79–006 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 115–858 

ANTI-TERRORISM CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2018 

JULY 23, 2018.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. GOODLATTE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H.R. 5954] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 5954) to amend title 18, United States Code, to clarify the 

meaning of the terms ‘‘act of war’’ and ‘‘blocked asset’’, and for 

other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended 

do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 1 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 2 

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 3 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 8 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 8 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 8 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 8 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 8 

Committee Cost Estimate ....................................................................................... 8 

Duplication of Federal Programs ............................................................................ 8 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings ..................................................................... 8 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 9 

Advisory on Earmarks ............................................................................................. 9 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 9 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 10 

The Amendment 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018’’. 

2 

SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF THE TERM ‘‘ACT OF WAR’’. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2331 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; 

and 

(3) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(6) the term ‘military force’ does not include any person that— 

‘‘(A) has been designated as a— 

‘‘(i) foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189); or 

‘‘(ii) Specially Designated Global Terrorist (as such term is defined in 

section 594.310 of the Code of Federal Regulations) by the Secretary of 

State or the Secretary of the Treasury; or 

‘‘(B) has been determined by the court to not be a ‘military force’.’’. 

(b) APPLICATION.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to any civil 

action pending on or commenced after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 3. SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST TERRORISTS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2333 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting at the end following: 

‘‘(e) USE OF BLOCKED ASSETS TO SATISFY JUDGMENTS OF U.S. NATIONALS.—For 

purposes of section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 

note), in any action in which a national of the United States has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party pursuant to this section, the term ‘blocked asset’ shall 

include any asset of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency 

or instrumentality of that party) seized or frozen by the United States under section 

805(b) of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1904(b)).’’. 

(b) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to any 

judgment entered before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 4. CONSENT OF CERTAIN PARTIES TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2334 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(e) CONSENT OF CERTAIN PARTIES TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), for purposes of any 

civil action under section 2333 of this title, a defendant shall be deemed to have 

consented to personal jurisdiction in such civil action if, regardless of the date 

of the occurrence of the act of international terrorism upon which such civil action was filed, the defendant— 

‘‘(A) after the date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 

subsection, accepts— 

‘‘(i) any form of assistance, however provided, under chapter 4 of part 

II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.); or 

‘‘(ii) any form of assistance, however provided, under section 481 of 

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291) for international 

narcotics control and law enforcement; or 

‘‘(B) in the case of a defendant benefiting from a waiver or suspension of 

section 1003 of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (22 U.S.C. 5202) after the 

date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this subsection— 

‘‘(i) continues to maintain any office, headquarters, premises, or other 

facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States; 

or 

‘‘(ii) establishes or procures any office, headquarters, premises, or 

other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United 

States. 

‘‘(2) APPLICABILITY.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any defendant who 

ceases to engage in the conduct described in paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B) for 

5 consecutive calendar years.’’. 

(b) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the 

date of enactment of this Act. 

Purpose and Summary 

The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 makes three needed 

improvements to the Antiterrorism Act of 1992 (ATA) to better ensure that victims of international terrorism can obtain justice in 

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3 

1 137 Cong. Rec. S1771–01 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 

2 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). The Antiterrorism Act (ATA) defines ‘‘international terrorism’’ to include 

activities that: (A) ‘‘involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 

the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation 

if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State’’; (B) ‘‘appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping’’; and (C) ‘‘occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction 

of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they 

are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in 

which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.’’ 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). 3See 136 Cong. Rec. S4568–01 (1990). 4 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property & Judicial Administration of the H. 

Comm. On the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 10 (1992) (‘‘1992 Hearing’’) (letter from Sen. Grassley). 5 136 Cong. Rec. at S14283 (statement of Sen. Grassley). 

6 1992 Hearing at 13. 

national terrorist activity. The legislation: (1) clarifies ambiguities 

in the ATA’s ‘‘act of war’’ exception that currently allows designated foreign terrorists and their supporters to avoid liability; (2) 

closes a loophole that currently prevents victims of narco-terrorism 

from enforcing their judgments against terrorist assets that have 

been blocked by the Treasury Department; and (3) addresses lower 

court decisions that have allowed entities that sponsor terrorist activity against U.S. nationals overseas to avoid the jurisdiction of 

U.S. courts. 

Background and Need for the Legislation 

I. Background 

In 1992, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism Act’s civil cause of 

action provision to help address international terrorist attacks that 

harm U.S. persons abroad by ‘‘provid[ing] the framework in our 

legal system for Americans to seek justice against those who defy 

all notions of morality and justice.’’ 1 The ATA’s civil liability provision is aimed at deterring support for terrorism, buttressing the 

country’s counter-terrorism initiatives, and providing justice for victims of terrorist attacks. The provision grants U.S. nationals injured by acts of international terrorism a civil action for damages. 

Specifically, it provides that: 

[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her 

person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, 

may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the 

United States and shall recover threefold the damages he 

or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.2

In passing the ATA’s civil remedy, Congress recognized that ‘‘reluctant courts and . . . jurisdictional hurdles’’ had often stymied 

the ability of victims of international terrorism to obtain redress for 

their injuries.3 Thus, the civil remedy was designed to ‘‘remove the 

jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims’’ of international terrorism 4 and ‘‘fill the gap by providing the civil counterpart to’’ the ATA’s criminal penalties.5 In addition, the civil remedy 

provision was designed to ‘‘put[] terrorists’ assets at risk and 

deter[] them from using the U.S. financial system to hide and augment their wealth.’’ 6 In short, by cutting terrorists’ financial lifelines, the provision furthers the United States’ longstanding efforts 

4 

7 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 2, Boim v. Quranic 

Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. For Relief & Dev, No. 01–1969 (7th Cir. Nov. 14, 2001). 8 18 U.S.C. § 2336(a). 

9 961 F. Supp. 2d 185 (D.D.C. 2013). 

10 18 U.S.C. § 2331(4). This amendment to the ATA is carried out by adding a definition of 

‘‘military force’’ to 18 U.S.C. § 2331. 11This third category—any person that has been determined by the court to not be a military 

force—is intended to preserve the courts’ ability to make a determination as to whether a person 

in addition to an FTO or an SDGT is not a military force of any origin. In other words, this 

language was included to make clear a person in addition to an FTO or an SDGT may be found 

not to be a military force. 

to reduce global terrorism and thus protect Americans here and 

abroad. 

The Department of Justice has recognized that the civil liability 

provision is ‘‘an effective weapon in the battle against international 

terrorism’’ because it ‘‘discourage[s] those who would provide financing for this activity.’’ 7 And the State Department has explained that the provision ‘‘discourage[s] sources of terrorist funding and hold[s] sponsors of terrorism accountable for their actions.’’ 

II. The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act 

The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act addresses three discrete 

problems that currently exist in the ATA: (1) ambiguities in the 

ATA’s ‘‘act of war’’ exception that allow designated foreign terrorists and their supporters to avoid liability; (2) a loophole that prevents victims of narco-terrorism from enforcing their judgments 

against terrorist assets that have been blocked by the Treasury Department under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act; 

and (3) lower court decisions that have allowed entities that sponsor terrorist activity against U.S. nationals overseas to avoid the 

jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 

A. ‘‘Act of War’’ Exception 

Defendants accused of aiding and abetting acts of international 

terrorism have been attempting to use the ATA’s ‘‘act of war’’ exception 8 as a means of avoiding civil liability, even in cases in 

which the plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by the actions of designated terrorist groups. For example, in Kaplan v. Central Bank 

of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the defendant banks successfully 

argued that rocket attacks carried out by Hezbollah—a designated 

foreign terrorist organization—were acts of war and thus outside 

the scope of the ATA’s civil liability provisions.9 The court agreed 

and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, finding that the attacks, carried out by a terrorist group against civilians, were acts of war. 

