1
2

Cover China’s military leaders, breaking with their past reliance on the sheer 

mass of their mechanized armies, have decided to significantly transcend their 

current rules and regulations, organizational structures, and dated equipment

with informatized concepts. This strategic redirection may well represent a 

“quantum-like” leap beyond their present-day military capabilities. The two 

dragons on the cover symbolize this explosive break with the mechanized past 

and their emergent future with an effectively more agile, multi-spectrum force.
3
4

The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect 

the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US 

government. 

The author works for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. FMSO is a component of the US Army's Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The office is charged with preparing studies 

and assessments based on the reading of foreign and domestic publications and 

through contacts with a network of foreign and US military and civilian 

security specialists. FMSO researches, writes, and publishes from unclassified 

sources about the military establishments, doctrines, and practices of selected 

foreign armed forces. It also studies a variety of civil-military and transnational 

security issues affecting the US and its military forces. FMSO products are 

prepared for the US Army and other services, the Department of Defense, as 

well as nonDoD organizations to include the Treasury and Justice Departments. 
5

This book is dedicated to Western analysts studying China. 
6

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author used only open-source translations for the construction of 

this document. Since the author does not speak Chinese, he fully utilized the 

translation talents of the Open Source Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service or FBIS) and other government contracted Chinese 

translators in order to write this book. The author is solely responsible for the 

selection and analysis of the material others translated.

In particular, the author would like to acknowledge the support of Mr. 

Charles A. Martinson III of Fort Leavenworth who designed the cover artwork. 

Mr. Martinson’s visualization of the contents of this book is unique. His 

creativity is truly his trademark. The author would like to thank Mr. Robert

Love of the Foreign Military Studies Office. Mr. Love monitored commercial 

translations of some material used in this work and ensured their timely 

delivery. Mr. Karl Prinslow, former Deputy Director of FMSO, ensured that 

funding for the translation of Chinese material was available. Finally, the 

author would like to express his thanks to FMSO director Mr. Tom Wilhelm for 

providing his support and encouragement for the project. 

It is the intent of this book to provide US analysts with the details of 

changes in China’s mode of thinking as it transitions from a mechanized to an 

informatized force. The author would like to thank the Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) G-2 for funding the second printing of this book in 

2011.
7

FOREWORD

Chinese observations of warfare in the information age have resulted in

a widespread transformation and metamorphosis of the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) from a mechanized to an informatized force. This transformation 

has affected nearly every aspect of China’s military from strategy to logistics to 

educational development. 

The Dragon’s Quantum Leap intends to peel back the transformation 

process and uncover the impact of new modes of thought on several key 

segments of military development (culture, stratagems, crisis management, 

deception, and reconnaissance among other elements) that digital-age thought is 

affecting. It expands the scope but not the basic theoretical theme of the 

author’s two previous works on Chinese information warfare concepts. They 

were Dragon Bytes, which covered Chinese IW activities from 1999-2003; and

Decoding the Virtual Dragon, which covered Chinese IW activities from 2003-

2006. The Dragon’s Quantum Leap updates these concepts and activities to 

mid-2009 and completes the author’s trilogy on the topic. As with the author’s 

previous works, this book primarily uses original Chinese source material. 

New military thinking in the PLA, in conjunction with digital 

advancements in other areas (economic, diplomatic, and so on), has resulted in 

the closer integration of military and civilian planning and actions. As a result 

of these improvements, Chinese military theory and systems will be more 

flexible and competitive, enabling the PLA to become an aspiring superpower 

in the twenty-first century. The Dragon’s Quantum Leap examines this 

transformation in detail. The book will cause the general military reader and the 

Chinese security specialist to think in different terms about Chinese military 

activities and to consider things yet unconsidered. 

Tom Wilhelm

Director

Foreign Military Studies 

Office

 2009
8

INTRODUCTION

Accelerating the informatization buildup of the Chinese military and 

constructing the informatized armed forces as quickly as possible form the core 

thinking of Comrade Jiang Zemin regarding the strengthening of the buildup of 

the modernization of national defense and the armed forces. This is what is 

primarily entailed in the revolution in military affairs with Chinese 

characteristics...1

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has watched and studied 

western wartime experiences over the past twenty years. The PLA has 

accumulated “lessons learned” from these experiences and applied them to 

China’s training exercises and included them in their educational curriculums. 

This has enabled China to better prepare for potential conflicts and to predict 

with some degree of certainty the nature of future war in an information age

context. 

The study of information-age conflicts has had a profound effect on 

China’s military leaders and organizational structure. This is expressed in the 

PLA’s integrated approach to military affairs, combining its ingrained historical 

proclivities (use of the dialectic and a comprehensive approach, focus on 

deception and strategy, seeking out strategic advantage or shi, etc.) with new 

technological concepts. This integration is manifested in the PLA’s new mode

of thinking, the focus of this book. The PLA’s new mode of thinking 

encourages innovation and creativity. It takes the best ideas from China’s 

military history and combines them with new concepts and visions resulting 

from the current discussion of information age developments.

The principal motivators for these changes were the use of information 

technologies by the United States (US) and its coalition partners in the recent 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

(NATO) conflict with Serbia over Kosovo in 1999; and the 1996 confrontation 

between China and the US over Taiwan. PLA theorists studied these high-tech 

applications and came away impressed (bordering on awe) with the 

enhancements that information technologies offered. 

 

1 Wang Baocun, “A View of the Informatization Buildup of the Chinese Military,” 

Information Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, New Military Affairs 

Reference (Special Edition), p. 116.
9

The Chinese response was to begin building a theoretical and tactical 

framework to support a military transformation with Chinese characteristics 

that would keep them competitive in the coming years. PLA leaders believe 

these changes are required for China to remain competitive in the current world 

environment. The focus of the transformation was on two levels: transforming 

from a mechanized to an informatized force2and updating the PLA’s mode of 

thinking. China’s military culture, theoretical developments, and planning and 

preparations for war have all been affected.

Incoming Pacific Command commander Admiral Robert Willard has 

noted that “China has EXCEEDED most of our intelligence estimates of their 

capability and capacity every year. They’ve grown at an unprecedented rate in 

those capabilities.”3 The Dragon’s Quantum Leap discusses several of the

developments in China’s mode of thought that have enabled this

transformation. The focus is on the integration of the old and new, which has 

injected digital devices and new life into campaign stratagems and deception; 

and on the desire to think creatively or “outside the box” and produce new 

concepts such as “beyond means warfare,” war engineering, system attack 

warfare, and non-war military operations. Other issues have also been affected, 

such as China’s concept of crisis management, military culture, and information 

warfare.

The Chinese military has enhanced its “informatized warfare” 

capabilities across the board. This transformation is often referred to as a “leap 

frog” development from a mechanized to an informatized force. However, as 

retired Chinese information warfare specialist General Wang Baocun notes, as 

the power of weapons and equipment grows qualitatively the combat 

capabilities of China’s forces grow exponentially. Therefore the all-inclusive 

nature of the transformation could also be termed a “quantum leap” in military 

thinking and modernization in synchronization with modern developments 

worldwide—not just a leap frog endeavor.

To fully understand this quantum leap, one needs to consider a wide 

array of activities in the PLA and think as comprehensively as the Chinese do. 

Focusing on a single area does not provide the proper scope and depth of the 

 

2 Several terms (cyber, digital, network) that are information-related in English are 

translated from Chinese into English in a number of ways (informationization, 

informationalization, etc.). In this work, informatization will be used as a noun and 

informatized as an adjective in place of these variants. When quotes or books/articles 

are referenced, the translator’s version of the term will be employed.

3

James A. Lyons, “Countering Beijing’s New Weapon,” Washington Times, 6 

December 2009, p. B3.
10

transformation. Chinese military documents selected for this work highlight 

several of these dramatic technical and theoretical shifts in the PLA. The end 

result is the realization that the PLA is on a fast track in its transformation from 

a mechanized to an informatized force and in the introduction of a new mode of 

thinking. This book shines particular light on the latter aspect of this 

transformation. However, the reader should be reminded that no book’s 

material on the PLA is truly “up to date.” That is, even though the material 

herein covers Chinese writings through 2009, who really knows to what level 

the PLA has advanced at the present time? This survey only scratches the 

surface of all the available texts on the PLA and its new mode of thinking. 

The book is divided into three parts. Part One examines the ideas 

behind new modes of thinking (the book Unrestricted War, an article that a 

Chinese general wrote on new modes of thought, and a case study of new 

modes of thought in the PLA’s military culture). Part Two examines some of 

the changes to ancient Chinese concepts in the information age (deception and 

stratagems). Also discussed are changes in the PLA’s crisis management 

concept. Part Three focuses more closely on digital thought (the PLA’s digital 

reconnaissance, an examination of a book dedicated to the idea of information 

war in China, and a look at how Taiwan views the Chinese concept of 

information war). Part Four comprises the conclusions one draws from this 

work.

Chapter One examines the 1999 book Unrestricted War and the 

responses of the international community to this highly controversial work. It 

is this author’s opinion that the Chinese may have done the US a favor by 

publishing this work since it opened the eyes of many US planners and 

tacticians to the potential attack options of a host of nation-states and 

insurgents. The book may have played a small role in the development of 

China’s informatized concept due to the variety of warfare options it offers. It 

played a much larger role, it appears, as a catalyst for the introduction of a new 

mode of thinking for the PLA.

Chapter Two discusses the impact of systems and informatized

processes on military thought, describing the transition to new modes of 

thinking based on innovation. The chapter examines one author’s method of 

integrating information technology into a Sun Tzu stratagem; and another 

author’s twelve recommendations for new modes of thought in the PLA. The 

Chinese stress innovation and creative thinking. They believe that even though 

China wasn’t the first to develop information warfare concepts, it still has a 

chance to be the most effective in using new information technologies. New 

concepts such as “war engineering” and “system attack warfare” are examined 
11

along with some subtle changes in military culture.

Chapter Three examines sixty-six articles on military culture written 

primarily by PLA authors in the journal China Military Science. The discussion 

covers Chinese traditional culture and what the PLA refers to as “advanced 

military culture,” the latter being a product of the information age. The analysis 

describes how military culture has progressed in the PLA through the years and 

offers the reader insights into China’s prejudices about the West. This is one of 

the few discussions available on PLA culture from a Chinese military academy 

source.

Chapter Four describes Chinese deception theory. The chapter starts by 

looking back at China’s historical record and fascination with deception. The 

chapter then analyzes how China has applied modern day technologies to its 

deception theory especially with regard to camouflage techniques and efforts to 

fool reconnaissance assets. These applications encourage continued study of 

deception techniques both on the battlefield and in the virtual world since they 

are so realistic and applicable to the contemporary digital world.

Chapter Five takes a look at campaign stratagems from a high-tech

vantage point. The chapter examines how to create and apply campaign 

stratagems in accordance with high-tech equipment and what technological 

forte is required of twenty-first century commanders. One interesting focal 

point is the list of issues that Chinese commanders must master to become 

proficient in the digital-age: dialectical thought, logical thinking, thinking in 

images, three-dimensional thought, unconventional thought, and associative 

thought. This chapter, based on the book Campaign Stratagems, is of great 

interest since its detailed discussion of various campaign stratagems is

applicable to any armed force.

Chapter Six discusses the PLA’s focus on high-technology crisis 

management responses. The chapter highlights the Chinese response to the May 

2008 Sichuan Province earthquake in which upwards of 90,000 people 

perished. Of interest to military specialists is that the PLA’s high-tech response 

is viewed by Chinese theorists as a non-military, high-tech response that helps 

prepare the PLA for informatized warfare. Non-military actions are described 

as well. They are becoming an important ingredient of the PLA’s new mode of 

thinking. Perhaps this is the most important chapter in the book with regard to 

potential cooperation with the Chinese, since crisis management offers China 

and any potential opponent a method through which to avert a potential crisis. 

The Chinese are working to improve their current crisis management system 

and western analysts should follow these developments closely.
12

Chapter Seven is a look at the PLA’s long-range electronicreconnaissance concept. It discusses, in a temporal manner, the development of 

the PLA’s active-offensive thinking in regard to information warfare. This 

focus represents a change from China’s traditional active-defense concept. How 

and when China might use its active-offensive concepts for purposes other than 

reconnaissance is unclear, but, as general concepts, they are worrisome. It does 

not bode well for future cooperation and stability if Chinese theorists really do 

believe (as they openly state) that China can offset an opponent’s information 

superiority only if China strikes first. 

Chapter Eight is a summary of the Chinese book Information Warfare 

in China. Published in 2005, the work compiles the writings of some of the 

best retired PLA theoreticians and strategists: Wang Baocun, Shen Weiguang, 

Wang Pufeng, and Li Bingyan, to name but a few. The book includes 

discussions of both the theory and technological underpinnings of IW. While 

there is not as much information in the book as one would desire on the 

development of a new mode of thinking, the discussion does uncover some

Chinese interests of value to analysts.

Chapter Nine discusses the thoughts of Taiwanese IW specialists who 

regularly examine the PLA’s information warfare concepts. The chapter 

focuses on Taiwan’s perception of the PLA’s revolution in military affairs, 

political work, information warfare concepts, electronic warfare, and the PLA’s 

plethora of information warfare institutes. The examination reveals that Taiwan, 

perhaps due to its intimacy with the Chinese language and culture, picks up on 

aspects of China’s information warfare developments that Westerners neglect. 

These aspects include acupuncture warfare, highly-controlled warfare, and 

political work Web sites, all items of interest to people studying a new mode of 

thinking.

Chapter Ten lists the conclusions this analysis has generated, focusing 

on the main issue of this text: the impact of the transformation from a 

mechanized to an informatized force on modes of thought in the PLA. The list 

of conclusions is indicative of the challenges facing western armies as they 

confront the opportunities for cooperation or potential conflict with the PLA.

There are also four appendixes. Appendix One covers informationrelated articles in the PLA journal China Military Science over the past few 

years. Appendix Two analyzes two Chinese concepts and their adaptation to the 

information age, the concept of shi and the thirty-six stratagems of war. 

Appendix Three offers definitions of additional deception-related terms not 
13

discussed in Chapter Four. Appendix Four lists the table of contents of five

books of relevance for the topic of new modes of thought based on a 

transformation from a mechanized to an informatized force.

This work completes a trilogy on Chinese information warfare issues. 

The work Dragon Bytes covers Chinese IW activities from 1999-2003; 

Decoding the Virtual Dragon covers Chinese IW activities from 2003-2006; 

and The Dragon’s Quantum Leap covers the period from 2006-2009, with some 

additional material included from earlier years. Hopefully these three works can 

serve as a guide to a western understanding of the PLA’s transformation efforts 

in the information age. It is the purpose of these works to help western analysts 

draw a more realistic picture of the challenge the PLA presents in the IW

arena—and a picture for areas of potential collaboration. 
14
15

CHAPTER ONE: UNRESTRICTED WARFARE: INSTIGATOR 

OF A NEW MODE OF THINKING?

This chapter analyzes the controversial aspects of this book and examines 

several novel Chinese concepts that have received scant attention in the West.

...proposing a new concept of weapons does not require relying on the 

springboard of new technology, it just demands lucid and incisive thinking. 

However, this is not a strong point of the Americans, who are slaves to 

technology in their thinking.4

Introduction

In 1999 the Chinese released a book titled Unrestricted Warfare.

5 The 

book caused an uproar among Western analysts for its anti-American overtones

and recommended employment of an unrestricted set of warfighting measures 

that appeared to go beyond the laws of armed conflict. In hindsight, the book 

also may have served as one of the primary catalysts for a new mode of 

thinking in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

At the time of the book’s release, the PLA was still in a state of awe 

over the military prowess that the United States (US) and its alliance partners 

had demonstrated in the 1991 war with Iraq and in the mid-1990s internecine 

conflict in Yugoslavia. A key component to the West’s success in each case 

was its reliance on a new set of military options focused on information 

technologies (IT). In Iraq IT included the expanded use of simulations and 

precision weaponry for the first time. With regard to Yugoslavia, the Chinese 

witnessed how the Dayton Accords Peace Process (involving the Presidents of 

Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia) utilized IT simulations and map-making abilities to 

“end the war without fighting,” an often-stated Chinese military aspiration.

The PLA felt quite helpless in the face of such a prominent IT-based 

military force. The concepts of Unrestricted Warfare provided the PLA with a 

plausible method for confronting and perhaps winning a war against such a 

superior opponent. According to the book’s authors, this could be accomplished 

with combinations of means employed in an unrestricted fashion and with the 

use of new theories and techniques. 

 

4 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Pan American Publishing 

Company, Panama City, Panama, 2002, p. 15.

