Muir S. Fairchild Research

Information Center

Challenges in the Multipolar 

Space-Power Environment

Matthew M. Schmunk

Captain, USAF

Michael R. Sheets

Captain, USAF

Fairchild Paper

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962

July 2007

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ii

Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Schmunk, Matthew M.

Challenges in the multipolar space-power environment / Matthew M. Schmunk 

and Michael R. Sheets.

 p. ; cm.––(Fairchild paper, ISSN 1528-2325)

Includes bibliographical references. 

Modeling the space-power continuum––China––India––European Union––Nature 

of the space environment.

ISBN 1-58566-166-X

1. Astronautics and civilization. 2. Astronautics, Military. 3. International relations. I. Title. II. Sheets, Michael R. III. Series.

 358.8––dc22

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited. 

This Fairchild Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the AU Press Web site http://

aupress.maxwell.af.mil and the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil.

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Dedicated To

Muir S. Fairchild (1894 –1950), the first commander of

Air University and the university’s conceptual father.

General Fairchild was part visionary, part keen taskmaster,

and “Air Force to the core.” His legacy is one of confidence

about the future of the Air Force and the central 

role of Air University in that future.

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Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 MODELING THE SPACE-POWER CONTINUUM . . 1

Domestic Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

National-Security Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Applying the Strategic Framework . . . . . . . . . 4

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Domestic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

National-Security Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3 INDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Domestic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

National-Security Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4 EUROPEAN UNION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Domestic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

National-Security Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

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Chapter Page

5 NATURE OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT . . . . . 43

Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

CONTENTS

vi

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Foreword

Space power is arguably one of the most valuable, yet underappreciated and misunderstood components of US national 

power. The effects derived from our presence in space have tremendous strategic implications: an explosion of communication capabilities, better weather prediction, precision navigation, and intelligence are but a few of the dividends derived 

from investments in space programs.

The United States no longer enjoys a near monopoly on space 

effects. Every week brings news of advances in space technologies by China, Russia, India, European powers, and others. 

Space, as a strategic medium (and probably a future warfighting medium), is the ultimate high ground; it is now widely 

shared and could be hotly contested. Ranging from satellitebased access to Internet services to China’s recent shoot down 

of one of its own satellites, new capabilities derived from spacebased assets are accelerating in terms of quality, ingenuity, 

and importantly, availability to allies and enemies alike.

US leaders must understand the strategic implications of 

these advances. The authors have filled an important void in 

the literature on the role of space in strategic decision making 

by applying two models. The first is Col W. Michael Guillot’s 

paper on strategic leadership, which serves as an excellent 

framework to analyze the space programs—and their significance—of three of the United States’ peer competitors in space: 

China, India, and the European Union. By putting individual 

advances of these entities in their proper strategic context, the 

reader gains a broader and deeper understanding of the meaning of these advances. Additionally, the authors apply the familiar “VUCA” (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity) model to space programs, aiding the reader in developing a 

framework in which to analyze space-power advances.

The inevitable conclusion upon reading this paper is that 

senior decision makers must plan for a strategic landscape where 

the United States does not enjoy unmatched or uncontested 

benefits from space power. Additionally, the authors make specific policy prescriptions regarding further development of US 

space power, international cooperation regarding space programs and effects, and suggestions on de-escalation mecha-

vii

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viii

nisms for developing space-based conflicts. Modern Airmen 

must be familiar with the entire vertical dimension, and this 

paper serves as an excellent primer for that purpose.

STEPHEN D. KISER, Lt Col, USAF

Joint Staff (J2), Pentagon

FOREWORD

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ix

Capt Matthew Schmunk is a developmental engineer currently studying astronautical engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 

Previously, he served as a space and counterspace employment 

analyst at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, where 

he supported the operational, acquisition, and policy-making 

communities. He is a distinguished graduate of the ROTC program and holds a bachelor of science degree in mechanical engineering from Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Capt Michael Sheets is an intelligence officer who is currently 

an operations analyst for the Space and Missile Systems Center 

at Los Angeles Air Force Base, California. He has also served as 

a team chief of intelligence operations from a forward operating 

location in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He received a 

three-year ROTC scholarship and was commissioned in 2002. 

After completing the Air Force Institute of Technology Civilian 

Institution program he entered the Air Force in 2005. Captain 

Sheets holds a bachelor of arts degree in political science and a 

master of arts degree in international affairs from Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

About the Authors

Capt Matthew Schmunk Capt Michael Sheets

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xi

Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge the Air Force Institute of National Security Studies for making this study possible. Their 

interest inspired us to address this substantial topic, and their 

support backed our need for firsthand experience in the field.

We would also like to acknowledge all the individuals that have 

shared their candid views on space power with us in the past few 

years––it is an exciting time to be a space professional, based on 

the diverse and passionate interest we have encountered.

Lastly, we would like to thank Air University Press for recognizing the importance of this subject matter. We are proud to provide our contribution to the dialogue surrounding space power 

and look forward to participating in its continued evolution.

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xiii

Introduction

The United States embraces space to satisfy its strategic 

goals for domestic, national-security, and military purposes––

augmenting each with international agreements. Distinct in 

policies, economics, doctrine, and supporting infrastructure, 

these elements define different spectra in the space-power continuum. The United States is no longer alone, however. More 

nations than ever before are turning to space to satisfy their 

own strategic goals. By examining foreign developments and 

strategies, we can paint in broad strokes a portrait of the space 

strategic environment for which the United States must prepare. The purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, by examining the domestic, national-security, military, and international 

efforts of emerging space powers, we implicitly conclude space’s 

strategic importance is rapidly expanding. Second, we discuss 

the nature of the space environment and identify complexities 

current and future leaders will face. Ultimately, because the 

environment is increasingly multipolar, international engagement in many forms will be a necessary prerequisite to achieve 

and maintain space power now and in the future.

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Chapter 1

Modeling the Space-Power Continuum

Despite the distinct nature of each spectrum in the spacepower continuum, there is complex interaction between any 

nation’s domestic, national-security, and military space programs. Since a nation may use all or any of these elements, we 

propose that two key goals should be achieved by any strategic 

analysis of national-space programs. First, the examination 

should avoid sharp focus on only one aspect of a nation’s space 

power at the risk of misunderstanding the complete picture. A 

nation’s military may advertise certain capabilities, for example, but the national leadership or domestic concerns determine what intentions will become reality. Second, an ideal 

model can describe the nature of the strategic environment and 

what current and future preparations should be made. For 

these reasons, the models and concepts developed by Col W. 

Michael Guillot in Strategic Leadership: Defining the Challenge

were found to be especially appropriate, and his work is used 

as a guide.

The purpose of Colonel Guillot’s work was to highlight the 

complexity of the exercise of strategic leadership and to make 

the understanding of the strategic environment and leadership 

processes simpler.1 To accomplish this, he chose a framework 

that broke the strategic leadership environment into domestic, 

military, national-security, and international-environmental 

segments. As Colonel Guillot states, this framework “illustrates 

how the strategic environment is interrelated, complementary, 

and contradictory,” which are the precise subtleties we must 

expose when analyzing space power.2 By viewing other nations’ 

activities in this way, we gain insight into how foreign strategic 

leaders are shaping their own space power to meet current and 

future needs. Since “this construct is neither a template nor 

checklist—nor a recipe for perfection,” it is necessary to briefly 

describe terms used in our analysis and acknowledge the assumptions and imperfections they may include.3

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MODELING THE SPACE-POWER CONTINUUM

Domestic Space Power

The domestic spectrum of space power consists of activities 

that directly benefit a nation’s citizens. In most cases, this is 

achieved by allowing space service providers to profit by selling 

information or entertainment to consumers. Alternatively, a 

government can assume the role of service provider and create 

public resources or promote scientific advancement with space 

programs. Building domestic space power is usually a nation’s 

primary focus—space assets form a commercial center of 

gravity and can be a source of national pride. 

Some major factors complicate the domestic space power 

spectrum, however. First, since multinational corporations own 

and operate many space assets, difficulties arise when nations 

wish to regulate content or users of commercial systems, especially if those users are foreign. Second, domestic space assets 

can have secondary national-security or military roles, either 

when purchased or commandeered. For these reasons and 

more, understanding a nation’s domestic goals is prerequisite 

to determining the concepts driving a nation’s space power development.

National-Security Space Power

Colonel Guillot notes that “within the national-security environment, strategic leaders should consider national priorities 

and opportunities and must know the threats and risks to national security, as well as any underlying assumptions.”4 Space 

power’s ability to help form leaders’ opinions on national security is well documented. While some may argue national-security 

space power equates to military capability, its nature is fundamentally different. National-security space efforts have strategic implications that do not directly support operational or tactical levels of decision making. Superior command, control, 

communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(C3ISR), made possible by space-based intelligence assets and 

secure global satellite networks, greatly enhances a nation’s 

ability to identify and evaluate foreign developments. Leaders 

can use space power to enable confident application of diploChap1.indd 2 9/6/07 12:15:56 PM
MODELING THE SPACE-POWER CONTINUUM 

matic pressure, effective delivery of humanitarian aid, and optimal force posturing to send effective strategic messages.

Likewise, national-security space power can be undermined 

when analysts misinterpret data or fall victim to a camouflage, 

concealment, or deception campaign. Key indicators of impending foreign developments may be missed or misunderstood, 

with faulty information passing directly to strategic leadership. 

Because of this, national-security space power can also become 

a liability.

As more nations gain national-security space power, each develops a better understanding of its benefits and liabilities. Space 

power’s broad reach results in better monitoring of both regional 

and global events, so more nations can apply independent judgment to data gathered. This represents a marked difference from 

decades of only one or two superpowers using space for these 

purposes. Many nations can carefully watch developments regarding claims to natural resources, border security, and deployments of military forces. They will share data with allies, 

publicly use it against adversaries and competitors, and doublecheck their own results with other nations’ claims; this will all 

occur in an increasingly complex blend of agendas. Because of 

scenarios like these, careful understanding of national-security 

space power remains critical to understanding its impact on the 

strategic environment.

Military Space Power

Whereas national-security systems are structured to support 

strategic leadership, military space power is best defined by its 

ability to directly influence armed conflict at operational and 

tactical levels from space. To achieve this, national-strategic 

leaders must first define the manner in and extent to which 

space will be used in combat. Whether this definition results 

from a formal or an informal process, the result is a military 

doctrine that defines space power objectives and the ways and 

means of achieving them.

Because a nation implements military space power based on 

its overall strategy, a space power analysis should consider 

that strategy. For Colonel Guillot, there are two reasons why 

leaders should carefully consider military strategy as part of 

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MODELING THE SPACE-POWER CONTINUUM

the strategic environment. “First, because the military instrument of power has such great potential for permanent change 

in the strategic environment, all strategic leaders must recognize its risks and limitations. Second, because military experience among civilian leaders has dwindled over the years and 

will continue to do so, strategic leaders have a greater responsibility to comprehend policy guidance and clearly understand 

expected results.”5

Taken in the context of military space power, these concerns 

are great challenges to forging effective doctrine. The risk of 

causing “permanent change” in the strategic environment, for 

example, is a key consideration when debating if and how 

weapons should be used through, in, or from space. Then, once 

a doctrine is developed, the authors face the challenge of convincing others that it will deliver the desired results and then 

weather inevitable changes in civilian policy guidance. With 

these uncertainties and the fact that many aspects of military 

space power are yet untested by major conflict, the development and implementation of military space power will prove to 

be one of the most difficult and yet inevitable tasks to face in 

coming decades.

International Engagement

Nations can promote space power through their own space 

policies and by developing international regimes that establish 

standards of conduct with regard to activities in space. These 

regimes can include treaties, nonproliferation schemes, international sanctions, and international space law. By cooperation, both spacefaring nations and those without space capabilities can leverage international agreements into another kind 

of “space power.” International efforts cannot be discounted. 

Colonel Guillot warns, “strategic leaders can be surprised and 

their decisions thwarted if they fail to understand the international environment sufficiently.”6

Applying the Strategic Framework

Having recast Colonel Guillot’s framework in terms of the 

space strategic environment, the next step will be to apply it in 

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MODELING THE SPACE-POWER CONTINUUM 

the cases of China, India, and the European Union. Each has its 

own space capabilities and liabilities, and all are regional powers 

seeking new opportunities. Each case study will include discussions of the respective domestic, national-security, military, and 

international spectrums. By doing so, we hope to gain insights 

into the future nature of the space strategic environment.

We acknowledge that these case studies are not exhaustive. 

Such an effort is far outside the scope of this work, but wherever possible, the most authoritative sources have been sought 

and translations have been kept in as much context as possible, while reserving the right to academic postulation and the 

use of anecdotal evidence.

Through this process, the following points became clear. 

First, because these nations are using space power to satisfy so 

many strategic functions, it implicitly shows the strategic importance of space. Second, the nature of the emerging multipolar space environment will lead to new challenges for strategic space leaders.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry 

in the bibliography.)

1. Guillot, “Strategic Leadership,” 67.

2. Ibid., 68.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 70.

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Chapter 2

China

Robust space power is critical to China’s achievement of national greatness. Space development represents a key indicator 

of science and technology (S&T) innovation, which is core to China’s national strategy—a point which cannot be overemphasized. 

Dr. Michael Pillsbury’s report to the United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s Progress in 

Technological Competitiveness: The Need for a New Assessment, 

explains the importance of China’s S&T goals. It is interesting to 

note that a sizable six of 16 remarkable S&T achievements in Dr. 

Pillsbury’s analysis are due to Chinese space efforts; all are key 

contributors to the Chinese concept of comprehensive national 

power (CNP),

CNP ([综合国力] zonghe guoli) refers to the combined overall conditions 

and strengths of a country in numerous areas[. S]cience and technology 

have become increasingly important in the competition for power and 

influence in the world. Chinese analysts have developed their own extensive index systems and equations for assessing CNP. . . . [T]heir analytical methods are not traditional Marxist-Leninist dogma or Western 

social science but something unique to China, particularly the stress on 

the role of S&T as the primary factor that can bring national greatness 

to China.1 (emphasis added)

This sentiment is core doctrine in the highest levels of Chinese 

government and offers incredible insight into China’s grand 

strategy for space. 

Pres. Hu Jintao, while addressing the Chinese Academy of 

Sciences (CAS) in June 2005, articulated a specific strategy to 

achieve the S&T power critical to China’s success. He put forth 

three requirements to guarantee innovation:

• Provide clear strategic goals and achieve breakthroughs in 

key and core fields to solve major problems in China’s economic and social development.

• Accelerate domestic scientific and technological systems.

• Foster talented people.2

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CHINA



Ma Xingrui, vice president of China Aerospace Science and 

Technology Corporation (CASC), identifies that space technology as a key field and “an important sign of the national comprehensive power of a country, it is one of the high technologies 

that have the most significant impacts on modern society.”3

Where President Hu’s comments highlight how China will foster innovation, national leaders like Ma Xingrui and others help 

detail what that innovation will focus on. These combined efforts result in what is probably the most carefully articulated 

and coordinated plan to achieve space power worldwide.

China seeks strategic breakthroughs in nearly all aspects of 

space. The 2000 “White Paper: China’s Space Activities” indicates that by 2010, China hopes to

• Develop an Earth monitoring system to monitor the land, 

oceans, and atmosphere of China, surrounding regions, 

and the globe. This includes a comprehensive nationwide 

remote-sensing data reception, processing, and distribution system.

• Develop an independently operated broadcast and telecommunications system to form China’s telecom industry.

• Develop an independent satellite navigation system.

• Improve space-launch systems capable of providing international launch services.

• Develop basic space science, including strengthened studies of materials, the environment, microgravity, and astronomy.

• Realize manned spaceflight.4

Independence is the most critical element noted throughout 

these national goals. Independence requires very strong domestic investment, support, and little or no reliance on external sources. The following sections will highlight China’s progress towards these goals as well as some hurdles China faces.

Domestic Environment

China’s domestic space power, whose complexity is often 

underestimated, is in surprisingly dynamic transition. As menChap2.indd 8 9/6/07 12:16:17 PM
CHINA



tioned before, nations can allow companies to sell services to 

citizens or the government can assume that role to bring space 

benefits to its citizens. In China, debate on the suitability of 

these two methods proves to be a major driver influencing its 

domestic space power. On the unlikely battlefield of satellitetelevision broadcast, we see how the sometimes contradictory 

influences of commerce and government are driving unique developments in both arenas.

One of China’s greatest domestic space issues is to develop 

independently operated satellite broadcast and telecommunications. According to Ma Xingrui, “satellite communications 

technology has brought us up to a hundred services including 

telephone, telegraph, facsimile, data transmission, television 

broadcasting, satellite television education, mobile communications, data collection, rescue, e-mail and telemedicine, significantly changing our life styles.”5 However, satellite broadcast juxtaposes with a major concern for the People’s Republic 

of China (PRC)—cultural imperialism. 

Prof. Junhao Hong notes that an unbalanced flow of media 

influence from a few Western sources, called cultural imperialism, does not cause so much economic damage as much as 

“the disruption of the basic social and cultural institutions of 

the [country].”6 Therefore, China responds with extremely tough 

domestic regulation on satellite broadcasts, codified through a 

number of national laws.

The following major domestic laws highlight specific restrictions on satellite broadcasts—many more limit content and 

conduct of media providers:

Measures on the Administration of Foreign Satellite Television Channel Reception (2004.08.01)

• Article 3: With the approval of the State Administration for 

Radio, Film and Television, foreign satellite television channels may be received by such designated places as three 

star and higher hotels for foreign guests, places specifically 

for foreigners to work and apartments set up for foreigners 

and other specified places. 

• Article 4: Applicants to distribute foreign satellite television 

channels shall have the following qualifications: . . . (4) The 

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CHINA

10

channel which is being applied for and its directly related 

agencies shall be friendly toward China, and have long 

term friendly broadcasting exchanges and cooperation with 

China.

• Article 6: Regarding a foreign satellite television agency, it 

shall in principle only receive approval for a single channel 

with a specific scope to be distributed, and in principle no 

foreign satellite television news channels shall be approved 

to be distributed domestically.7

Notice Regarding Strengthening the Administration Work 

of Provincial Level Television Satellite Program Channels 

(2000.01.30)

• Satellite television channels shall strictly observe propaganda requirements, and firmly observe correct guidance 

of public opinion. With respect to reports on important 

events, breaking stories and other sensitive issues, they 

must obey the integrated dispositions of the local party 

committee Propaganda Departments, and strictly abide by 

Party discipline.8

Regulations for the Management of Ground Satellite Television Broadcasting Receptors (1993.10.5)

• Article 9: Individuals may not install and use satellite Earth 

reception equipment.9

Chinese law enforcement works hard to enforce these laws. In 

an April 2004 raid, for example, authorities in Haidan District 

discovered that Hua Yian (Wild Goose) Communications was 

selling satellite reception equipment without permission. The 

subsequent raid netted 174 satellite dishes and other equipment valued at over 200,000 Yuan ($25,000).10

Change is coming, although slowly. China now allows foreign 

partnership with Chinese media companies, with state oversight. Based on Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation’s successful pairing with Hunan Radio, Film, and Television Group and 

Li Kashing’s TOM Group, private entities can be commercially 

successful in China, especially when media has regional talent 

and focus.11 According to Kevin Latham, a media research diChap2.indd 10 9/6/07 12:16:17 PM
CHINA

11

rector, “One has to understand the logic of the Chinese system 

in its own terms, and if you put yourself in the position of a 

Chinese television producer, program planner or other executive who is resigned to not trying to upset the political boat . . . 

then they have enormous flexibility in program choice.”12 Complete deregulation of satellite broadcast content, it would seem, 

is unlikely anytime soon.

Enormous opportunities exist for those willing to respect the 

PRC’s measured approach to progress, however. For equipment 

providers, World Trade Organization (WTO) reform is helping: 

import tendering was lifted on satellite Earth stations in 2004,

enabling foreign import.13 As for importing programming, David Leavy of Discovery Networks Asia explains, “We are a culturally and politically neutral channel with a focus on science 

and history and have never experienced any problems.”14 Successful ventures like this encourage broadcasters to redefine 

their approach when entering China’s expanding market.

China’s major domestic goal to operate independent satellite 

broadcast systems was understandable then, considering these 

issues. By owning and operating satellite broadcast systems 

capable of meeting national needs, the PRC precisely controls 

domestic media, allows cooperation where appropriate, and 

guarantees national profit from all ventures targeting China’s 

consumers. Concurrently, broadcasters willing to respect China’s culture and guidelines stand to profit accordingly. There is 

no doubt both institutions will be stressed as boundaries are 

drawn and challenged, but a unique environment is certainly 

developing in China like few others worldwide.

National-Security Efforts

China’s Commission of Science Committee recently articulated China’s 20-year goal to promote the national defense industry in support of national security. Through 2010, China’s 

tenth five-year plan will form a foundation by reducing international disparity in weaponry research and production, as well 

as reforming organizational structures to achieve breakthroughs 

in national defense technology and economic efficiency.15 The 

breakthroughs China seeks include national-security space 

Chap2.indd 11 9/6/07 12:16:17 PM
CHINA

12

systems not only to support its strategic initiatives, but as a 

measure of comprehensive national power as well.

One area of great development is in remote-sensing satellites. 

A Chinese company that leads such efforts is the Dongfanghong (DFH) Satellite Company. Mainly engaged in the research 

and development of small and microsatellites, DFH has already 

developed a universal satellite bus, the CAST968 platform, 

which can be applied to Earth and ocean observation, communications, navigation, and more.16 During the tenth five-year 

plan (through 2010) DFH will launch a constellation of two optical and one synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites. Between 

2010 and 2015, they intend to launch an eight-satellite constellation with four optical systems and four radar systems.17

These revolutionary new systems will no doubt impact China’s 

ability to use space to meet national-security needs.

Considering that 2004 saw a record number of “resources 

satellites, retrievable satellites, scientific experiment satellites, 

scientific exploration satellites, meteorological satellites and 

small satellites,”18 China is already reaping benefits of increased 

investment. Supporting this ever-increasing battery of satellites 

requires improved command and control, but China is keeping 

pace with demand. Upgrades to its satellite-management system in late 2004 were independently developed by Xian Satellite 

Observation and Control Center, allowing “automatic adjustment of multisatellite observation and control plans and realtime automatic monitoring of the observation and control process.”19 Thanks to mid-2005 upgrades, “the data handling 

capacity of the center has increased by almost 8 times, thus the 

command and control capability of the center has been greatly 

enhanced.”20 China’s rapidly expanding space fleet performs 

more missions than ever before—and indicates immediate goals 

to improve comprehensive national power are being met.

However, China’s self-reliant stance and compartmentalized 

development may eventually hurt its struggle for systems comparable to those of other nations. Li Deren, Shu Peng, and six 

other remote-sensing professionals from the Chinese Academy 

of Science believe that high-resolution remote-sensing satellites are a critical development area for China. According to 

them, “space technology has become an important symbol of 

comprehensive national power.”21 However, their summary of 

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CHINA

13

issues with China’s remote-sensing technology application includes the following highlights:

1. Chinese remote-sensing satellites are an order of magnitude less capable than western satellites.

2. China lacks a space navigation system to help pinpoint 

locations on the Earth.

3. China’s remote-sensing layout lacks overall consideration 

[for military and civilian users], which leads to duplication of resources, omission, and waste of funds.

4. Satellite launching and applications have not yet formed 

commercial operations.

5. Because programs are dependent wholly on government 

investment and lack market motivation, units and individuals cannot give play to their initiative.22

Proposals to improve the direction of Chinese remote sensing 

are sweeping: they include establishing a military and civilian 

group to realize high-resolution, multispectral-satellite and 

radar-satellite constellations for civil and reconnaissance purposes. High technologies including improved orbit-and attitudedetermination technology, wide-spectrum systems, miniaturization, data-relay satellites, and more are also necessary. 

Finally, they admit that launch and construction of satellites 

require government investment, but call upon China’s remotesensing data services to “strive as soon as possible to form a 

Chinese remote-sensing operation that faces the domestic 

and foreign markets with our country’s remote-sensing systems.”23 This statement not only highlights the potential strife 

between China’s remote-sensing communities, it also suggests the harsh reality that without commercial competition, 

rapid innovation may simply not be possible. This, in turn, 

could hurt China’s ability to maximize its space capabilities in 

the national-security spectrum.

Military Space Power

The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) current and future participation in space programs that directly support military operations is shrouded in mystery. However, considering selected 

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publications and what is known of China’s national goals, the 

following details are inferred:

• Thanks to comprehensive national power, China’s military 

will leverage a strong S&T base of technicians and facilities 

to build a savvy space cadre, perhaps even a dedicated space 

force.

• Once present, China’s space professionals would execute a 

space control doctrine that evolves through three distinct 

phases:

o Space is an information battleground: superior space 

navigation, reconnaissance, and communication systems must be integrated into military strategy.

o Space is a physical battleground: direct combat power 

projection into space provides the ability to deny the adversary’s space power.

o Space enables combat power projection: Far-reaching 

technologies allow combat power to be applied globally 

and instantaneously.24

CNP, as described earlier, accelerates technological development by fostering talented people. This, in turn, reflects directly on the relative power of China—including its military 

prowess. Based on selected Chinese writing, military thinkers 

are discussing “space war” (天战); for some in China it holds 

great promise and has very vocal support. And, in order to win 

space war, one first must develop a very capable group of professionals. 

Col Wu Tianfu, guest researcher at China’s Military Academy 

of Military Science and Strategic Research Center, notes that in 

the “space war” century (the twenty-first century), one must 

“try the best to educate people with high-tech knowledge, to fit 

the need of space war in the next century, we need many, with 

high quality.”25 Such qualities include specialty training, taking advanced courses abroad, on-the-job experience, college 

and university education, and research-and-development 

skills. Accordingly, human resources, financial, and material 

support should be increased.26 The training and education of 

capable soldiers is a key goal to prepare for space war.

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The PLA does not delay meeting these goals—efforts to develop highly talented soldiers began as early as 1999. For example, three military schools in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, 

were merged to create the PLA’s Information Engineering University (IEU) to cultivate hi-tech warfare involving the use of 

information technology.27 In addition to its numerous information security programs, the university offers courses in space 

positioning and remote sensing; it possesses space facilities, 

including a global positioning system (GPS) test ground, a satellite ground station, and a satellite observation station.28 In 

late October 2004, as part of China’s 2110 Project, a remotesensing ground station was installed. According to reporters 

Shen Yi and Li Yuming, “the establishment of the station will 

play a positive role in improving the overall military photographic survey level and battlefield monitoring of the PLA, and 

in boosting the quality of the topographic personnel and in carrying out military-application research and theoretical study of 

world-oriented space remote-sensing technology.”29 The IEU 

characterizes the institutions that will produce China’s first 

generation of space cadre.

Institutions like the IEU and others help China’s officers and 

enlisted rapidly develop space savvy. For example, Wang Da 

and others from the National University of Defense Technology 

recently studied the ability of Analytic Graphics Satellite Toolkit (STK) to simulate space-ground integrated combat, noting 

that “study on the modeling and simulation of space-ground 

integrated combat has very important significance to the preparation of future military warfare.”30 In another example, 300 

noncommissioned officers (NCO) at Jiquan launch site handle 

key launch operations, such as rocket fuelling. According to 

one NCO, “the fuel-filling was done by scientists personally, 

later this job was taken over by professional technical officers, 

and now this job is done by us NCOs. So in a sense, it is we 

who send rockets to space!”31 Chinese soldiers obviously take 

space seriously and are proud of their accomplishments.

With a confident cadre of space professionals, a PLA space 

force is a likely development. The important question, then, is 

what will be China’s space force’s structure and doctrine? The 

structure of a space force, according to an article on China’s 

National Defense Education Network, could consist of:

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1. Launch Troops: personnel that launch, inspect, test, and 

refuel spacecraft.

2. Control Network Personnel: widespread control assets, 

with both civilian and military personnel, track and control spacecraft.

3. Early Warning or Space Surveillance Troops: monitor 

hostile countries’ spacecraft and ballistic missiles, track 

satellites, discover enemy intelligence efforts and provide 

early warning to a space commander, who could then 

order antisatellite satellites or missiles to intercept the 

threat.

4. Military Astronauts: a small group deployed in space, this 

group also manages, improves tactical control, detects, 

observes, and provides information on fighting—their role 

cannot be replaced.32

Regardless of the specific form chosen, any PLA space army will 

need a doctrine to guide operational and tactical commanders. 

That doctrine, some predict, will evolve through three distinct 

phases. The exact time line for such evolution is pure speculation; like any doctrine, it is often employed when required and 

is always subject to change. The point remains, though, that 

whether or not Chinese military thinkers are inventing this 

doctrine or simply regurgitating doctrine from outside China, 

they are internalizing the concepts key to building military 

space power.

The first distinct evolution of space-control doctrine treats 

space as an information battlefield, where one wages information warfare to achieve superiority. Though the terminology 

may be abstract, Chinese descriptions depict this kind of conflict as centering not on denying others, but acquiring and successfully integrating military space power into operational and 

tactical strategies. Prof. Yin Weibin and Prof. Wang Xingzhong 

note that information warfare enables rapid reaction and precise long-range strikes, and is decided by space-information 

superiority.33 This information superiority includes possession 

of advanced reconnaissance, communication, and especially 

navigation technologies secure from interference. Li Jian and 

Sun Honglin, contributors to China’s National Defense NewsChap2.indd 16 9/6/07 12:16:18 PM
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paper, warn of the dangers faced when information superiority 

is lacking or threatened. They claim Taiwan’s lack of military 

space power is its weak spot because “Taiwan’s military lacks 

aerospace-reconnaissance and satellite-communication methods, 

and especially because it lacks ballistic missile early warning 

satellites.”34 The authors also note Taiwan does not possess its 

own military communications satellites and must rent them 

from others.35 From these examples we see Chinese doctrine 

development will first tackle the ways and means military space 

power can be integrated at lower levels of command. Once these 

challenges are met, doctrine can be expanded to meet its second 

set of goals.

The second phase of space war extends to “capturing” space 

power. Rather than focus on overcoming internal friction, this 

type of doctrine explains how the military space power of others 

is threatened. Chang Xiangqi explains that capturing space 

power is important because space systems’ tactical integration 

with weapons systems increases daily. As more countries operate space systems, the resulting multifaceted environment will 

break the American and Russian space monopoly.36 As simply 

put in the Shanghai National Defense Strategy Research Institute’s 21st Century Space Soldiers and Space Wars, “Obviously, 

space war is no longer a fantasy, it is a fact that cannot be 

avoided.”37

There are varying methods proposed to capture space power, 

but ways, means, and potentially unique doctrine will probably 

fall into broad categories. One scheme lays out space war’s four 

main modes (or styles) of combat, with examples:

1. “Acupuncture” point attacks: specialized attack, jamming, 

and destruction of the enemy’s space-war command-andcontrol systems’ important points, such as destroying the 

enemy’s space-war control center or different kinds of 

spacecraft-control centers to attain the goal of destroying 

the enemy’s star-wars control systems to paralyze the 

enemy.

2. Blinding attacks: using “soft” methods to make the enemy’s 

“eyes,” such as radar, communications, navigation, and 

electronic reconnaissance equipment, ineffective or blind. 

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Using one satellite to spray an opaque chemical on another satellite’s sensors is an example of this attack.

3. “Kill-the-body” attacks: using interception satellites or 

space mines, usually hidden in a prearranged orbit, patrolling like a soldier on patrol. Once it discovers a target 

it can make a decision to, or on command, launch itself 

at the enemy target. The 1982 Soviet ASAT [antisatellite] 

test is an example of this attack.

4. “Attack-the-heart” attacks: using a kinetic-energy weapon 

or directed-energy weapon to attack the enemy’s star-wars 

weapon systems’ “brain” or “heart” (for example the computer, control system, or power sources and subsystems) 

to attain the goal of destroying the enemy’s target. The 

1997 Air Force laser test is an example of this attack.38

To enable these combat modes, high levels of technology and 

skilled people are required. It is noted that CNP and defensemodernization efforts are again core to the success of spacewar doctrine.

Space war’s third evolution focuses on its third, and most 

romantic, phase: actual power projection through and in space. 

Employing advanced technology like aerospace craft, space stations, space-depot ships, and high-power lasers, military space 

power may be used to capture military power.39 According to 

Wu Tianfu, by 2030 or 2040 this could be a reality. He describes 

a situation in which a small detachment of space troops could 

physically assault a space station or attack the ground, which 

he says “will totally change traditional modes of combat on the 

ground.”40 It is pure speculation whether or not this kind of 

combat power can be developed so quickly, but it certainly is 

seen as an inevitable development in the course of warfare. 

Regardless of the ultimate form of space war, proposed ways, 

means, and doctrine to support it are pursued today. According 

to Wu, “if we use space strategy and international strategy, then 

our influence and control of power will be increased in a big 

way, we can use space strategy to resolve some important international military issues.”41 This attitude reflects a desire for 

revolutionary developments in China’s military space power. 

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Those developments, in turn, will no doubt become key elements 

to consider when examining the space-strategic environment.

International Engagement

Despite the space-war doctrine military thinkers are developing, China is pursuing a concurrent and contradictory international effort to staunch a space-arms race. Currently known 

as the Conference on Disarmament Prevention of an Arms Race 

in Outer Space (PAROS) working paper, CD/1679, it includes 

the following key concepts:

• Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying 

any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space 

in any other manner. 

• Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer 

space objects. 

• Not to assist or encourage other states, groups of states, or 

international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this treaty.42

To date, the Russian Federation is China’s primary partner, 

along with Vietnam, Indonesia, Belarus, Zimbabwe, and the 

Syria Arab Republic. Canada, Sri Lanka, France, Sweden, and 

Italy have also proposed constructive measures on the topic. 

Mr. Hu Xiaodi, ambassador for disarmament affairs of China, 

summarized the motivation for such a treaty at the United Nations (UN) Plenary of the 2003 Session of the Conference on 

Disarmament, “With the demise of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) 

Treaty, the restriction by the international legal regime against 

the development and deployment of outer space weapons has 

been further eroded. As a matter of fact, there are no legal prohibitions whatsoever against the introduction of non-WMD 

[weapons of mass destruction] weapons [i.e., weapons other 

than nuclear, biological, and chemical] into outer space.”43

In 2004, Mr. Hu noted, “such combat theories and concepts 

as ‘control of outer space, power projection into and through 

outer space’ as the R&D [research and development] of outer 

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space weapons have found their ways into implementation.” He 

added, “CD/1679 is still evolving and improving.”44

In June 2005, China’s Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs affirmed China’s continuing commitment on nonweaponization of space.

The prevention of weaponization of outer space and any forms of arms 

race in outer space conduces to global strategic stability and promotes 

the process of arms control and disarmament. The international community should attach great importance to this and take vigorous and 

effective measures to forestall this danger. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should promptly set up an ad hoc committee for the 

negotiations and conclusion of relevant international legal instruments 

or work toward the objective of plugging the loopholes in the current 

legal regime of outer space and effectively preventing the weaponization 

of outer space and any forms of arms race in outer space.45

Do such statements mean China cannot develop space weapons at any point? Will it avoid preparations for space war? 

These issues are certainly considered seriously by China’s national leadership. The situation is probably best summed up in 

a recent opinion piece on China’s ability to build satellite jammers. According to the author, “we have the information, but 

don’t have the ability to build a satellite jammer. We cannot let 

this plan come true, because the Chinese government is against 

a military contest in space. Therefore, we cannot determine 

what Beijing wants to do.”46 Simply put, China’s future military 

space power will be influenced as much by domestic ways, 

means, and doctrine as it will be by perceived success or failure 

in its international efforts. 

Although some may consider simultaneous progress towards 

space war and PAROS hypocrisy, China’s leaders may benefit 

both ways. If PAROS succeeds, debate about weaponization 

might drop from international attention and delay worldwide 

interest in building more advanced military space power. This 

could provide China the time it needs to develop equitable CNP, 

credible technology, and be prepared for space war. Additionally, if space weapons are used against China in the meantime, 

the diplomatic mileage gained would be significant. If PAROS 

fails, however, the PRC could freely develop space-war concepts, reserving the right to take action without any international violation. Such could become major developments in the 

strategic-space environment.

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Whether China is developing a new strategy or employing the 

ancient concept of “fooling the emperor to cross the sea,” the art 

of hiding intentions under the guise of everyday activities, remains to be seen.47 China’s clearly articulated interest in hightechnology weapons and development of space-war thinking, 

when taken in this context, indicates its efforts should be closely 

monitored and seriously considered. At the same time, efforts 

such as PAROS should not be dismissed entirely—building trust 

and increasing transparency could result in the creation of new 

nonmilitary mechanisms that could help mitigate military 

space-power developments.

Notes

1. Pillsbury, China’s Progress.

2. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in India, “President Hu.”

3. Ma, “Develop Space.”

4. “White Paper,” Xinhua.

5. Ma, “Develop Space.”

6. Junhao, Internationalization of Television, 21.

7. Congressional Executive Committee on China, PRC Domestic Laws and 

Regulations.

8. Ibid.

9. Congressional Executive Committee on China, International Agreements.

10. Beijing Administration of Industry and Commerce, “Law Enforcement.”

11. “China’s Media Accelerates,” trans. Wang; and Borton, “Face-off.” 

12. Ibid.

13. Walton, “WTO [World Trade Organization],” 10–17.

14. Borton, “Face-off.”

15. “The Chinese National Defense,” China National Survey Service.

16. Sun, “DFH [Dongfanghong] Satellite Co.,” 22.

17. Ibid.

18. Zhang, “Space Launching.”

19. Li and Sun, “New Satellite Management.”

20. Li and Zhao, “New-Type of Data Exchange.”

21. Li and Shu, “China’s Military.”

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Chang, “Space War”; and Yin and Wang, On Space War.

25. Wu, “The Next Century.”

26. Ibid.

27. “University to Foster Talent.”

28. Zhong, Jun, and Zhao, “Information Engineering University.”

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29. Shen and Li, “Multi-function Remote Sensing.”

30. Wang, Qiu, and Huang, “Study on STK-RTI [Satellite Tool Kit/RunTime Infrastructure],” 501­–503.

31. Wang, “NCOs [noncommissioned officers].”

32. “. . . Space Soldiers,” China National Defense Education Network.

33. Yin and Wang, “On Space.”

34. Li and Sun, “C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).”

35. Ibid.

36. Chang, “Space War.”

37. Shanghai National Strategy Defense Research Institute, “21st Century.”

38. Ibid.

39. Yin and Wang, “On Space War.”

40. Wu, “Next Century.”

41. Ibid. 

42. Hu, “The Weaponization of Outer Space.”

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Office of the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Position Paper.”

46. “China Space Power.”

47. Verstappen, Thirty-Six Strategies.

Chap2.indd 22 9/6/07 12:16:18 PM
23

Chapter 3

India

India pursues space technology to provide for its citizens, 

improve national security, give its military forces a tactical advantage, and boost its regional and international status. A 

world leader in space technology, the Indian space program is 

entering its golden age.

Domestic Environment

India is probably the world’s best example of domestic space 

power used as a national means of improving citizens’ lives. Its 

space programs encourage indigenous technological skill and 

offer new opportunities for industry and commerce; these benefits are shared with surprising equity, both within and outside 

of India.

The most crowning achievement of India’s space systems to 

date is its highly successful constellation of Indian National 

Satellite (INSAT) communications spacecraft. With the 20 September 2005 launch of Edusat, the INSAT system has more 

than 130 transponders in C-band, Extended C-band, and Kuband, providing a variety of telecommunication and television 

broadcasting services.1 To put this in perspective, assuming 

industry standard data rates (DVB-S or the digital video broadcasting, satellite standard), INSATs can transmit up to 7 gigabytes per second over South Asia—the same as 125 million 56 

kilobytes per second modems!2

India uses this bandwidth to solve a longstanding problem: 

connecting its government with its people. In fact, India’s government develops domestic satellite technology today for the 

same reasons radio broadcast was pursued in the 1930s. In 

Satellites over South Asia, David Page and William Crawley explain, “radio held out the prospect of an end to the touring of 

districts and repetition of messages, which was the daily routine of officials working in rural reconstruction.”3 That same 

goal is handled by satellite today, where in the state of Assam 

a “64-kilobits-per-second (Kbps) very-small-aperture-terminal 

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(V-SAT)-based wide area network (WAN) interconnects the state, 

district and block administrative headquarters providing direct 

access to the Internet.”4 This concept, called “e-Governance,” 

allows India to connect its large, dispersed population in a way 

not otherwise possible.

In addition to e-Governance and Internet connectivity, INSAT provides the more pervasive, and perhaps popular, service 

of broadcast television. Again, India’s early days of radio offer a 

valuable insight. As radio developed in India, Frederick Brayne, 

a Punjab rural reconstruction commissioner, noted “the local 

dialect should be used and the matter must, for the most part, 

be familiar to the hearer in relation to his daily life.”5 That sentiment echoes today, for INSAT spacecraft carry programming 

in not only Hindi and English, but 11 other languages as well.6

The Language Independent Programme Subtitles (LIPS) also allow India’s state broadcaster, Doordarshan, to feed the same 

signal to all parts of India via INSAT with electronic subtitles in 

up to 20 languages.7 It is no surprise that INSAT spacecraft are 

a commercially successful venture for the Indian government—

television broadcasters clamor for more bandwidth to satisfy 

India’s demanding and growing television audience.

