No. 3-07-0 735, co ns.

______________________________________________________________________________ File d January

9, 2009 IN THE

APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS THIRD DI STRICT A.D., 2009 M.K ., ) Appe al fro m the C ircu it Co ur t of t he ) Te n

th Judi ci al Ci rc ui t, Pl ai n ti f f -A pp el l an t, ) Peor ia County, Ill in ois, ) v. ) No. 07-L-144 ) No. 07-L-79 L.C. a nd N .G., ) No. 07-L-75 ) No. 07-L-34 Defe ndan ts-Appelle es ) No. 07-L-142 ) No. 07-L-143 Ho ly Fami

ly Catho lic Churc h, ) No. 07-L-141 formerly known as St . Mar y’s ) No. 07-L-32 Catho li c Church, and St . Pat rick’s ) No. 07-L-78 Cat holic Chu rc h and ) No. 07-L-77 Da nie l R. Je nk y, B isho p o f t he Ca t ho lic ) Diocese of

Peoria, ) a Re ligious C or po ra t ion, and ) the Catholi

c Di ocese of Peoria, ) T he Ho no r ab le a Re ligious C or po ra t ion, ) Joe R. Vespa ) Kev

in R. Gall ey Defendan ts. ) Judges Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CEMc DA

DEde l i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t:

______________________________________________________________________________ In June 2007 the circuit court of Peor ia County granted defendants’ m ot ions to dismi

ss pla in tif fs ’ clai ms to recover dama

ges f or sexual abuse on the grounds pl

ai ntif fs ’ clai ms were timebar re d. The t rial co ur t denied plaint iff s’ mot ions t o r eco nsider in Oct obe r 2 007 . Fo r t he r eas ons that foll ow, we reverse.-2- BACK GROUND In t his co nso lidat ed a ppe al, p laintiffs all all ege t o ha ve bee n t he vict ims of sep ar at e and
nu mer o us ac t s o f se xu al a bu se wh ile in t he ir min o r it y by t he ind ividua l de fen da nt s, all C at ho lic pri es ts. P l ai nti f f s a l l eg e that a

t the ti mesthe ab us e oc cu rre d, def en da nts , th e C ath

ol i c D i oce se

of Peoria, and Bi

shop Dani

el Jenky , in div idua ll y, an d the defe ndan ts’ respectiv

e church es, em ploy ed
or co ntroll ed the i

ndi vi dual defen dants as pari sh priests. Plai ntif fs all f il ed thei r complai nts af ter reachi ng m aj ority an d after reachi

ng age 30. Def

endan ts fi le d motions

to dis mi ss on the grounds the sta tute of rep ose appl i ca bl e to p l ai nti f f s’ ca us esof ac ti on e xp i red pri or to pl ai nti f f s’ f i l i ng of their complain

ts. Defend ant s pr emised t heir mo t ions t o d ismi ss o n t he st at ut e o f rep os e co nt ained in t he 19 91 Child ho o d S exu al Abu se Act (A ct ) ( 73 5 I LC S 5 /1 3- 20 2. 2 ( Wes t 19 92 )) . P laint iffs
r es po nd ed su bse qu en t ame nd men t s t o t he Ac t r emo ve d t he st at ut e o f r ep o se an d s ho uld ap ply
r et r o ac t ive ly t o t he ir c laims
. Pla int iffs a r gu ed t ha t t he 19 91 Ac t did no t cr ea t e a ve st ed r igh t in def endan ts to the ex

pi rati on of the statute of re

pose, a nd, th eref ore, plai ntif f s’ caus es of

action are not ba rred. Pl ai ntif f s al so res ponde d tha

t if the statute of re

pose d i d app l y , thei r com plai nts a re not barred under the doctrine of e quitabl e tolli ng. In J une 2007 th e ci rcui t court of Pe oria

Coun ty g ran ted def endan ts’ m otion s to di sm

i ss. The trial court deni

ed pl ai ntif fs ’ m ot ions to reconsider in

October 2007. This appeal fol lowed. “W e rev i ew the tri al

court's rul i ng on the s ection 2-6 19 [(73 5 ILC S 5/2-6 15 (W est 200 6))] motion to dism

is s bas ed on the statut e of repose de novo. ” Trogi v. Di abri & V icari, P.C. , 362 Il l . Ap p. 3d 93 , 95, 839N.E.2d 5 53, 555 (2005 ). AN AL YSIS-3-

Pl ai n ti f f s a rgue th at th e c i rc ui t cou rt of Pe ori a C oun ty er re d i n f i n di n g th at def en da n ts po ss es s a ve st ed r igh t t o t he pr o t ec t io n o f t he st at ut e o f r ep o se . Un de rt he ve r sio n o f t he Ac t in ef f ec t 12 y ea rs af ter p l ai nti f f s reach ed maj ori ty , th e tri al cou rt con cl ude d, p l ai nti f f s’ ca us esof act ion t er minated but none had filed su it. Defend ant s ar gue d t hey obt ained a vest ed r ight t o t he expi ration o f pl

ain tiff s’ causes of action. At t hat time the statu te rea d, in pertinen t par t as follows: “(b) [I]n n

o event m ay an action for personal

in jury based on chi ldh ood sexual ab

use be com

me nced m ore t han 12 ye ars af

ter the date on whi ch the person ab used attains

the age of 18 y

ears.” 735 IL CS 5/1 3-202 .2 (West 199 2). Plaint iff s filed suit in April 200 6, mor e t han 12 years aft er re aching majo rit y, and aft er re aching ag e 3 0. B ef

oreA pri l 20 06 , the I l l i

n oi s l eg i sl atu ream en de d s ecti on

13 -2 02 .2 o f

th e CA SS to
rem ove the sta tute of rep ose an d to c l ari f y the appl i ca ti on of the di sc ove ry rul e i n c as esof childhoo d se xual abu se. Fo llowing t he first amendment t o t he Act , t he st at ut e r ead , in pe rt inent part , as foll

ows:

“ (b ) A

n a cti on f or da mag esf or pe rs ona l i njury base d on childhoo d se xual abu se must be co mmenced w ithin 2 year s o f the da t e t he pe r so n a bu se d d isc o ve r s o rt hr o ug h t he us e o f r ea so na ble dil igen ce should di scover t hat the act of chi ldh oo d sexual ab

use occurred and that the in

jury was caused b

y the chi ldh ood sexual abuse. * * * (e ) T his Sec t ion ap plies t o a ct ions p ending o n t he effect ive-4- dat e o f this amend at or y Act o f 199 0 as well as t o a ct ions
co mmenc ed o n o raft er t ha t da t e. T he ch an ge s ma de by t his
am en da tory A ct of 199 3 s ha l l appl y onl y to ac ti ons

com men ce d on or after the eff

ective date of this

am endatory Ac

t o f 1993." 735 ILCS 5/13-2 02.2 (W

est 199 4) (herei

naf ter 1993 Act). Plai ntif fs argue that the tr ia

l c ourt should have applie d the versi on of the Act i

n ef fect when they actuall y f il ed thei r complai nts agai nst def endan ts. Plai ntif fs argue this

in cl udes proceedin g without a period of repose. Wh en pl ai ntif fs fi le d, the statut e read, in

pertinen t part , as foll ows:

“ (b ) Notwi ths tan di ng an y othe r provi si on of l aw , an ac ti on for damages f

or p ersonal i

nj ury based on chi

ldh oo d sexual ab

use
m us t be com men ce d w i thi n 1 0 y ea rs of the da te the l i m i tati on per iod begins t o r un und er subs ect ion ( d) or wit hin 5 years of t he da t e t he pe r so n a bu se d d isc o ve r s o rt hr o ug h t he us e o f r ea so na ble dil ige nce sh ould di scover both (i) that the act of chi ldh ood sexual ab us e oc cu rre d a nd (ii) th at the i

njury wa s c au se d by

the ch i l dhood sexual abuse. The

fact that the person abuse d dis covers or thro ugh the us e of reason ab l e di l i genc e shou

l d di sc ove r th at the act of chi l dhood s ex

ual abuse occurre d i s n

ot, by i tself , suf f i cien t to start t he disc ove ry pe rio d und er t his subse ct ion ( b). Know ledge of t he abuse does n

ot constitute discove

ry of the in jury or t he causa

l relationshi

p between an

y l ater-discovered i

nj ury an d the abuse.-5- * * * (e ) T his Sec t ion ap plies t o a ct ions p ending o n t he effect ive dat e o f this amend at or y Act o f 199 0 as well as t o a ct ions
co mmenc ed o n o raft er t ha t da t e. T he ch an ge s ma de by t his
am en da tory A ct of 199 3 s ha l l appl y onl y to ac ti ons

com men ce d on
or aft er t he effect ive dat e o f this amend at or y Act o f 199 3. The chan ges m ade by this am endatory Ac

t o f the 93rd Gen

eral Ass emb ly ap ply t o ac t io ns p en din g o n t he effe ct ive da t e o f t his amenda t or y Act o f the 93r d Ge ner al Assembly as well as a ct ions
commen ced on o r after t hat dat e.” 735 I LCS 5/13-20 2.2(b) ( West 2006)
. Plai ntif fs argue that under the current version of the statute t he limitations period had n ot run be ca us e n o ne o f t he pla int iffs h ad dis co ve r ed , o r t hr o ug h t he us e o f r ea so na ble dilig en ce sho uld ha ve dis co ve r ed , t ha t t he ac t s o f ch ildh o o d s ex ua l ab us e o cc ur r ed o rt ha t t he ab us e c au se d t he ir i nj uries. Plaint iff

s also ar gue t hat t he st at ut e o f rep os e do es no t app ly to t heir ca use s o f act ion, de sp it e t he fa ct t ha t t he st at ut e o f r ep o se wa s in ef fe ct t we lve yea r s a ft er t he y r ea ch ed majo r it y, be ca us e t he leg isla t ur e in t en de d t he 20 03 ame nd men t s t o t he Ac t t o ap ply r et r o ac t ive ly t o all cl ai ms of chi ldh ood sexual ab

use. 1. Were Plain

tiff s’ Causes of Action Termi nated Under t he 1991 St atut e of Repose Foll owing the 1994 Am endm ent Eli mi natin g the Stat ute of Repose. A t hr es ho ld ma t t er is w he t he rt he 20 03 ame nd men t s t o t he Ac t ap ply r et r o ac t ive ly t o p laintiffs’ claims. I n Clay v. Kuhl , 189 Ill . 2d 603, 609, 727 N.E .2d 217, 221 (2000), our-6-

suprem e court expli

ci tly hel d that, in that case: "The pl ai ntif f correctly

concede[d] that if

her action was al

ready bar re d und er t he co mmon law disc ove ry ru le pr ior t o t he ena ct ment of se cti on 13 -2 02 .2, th en

th e n ew sta tute cou l d n ot h av e rev i v ed i t; unde r I lli nois law , t he bar ring o f an act ion by a st at ut e o f li mitat ions
cre ate s a ve ste d ri gh t i n f av or of the de f en da nt, an d the acti on cannot later be revived. [Citations.]" Clay , 189 Ill . 2d at 609, 727 N.E.2d at 221. Howev er, Clay is no t dis po sit ive o f t he inst an t ap pe al b ec au se t he co ur t st at ed ex plic it ly t ha t it had "no occasion here to consider the oper ation or appli cation of section 13-202 .2." Clay , 189 Ill. 2d at 609 , 7 27 N .E .2 d at 221 . Any re liance de fendant s plac e o n Clay is mi splaced. Plaint iff s cit e t he Fifth D istr ict’ s re cent dec ision in Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas , 37 9 I ll. App. 3d 782, 885 N.E.2d 376 (2008), in support o f thei

r clai m that a cause

of action s

urvi ves wh ere the legi slature re

peal s a statute of re

pose that would ha

ve term i na ted the caus e of action. Pl ai n ti f f s a rgue th e rep ea l re v i v es th e c au se of acti on i f th e l an gu ag e i n th e a men de d s tatu te evinces a legislat ive intent for re t ro act ive app licatio n of t he amend ed s t at ut e and if ret ro act ive appl i cation of the a mended statute i s n

ot prohi bi ted by the c onsti

tution
. Diocese of Dallas , 379 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 789, 885 N.E.2d a

t 382. The Dallas court did n

ot directl y a ddress the i ssue of retroactivi ty as i t applies to st atutes of r epo se. The spe cific ques t ion in Dallas wa s w h eth er , “ [i]f th e cur re n t statute of limitations is retroacti ve , *** the pl

ai ntif f ’sl awsui t shoul d *** h av e b een di sm i sse d.” (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 788, 885 N.E .2d at 381. T he Dallas co ur t ’s ho ldin g is-7-

li mi ted to a determi

nation of the “retroactivi

ty of the 2003 limitations ame nd men t . ” ( E mph as is adde d.) Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E .2d at 386. No nethel ess, the Dallas
co ur t ’s o pinion is inst ru ct ive. We find t hat t he sa me analysis it ap plied t o d et er mine that t he chan ge i n the statute o f l

im itations applie d retro activel

y a ppli es i n thi s case. A

pply in g that
an alys is, we find t ha t t he leg isla t ur e in t en de d it s r ep ea l o f t he st at ut e o f r ep o se t o ap ply
r et r o ac t ive ly. The Dallas cou