The ATA’s ‘‘act of war’’ exception should not be a liability shield for 

those who aid or abet attacks carried out by designated terrorist 

organizations. 

This legislation effectively amends the definition of ‘‘act of war’’ 

in the ATA 10 to clarify that the act of war exception does not apply 

to any person that has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department or a Specially Designated Global 

Terrorist by the Treasury or State Departments, or any person that 

has been determined by the court to not be a ‘‘military force.’’ Simply put, this definitional change means that a defendant would not 

be able to use the ATA’s ‘‘act of war’’ defense if the terrorist act 

was carried out by a designated terrorist organization or by any 

other person the court determines is not a military force.11

5 

12 H.R. Rep. No. 102–1040 at 7 (1992); S. Rep. 102–342 at 46 (1992) (emphasis added). 13Stansell v. BGP, Inc., 2011 WL 1296881, at *11 (M.D.Fla. 2014) (‘‘To find that a terrorist 

organization can be a military force under the ATA would defeat the purpose of the Act.’’); Weiss 

v. Arab Bank, PLC, 2007 WL 4565060, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007) (‘‘I find that a designated terrorist organization cannot constitute a ‘military force of any origin.’ ’’); Morris v. 

Khadr, 415 F.Supp.2d 1323 (D.Utah 2006). 14 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201, 515.310 (CACR) (requiring a license for attachment); id. 

§§ 535.201, 535.310 (Iran Assets Control Regulations) (same); id. §§ 594.201, 594.312 (GTSR) 

(same). 

This definitional change furthers Congress’ original intent with 

regard to the act of war exception. Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees’ reports concerning the ATA include section-bysection analyses of the statute. In discussing the ‘‘act of war’’ exception, the House and Senate reports provide: 

This section excludes from the scope of any civil action 

a claim brought on account of ‘‘an act of war.’’ The intention of this provision is to bar actions for injuries that result from military action by recognized governments as opposed to terrorists, even though governments also sometimes target civilian populations.12

The change is also consistent with the approach taken by several 

courts that have interpreted the exception.13

B. Judgments Against Narco-Terrorists 

Under statutes like the civil liability provision in the ATA, U.S. 

terrorism victims have successfully obtained judgments against terrorist parties that have caused them harm. However, after being 

awarded such judgments, terrorism victims have often faced practical and legal difficulties at the enforcement stage. Assets of terrorist parties may not be present in the United States and, to the 

extent they are present, they are often either well concealed or 

seized or frozen by the federal government. 

In 2002, in order to help lessen these enforcement burdens, Congress passed section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 

(TRIA), which authorizes execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy a terrorism judgment against a terrorist 

party from the blocked assets of that terrorist party. By permitting 

terrorism victims to attach blocked assets in order to satisfy their 

terrorism-based judgments, TRIA permits victims to bypass the 

usual requirement that a litigant first obtain a license from the 

United States Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets 

Control (OFAC) in order to attach blocked assets.14 Section 201(a) 

of TRIA provides: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . , in 

every case in which a person has obtained a judgment 

against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of 

terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune 

under section 1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in 

effect on January 27, 2008) of title 28, the blocked assets 

of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any 

agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be 

subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in 

order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any comVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:01 Jul 30, 2018 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR858.XXX HR858
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15Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), Pub. L. 107–297 201(a), § 201, 116 Stat. 2337 (28 

U.S.C. § 1610 note). 16 50 U.S.C. app. 1–44. 17 50 U.S.C. § 1701–1708. 18See TRIA § 201(d). 19 137 Cong. Rec. 6, 8143 (1991) (Statement of Sen. Grassley). 20See Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and 

Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1990) (Statement of Sen. 