5 According to several Chinese linguists, a closer translation of the title is “Beyond 

Limits Warfare.” However, due to its more common usage and translation, the title 

Unrestricted Warfare will be used in this chapter. 
16

For the West, the book represents the first collection of thoughts from 

Chinese officers that seriously interpreted the evolving nature of war. The 

1999 book was prescient in several regards, such as its discussions of hybrid 

wars, non-war military actions, and “combinations of actions” designed to win 

or thwart war. All three of these issues eventually rose to be the focus of 

theorists world-wide. 

Two PLA colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, co-authored the 

book. Many US authorities assumed outright that this controversial work was 

sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party due to its military roots. Such 

works don’t normally find their way to the public without official sanction.

However, senior civilian leaders in China reportedly were forced to read the 

book after its publication to see what all the international fuss was about. While 

not dispelling all doubts, this fact does make it seem more unlikely that the 

work had the sanction of the highest authorities when first released.

Wang stated later that the 1996 Chinese maneuvers in the Taiwan 

Straits (designed by China to prevent Taiwan from taking steps toward 

independence) used a combination of factors to deter Taiwan. This success, and 

the recognition that other countries were using combinations of issues (military, 

economic, diplomatic, etc.) in their conflicts (Iraq, Kosovo, etc.), was the final 

push needed for him and Qiao to write Unrestricted Warfare.

6

This chapter begins with an examination of the background of the 

authors and some initial comments from the Chinese about Unrestricted

Warfare. The focus then switches to key aspects of the book seldom highlighted 

by Western pundits, aspects from which the US can learn much about the 

Chinese way of war and about Chinese views of the US military. The chapter 

concludes with 1999-2001 post-publication interviews with authors Qiao Liang 

and Wang Xiangsui about their book. The authors’ views of their book in 

hindsight are of interest as they reinterpret some controversial aspects of their 

work. 

 

6

“Ingenious Remarks by the Author of ‘Transfinite Warfare’ on Using Force against 

Taiwan,” Hong Kong Tai Yang Pao, 24 November 1999, p. D4, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number FTS 

19991220001805. The term “Transfinite Warfare” is actually a variation of the 

translation of “Unrestricted Warfare.”
17

Who are These Officer Authors?

Qiao Liang was born in 1954 to a military family. A member of the 

Committee of the Chinese Writers’ Association, he was a Deputy Director of 

the Writing Office of the Political Department of the Air Force in 2005. He was 

designated a special researcher for the Strategic Research Center of the Air 

Force and served as a Professor at the Shanghai Defense Strategy Research 

Institute. At the Eighth International Sun Tzu Art of War Symposium in 

November 2009 he was identified as a Major General in the air force serving as 

a professor at the Air Force Command College. He is a “grade one writer.” His 

novels include Gateway to Doomsday, Spiritual Banner, and The Great Glacial 

River. He has cooperated with other authors to write On Military Officer 

Quality, A Review of the World’s Big Military Powers, A Listing of the 

Rankings of Global Military Powers, and The New Warring States Period. He 

has studied military theory for many years and read most of the great works of 

Chinese military history. 7

Wang Xiangsui was also born in 1954, in Guangzhou, and joined the 

armed forces in 1970. He has been a political instructor, a political commissar 

of a wing, a regimental political commissar, a deputy political commissar for a 

division, and a researcher. In 2005 he was the Director and Professor of the 

Center for Strategic Studies at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and 

Astronautics. He was also Director of the Academic Department of the National 

Security Policy Research Committee of the China Research Society of Policy 

Science. In cooperation with other authors he has written On Military Officer 

Quality, A Review of the World’s Big Military Powers, and A Record of the 

World’s Past Major Wars.

8 He has retired from military service and is a civilian 

academic at the present time, and reportedly is still serving as the Director of 

the Center for Strategic Studies.

Qiao and Wang have worked together on several book projects in 

addition to the ones cited above. For example, they co-authored two chapters in 

the Chinese military book On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs. This 

book features some of the best Chinese strategists and to be included in this 

work demonstrates not only their abilities to write on many topics but also their 

highly regarded reputations. One of their chapters in the book, written with Liu 

Yazhou, was titled “Taking War to the Air and China’s Air Force.” Liu, Qiao, 

 

7 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, “Do We Advocate Terrorism?,” Shanghai Guoji 

Zhanwang, 1 November 2005, pp. 86-89, published in the March 2000 issue of 

Juanchuan Zhishi, as translated and downloaded from the OSC website, document 

number CPP20051227318001.

8

Ibid.
18

and Wang’s chapter discusses the primary place of the offensive in modern 

combat and the important role of the Chinese Air Force in fulfilling that 

requirement. The air war is where China feels it can win limited war under 

informatized conditions.9

The other chapter in the book was co-authored by just Qiao and Wang. 

It is titled “Fully Calculating the Costs and Profits of War.” Wang and Qiao 

discuss the US-led war with Iraq. They state that the “beyond limits” concept of 

bribing Iraqi generals maximized results and was much less expensive than 

using only the air force. The war also resulted in the acquisition of political 

profit. Wang and Qiao state that US President George Bush wanted to lay a 

foundation for his reelection; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wanted to 

use the war to promote lightening reforms in the US military; and General 

Tommy Franks wanted to prove that the Army still maintained an irreplaceable 

role even in modern warfare. These are all understandable opinions from 

someone writing from abroad.10

The Book Causes a Stir in the US and China

Unrestricted Warfare has been the focus of many heated discussions 

and close analyses in the US and abroad. It is easy to understand why the book 

has attracted so many readers in the US. It offers a completely new theoretical 

form of warfare that has no boundaries; it offers a critical analysis of the US; 

and it is the product of a country billed as a rising superpower in the twentyfirst century. Further, the book bypasses traditional modes of war, integrates all 

forces and means, and recommends fighting against the enemy from all 

angles.11 For these reasons and others, the Chinese authors used the term 

“unrestricted” in the title. 

A subtitle stating “China’s Master Plan to Destroy America” was added 

to a 2002 English translation of the book. The translation is the work of the Pan 

American Publishing Company, Panama City, Panama. The subtitle and a 9/11 

photo of the burning Twin Towers were portrayed on the cover of the Pan 

American work. To the uninformed reader it appears that China had something 

 

9 Liu Yazhou, Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, “Taking War to the Air and China’s Air 

Force,” The Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China 

Press, 2003, pp. 48-62. 

10 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, “Fully Calculating the Costs and Profits of War,” 

The Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, 

2003, pp. 174-186. 

11 Tung Yi, no title, Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao, 12 February 2001, p. A18, as 

translated and downloaded from the OSC website, document number 

CPP20010212000047.
19

to do with the 9/11 tragedy. Such sensationalism has added to the hyperbole 

and hysteria surrounding the book since most Americans can only read the 

English version. The cover of the Chinese version of the book appears to have

two laser beams coming from China that are focused on a satellite stationed 

over China while a jet fighter circles nearby. 

In addition to the furor over Unrestricted Warfare in the US, the book 

was subjected to harsh criticism in China that was not well documented and 

discussed overseas. Chinese lawyers and military officials alike discounted the 

book’s importance due to legal issues. Critics asked whether the advocacy of 

unlimited war was at odds with just war theory. Other Chinese analysts 

criticized the book’s content for its distance from the Marxist point of war and 

for its support for questionable actions (terrorism, etc.) that were damaging

China’s international image. The authors reportedly were called before the 

Academy of Military Sciences and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000 and 

subjected to official criticism. 

In addition to the inquiries of lawyers and official military and foreign 

affairs figures, there were several pointed domestic criticisms of Unrestricted 

Warfare. A daily newspaper owned by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 

the Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, presented a strongly worded criticism of the 

book. The author of the article, Kao Chieh-chien, used a question and answer 

technique to present his views. 

First, Kao questions whether unrestricted warfare techniques will be 

effective. Authors Qiao and Wang had recommended using a combination of 

unrestricted means, to include command, finance, hackers, and so on. Kao notes 

that this might put state security and military strategies above state 

development strategies which could weaken national strength and economic 

development. There are also political restrictions that the authors appear to 

ignore. Qiao and Wang recommended that the basic rule of unrestricted war 

should be “the best way to achieve a goal. Any means compatible with this 

principle can be considered the best means.” They add that this method is

considered “to be an out-and-out Machiavelli.” Kao notes that this is a break 

with traditional Chinese ethics and encourages one to act like terrorists, two 

paths Kao does not support.12

 

12 Kao Chieh-chien, “What Limits Has ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ Exceeded—Also 

Discussing the Phenomenon Where ‘Readers and Experts Stick to Their Own Views,’” 

Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, 21 June 2000, as translated and downloaded from the OSC 

website, document number CPP20000621000055.
20

Second, Kao questions whether Unrestricted Warfare has been misread.

Kao writes that in some places, Qiao and Wang “are humming [sic] and hawing 

in an effort to have their bread buttered on both sides, not that the readers 

misread the book.” In this case, Kao is referring to incidents where Qiao, for 

example, said he does not support terrorism, then later adds that if the British 

and US can use terrorist methods, why can’t the Chinese? Qiao later states that 

“saying without doing it [terrorism]” is using “theoretical deterrence.” Kao 

writes that such thought is purely a fool’s paradise and that “military thinking 

without the restriction of ethics is the ruthless thinking of heartless and 

mindless tyrannies.” Instead of dreaming up combinations of methods, one’s 

first thoughts should be whether a war should be fought or can be fought. 

Without these considerations, one is simply an armchair strategist.13

Third, Kao questions whether there are limits for military thinking. Kao 

feels that Qiao and Wang believe war is unavoidable and that the enemy has 

been determined. This has confined their research to a small area. Kao adds

It has taken the travails of three generations of statesmen to turn the 

United States from the number one enemy in battlefields into a 

potential constructive and strategic partner, but to regress Sino-US 

relations into antagonistic relations, it takes only a slight error in 

thought; one has only to say no or to go beyond the limits, and Sino-US 

relations will slide down easily to an unmanageable extent.14

Finally, Kao questions the conscience of military experts and the 

silence of civilian specialists. He notes that it is never a good omen for the 

country when “the voice of specialists and scholars of the humanities and social 

sciences is buried by the same story in the media and that military experts are in 

high and vigorous spirits and receive the spotlight.” He asks how in China 

“soldiers can have more freedom of speech than the common people in 

politically sensitive issues?” Kao ends his article by calling for more control of 

“civil officers” over the military and continuing the focus on economic 

development as the crucial task.15

Kao’s criticism was buttressed by international critics who blasted the 

book. Some of the methods that Qiao and Wang advanced were deemed 

extreme and cause for worry regarding China’s commitment to ban chemical 

 

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.
21

and biological weapons.16 However, in spite of the domestic and international 

uproar over the book, a September 1999 Chinese news article indicated that the 

book had gained traction and a high level of interest in China. Unrestricted 

Warfare was reprinted five times with 40,000 copies in circulation. Central 

Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin and Defense Minister Chi Haotian 

reportedly ordered the book.17 By February 2001 the book was in its seventh 

printing, totaling 70,000 books. Qiao stated that 120 generals had contacted him 

and requested the book.18

Thus Unrestricted Warfare appears to have generated much discussion 

among members of the Chinese military and civilian elite. The book’s 

popularity at home and abroad cannot be denied albeit for different reasons. It 

appears that when the initial furor over the book subsided, many people in 

China realized that this was an interesting book with lots of innovative thought 

as to how to confront the US. The book implied that unrestricted warfare could 

serve as a cognitive countermeasure to US technological advantages in 1999

and that unrestricted warfare could intimidate or scare US decision-makers with 

China’s potential use of asymmetric warfare capabilities. However, the book 

could also have been using an old Chinese stratagem, to appear strong when 

weak, through these threats. For Chinese readers, the book’s anti-American 

overtone supports PLA resolve against US military actions. It offers PLA 

servicemen confidence in the thinking ability of their leaders to find new ways 

for the “inferior to defeat the superior.”

For the US, Unrestricted Warfare has provided a potential template of 

how terrorists, insurgents, or nation-states might attack the US from a non USbased doctrinal perspective. The book has made the US military pay attention 

to other methods of potential conflict and future war scenarios. It has not 

paralyzed US strategists as some suggest but, on the contrary, has mobilized 

and prepared them for a potential onslaught of creative activities. Qiao and 

Wang’s book initially, at least, placed China squarely in US crosshairs as a 

result of their manuscript. 

 

16 Ming Zhang, “War without Rules,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 

1999, at http://rempost.bolgspot.com/2006/01/war-without-rules.html.

17 Chiang Hsun and Liu Ning-jung, “Completely New Method of Unrestricted 

Warfare,” Hong Kong Yazhou Zhoukan, 20 September 1999, pp. 38-40, as translated 

and downloaded from the OSC website, document number FTS19991016000039.

18 Tung Yi.
22

A Discussion of Unrestricted Warfare: Looking for Nuggets

Unrestricted Warfare has gained some notoriety in the West. It has a 

place in both Wikipedia and in ConflictWiki. These are mainly short summaries 

of book reviews on the text, although ConflictWiki goes into more detail. 

Dr. James D. Perry, an analyst for Science Applications International 

Corporation (SAIC), wrote a review of Unrestricted Warfare for Aerospace 

Power Journal in the summer of 2000. He notes that the book was not a 

blueprint for a “dirty war” against the West as many suggested but a call for 

innovative thinking on future warfare. Thus Perry does not look at the book as a 

master plan to destroy America. Authors Qiao and Wang discuss technological 

and political changes that may shape future battlefields and these battlefields, 

Perry adds, could be everywhere and include many different topics (for 

example, trade warfare, financial warfare, terrorism, ecological warfare, 

computer-network attack, media warfare, drug warfare, and psychological 

warfare among other methods). 

Perry wrote that Qiao, interviewed in 1999, criticized Slobodan 

Milosevic for “playing by the rules” against the US in Kosovo. This battlefield 

offered a fertile ground for unrestricted thinking that Milosevic did not exploit. 

He should have used the rules of Unrestricted Warfare and sent surface-to-air 

missile teams into Western Europe to attack NATO planes as they took off

from air bases, Qiao noted. Qiao stated that the US was smarter in that it didn’t 

restrict itself to purely military means in Kosovo, since “media war, news 

restrictions, trade sanctions, and financial attacks (such as freezing the other 

party’s assets)” were employed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.19

These are measures the US has been using for years, however, and indicate that 

Qiao and Wang’s work on combinations in warfare is not something new in 

every respect. Rather many of their ideas were actions that they hadn’t 

considered in the past.

This author is in agreement with Perry that Unrestricted Warfare was a 

special book for its time (1999) for several reasons. First, it introduced some

ideas that are only now being further developed in both China and the US. In 

the case of China it was the introduction in Unrestricted Warfare in 1999 of the 

concept of non-military operations. This concept has been a current focus of the 

Chinese military press (for example, a special section on non-military 

operations was developed in a 2008 issue of China Military Science). For the 

US, the concept introduced in Unrestricted Warfare and a topic of current 

 

19 James D. Perry, “Operation Allied Force: the View from Beijing,” Aerospace Power 

Journal, Summer 2000, pp. 78-90.
23

discussion in the US is hybrid wars. Frank Hoffman, for example, wrote about 

hybrid war in a 2009 issue of Joint Force Quarterly. Unrestricted Warfare

discussed both of these issues ten years ago. 

Second, the book offered a good description of US strengths and 

weaknesses from Qiao and Wang’s perspective. Surprisingly, a US weakness 

was identified as the concept of full spectrum war. To the authors, the concept 

is too conventionally focused and does not comprehensively engage all of the 

aspects of warfare as does Unrestricted Warfare. Finally, the book discussed in 

detail some Chinese concepts that were new to the non-Chinese specialist, such 

as the golden section, the side rule, the empty basket, and the extended domain

(each concept is explained in detail below). In short, Qiao and Wang appear to 

have been poised at the leading edge of new thinking in 1999. Unrestricted War

introduced a new mode of thinking into the PLA. For the US, the book offered 

a glimpse into some creative yet threatening Chinese thought.

The Dragon’s Quantum Leap focuses on new modes of thinking which 

are now central to several contemporary PLA developments. Some of the new 

modes of thought found in Unrestricted War are listed below in the form of 

selected quotes that fall into one of two categories, either Chinese views of US 

warfare strengths and weaknesses; or Chinese views of the contemporary 

operational environment. Following the selected quotes is a general discussion 

of Qiao and Wang’s views of new concept weapons and other specific Chinese 

topics.

Chinese Views of Strong and Weak Points of the American Way of War

Strong Points:

On the US Use of Lessons Learned: “It truly seems as if the Americans are 

always able to find the key to open the door of the next military action among 

the lessons of each military action.”20

On Goldwater-Nichols: “The emergence of the ‘Reorganization Act’ in the 

United States and the effects it produced in the US military are food for 

thought, and any country which hopes to win a war in the twenty-first century 

must inevitably face the option of either ‘reorganizing’ or being defeated. There 

is no other way.”21

 

20 Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 51.

21 Ibid., p. 53.
24

On the Results of the Gulf War: “It is already destined to become the starting 

point for the theory of ‘omni-dimensional combat’ proposed by the elite of the 

US Army when they suddenly woke up.”22

On Helicopters, America’s “Flying Cowboys:” “...very few people recall 

that it was the helicopters, not some of the other favorite new weapons, that 

performed first-rate service in ‘Desert Storm’...This was definitely the most 

deeply significant tactical operation of the ground war during the war. It 

proclaimed that, from this point, helicopters were perfectly capable of 

conducting large-scale operations independently...there is no doubt that it is 

just a question of time before it [helicopter] drives the tank from the 

battlefield...Furthermore, the new concepts of a ‘flying army’ and ‘flying 

ground warfare’ in which the helicopter is the main battle weapon may become 

standard military jargon and appear in every military dictionary.” 23

On the US Air Force: “...General McPeak...was able to achieve his dream of 

breaking down the barriers between the strategic and tactical air forces and 

establish mixed air force wings, as well as his use of the ‘subtract seven and 

add four’ approach following the war to bring about the most richly original 

reform of the Air Force command structure in its history.”24

On Costly Weapons: “What you must know is that this is a nationality that has 

never been willing to pay the price of life and, moreover, has always vied for 

victory at all costs. The appearance of high-technology weaponry can now 

satisfy these extravagant hopes of the American people.”25

Weak points:

On Technology Dependence: “Moreover, who now dares state with certainty 

that in future wars this heavy spending will not result in an electronic Maginot 

line that is weak because of its excessive dependence on a single technology?”26

On the Diminished Role of the Navy in Desert Storm: “If the Gulf War is 

really seen as a big elephant, then it can be said that the US Navy’s front fin is 

hardly touching the fur of the elephant, which is just the same as saying it is not 

touching the elephant at all.”27

 

22 Ibid., p. 54.

23 Ibid., pp. 56-58.

24 Ibid., p. 62.

25 Ibid., p. 75.

26 Ibid., p. 70.

27 Ibid., p. 72.
25

On a Lack of Thinking: “Having thought lag behind reality (much less to 

speak of surpassing it) is not only a shortcoming of American soldiers, but it is 

very typical of them.”28 “They [Americans] believe that as long as the Edisons 

of today do not sink into sleep, the gate to victory will always be open to 

Americans. Self-confidence such as this has made them forget one simple 

fact—it is not so much that war follows the fixed race course of the rivalry of 

technology and weaponry as it is a game field with continually changing 

direction and many irregular factors. Whether you wear Adidas or Nike cannot 

guarantee you will become the winner.”29 “...proposing a new concept of 

weapons does not require relying on the springboard of new technology, it just 

demands lucid and incisive thinking. However, this is not a strong point of the 

Americans, who are slaves to technology in their thinking.”30

On Overreliance on Weaponry: “Warfare’[s]...high-technology, highinvestment, high-expenditure, and high-payback features make its requirements 

for military strategy and combat skill far lower than its requirements for the 

technological performance of weaponry.”31

On Institutional Reforms’ Impact on National Strategy: “The institutional 

reforms that began after the Gulf War...even had a far-reaching effect on 

America’s national strategy...in handling international affairs the US 

government has become increasingly fond of using force, makes moves more 

quickly, and seeks revenge for the smallest grievances.”32

On Lacking an Opponent like the Soviet Union: “... what is surprising is 

that such a large nation unexpectedly does not have a unified strategy and 

command structure to deal with the threat [of non-military war, such as 

terrorists]. What makes one even more so wonder whether to laugh or cry is 

that unexpectedly they have forty-nine departments and offices responsible for 

anti-terrorist activities, but there is very little coordination and cooperation 

among them.”33

 

28 Ibid., p. 121.

29 Ibid., p. 77.

30 Ibid., p. 15.

31 Ibid., p. 76.

32 Ibid., p. 81.

33 Ibid., p. 107.
26

Chinese Views on Changes in the Contemporary Strategic Environment

On Thinking about the “Empty Basket” and the 24 Methods of War:

34

“The combination of which we speak is just this type of empty basket, an 

empty basket of military thinking. It is not the same as any of the very strongly 

directed methods of operation of the past, for only when the basket is filled 

with specific targets and contents does it begin to have directionality and aim. 

The key to whether or not victory is won in a war is nowhere else but in what 

things you are able to pack into this basket.”35

On Hidden Agendas: “Only a handful of soldiers are likely to grasp a 

principle that every statesman already knows: that the biggest difference 

between contemporary wars and the wars of the past is that, in contemporary 

wars, the overt goal and the covert goal are often two different matters.”36

On New Technological Spaces and Battlefields: “We can anticipate that 

every major alteration or extension of the battlespace of the future will depend 

on whether a certain kind of technological invention, or a number of 

technologies in combination, can create a brand new technological space.”37

“Thus, warfare will simultaneously evolve in the macroscopic, ‘mesoscopic’, 

and microscopic spheres...”38

On the Term “Unrestricted War:” “When we suddenly realize that all these 

non-war actions may be the new factors constituting future warfare, we have to 

come up with a new name for this new form of war: warfare which transcends 

all boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted warfare.”39

On the Economic Factor Replacing the Military Factor: “...military threats 

are already often no longer the major factors affecting national security...these 

traditional factors are increasingly becoming more intertwined with grabbing 

resources, contending for markets, controlling capital, trade sanctions, and 

 

34 Ibid., p. 123. The 24 methods of warfare proposed in the book are atomic, diplomatic, 

financial, conventional, network, trade, bio-chemical, intelligence, resource, ecological, 

psychological, economic aid, space, tactical, regulatory, electronic, smuggling, 

sanction, guerrilla, drug, media, terrorist, virtual (deterrence), and ideological. 

35 Ibid., pp. 124-125.

36 Ibid., p. 28.

37 Ibid., p. 31.

38 Ibid., p. 31. Mesoscopic, according to Qiao and Wang, is the area between 

macroscopic and microscopic.

39 Ibid., p. 5.
27

other economic factors, to the extent that they [traditional factors] are even 

becoming secondary to these factors.”40

On the Extended Domain View: “Actually, it is not only the US but all 

nations which worship the view of modern sovereignty that have already 

unconsciously expanded the borders of security to a multiplicity of domains, 

including politics, economics, material resources, nationalities, religion, 

culture, networks, geography, environment, and other space, etc. This type of 

‘extended domain view’ is a premise for the survival and development of 

modern sovereign nations as well as for their striving to have influence in the 

world.”41

On an Extended Domain Strategy: “Such a strategy takes all things into 

consideration that are involved in each aspect of the security index of the 

interests of the entire nations, as well as superimposes political (national will, 

values, and cohesion) and military factors on the economy, culture, foreign 

relations, technology, environment, natural resources, nationalities, and other 

parameters before one can draw out a complete ‘extended domain’ which 

superposes both national interests and national security—a large strategic 

situation map.”42

On Combining Different Types of War: “With combination there is 

abundance, with combination there are a myriad of changes, and with 

combination there is diversity. Combination has nearly increased the means of 

modern warfare to the infinite...”43

On Desert Storm: “We have no intention of helping the Americans create a 

myth but when ‘Desert Storm’ unfolded and concluded for all to see...who 

could say that a classic war heralding the arrival of warfare in the age of 

technical integration-globalization had not opened wide the main front door to 

the mysterious and strange history of warfare...”44 “...it does represent the first 

and most concentrated use of a large number of new and advanced weapons 

since their appearance, as well as a testing ground for the revolution in military 

affairs triggered by this, and this point is sufficient to earn it the position of a 

classic in the history of warfare...”45

 

40 Ibid., p. 95.

41 Ibid., p. 96.

42 Ibid., p. 97.

43 Ibid., p. 98.

44 Ibid., p. 48.

45 Ibid., p. 63.
28

On the Importance of Information Technology: “We can say with certainty 

that this is the most important revolution in the history of technology, its 

revolutionary significance is not merely in that it is a brand new technology 

itself, but more in that it is a kind of bonding agent which can lightly penetrate 

the layers of barriers between technologies and link various technologies which 

appear to be totally unrelated.”46

On Future War and Information War: “Even if in future wars all the 

weapons have information components embedded in them and are fully 

computerized, we can still not term such war information warfare, and at most 

we can just call it computerized warfare. This is because, regardless of how 

important information technology is, it cannot completely supplant the 

functions and roles of each technology per se.”47

On the Difference in Computerized War and Information War: 

“Computerized warfare in the broad sense and information warfare in the 

narrow sense are two completely different things. The former refers to the 

various forms of warfare which are enhanced and accompanied by information 

technology, while the latter primarily refers to war in which information 

technology is used to obtain or suppress information.”48

On Tactics Leading, Weapons Following: “...when the Americans proposed 

the concept of ‘building the weapons to fit the fight,’ it triggered the greatest 

single change in the relationship between weapons and tactics since the advent 

of war. First determine the modes of combat, then develop the weapons, and in 

this regard, the first stab that the Americans took at this was ‘air-land battle.’ 

The currently popular ‘digitized battlefield’ and ‘digitized units’ which have 

given rise to much discussion represent their most recent attempt.”49

On National Interests: “...Iraq had seized the entire West by the throat. 

Lifelines are naturally more important than face, and the United States had no 

choice but to take it seriously...”50

On the New Form of Alliances: “In the new age, going it alone is not only 

unwise, it is also not a realistic option.”51 “More profoundly, the appearance of 

 

46 Ibid., p. 3.

47 Ibid., p. 9.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., p. 12.

50 Ibid., p. 48.

51 Ibid., p. 49.
29

the ‘overnight’ alliance brought an era to a close. That is, the era of fixed-form 

alliances...”52

On the Media: “Unlike battlefield propaganda, which has an excessively 

subjective tinge and is easily rejected by an opponent or neutral individuals, 

because it is cleverly cloaked as objective reporting, the media has a quiet 

impact that is hard to gauge.”53

On the Difficulty of Being a Soldier Today: “It is very obvious that none of 

the soldiers in any one nation possesses sufficient mental preparation against 

this type of new war which completely goes beyond military space. However, 

this is actually a severe reality which all soldiers must face.”54

On International Rules of War: “Small nations hope to use the rules to 

protect their own interests, while large nations attempt to utilize the rules to 

control other nations.”55

This ends the section on selected quotes from Unrestricted Warfare. 

The next section highlights some of the important general concepts of the book.

General Discussion of Key Points in Unrestricted Warfare

Qiao and Wang offer some specific innovations and developments 

(especially in the book’s final three chapters) that require more explanation. 

Each topic is covered below from the perspective of these two officers. They 

include the following concepts: combined war that goes beyond limits; new 

concept weapons versus a new concept of weapons; the side-principal rule; the 

golden section rule; the “civilianization” of war (the degree of participation of 

the entire population in war, such as the use of hackers); breaking ideological 

boundaries; and the new “essential principles” of warfare. 

Combined War that Goes Beyond Limits: Qiao and Wang write that the 

concept of warfare has been expanded due to the diversity of means available 

today. Any future war will be a “cocktail mixture” or combination of means 

beyond the traditional battlefield.56 Combinations introduce diversity and 

abundance into the conduct of warfare. Qiao and Wang believe “what is truly 

important is whether or not one understands what goes with what to implement 

 

52 Ibid., p. 50.

53 Ibid., p. 60.

54 Ibid., p. 108.

55 Ibid., p. 109.

56 Ibid., p. 43.
30

combinations.”57 Combinations of non-traditional means will challenge the 

logic, laws, and traditional models of warfare.58 In defining combined war that 

goes beyond limits, Qiao and Wang write:

But in fact, unlimited surpassing of limits is impossible to achieve. Any 

surpassing of limits can only be done within certain restrictions. That 

is, ‘going beyond limits’ certainly does not equate to ‘no limits,’ only 

to the expansion of ‘limited.’ That is, to go beyond the intrinsic 

boundaries of a certain area or a certain direction, and to combine 

opportunities and means in more areas or in more directions, so as to 

achieve a set objective.59

The authors thus imply most clearly that the term “unrestricted” doesn’t really 

work as a translation of the title of their book. Rather, “exceeding limits” seems 

to better express the title of their book. The authors stress that the concept of 

combined war is first of all a way of thinking, and only afterwards is it a

method.60 Qiao and Wang believe the ability to transcend ideology is the first 

requirement of exceeding limits. Only then can the second meaning, to 

transcend limits and boundaries, take effect. The latter involves selecting the 

most appropriate means but not necessarily the most extreme means.61

New Concept Weapons versus a New Concept of Weapons: Man-made 

earthquakes, tsunamis, weather disasters, subsonic waves, and new biological 

and chemical weapons all constitute new concept weapons (NCW).62 Kineticenergy weapons, directed-energy weapons, sub-sonic weapons, geophysical 

weapons, solar-energy weapons, meteorological weapons, and gene weapons 

are also NCW.63 These new concept weapons differ from a new concept of 

weapons. The latter include stock market crashes, computer viruses, and rumors 

or scandals as new weapons. A hacker in general and a non-state actor in some 

instances can help create trade war; financial war; new types of terror warfare; 

ecological, psychological, and smuggling war; media, drug, network, and 

technological war; and fabricated, resource, culture, and international law 

warfare.64 Technology is no longer the main factor. A new concept of weapons 

implies using things that initially benefit mankind to harm mankind. China’s

 

57 Ibid., p. 119.

58 Ibid., p. 120.

59 Ibid., p. 155.

60 Ibid., p. 171.

61 Ibid., p. 154.

62 Ibid., p. 16.

63 Ibid., p. 24.

64 Ibid., pp. 38-43.
31

awareness of things must expand since anything can become a weapon, Qiao 

and Wang note.

65 These “kinder weapons” may try to paralyze or undermine 

but they do not intend to produce casualties. They may be the watershed 

between the old and new weapons of war.66

The Side-Principal Rule: The side-principal [spelling per the document] rule 

is apparently another way to consider a concept being “asymmetric” since it 

implies striking an object from any direction other than head-on. Qiao and 

Wang write that “the side-principal rule is opposed to all forms of parallel 

placement, balance, symmetry, being all-encompassing, and smoothness, but, 

instead, advocates using the sword to cut the side.”67 Frontal collisions must be 

avoided. This “is the most basic grammar of victory for the ancient article of 

war.”68 However, the concept doesn’t always exclude a frontal collision if such 

a move imposes surprise on an adversary. A side element is a deviation in 

“terms of lines of thought and essence, instead of deviation in form.” Thus if 

one is not expecting a frontal assault, it can be applied as a surprise move that 

utilizes the side-principal rule (a deviation in thought) to achieve success.69

Golden Section Warfare: The number .618 is known as the rule of the golden 

section. It refers to a mathematical ratio and was originally considered by artists 

as the golden rule of aesthetics. The number became a basic design scale which, 

in the case of the Parthenon, for example, was found to be the ratio of vertical 

lines to horizontal lines. American J. Kieffer in 1953 and the Chinese 

mathematician Hua Luogeng turned this number into the “optimum seeking 

method.” This optimization can refer to number of soldiers and force. It often 

appears in attack or defend ratios of forces such as 2:3, 3:5, 5:8, and 8:13.70

These ratios usually ensure success if one is on the right side of the .618 rule. 

Qiao and Wang state that .618 can be found in the arc of a cavalry sword, the 

apex of the flying trajectory of a bullet shell or ballistic missile, and in the 

optimum bomb-release altitude and distance for an aircraft in dive bombing 

mode. In these cases (no further explanation was provided, which makes it 

difficult to prove) the .618 principle also applies.

71

The Civilianization of War: Qiao and Wang believe that future war will be 

conducted in non-war spheres. Winning wars with non-war means has become 

 

65 Ibid., p. 16.

66 Ibid., p. 20.

67 Ibid., p. 141.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., p. 147.

70 Ibid., p. 148.

71 Ibid., pp. 130-136.
32

a reality, even though the outline of the “civilianization” of such a concept isn’t 

yet clear. The civilianization of war (People’s War in the information age?) has 

been a theme of several writers since the publication of Unrestricted Warfare.

72

Breaking Ideological Boundaries (supra-domains, supra-means, supra-tiers): 

Transcending ideology is the first requirement of exceeding limits in Qiao and 

Wang’s opinion, as mentioned above. To do so requires supra-domain, suprameans, and supra-tier combinations. Those involved in warfare must break free 

from the confines of domains and the boundaries of ideology in order to enter a 

state of freedom of thought. There is now no domain that cannot be used. The 

Chinese are good at understanding and using this fact while Americans are not,

according to Qiao and Wang.73 It is necessary to select which domain will be 

the main battlefield to achieve the objectives of war, domains that may not be 

military.74 Domains must become playing cards deftly shuffled in Chinese

hands.75 Non-state organizations may, for example, combine kidnapping, 

assassinations, hackers, and currency speculation as an example of suprameans.