rt re cogni ze d that if ei the r th e 1 991 l i

m i tations period or th

e 1 991 period of repose applie d to the pla in tif f’ s case, then

ei ther “could s erve to bar the plai ntif f’ s sui t.” Diocese of Dallas , 3 79 I ll. App. 3d a t 788 , 8 85 N .E .2 d at 381 . T he co ur t re ject ed t he defend ant s’ ar gument t hat “the 200 3 amend ment t o t he child se xual abu se st at ut e o f li mitat ions
canno t ser ve t o r evive an e xpire d claim and t hat t he legislat ur e neve r int ende d fo r a re t ro act ive applic ation of the statut e for the purpose of revi vi ng an expi red cla im .” Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 788, 885 N.E .2d at 381. T he court ultim ately found that the legi slature intende d the am en dm en t to the sta tute of l i m i tations to appl y retroac ti ve l y an d that “ retroac ti ve appl i ca ti on does not unreasonabl

y i nf rin ge on any due process righ

t.” Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 794, 88 5 N.E.2d

at 385. The Dallas cou

rt re cog n ize d th at dicta in a “F irst Di strict deci si on in terpret in g si mi la r la nguage rel

ating to the applic ation of the 1990 am endm ent” repealing th e statute of repose and changi ng th e l i m i tations peri od reache d the opposi te conc l usi on. Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d a t 791 , 88 5 N .E.2 d a

t 383 . How ever, the

Fi f th D i stri ct f oun d that the def

en da nts ’ rel i an ceon the Fi rs t Di stri ct’ s rati ona l e w asun pe rs ua si ve , b ec au se

the Fi rs t Di stri ct re ac he d that c onc l

us i on “sev en y ears bef ore t he suprem

e court decided Commonw ealth Edis on Co. [v. Wil

l County-8-

Collector , 196 Ill . 2d 27, 749 N.E. 2d 964 (2001)]." Before Commonw ealth Edison Co. cou

rts fo llo we d t he ve st ed r igh t s a pp r o ac h t o r et r o ac t ivit y, u nd er wh ich leg isla t ive int en t wa s la r ge ly i gnore d. Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 792, 885 N.E .2d at 384, quo ting Commonw ealth Edison Co. , 196 Il

l . 2d at 34 , 749 N .E.2d at 96 9. Despi te stat in g that it recognize s that "the Ill in ois Suprem

e Court *** r ej ected the vested right s ap pr oa ch t o r et ro act ivity and ad op t ed t he legislat ive intent app ro ach, " t he disse nt
none t heless finds t hat t he su pr eme co ur t ’s de cision in M.E.H. v. L.H. , 177 Ill . 2d 207, 685 N.E. 2d 335 (1 997 ), is co nt ro lli

ng. Slip o p. at ___ . I n M.E.H. , o ur sup re me co ur t fou nd t hat t he defend ant in that cas e had a ves t ed r ight t o invo ke t he limi t at ions p er iod as a defens e and t hat t he defendan t’s vested right

co uld no t be t ake n awa y witho ut offend ing t he du e pr oc ess p ro t ect ions of the state’ s consti

tution
. M.E.H. 177 Ill. 2d at 214 -1 5, 685 N. E. 2d a t 339 . We re ject t he dissent ’s implicatio n t hat unde r t he su pr eme co ur t ’s de cision in M.E.H. "ta ki n g a wa y th e ri gh t to invo ke t he st at ut e o f r ep o se as a d efe nse t o a c au se o f ac t io n is" in a nd o f it se lf, "c o nst it ut io na lly prohib ited." Sl

ip op. at ___. We fi

nd that the M.E.H. co ur t re ache d it s co nclusio n base d o n t he exi stence of a v

ested righ t. The court reached i

ts decis ion onl

y a fter fi rst concludi

ng that “once a statut e of l

im itations has ex pired, the def

endan t has a vested right

t o invo ke t he bar of t he lim itat ions p er iod as a defens e t o a cau se o f act ion. Tha t right canno t be t ake n awa y by the le gis la ture without o ff

endi ng the due process protections of our state’s constitution.” M.E.H. , 177 Il l . 2d at 21 4-15, 6 85 N.E.2 d at 339 -40. In Commonw

ealth Edison Co. , the supreme c ourt form ally adopted “the Landgraf approac h” to asse ss th

e retroacti

vi ty of a legi slati ve am endm en t. Now, under Landgraf v. USI FilmPro duct

s, 511 U. S. 244 , 1 28 L . E d. 2d 2 29, 114 S. Ct . 1 483 (1 994 ), co ur t s “first det er mine-9-

if the le gis la

ture expressed i

ts in tent relativ

e to r etro activ

ity . If the legi slature’s in

tent is cl ear, we
mus t give e ff ect to that intent unl

ess consti tut iona l pri nci ple s otherwise prohi

bi t t he appl ic ation.” Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 789, 885 N.E .2d at 382, citing Commonw ealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill . 2d at 38, 749 N. E.2d at 971. The M.E.H. court did n ot fi nd a gen eral c onstitutional proh i bi ti on a gai ns t the l eg i sl atu re’ s j udg men t to el i m i na te a sta tute of rep ose . The s ol e b as i s f

or t he su pr eme co ur t ’s ho lding in M.E.H. was the exi stence of wh

at was then a vested righ

t. Our
su pr em e c our t h as f l atl y re j ected th e " v ested

ri gh ts" approach

an d c l ea rl y estab l i sh ed an al ter n ate mode of in

quiry for det ermi

ni ng the ret roact iv

e im pact o f a l egisl ative chan ge that this court must
em pl oy on a c as e- b y-c as e b as i s. Gi

v en th e s up re me c our

t’s re j ecti on of th e v ested ri gh ts appr oach we m us t f i n d th at M.E.H. no lo ng er co nt r o ls t he inst an t ap pe al. The Commonw

ealth Edison Co. court further ex pla in ed the Landgraf

approach as fol l ows: "A co ur t must co nsider t he nat ur e o f a ** * meas ur e and t he

ci rcumstances leadi

ng to its adoption bef

ore t he court may det er mine "tha t its r et ro act ive app licatio n is so har sh and op pr essive as to tran sgre ss th

e con sti tution al l i m i tation ."‘ [ Ci

tation ]. In d et er mini

ng whe t her a r et ro act ive *** measu re is "‘so har sh and opp re ss i v e a s to tra

n sg re ss th e c on sti

tuti on al l i m i tati on ’" [c i tati on ], c our ts have c ons ider ed s uch fac t or s as t he legislat ive pur po se in enac t ing t he
am endm en t [ci tations], the

l ength of the p eriod of re

troacti vi ty [c i tations], whether [an i

ndi vi dual ] reasonabl

y a nd detrim entally reli ed on the prior law [citations ], and whether the [i ndi vi dual ] had adequate notice of the chan ge-10- i n the law [c i

tation ]. Pa r en t he t ica lly, w e n o t e t ha t t he Un it ed St at es Su pr eme Court has strictly

