1. Plaintiff is currently confined in the State Correctional Institution, in Graterford, Pennsylvania. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES EAKLE, :

:

Plaintiff : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-0-0007

:

v. : (Judge Jones)

:

JOHN A. PALAKOVICH, et al., :

 : 

Defendants :

ORDER

March 21, 2006

Charles Eakle, an inmate formerly confined in the Smithfield State Correctional

Institution (“SCI-Smithfield”), in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, filed this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to

exercise his religious beliefs because they refused to grant him a hair length exemption

to the Department of Corrections' Grooming Policy. Named as Defendants are the

following SCI-Smithfield employees: Superintendent John A. Palakovich; Chaplains

David Bowen and Robert Shehan; Hearing Examiner Robert Norris; Corrections Officer

Grove; and Lisa Hollibaugh, Assistant to the Superintendent and Grievance Coordinator.

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 Presently pending before the Court are the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment.

(Rec. Docs. 15, 37). Defendants argue, inter alia, that Eakle has failed to exhaust

available administrative remedies. Because Defendants' argument that Plaintiff has failed

to exhaust administrative remedies is case dispositive, Defendants' other arguments will

not be addressed. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment will be granted.

I. Standard of Review

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires the court to render summary

judgment " . . . forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some

alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine

issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)

 (emphasis in original). 

A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect

the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;

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2. Eakle was provided with copies of M.D. Pa. Local Rules 7.1 through 7.8, Local Rule 26.10, and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). In relevant part, Rule 56(e) states:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,

an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse

party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise

provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

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Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material

fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir.

1991).

When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must

view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v.

Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 963 F.2d

599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d

Cir. 1988). In order to avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not

rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. When the party seeking

summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56(c) of identifying evidence which

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party is

required by Rule 56(e)2

 to go beyond the pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers

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appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party. 

Local Rule 7.4 provides in relevant part:

All material facts set forth in the statement required

to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be

admitted unless controverted by the statement required

to be served by the opposing party.

See Rec. Doc. 3, Standing Practice Order.

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to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give

rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The

party opposing the motion "must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith

Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). When Rule 56(e) shifts the burden of production to the

nonmoving party, that party must produce evidence to show the existence of every

element essential to its case which it bears the burden of proving at trial, for "a complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp.,

967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). 

II. Statement of Facts

Eakle was incarcerated in SCI-Smithfield from June 15, 2004 to November 8,

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3. DC-ADM 807, the Inmate Hygiene and Grooming Policy, governs the length of an inmates hair

while incarcerated. (Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. A, DC-ADM 807). The policy operates to provide a safe,

clean, and healthy environment for inmates and staff. Id. Pursuant to the policy, male hairstyles

include hair lengths that do not fall below the top of the collar in length (Afro styles no longer than 4

inches are permitted.). Id. A beard or goatee may be no longer than 3 inches, a mustache and

sideburns shall be permitted, provided they are kept neat and clean. Id. 

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2005. (Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. 1, Declaration of John A. Palakovich at ¶ 17). On July 17,

2004, pursuant to DC-ADM 819, Eakle submitted a request for a religious exemption

from the haircut provision of the DOC's Grooming Policy. (Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. E, Inmate

Religious Accommodation Request). 

 Section VI(G) of DC-ADM 819 sets forth the procedures that an inmate must

follow in order to obtain an exemption to the grooming policy for legitimate religious

purposes, and provides as follows:

A request for a religious accommodation that is not covered

elsewhere in Department policy shall be made as follows:

a. Each inmate must use a DC-52, Inmate Religious Accommodation

Request Form to submit his/her request for accommodation to the

FCPD.

b. In cases of an inmate request for an exemption from Department

policy DCADM 807,3

 “Inmate Grooming and Barber/Cosmetology,”

the inmate must submit a DC-52 within 15 working days of receiving

the order to cut his hair. If no DC-52 is submitted within 15 working

days of the initial order to cut his hair or no religious accommodation

is claimed, the inmate shall be subject to discipline in accordance

with Department policy DC-ADM 801, “Inmate Discipline.”

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c. The inmate shall obtain written information from his/her outside

faith group, including any publications that describe the goals,

beliefs, and practices of the group and supply this information to the

FCPD for review.

d. The Religious Accommodation Review Committee shall review

each inmate’s request for a religious accommodation within 45 days

of receipt and forward a recommendation to the affected Regional

Deputy Secretary.

e. The Regional Deputy Secretary shall, within 15 days of receiving

the recommendation from the Director of the Bureau of Inmate

Services/designee, approve/disapprove the request and notify the

Director of the Bureau of Inmate Services of the decision.

f. The Director, Bureau of Inmate Services shall, within 10 days,

inform the Facility Manager and the FCPD of the requesting facility

of the determination and ensure copies of all final determinations are

provided to all Deputy Secretaries and Facility Managers. The FCPD

shall be responsible for informing the affected inmate of the outcome

of his/her request no later than 10 working days from the date that the

determination of approval/disapproval is received.

g. If an inmate is informed by the FCPD that the request will not be

accommodated, the inmate may then file a grievance in accordance

with Department policy DC-ADM 804, “Inmate Grievances.”