India demonstrates that television is not merely for entertainment and advertisement, however, as its telemedicine and 

tele-education endeavors show. The September 2005 launch of 

Edusat, an INSAT dedicated to providing educational services, 

is a testament to India’s commitment to use space for its citizens’ benefit.8 In a 2004 address in South Africa, Indian president, Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, who personally contributed over 

two decades of service developing India’s space-launch systems, 

describes a tele-education service known as the President’s Virtual Institute for Knowledge: “The connectivity is through VSATs provided by Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), 

Voice Over Internet Protocol and Internet. It provides for both 

synchronous and asynchronous communication, from text to 

voice, video; one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many connectivity. In this platform, the live virtual studio environment is 

created and it will connect a number of remote locations and 

provide seamless connectivity.”9 Such satellite technology enables India’s institutions of higher learning direct access to students spread throughout India. In a similar fashion, telemediChap3.indd 24 9/6/07 12:16:35 PM
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cine allows medical specialists to interface with patients 

hundreds of kilometers away. Considering the majority of patients are from India’s rural areas, where only 2 percent of India’s doctors practice, it is easy to understand that “this calls 

for innovative methods of utilization of science and technology 

for the benefit of our society and telemedicine assumes a great 

significance to revolutionize the health care system in India.”10

The satellite communications services INSAT provides are well 

poised to meet the demands of India’s growth—not only in population, but quality of life and educational goals as well.

National-Security Efforts

India’s serious pursuit of space to support national security 

was born in 1999, when Pakistan pushed into the Kargil-Dras 

sector in a limited war known as the “Kargil conflict.”11 As a 

RAND study described, “Kargil also occasioned reconsideration 

of India’s perception of its security and its intelligence apparatus: in particular, Kargil strengthened the belief that Pakistani 

surprises can and will occur with potentially dangerous results 

and that they consequently merit anticipatory preparation in 

India.”12 As we will see, these themes reverberate even today, 

as India pursues space systems for national security.

India’s own assessment of the Kargil conflict was captured in 

the Kargil Committee Report, which details events leading up 

to the event, as well as suggestions for improvement. Explaining why India did not detect advancing Pakistani troops, “a 

combination of factors prevented their detection: camouflage 

clothing; helicopter vibrations which hampered observation; 

opportunity for concealment on hearing the sound of approaching helicopters; and peace time safety requirements of maintaining a certain height above the ground and a given distance 

from the LOC [line of control].”13 In addition, the primary organization responsible for external intelligence, the Research and 

Analysis Wing (RAW) was sharply criticized. As the committee 

stated, “It is neither healthy nor prudent to endow that one 

agency alone with multifarious capabilities for human, communication, imagery and electronic intelligence.”14 Based on 

the limitations of existing strategic surveillance techniques and 

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faults in the intelligence system, the use of space systems in 

the national-security environment was primed for change.

The Kargil Committee noted that “Kargil highlighted the gross 

inadequacies in the nation’s surveillance capability, particularly through satellite imagery. The Committee notes with satisfaction that steps have been initiated to acquire this capability.”15 Those steps ultimately resulted in the creation of the 

National Technical Facilities Organization (NTFO) in 2004. The 

NTFO is, in US military terms, India’s executive agent for strategic intelligence, including the use of satellites to support that 

mission. The NTFO has an annual budget of $155.5 million, a 

higher-ranking director than any other Indian intelligence service that directly reports to the prime minister’s office; the 

NTFO is clearly in a position to revolutionize India’s space presence for national security.16

A key element of that revolution is India’s drastically improving spacecraft systems. Its CARTOSAT-2 spacecraft can identify ground objects as small as one meter across and could revisit the same target in one day. India is also developing its 

Radar Imaging Satellite (RISAT) with a 3–50 meter resolution.17

The availability of such high-resolution and radar systems, 

which provide all-weather day-or-night capability, could provide a major boost to India’s national-security space power.

Broader national-security reforms may ultimately drive an increased use of space for national security. India’s National Congress Party, for example, was vocally critical of its predecessor, 

the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)/National Democratic Alliance 

(NDA) government on reforms, stating that “the BJP/NDA Government’s management of India’s national intelligence institutions has been equally abysmal.”18 Before the April 2005 peace 

talks with Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, the Indian 

prime minister, Manmohan Singh, was quoted as saying, “We 

must find technical ways and means to resolve all outstanding 

issues between us in a reasonable, pragmatic manner cognizant 

of the ground realities.”19 The technical means Prime Minister 

Singh suggests, combined with the reforms the Congress Party 

supports, will undoubtedly play a role in developing India’s 

national-security space power spectrum. This new emphasis on 

national-security space power, in turn, will increase India’s 

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overall ability to use space power to keep its leadership informed 

on key issues, not only regionally but globally as well.

Military Space Power

India’s military was affected by the Kargil conflict even more 

extensively than India’s intelligence community: its soldiers 

and leaders fought the battles and suffered through a tougher 

environment than most will ever face. As India’s national leaders discussed how to improve national security, India’s armed 

forces began to focus on how stronger military space power 

could meet their immediate needs of maintaining a tactical 

edge over their adversaries.

The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) struggle to create an Aerospace 

Command is the most characteristic example of how India’s 

armed forces are developing a greater understanding of military space power. It is also an excellent example of challenges 

to the same. The concept of Aerospace Command was first articulated by IAF chief of Air Staff Srinivasapuram Krishnaswamy in 2003, when he said the service was considering the 

command to “link the force with the country’s space-based assets like satellites.”20 However, more expansive uses of military 

space power were also being considered. Pakistan’s Daily Times 

noted Krishnaswamy’s comment on an orbiting weapons platform: “Any country on the fringe of space technology like India 

has to work towards such a command station because advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapon 

platforms in space and killer satellites.”21 Such a comment certainly fell outside of India’s typically nonaggressive stance and 

was generally met with disapproval worldwide.

In response, less than three weeks later Air Chief Krishnaswamy retracted his bold statement. He stated, “We are prepared to use space for our own efficiency and projection in future use. They [satellites] will be used for command and control 

purposes and not for weapons delivery.”22 Still, Aerospace 

Command was not dead. As Krishnaswamy’s successor, Chief 

of Air Staff Shashindra Pal Tyagi, noted in mid-2005, “It is time 

for India to have an aerospace command because our assets in 

space will grow. We in IAF understand that they require to be 

protected.”23 Yet again, Aerospace Command was tabled in 

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September 2005—because of “large financial implications in 

the near term,” as a senior Indian official put it.24 It seems that 

India’s willingness to allow the IAF to develop organic-military 

space power may be doomed to wax and wane for some time.

Aerospace Command retains a nucleus for the future, however, if in spirit but not in name. An IAF subcommand will be 

created, and India is exploring how to integrate space power as 

part of overall military strategy: “The Directorate of Concepts 

and Doctrines at HQ [headquarters], the brain behind the IAF’s 

operational profile, has already started authoring a complex 

military space doctrine exclusively for the IAF’s use, which, 

through the doctrinal cycle, will be eventually absorbed into 

the force’s primary war doctrine. The doctrine will use inputs 

from IAF officers trained at the USAF [United States Air Force] 

Space Command training centre at Colorado Springs.”25 Within 

the next few years, the IAF will no doubt develop a comprehensive military space doctrine. Inputs from lessons learned in the 

Kargil Crisis, input from the USAF, and political encouragement or lack thereof will shape it to match India’s needs.

International Engagement

India’s long-standing tradition as a leader of the world’s 

nonaligned movement and advocate for developing nations in 

the Asia-Pacific region infuse a distinctly international flavor 

into much of its space program. In addition, its strategic alignment with competitor/partners such as China, Russia, and the 

Unites States have varied over the years. At the moment, however, the most important development in India’s international 

outreach is its recent partnership with the United States on key 

issues such as civilian space and missile-defense technology. A 

landmark joint statement, issued on 18 July 2004, describes 

the impetus for closer ties. “Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 

and President Bush today declare their resolve to transform 

the relationship between their countries and establish a global 

partnership. As leaders of nations committed to the values of 

human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the new relationship between India and the United States will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world.”26

This agreement marks a relatively recent approach of openness 

Chap3.indd 28 9/6/07 12:16:35 PM
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on the United States’ part, which India will leverage to augment 

its own space power capabilities.

Specific impacts on India’s high-technology and space programs due to cooperation with the United States include:

• Joint research and training provisions and establishment 

of public/private partnerships, building on the US-India 

High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG).27

• Closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and 

launch, and in the commercial-space arena through mechanisms such as the US-India Working Group on Civil Space 

Cooperation.28 To date, the Group proposes the following:29

o A multiple-hazards early warning and response system 

to serve national objectives of both sides.

o Cooperate on India’s Chandrayaan-1 lunar mission. 

o Promote interoperability between the US GPS, the US WAAS 

and the Indian Gagan satellite navigation-augmentation 

systems.

o Collaborate on a variety of Earth-observation projects involving the US National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), Landsat, and IRS 

[Indian remote sensing] satellites.

o Cooperate in remote-sensing efforts such as the Group 

on Earth Observation. 

o Explore complements in satellite-communications technology and applications, including telemedicine, teleeducation, and space education and training.

• Remove certain Indian organizations from the Department 

of Commerce's entity list.30 On 6 September 2005, the following ISRO organizations were removed:31

o ISRO Telemetry, Tracking, and Command Network (ISTRAC).

o Inertial Systems Unit.

o Space Applications Centre.

Chap3.indd 29 9/6/07 12:16:36 PM
INDIA

30

The following ISRO entities remain on the entity list:32

o Liquid Propulsion System Centre.

o Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre.

o Satish Dhawan Space Centre (Sriharikota).

The results of these efforts so far are mixed. In one example, 

despite an improved ability to do so, collaboration between 

ISRO and Boeing is on hold. According to ISRO chairman G. 

Madhavan Nair, “They [Boeing] are not doing small satellite 

business anymore. They have changed their business plans. 

So, [the ISRO-Boeing initiative] is not going forward at this moment.”33 Despite the best international efforts, lack of commercial advantage can always halt cooperation.