li mi ted t he scope of inqui

ry under the due pro cess cl ause of the f

ederal constitution, holdin

g that nei ther lack of

notice
nor det riment al reliance ar e ‘d ispo sitive’ fa ct or s in det er mini ng whether the retroact iv

e applic ation of a[n

] *** amen

dme nt violates the due pro cess clause of the f ederal constitut ion. [Citation]." Commonw

ealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill . 2d at 43, 749 N. E.2d at 974. The Dallas cou

rt f oun d th at u n der the ol

d a pp roach (the v ested ri gh ts a pp roach ), “cou rts automatical

ly found that retroact iv

e chan ges to st atutes o f l

im itations and repose vi

olated due process without balanci

ng the consi

derations set f

ort h by the Commonw

ealth Edison Co. court .” Diocese of Dallas , 37 9 Il l . A pp. 3d a t 792 , 88 5 N .E.2 d a

t 382 . Se e al so Gallow

ay v. Diocese of Springfield i

n Illinois , 367 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 99 7, 1002 , 857 N .E.2d 737 , 741-4 2 (200 6) (Ch apm an , J., di ss en t ing ) ( “T he ba lan cin g r eq ui r ed by La nd gr af and Comm onw

ealthEdiso n Co. marks a signifi cant shi ft f rom the approach to due pro cess concerns under the v ested righ ts anal ys is . *** Those co urt s found that ret roact iv e appli cation would run afoul of due process because defend ant s have a ves t ed r ight in the a ffi rmat ive defens e affo rd ed t hem by sta t ut es o f li mitat ions or repose , but they

did not perf

orm th e ca ref ul ba l anci ng m andated u nde r La nd gr af and Commonw

ealth Edison Co. i

n a rri vi ng a t thi s res ul t”). Al though the suprem

e court has never di

rectly hel d that t he Landgraf

approach appl i es to determi ni ng whether a repeal

of a statute o f repose appl ie s retro activel

y a nd Commonw

ealth Edison Co. did n

ot specifi cally appl y the Landgraf

anal ys is to a statut e of repose, the Landgraf-11-

app ro ach r equ ires c ou rt s, fa ced wit h anylegislat ive amendment , t o “ba lance t he r eas ons for and agai nst a retroact iv

e applic ation an

d consider whether i

t is f ai r to appl y the chan ge retro activel

y.” Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E .2d at 384, citing Commonw ealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill . 2d at 44-45, 749 N.E.2d at 975. The Landgraf ap pr o ac h’s gu ar an t ee o f fair ne ss st r o ng ly
su ppor ts i ts a ppl i ca ti on to d eterm i ni ng the retroac ti ve appl i ca bi l i ty of a re pe al of a s tatute of
r ep o se as we ll as t o de t er minat io ns o f wh et he rch an ge s t o st at ut es o f limit at io ns a pp ly retro activel

y. The sam e questions

in herent i n determi ni ng whether a statut e of l

im itations ma y appl y retroacti ve l y , e.g. , w het her t he legislat ur e evince d a d esire t o fix pr oblems inher ent in a pr ev io us ve r sio n o f t he st at ut e, ap ply t o de t er mining wh et he ra c ha ng e in a s t at ut e o f r ep o se ap ply retroacti ve l y . Under Landgraf

, t he court asks whether the legisl atur e changed (in

this case repea l ed) the statute of

repose “to f i x the prob l ems i

nh eren t in [the] previ ous” statute of re pose. Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E .2d at 385, citing Comm onw ealthEdiso n Co., 19 6 I ll. 2 d a t 44 , 74 9 N
. E
. 2d at 97 5 ( ap pr o ving t he leg isla t ive mo t ive t o co rr ec t pr ev io us ly exi stin g la w). Moreo ver, the suprem e court did not li

mi t t he Landgraf

ap pr o ac h t o t he sp ec ific l egi slati ve am endm en t bef ore i t but stated

i t as a g eneral

rule f or determ i ni ng r etroacti vi ty. Appl yi ng the Landgraf

approach to t he am

endm ents to t he A

ct, t he Dallas court noted t hat “[a] ll thre e amend ments t he legislat ur e made t o t he st at ut e we re mot ivate d by an incre asing
aw aren es s of th e f act th at th e ty pe of ab us e a l l eg ed b y th e p l ai n ti f f i s b y i ts v er y n atu resu b j ect to long-repress ed m

em ories.” Diocese of Dallas , 3 79 I ll. App. 3d a t 793 , 8 85 N .E .2 d at 385 . T he court f ound th at “[a ]m endm en ts to the statute th

at make i t easi er to fi l e a c l ai m ev en man y years af ter th e al l eg ed ab us e oc cu rs ev i nc e a l eg i sl ati ve i nte nt to m ake the p roce dur

al l i m i ts on cl ai m s of this sort bett er sui

t t he n ature of the clai

m. Tha t desire to fi

x the problem s i

nhe rent in a previ ous-12-

versi on of a statute weighs i

n f avor of a retroact iv

e applic ation.” Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 79 3, 885 N .E.2d at 38 5. Altho ugh a st at ut e o f rep os e differs fro m a st at ut e o f li mitat ions a nd cr eat es a subs t ant ive right unl ike the purely

pro cedural stat ute o f l

im itations (Freeman v. Williamson , 383 Ill . App. 3d 933 , 93 9, 8 90 N .E.2 d 11 27, 113 3 (2 008 )), th e l eg i sl atu re h asde term i ne d that b oth s

tatute s of lim itat ions a nd st at ut es o f rep os e ar e pr oc edu ra l to ols. The sup re me co ur t , in ad op t ing t he Landgraf app ro ach in Commonw

ealth Edison Co. h as

also m ade c l ea r that th e f act th at th

e statu te of repos e cre ate s a

su b sta n ti v e ri gh t i s n o l onger d ete

rm i n ati v e. If th e c our t wereto de cl

i n e to app ly a legislative a mendment re t ro act ively, it wo uld d et riment ally i mpact t he plaint iff

's
su bst an t ive r igh t t o a r eme dy. I f t he co ur t do es de t er mine t ha t r et r o ac t ive ap plic at io n is appropri ate, i t ma y af f ect the def endan t's s ubs tanti ve ri ght to the protecti ons of a repos e peri

od. Under Landgraf

, t he issue in det er mini

ng r et ro act ivity is how t he su bst ant ive right s o f the
re sp ec ti v e p ar ti es --e i th er th e def en da n t' s r i gh t to pr oce du ral protec ti on s or th e p l ai n ti f f ' s r i gh t to redre ss f rom th e al l eged wrong s--wi

l l be af f ected. Thu s, t he qu est ion is no t whet her defend ant s’ su bst ant ive right exist s o r is impact ed. The que st ions is w het her t he legislat ur e’s a ct in changing t hos e r ight s o ffends du e pr oc ess. The Un i ted State s S upr

em e C ourt h asrec ogn ize d, a nd our s upr em e c ourt h asagree d, th

at “Le gi sl ati on h as com e to s uppl y th e dom i n an t mea n s of l eg al ord eri n g, a n d c i rc um sp ecti on h as gi v en wa y to greater deference

to le gis la tive judgme

nts.” Commonw

ealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill . 2d at 37-38, 749 N.E.2d at 971, quot in

g Landgraf

, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 256-57, 114 S. Ct . at 1500-01. Despite thi s recogni tion, even where the l

egi slature has stated its i

ntent that t he ch

ange in the law app ly ret ro act ively, the co ur t is none t heless bo und t o d et er mine if t her e is any-13-

constitutional

prohib ition to followi

ng the l egi slature’s wis

hes. See Commonw

ealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill . 2d at 38, 749 N. E.2d at 971 ( “Un der the Landgraf

t es t , if t he leg isla t ur e h as cle ar ly i ndi cated w ha t the tem poral reach of an am ended statute sh

oul d be , then, absent a constitutional prohibition , that ex

pres sion of

l egi slati ve i nten t mu st be gi ven e f f ect” (e m phasi s ad ded)). Not abl y, i n this cas e, t he legisl

atur e chose to take away childh oo d sexual ab

use de fen da nt s’ su bst an t ive r igh t t o t he pr o t ec t io n o f t he st at ut e o f r ep o se at t he sa me t ime it pr ovid ed a ddit ional su bst ant ive right s for t he allege d vict ims of childho od sexu al abus e. In finding th at a re troacti v e a pp l i ca ti on of th e ch an ge i n th e statu te of l i m i tati on s d i d n ot pres en t a constitutional

problem , the Dallas cour t not ed as foll ows:

“ In al l l i ti ga ti on, the pa ss ag e of

ti me c arr i esa p oten

ti al f or
ev i de nti ary prob l em s. Mem ori esf ade. R ec ords m i gh t be l ost or destro yed. Wi

tnesses mi

ght have m

oved away or died. Whi

le these issues wi th time af fect both plain

tiff s and defen

dants ali ke, we must deter mi ne whether the defense has relied on t hi s li

mi tat ions def

ense in so me w ay. While t he r e mig ht be ca se s in w hic h a de fen da nt t ruly takes actions i

n rel ia nce upon a l

im itations period, i n thi s f actual context we are unabl

e to co ncei

ve of s uch rel ia nce. The di

ff ic ulties in herent i n def endi ng an action l ike the pla in tif f' s case do not stem from a retro active applic ation of the statut e; rather, the di ff ic ulties f l ow f rom the l eg i sl atu re' s j udg men t tha t plac i ng thi s b urden on defen dants i s an acc eptabl e price to pay for tail oring procedural li mi tations to r efl

ect the nature of the type of i nj ury al le ged.”-14- Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 793-94, 885 N.E .2d at 385. Th e s am e c ons i de rati

ons appl y to de term

i ni ng whether a

ppl y i ng the rep eal of the sta tute of repose retr oactivel

y to plai ntif fs ’ clai ms presents a consti

tut iona l probl em . We m

ust conside

r wh et he rt he de fen se ha s r elie d o n t he pe r io d o f r ep o se an d w he t he ran y po t en t ial d ifficu lt ies in defend ing plaint iff

s’ co mplaints “s t em fro m a ret ro act ive app licatio n of t he st at ut e” r epe aling t he peri od of re pose. Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E .2d at 385. I n m aki ng that det er minatio n, w e ar e r equ ired t o a sses s whe t her placing t he bur den o n defend ant s t o d efend pl ai n ti f f s’ ca us es of acti on “ i s a n ac ce pta b l e p rice to pa y f or tai l ori n g p roc ed ur al l i m i tati on s to refl ect the nature of the type of i nj ury al le ged.” Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E.2d at 385. As t o t he impact of r et ro act ive app licatio n of t he r epe al of t he st at ut e o f rep os e o n t he defen dants i n thi s case, Goodman

cl ai ms that “[a] proper r eadi

ng of the Commonw

ealth Edison Co. cas e de monst ra t es t hat so me asse rt ed r ight s ** * do not co nst itu t e ves t ed r ight s which p re sent a ‘ co nst it ut io na l pr o hibit io n’ t o t he r et r o ac t ive ap plic at io n o f a s t at ut e” wh ile in c o nt r as t “c er t ain right s, s uch a s t he de fense r esu lting fro m the ba rr ing o f a claim, o per at e t o p re clude t he retroac ti ve appl i ca ti on of a s tatute tha t wol d re su rre ct suc h c l ai

m s.” Thi s is a m i scha racteri za ti on of t he bas is of t he su pr eme co ur t ’s de cision in Commonw ealth Edison Co. an

d a m i sstate men

t of t he law a nnou nced in Landgraf
. The Commonw

ealth Edison Co. court reli ed heav il y on the school district’s settled
ex pe cta ti ons i n d i sti ng ui sh i ng retroac ti ve appl i ca ti on of the am en de d s tatute

i n th at c as e f rom
re t ro act ive app licatio n of t he amend ed s t at ut e in Henrich v. Libertyville High School , 186 Ill . 2d 381, 712 N.E.2d 298 ( 1998)

. I t did no t ho ld t ha t int er fer en ce wit h w ha t t he co ur t pr ev io us ly-15-

wo uld ha ve fo un d t o be a “ ve st ed r igh t ” is co nst it ut io na lly pr o hibit ed
. Ou rsu pr eme co ur t o nly hel d that a defen

dant’s “ settled expectations” shoul d be considered

in d ec id ing wh et he rt o ap pl y a l egi slati ve am endm en t retroacti ve l y . Commonw

ealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill . 2d at 39, 749 N. E.2d at 971-72, quot in

g Landgraf

, 511 U. S. at 269-70, 128 L. Ed . 2d at 254-55, 114 S. Ct . at 1499 ("A sta tute d oesnot op era

te ‘ retrosp ec ti

ve l y ’ m ere l y be ca us e i t i s a ppl i ed i n a ca se ari si ng f rom
co nduc t ant eda t ing

the statute's

enactm en t [ci tation ] or upse ts ex pectati ons b ase d i

n pr i or la w. Ra th er , the c our

t m us t ask w h eth er th e n ew prov i si on atta ch es n ew l eg al con se qu en ce s to ev en ts
co mp let ed be fo r e it s e na ct men t . T he co nc lu sio n t ha t a p ar t icu lar rul e o pe r at es ‘r et r o ac t ive ly’
co mes at t he end of a pr oc ess o f judgment co ncer ning t he nat ur e and ext ent of t he cha nge in t he l aw an d the degre e of conn ection b etween the opera