Grassley). 21See, e.g., Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016); Livnat 

v. Palestinian Authority, 851 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 

pensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been 

adjudged liable.15

TRIA further provides that a ‘‘blocked asset’’ is any asset seized 

by the Executive Branch pursuant to either the Trading With the 

Enemy Act (TWEA) 16 or the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (IEEPA).17

Thus, under current law, victims of terrorism may satisfy a 

court-awarded judgment against a terrorist party using assets of 

that terrorist party (or an agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) that the U.S. government has frozen pursuant to 

TWEA or IEEPA.18 However, assets frozen under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act) are not currently 

available to terrorism victims. This leaves victims of narco-terrorism without a meaningful method of satisfying their ATA judgments. It makes little sense for our nation’s counterterrorism laws 

to reach narco-terrorist organizations, like the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), but then prevent victims from 

executing on such an organization’s blocked assets merely because 

the U.S. government blocked those assets under the Kingpin Act 

instead of TWEA or IEEPA. 

The Antiterrorism Clarification Act amends the ATA to make 

clear that assets blocked under the Kingpin Act shall be available 

to victims of narco-terrorism who have obtained judgments against 

the responsible terrorist party. 

C. Personal Jurisdiction Over Overseas Terrorist 

Sponsors 

Congress passed the ATA to ‘‘provide for Federal civil remedies 

for American victims of international terrorism’’ and to ‘‘remove[] 

the jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims. . . .’’ 19

The ATA, in fact, was designed to ‘‘provide[] extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist acts abroad against United States nationals.’’ 20 Yet, recent federal court decisions have called into question 

the ATA’s continued ability to bring terrorists or their abettors to 

justice in U.S. courts.21 Most recently, the Supreme Court denied 

certiorari in a case concerning American victims of Palestinian terrorism. The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization leaves in place a flawed Second Circuit decision that extends due process protections to the Palestine 

Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) 

and severely limits the extraterritorial scope of the ATA. 

Carrying out or assisting an act of international terrorism that 

injures or kills American citizens abroad should be, in and of itself, 

sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts. But even 

more so, the purposeful availment by a defendant of certain benefits under U.S. law should constitute consent to jurisdiction in ATA 

7 

22 18 U.S.C. § 2334. 23This provision in the bill applies to the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof. See 22 U.S.C. § 5202. 24The consent provision is clearly constitutional under both long-established precedents permitting deemed consent to personal jurisdiction and on the basis of express language in the statute alerting affected persons that by accepting U.S. foreign assistance or maintain or establishing a physical presence in the United States, they will be agreeing to submit to personal 

jurisdiction for cases under the ATA. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 638–39 

(2d Cir. 2016) (‘‘state statute lack[ed] explicit reference to any jurisdictional implications’’); accord Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142 (Del. 2016) (‘‘Nothing in the registration 

statutes explicitly says that a foreign corporation registering thereby consents to the personal 

jurisdiction of this state.’’); Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home 

Loans, Inc., 898 Wis.2d 528, 552 (2017) (pointing to absence of ‘‘express statutory language asserting general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on its appointment of an agent for 

service of process’’); Aspen Am. Ins. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d 440, 447 (Ill. 

2017) (pointing to ‘‘absence of any language’’ in the statute). 

The provision also meets the standard for implied consent to the jurisdiction of a particular 

court. Such consent is implied in cases in which the litigant is aware of the right to refuse to 

consent and still proceeds voluntarily. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 

1932, 1948 (2015); Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 590 (2003). Knowledge of our laws may fairly 

be charged to persons, like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) when they ‘‘chose to enter’’ the United States. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 

465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984). Thus, if a defendant in an ATA case has voluntarily chosen to accept 

U.S. foreign assistance or voluntarily remain in the United States, they may fairly be deemed 

to consent to person jurisdiction in ATA cases. The Constitution does not bar giving a person 

who excludable from the United States fair warning that if it continues to accept U.S. foreign 

assistance or to maintain a physical presence in the United States on the condition that it refrain from engaging in or supporting international terrorism, it will be liable to U.S. victims 

in U.S. courts for breaching that condition. 

claims in U.S. courts. No defendant should be able to accept U.S. 

foreign assistance while simultaneously dodging responsibility in 

U.S. courts for aiding or carrying out terrorist attacks that harm 

Americans. 