76

Means are methods or tools through which one can obtain an objective. 

Supra-means could include “buying or gaining control of stocks to turn another 

country’s newspapers and television stations into tools of media warfare.” Or it 

could include using assassination against financial speculators in Wang and 

Qiao’s opinion.

77

With regard to supra-tier levels, Qiao and Wang state that war no 

longer needs to progress from one level to another until a “moment of destiny” 

is reached.78 Rather, that moment of destiny is now something that can be 

created through combinations. To be able to continuously create such moments 

is something to be achieved, a winning strategy that should be used often. 

Warfare could thus be “changed into a dragon with interchangeable limbs, 

torsos, and heads which we could put together as we like, and which could 

swing freely in any direction.”79 At the national level the PLA’s actions could 

also include non-military actions that correspond to strategy.80 

 

72 Ibid., pp. 144-145.

73 Ibid., p. 161.

74 Ibid., p. 163.

75 Ibid., p. 164.

76 Ibid., p. 166.

77 Ibid., p. 164.

78 Ibid., p. 168.

79 Ibid., pp. 168-169.

80 Ibid., p. 170.
33

Essential Principles: Qiao and Wang believe the Gulf War changed the nature 

of war as it was once understood. The authors define warfare in the following 

manner: 

Warfare can be military, or it can be quasi-military, or it can be nonmilitary. It can use violence, or it can be nonviolent. It can be a 

confrontation between professional soldiers, or one between newly 

emerging forces consisting primarily of ordinary people or experts. 

These characteristics of beyond-limits war are the watershed between it 

and traditional warfare, as well as the starting line for new types of 

warfare.81

This new nature of war results in new principles of war with which no one is 

familiar, the authors add. These principles include omni-directionality, 

synchrony, limited objectives, unlimited measures, asymmetry, minimal 

consumption, multi-dimensional coordination, and the adjustment and control 

of the entire process. 

Omni-directionality means considering all factors associated with 

unrestricted war. The idea is to use all war resources, prevent blind spots, move 

in an unrestricted manner, and orient at will. Through the use of this 360 degree 

method the situation can be properly ascertained as well.82

Synchrony has replaced phasing as an important planning principle 

according to Qiao and Wang. It implies doing something within the same time 

period but does not imply “simultaneity.” The authors note that unrestricted war 

could also be dubbed “designated time warfare.” They believe that the US has 

not expanded this battlefield concept beyond the military.83

Limited objectives imply not pursuing objectives beyond one’s reach. If 

objectives are outside the reach of available measures then defeat is certain. 

Qiao and Wang use a speech by President Clinton to emphasize this point. They 

note that Clinton sought on one occasion to promise action when America’s 

national interests and sense of values were in danger. Actions can be achieved 

through the use of power but changing values is outside the reach of power as 

an objective in Wang and Qiao’s opinion.84

 

81 Ibid., p. 177.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., p. 179.

84 Ibid., p. 180.
34

Unlimited measures refer to employing measures beyond boundaries or 

restrictions to achieve limited objectives. The implication is to disobey the law 

when implementing such measures.85

Asymmetry means hitting an opponent where he least expects it or

following a train of thought that opposes a line of symmetry. Asymmetrical 

factors should be examined when considering a main axis of attack, a center of 

gravity, or force disposition and deployment. It is necessary to work on 

developing a line of action that creates power for oneself and allows the 

situation to develop as intended.

86

 

The minimal consumption principle refers to making rational use of 

combat resources. It has three components: rationality is more important than 

thrift; the size of combat consumption is decided by the form of combat; and 

the consumption of combat means can be lowered by using more measures. 

Here again the authors advise a force to “combine the superiorities of several 

kinds of combat resources in several kinds of areas to form up a completely 

new form of combat” and thereby minimize consumption.87

Multidimensional coordination means coordinating different spheres 

and forces to accomplish an objective. These different spheres include 

geography, history, culture, ethnic identity, and the influence of international 

organizations. This is especially important today since any sphere can become a 

battlefield.88

Finally, there is the essential principle of the adjustment and control of 

the entire process. This refers to obtaining feedback during an operation and 

making the proper revisions. Control over this process is very important.89

The future battlefield’s military sphere will be but one of several 

domains to which these essential principles apply. With the increased stature of 

non-military activities and their impact on future military and non-military 

battlefields, control over these domains will become particularly important. 

According to the authors, control is a point that China focuses on constantly 

while the US tends to focus more on dominance and superiority than control. 

 

85 Ibid., p. 181.

86 Ibid., pp. 181-182.

87 Ibid., pp. 182-183.

88 Ibid., pp. 183-184.

89 Ibid., p. 185.
35

Qiao’s Newspaper Interviews on Unrestricted Warfare, 1999-2001

The publication of Unrestricted Warfare generated a series of author 

interviews with the Chinese and Taiwanese press. One of the first interviews 

was with Qiao and it took place in June 1999 with the newspaper Zhongguo 

Qingnian Bao, which the China Youth League sponsors. Qiao stated that no 

other country in the world can match US superiority in military technology. 

Therefore other nations must depend on non-military actions as much as 

military actions to defeat a nation so equipped. It is a way for a weak country to 

cope with a larger evil.90 Beyond-limits or unrestricted warfare is required to 

defeat or at least injure such a superior opponent. This type of warfare is more 

humane than conventional war and may require the overlapping of several 

methods, Qiao notes, such as “Schwarzkopf (commander) plus Soros (finance) 

plus bin Laden (terrorist) type tactics.”91 The most ominous part of the 

interview was Qiao’s belief that war with the US is “inevitable.” This is 

because China will grow strong only at the cost of consuming much of the 

world’s resources which will put it in direct competition and eventually conflict 

with the US.92

In a September 1999 interview Qiao said he realized that war was not 

the only way to force ones’ will on another party and that the purpose of the 

book was to develop a “new war theory” similar to that formed earlier by 

Clausewitz. This can be accomplished by the “dislocation” method in which 

one upsets the “order of the cards in one’s own hand and reorganizes them in 

accordance with the needs of war and interests of that time.”93

In the September interview Qiao listed “military war methods” as 

atomic, conventional, biological, chemical, ecological, space, electronic, 

guerrilla, and terrorist warfare; “above-military war methods” as diplomatic, 

network, intelligence, psychological, technological, smuggling, drug, and 

fictitious warfare; and applicable “non-military war methods” as financial, 

trade, resources, economic aid, legal, sanction, media, and ideological warfare. 

He noted that he was not proposing that China follow non-military war actions 

but that if all else failed and the country’s existence was at stake, it must 

consider such issues. Thus his strident tone seems to have diminished 

 

90 Sha Lin, “Two Senior Colonels and ‘No-Limit Warfare,’” Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 

28 June 1999, p. 5, as translated and downloaded from https://www.opensource.gov, 

document number FTS19990728000697.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Ma Ling, “Special Topic on Important News,” Ta Kung Pao, 19 September 1999, p. 

B3, as translated and downloaded from www.opensource.gov, document number 

FTS19991005000805.
36

somewhat between June and September. Qiao states that the US has already 

used the principles of unrestricted warfare without knowing it. He notes, for 

example, that the US in Iraq used conventional plus diplomatic plus sanctions 

plus legal plus media plus psychological plus intelligence warfare all at the 

same time.94

In March 2000 in Liaowang, the weekly journal of China’s official 

news agency Xinhua, Qiao stated that, with regard to non-military actions, “our 

study, analysis, and pointing out the possibility of such actions does not at all 

equate to approval of it...”95 Qiao added that the US makes rules for their 

interests and puts domestic laws above international laws, breaking the latter as 

they see fit. The intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) over human rights 

issues at the expense of the FRY’s national sovereignty is a good example in 

his opinion. He then notes that “the concept of unrestricted warfare that we 

proposed does not at all mean breaking all the rules,” a statement quite at odds 

with Qiao’s statements in other articles.96 He added that the intent of 

Unrestricted Warfare was to provide an approach, an option, and a new kind of 

military thinking for strategic military studies.97

In a June 2000 interview, this time with Taiwan’s press, Qiao stated

that the book is popular because of its innovative content. He was quick to add 

that the book does not represent an official PLA viewpoint. Qiao said the book 

has allowed for more guesswork by people concerned with cross-strait issues

but that a certain geographical reality cannot be avoided. Taiwan is a “geoprisoner” of the mainland. He said a reason for writing the book was to stress 

the absurdity that the US can lay down the existing international norms on the 

one hand and, on the other, change them at will. He added that this does not 

mean that China will break international norms arbitrarily as the US has done.98

Of course, the events of 9/11 gave the Chinese press a reason to 

reenergize their interest in Qiao and Wang, just as their popularity was 

 

94 Ibid.

95 Staff reporter, “Unrestricted War—New Concept of War Presented by Non-Military 

Experts,” Beijing Liaowang, 13 March 2000, No. 11, pp. 55-56, as translated and 

downloaded from the OSC website, document number CPP20000322000070.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Yuan Leyi, “War Does Not Have a Law; A Strong Enemy Can be Outwitted with 

‘Unrestricted Warfare’...,” Taipei Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, 30 June 2000, p. 14, as 

translated and downloaded from the OSC website, document number 

CPP20000712000045.
37

beginning to wane. For example, a PRC-owned newspaper praised the authors 

for their foresight in predicting that high-tech means outside of military means 

would be used by terrorists. The effect was strategic and the US, too self-willed 

and conceited, finally paid for the enemies it had made over the years, 

according to Qiao and Wang. They added that perhaps the US will reflect on 

these events and make some changes to its foreign policy.99 Qiao paid equal 

attention to the new insurgent capability, however, stating

One of the byproducts of globalization resulting from technological 

integration is global terrorist activities. Non-professional soldiers and 

non-government organizations constitute a growing threat to the 

sovereign state. Increasingly they are the opponents of all professional 

armies. Next to non-professional fighters, the professional army looks 

powerful beyond compare. In the new era, however, the professional 

army is the dinosaur that cannot adapt. Non-professional fighters, on 

the other hand, are like raptors, full of life. They could use their sharp 

teeth to bite off half the world.100

A few years later, in November 2005, an article on Unrestricted 

Warfare was published in the Shanghai Guoji Zhanwang. In this article authors 

Qiao and Wang answered questions from interested readers. First, readers 

wanted to know if the book would fuel the West’s China threat theory. The 

authors answered that this had already happened and that the Russian example 

(the disintegration of the USSR) should make China wary of US theories of this 

type. The authors state that their book, on the other hand, raises the issue of the 

state terrorism of big Western countries that threatens the world. Their book 

opposes terrorism, Qiao and Wang note, especially state terrorism.101

Qiao and Wang expressed their opinion again that ‘going beyond 

limits’ does not equate to ‘no limits,’ only to an expansion of ‘limited.’ Further, 

the word unrestricted refers to “non-military war actions and to going beyond 

the military sphere to open up new battlefields and find new combat 

 

99 Ma Ling, no title, Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, 13 September 2001, as translated and 

downloaded from the OSC website, document number CPP20010913000078.

100 Jiang Xun, “Terrorism As New Form of War in the 21st Century,” Hong Kong 

Yazhou Zhoukan, 17 September 2001, No. 38, pp. 41- 42, as translated and 

downloaded from the OSC website, document number CPP20010920000063.

101 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, “Do We Advocate Terrorism?” Shanghai Guoji 

Zhanwang, 1 November 2005, pp. 86-89, originally published in the March 2000 issue 

of Jianchuan Zhishi, as translated and downloaded from the OSC website, document 

number CPP20051227318001.
38

measures.”102 Combined war that goes beyond limits is “to go beyond the 

intrinsic boundaries of a certain area or a certain direction, and to combine 

opportunities and means in more areas or in more directions so as to achieve a 

set objective.”103 Their book appears to be aimed at the US when in fact the US 

was used as the threat only because it is the world leader in terms of equipment, 

mobility, and military theory. Rather, the authors conclude, their work is aimed 

at any nation that would harm China’s national interests.104 Obviously, Qiao 

and Wang’s logic is highly debatable from a US viewpoint.

Conclusions

Qiao and Wang believe that an underdeveloped country like China that 

has never sought hegemony cannot follow blindly behind developed countries 

like the US and try to develop high-tech weaponry. Rather it must establish new 

ways of thinking and readjust its strategies, theories, and concepts to ensure 

national security. Unrestricted Warfare tells the PLA how to do this.105 In this 

sense it is the first step among many in adopting a new mode of thinking as the 

force transforms from a mechanized to an informatized presence.

Zheng Liming, writing for China’s official news service Zhongguo 

Xinwen She, noted that Unrestricted Warfare constitutes

A sagacious grasping of the current lag in military thought that people 

were still unaware of, points out the fatal weaknesses existing in US 

military thought and its unavoidable fragility in modern warfare, and 

reminds people that today, with economic globalization and constant 

social changes, there is an increasingly wide range of factors that have 

a bearing on national security and that there is a really great possibility 

that nonmilitary means and nonmilitary actions will win victory and the 

initiative in a future war.106

Qiao and Wang’s discussion in Unrestricted Warfare is well 

represented by this summary. The authors state that the diversity of means 

available for contemporary warfare (the twenty-four methods listed earlier) has 

enlarged the concept of war. The battlefield is everywhere and war may be 

 

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid. 

104 Ibid.

105 Zeng Liming, “Theoretical Breakthrough and Strategic Readjustment—A New 

Change in China’s Idea of National Defense,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, 28 December 

1999, as translated and downloaded from the OSC website, document number 

FTS20000126000997.

106 Ibid.
39

conducted in areas where military actions do not dominate. When combinations 

of these methods are put together, the result is termed a “cocktail warfare 

mixture.” This mixture represents a gradual accumulation of links and

competencies that are replacing a form of warfare that used to proceed from one 

level to the next. The authors stress that 

With combination there is abundance, with combination there are a 

myriad of changes, and with combination there is diversity. 

Combination has nearly increased the means of modern warfare to the 

infinite, and it has basically changed the definition of modern warfare 

bestowed by those in the past: warfare carried out using modern 

weapons and means of operation.107

The twenty-four methods they propose are not entirely new “means to 

compel the enemy to accept one’s interests” but rather means that have been 

used continuously by nation-states over the past three decades. That is, the two 

colonels are not nearly as original in their thinking as many analysts worldwide give them credit. Their originality comes in adding the word “war” behind 

each of the methods, and in advancing a theory to really combine methods 

which US analysts and doctrine writers have not done to the same degree. 

From a Western viewpoint, there are several lessons that one can learn 

from this discussion of Unrestricted Warfare. First of all is the danger of 

writing a provocative book if you are a representative of a nation-state! This 

book has generated all types of international concern and raised China’s threat 

posture higher on the radar of other countries than it previously was. While the 

authors were responsible for this international scrutiny, they were not

responsible for the manner in which some people tended to exploit the book 

and manipulate its content. For example, the English version of the book 

incorrectly associated the unrestricted warfare concept with 9/11 (and indicted 

China as a co-conspirator). 

A second point of interest is the warning shot the book fires across the 

bow of US military thinking and operational concepts. US operations are 

currently focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors note that a country 

placing an excessive focus on one type of enemy can be attacked by another 

outside of their field of vision.108 US strategists as a result must pay close 

attention to the entire spectrum of threats, to foreign perspectives of the 

contemporary operational environment, and to ways that other nations plan to 

 

107 Qiao and Wang, p. 98.

108 Ibid., p. 121.
40

manipulate it. Qiao and Wang note that the information age may not be all it is 

cracked up to be. The authors write that “it is difficult for high-tech troops to 

deal with unconventional warfare” and add that “perhaps there is a rule here, or 

at least it is an interesting phenomenon which is worth studying.”109 It is not 

known whether such a rule (how unconventional forces defeat high-technology 

forces) is under consideration or not in China. 

A third point of interest to Western analysts is that the book 

underscores what apparently is a rising theory in China, non-war military 

actions. Such actions are now discussed in detail in Chinese military journals. 

For example the authoritative Chinese journal China Military Science, in Issue 

3, 2008, dedicated its lead section on “Subject Discussion” to non-war military 

operations theory and practice. Six articles discussed: the study of non-war 

military operations; non-military operations during the Sichuan earthquake; the 

terrorist threat and new armed forces missions; legal issues surrounding nonwar military operations; characteristics of naval non-war military operations; 

and the growth and termination of the US theory of non-war military 

operations.110

Fourth, Western analysts should pay attention to Unrestricted Warfare

for a better understanding of how the Chinese view our militaries. There is

clearly frustration with the US and its coalition partners that are expressed in 

the book. These frustrations also illuminate Chinese prejudices in their 

consideration of America’s national security policies. One prejudice is that the 

authors only see negatives in US ventures abroad and rarely give the US credit 

for the humanitarian work it does all the time. This could involve things like 

Tsunami relief efforts or passing out food to those in need after earthquakes or 

other natural disasters. Another prejudice, perhaps more in line with reality, is 

the authors’ perception that a real shortcoming of the US military is its 

tendency to allow thought to lag behind reality. Perhaps this latter statement is 

truer now than it was fifteen years ago simply due to the crush of deployments 

that the US military has faced. There has been precious little time to think.

