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17‐1498

United States v. Huntley

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION

ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY

PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley

Square, in the City of New York, on the 9th day of May, two thousand eighteen.

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

DENNIS JACOBS,

Circuit Judges,

KATHERINE B. FORREST,

    District Judge.*

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,   

Appellee,

  ‐v.‐            17‐1498

JOSEPH HUNTLEY,   

 

*     Judge Katherine B. Forrest, of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York, sitting by designation.
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Defendant‐Appellant.

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FOR APPELLANT: Philip L. Weinstein, Federal

Defenders of New York, Inc., New

York, NY.

FOR APPELLEE: Karl Metzner (Timothy V. Capozzi,

on the brief), Assistant United States

Attorneys, for Geoffrey S. Berman,

United States Attorney for the

Southern District of New York, New

York, NY.   

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Sullivan, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be

AFFIRMED.

Defendant‐appellant Joseph Huntley appeals from a May 5, 2017 judgment

convicting him, following a guilty plea, of being a felon in possession of a firearm,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as well as the same court’s judgment revoking

supervised release.    On appeal, Huntley argues that the government steered his

firearms offense case to the judge presiding over his supervised release violation,

which undermined the basic fairness of the proceedings and violated due process

because that judge had already warned that Huntley would be treated harshly.   

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

history, and the issues presented for review.

To begin, the appellant lacks standing to appeal an assignment decision by

the Assignment Committee of the Southern District of New York.    As the

government explains, the preamble to the Rules for the Division of Business
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Among District Judges for the Southern District of New York (“Rules for the

Division of Business”) states that “[t]hese rules are adopted for the internal

management of the case load of the court and shall not be deemed to vest any

rights in litigants or their attorneys . . .”    Id. at 101.   

Even if Huntley had standing to appeal the assignment of his firearms

offense to Judge Sullivan, the government did not violate any of the Court’s Local

Rules.    Rather, the government’s July 21, 2016 letter advised the court of the

overlapping nature of Huntley’s two cases, as is common practice for the

government.    See e.g., United States v. Borker, No. 10‐CR‐1266 (RJS), No.

17‐CR‐391 (PGG) (June 22, 2017 letter).    Contrary to Huntley’s assertions, the

government made clear that the cases were not related for the purposes of Rule 13

of the Rules for the Division of Business, nor did the Assignment Committee treat

the cases as such.    The firearms offense case was reassigned to Judge Sullivan for

efficiency reasons, and done under Rule 14 of the Rules for the Division of

Business.   

Huntley’s allegation that the perceived unfairness of the proceedings

violated his due process rights rests on the false premise that the government

improperly steered the firearms offense to a specific judge.    Huntley deems it

suspicious that the July 21, 2016 letter was dispatched immediately after Judge

Sullivan warned Huntley that he would have to face the consequences of

violating his parole.    But, as noted, such letters constitute a common practice; as

Huntley’s own brief concedes: “[i]t is common for a sentencing Judge to warn a

defendant of harsh consequences for any violation of supervised release.”   

Appellant’s Br. at 13.    

Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.    

FOR THE COURT:

CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK