The Clerk of Court is res pectfully dir ected to amend the capti on to conform to the 1 lis tin g a bo ve . 1 08 -6 26 2- cr US A v. Van B ur en 1 UNITED STATE S COURT OF AP PEALS 2 3 FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 4

_______________________________ 5 6 August Term, 2009 7 8 (Argued: Januar y 22, 2010 Decided: Mar ch 17, 2010) 9 10 Do ck et N o. 08 -62 62 -cr 11

_______________________________ 12 13 U NI TE D S TA TES OF A MERI CA , 14 15 App ellee , 16 17 v. 18 19 B ARC LA Y J. V AN B UREN , J R ., 20 21 Defendant-Appell ant

. 1 22

____________________________________ 23 24 Be fo re: WALKER , S TR AUB , and L I VI NGS TO N , Ci rcu it J ud ges . 25

____________________________________ 26 Th e U nit ed St ate s D istric t C ourt f

or t he No rth ern

Di str ict of Ne w Y ork

(T ho m as J

. 27 McAvoy, Judge ) entere d a judgment of conviction and sente nce againstdefendant-appell ant 28 af

ter a ju ry f ound him gu ilty o f f

ail ing to c om

ply wi th t he req uir em en ts o f t

he Se x O ff

en de r 29 Registrat ion and Notificati on Act (“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and 42 U.S .C. § 16901 et seq. 30 De fe nd an t-a

pp ell an t ap pe als , argu ing that th e D ist ric t C ourt e rre d in

de ny ing his m oti on

to2 1 dismiss the indict ment and erred in its instruct ions to the j ury. In part icular, de fendant-appell ant 2 argues thathis indict ment should have been dismissed for the following rea sons: (1) SORNA 3 exceeds Congress’ s Commerce Clause authorit y; (2) SORNA im permissibly delegat es legisl ative 4 autho rity to the ex ecutiv e b ran ch ; an d (3 ) S OR NAsh ou ld n ot a

pp ly t o h im

be cau se t he states in 5 wh ich

he trave led

an d re sid ed

have no t ye t im

ple m en ted

SO RN A. In a dd iti on , d ef en dant6 ap pe llant argu es ( 4) t hat th e D istric t C ourt e rre d in ins tru cti ng the jur

y a bo ut t he sco pe of

his 7 dutie s und er S OR

NA . F or t

he rea so ns set

fo rthbe low , th e ju dg m en t of the Di str ict

Co urt is 8 AFFIRMED. 9

_________________________________ 10 11 J A M ES P. E GAN , Of fi ce o f t he Fe de ral Pu

bli c D ef en de r (A lex an de r B un in, Fe de ral Pu bli c 12 Defender, and Lisa A. Peebles, Fir st Assista nt Federal Publ ic Defender, on thebr ief ), 13 Syracuse, N.Y., for Defendant- Appellant

. 14 15 R I CHAR D A. F RI ED MAN , Appellate Sect ion, Criminal Division, Unite d States Depart ment 16 of

Ju sti ce ( Lanny A . B reu er, As sis tant A tto rne y G en era l, and Gary G . G rin dle r, D ep uty 17 As sis tant A tto rne y G en era l, C rim ina l D ivi sio n, Un ite d S tat es D ep artm en t of Ju sti ce; 18 An dre w T . B ax ter , Unit ed St ate s A tto rne y, an d K ev in P . D oo ley an d B ren da