According to several bloggers writing from a Western point of view, 

the PLA authors ignored US diplomatic efforts such as attempts to bring peace 

to the Middle East, US economic sanctions to force nations to abide by 

international and humanitarian law, US efforts to control the drug trade in 

Colombia and other countries, and other non-military US measures over the 

 

109 Ibid., p. 13.

110 China Military Science, Issue 3, 2008, table of contents.
41

years. It is as if the authors read no newspapers in the 1990s that offered any 

insight on US international efforts in any of these fields. 

Thus, while some of the negative points from a Chinese point of view 

should be taken into consideration by our military leaders, other points should 

just be ignored as they demonstrate a misunderstanding of Western military 

thought and actions. Qiao and Wang ignore much of the good that Western 

armies perform. The absence of this contextual aspect certainly leads the 

authors to the dire predictions and prejudices they expose on the pages of 

Unrestricted Warfare. A well-rounded critique of what America and other 

nations do in relief operations of all types worldwide would help alleviate some 

of their mistaken perspectives.

So, is Unrestricted Warfare China’s master plan to destroy America as 

the books English translation contends? Is it a wild concept by irresponsible 

writers that deserves strong condemnation world-wide? Or is it a book that 

offers insights into Chinese thinking and indicates where the Chinese military is 

heading? This author sides with the latter proposition. Unrestricted Warfare is 

an interesting thought piece not previously advanced by military theorists at 

home or abroad, especially by a uniformed member of another nation-state. For 

this reason alone, it is worth reading. The text offers many new ways to 

consider the operational environment and ways to control it. As Qiao and Wang 

write

For a long time both military people and politicians have become 

accustomed to employing a certain mode of thinking, that is, the major 

factor posing a threat to national security is the military power of an 

enemy state or potential enemy state. However, the wars and major 

incidents which have occurred during the last ten years of the twentieth 

century have provided to us in a calm and composed fashion proof that 

the opposite is true: military threats are already often no longer the 

major factors affecting national security.111

If America’s military desires to break free from the Chinese label of 

“lacking lucid and incisive thinking,” then theorists in the US should be 

considering NOW new combinations and cocktail mixtures since we are ten 

years removed from the publication of Unrestricted Warfare. Most assuredly 

the Chinese are doing so as this work goes to press.

 

111 Qiao and Wang, p. 95.
42

CHAPTER TWO: THE “ART OF WAR” IN THE 21ST

CENTURY

This chapter highlights how ancient military thinking and information age

concepts are being integrated to produce new modes of thought.

112

The theoretical thinking of each era, including the theoretical thinking of our 

times, is a historical product. It has completely different forms in different 

times and has completely different content.113 Engels

Introduction

The history of warfare demonstrates that nations taking the lead in 

transforming their militaries during periods of revolutionary change have the 

best chance of seizing the initiative in future war. It is apparent that the book 

Unrestricted Warfare gives the PLA a new mode of thinking that encourages 

transformations of this type in the Chinese military.

The Chinese concept of “informatized warfare” represents a focused 

transformation of the nation’s mode of thinking. Traditional and mechanized 

methods of thought work less well in an integrated and systems-oriented 

environment characterized by rapidly changing time-space relationships. The 

strategic focus of the transformation requires “changing the thinking style, 

introducing innovation in operational theory” according to one source.114

Engel’s prediction was correct. Modern times encourage change and the 

development of entirely different forms of military thought and content.

This chapter examines the PLA’s new modes of thought. Included in 

the discussion are the integration of technology with ancient stratagems, the use 

of new concepts such as war engineering and system attack warfare, and the 

impact of culture on new modes of thought.

 

112 A variant of this article appeared in the Summer, 2009 edition of India’s military 

journal CLAWS, pp. 164-182.

113 Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Beijing, The People’s Press, 1995, Second 

Chinese Edition, Vol. 4, p. 248, as quoted in Deng Yifei, “A Revolution in Military 

Thinking in the Information Age,” Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military 

Science), No. 6, 2007, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20080527563002.

114 Zhan Yu, “Strategic Considerations for Army Transformation,” Beijing Zhongguo 

Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 25 August 2008, pp. 86-97, as translated and 

downloaded from the OSC website, document number CPP20080825563003.
43

China’s White Paper: Formalizing the Transformation Process

Evidence of change in PLA thought is found in the Chinese White 

Paper on National Defense released in January 2009. China’s military White 

Papers have traditionally explained the general azimuth of the PLA’s 

development. The terms “mechanized” and “mechanization” were used only 

seven times in the 2009 version while the terms “informatized” and 

“informationization”

115 were used nearly fifty times, clearly showing where the 

emphasis is now placed. Only the terms “nuclear” and “defense” exceeded 

these information-oriented terms in word count.116

The catalyst for a new thinking style emanates primarily from Chinese 

observations of and lessons learned from US and coalition actions in the Desert 

Storm and Kosovo operations, and then from US/coalition actions in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. These conflicts demonstrated the power and accuracy of 

a new type of thinking, one based on information age concepts. 

The informatization of the armed forces, the PLA realizes, demands

new modes of thinking that “possess more pronounced comprehensive, 

dynamic, flexible, effective, creative, and forward-looking thought 

functions”117 than conventional military thought. Such demands result in 

completely new warfare concepts118 that affect every branch of the military.

In the PLA’s opinion, these changes are transforming the military from a closed 

force into a modern information age power focusing on new missions and roles 

to include peacekeeping, military diplomacy, and joint antiterrorism maneuvers 

with other nations. These are some of the nonwar military actions addressed in 

Unrestricted Warfare and elsewhere in PLA publications. Most recently, the 

PLA’s navy has accepted the mission of combating Somali pirates. Such

changes not only indicate that China’s military reform process is underway, but 

they also demonstrate that China is increasing its military potential and 

willingness to accept more missions. The end goal of change is to have the 

 

115 “Informationization” is equivalent to the English term “informatization.”

116 “Full Text: China’s National Defense in 2008,” Xinhua in English 0208 GMT 20 

January 2009, as downloaded from the OSC website, document number 

CPP20090120968111.

117 Li Deyi, “A Study of the Basic Characteristics of the Modes of Thinking in 

Informatized Warfare,” Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 20 

August 2007, pp. 101-105, as translated and downloaded from the OSC website, 

document number CPP20081028682007.

118 Ibid.
44

capability “to win local wars in the era of information,”

119 another focus of the

2009 White Paper.

The PLA’s “informatized thought” transformation is the outer formal 

reflection of a much deeper reform of the entire Chinese military establishment, 

a transformation that will affect both doctrine and equipment. At the same time

the fundamentals upon which the PLA’s thought processes rest (use of the 

dialectic, comprehensive assessments, Sun Tzu’s principles, stratagems, etc.) 

remains as the thought platform to which integrated and system-oriented 

applications will be attached. Perhaps in this sense not as much has changed as 

Chinese theorists like to posit. Mixing the old and the new is akin to having

“Sun Tzu at the computer.”

Informatized Thought: Can the Inferior Still Defeat the Superior?

The work of PLA Major Peng Hongqi demonstrates the application of 

informatized warfare concepts to age-old Chinese military principles that result

in a new mode of thinking. His article, “A Brief Discussion of Using the Weak 

to Defeat the Strong under Informatized Conditions,” was written for the 

authoritative journal China Military Science. The article offers nine ways that 

an information-based inferior force could attack an information-based superior 

force.120 Thus Peng still believes that the inferior can defeat the superior, 

especially after reading of some insurgent successes against coalition forces.

Peng offers a number of methods to help an inferior informatized force 

(China) overcome a superior informatized force such as the US. First, Peng 

states that it is imperative that the weaker side in an information confrontation 

find a way to limit a superior opponent’s control over information. The weaker 

side must adhere to the active offense, he notes, especially in peacetime. This 

latter assertion contradicts the active defense emphasis of China’s White Paper. 

The offense in peacetime provides the inferior side with a moment of relative 

equality that changes the traditional law of the weak always being on the 

defensive. Active offense is an asymmetric operation that requires properly 

determining key targets such as those that control data and make decisions. An 

inferior force must strike first or lose its opportunity to subdue the enemy. 

Attacks must be continuous once initiated, Peng notes, and both the military 

and the people must be mobilized. Society’s informatized elite must be 

 

119 “Military Support to Peaceful Development,” China Daily, 6 January 2009, at 

http://www.china-wire.org/2009/01/military-support-to-peaceful-development. 

120 Peng Hongqi, “A Brief Discussion of Using the Weak to Defeat the Strong under 

Informatized Conditions,” Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 

No. 1, 2008, pp. 142-148, as translated and downloaded from the OSC website, 

document number CPP20080624563002.
45

absorbed into the military’s plans since everyone with a notebook computer can 

become a combatant.121

In a surprise interpretation of United Nations (UN) regulations, Peng 

states that, according to the self-defense charter of the UN, 

the inferior side carrying out a preemptive strike to subdue the enemy 

stems from the need to seize freedom of military actions, which is 

fundamentally different than a powerful enemy interfering in the 

internal affairs of another country and carrying out aggressive “first 

strike” actions.

Thus Peng seems to imply that it is the RIGHT of an inferior force to attack a 

superior force first.122

A second way for an inferior informatized force to defeat a superior 

informatized force is through the manipulation of the latter’s “price disparity,” 

the point where psychological weakness occurs, and through the use of allies. 

Causing massive war losses and casualties may affect the will of the superior 

force to continue fighting before it affects the inferior force since the former 

fears paying the price for victory more than the inferior force. Winning the 

support of allies and destroying an opponent’s coalition through persuasion and 

the use of the “righteousness of a war effort” are other ways the inferior can 

defeat the superior.

123

Third, Peng states that one must grasp the laws and circumstances of 

informatized conditions that guide information-based societies and militaries. 

One such issue to exploit is that only 20 percent of systems actually play key 

roles in the sustenance of a society or military force. The other 80 percent are 

only of secondary importance. The most vulnerable and most important of the 

20 percent are space systems, networked systems, and logistic systems in that 

order. These are the systems that should be targeted. Another key measure, 

Peng notes, is developing countermeasures in conjunction with strategy.

124

Fourth, the enemy must not be allowed to control information 

superiority, especially “the control of perception.” Control of perceptions 

allows an inferior force to induce information confusion in a superior force via 

information excess, information inflation, or information inundation. 

 

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.
46

“Technological blind spots” (those areas not covered by satellites) can also aide 

an inferior force’s plans. Studying the operating principles, systems, and 

conditions of an adversary’s technical and theoretical conditioning allows 

Chinese forces to nullify some components of an adversary’s overall perception

system.125

Fifth, Peng writes that an inferior force must conduct information 

reconnaissance and prepare confrontational responses as asymmetric checks 

and balances on an opponent’s strategy. An inferior force must control an 

adversary’s combat preparations. Protracted control over an enemy is a means 

by which effective control is maintained over time and space. Protracted control 

also requires demonstrating countermeasure potential to a superior opponent. 

Without such a demonstration, the adversary would have no reason to go along 

with a protracted fight.126

Sixth, much of an inferior force’s reconnaissance can now be done 

surreptitiously on computers through the use of hackers or other civilian means. 

This enhances the PLA’s ability to claim plausible deniability when accused of 

being part of the attack. Forces begin engagements and reconnaissance well 

before a conflict emerges. Peacetime collection of key information on another 

force’s data collection and processing systems is vital to success and offers an 

opportunity to act before a war breaks out.127 Peng states that one should

...treat the peacetime struggle for information supremacy as a ‘genuine, 

perpetual, and never-ending battle’ in preparation and implementation. 

It must practice strict information secrecy. The essence of information 

confrontation is to gain as much enemy information as possible and 

keep the enemy from gaining information on one’s own side.128

China appears to have performed Peng’s vision well if the number of 

accusations leveled against the mainland is any indicator. India, South Korea, 

Germany, Australia, the US, and others have all accused China of penetrating 

their computer systems. The Chinese government has denied all of these 

accusations against them. Peng also notes that “the only way the inferior side 

can compete with a powerful enemy is by taking full advantage of peacetime to 

energetically elevate its material and technological foundation.”129 Chapter 

Seven of this book focuses on just this issue.

 

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid.
47

Seventh, Peng states that the process through which information is 

understood (and how it can be manipulated) is important for nations to 

understand. The struggles between reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance 

and deception and counter-deception are indicative of why this requirement is 

so important. One side can collect huge amounts of information on the other 

side, but if 50 percent of that information is deceptive input, then the side 

collecting information can be placed at a significant disadvantage.130 Verifying 

data reliability is a requirement that cannot be delayed. 

Eighth, Peng writes that the initiative in battle can only be won when 

“external potential” is achieved. External potential means using clandestine 

special operations to disrupt enemy plans, using the media to advertise the 

crimes of an enemy force, and applying external pressure on the enemy from 

other countries. External operations are important because science and 

technology are shrinking the power of spirit, strategy, and other non-technical 

elements. Outside pressures must be increased on these elements as a result.131

Finally, Peng contradicts many of his colleagues who search for socalled “trump” weapons. He believes there is too much emphasis on trump 

weapons since weapons alone cannot decide a conflict. They can be countered 

by other trump weapons that also contain asymmetric superiorities or by 

creative thought processes. Inferior forces are required to find technological 

niches and occupy a small space in that field if they are to maintain some type 

of counterforce (and thus balance) when dealing with a superior opponent. 

Optimizing the use of existing technologies, using strengths to make up for 

weaknesses, putting together things that are weak to make something strong, 

and using structural changes to enhance combat strength are other effective 

measures.

132

Peng’s article indicates that informatized war is a confrontation of not 

only technologies but also knowledge and the information age talents of people.

The slant of Peng’s article is very important since it offers thoughts foreign to 

many US analysts who don’t (can’t) think as Peng does due to our own prisms 

and limitations (legal, ethical, cultural, etc.). Peng’s thinking approaches 

several of the thought processes in Unrestricted Warfare.

 

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.
48

Peng’s use of a simple thought from the era of Sun Tzu, how “the 

inferior can defeat the superior,” demonstrates that even in the information age 

the PLA can use ancient thought. Peng is not the only author who has written 

about integrating strategies into the informatized warfare paradigm. For 

example, a Jiefangjun Bao article in January 2008 examined warfare strategies 

for network attack and defense. These strategies included “preserving and 

breaking,” “attacking and defending,” “peculiarity and straightness,” “showing 

the shape,” “form and force,” and “using space” to influence the struggle over 

network space.133 All of these are variations of ancient stratagems.

Changing a “Mode of Thinking”

The information age offers Chinese leaders a unique chance to make a 

“quantum leap” in military affairs and bypass many long years of research and 

production of mechanized equipment. However, the transformation from a 

mechanized to an informatized force requires changes to the military’s mode of 

thought. The PLA has to learn how to apply new technologies and to develop 

new thinking styles quickly or risk falling further behind. Military leaders are 

confronted with digital, high speed versions of command information, control 

information, early warning information, survey information, intelligence 

information, systems information, and evaluation information that change the 

way operations are conceived and executed, according to several prominent 

Chinese authors. 

Targets have also changed. The foci of Chinese information attacks are 

enemy command centers, information systems, and information capabilities 

rather than troop formations as in the past. Battles will be fought over 

information resources at both the tactical and strategic levels. New modes of 

thinking are required to protect operations, logistics, and other associated 

areas.134

Li Deyi, Deputy Chair of the Department of Warfare Theory and 

Strategic Research at the PLA’s Military Academy of Science, highlights what 

must change (and why) in the PLA’s mode of thinking. He states: 

1. Changing the mode of thinking is a requirement for ensuring 

victory in future war. Conventional thinking needs to move 

 

133 Liu Wanxin, Dang Wanlong, and Zhang Dan, “Network Attack and Protection also 

Need Strategies,” Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 2 January 2008, p. 

6, as translated and downloaded from the OSC website, document number 

CPP20080102436002.

134 Li.
49

from individual system engagement toward systemized 

thought and system-to-system engagements. Group and 

organizational decision-making replace individual thought.

2. Strategy and technology are unified for planning purposes. 

The information superhighway can produce information 

misdirection, spread the fog of war, and interfere with and 

disrupt the enemy’s strategic perceptions. Electronic 

deception, camouflage, and interference along with viral 

infiltration and interference with/deception of satellites can 

cause enemy errors in judgment. 