In such areas as space-launch services, however, continuing 

cooperation with the United States may offer India new opportunities. No doubt ISRO welcomes the opportunity to avoid 

deal-breakers because of export-control restrictions. In 2001, 

for example, Taiwan’s original plans to use India’s polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) were scrapped after the United States 

forbade the launch unless Taiwan dropped high-tech satellite 

components from the ROCSAT-2 (Republic of China satellite 

now FORMOSAT-2 or Formosa satellite) remote-sensing satellite.34 Future challenges for India and the United States were 

even noted by Jian Yan in a monthly publication of the CAS. 

According to Jian, “Cooperation is bilateral. Although India is a 

‘democratic country’, and can become an important partner for 

the United States, it is also one of the world’s most closed domestic markets. If the United States adjusts its policies, India 

may also make a corresponding adjustment.”35 Ultimately, India’s success will depend on its technical prowess and reputation, combined with a desire to cooperate—both of which already indicate great promise.

Regardless of the opportunities and shortcomings India faces 

in the years ahead, one thing is clear: its commitment to developing space systems to meet national objectives will continue. 

India’s space power must be taken seriously, for the sum of its 

domestic, national-security, and military spectra augmented 

with extensive international outreach will forge a significant 

independent space power in the years to come.

Chap3.indd 30 9/6/07 12:16:36 PM
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31

Notes

1. Indian Space Research Organization [ISRO], “GSLV-F01 Launch.”

2. European Space Agency, “AMERHIS.”

3. Page and Crawley, Satellites over South Asia, 37. 

4. Ali, “Assam,” 7.

5. Page and Crawley, Satellites over South Asia, 37.

6. “LyngSat,” LyngSat. 

7. Centre for Development of Advanced Computing, “Subtitling Services.”

8. ISRO, “GSLV-F01.”

9. Office of the President of India, “Profile: Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam”; and 

Kalam, “Address.”

10. Technical Working Group on Telemedicine Standardization, “Recommended Guidelines.”

11. Tellis, Fair, and Medby, Limited Conflict, 1.

12. Ibid., 28.

13. Subrahmanyam, Hazari, Verghese, and Chandra, “Executive Summary.”

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Raghuvanshi, “India Plans.”

17. ISRO, “Annual Report.”

18. Indian National Congress Party, “Security Agenda.”

19. Bindra, “Pakistan, India Meet.”

20. Indo-Asian News Service, “India Looking to Buy.”

21. Gilani, “India Building.”

22. Dikshit, “Space Will Not Be Used.”

23. Dikshit, “Centre Taking Steps.”

24. “Govt Caps Commands,” Yahoo! Indian News.

25. Ibid.

26. Bush and Singh, “Joint Statement.”

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. “US-India Joint Working Group,” US-India Joint Working Group.

30. Bush and Singh, “Joint Statement.”

31. “US Removes Six Indian Facilities,” SpaceWar.com.

32. “Three ISRO Units,” SpaceWar.com.

33. “ISRO-Boeing,” Times of India.

34. eoPortal, “ROCSat-2”; and “Satellite Launch,” Taipei Times.

35. Jian, “The United States Government.”

Chap3.indd 31 9/6/07 12:16:36 PM
Chap3.indd 32 9/6/07 12:16:36 PM
33

Chapter 4

European Union

In January 2003, European research commissioner Philippe 

Busquin introduced the European Commission’s (EC) Green 

Paper: European Space Policy. “Over the last few years, the 

Union became aware of the importance of space. It has been 

enhancing its role as an actor, in particular on the basis of applications useful to the conduct of its policies (e.g., the Galileo 

satellite positioning and navigation project) and the GMES initiative (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) for observation of the environment and for security purposes.”1 First 

and foremost, this statement acknowledged that the European 

Union (EU) recognizes space as a strategic environment, and 

described what key areas the EU will focus on. Additionally, the 

Green Paper was meant to spark debate on Europe’s space 

policy with both national and international organizations. As 

we will see, these initiatives are forming a unique space power 

that intends to leverage cooperation to achieve success.

There is extensive debate on the strategic importance of space 

within the EU today. Participants include national leaders, industry, consumers, the scientific community, and citizens. The 

EU believes that all players remotely involved in space must 

understand the larger picture of why space is important. The 

EU also recognizes that its system is fragmented. As the EC’s 

November 2003 white paper Space: A New European Frontier 

for an Expanding Union describes, “The actual and potential 

benefits of space technologies cannot be fully secured under 

present institutional and budgetary arrangements.”2 Europe is 

taking steps to remedy the situation, however.

Numerous proposals to deal with outdated arrangements are 

weaving themselves through European doctrine and policy papers. Despite varying assumptions, most agree that intraEuropean cooperation is a necessity for future success. Efforts 

are already under way to normalize European space institutions, which could have significant impact on the EU’s space 

power. For these reasons, although the EU is many individual 

Chap4.indd 33 9/6/07 12:16:52 PM
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34

nations, current developments warrant examining it as a cohesive entity when it comes to space power.

Domestic Environment

Europe has always shared strong commercial ties with the 

United States—European and American space systems have 

shared much philosophically and technologically. Due to a 

number of factors, however, the EU and its states are beginning to place greater emphasis on developing their own technologies and methods. Consequently, the United States and 

Europe are drifting apart in both the military and civilian space 

sectors as the EU looks to a revamped domestic space industry 

for revolutions in space power development.

The European cooperative rhetoric for space policy has been 

spearheaded primarily by the EU and the European Space 

Agency (ESA), who have been working for over two decades to 

integrate space into the EU’s overall security and defense strategy. 

An integrated approach would bridge the gap between individual 

national space efforts. The EC’s white paper laid the groundwork 

for that integration: it calls for a larger and more integrated funding pool for space projects while inspiring new European space 

efforts to provide advantages for defense and security, and to 

use the technologies of space to improve the quality of life for all 

Europeans.3 In order to carry out the strategic plans put forth by 

the EC, the Space Council was established. 

In November 2004, the first meeting of the Space Council 

was held to seriously discuss formulation of a European space 

policy. As Dutch minister for economic affairs Laurens-Jan 

Brinkhorst noted, “With the first EU-ESA Space Council Europe made a major step in the direction of a strong and coherent European Space Programme. Space technologies and applications will help Europe to reach its common goals in the 

field of i.e. competitiveness, environment and security.”4 A second meeting in June 2005 laid the groundwork for the Council’s ultimate goal: endorsement of a European Space Strategy 

through 2013, to be ratified at the Council’s November 2005 

meeting.5 Key proposals will certainly include mechanisms to 

better integrate Europe’s domestic space industries as a precursor for building greater space power across the continuum. 

Chap4.indd 34 9/6/07 12:16:52 PM
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35

To modernize its industries, Europe’s will improve research 

and development of dual-use space technology, increase overall spending for space, and champion “Europeanization” of its 

domestic industries. By enabling better cooperation between 

EU nations and their industrial consortiums and high-tech industries, Europeanization will result in a greatly improved industrial base to support space power development. A number 

of programs are already under way, including:

• AlphaBus: A joint venture between the ESA, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), European Aeronautic 

and Space Company (EADS) Astrium, and Alcatel Space. 

The AlphaBus communication satellite will bring advanced 

technology at lower costs to the world market by 2007; it is 

“a true product of European industry.”6

• European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS): ESA, the EC, and Europe’s air-navigation system 

Eurocontrol are partnering on this satellite navigationaugmentation system, which paves the way for the Galileo 

satellite navigation system.7

• ESA’s Technology Transfer Program (TTP): 

o European Space Incubator (ESI): Recognizing many of 

the best industry innovations are developed into new 

products by small entrepreneurial companies, the ESI in 

Noordwijk, the Netherlands, provides office space, funding support, technical expertise, and research facilities 

to aid access to international markets, encourage crossfertilization, and improve funding and investment opportunities.8

o ESI Network (ESINET): Through an intranet and other 

services, ESINET connects incubators and partners in 

34 European countries.9 Phillipe Busquin states it is 

“part of our offer to build a critical mass of scientific and 

technological excellence at EU level in order to create a 

true European research area.”10

There are several barriers to a European integrated space 

policy, however. The primary obstacle is that not every member 

of the EU expresses the attitude or the involvement which is 

desired.11 In order for the Europeans to fully integrate their 

Chap4.indd 35 9/6/07 12:16:52 PM
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36

space efforts, each state actor must contribute proportionally 

equal commitments. Simply put, each member is expected to 

provide adequate financial and policy backing on par with the 

benefits they receive from domestic space power. Since many 

European states do not have an equal ability to contribute, 

they may be forced to rethink decisions to join the European 

space club or go it alone. The ESA does not have the authority 

to enforce a European space policy. It has a problem similar to 

the EU, with its European Community Treaty, which stipulates 

that the defense sector is largely outside the scope of community authority and remains under the control of national governments.12 Full European integration for space remains a 

challenge, but the effort to rebuild its domestic industries is a 

critical first step in achieving greater space power.

National-Security Efforts

Europe is developing a number of programs that use space 

systems to support national security. As the EC’s 2003 white 

paper notes, “Space technologies lend themselves well to address questions which are of large-scale and global nature. 

Space is not the answer to every problem, but it should occupy 

an important place in Europe’s policy toolbox.”13 GMES is just 

such a tool, and will be the EU’s primary method to exercise 

national-security space power.

The GMES system provides an autonomous European capacity for Earth observation and monitoring by bringing together space assets that exist on a national or bilateral basis.14

GMES is expected to support both civil and military national 

satellites used for security purposes and to enhance imagery 

and mapping capacities. As Phillipe Busquin and Jean-Jaques 

Dordain describe, the “GMES initiative represents, in simple 

terms, a concerted attempt to produce better policy relevant 

information.”15 On 3 February 2004, the EC adopted the 2004–

08 action plan which establishes a GMES capacity by 2008. In 

addition, the EC’s Strategic Aerospace Review (STAR) 21 Report also called on the EU to ensure European autonomy by 

developing GMES.16 The ability to operate an independent, autonomous space system for national security will be a major 

development in Europe’s national-security space power.