Grievances may only be submitted after the inmate has received

notification of the decision on the requested accommodation.

h. If an inmate is found not to comply with the accommodation or the

reasons for the accommodation, the accommodation may be revoked.

If appropriate, the violation shall be handled in accordance with

Department policy DC-ADM 801,“Inmate Discipline.”

Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. B, DC-ADM 819, Religious Activities Policy.

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In August 2004, Superintendent Palakovich reviewed the evaluation submitted by

Chaplain Bowen and SCI-Smithfield staff, concerning Eakle's request. Id. He concurred

in their recommendation to disapprove Eakle's request for a hair length exemption to the

Grooming Policy based upon security and sincerity concerns. Id. 

On September 30, 2004, the DOC Bureau of Inmate Services concurred in the

denial of Eakle's hair length exemption request and on October 6, 2004, Chaplain Bowen

informed Eakle that his request for an exemption from the haircut provisions of the

Grooming Policy had been denied by the DOC Central Office. Id. Chaplain Bowen

further informed Eakle that he was required to follow the provisions of the Grooming

Policy and failure to do so would result in disciplinary action. Id. 

On October 7, 2004, Eakle was issued Misconduct No. 327880 for “Refusing to

Obey an Order” to cut his hair. (Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. F., Misconduct No. 327880). On

October 12, 2004, a hearing was held regarding Misconduct No. 327880. (Rec. Doc. 38,

Ex. F., Disciplinary Hearing Report). At the hearing, Eakle indicated that he was willing

to get a haircut and the hearing was suspended until October 15, 2004. Id. When the

hearing resumed on October 15, 2004, Eakle attended the hearing with his hair cut and

claimed that the order to cut his hair was a misunderstanding. Id. Eakle was found guilty

of the charges. Id. He did not file an appeal from the hearing examiner's decision. (Rec.

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Doc. 38, Ex. 1, Palakovich Declaration at ¶ 22). 

On October 17, 2004, Eakle submitted Grievance No. 99039-04, concerning the

denial of his religious accommodation request. (Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. G, copy of grievance).

On October 21, 2004, Chaplain Bowen responded to Grievance No. 99039-04 with the

following: 

Your request for a haircut exemption was denied by Central Office.

You are listed in your DC-15 records as “Protestant”. When I spoke

with you, you told me you were a “born again Christian.” You also

told me you are a Rastafarian. You told me you have taken the

“Nazaite”(sic) vow as had Jesus. I asked if you knew the difference

between Nazarite and Nazarene. You didn't know the difference. 

You seem to be sincere in your desire for a haircut exemption but you

do not evidence sincerity in your knowledge or practice of the

Rastafarian religion. The Protestant or Christian faith does not

require that you not cut your hair. 

When I asked you if there is anything else involved in the Nazarite

vow other than not cutting your hair according to the Bible, you told

me no. You claim to be basing your request on the Bible, but you

don't even know what the Bible says about the vow. 

All of the above demonstrates confusion rather than sincerity

regarding your religious faith and practice on which you base your

request for a haircut exemption. 

Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. G, Official Inmate Grievance Initial Review Response. Eakle appealed

Chaplain Bowen's decision to Superintendent Palakovich. (Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. 1,

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Palakovich Declaration at ¶ 25). On October 28, 2004, Superintendent Palakovich denied

Eakle's appeal. (Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. G, Grievance Appeal). Eakle then appealed

Superintendent Palakovich's denial to the DOC Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievance

and Appeals. 

By letter dated November 16, 2004, Eakle's appeal to the Secretary's Office was

rejected, based upon the following: 

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter to this office. Upon

review of your letter, it is the decision of this office to file your letter

without action. You have failed to comply with the provision(s) of the

revised DC-ADM 804 effective May 1, 2002. 

In accordance with the provisions of DC-ADM 804, VI D, 1h, a

proper appeal to final review must include photocopies of the Initial

Grievance, Initial Review, the Appeal to the Facility Manager, and

the Facility Manager's decision. The text of your appeal(s) to this

office shall be legible, presented in a courteous manner, and the

statement of facts shall not exceed two pages. 

Review of the record reveals that your appeal(s) is incomplete. You

have failed to provide this office with the required documentation that

relates to your appeal(s). You are not permitted to appeal to this

office until you have complied with all procedures established in DCADM 804. You have ten working days from the date of this memo

to provide this office with documents needed to conduct final review.

Any further correspondence from you regarding your appeal(s),

which does not contain the required documents, will result in the

dismissal of your appeal(s). 

Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. G, November 16, 2004 letter. 

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On December 29, 2004, the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievance Appeals

informed Eakle that his appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with DC-ADM 804,

specifically, that Eakle's appeal packet, received on December 9, 2004, failed to include

[his] initial grievance and appeal to the Superintendent.” (Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. G, December

29, 2004 letter). 

On January 3, 2005, Plaintiff filed the instant action in which he seeks

compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. (Rec. Doc. 1,

complaint). 

III. Discussion

Defendants contend that Eakle's failure to exhaust available administrative

remedies entitles them to an entry of summary judgment in their favor. In pertinent part,

the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Exhaustion requires completion of the entire administrative process. Ahmed v.