K. Sann es, 19 As sis tant U nit ed St ate s A tto rne ys , N ort

he rn D istric t of

Ne w Y ork ; on thebr ief

), 20 W ashington, D.C., for Ap pe lle e . 21

_________________________________ 22 23 S TR AUB , Circuit Judge : 24 Th e U nit ed St ate s D istric t C ourt f

or t he No rth ern

Di str ict of Ne w Y ork

(T ho m as J

. 25 McAvoy, Judge ) entere d a judgment of conviction and sente nce againstdefendant-appell ant 26 Barclay J. Van Buren, Jr ., after a jury found him guilty of failing to c omply with the 27 requirements of the Sex Offender Registrat ion and Notificati on Act (“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C. § 28 2250 and 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. De fe nd an t ap pe als , argu ing that th e D istric t C ourt e rre d in3 1 de ny ing his m oti on to d ism iss the ind ictm en t an d e rre d in its ins tru cti on s to the jur y. Mo re 2 specificall y, defendant argues t hat his indi ctment should have been dismissed for the following 3 reasons: ( 1) SORNA exceeds Congress’s Comm erce Clause a uthority; (2) SORNA 4 imperm issibly de legates l egislat ive authori ty to the exe cutive bra nch; and (3) SORNA should not 5 ap ply

to h im be cau se t he states in whic h h e tr av ele d and res ide d h av e n ot y et i m

ple m en ted 6 SO RN A. In a dd iti on , d ef en dant argu es t

hat (4 ) th e D ist

ric t C ourt e rre d in

ins tru cti ng the jur

y 7 about the scope of his duties underSORNA . For the reas ons set forth bel ow, we reject al l four 8 of defendant’s arguments. 9 FACTU AL AND PROCEDU RAL BA CKGROUND 10 I. De fen da nt ’s U nd erl yin g F ed era l S ex Off en se a nd Pr ev iou s V iol ati on s o f S up erv ise d 11 Re lea se 12 13 On March 19, 2002, defendant plea ded guilty i n the United Stat es Distri ct Court for the 14 No rth ern

Di str ict of Ne w Y ork

to r ece ivi ng ch ild pornography in vi olation of 18 U.S.C. § 15 22 52 A( a)( 2)( A)

. As a co ns eq ue nc e o f t hat co nv ict ion , d ef

en dant w as r eq

uir ed to r eg ist er a s a 16 sex offender in New York State, which he firstdid in June 2004. 17 Whil e d ef en dant w as s erv ing his thr ee- ye ar t erm of su pe rvi sed rel eas e f or h is M arc h 18 20 02 fe de ral sexof fe ns e co nv ict ion , h e d id n ot a bid e b y th e co nd iti on s o f h is s up erv ise d re lea se 19 and, as a resul t, was resent enced to six months of incarcer ation to be foll owed by a new term of 20 thi rtym onths of

su pe rvi sed rel eas e. Whil e se rvi ng thi s n ewter m of su pe rvi sed rel eas e, 21 de fe nd an t ag ain

vio lat ed the co nd iti on s o f h is s up erv ise d re lea se, thi s ti m e b y f ail ing to “ ref

rai n 22 from

places where i ndividuals unde r the age of 18 are l ikely to congr egate.” Accordi ngly, on 23 October 19, 2006, the Dist rict Courtrevoked defendant’s term of supervised relea se and4 1 sentenced hi m to an additional twelve months of im prisonment, to be followed by a new term of 2 eighteen months of supervised r elease. 3 II. De fen da nt ’s F ail ur e to Up da te R eg ist ryan d S ub seq ue ntAr res t 4 5 Af

ter be ing rel eas ed

fr om inc arc eratio n a

nd be ginnin g a

thi rd t erm

of su pe rvi sed rel eas e, 6 de fe nd an t li ve d in the Di xie Ho tel at 1 06 He nry Stree t, B ing hamton , N ewYo rk, wh ich wa s h is 7 registe red address in the New York sex offender regist ry. Hom e confinement was a condition of 8 defendant’s super vised rel ease, and defendant was r equired to wearan electr onic monitoring 9 device and inform his probati on officer of his movem ents. On February 20, 2008, defendant 10 signed out of his re sidence and fail ed to retur n or contacthis probati on officer. On March 7, 11 2008, the United Stat es Marshal s Service file d a criminal complaint againstdefendant, allegi ng 12 that he fa ile d to reg ist er o r up date h is r eg ist rat ion inf orm ati on as r eq uir ed bySO RN A, in 13 vio lat ion

of 18 U. S. C. § 2 25 0. An

arr est warrant i ssu ed , and

lawen fo rce m en t of

fi cer s ar res ted 14 de fen da ntth atni gh t a t h is mothe r’ s r es id en ce in Bur li ng to n, Nor th Ca ro li na . Atno ti me 15 be tw een