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37

There are numerous satellite systems available to Europe for 

the GMES system, which will employ a unique federated system. According to the European Institute for World and Space 

Affairs (EIWSA) GMES Financial and Technological Assessment, 

“technologically GMES, at least in the medium term, rather 

than running its own satellites, will rely on the satellite systems deployed by the national EU-member states—such as Italy’s Cosmo-SkyMed (constellation of small satellites for Mediterranean basin observation-satellite-based Continuing Medical 

Education) (2005–07), France’s Helios I and II (2003–04) as well 

as Pléiades (2006–08), Germany’s SAR-Lupe (synthetic aperture 

radar—German for magnifying glass) and Telestart (2004–?).”17

The Cosmo-SkyMed system, as an example, will be a major contributor. The Assessment notes, “The currently developed 

Cosmo-SkyMed project will be crucial for the EU monitoring 

capabilities of the Mediterranean sea and adjacent territories.”18

Not only does Cosmo-SkyMed demonstrate European dual-use 

design philosophy, it highlights Europe’s plans to rely on cooperation to achieve its national-security goals.

Cosmo-SkyMed is an Italian Space Agency (ASI) system first 

proposed in 1997 as a dual-use system based on a constellation of four small satellites. Equipped with either radar or optical sensors, it supports national security, risk management, 

and environmental monitoring missions. System requirements 

highlight the utility of the system for national-security missions:

• High-quality imaging (less than one-meter resolution)

• High-accuracy geolocation

• Fast response time

• All-weather day-or-night acquisition capability

• Wide-area collection with along-track stereo acquisition

• Global access19

The most significant feature of COSMO-SkyMed is not technical in nature, however. The fact that it is totally European-born 

and designed to integrate with other EU nations’ systems is 

telling of Europe’s new approach to space use. The GMES Assessment states, “The Italian officials have envisaged from the 

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38

beginning of the COSMO-SkyMed programme to open it up to 

other European partners. The COSMO radar component would 

be complementary initially to the [French] Helios optical satellites and later with Pléiades.”20 This kind of partnership lays 

the groundwork for a Europe in which national-security space 

power will have greater influence over its policy makers.

Military Space Power

It is challenging for a nation to completely share its military 

space capabilities with others, even close EU partner states. 

However, there is one collaborative European space program 

that clearly leverages partnership to improve European military space power: Galileo.

European independence is the chief reason for developing 

Galileo. Although Galileo can work with GPS and the Russian 

GLONASS (ГЛОНАСС�— ГЛО�������� бальная �������� ������������ ������������ вигационная������ путни

ковая������; transliteration: GLObal’naya NAvigatsionnaya 

Sputnikovaya Sistema; translation: GLObal NAvigation Satellite 

System) to improve accuracy, the constellation’s orbital configuration gives it better coverage over Northern EU countries.21

Galileo is a joint initiative between the European Commission 

and ESA, uses a network of 30 satellites, and is expected to be 

operational by 2008. Galileo offers Europe high-fidelity positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services, with an unprecedented real-time location error within the meter range.22 Prior 

to the launch of Galileo, satellite navigation users in Europe 

have no alternative other than to take their positions from US 

GPS or GLONASS satellites. From a European perspective, neither of these systems provides guaranteed service—a serious 

drawback for Europe’s military forces.

To counter that drawback, Galileo will use the jam and spoofresistant public regulated signal (PRS), which is encrypted and 

not commercially available.23 Europe plans on using Galileo’s 

PRS to support regional military actions, such as Petersbergtype operations. These operations include tasking combat 

forces to execute humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping missions using a number of national and multinational forces.24

Lindström and Gasparini provide some examples of how GaliChap4.indd 38 9/6/07 12:16:53 PM
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39

leo could support EU military activities in an European Union 

Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS) occasional paper:

For example, during low-intensity Petersberg-type operations Galileo 

could be used to monitor troop movements (given adequate tracking 

devices), facilitate the transport of supplies, establish perimeters, etc. 

For high-end Petersberg operations requiring the use of force, the positioning system could be used for traditional GNSS tasks such as logistics planning, targeting and munitions guidance. Under both types of 

operations, reliance on the PRS signal would be advantageous given the 

possibility to use it asymmetrically.25

Galileo’s design guarantees access for government and military users in Europe. Access to a high-quality, secure, and reliable navigation service in the form of Galileo greatly enables 

European military space power regionally. However, Galileo is 

more than just a regional effort—it has a significant international aspect as well.

International Engagement

Galileo not only impacts Europe’s military users—it can be 

argued its primary purpose is to leverage European space power 

through international means. Despite concerns over GPS and 

Galileo duplicity, the EU sees Galileo as an inherently international system and global alternative to GPS. In this sense, Europe is carving out a portion of international power the US currently enjoys through its operation of the GPS system.

In 2002 the United States expressed concerns over Galileo 

regarding interference and interoperability with the GPS system.26 It was also noted, “The United States has made its system available free of charge to non-military users since 1983 

and sees ‘no compelling need’ for the European version because 

it believes the United States system will meet the needs of users for the foreseeable future.”27 The EU, however, recognizes 

that many other nations are hesitant to integrate their national 

infrastructures with GPS alone. Galileo therefore encourages a 

more multipolar environment in satellite navigation technology. In the following two examples, Europe’s international 

efforts with Russia and separately with China reveal Europe’s 

plan to build better space power through cooperation.

Chap4.indd 39 9/6/07 12:16:53 PM
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40

In the first example, Europe is leveraging Russia’s expertise 

in operating space systems. The ESA and Russian Aviation and 

Space Agency (Российское авиационно-космическое агентство, 

commonly known as Росавиакосмос or Rosaviakosmos) view 

global satellite navigation as an area of mutual interest, and 

Galileo was specifically cited as an area for cooperation at the 

15th Annual EU–Russia Summit in May 2005.28 Russia’s experience in operating its own navigation satellite system is a major 

benefit because “Russia’s experience in operating a highly accurate navigation system and the European Union’s strength in 

providing the technologies required for both space- and groundbased segments create the conditions for a very fruitful collaboration.”29 In addition, Russia will use its Soyuz launch system 

to place the two prototype Galileo systems into orbit.30 Europe 

recognizes that a strong international agreement with Russia 

can give Galileo a tangible boost—Russia’s experience and technology will be leveraged to improve Europe’s program.

Just as Europe leverages Russia’s experience, China hopes 

to leverage Europe’s willingness to cooperate internationally 

and provide new technology and training to its partners. The 

EU and China signed an agreement in September 2003, where 

Loyola de Palacio, vice president of the EC, stated “China will 

help GALILEO to become the major world infrastructure for the 

growing market for location services.”31 China’s S&T minister 

Xu Guanhua added that “China supports GALILEO and plans 

to participate actively in its construction and application for 

mutual benefits.”32 Sino-European cooperation and the EU’s 

goal to supplant GPS as the “major world infrastructure” are 

very characteristic of the rapid development of multipolar 

trends in the space strategic environment.

Europe and China facilitate cooperation through the ChinaEurope Global Navigation Satellite Service (GNSS) Technology 

Training and Cooperation Center (CENC). Founded by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of the PRC, the EC, 

and the ESA, its goals are

• To offer the Galileo network service

• Support a GNSS Center

• Provide GNSS information

Chap4.indd 40 9/6/07 12:16:53 PM
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41

• Coordinate unified study campaigns and GNSS application 

exploitation

• Organize GNSS training

• Support temporary or specialty GNSS campaigns33

The National Remote Sensing Center of China (NRSCC) provides support and is responsible for two Galileo procurement 

actions: the medium Earth orbit local user terminals (MEOLUT) that will locate and relay Galileo’s distress signals, and 

search and rescue link end-to-end validation.34 In a related effort, the European EGNOS augmentation system is already 

tested in China. In 2004 a triangular EGNOS service area was 

deployed that improved the quality of GPS signals within by a 

factor of three.35 Considering China’s goal to develop CNP, the 

support, technology, and training provided by the European 

Galileo effort are welcome developments. 

By examining EU efforts to develop its international power, 

provide for its national-security and military needs, and Europeanize domestic space industry, we recognize a new formula 

at work. By focusing on cooperation, Europe as a whole can 

benefit from space power far beyond what any single nation 

could hope to achieve. Based on the evidence presented here 

this formula may be a winning one for the EU, enabling it to 

become a truly independent space power. 

Notes

1. EC, Green Paper.

2. EC, Space.

3. Ibid.

4. ESA, “First Ever.”

5. ESA, “Further Steps.”

6. ESA, “Alcatel Space and Astrium.”

7. ESA, “Safer Train Circulation.”

8. “ESI Overview,” European Space Incubator.

9. About the European Space Incubators Network,” ESINet.

10. Silvestri, “Space and Security,” 11.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 17.

13. EC, Space.

14. ESA, “What is GMES?”

15. Ibid.

Chap4.indd 41 9/6/07 12:16:53 PM
16. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “European Union.”

17. European Institute for World and Space Affairs (EIWSA), “GMES.”

18. Ibid.

19. Rum, “The Interest of a Constellation,” 53.

20. EIWSA, “GMES.” 

21. Lindström and Gasparini, “Galileo Satellite System,” 15.

22. ESA, “What is Galileo?”

23. Lindström and Gasparini, “The Galileo Satellite System,” 19.

24. Pagani, “New Gear,” 738; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Implementation.”

25. Lindström and Gasparini, “Galileo Satellite System,” 21.

26. The United States Mission to the European Union, “US Explains Position.”

27. Ibid.

28. EC, “Satellite Navigation”; and EC, “EU and Russia.”

29. EC, “Satellite Navigation.”

30. EC, “Soyuz.” 

31. “EU and China,” China-Europe GNSS Technology Training and Cooperation Center.

32. Ibid.

33. NRSCC, “About CENC.”

34. NRSCC, “Implementation of Galileo MEOLUT (Medium Earth Orbit Local User Terminal)”; and NRSCC, “NRSCC Documents.”

35. ESA, “EGNOS.”

42

EUROPEAN UNION

Chap4.indd 42 9/6/07 12:16:53 PM
43

Chapter 5

Nature of the Space Environment

Examining China, India, and the European Union provides 

us invaluable insight into disparate elements of the space strategic environment. By applying Colonel Guillot’s framework, we 

have shown how these parties use space to meet strategic goals, 

implicitly proving space power will play an ever-increasing role 

in the strategic environment. By “knowing the disparate components of the strategic environment,” the first step in identifying strategic leadership challenges has been completed. The 

second step, Colonel Guillot says, is “understanding the nature

of the strategic environment.”1

The nature of the strategic environment is volatile, uncertain, 

complex, and ambiguous. Colonel Guillot shows how this 

nature makes special demands on the process of making consequential decisions.2 These characteristics have been translated into actual space-power contexts for clearer observation, 

and each narrative section identifies the apparent critical areas 

for continued attention, action, and research.

