical and realistic manner and afforded all reasonable inferences from 

the facts contained within, provided the magistrate with a ‘substantial basis’ for the 

issuance of a warrant.” Foreman, 613 S.W.3d at 164.

The admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is 

reviewed for harmless error. See Hernandez v. State, 60 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2001). Under that standard, a conviction must be reversed “unless the 

court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 

conviction.” Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a).

C. Motion to suppress

1. Possession of cell phone immediately before, during, or after the 

alleged offense

Appellant relies on Baldwin to claim that the search-warrant affidavit in the 

present case was not supported by probable cause because it did not provide any 

evidence that appellant possessed his cell phone immediately before, during, or 

after the alleged murder. See Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 135. However, Baldwin does 

not stand for the general proposition that to be supported by probable cause, a 
10

search warrant affidavit must provide facts that the defendant carried a cell phone 

before, during, or after the commission of the alleged crime. Instead, the court in 

Baldwin summarized its conclusion as follows:

Is generic, boilerplate language about cell phone use among criminals

sufficient to establish probable cause to search a cell phone? We hold

it is not. Instead, specific facts connecting the items to be searched to

the alleged offense are required for the magistrate to reasonably

determine probable cause. . . .

Id. at 134.

Ultimately, the court in Baldwin concluded that the affidavit in question was 

not supported by probable cause because it relied on generic “boilerplate language”

that it “is common for suspects to communicate about their plans via text 

messaging, phone calls, or through other communication applications.” Id. at 126.

The court then detailed the affidavit’s lack of facts connecting the cell phone to the 

alleged offense:

The affidavit contains nothing about the phone being used before or

during the offense. Suspicion and conjecture do not constitute

probable cause, and “the facts as recited in the affidavit in this cause

evidence nothing more than mere suspicion.” Therefore, the

magistrate erred by substituting the evidentiary nexus for the officer’s

training and experience and generalized belief that suspects plan

crimes using their phones. The boilerplate language in itself is not

sufficient to provide probable cause in this case, nor does the

remaining affidavit set forth details in sufficient facts to support

probable cause. Considering the whole of the affidavit, there is no

information included that suggest anything beyond mere speculation

that Appellee’s cell phone was used before, during, or after the crime.

Id. at 135 (internal quotations omitted).

Months after Baldwin was issued, this court issued Stocker v. State, which is 

procedurally similar to the present case. See 656 S.W.3d 887, 899 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. granted). Stocker was charged with murder and 
11

filed a motion to suppress site-location information associated with his cell phone. 

This court observed that:

a mere desire to learn the movements or location of a suspect is not 

sufficient probable cause to obtain cell site location information from 

a suspect’s wireless carrier. There must be some factual basis in the 

affidavit providing a fair probability that law enforcement could 

expect to find inculpatory location information evidence from the 

carrier indicating that a specific person committed a particular 

offense.

Id. at 906–07.

Then, analyzing the probable-cause affidavit for the search warrant, this court 

concluded that the affidavit was supported by probable cause:

Considering the four corners of the affidavit, we conclude that it 

contains sufficient factual assertions from which the district judge 

could reasonably determine there was a fair probability that the 

location data relating to appellant’s phone would provide evidence of 

the murder described in the affidavit and that appellant committed the 

murder. Although the affidavit does contain some conclusory 

statements, it also includes additional facts establishing the requisite 

nexus between the murder and the electronic records to be searched. 

In particular, the affidavit contains facts conclusively linking 

appellant to the murder weapon—a handgun—thereby connecting 

appellant to the specific location of the murder. Thus, the facts 

contained in the affidavit give rise to a fair probability that a search of 

T-Mobile’s cell site location information associated with appellant’s 

phone would reveal inculpatory evidence that a particular person,

appellant, committed the murder because the location of his Samsung 

phone would be placed at or near the murder scene at the relevant 

time.

Id. at 908.

The search-warrant affidavit in the present case is much more akin to the 

affidavit we approved of in Stocker than the affidavit in Baldwin. Crain did more 

than simply assert boilerplate language concerning how criminals use cell phones. 
12

Based on the facts asserted in Crain’s affidavit: Becky was last seen leaving her 

place of employment with appellant; appellant’s ex-girlfriend, who lives in the 

same apartment complex as Becky, told Crain that appellant was acting strange 

when he visited her apartment several days after Becky’s disappearance; on July 

28, appellant’s sister picked up appellant from a park and drove him “to her sister’s 

home”; after asking his sister for a Clorox wipe, bleach, and latex gloves, appellant 

asked her to return him to the park, where appellant then walked under the nearby 

bridge; and Becky’s corpse was located under the same bridge.

Stated differently, the test is not whether the State alleged facts showing that 

the defendant possessed a cell phone before, during, or after the alleged offense, 

but “whether the affidavit, read in a commonsensical and realistic manner and 

afforded all reasonable inferences from the facts contained within, provided the 

magistrate with a ‘substantial basis’ for the issuance of a warrant.” Foreman, 613 

S.W.3d at 164. We conclude that the facts contained in the affidavit give rise to a 

fair probability that the wireless carrier’s geolocation information associated with 

appellant’s cell phone would reveal inculpatory evidence that a particular person, 

appellant, committed the murder because the location of his cell phone would be 

placed at or near both the murder scene—Becky’s apartment—and the location 

where the torso was recovered—underneath the bridge—at the relevant times.

2. Explanation of geolocation data

Appellant next argues that the affidavit was insufficient because it did not 

explain what geolocation data is or how it would connect him to the murder. But 

appellant does not cite to any cases that have required a search warrant affidavit to 

specifically explain what geolocation data is. Furthermore, in Stocker, this court 

concluded (1) the affidavit contained sufficient factual assertions from which the 

district judge could reasonably determine there was a fair probability that the 
13

geolocation data from defendant’s cell phone would provide evidence of the 

murder described in the affidavit and (2) the defendant committed the murder,

despite the affidavit not defining geolocation data. See Stocker, 656 S.W.3d at 908.

We also note that the controlling statutory authority for obtaining a search 

warrant of geolocation data imposes no requirement of defining geolocation data:

(b) A search warrant may not be issued under this article unless the 

sworn affidavit required by Article 18.01(b) provides sufficient and 

substantial facts to establish probable cause that:

(1) a specific offense has been committed; and

(2) the electronic customer data sought:

(A) constitutes evidence of that offense or evidence that a

particular person committed that offense; and

(B) is held in electronic storage by the service provider

on which the warrant is served under Article 18B.355(c).

Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 18B.354. Thus, like our discussion above, the test 

here for probable cause is not guided by whether the State defined geolocation data 

in the affidavit, but “whether the affidavit, read in a commonsensical and realistic 

manner and afforded all reasonable inferences from the facts contained within, 

provided the magistrate with a ‘substantial basis’ for the issuance of a warrant.” 

Foreman, 613 S.W.3d at 164.

The search-warrant affidavit in the present case provided substantial facts

establishing that a specific offense had been committed—murder—and that the 

electronic data sought constituted evidence of that murder. See Tex. Code Crim. 

Pro. Ann. art. 18B.354. Therefore, we conclude that the affidavit provides probable 

cause to support issuance of a search warrant. See Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130; see

also Stocker, 656 S.W.3d at 908. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying 

appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of the cellular 

carrier’s records. See Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 189–90. We overrule issue 1.
14

Because we have concluded the trial court did not err, we need not address 

issue 2, which addresses harm. Tex. R. App. P. 471.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.

/s/ Charles A. Spain 

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Jewell and Spain.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).