The Antiterrorism Clarification Act amends the jurisdiction and 

venue section of the ATA 22 to make clear that defendants who take 

advantage of certain benefits provided by the U.S. government 

shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction. Specifically, a defendant will be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction in an ATA civil action if, after 120 days after the date 

of enactment of the bill, the defendant accepts U.S. assistance 

under certain provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Alternatively, a defendant will be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction if such defendant continues to maintain any office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities within the U.S., or 

establishes or procures any office, headquarters, premises, or other 

facilities within the United States.23 If they continue to accept the 

covered benefits, they will subject themselves to personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts in ATA cases that are already pending or that 

may be filed in the future. 

Accordingly, the consent provision provides affected persons with 

a reasonable and unambiguous choice: if you accept U.S. foreign assistance and enter our nation’s borders, you must do so on the condition not to support or take part in acts of international terrorism 

and that you compensate your victims if you breach that promise. 

It is eminently reasonable to condition acceptance of U.S. foreign 

assistance and continued presence in the United States on consent 

to jurisdiction in cases in which a person’s terrorist acts injure or 

kill U.S. nationals.24 This is particularly so with regard to the PLO 

and the PA, as Congress has repeatedly tied their continued receipt 

of these privileges to their adherence to their commitment to renounce terrorism. Moreover, the conditions the bill imposes, furthers a legitimate governmental purpose: to halt, deter, and disrupt 

8 

international terrorism and to compensate U.S. victims of international terrorism. 

Hearings 

The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on H.R. 5954. 

Committee Consideration 

On June 13, 2018, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill (H.R. 5954) favorably reported by voice vote, a 

quorum being present. 

Committee Votes 

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that no recorded 

votes occurred during the Committee’s consideration of H.R. 5954. 

Committee Oversight Findings 

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of The 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures 

Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new 

budgetary authority or increased tax expenditures. 

Committee Cost Estimate 

In compliance with clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that, based on 

informal discussions with the Congressional Budget Office, implementing this legislation would not affect direct spending or revenues. The Congressional Budget Office did not provide a cost estimate for the bill in time for inclusion in this report. 

Duplication of Federal Programs 

No provision of H.R. 5954 establishes or reauthorizes a program 

of the Federal government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the 

Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 

21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings 

The Committee finds that H.R. 5954 contains no directed rule 

making within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 551. 

9 

25 18 U.S.C. § 2331. 26 18 U.S.C. § 2331(3). 

Performance Goals and Objectives 

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 5954 amends 

the Antiterrrorism Act of 1992 to clarify meaning of the terms ‘‘act 

of war’’ and ‘‘blocked asset’’ and to provide for consent to personal 

jurisdiction in certain circumstances. 

Advisory on Earmarks 

In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 5954 does not contain any congressional 

earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined 

in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI. 

Section-by-Section Analysis 

The following discussion describes the bill as reported by the 

Committee. 

Section 1. Short title. Section 1 sets forth the short title of the 

bill as the ‘‘Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018.’’ 

Sec. 2. Clarification of the Term ‘‘Act of War.’’ This section clarifies the meaning of the term ‘‘act of war’’ as it is defined in the 

ATA. Under current law, the term ‘‘act of war’’ is defined as ‘‘any 

act occurring in the course of: (A) declared war; (B) armed conflict, 

whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations; or (C) armed conflict between military forces of any origin.’’ 25

The third category—armed conflict between military forces of any 

origin—has caused some level of confusion in its application by the 

courts, allowing designated terrorist entities and their supporters 

to avoid liability for terrorist attacks in some cases. 