Sromovski, 103 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843-44 (E.D. Pa. 2000). If a prisoner fails to follow the

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required administrative procedures, including meeting deadlines, the inmate’s action

cannot be maintained. See Buckner v. Bussanich, No. 1:CV-00-1594, slip op. at 6 (M.D.

Pa. April 3, 2001) (Caldwell, J.)(“an administrative remedy is not made unavailable

simply because a prisoner failed to timely exercise his rights under the procedure.

Otherwise, the prisoner could avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by refusing to

pursue administrative remedies”).

The Pennsylvania DOC has established procedures for the filing of complaints.

First, the Pennsylvania DOC Consolidated Inmate Review System provides for three

levels of administrative review of inmate grievances: the initial grievance submitted to

the Facility Grievance Coordinator, an intermediate level of appeal to the Facility

Manager, and a final level of appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and

Appeals. (See Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. 2-A, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of

Corrections, Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System, Policy No. DC-ADM 804

§ VI). See also Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293 n.2 (3d Cir.2000) (outlining the

grievance review process).

 The grievance procedure requires a prisoner to submit a grievance for initial review

within fifteen working days after the event upon which the grievance is based. (Rec.

Doc. 38, Ex. 2-A, DC-ADM 804 § VI, Part A(1)(h)). The inmate should state the facts

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upon which he is entitled to relief. (See Rec. Doc. 20, Ex. 2-A, DC-ADM 804 § VI, Part

A(1)(g)(“The inmate shall include a statement of facts relevant to the claim. . . The

inmate should identify any persons who may have information that could be helpful in

resolving the grievance. The inmate should also include information on attempts to

resolve the matter informally.”)). Indeed, in Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-28 (3d

Cir. 2004), the Third Circuit recognized the significance in identifying the relevant facts

and persons in order to bring a subsequent federal lawsuit: 

On this matter, the text is mandatory, or nearly so. . . To the extent

that Brown's identity is a “fact [] relevant to the claim.” – and it is–

it was mandatory for Spruill to include it. To the extent that Brown

was a “person [] who may have information” or someone with whom

Spruill made “attempts to resolve the matter informally” – and he was

– Spruill was required to identify Brown if practicable. 

Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234. Moreover, the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a) is not

satisfied simply "whenever there is no further process available to the inmate within the

grievance system (which would happen if, say, an inmate fails to file an administrative

appeal) . . ." Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-28. Rather, § 1997e(a) requires that an inmate

"avail[ ] himself of every process at every turn (which would require all appeals to be

timely pursued, etc.)." Id.

In applying the above analysis to the factual background surrounding this action,

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it is readily apparent to the Court that Plaintiff has procedurally defaulted on his claims

and summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff's appeal to the

Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals was rejected because it failed to

comply with DC-ADM 804, VI., D., 1h; specifically, it did not include copies of

plaintiff's initial grievance and his appeal to the Superintendent. (Rec. Doc. 38, Ex. G).

The record discloses that Eakle failed to resubmit the required documentation relative to

his appeal. Id. Thus, Eakle has sustained a procedural default under the applicable DOC

regulations. 

Spruill, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, cited with approval the Seventh

Circuit decision in Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Spruill,

372 F.3d at 231. In Pozo, the Seventh Circuit ruled that “to exhaust remedies, a prisoner

must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative

rules require.” Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025 (emphasis added). Eakle offers no justification for

his failure to resubmit the appropriate documentation in accordance with the appropriate

Department of Corrections Directive. Thus, Eakle is now foreclosed from litigating this

claim in this Court. 

In Spruill, the Third Circuit found that a procedural default component to the

exhaustion requirement served the following congressional objectives: “(1) to return

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control of the inmate grievance process to prison administrators; (2) to encourage

development of administrative record, and perhaps settlements, within the inmate

grievance process; and (3) to reduce the burden on the federal courts by erecting barriers

to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.” 372 F.3d at 230. In Pusey v. Belanger, No. Civ. 02-351,

2004 WL 2075472 at *2-3 (D. Del. Sept. 14, 2004), the court applied Spruill to dismiss

an inmate’s action for failure to timely pursue an administrative remedy over the inmate’s

objection that he did not believe the administrative remedy program operating in

Delaware covered his grievance. In Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 86-88 (2d Cir. 2004),

the court affirmed the dismissal of an inmate’s action with prejudice where the inmate

had failed to offer appropriate justification for the failure to timely pursue administrative

grievances. In Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004), the

court embraced the holding in Pozo, stating that “[a] prison procedure that is procedurally

barred and thus is unavailable to a prisoner is not thereby considered exhausted.” Such

precedents support dismissal of this action for Eakle's failure to pursue his administrative

remedies with respect to his claims. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment will be granted. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 37) is

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GRANTED. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of

Defendants and against Plaintiff.

2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 15) is

DENIED. 

3. Plaintiff's Motion to Add Defendants (doc. 22) is DISMISSED

as moot. 

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. 

5. Any appeal taken from this order will be deemed frivolous,

without probable cause, and not taken in good faith.

 s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Judge

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