United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 06-1774

HOULTON BAND OF MALISEET INDIANS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

PATRICIA E. RYAN, Executive Director, Maine Human Rights

Commission; MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEMBERS; G. STEVEN

ROWE, Attorney General of the State of Maine; CONNIE ZETTS,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Lynch, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

 Douglas J. Luckerman, with whom Law Office of Douglas J.

Luckerman, Michael A. Duddy, Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, and David

Kaplan were on brief, for appellant.

Christopher C. Taub, Assistant Attorney General, with whom G.

Steven Rowe, Attorney General, Paul Stern, Deputy Attorney General,

and John P. Gause, Counsel to the Maine Human Rights Commission,

were on brief, for appellees Ryan, Maine Human Rights Commission

Members, and Rowe.

April 17, 2007
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The Houlton Band of Maliseet

Indians ("Houlton Band") is an Indian tribe based in northern Maine

and the plaintiff in this lawsuit. According to the tribe's

complaint, in August 2005 the Houlton Band ended its employment

relationship with Connie Zetts, an employee who had worked in the

tribe's health clinic since November 2004. Zetts proceeded to file

charges of employment discrimination with the Maine Human Rights

Commission ("the Commission"), a state agency that investigates

discrimination charges. She alleged that the Houlton Band had

violated the Maine Human Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5,

§§ 4551-4634, a state employment discrimination statute.

In response, the Houlton Band filed the instant lawsuit

in federal district court. The suit named as defendants Zetts, the

Commission's members and executive director, and Maine's Attorney

General. The Houlton Band's two-count claim was that either as a

result of its inherent tribal sovereignty and its alleged statutory

right to self-governance, or as a result of tribal sovereign

immunity, Maine was precluded from enforcing its antidiscrimination laws against the Houlton Band. The Houlton Band

sought both declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the

Commission from proceeding with Zetts' complaint, and with any

future discrimination complaints filed by employees and former

employees of the Houlton Band.
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The federal proceedings were originally held before a

magistrate judge, and the defendants each moved to dismiss the

complaint. The magistrate judge recommended that, as to the

Commission members and the state individual defendants, the court

should dismiss both counts under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

This ruling was based on the fact that the Houlton Band had

previously litigated similar issues in a 1996 lawsuit it filed

against the Commission, a case that led to a final judgment against

the Houlton Band. See Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Me.

Human Rights Comm'n, 960 F. Supp. 449 (D. Me. 1997). That earlier

case had never been appealed. As to defendant Zetts, who had not

been a party to the earlier lawsuit, the magistrate judge

recommended that the tribe's claims be dismissed on the basis of

issue preclusion. The district court adopted the magistrate

judge's recommendations, and it dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, we need not resolve the contested issues

surrounding the preclusion doctrines. That is because even if the

Houlton Band is not precluded from bringing this lawsuit, it is

clear that the tribe would lose on the merits. Our decision in

Aroostook Band of Micmacs v. Ryan, Nos. 06-1127 and 06-1358, issued

this same day, forecloses both of the Houlton Band's claims.

Aroostook holds that a federal statute, the Maine Indian Claims

Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735, allows Maine to

enforce its employment discrimination laws against Maine tribes,
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including the Houlton Band (and other than the Passamaquoddy Tribe

and the Penobscot Nation). See Aroostook, slip. op. at 16-31, 33-

40, 47-49; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1725(a).

The judgment of the district court dismissing the action

is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the defendants-appellees.

-Concurring opinion follows-
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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur with the

judgment of the majority affirming the judgment of the district

court dismissing the action against all defendants, but reach that

outcome on the basis of preclusion principles.