Section 2 removes any uncertainty regarding whether designated 

terrorist organizations can be considered a military force of any origin by clearly stating that the term ‘‘military force’’ does not include any person (as defined by the ATA) 26 that has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1189 or as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) as such 

term is defined in section 594.310 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations. In addition, the section makes clear that persons in addition to FTOs and SDGTs may also not constitute a ‘‘military force’’ 

if the court determines that such person is not a military force. 

Sec. 3. Satisfaction of Judgments Against Terrorists. This section 

provides that in a civil action brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333 

for which a U.S. national has received a judgment against a terrorist party, the assets of that terrorist party (including any agency 

or instrumentality of that party) that have been seized or frozen by 

the United States under section 805(b) of the Foreign Narcotics 

Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. § 1904(b)) shall be considered 

‘‘blocked assets’’ for purposes of section 201 of the Terrorism Risk 

Insurance Act (TRIA) (28 U.S.C. § 1610 note). 

This means that in ATA civil liability cases for which the plaintiff has received a judgment against a terrorist party, any assets 

of that terrorist party (including the assets of its agents and instrumentalities) that have been blocked under the Kingpin Act are subVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:01 Jul 30, 2018 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR858.XXX HR858
10 

ject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy the judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for 

which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable. This is already 

the case, under TRIA, for assets blocked pursuant to the Trading 

With the Enemy Act and the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act. 

Sec. 4. Consent of Certain Parties to Personal Jurisdiction. Section 4 provides that under certain circumstances defendants in 

ATA cases shall be deemed to have consented to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. This section amends 18 U.S.C. § 2334 to provide that if an ATA defendant, 120 days after the date of enactment, accepts any form of assistance, however provided, under 

chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

U.S.C. § 2346 et seq.), section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2291) for international narcotics control and law 

enforcement, or chapter 9 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act 

of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §§ 2349bb et seq.) that defendant shall be 

deemed to have consented to U.S. court jurisdiction in a case 

brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2333. In addition, consent to U.S. court 

jurisdiction shall be deemed to have occurred if 120 days after the 

date of enactment of this Act an ATA civil defendant benefited 

from a waiver or suspension of section 1003 of the Anti-Terrorism 

Act of 1987 (22 U.S.C. § 5202) by continuing to maintain any office, 

headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within 

the jurisdiction of the United States or by establishing or procuring 

any office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States. 

Because Section 4 is purely procedural and affects no substantive 

entitlement to relief, it takes effect on the date of enactment and 

will begin to apply in cases (including cases that are pending in the 

courts of the United States on the date of enactment) in which a 

defendant more than 120 days after the date of enactment receives 

the types of assistance, or takes advantage of a waiver, listed in 

that section. 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported 

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

PART I—CRIMES 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 113B—TERRORISM 

* * * * * * * 

11 

§ 2331. Definitions 

As used in this chapter— 

(1) the term ‘‘international terrorism’’ means activities that— 

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 

that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 

States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United 

States or of any State; 

(B) appear to be intended— 

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 

destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 

(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of 

the United States, or transcend national boundaries in 

terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the 

persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or 

the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum; 

(2) the term ‘‘national of the United States’’ has the meaning 

given such term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act; 

(3) the term ‘‘person’’ means any individual or entity capable 

of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property; 

(4) the term ‘‘act of war’’ means any act occurring in the 

course of— 

(A) declared war; 

(B) armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations; or 

(C) armed conflict between military forces of any origin; 

øand¿ 

(5) the term ‘‘domestic terrorism’’ means activities that— 

(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 

State; 

(B) appear to be intended— 

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 

destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 

(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of 

the United Statesø.¿; and 

(6) the term ‘‘military force’’ does not include any person 

that— 

(A) has been designated as a— 

(i) foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of 

State under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189); or 

(ii) Specially Designated Global Terrorist (as such 

term is defined in section 594.310 of the Code of Federal Regulations) by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury; or 

12 

(B) has been determined by the court to not be a ‘‘military 

force’’. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 2333. Civil remedies 

(a) ACTION AND JURISDICTION.—Any national of the United 

States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason 

of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, 

or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the 

United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she 

sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees. 