Fe bru ary 20 , 2 00 8, an d h is arre st o n M arc h 7 , 2 00 8, did de fe nd an t up date h is r esi de nc y 16 information with the New York sex offender registr y, nor did he regi ster in Nort h Carolina. 17 III. Indictment , Denial of Moti on to Dismiss, and Jury Inst ruction 18 On April 17, 2008, an indict ment returned in the Unit ed States Dist rict Courtfor the 19 No rth ern

Di str ict of Ne w Y ork

ch arg ed that de fe nd ant, b ein g “ anind ivi du al r eq uir ed to r eg ist er 20 un de r [ SO RN A] byrea so n o f h is c onvic tio n und er f ed era l law, did

trave l in int ers tat e co mm erc e 21 and did knowingly fail t o registe r and update hi s regist ration as required by l aw,” in violat ion of 22 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).5 1 Prior to t rial, defendantmoved to dism iss the i ndictment on various st atutory and 2 constitut ional grounds. The Dis trictCourt denied defendant’ s motion in a thorough decis ion 3 fi led

on Au gu st 8 , 2 00 8. Pe rti ne nt t o th e p res en t ap pe al, the Di str ict Co urt rej ect ed de fe nd an t’s 4 arguments that SORNA (1) exceeds Congress’ s authorit y under the Comm erce Clause, ( 2) 5 vio lat es t

he no n-d ele gatio n d oc tri ne , and (3) did no t ap ply

to h im be cau se N ewYo rk and

No rth 6 Carolina have notyet implemented the statute. 7 At

tri al, the parti es d isp ute d whe the r th e te rm inatio n o f d ef en dant’ s N ewYo rk r esi de nc e 8 co ns tit

ute d a “ch an ge ” in

res ide nc e su ff

ici en t to tri gg er h is d

uty un de r S OR

NAto u pd ate his 9 registr ation information. Defendant argued t hat termination of his ol d residence was insufficient 10 an d th at h e w as r eq uir ed to u pd ate his reg istrat ion

inf orm ati on on ly u po n e sta bli sh ing a n ew 11 res ide nc e. Th e D istric t C ourt r eje cte d d ef en dant’ s ar gum en t, i ns tru cti ng the jur y in a cco rdanc e 12 with the government’s re quested char ge that te rminating a reside nce with no inte ntion of 13 returni ng constitut es a “change” i n residence under SORNA. 14 DI SC US SI ON 15 I. De fen da nt ’s F irs t T hr ee A rg um en ts 16 Defendant concedes thatthe first t hree issue s that he r aises on appea l—whether SORNA 17 ex cee ds Co ng res s’s Co mm erc e C lau se a uth ori ty; wh eth er S OR

NAim pe rm iss ibl y d ele gates 18 leg isl ati ve autho rity to the ex ecutiv e b ran ch ; an d whe the r S OR NAap pli es t o d ef

en dant e ve n 19 though New York and North Carolina ha ve not yet implemented SORNA —are foreclose d by our 20 recent opi nion in United States v. Guzman , 5 91 F. 3d 83 (2d Ci r. 2 01 0). Be cau se d ef en dant’ s 21 first thre e arguments are the sa me as those that we reje cted in Guzman , we find no error in t he6 1 Di str ict