tion of the new rul

e an d a rel ev an t past ev en t. *** H owever, retroactiv

i ty i s a m atter on wh

i ch j udge s ten

d to hav e ‘s ound...i

nstin ct[s],' [c itat ion] and familiar co nsider at ions o f fair not ice, re aso nable re liance, and s et t led exp ect at ions off er soun d gui dan ce" ). The co ur t has mad e clea r t hat “[i]n a sses sing t he fairne ss o f a re t ro act ive app licatio n, relev ant considerations i

ncl ude *** the l egi slature's m ot iv e i n en actin g the statut ory chan

ge *** and *** wh

ether the parties detrim

entally reli ed on the prior versi

on of the law.” Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E .2d at 384-85, ci ting Commonw

ealth Edison Co. , 19 6 I ll. 2d at 44-4 5, 74 9 N.E .2d a t 9 75. App ly ing that analysi s in thi s case, w e fi nd that the legislature’s repea l of the sta tu te o f repose “weighs i n favor of a re tr oac tive application” o f the legisl atu re’s repeal of the statute o f repose. See Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E .2d at 385, citi ng Commonw

ealth Edison Co. , 196 Il

l . 2d at 44 , 749 N .E.2d at 97 5. As t o t he leg isla t ur e’ s mo t ive in e na ct ing t he st at ut o ry cha ng e, t he co ur t ha s a lre ad y held-16-

that a pro blem

in herent i n the old v

ersi on of the statute (incl

udin g the statut e of repose) was that i t di d not su

i t the nature of

clai m . In th i s ca se the nature of

the c l ai m i s one whi ch “b y i ts ve ry nature [is] sub

je ct to long-repress ed m

em ories.” Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385, citi

ng Ped igo v. Ped

igo, 292 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 83 1, 839, 6 86 N.E.2 d at 118 5 (199 7). A n y sta tute of repos e a pp l i ca b l e to i n ci den ts o f ch i l dh ood s ex ual ab us e i n h eren tl y f ai l s to recogniz e that the nature of the cl ai m i s subj ect to long-repress ed m em ories. Appl

yi ng the repeal of the stat ute o f repose ret roact iv ely to all ow plain tiff s to brin g suit long af

ter t he alleged abuse
oc cur re d wo uld co rr ect t hat pr oblem and bring t he cu rr ent app licatio n of t he law int o line wit h t he
na ture of the c l ai m . Tu rning t o w het her any of t he pa rt ies have d et riment ally relied o n t he pr ior ver sion o f the law, none of t he de fendant s have po inted t o a ny det riment al reliance t hey have p laced on t he t er minatio n of p laintiffs’ cau ses o f act ion. Eve n assu ming the defend ant s ar e r elying on t he dif fi cul ty i n def endi ng agai nst pl ai ntif fs ’ clai ms concerni ng i nci dents that occurred long ago, that fact is i nsuf fi cien t t o t ip the scales against ret roact iv e appli cation of the eli

mi nation of the repo se period. The Dallas cour t’s reaso ni ng i s in struct iv e. That cour t wr ot e as foll ows:

“ In al l l i ti ga ti on, the pa ss ag e of

ti me c arr i esa p oten

ti al f or
ev i de nti ary prob l em s. Mem ori esf ade. R ec ords m i gh t be l ost or destro yed. Wi

tnesses mi

ght have m

oved away or died. Whi

le these issues wi th time af fect both plain

tiff s and defen

dants ali ke, we must deter mi ne whether the defense has relied on t hi s li

mi tat ions def

ense in so me w ay. While t he r e mig ht be ca se s in w hic h a de fen da nt t ruly takes actions i

n rel ia nce upon a l

im itations period, i n thi s f actual-17- context we are unabl

e to co ncei

ve of s uch rel ia nce. The di

ff ic ulties in herent i n def endi ng an action l ike the pla in tif f' s case do not stem from a retro active applic ation of the statut e; rather, the di ff ic ulties f l ow f rom the l eg i sl atu re' s j udg men t tha t plac i ng thi s b urden on defen dants i s an acc eptabl e price to pay for tail oring procedural li mi tations to r efl

ect the nature of the type of i nj ury al le ged.” Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 793-94, 885 N.E .2d at 385. Both de f endan ts an d pl ai ntif f s f ace si m i l ar ev i den tia ry di f f i cul tie s i n th i s l i tig ati on. Defe ndan ts have poi

nted to no act ual

actions they

to ok in rel

ia nce on the repose period. No
r ec o r ds we r e d es t r o yed
. No wit ne ss es die d. T he leg isla t ur e h as de t er mined t ha t it pr ev io us ly f ail ed to recogn

ize that al l egati ons of thi s ty pe are sub j ect to repres sed

mem orie s an d m ay requi re significant t ime befor e a p laintiff brings a c aus e o f act ion. The legislat ur e de t er mined t hat placing the burden on de fen

dants to defend old cl ai

ms of thi s type is general

ly an acceptab le

price to pay to all ow victim s of sexual

abuse to seek redress. De fen dants po in

t t o no unique facts in

this case tha t woul d m ake thei r burden an y hi gher th an the bu rde n th e l eg i sl atu re c hos e to p l ac e on defen dants i n thi s type of

case. Theref

ore none of def

endan ts’ dif fi cul ties i n def endi ng thi s case, ha d they ac tual l y al l eg ed an y , wou l d a ctu al l y res ul t f rom retroac ti ve appl i ca ti on of the sta tute of repose. Rather, any s

uch diff ic ulties f low na turall y f rom def endi ng cl ai ms of thi s type. We ho ld t ha t r et r o ac t ive ap plic at io n o f t he leg isla t ur e’ s r ep ea l o f t he st at ut e o f r ep o se is
con siste n t wi th th e l eg i sl atu re ’s moti v e i n en acti n g th e statu tory ch an ge an d th at th e def en da n ts h av e n ot re l i ed on th e statu te of repos e to th

ei r d etr i men t. Th e l eg i sl atu re ’s repe al of th e statu te of r epo se a pplies t o p laintiffs’ claims. Acc or dingly, plaint iff s’ co mplaints a re not bar re d by t he-18-

statut e of repose. 2. Are Plain

tiff s’ Causes of Action Barred by the St atut e of Lim

itations. Plai ntif fs argue the applic abl

e statut e of l

im itations is that stat ed i

n the 2003 statut e. Plai

ntif fs argue that because, whe

n they fi le d sui t, t hey had n ot dis covered the “caus al
re latio nship bet wee n any late r- disco ver ed injur y and t he abu se, ” t he disc ove ry ru le to lled t he st at ut e o f limit at io ns. De fen da nt s a r gu e t ha t t he st at ut e o f limit at io ns in t he pr e- 19 93 st at ut e is t he ap plicable st at ut e o f li mitat ions, t hat unde r t hat ver sion o f the Act t he st at ut e o f li mitat ions
ex pir ed wh en pla int iffs r ea ch ed majo r it y, a nd , t he r efo r e, t ha t pla int iffs fa iled t o t imely file t he ir
com pl ai n t.