3. Systems methodology has broken armies away from singular 

cause and effect determinism that is characteristic of 

conventional warfare. Systems use information, information 

technology, and information system modes of thought to

reduce an enemy’s combat effectiveness.

4. Information and information technology determine combat 

effectiveness, victory, and defeat in war. They stand 

alongside materials and power as one of the three major 

strategic resources. 

5. Information deterrence (that is, information technology, 

weaponry, and resource deterrence as well as counterinformation deterrence) are new modes of strategic thought 

and are important new deterrent forces just behind nuclear 

deterrence in achieving national strategic objectives.

6. New modes of thinking will enable breakthroughs in control 

theory.

7. New modes of thinking integrate information reasoning, 

analysis, strategic capabilities, and the experiences of 

warfare with information collection and storage, information 

processing, information transmission, and the logical 

reasoning capabilities of computers and artificial 

intelligence. C4ISR system decision-making is scientific, 

collective, real-time, and precise. 

8. Systemized warfare is represented by activities that have 

organization, planning, objectives, measures, layers, and 

steps. It is networked thought built on a network foundation. 

Networks are systems so systemization thinking is also 

“networkization” thinking, another new mode of thought.

9. The design of military system architectures, defensive 

alignments, and attack countermeasures must utilize 

qualitative and quantitative analysis. Precise analysis, 

planning, design, guidance, and management are the 
50

requirements of the man/machine process for new 

thinking.

135

Li is not the only Chinese leader to emphasize the need for new 

thinking styles. Major General Zhan Yu, commandant of the Shijiazhunag 

Army Command Academy, believes new problems will emerge that transform 

solutions based on books toward solutions based on practical experience/facts. 

This transformation requires a change from conservative to creative thought. 

Personnel must discuss what has never been discussed and do what has never 

been done. This is not a transformation of thought that deals with emergencies 

but rather with long-term perspectives. Finally, Zhan agrees with Li on at least 

one point. He notes that new modes of thought can be viewed as a “systems 

engineering” project. Modes of thought must change from singular or 

individual areas to systemic thought that is integrated.136

Another leader emphasizing change was the Dean of the Department of 

Military Political Work of Shijiazhunag Army Command College, Senior 

Colonel Deng Yifei. He writes that change requires foresight, flexibility, 

effectiveness, and awareness of how information resources are expanding

infinitely and being transmitted in an unobstructed way. Information technical 

tools enable more complex and precise planning, release the energy of thinking, 

and inspire creative thought. Information resources have turned into a 

multiplier of thinking effectiveness.137 In the information age, Deng believes 

that creative thinking is the pivot point for innovative thought and the “golden 

key” to the door to success and victory in war.138

War Engineering: An Example of a New Mode of Thought

Major General Hu Xiaofeng, a professor in the Information Operations 

and Command Training-Teaching and Research Department at China’s 

National Defense University, noted that the age of informatization requires new 

approaches to the study and management of information age wars. War 

engineering is one of these new approaches.139 It appears to be an updated 

version of the Chinese concept of war control.

 

135 Li.

136 Zhan Yu.

137 Deng Yifei, “A Revolution in Military Thinking in the Information Age,” Beijing 

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), No. 6, 2007, as translated and 

downloaded from the OSC website, document number CPP20080527563002.

138 Ibid.

139 Hu Xiaofeng, “The Basics of War Engineering,” Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue

(China Military Science), No. 3, 2007, as translated and downloaded from the OSC 

website, document number CPP20070927478001.
51

War engineering arose, Hu contends, from the requirement to find a 

method to study, manage, and control information age war systems. Chinese 

war engineering is “a method of systems engineering that studies, designs, tests, 

controls, and evaluates war systems and that is guided by systematic thinking, 

based on information technology.”140 The most important element of war 

engineering is to maintain control of war systems. Through war systems, 

control of the course of operations is possible.141 The concept is centered on 

managing warfare and has total victory as its goal. 

War engineering looks at combat as a nonlinear, complex adaptive 

system. War engineering studies, designs, and manages war requirements, 

theories, experiments, and processes. It has five parts: requirements, planning, 

testing, control, and evaluation engineering. Control engineering, the most 

important element, consists of strategic, campaign, and tactical command 

information systems which monitor situations, control decision-making, handle 

anomalies, and evaluate results.142

Hu concludes his thoughts on war engineering by quoting Engels, who 

noted that “it wasn’t the inventors of new material measures; it was the first 

person who, in the correct manner, used a new measure that had already been 

invented.” Hu believes China is searching for a way to be the first to use US 

inventions to their benefit and prove Engels correct. China hopes to be able to 

manage and control war instead of reacting to it and to make wartime changes 

in advance (through simulations) instead of making changes as war requires or 

demands. War engineering, according to Hu, will be one of several catalysts 

that promote the further development of information war studies as China 

transforms its military from a mechanized to an informatized force.143

System Attack Warfare: Another New Mode of Thought

New modes of thinking require, above all else, creativity and 

innovation. Dai Qingmin, the Director of the All-PLA Informatization 

Consultation Committee (and former head of the Electronic Warfare 

Department of the Chinese General Staff), wrote an important article regarding 

innovation and informatized thought in 2007 in China Military Science. He 

discussed information attack theories, not active defense theories, and he 

stressed the importance of innovative developments. 

 

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.
52

Innovation, Dai writes, is the precursor to the further development of 

military technology, weapon modernization, organizational restructuring, and 

changes in military practice.144 The basic task of innovation in the information 

age is to “reveal the law of informatized warfare, put forward a corresponding 

strategy for informatized warfare, and formulate the principles for informatized 

operations.”145 Innovation creates new transformation theories, systems 

integration theories, and service and arms building theories.146 Technical 

informatized innovation must take into account issues not considered in the past

in China, Dai notes, such as fair competition, a sound investment mechanism, a 

legal system for protecting intellectual property rights, and an effective human 

resources cultivation mechanism.147

In another 2007 article, this time in the Liberation Army Daily, Dai 

wrote that one innovative change is to use “system attack warfare as a guide.” 

Coming from a person of such renown, this is a very important statement and 

one that should concern the West. There is no mention of active defense in 

Dai’s writing here, just attack options. He also stated that it is imperative to 

grasp the initiative in future war, take information dominance as a core 

principle, and develop informatization operations theories ahead of time.148

According to Dai, these actions require an objective analysis of the 

contradictions that exist in the current stage of informatization,149 and the focus 

should be on those that can be exploited. These points and concerns differ 

markedly from mechanized thought, where China stressed active defense and 

an interest in attacking only after first being attacked. Now, Dai states that 

System attack warfare is the basic thought of our armed forces for 

fighting operations in the environment of informatization. System 

attack warfare stresses the use of asymmetric offensive actions to seize 

battlefield control in all battle domains, using elite forces and 

 

144 Dai Qingmin, “Ensure Historical Orientation and Promote Comprehensive 

Innovation of Military Informationization,” Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China 

Military Science), No. 1, 2007, as translated and downloaded from the OSC website, 

document number CPP20070512563001.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid.

148 Dai Qingmin, “Further Understanding on Laws of Military Informatization 

Building,” Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 13 February 2007, p. 6, as 

translated and downloaded from the OSC website, document number 

CPP20070213721038. 

149 Ibid.
53

composite operation means that mix hard and soft attacks to focus 

attacks on the core and weak links of the enemy operation system...150

Problems that the PLA will have to overcome, according to Dai, as a 

change is made from a traditional to an informatized mode of thought, include: 

structural problems such as breaking down section barriers and department 

interests; the current inability to independently innovate; and the clarification of 

unclear demands for the construction of an information network.151 Military 

innovations must solve these problems. 

Zhang Zhiping and Ye Haiyuan, in their work on the transformation of 

the military with Chinese characteristics, also discussed innovation. They state 

that innovation must include new viewpoints, concepts, and thoughts. 

Operations theory, for example, might include information warfare, spatial 

warfare, precision operations, and integrated joint operations. The development 

of strategies for operational issues will be particularly important for future 

informatized warfare concepts.

152 Once again, the focus is on combining 

technology with strategies as other military authors have repeatedly stressed.

Major General Zhan Yu, cited previously in this chapter, offers other 

thoughts on innovation in operations theory. He states that systemic destructive 

attack must be emphasized; information must take a leading role; and firepower 

will control the process of operations, with precision operations the highest 

state to be pursued. The PLA’s operational style must change to be of the joint, 

non-linear, precision, and non-engagement (no direct contact) types. Finally, 

combat capability must undergo a transformation in command and control, 

information operations, precision-strike capability, strategic maneuver, fast 

assault, special operations capability, and comprehensive-defense capability for 

the conduct of informatized warfare. This will enable a qualitative leap in 

military organization and force structure.153 Where Zhan sees a qualitative leap, 

this author believes the PLA’s progress is more akin to a quantum leap.

Culture Affects Innovation Trends

According to Chinese analysts, China’s new mode of thinking will 

develop differently than would a corresponding transformation of thought in the 

 

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid. 

152 Zhang Zhiping, Ye Haiyuan, “Trends in World Military Development: Accelerating 

Military Transformation with Chinese Characteristics,” Beijing Renmin Ribao (Internet 

Version), 9 April 2008, p. 7, as translated and downloaded from the OSC website, 

document number CPP20080409710003.

153 Zhan Yu.
54

West. This is due to the impact of Chinese culture and history on innovation 

and due to the development of two types of thought processes, metaphysical 

and dialectical. No further explanation was offered.

Innovation affects culture and vice versa. Authors Xiao Dongsong, a 

doctoral student in military studies at China’s National Defense University, and 

Li Qing, an associate professor in the Teaching and Research Section for 

Political Theory at National Defense University, wrote about the effects of 

culture on innovation. The authors state that knowledge is gained from 

cognitive reflections on the essence, patterns, properties, and features of the 

external world. Values are reflected in the way things and processes are used, 

resulting in a series of “value reflections, value assessments, value principles, 

and value concepts to form a value system for society.”154 Informatized thought 

(such as that produced over the Internet) has greatly changed “how we know” 

and has created new modes of thought. Wikipedia is perhaps the best example

of putting a new spin on “what we know.” “What we know” is determined by 

the hundreds of individuals who contribute to Wikipedia, and their personal 

agendas are unknown.

Xiao and Li define culture as “the organic unity of knowledge systems, 

value systems, and methodological systems of thought.”155 Knowledge system 

innovation includes new phenomena that must be recognized, analyzed, and 

summarized. This will require that existing knowledge categories for military 

actions, truth, philosophy, and information war be processed and refitted. 

Existing categories of knowledge (ethics, etiquette, benevolence, justice, gain 

and harm, material substances, actions, systems, control, information, etc.) must 

adopt new measures as well.

156

Value system innovation is the result of different assessments in 

attitudes, interests, enthusiasms, and mental dynamics. Value assessment 

systems of different societies are reflected in conditions such as geography, 

demography, customs, and means of production. It is also reflected in how 

religion and people, individuals and groups, mind and strength, and morality 

and gain are related (and which are the most important to a culture).157 A 

 

154 Xiao Dongsong and Li Qing, “Analysis of the Impact of Culture on the Innovation 

of Military Theories,” Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 2002, 

No. 3, pp. 31-39. For more information on Chinese military culture in the information 

age, see Chapter Three.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.
55

methodological system of thought is then created out of “how we know and by 

what means we know the external world.”158

As a methodological system of thought, culture provides military 

theory with innovative tools for thought and with the logical means and patterns 

for processing information. As an example, Xiao and Li contrast Greek and 

Chinese thought:

The early Greek method of thought was a simple and substantial way of 

thinking, in that the essence of things was within the things themselves. 

As such it held that one should understand the substance, that is, the 

thing in and of itself in order to grasp the essential nature and pattern of 

said thing. By contrast, the method of thought in Chinese antiquity was 

a simple and relational way of thinking, in that the essence of things 

was reflected in the relationship between a given thing and other things. 

As such, understanding a thing meant understanding various types of 

relationships. These two different methods of thinking provide two 

different anchor points for thinking; one is substantial, and the other 

relational.159

Xiao and Li also contrast views in the West and in China on the concept of war. 

They noted:

The West placed emphasis upon seeing war as an entity, in that new 

viewpoints, ideas, and theories were extracted during the process of 

bringing war in and of itself to light. China, however, placed war within 

a larger relational world, and extracted new viewpoints, ideas, and 

theories by means of revealing the relationships between war and 

politics, war and economics, war and the natural environment, and war 

and leadership.160

In terms of logical thought patterns, the West uses metaphysics which 

is based on analysis and decomposition according to Xiao and Li. A subject is 

understood as a static and isolated presence that is broken down into a series of 

mutually independent elements and these elements are analyzed as a means of 

gaining a precise understanding of the subject. China uses dialectical thought. 

Here the logical patterns of thought are represented by a high degree of analysis 

with a high degree of integration. Understanding a subject is seen as a presence 

 

158 Ibid.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid.
56

with common links and actions. A comprehensive examination of the 

relationships between the possible and actual, history and the future, and the 

whole and the part is performed in order to gain an understanding of the 

essential nature and pattern of things.161 

New modes of thought are affected by this cultural thought process. A 

person brought up in the Chinese system will analyze information age

developments and apply them differently than someone brought up in a 

Western society who performs the same analysis, according to this way of 

thinking.

One’s level of expertise in military practice, according to Xiao and Li,

also affects one’s attempts at innovation. In the area of military practice the 

PLA is weak since it has not fought a high-tech war yet. But the PLA’s work on 

war theory appears strong and focused on inculcating information age

technologies into the force. The PLA is attaching particular significance to an 

examination of philosophical, historical, and scientific culture. Philosophy 

considers the connections and development of various aspects of nature and 

society; military history helps summarize the lessons of military culture; and 

science, in particular the impact of technology (with information technology at 

its core), has caused fundamental changes in both societal and military 

activities. Theories of information war and associated theories (Third Wave, 

etc.) have evolved from these developments.162

Xiao and Li believe the use of technology (such as the development of 

simulations) has led to a closer understanding of military practice and a 

corresponding move away from Confucianist practice. Technology has 

encouraged China to move away from traditional military thought and toward 

an advanced culture, one that takes into consideration new developments and 

results in innovation in military theory.163

The authors conclude that the development of an advanced military 

culture will increase the knowledge level of officers and troops, their scientific 

knowledge and culture levels, and Chinese combat power. At the same time, 

the Marxist value system must be updated and enriched in areas such as

patriotic devotion. In a reversal of traditional values and modes of thought, now 

the qualitative must be emphasized over the quantitative and effectiveness 

emphasized over fairness.164

 

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid.

163 Ibid.

164 Ibid.
57

Final recommendations by Xiao and Li included the following:

Continue to create, learn, and understand new methods of thinking. Pay 

attention to the latest changes and results of research and understand 

the content and essential characteristics of modern methodology.

Strengthen the systematic buildup of methods of thinking to include 

philosophical, sociological, physiological, and psychological methods; 

and combine and integrate them. Study the structure, logic, and means 

by which this new organic system can be employed.165

The next chapter will discuss in more detail the changes that have 

occurred in Chinese military culture as a result of information age

developments.

Conclusions

Innovations and creative thinking, in the view of the PLA, are the keys

to victory in future war. This requires escaping from the grasp of mechanized 

thought and finding new and innovative ways to implement informatized 

thinking. Innovations involve finding new ways to apply ancient stratagems to 

information age developments. In a certain sense, a new mode of thinking is an 

asymmetric answer to a competitor with technological prowess but who has 

failed to apply these advances to their fullest. Engels belief that “it wasn’t the 

inventors of new material measures; it was the first person who, in the correct 

manner, used a new measure that had already been invented” could find new 

applicability in the information age. Sun Tzu’s principles integrated with 

systems thinking may provide such a cognitive advantage.

The PLA is moving from a mechanized to an informatized force as fast 

as possible. For example, the PLA’s University of Science and Technology 

(UST) reports it is cultivating junior commanders for joint operations under 

informatized conditions. Five training systems have been formed, to include a 

command information engineering system. Courses have increased their 

content on complex electromagnetic environments, information security, and 

psychological operations.166

 

165 Ibid.

166 Liu Geng’an and Ma Shengwei, “PLA UST Cultivates New-Type Military Talents,” 

Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 5 January 2009, as translated and 

downloaded from the OSC website, document number CPP20090105702014.
58

Peng’s analysis and recommendations on how the inferior could defeat 

the superior were the closest examples of an actual way to apply Sun Tzu-type 

methods to the information age. Li Deyi listed twelve changes in the PLA’s 

mode of thinking that must be integrated into informatized thought. Systems 

methodology, information deterrence, control theory, and other factors were 

highlighted. Some of his recommendations share a common reference point 

with Western information age theory while others do not. Those in the latter 

category should be closely examined by Western analysts for their potential 

implications or use.