Co urt ’s d eci sio n th at r eje cte d th ese thr ee argum en ts and de nie d d ef

en dant’ s m oti on

to 2 dismiss the indict ment. 3 II. Defendant’s Argument Regarding the Jury I nstruction 4 The only issue notforeclosed by our r ecent deci sion in Guzman is defendant’s a rgument 5 that the Dis trictCourt incorr ectly ins tructed t he jury about t he scope of defendant’s re gistrat ion 6 duties underSORNA . Under SORNA, a convicted sex offender must register “and ke ep the 7 registr ation curr ent, in each j urisdict ion where the offender res ides,” is e mployed, or is a student. 8 42 U. S. C. § 1 69 13 (a) . M ore sp eci fi cal ly, un de r 42 U. S. C. § 1 69 14 , a co nv ict ed

sexof fe nd er 9 m us t “p rov ide

. . . [ t] he ad dre ss o f e ach res ide nc e at

wh ich the sexof

fe nd er r esi de s o r w ill 10 res ide .” Id. § 16914(a)(3) . Moreover, wit hin “3 business days after each change of nam e, 11 res ide nc e, em

plo ym en t, o r st

ud en t st atu s, ” se cti on

16 91 3(c ) pr ov ide s th at a reg ist rant m us t 12 “appear in pe rson” at an appropriat e office “and inform [ the] jurisdi ction of all cha nges in the 13 inf

orm ati on req uir ed fo r th at o ff

en de r in the sexof

fe nd er r eg ist

ry. ” Id. § 1 69 13 (c) (em

ph asi s 14 added). The juri sdiction s o informed m ust then shar e that information with othe r juris dictions 15 where the offender is re quired to r egister

. Id. Under SORNA’s criminal enforcem ent provisi on, 16 if an individual who is require d to regist er knowingly fails t o registe r or keep the registr ation 17 information current, the offender is subject t o a fine, imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 18 22 50 (a)

. 19 Ac co rdi ng to t he go ve rnm en t, “ [t ]h e p rin cip al l eg al and fa ctu al d isp ute at tria l w as 20 wh eth er the go ve rnm en t . . . h ad to p rov e th at [ de fe nd an t] est ab lis he d a ne w r esi de nc e el sewhe re, 21 or whe the r hi s te rm inatio n o f t he ho tel res ide nc e w as a

su ff ici en t ‘c hang e’ t o h is r esi de nc y to7 1 triggerthe requir ement that he update his registr ation information” under SORNA. Brief of 2 Appellee at 10. With regar d to this i ssue, the Dist rict Courtaccepted t he government’s positi on 3 that te rm inatio n o f a res ide nc e w ithno int en tio n o f r eturni ng is s uf fi cie nt t o tr igg er a

reg istrant’s 4 duty t o u

pd ate his inf

orm ati on an d d eli ve red

the fo llo wi ng jur

y in str uc tio n o ve r de fe nd an t’s 5 objection: 6 Th e S exOf fe nd er R eg istrat ion

an d N oti fi cat ion

Ac t re qu ire s a s exof

fe nd er t o 7 rep ort

a ch an ge of

nam e, res ide nc e, em

plo ym en t, o r st

ud en t st atu s w ith in t

hre e 8 days af

ter any s uc h c hang e. Th e re po rt m us t be pro vid ed

to e ith er the state whe re 9 the sexof

fe nd er r esi de s, wo rks , o r is a st ud en t. 10 To ch an ge so m eth ing m ean s to m ak e d if fe rent f rom wh at i t is ; or

to 11 substitut e one thing for anothe r. One’s resi dence is defined as where one 12 reside[s] or maintains his home. The term resides means locati on of the 13 individual ’s home or other place wher e the indivi dual habitua lly live s. A change 14 in reside nce does not re quire thatyou find that the defendanthas establ ished a 15 new residence. Rat her, it’ s enough for you to find that t he defendant’s home or 16 other plac e where he habitually li ves is no longerthe same as the one lis ted in the 17 registr y. Accordingly, if you find the defendantleft the res idence li sted in the 18 reg istry w ithno int en tio n o f r eturni ng an d k no wi ng ly f