(b) ESTOPPEL UNDER UNITED STATES LAW.—A final judgment or 

decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding under section 1116, 1201, 1203, or 2332 of this title or section 46314, 46502, 46505, or 46506 of title 49 shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding under this section. 

(c) ESTOPPEL UNDER FOREIGN LAW.—A final judgment or decree 

rendered in favor of any foreign state in any criminal proceeding 

shall, to the extent that such judgment or decree may be accorded 

full faith and credit under the law of the United States, estop the 

defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding under this section. 

(d) LIABILITY.— 

(1) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘person’’ has 

the meaning given the term in section 1 of title 1. 

(2) LIABILITY.—In an action under subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international terrorism committed, 

planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), as of the 

date on which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or authorized, liability may be asserted as to 

any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism. 

(e) USE OF BLOCKED ASSETS TO SATISFY JUDGMENTS OF U.S. NATIONALS.—For purposes of section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 note), in any action in which a 

national of the United States has obtained a judgment against a 

terrorist party pursuant to this section, the term ‘‘blocked asset’’ 

shall include any asset of that terrorist party (including the blocked 

assets of any agency or instrumentality of that party) seized or frozen by the United States under section 805(b) of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1904(b)). 

§ 2334. Jurisdiction and venue 

(a) GENERAL VENUE.—Any civil action under section 2333 of this 

title against any person may be instituted in the district court of 

the United States for any district where any plaintiff resides or 

where any defendant resides or is served, or has an agent. Process 

in such a civil action may be served in any district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent. 

13 

(b) SPECIAL MARITIME OR TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—If the actions giving rise to the claim occurred within the special maritime 

and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as defined in section 7 of this title, then any civil action under section 2333 of this 

title against any person may be instituted in the district court of 

the United States for any district in which any plaintiff resides or 

the defendant resides, is served, or has an agent. 

(c) SERVICE ON WITNESSES.—A witness in a civil action brought 

under section 2333 of this title may be served in any other district 

where the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent. 

(d) CONVENIENCE OF THE FORUM.—The district court shall not 

dismiss any action brought under section 2333 of this title on the 

grounds of the inconvenience or inappropriateness of the forum 

chosen, unless— 

(1) the action may be maintained in a foreign court that has 

jurisdiction over the subject matter and over all the defendants; 

(2) that foreign court is significantly more convenient and 

appropriate; and 

(3) that foreign court offers a remedy which is substantially 

the same as the one available in the courts of the United 

States. 

(e) CONSENT OF CERTAIN PARTIES TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), for 

purposes of any civil action under section 2333 of this title, a 

defendant shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction in such civil action if, regardless of the date of the occurrence of the act of international terrorism upon which such 

civil action was filed, the defendant— 

(A) after the date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this subsection, accepts— 

(i) any form of assistance, however provided, under 

chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.); or 

(ii) any form of assistance, however provided, under 

section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

U.S.C. 2291) for international narcotics control and 

law enforcement; or 

(B) in the case of a defendant benefiting from a waiver 

or suspension of section 1003 of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 

1987 (22 U.S.C. 5202) after the date that is 120 days after 

the date of enactment of this subsection— 

(i) continues to maintain any office, headquarters, 

premises, or other facilities or establishments within 

the jurisdiction of the United States; or 

(ii) establishes or procures any office, headquarters, 

premises, or other facilities or establishments within 

the jurisdiction of the United States. 

(2) APPLICABILITY.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any defendant who ceases to engage in the conduct described in paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B) for 5 consecutive calendar years. 

* * * * * * * 

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