“ W he n a ch an gei n l aw af f ec ts on l y the rem ed y or th e l aw of procedure, a right of action wi ll be en forced under the n

ew pr oc edu re wit hou t re gar d t o w het her it ac cr ued befo re or aft er t he chan ge i n the l aw, and wi

thout regard to whether or not suit had been in stituted.” Becharas v. Cummings , 292 Ill . App. 3d 1105, 1107-1108, 687 N.E. 2d 95, 97, citin g In re Pronger, 118 Ill . 2d 512, 522, 517 N.E. 2d 1076 (1987), citin g Ogdon v. G ianakos, 415 Il l . 591, 59 7, 114 N .E.2d 686 (1953 ). We f i nd th at the 2 003 a

mendm en ts to the Act appl

y to pla i ntif f s’ clai m s. The legi slature
evi nc ed an i nten t that i ts am endm en t to t he Act appl y retroacti ve l y . Under Landgraf

, t he o nly qu es t io n r ema ining fo rt he co ur t is w he t he rr et r o ac t ive ap plic at io n o f t he ame nd men t wo uld off end due process. As

previously

dis cussed, the retroact iv

e applic ation of the l

egi slature’s repeal of th e statu te of repos e does

n ot of f en d d ue proce ss . It woul

d b e i l l ogi ca l , theref ore , f or u s to-19-

ho ld t ha t r et r o ac t ive ap pl ica t io n o f t he st at ut e o f limit at io ns o ffe nd s d ue pr o ce ss . Fin ally,
r et r o ac t ive ap plic at io n o f t he leg isla t ur e’ s a men dme nt t o t he st at ut e o f limit at io ns d o es no t in i tse l f of f en d du e p roce ss f or th e s am

e re as ons retroac ti ve appl i ca ti on of the rep eal of the sta tute of
r ep o se do es no t o ffen d d ue pr o ce ss . Fo rall o f t he fo r eg o ing r ea so ns, t he st at ut e o f limit at io ns in the 2 003 A

ct appl i es to pl ai ntif f s’ com plai nts. The 2003 Act r eads, in pertinen t par t, as foll

ows:

“ (b ) Notwi

ths tan di ng an y othe r provi si on of l aw , an ac ti on for damages f

or p ersonal i

nj ury based on chi

ldh oo d sexual ab

use
m us t be com men ce d w i thi n 1 0 y ea rs of the da te the l i m i tati on per iod begins t o r un und er subs ect ion ( d) or wit hin 5 years of t he da t e t he pe r so n a bu se d d isc o ve r s o rt hr o ug h t he us e o f r ea so na ble dil ige nce sh ould di scover both (i) that the act of chi ldh ood sexual ab us e oc cu rre d a nd (ii) th at the i

njury wa s c au se d by

the ch i l dhood sexual abuse. The

fact that the person abuse d dis covers or thro ugh the us e of reason ab l e di l i genc e shou

l d di sc ove r th at the act of chi l dhood s ex

ual abuse occurre d i s n

ot, by i tself , suf f i cien t to start t he disc ove ry pe rio d und er t his subse ct ion ( b). Know ledge of t he abuse does n

ot constitute discove

ry of the in jury or t he causa

l relationshi

p between an

y l ater-discovered i

nj ury an d the abuse.
*** ( d) T he limit at io n p er io ds un de rsu bse ct io n ( b) do no t be gin to run bef ore t he person ab

used attains

the age of 18 y

ears ***.”-20- 735 IL CS 5/1 3-202 .2(b ), (d) (W est 200 6). Plai ntif fs fi le d their com

pla in ts in April 2006. The

y a rgue that t hei

r complai nts alle ge
suf f i ci en t f acts to rai se

mate rial qu esti on s of

f act as to wh en th ey di sc ov ered

th at th e acts de fen da nt s a lleg ed ly co mmit t ed co nst it ut ed an “a ct o f ch ildh o o d s ex ua l ab us e” an d t ha t t he ir i nj uries w ere “caus ed b

y the chi l dhood s ex

ual abuse .” 735 ILCS 5/13-2 02.2(b) (We st 2006 ). “Normal ly , the qu es t io n o f wh en a p ar t y kn ew o rsho uld ha ve kn o wn bo t h o f an inju ry and it s p r o ba ble wr o ng ful c au se is
o ne o f fact, unl

ess the f ac ts a re u nd i spute d a nd onl y one con cl us i on
ma y b e drawn f

rom them . [Citation.] Thus, the court may ma ke
such a d eterm i na ti on u pon a m oti on to d i sm i ss or a m oti on f or summary judg ment s o lo ng as suc h co nclusio n is the only o ne t o be dr aw n fr o m pla int iff's ple ad ing
. [ Cit at io n. ] St r ict sc rut iny is applied to deter mi

ne whether the stat e of the victi m' s awareness was such that could reasonabl

y h ave put hi m on n ot ic e of the ne

xus between the abuse and the injuries. [Citation.]" Benton v. Vonnahmen , 288 Ill . App. 3d 199, 206, 679 N.E. 2d 1270, 1275 (1997 ). De f en da n t Good man argu es th at p l ai n ti f f s f ai l ed to al l eg e s uf f i ci en t f acts to toll

th e statu te of l im itations usi ng the di scovery

rule b ecause (a) plai

ntif fs fai le d to alle ge exactl

y w hen they dis co ve r ed t he ir c au se o f ac t io n u nd er t he dis co ve ry ru le a nd be ca us e ( b) t he alle ga t io ns in pla int iffs’ co mpla int s d emo nst r at e t ha t t he y we r e a wa r e o f t he alle ge d mis co nd uc t wh en it
o cc ur r ed an d t ha t t he alle ge d mis co nd uc t r es ult ed in ha rm.-21-