ail ed to n oti fy the reg ist ry 19 of

that f act wi thi n three da

ys of the ch an ge , th enyo u m

us t f ind that th is t hir d 20 element has been sati sfied. On the other hand, i f you find the defendant left the 21 residence listed i n the regis try, but int ended to return to the r esidence l isted in t he 22 registr y, then you must find that this el ement has not been satis fied. 23 Al tho ug h w e re vie w c ha lle ng ed jur y ins tru cti on s de no vo , “ we wi ll r ev ers e o nly wh ere 24 the charge, vi ewed as a whole, eit her failed to i nform the jury ade quately of the la w or misled the 25 jury about t he correctlegal rul e.” Un ite d S tates v . Q uin on es , 511 F.3d 289, 314 (2d Cir. 2007) 26 (internal quotati on marks om itted) , cer t. d en ied, 1 29 S. Ct . 2 52 (20 08 ). I n th e p res en t ca se, 27 de fe nd an t ob

jec ts t o th e ab ov e in str

uc tio n, arg uin g th at i ns tea d o f s im ply req uir ing that a 28 de fe nd an t le av e a r eg ist ere d a dd res s w ithno int en tio n o f r eturni ng , to “ch an ge ” o ne ’s r esi de nc e 29 req

uir es e sta bli sh ing a n ewres ide nc e. In m ak ing thi s ar gum en t, d ef en dant a sse rts that th ere areDefendant conceded at or al argument that, were we t o rejecthis definiti on of 2 “change,” he would have be en require d to notify the re gistry of his t ermination of residence. Be cau se w e inter

pre t S OR NAas r eq

uir ing a se x o ff

en de r to ap pe ar i n p ers on to u pd ate his registr ation information within t hree days of vacati ng his fixed resi dential a ddress with no intenti on of returning, we do not hes itate t o conclude thatVan Buren violated 18 U.S.C. § 8 1 two possible defini tions of the word “change ”: (1) “c hange” that means “to change from 2 something to nothing” and (2) “change” thatmeans to “change from som ething to something 3 else.” Opening Bri ef of Appellant at 58. Defendant argues that SORNA’s statutory context 4 m ak es c lear th at “ ch an ge ” in thi s si tuatio n m ean s to “ch an ge fr om so m eth ing to s om eth ing els e” 5 an d, the ref

ore , th e st atute s ho uld

be int erp ret ed

as r eq uir ing on ly t

hat a r eg istrant up date h is 6 residence information upon establishi ng a new residence . As an alterna tive argument, defendant 7 asserts that, if ambiguity exist s about which definit ion of “change” SORNA em ploys, the rul e of 8 lenity r equires t hat we read the statute in defendant’s favor. 9 Th ere are sev era l pr ob lem s w ithde fe nd an t’s arg um en ts. Fi rst , d ef en dant’ s co nd

uc t in 10 ter

m inatin g h is r esi de nc e to trave l to No rthCarol ina , w ithno int en tio n o f r eturni ng to h is 11 residence in New York, qualifies as a “ change” in his residence regardle ss of which definition of 12 “change” one uses . Defendant’s conduct qual ifies as a “cha nge” in the se nse of “chang[ing] 13 from

something to nothing” becaus e he has gone from having a resident ial addre ss to having no 14 permanent address. Defendant’s c onduct also cons titute s a “change” i n the sense of “chang[ing] 15 fr om

so m eth ing to s om eth ing els e” b eca us e d ef en dant h as g on e f

rom havin g a fi xe d re sid en ce t o 16 havin g an it ine rant or co ns tantlym ov ing res ide nc e. Th ere fo re, wh ich ev er d ef ini tio n o ne us es, 17 de fe nd an t’s co nd uc t vi olates the req

uir em en t th at h e u

pd ate his reg ist

rat ion inf orm ati on wh enhis 18 res ide nc e ch an ge s. 22250(a). However, we expres s no opinion about Van Buren’ s continuing r egistra tion obliga tions

un de r S OR

NAor whe the r an

iti ne rant se x o ff

en de r w ho ha s n o f

ixe d a dd res s m us t up date h is registr ation information within t hree busines s days of every move to a new, transientlocation. W e f urt he r no te that, a cco rdi ng to t he Di str ict