General Dai’s new mode of thinking focused more on systems and 

innovation than on applying old principles of war. He stated that to grasp the 

initiative in future war China must take system attack warfare as its guide and 

develop informatization operations theories ahead of time.167 The Chinese, like 

other nations, believe it is better to worry about things before they happen 

instead of after the fact when it is too late. War engineering, innovation, and 

creativity are required ahead of time in order to affect efficiency, management, 

strategy, organization, and theory with information means.168

Cultural proclivities provide military theory with some of the tools for 

innovative thought. Xiao and Li’s contrast of Greek and Chinese thought was 

noteworthy. While Greek thought emphasizes understanding the substance of 

something, Chinese thought stresses thinking of things in relation to one 

another. As the authors noted, these two different methods of thinking provide 

two different anchor points for thought: one is substantial and the other 

relational.169 It is thus to be expected that Chinese theoreticians will be looking 

for all types of relational aspects associated with informatized thought.

While the West uses metaphysics China uses dialectical thought. The 

dialectic enhances the development of countermeasures merely by its thought 

process of thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis. This requires that Western analysts 

conduct a close analysis of the links, actions, and counteractions that the PLA 

stresses and how they are being integrated into the force. A comprehensive 

examination of the relationships between the possible and actual, history and 

the future, and the whole and the part is performed in the PLA in order to gain 

an understanding of the essential nature and pattern of things.170 

 

167 Dai Qingmin, “Further Understanding on Laws of Military Informatization 

Building.”

168 Ibid.

169 Xiao and Li.

170 Ibid.
59

In summary, it is quite apparent that the PLA’s approach to 

informatized war will vary from Western modes of information age thought. 

This is not unexpected. Perhaps, however, too few Westerners appreciate the 

specific aspects of these differences and ignore such developments at their risk. 

To better understand the Chinese and find ways to work together with them or 

to develop counters to their creative thinking (as they develop counters to our 

way of thinking) it is strongly recommended that Western analysts study the 

Chinese as they study us—in detail. We must learn from them as they have 

learned from us. We can start by better understanding their new modes of 

thought—and warning them of some of the perils they are contemplating and 

introducing. 
60

CHAPTER THREE: CHINESE INFORMATION AGE MILITARY

CULTURE

This chapter examines the development of military culture in China as 

presented in China Military Science over the past several years.

In confrontations on the future battlefield, what is scarier than inferior 

technology is inferior thinking.171

Introduction

With over 5000 years of history, officers and academicians of the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have much information on which to base their 

books and articles about China’s rich tradition of military culture. For a 

Western audience, there is much to learn about (and from) the Chinese. For 

example, while most Western audiences like to think of Sun Tzu’s maxim of 

“winning without fighting” as representative of Chinese military culture, 

Chinese Colonel Jin Lixin disagrees. He wrote that being able to break the 

enemy’s resistance without fighting “is the rarest of rarities.” What Chinese 

history demonstrates, according to Jin, is an offensive philosophy of “attacking 

the enemy’s army in the field.”172

A few test questions on Chinese military thinking further demonstrate

the West’s unfamiliarity with PLA culture. To answer the following four 

questions, select from Karl Marx, Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, or Deng Xiaoping: 

Whose philosophy and military thought serves as the advanced culture of 

military thought in China?173 Whose philosophy serves as the PLAs guiding 

principle?174 Who developed People’s War?175 Who said that the biggest 

mistake is to miss an opportunity to send superior military forces against the 

 

171 Deng Yifei, “Realizing a Historic Leapfrog in Military Thinking Mode,” Guangming 

Daily, 17 January 2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20080219563001. 

172 Jin Lixin, “Ye Jianying and Traditional Chinese Military Culture,” China Military 

Science, 2002, No. 1, pp. 65-72.

173 Fang Yonggang, “Defining Advanced Chinese Military Culture,” China Military 

Science, 2005, No. 6, pp. 73-83. 

174 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, editors, The Science of Military Strategy, Military 

Science Publishing House, Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army, English version, 2005, p. 150.

175 Ibid., pp. 121, 126.
61

enemy?176 The answers to these questions can be found in the footnote to this 

sentence.177

The Chinese believe that the cyber/information age has helped them 

transform their rich traditional military culture into what they term as an 

“advanced military culture.” The primary factors behind this change are the 

PLA’s recognition of the influence of technology on strategy, the penetration of 

China’s traditional culture by modern media, and the creation of hightechnology strategic psychological warfare concepts. In the words of one 

author, China must construct socialist culture with Chinese characteristics; must 

create cultural diffusion hardware and software over which China has 

autonomous intellectual property rights; and, most important for Western 

audiences, China must take action to “propel China’s culture industry and 

media industry beyond China’s borders in an effort to take over the 

international culture market.”178 Western media outlets and militaries should be 

made aware of this Chinese effort.

This chapter will focus on Chinese military culture based on selected 

articles that express the thoughts of PLA officers and academicians over the 

past eight years. The discussion does not include a typical PLA soldier’s 

military cultural focus (the oath, flag, colors, and other military representations) 

but rather military thought and philosophy. The lessons learned from this 

examination are extensive and at times surprising in both context and 

substance. The examination exposes potential Chinese predispositions and thus 

intentions for further scrutiny and interpretation, and exposes Chinese thinking

and prejudices about US military culture. The examination begins, however, 

with a short overview of the manner in which this analysis was conducted. 

The Journal China Military Science

China Military Science is a core PLA military periodical. It serves as 

the sole source of information for this chapter. The journal is published 

bimonthly and is sponsored by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science and by 

the Chinese Military Science Association. Therefore the chapter reflects the 

thoughts of the Academy’s officers and academicians and its content is 

controlled by the editors. China Military Science addresses issues of strategy, 

 

176 Ibid., p. 288. 

177 The answer to all of these questions is Karl Marx. If you correctly selected the 

Prussian-born philosopher as the answer to all of these questions, consider yourself 

among the very few to do so.

178 Wang Shudao, “Modern Cultural Diffusion and National Security,” China Military 

Science, 2005, No. 3, pp. 64-69. 
62

history, defense, troop building, combat theory, and international military 

studies in addition to culture. The journal has won numerous awards in China. 

The material examined covered the eight years (1999-2007) of the 

journal, where no less than 66 articles had the word “culture” in an article’s 

title. Of the 66 articles179 examined, fourteen were history related, twelve were 

foreign military related, three were Communist Party related, seven were 

strategy related, six were society related, and twenty-four were purely military 

related. The latter category included law, camp culture, spiritual construction, 

combat power, military theories, advanced and future culture, systems, science 

and technology, modernization, worship, the environment, frontier defense, 

duty, national defense, and harmony and balance. Twenty-eight articles on 

culture were published in 2002 alone, the apparent height of interest and 

discussion on the subject. From 2000 to the last issue of 2002, the journal 

published six “groups” devoted to military culture under the title “Theoretical 

Study of Chinese Military Culture.” In each set there were approximately five 

or six culture-related articles.180

Definitions

To understand Chinese military culture a few important terms must be 

defined upfront. These terms are important for the remainder of the discussion 

that follows. The terms that are defined are culture, military culture, traditional 

military culture, Marxist culture, and advanced military culture, the latter being 

the focus of this chapter.

Culture

Fang Yonggang, a doctoral student at the Dalian Naval Academy, notes 

that culture is the object of the strength of people. It is the sum of the material 

and mental results created during a historical process that transforms nature, 

society, and people. It is a conceptual system of social ideology (philosophy, 

politics, law, ethics, and art). Fang states that culture is described in three ways. 

First, he uses scholar Liang Shubins’s definition of culture, which states that 

“culture is everything that our life depends upon...the meaning of culture is 

surely in economics and politics, but it encompasses everything.” Second, Fang 

states that culture refers to mental culture, to include philosophy, art, religion, 

language, logic, natural science, and other forms of knowledge such as the 

 

179 Five issues between 1999-2007 were not available for examination in the library of 

the author’s place of employment, the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas.

180 The discussion is understandably far from conclusive but rather attempts to offer an 

introductory point of view for discussing Chinese military culture. 
63

humanities and social sciences, human thought and consciousness, ways of 

thinking and acting, customs and habits, education, cultural institutions, and 

social organizational forms. Third, Fang notes that culture refers to the mental 

activities and products established upon a definite economic foundation and 

adapted to definite political institutions. 181

Zhang Xiaojun and Xu Jia define culture differently. They cited 

China’s 1982 Concise Social Sciences Dictionary to define culture as “the sum 

of the material wealth and the spiritual wealth created by mankind in the course 

of social development.” Zhang and Xu add that culture is “the social messages 

carried by the system of consensual symbols and its products and 

developments.” 182

Military Culture

Wu Mengchao, a Major General in 2002 and Vice President of the 

Nanjing Political Academy, defines military culture as a pattern of ideas 

attached to the potential military strength of an armed force (equipment, 

personnel, institutions, and training), to warfare (combat strength and its 

application), and to society (transformation from national strength to military 

strength). Military culture occurs when societal culture is shifted to military 

activities. Historical observations and logic (based on the past, present, and 

future of an object) determine military culture as well. The more developed a 

society is, the stronger is its cultural accumulation and the stronger the mental 

power of its people. Military cultural content is a qualitative indicator of 

military building. 183 

Fang Yonggang discusses Chinese military culture in a 2005 article. He 

states that military culture is a conceptual, complex entity formed from military 

knowledge systems, military value systems, and systems of military cognitive 

methods. It is the cultural basis formed from the combat strength of the armed 

forces. 184

Wang Zhaohai, in 2007, defines military culture as “the sum and 

substance of the ideology gradually formed among members of the military 

through military practice, consisting of the knowledge system, concepts of 

values, and methods of thought and conduct. It is the historical precipitate of 

 

181 Fang Yonggang.

182 Zhang Xiaojun and Xu Jia, “A Comparison of the Features of the Traditions of 

Chinese and US Strategic Culture,” China Military Science, 2004, No. 2, pp. 112-115.

183 Wu Mengchao, “Where is Our Military Culture? On the Present-Day Forms of Our 

Military Culture,” China Military Science, 2002, No. 3, pp. 20-23.

184 Fang Yonggang.
64

the spiritual production and spiritual life of members of the military. It is the 

carrier of symbols of values for the military and members of the military.”185

Traditional Military Culture

Jin Lixin’s 2002 work on Marshall Ye Jianying’s view of military 

culture listed key points for understanding traditional Chinese military culture. 

They are: 

 Clarity of Goal. Ye’s goal was to emphasize the past to benefit 

the present. He advocated using China’s precious historical 

inheritance to apply success and avoid defeats in these

changing times.

 Take a Firm Stand. China must use Marxist and Mao Zedong 

thoughts as weapons to dissect, sort out, and critique ancient 

military heritage using a scientific and dialectic attitude.

 Deal Strictly with Concrete Matters. Open up research into 

military science, and seek truth from facts. Remain down to 

earth and don’t make something out of nothing. General rules 

are more universal. 

 Weed through the Old to Bring Forth the New. One must 

“assume an impressive posture” by bringing the bow back but 

not shooting, demonstrating that one is ready to do battle. This 

is active defense.186 

This latter point is much like present day deterrence thought and the Chinese 

concept of shi (see Appendix Two for a detailed description of shi).

Marxist Military Culture

Liu Dingchang and Wang Yi, in 2002, write that Marxist military 

culture includes both software (thought, scholarship, science, etc.) and 

hardware (infrastructure, equipment, and training) and has five levels. They are:

 The culture of military thought which includes military 

dialectics and basic theory about war and strategy

 The culture of military scholarship which includes the sciences 

of strategy, campaigns, tactics, and war mobilization, among 

others

 

185 Wang Zhaohai, “Tentative Analysis of the Development of Harmonious Culture and 

Military Cultural Development,” China Military Science, 2007, No. 1, pp. 47-56.

186 Jin Lixin.
65

 The culture of military technology which includes military 

science and technology and military training

 The culture of military systems which includes the systems of 

leadership and political work

 The culture of military infrastructure which includes military 

organization and equipment.187

Advanced Military Culture

Fang Yonggang defined advanced military culture as merely an 

extension of advanced culture but with specific differences between soldiers 

and civilians in ideas, aesthetic values, and means of continuity. Drawing upon 

its superior military cultural heritage and forward orientation, advanced military 

culture must change in accordance with temporal and spatial conditions (such 

as cultural qualities, psychological features, and individual characteristics of 

officers and troops). Change includes examining the rational components of 

foreign military cultures.188

Wang Zhen, a professor in the Political Department of the Chinese 

Navy’s Dalian Ship Academy and the chief editor of the work Theory for 

Building the Communist Party of China, noted in 2005 that while China’s 

modern military culture is guided by Marxism, Mao Zedong military thought is 

an important component of China’s modern advanced military culture. Wang 

states that modern advanced military culture is differentiated from China’s 

ancient and modern military culture by profound changes in military concepts. 

In particular, the emergence of Mao Zedong military thought shattered 

traditional thought and reformed important traditional concepts. This 

revolutionary change was manifested in the following ways:

 It used the purpose of the new People’s Army to explain the 

instrumental value of the army. No longer were armies tools of the 

ruling class to make war but now the PLA works for the people to 

spread propaganda, organize the masses, arm the masses, help the 

masses establish a revolutionary political power, organize the 

establishment of the Communist Party, and make war if necessary. 

 It used a cultural perspective of the party commanding the guns to 

thoroughly transform the cultural perspective of the gun alone being 

supreme. That is, the gun was not the only element of respect. Rather, 

the Party commands the guns and not vice versa. 

 

187 Liu Dingchang and Wang Yi, “The Fundamental Features of Marxist Military 

Culture,” China Military Science, 2002, No. 4, pp. 19-25.

188 Fang Yonggang.
66

 It used materialist dialectics to make innovations and develop theories 

and strategies in Chinese and foreign military cultures. Mao, being 

knowledgeable in ancient, foreign, and Marxist writings, attached 

importance to deriving the best from both local and foreign military 

thought, especially theory and strategy. Revolutionary wars are just, 

and counterrevolutionary wars unjust. 189

Wang defined advanced military culture as “the military culture 

concepts and military culture system that are established under the guidance of 

correct military values.” Mao’s military thought clarified scientific military 

values and allowed military concept culture, military system culture, and 

military action culture to take shape as a scientific system.190

The Move from Traditional to Advanced Culture

Military culture is transitioning in accordance with the Chinese

military’s move from a mechanized to an informatized force and with the 

world’s transition from a Cold War environment to a digital age marked by 

global economic and social integration. The move to advanced military culture

does not mean, of course, that traditional cultural thought is being tossed out. 

Rather, it is being updated in correspondence with today’s digital context. For 

example, traditional concepts such as the preservation of unity, the pursuit of 

peace, and emphasis on rational thought all remain part of advanced military 

culture.191 Updating military culture simply ensures that the culture of military 

thought does not suffer from inferior thinking but keeps up with the times.

One main concern serves as a motivating factor for the PLA to 

transform from traditional military culture to advanced military culture. This 

concern is that some PLA members believe Western culture is penetrating 

China via digitized public opinion means. Wang Shudao, an Assistant Professor 

in the Military Personnel Management Department of the Xian Political 

Institute, is one who believes that Western penetration of the media has forced a 

cultural transformation.192 The digital age has introduced more cultural 

diffusion in China due to access to other cultures ideologies and philosophies. 

Cultural diffusion, according to Wang, is a means to pass on, promote, 

and develop cultural content. It can act positively (supporting the PLA) or 

 

189 Wang Zhen, “Mao Zedong Military Thought and China’s Advanced Military 

Culture,” China Military Science, 2005, No. 1, pp. 53-62.

190 Ibid.

191 Wang Zhaohai.

192 Wang Shudao.
67

negatively (enabling the disintegration of the PLA) and has two layers of 

meaning. The first is the diffusion of culture itself, its semiotic characteristics 

and system of meaning. The second is diffusion activities through definitive 

media both internal (within a community) and external (among different 

communities, known as intercultural diffusion or cross-cultural diffusion).193

These activities use modern information technology and specialized media. 

There are five elements: the diffuser of culture; a specific system of meanings; 

a definitive semiotic system; specialized media; and the target of cultural 

diffusion. Modern cultural diffusion is based on high-technology, is global in 

scope, and can be used as a combat power additive.194

Cultural diffusion in the information age has new forms. These are:

 With respect to cultural symbols—artificial language and logic 

symbols are in the process of replacing traditional material and 

written symbols as the carriers of cultural information and the 

transmission of systems of meanings

 With respect to communication technology—digital information 

technology and virtual reality technology are replacing traditional 

printing and electronic technologies 

 With respect to diffuse media—satellite radio, television media, 

and computer network media are increasingly replacing traditional 

paper publication media.195

Wang sees three challenges to China. First is the challenge to China’s 

national spirit, the latter touted as the essence of China’s military culture. This 

challenge is caused by exposure to other lifestyles and to Western 

“libertarianism.” This has introduced feelings of cultural inferiority among 

some Chinese. A second challenge is that presented to socialist ideals. The 

penetration of China by digitized systems has offered the West a chance to 

highlight their capitalist system and values. A third challenge is that presented 

to socialist information and the public opinion environment in general in China. 