Volatility

Volatility, in a broad sense, is not ordinarily associated with 

space power. As we have seen, many space programs require 

years of careful planning and thoughtful investment. Because 

of this, serious shifts in a particular nation’s strategic space 

power usually occur with advance warning or advertisement. 

But, even well-understood systems can be unpredictable—an 

unexpected “trigger” event or seemingly unrelated conflict can 

cause rapid escalation of actions and reactions, resulting in 

violence. As Colonel Guillot stated, “The challenge for strategic 

leaders lies in anticipating volatile scenarios and taking action 

to avert violence.” It is up to the strategic leader to form comprehensive plans that will bring a quick return to a peaceful 

and functioning state.3

Preventing volatile, violent scenarios from occurring in space 

was addressed early in the context of preventing space from 

Chap5.indd 43 9/6/07 12:17:08 PM
NATURE OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT

44

becoming a Cold War battleground. In 1967 the Outer Space 

Treaty (OST) went into effect and now serves as the “basic 

framework on international space law.”4 The OST outlaws use 

of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons in or from space or 

any celestial bodies. Space powers can focus on using space 

power rather than protecting or denying it; and because the 

magnitude of conflict involving violence in space can be expected to result in the destruction of the earth, protection of 

space power for its own sake has become a secondary issue. 

Furthermore, enforcement of the OST has been very lax, and 

settlements arising out of loss of national space power usually 

come about through international lawsuits or negotiations.

Although nobly intentioned, it is unlikely that agreements like 

the OST will weather multipolar space power. The OST was the 

product of Soviet and US agreement, which by Cold War standards was globally unanimous. As more nations use space, 

however, a multitude of standards of behavior will emerge. Will 

international treaties become unenforceable as multiple parties 

realize their own innate space “rights” to self defense, or will the 

treaties be replaced with stricter codes of conduct with greater 

international enforcement? As we have learned, PAROS represents a proposed evolution where nations will self-impose extensive restrictions on their space use to preserve the peace in space 

for all. Should self-restraint fail in the face of pressing particular 

national strategic needs, the challenge of de-escalating space 

conflicts will remain.

Avoiding volatile and potentially violent scenarios requires 

rigorous and clear-minded attention. It must be understood 

that there likely will be volatility leading to violence as a consequence of the implementation, proposal, or even conception 

of new methods of “capturing” space power. Conflicts may 

erupt because of perception of unacceptable risk to a nation’s 

space power.

Current major international initiatives and even PAROS focus on attempting to prohibit conflict. Because the space strategic environment is volatile, however, international regimes 

should be pursued that acknowledge the possibility of conflict 

and address methods to bring about quick de-escalation and 

arbitration. If not, future strategic leaders may resort to ”Gordian knot” solutions with little international coordination or coChap5.indd 44 9/6/07 12:17:08 PM
NATURE OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT

45

operation. The results of these kinds of actions could be tragic 

and permanent.

Uncertainty

Uncertainty is a very familiar trait of the space strategic environment. Strategic leaders “face situations in which the intentions of competitors are not known—perhaps deliberately 

concealed. At other times, they will even have reservations 

about the actual meaning of truthful information. Their challenge is to penetrate the fog of uncertainty that hugs the strategic landscape.”5

This uncertainty is intrinsic to space power. On one extreme, 

domestic and international efforts tend to be public efforts that 

benefit greatly from collaboration and open commerce. On the 

other, national-security and military space-power users tend to 

move in guarded circles with concealed intentions. Considering 

the impact of inevitable collaboration between these communities and other complicating factors, determining the true intentions of competitors is a major challenge. 

Some interesting examples of how different nations may deal 

with such challenges have been presented here. China, through 

PAROS, proposes that strict self-regulation regarding the use 

of space weapons can limit international uncertainty for all. 

The PRC also avoids the chaos of foreign influence by favoring 

indigenous systems and limiting import and free use of space 

technology. India is taking the opposite approach by seeking 

the synergy of international partnerships as the first step in 

strengthening its own capabilities. The EU plans to build a Eurocentric space power structure that works around uncertainty 

by building independent, interoperable systems such as Galileo and GMES.

If the spirit of cooperation defeats uncertainty, there could be 

new opportunities on the horizon. It was asserted earlier that 

national-security space systems will become much more prolific. 

Currently, nations guard their space-based C4ISR capabilities 

closely, sharing only hazy hints at their contribution to decision 

making. In the future, however, nations may be more willing to 

share their technology and tradecraft with others. Although this 

seems to be an uncomfortable development for some, it could 

Chap5.indd 45 9/6/07 12:17:08 PM
NATURE OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT

46

also prove beneficial. For example, data-sharing agreements 

could allow nations to jointly monitor and digest common concerns. By comparing independent assessments, analysts could 

then offer their leaders the best possible inputs. Alternatively, a 

coalition force may accept a member nation’s C4ISR support, 

rather than troops or money, as a welcome contribution.

Because of possibilities like these and more, strategic space 

leaders should prepare to work with international partners in 

new ways, should cooperation become the global standard. Not 

only can a nation improve its access to space capabilities, but 

partnerships may offer improved robustness and flexibility over 

completely indigenous solutions. 

Complexity

Examining a nation’s domestic, national security, military, 

and international space efforts as disparate components is an 

excellent way to structure an analysis. What it does not expose, 

however, is the complex interdependence of each. By focusing on 

only the space segment of a given system, it is difficult to quantitatively determine its importance within much larger mechanisms. What elements of space power are “nice to have” and what 

elements are “need to have” capabilities? What impact will their 

presence or absence have on larger strategic conflicts? Understanding interdependencies like these make complexity the 

“most challenging characteristic” of the strategic environment.6

We have shown that space power provides invaluable and 

perhaps otherwise unattainable contributions to a nation’s 

strategic power. For this to occur, however, space power must 

be successfully integrated into larger systems of systems. This 

poses a dual challenge for strategic space leaders: successfully 

integrate space power into their own key strategic systems, and 

understand how others accomplish the same.

Integrating space power into existing strategic systems is as 

much art as it is science. Local culture determines the kinds of 

workforce and infrastructure that will spring up with rapidly 

advancing technology, the changing user demands, and the 

evolving strategic requirements. There are different approaches 

to solving these challenges. China, for example, is developing 

institutions like the IEU to locally educate a space cadre capable 

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NATURE OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT

47

of developing and executing space-war doctrine. Chinese institutions like the China Academy of Space Technology are focusing on using the latest technologies to achieve space information superiority. India, on the other hand, is seeking a more 

international approach, hoping to partner commercially with US 

companies and use US military doctrine as the foundation for its 

own. Finally, the European Union is implementing a coalition 

mechanism in which cooperation between multinational components is a prerequisite condition for effective space-power projection. Time will tell if these approaches are suited for their users, 

but one fact is clear: greater diversity in the means of achieving 

space power produces an environment ripe for revolution. If the 

strategic leader wants to benefit from new revolutions, lessons 

must be learned not just from local culture and infrastructure, 

but also across the global state of the art as well.

Understanding the process by which other nations build and 

integrate space power produces valuable lessons that can be 

applied locally. A second and equally important reason to 

understand space interdependencies is to help understand unintended consequences that may arise from seemingly straightforward actions. Driving factors as diverse as cultural imperialism, 

the demise of the ABM treaty, and Europeanization of high-tech 

industries have been shown to have direct, if unintended, consequences in the strategic space-power environment. Predicting 

actions and reactions requires integrative thinking. Colonel 

Guillot argues, “if leaders are to anticipate the probable, possible, 

and necessary implications of the decision, they must develop a 

broad frame of reference or perspective and think conceptually.”7 Therefore, cognizance must be paid not only to the details 

of how nations use space power, but to the concepts driving 

their actions as well.

Ambiguity

Differing international concepts driving space-power development ultimately produce the environment’s final characteristic, ambiguity. Colonel Guillot describes ambiguity as coming 

“from different points of view, perspectives, and interpretations 

of the same event or information.”8 For space powers, this is 

exacerbated by the fact that close monitoring of the space enviChap5.indd 47 9/6/07 12:17:08 PM
NATURE OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT

48

ronment requires expensive and complex systems—even so, it 

is possible for events to occur without warning. Attribution and 

interpretation are also difficult tasks—how does one distinguish intentional attacks from accidents? Furthermore, what 

weight will a claim carry if third parties cannot verify that a 

particular event ever occurred?

Ambiguities like these continue to fuel international debates 

on space power, its value, and how it is changing. Just as the 

environment can be broken into domestic, military, national 

security, and international elements, friction and conflicts will 

emerge from their various participants as well. Because of this, 

strategic leaders should realize the value of using a team-based 

consensus to “help eliminate ambiguity and lead to effective 

strategic decisions.”9 It is doubtful these debates can be quickly 

resolved, but the space leader can count on one thing: the 

multipolar nature of space power will make both local and international teamwork essential to producing effective strategic 

decisions.

Conclusion

Many nations are advancing their use of space to meet domestic, national-security, and military needs—this proves space 

power is becoming an increasingly important strategic environment. Case studies examining the unique space power of China, 

India, and the European Union conclude that the strategic environment will become increasingly multipolar, offering new 

challenges for the strategic leader. Colonel Guillot’s model for 

strategic environments demonstrates that this will require overcoming the volatile, complex, uncertain, and ambiguous nature 

of the space environment. 

Although local paradigms will be challenged, leaders should 

prepare to leverage global advances in the state of the art at 

home, build more stable and less vulnerable space power through 

carefully developed cooperation, and create effective means for 

de-escalation of space-based conflicts if and when they occur. 

Internationally, these trends are already at work and redefining 

the strategic landscape. Regardless of its final form, international engagement in a multitude of forms will be necessary to 

achieve and maintain space power now and in the future.

Chap5.indd 48 9/6/07 12:17:09 PM
NATURE OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT

49

Notes

1. Guillot, “Strategic Leadership.”

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States,” United Nations 

Office for Outer Space Affairs.

5. Guillot, “Strategic Leadership.”

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

Chap5.indd 49 9/6/07 12:17:09 PM
Chap5.indd 50 9/6/07 12:17:09 PM
51

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bib.indd 60 9/6/07 12:19:46 PM
Challenges in the Multipolar

Space-Power Environment

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

James S. Howard

Copy Editor

Darlene H. Barnes

Cover Art and Book Design

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Vivian D. O’Neal

Quality Review

Mary J. Moore

Print Preparation

Joan Hickey

Distribution

Diane Clark

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