Co urt ’s j ury

ins tru cti on s, a re gis trant’ s duty t o u pd ate his res ide nc e in fo rm ati on wo uld b e tr igg ere d o nly

if the reg istrant te rm inated his reg ist ere d re sid en ce w ithno int en tio n o f r eturni ng an d th at h is d uty to u pd ate his res ide nc e information would not be trigger ed if the regis trant i ntended to re turn to his registe red resi dence. Ac co rdi ng ly, ha d th e jury f ound that de fe nd an t m ere ly i nte nd ed to v isi t hi s m oth er i n N ort h Carolina and t hat defendant int ended to return to his New York resi dence, defendant would not have been convict ed of violating SORNA. Se e U nited Sta tes v. Sa lam eh , 152 F.3d 88, 116 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Jur ies are pr esumed to follow their instructions.” ( altera tion and int ernal quota tion marks om itted) ), cert. denie d sub nom. , Ab ou ha lim a v . U nited Sta tes , 5 25 U. S. 11 12 (19 99 ). 9 1 Se co nd , e ve n if we we re t o c red it d ef

en dant’ s ar gum en t th at the re are two dis tin ct 2 definitions of “change” and that defendant’ s conduct const itutes “ change” under onl y one of 3 tho se d ef

ini tio ns , it

is n ev erthe les s cl ear

fr om SO RN A’ s lang ua ge an d le gis lat ive his tor y th at 4 SORNAapplies t o defendant’s conduct . W e therefore r eject defendant ’s argument that SORNA 5 is ambiguous and that the rule of lenity r equires us t o interpr et SORNA in defendant’s favor. As 6 the Supreme Court has noted, “Because the meaning of language is inher ently conte xtual, we 7 have de cli ne d to de em a st atute ‘ am

big uo us ’ f

or p urp os es o f l en itym ere ly b eca us e it wa s 8 po ssi bleto arti cu lat e a c on str uc tio n m ore narro w than th at urge d b y th e G ov ernm en t.” Mos ka l v. 9 Un ite d S

tates , 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). Rather, the Supr eme Court has “reserved l enity for 10 those situations in whic h a reasonabl e doubt persi sts about a s tatute’ s intended sc ope even after 11 res ort

to t he lan gu ag e an d s tru cture, leg isl ati ve his tor y, an d m oti vatin g p oli cie s o f t he statut e. ” 12 Id. (inter

na l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed ); see Reno v. Koray , 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (“The rule of 13 lenity appl ies only if, after s eizing ever ything from which aid can be derived, we ca n make no 14 more than a guess as to what Congres s intended.” ( internal citati ons and quotati on marks10 1 omitted)). 2 In e na cti ng SO RN A, “C on gre ss’ s g oa l w as . . . to ‘ est ab lis h[ ] a co m pre he ns ive natio na l 3 sy ste m

fo r th e re gis tratio n o f [ sex ] o ff en de rs. In o the r w ord s, Co ng res s w an ted to m ak e su

re s ex 4 of fe nd ers co uld

no t av oid

all reg istrat ion

req uir em en ts j us t by

m ov ing to ano the r st ate .” 5 Guzman , 5 91 F. 3d at 9 1; id. (no tin g th at the req uir em en t th at c onvic ted

sexof fe nd ers reg ist er 6 int ras tat e ch an ge s in

res ide nc e is “a p erf

ect ly l og ica l w ayto h elp en sure that st ate s w ill m ore 7 effectively be able to track s ex offenders when they do cross st ate line s”). As set forth i n a 8 Ho us e R ep ort