It is i nsuf fi ci ent that plai

ntif fs knew or even

suspected that defen

dants al le ged m is conduct
wa s w r o ng ful a nd t ha t de fen da nt s’ wr o ng ful c o nd uc t ha rmed t he m. T he leg isla t ur e h as cle ar ly provided: “The fa ct t hat t he pe rso n abus ed d isco ver s o r t hro ugh t he

us e of reason ab l e di l i ge nc e shou

l d di sc ove r th at the act of chi l dhood s ex

ual abuse occurre d i s n

ot, by i tself , suf f i cien t to start t he disc ove ry pe rio d und er t his subse ct ion ( b). Know ledge of t he abuse does n

ot constitute discove

ry of the in jury or t he causa

l relationshi

p between an

y l ater-discovered i

nj ury an d the abuse.” 735 IL CS 5/1 3-202 .2(b ) (We st 2006 ). Goodman’s

argumen t fails to address that plai

ntif fs alle ged that they di

d not discover the caus al relationshi

p between the acts (regardless of whether they

were wrongful

and wh o was to bl

am e)
and the i r i nj uri es. Fina lly, G o o dma n c it es no au t ho r it y fo rhis p r o po sit io n t ha t pla int iffs mu st alle ge ex ac t ly when they

discovered their causes of action. He cites D.P. v. M.J.O. , 266 Ill . App. 3d 1029, 1034-35 , 640 N. E.2d 1 323, 132 7 (1994) , where t he court wrot e as foll ows: “In t he inst ant cas e ho weve r, t he plea dings r ega rd ing t he plai ntif fs' belated discovery of the connection between their abuse and thei r sy mptoms is sparse an d concl usory. Unl

ike the ple adi

ngs in Franke v. Geyer, t he plea dings in t his case do not pr ovid e any basi s upon which

to eval uate whet her the stat e of the plai ntif fs'
awareness

was suf fi ci ent to have put them on n ot ic e of that-22- connecti on at any

earli er tim e. Accordin

gly , the trial court was pr emat ur e in dismissing co unt s I a nd I V pu rsu ant t o d efenda nt 's fac t mo t io n br o ug ht un de rse ct io n 2
- 61 9( a) ( 5) o f t he Co de o f Civ il Procedure. No extrin

si c fac ts out side of the pleadi

ngs were of

fered by the mova nt from whi ch an y e val uation coul d have been

ma de as to whether the state of the plai ntif fs ' awaren ess was s uff ic ie nt to put them on n ot ic e of the conn

ection b etween the abus e and the i nj ury.” D.P. , 266 Ill . App. 3d at 1034-35, 640 N.E .2d at 1327. Go od man arg ues t hat plaint iff s’ fact ual allega t ions a re not sufficient t o invo ke t he di scovery rule b eca use they do not al l ege a n exact date pl

ai ntif f s discovered th

ei r caus es of

action. Nothing i n the D.P. cou

rt’ s l an gua geprov i de s th at a pl ai nti f f m us t al l eg e a n e xa ct d ateof “di scovery

” to invoke the discovery

rule. Goodman

does not at tack the quality of plai ntif fs’ factual alle gations. The D.P. co ur t ba se d it s d ec isio n o n t he qu alit y o f t he pla int iff’s alle ga t io ns in that case, fi

ndi ng them to be “ sparse an

d concl usory.” D.P. , 266 Ill . App. 3d at 1034-35, 640 N.E.2d at 1327. Goo dma n onl y a tt acks the sufficiency of p laintiffs’ fact ual allega t ions. We find that un der the pl ai n l anguag e of

the A ct plai ntif f ’ al l egati ons a re suf f i cien t to in voke the d i scovery
ru l e a s def

i n ed i n th e A ct. CONCLUSION Plai ntif fs ’ compl ai nts are not barred by

the statut e of repose found i n the Act when plaint iff s re ache d major ity. P laintiffs’ cau ses o f act ion ar e no t bar re d by t he st at ut e o f li mitat ions b ec au se pl ai n ti f f s h av e p l ed adeq ua te f acts to i n v oke th e d i sc ov er y ru l e a n d f i l ed th ei r c om pl ai n ts withi n the period of li

mi tations fol lowi ng di scoveri

ng both “ (i) that the act of chi ldh ood sexual-23-

abuse occurr ed and (ii

) that the injury was caused by the chil dhood sexual

abuse.” Because pla int iffs’ co mpla int s w er e t imely file d, we ne ed no t r ea ch pla int iffs’ ar gu men t s t ha t eq uit ab le prin ci ple s al so serve to t oll

the statut e of l

im itations or t hat pla

in tif fs ’ al le gations of

repressed
memor ies t olled t he st at ut e o f li mitat ions. The circu it co ur t of P eo ria Co unt y’s or der gr ant ing
sum ma ry j udgme nt in defen dants’ f avor is reversed an

d the cause rem

anded f or further pro ceedings. Reversed and remanded. O’BRIEN, P.J., concurs. CARTER, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent because I believe the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the 1991 statute of repose, which barred anyone over the age of 30 from bringing an action for damages based upon childhood sexual abuse. Each of the plaintiffs here reached the age of 30 before the statute of repose was repealed in 1994. While the majority relies upon one Fifth District case, Doe v. Diocese of Dallas , 379 Ill. App. 3d 782, 885 N.E.2d 376 (2008), I agree with the analysis set forth in a case decided by another Fifth District panel, Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Illinois , 367 Ill. App. 3d 997, 857 N.E.2d 737 (2006). In Galloway , the court recognized that the Illinois Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 21, 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001), rejected the vested rights approach to retroactivity and adopted the legislative intent approach of the United States Supreme Court set forth in Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. E. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483(1994).-24-

Galloway , 367 Ill. App. 3d at 999-1000, 857 N.E.2d at 739-40. Under this test, “if the legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent must be given effect.” Commonwealth Edison , 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 749 N.E.2d at 971 (2001). The supreme court recognized in Commonwealth Edison , however, that cases decided under the vested rights approach to retroactivity remain relevant insofar as they define interests protected from legislative interference by the due process clause. Commonwealth Edison , 196 Ill. 2d at 47, 749 N.E.2d at 976. Prior to its decision in Commonwealth Edison , the supreme court decided the question at issue in the instant case, namely, whether the 1991 statute of repose applied to the plaintiffs’ action where the time limit was not in effect when the abuse occurred and was repealed before the action was filed. M.E.H. v. L.H. , 177 Ill. 2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335 (1997). The supreme court found that the defendant in that case had a vested right to invoke the limitations period as a defense, and that this right could not be taken away without offending the due process protections of the state’s constitution. M.E.H. , 177 Ill. 2d at 214-15, 685 N.E.2d at 339. I agree with the Galloway court that M.E.H. remains good law. Galloway , 367 Ill. App. 3d at 1000, 857 N.E.2d at 740. While Commonwealth Edison “switches the focus of the first step of the retroactivity analysis from ‘vested rights’ to legislative intent, it did not overrule the ruling in M.E.H.-25-

that taking away the right to invoke the statute of repose as a defense to a cause of action is constitutionally prohibited.” Galloway , 367 Ill. App. 3d at 1000, 857 N.E.2d at 739. Thus, I would find that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of repose, and cannot be revived. In addition, I would find that the plaintiffs did not bring suit within a reasonable time period after the period of repose went into effect, and that the statute of repose was not tolled by the plaintiffs’ claims that their memories of abuse were suppressed. M.E.H. , 177 Ill. 2d at 217, 685 N.E.2d at 340. Finally, I would find that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the period of repose should be tolled due to fraudulent concealment of the abuse by the defendants. See Clay v. Kuhl , 189 Ill. 2d 603, 613, 727 N.E.2d 217, 223 (2000). Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s decision granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and must dissent.