reg ard ing the Ch ild

ren ’s S af ety Ac t of 20 05 , an e arl ier

bil l w ithsexof

fe nd er 9 reg istrat ion

an d n oti fi cat ion

pro vis ion s si m ilar to tho se l ate r en act ed in S OR NA : “T he m os t 10 significant e nforcement issue in the sex offender progr am is that over 100,000 sex offenders, or 11 ne arl y o ne -f

if th i n th e N ati on [, ] are ‘ m iss ing ,’ m ean ing that th eyhave no t co m pli ed wi th s ex 12 of

fe nd er r eg istrat ion

req uir em en ts. This typical ly occurs when the sex offende r moves from one 13 Sta te to a no the r .” H. R. Re p. No . 1 09 -21 8(I ) (2 00 5), 20 05 W L 2 21 06 42 (em ph asi s ad de d); see 14 also 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02, S8014 (daily ed. Jul y 20, 2006), 2006 WL 2034118 (statement of 15 SO RN A c o-s po ns or S en . B ide n) ( “O ne of the big ge st p rob lem s in

our cu rre nt s exof

fe nd er 16 registr y system happens when register ed sex offenders travel from one State to a nother.”). 17 “When a sex off

ender fails t o registe r [or keep his re gistrat ion current ] in a State in which he or 18 she reside s, there i s no effective system by which the State s can notify each ot her about the 19 ch an ge in a

sexof fe nd er[ ’] s st atu s. ” H .R . R ep . N o. 10 9-2 18 (I) (20 05 ), 2 00 5 W L 2 21 06 42 . A s a 20 mea ns of a ddre ss in g t hi s p ro bl em a ndes tabl is hi ng a c ompr eh en si ve na ti on al re gi st ra ti onsy st em, 21 SORNAprovides tha t each regi strant must “keep [his] regis trati on current,” 42 U.S.C. §11 1 16 91 3(a ), and

“ap pe ar i n p ers on ” at

anap pro pri ate of

fi ce “ no t later

than 3 bu sin ess days af

ter 2 each change of name, residence, employment, or student stat us . . . and inform [the] jurisdiction 3 of all ch an ge s in

the inf orm ati on req uir ed fo r th at o ff

en de r in the sexof

fe nd er r eg istry, ” id. § 4 16913(c). 5 Be tw een

SO RN A’ s lang ua ge an d le gis lat ive his tor y, it i s cl ear

that a r eg istrant m

us t 6 up date h is r eg istrat ion inf orm ati on if he alt ers his res ide nc e su chthat it no lon ge r co nf

orm s to 7 the information that he ea rlierprovided to t he regist ry. Without accurate r egistra tion 8 information, SORN A would be ineffective. If a sex offender terminated his residence with no 9 int en tio n o f r eturni ng an d w ere no t re qu ire d to up date h is r esi de nc e in fo rm ati on , it wo uld en ab le 10 him to evade registr ation requi rements, and thus, law enforcement, by leading an i tinerant 11 lif

est yle . B y c ontra st, req

uir ing su cha se x o ff

en de r to ap pe ar i n p ers on at an a pp rop riate o ff

ice 12 wi thi n three bu sin ess days of ter m inatin g h is r esi de nc e w ou ld e na ble the jur isd ict ion

to a sk 13 pertinentquestions aboutthe regis trant’ s future plans. This , in turn, would diminish the 14 likeli hood that the r egistra nt would go “missing” and would further SORNA’s purpose of 15 creati ng a comprehensive national sex offender registr ation syst em. In sum , based on the 16 lan gu ag e an d le gis lat ive his tor y o f S OR NA , w e co nc lud e th at S OR NAreq uir es a co nv ict ed

sex 17 of

fe nd er t o u

pd ate his reg istrat ion

inf orm ati on in p ers on up on ter m inatin g h is c urr en t re sid en ce 18 wi th n o intentio n o f r eturni ng , e ve n if the sexof

fe nd er h as n ot y et e sta

bli sh ed a n ewres ide nc e. 19 CO NC LU SI ON 20 For the reas ons set forth above, t he judgment of the District Courtis AFFIRMED.