Wang believes there is an “information supermarket” that has resulted in a loss 

of control and management over information in China. Citizens are not able to 

distinguish between good information and “information detrimental to the 

stability of Chinese society, interfering with the direction of public opinion and 

social psychology.”196 The diffusion of Western values has caused, according to 

 

193 Wang Shudao.

194 Ibid.

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.
68

Wang, a crisis in beliefs and an upheaval in convictions, hedonism, and 

extreme egoism.197

Wang believes that cultural diffusion is a new form of soft power that 

can affect national security. In response, China must adapt a preventative 

cultural diffusion strategy in order to regain the strategic initiative in what 

Wang describes as the “cultural psychological warfare of the new period.”198

The West’s cultural diffusion has not only intervened into China, it has 

established a “strategic containment of the cultural layer” that has allowed the 

West to gain the initiative in cultural psychological warfare. Three 

recommendations were made by Wang:

 Proactive defense must be China’s strategy to control the diffusion 

of Chinese culture since the West is in a position of relative 

strength. The hypocrisy of the West’s anti-Chinese forces must be 

exposed.

 The Party must exert control over cultural diffusion. It must 

vigorously develop advanced culture, integrating traditional and 

modern diffusion media and national and private sector media to 

propagate national spirit and basic national values.

 Socialist culture with Chinese characteristics must serve as an 

essential condition for the implementation of cultural 

counterattacks and what Wang describes as “cultural attack 

psychological warfare.”199

Advanced military cultural thought should continue to innovate and 

change, to take the best from the West, and to elevate quality on a level above 

quantity in terms of importance. These requirements are mandated by the 

changes accompanying the digital age. For example, with regard to the quality 

over quantity concept, Liu Dingchang, then a Senior Colonel and President of 

the Nanjing Institute of Politics at Shanghai, and Wang Yi, a Senior Colonel 

and the Political Commissar of the same institute, noted in 2002 that 

China’s quantitative fighting strength is determined by the socialist 

political system, the population, economic factors, and natural 

geography. These factors are in constant flux based on modifications to 

military strategy. Qualitative aspects of fighting strength refer to the 

quality of military affairs, politics, technology, culture, health, and the 

 

197 Ibid.

198 Ibid.

199 Ibid.
69

psychological caliber and disciplinary style of the officers and troops as 

well as the caliber of military thought, strategy, and tactics. Marxist 

military culture has always placed great emphasis on the quality of the 

army.200

Wu Mengchao states that strong values and knowledge are two areas of 

measurement to help determine the development of an advanced military 

culture. Values emphasize the character of people. Chinese internal values 

include a peaceful disposition based on an active defense concept, an emphasis 

on strategic thinking, the use of deterrence whenever possible, and a benevolent 

approach. China’s military values are handed down from a historical study of 

Confucianism and Mohist, Daoist, and Legalist thought. Knowledge, the other 

area of measurement, emphasizes the scientific nature of culture. It includes 

learning from Marxist ideology, focusing on science and technology, and 

studying lessons learned from actual practice. 201

Revelations for a Non-Chinese Expert

For the average Western analyst who is not a Chinese expert, there are 

several points of interest embedded in Chinese discussions of culture. Among 

the most important issues are:

 How technology must be embedded into strategy, the latter serving as 

the strongest military cultural element of China

 The importance of Marxism to contemporary Chinese military culture 

and philosophy 

 Contradictions to some commonly accepted Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong 

phraseology 

 The role of intellectuals in the development of Chinese military culture 

and thought 

 The importance of strategic psychological warfare and persuasive 

media to the enhancement or degradation of military culture, to include 

persuasive simulations 

 The impact of informatization on military culture.

Strategy and Information Technology 

It should come as no surprise that the focus of many Chinese cultural 

writings is the issue of strategy. The Chinese have studied strategy closely for 

thousands of years. The revelation for a Western reader is not the PLA’s 

continued study of strategy but the manner in which they intend to improve it. 

 

200 Liu Dingchang and Wang Yi.

201 Wu Mengchao.
70

Major General (retired) Li Bingyan, a Senior Editor of the Liberation Army 

Daily, the PLA’s major newspaper, offered some of the best suggestions in this 

regard. He is well-known in China and abroad for his writings on military 

strategy. He has authored, among many works, a new edition of The Thirty-Six 

Stratagems and Strategies of the Ancients. 

Li points out three differences in Western and Eastern thought. First, 

Westerners focus on technology while Easterners focus on strategy. Li believes 

this is because Westerners created a socio-cultural environment where science 

and technology were esteemed while Easterners incorporated nature into human 

affairs and believed that changes in society were linked to changes in nature.202

This is an important point for western analysts to consider.

Second, when Westerners look at a problem, Li thinks they focus on a 

single point. Easterners, on the other hand, develop a comprehensive way of 

looking at a problem, what Li terms a “twin-lens” approach (or a 

comprehensive approach). Third, when examining relationships, Li believes 

that Westerners view coordination and struggle as incompatible. Easterners, on 

the other hand, seek a point of equilibrium between coordination and struggle 

advocating a battle of wits and eventual harmony and not a reliance on force. 

Li states that China must not rely on strategy alone in its battle of wits 

any longer. Rather, China should learn from the West and integrate strategy 

with technology.203 In this sense he aims to improve the quality of strategy in 

China. 

Li notes that there is a reason beside “incorporating nature into human 

affairs” for China’s slow acceptance of technology. During the Western Han 

era (206 BC—25 AD), China was governed by the concepts of “reject a 

hundred schools of thought, esteem only Confucianism” and “emphasize 

officials, not technology.” Officials, viewed as saviors of the people, blocked 

anyone venturing toward science, as the latter was deemed work for men who 

were clever with their hands. Li terms this a negative element of Chinese 

culture. As a result, Chinese strategy was forced down the narrow road of deceit 

and trickery, where stratagems play a major role.204 In Li’s opinion, China 

studies the use of strategy to win victory while the West studies the use of force 

to achieve victory. Since the Chinese believe that war is not only a contest of 

 

202 Li Bingyan, “Emphasis on Strategy: Demonstrating the Culture of Eastern Military 

Studies,” China Military Science, 2002, No. 5, pp. 80-85. 

203 Ibid.

204 Ibid.
71

material forces but also a battle of wits, they stress subjective (flexible, creative 

thinking) factors in war.

Lin Ronglin, a Colonel and professor at the Naval Command Institute, 

and Cui Tao, an MA candidate at the same institute, agree with Li. They write

that the integration of stratagems and technology is important.205 The authors 

conclude that “not only must we continue traditional Chinese military thought 

on strategy, we must also emphasize the borrowing of Western information 

technology advantages in order to adapt to information wars of the future.”206

Lin and Cui list four reasons for China’s emphasis on strategy:

 War has rules and by recognizing the rules, one could use other 

strategies to trounce the enemy.

 The full utilization of the subjective mobility of those involved 

in a conflict is required. Based on objective factors, subjective 

efforts are used to obtain victory.

 Both sides in a war are flexible. Both hide the truth and show 

falsehoods, and both compete in intelligence and bravery. The 

use of deception is necessary. 

 War must be in the service of a particular political end and 

serve as a means to that end.207

Marxism

Fang Yonggang wrote in 2005 that it was Mao who began the 

integration of Marxist thought into the Chinese revolution. This began an 

innovation in military culture that allowed China to show that it is adaptive and 

able to integrate traditional military strategy and philosophy with science and 

technology from the West.208 

Marxist writings have had a much greater impact on Chinese military 

philosophy than many non-Chinese experts (such as this author) could ever 

expect. The Chinese give Marx and Engels credit for strongly influencing many 

of the key aspects of their military thought. This influence should never be 

underestimated. Wang Zhaohai notes as late as 2007 that Marxism is the 

 

205 Lin Ronglin and Cui Tao, “Innovation in Chinese Military Thinking through 

Comparison with the West,” China Military Science, 2006, No. 5, pp. 117-124. 

206 Ibid.

207 Ibid.

208 Fang Yonggang.
72

guiding ideology and correct direction of development for Chinese thought. He 

adds that the core element of military culture is the socialist value system.209

Marxism is considered an essential aspect of traditional Chinese 

military culture, even though it is a nineteenth century concept. Jin Lixin, a

Colonel and assistant researcher at the Academy of Military Science’s 

Encyclopedic Research Department, wrote in 2002 about Marshall Ye 

Jianying’s view of traditional Chinese military culture’s Marxist and dialectical 

connections.210 He notes that Ye read the Marxist/Leninist classics and Chinese 

and foreign history of all kinds. Further, Jin notes with regard to Marxism and 

the dialectic, “study and draw on dialectical thinking in ancient military 

strategies and tactics, especially Sun Tzu’s Art of War. Solving the 

contradiction of the unity of opposites—the enemy and oneself—was the 

premise for conducting all military activities.” The one “without or hollow” is 

vacuous and the one “with or solid” is substantial (attack what is weak, avoid 

what is strong).211

Liu and Wang write that this ideological aspect of military culture is 

supported by Marxism’s cornerstones, dialectical materialism and historical 

materialism.212 Marxist dialectical materialism, they write, reveals objective 

facts and inherent relationships that outmoded metaphysical precepts cannot. 

Relationships include, for example, those between war and culture, the buildup 

of the national economy and the armed forces, the people and weapons and 

equipment, and a series of dialectical relationships within the military 

(attacking and defending, weakness and strength, superiority and inferiority, 

and so on).213

Historical materialism provides a theoretical basis for patterns of social 

development, for the form of a socialist economy, and for methods of 

production. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin, the authors note, 

have developed Marxist military culture with Chinese characteristics although 

they didn’t specify just what these characteristics were.

214

Authors Liu and Wang discount the contributions of Clausewitz and 

Jomini to military culture by stating that “military cultures prior to the advent 

of Marxism are limited by historical conditions, in particular because they are 

 

209 Wang Zhaohai.

210 Jin Lixin.

211 Ibid.

212 Liu and Wang. 

213 Ibid.

214 Ibid.
73

not guided by scientific concepts of the world or methodologies. As such, they 

have many drawbacks in terms of their content and function which 

fundamentally hold back any further progress for them.”215

Jin offers some historical offensive-oriented Chinese military doctrine

for Western readers to ponder.216 On the one hand, Confucian, Daoist, and other 

Chinese doctrines have repudiated war for thousands of years in books. On the 

other hand, Marshall Ye Jianying’s military theories, according to Jin, include 

seeing value in war and value in fighting (instead of “winning without 

fighting”). Ye saw progress for China in the conduct of war and used the War 

of Resistance against Japan as an example. This war formed a unified people’s 

war front, unified the government, unified the military, formed resistance 

leaders, and founded the Political Department. “This overall view of Ye 

Jianying’s concerning the value of war is clearly of an epochal and scientific 

nature.”217 Jin added that “Looking back through the volumes of China’s 5,000 

year history, what we see more of is ‘attacking the enemy’s army in the field’ 

with shining spears, armored horses, and fierce combat, and ‘besieging walled 

cities’ by beheading generals, capturing banners, and blood baths; truly being 

able to ‘break the enemy’s resistance without fighting’ is the rarest of 

rarities.”218 Thus Westerners should keep a wary eye on China’s military 

buildup for good reason.

These two thoughts, war helps China progress and “the rarest of 

rarities” is breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting, are truly different 

thoughts than Westerners are accustomed to hearing. Finally, Jin stresses time 

and again that Ye’s focus is on applying lessons learned from the past to 

present day situations. One must learn and adapt.

The Role of Intellectuals

Wang Xingsheng was a senior Colonel in 2002. He was the Director of 

the Fifth Research Office of the Chinese Academy of Military Science’s 

Military Systems Research Department. Wang wrote that ancient Chinese 

intellectuals paid attention to military matters and that they greatly enriched the 

story and tradition behind China’s military culture. Scholars focused on war 

prevention, opposed wars of annexation, but advocated war for moral 

principles. What arose was a scholarly group of military strategists that 

 

215 Ibid. 

216 Jin. 

217 Ibid.

218 Ibid.
74

remained active even during the period of Confucianism. Several were later 

designated as officers due to their extensive knowledge of strategic affairs.219

Ancient Chinese intellectuals focused on military matters in the 

following ways: 

 They directly threw themselves into military struggles of the times. 

There were two groups—intellectuals that the emperor appointed as 

generals (some like Sun Tzu and Sun Bin became outstanding 

commanders and strategists) and intellectuals who served as 

officials or military aids and took part in the planning and decisionmaking in army tents (such as Zhang Liang and Xiao He).

 They wrote books on the art of war and war policy complete with 

notes and commentaries on them. They described how to enhance 

war preparations, inspire morale, study strategy, amass forces, and 

restore the country. 

 They summarized military successes, failures, gains, and losses 

while researching and constructing history. 

 They wrote prose that reflected war and military life. A 

considerable portion of Chinese poems are about military matters.

 They created novels with war as the main object of discussion

which spread military culture and helped in the accumulation of the 

military cultural psychology of the nation.220

Ancient intellectual writings thus have significantly shaped the style of 

Chinese military culture. Wang believes both ancient and modern intellectuals 

have enhanced the concept of national unity, imbued Chinese military culture 

with a distinctively patriotic and heroic hue, and caused Chinese military 

culture to assume an even more pacifistic and compassionate spirit for the state 

of the world and its people.221 Further, intellectuals provide Chinese military 

culture with incisive language and an aesthetic characteristic that blend 

philosophy and poetic appeal in a concise, comprehensive, innovative, and 

universal manner. Perhaps most important, intellectuals promote a military 

style of thinking that is good at strategy and adept at the use of indirect 

methods.222 Why did strategy develop earlier in China than in other 

 

219 Wang Xingsheng, “Chinese Intellectuals Paying Close Attention to Military Issues: 

Tradition and Its Impact on Military Culture,” China Military Science, 2002, No. 6, pp. 

23-27.

220 Ibid.

221 Ibid.

222 Ibid.
75

nationalities? Wang believes that the answer may be grounded in the fact that 

intellectuals did not come from families with military backgrounds in most 

cases. They were thus unfamiliar with issues on an operational level and only 

dealt with strategic issues. Further, the battle of wits between two sides 

interested and excited Chinese scholars. The novels and plays they wrote 

further popularized strategy.223

Psychological and Cognitive Issues, Persuasion, and National Character

Yan Xiaofeng, Deputy Director of the Philosophy Teaching and 

Research Office of the Marxism Teaching and Research Department at 

National Defense University, writes that the strength of strategic psychological 

warfare (SPW) comes from national culture. 

Yan states that national culture is defined from a series of issues. They 

are:

 National culture is the combination of factors, including a 

country’s national spirit, ideologies, traditions, customs, ways 

of thinking, and the quality of sciences. 

 National culture is the development of a nation’s economy and 

politics. They are interdependent.

 National culture is a combination of a nation’s various concrete 

cultures such as various forms of social ideology and social 

psychology. The former includes political and legal thinking, 

morals, art, religions, sciences, philosophy, and so on. The 

latter includes feelings, will, habits, and interests.

 In the national culture system, national spirit is the essence and 

ideology is the symbol. National spirit is the national faith, 

belief, character, and quality that a nation develops under 

certain national, historic, and production conditions. 

 National culture is a system that has complex structure and 

abundant content. 

 Finally, national culture is a country’s image. Advanced 

national culture is a powerful strategic weapon in strategic 

psychological warfare. It shows to the world a civilized image 

that “our country loves peace, insists on justice, and pursues 

advancement.”

224

 

223 Ibid.

224 Yan Xiaofeng, “Competition and the Contest of National Culture,” China Military 

Science, 2004, No. 4, pp. 57-63.
76

In the case of China, Yan believes that there are two reasons why 

China’s national culture is so strong: a sense of national dignity developed over 

thousands of years which enable a sense of identification and belonging; and 

the influence of the Chinese Communist Party. The latter has created a culture 

of democracy that enables justice, advancement, and enlightenment according 

to Yan.

225

Another country’s culture often becomes the target of SPW. The party 

that launches SPW is trying to make another country’s people, especially the 

elites, accept, become interested in, or long for the values, thoughts, ideas, life 

styles, and even social systems of another country. With this understanding, and 

the Chinese focus on preventing the spread of foreign information within its 

culture, China probably considers US policy makers as experts in creating 

SPW. 

Yan continues that it is also important to eliminate hostility in the target 

country and to create favorable opinions of the party launching SPW. If war 

does erupt, opposing counties will then have more difficulty developing hatred 

and a fight-to-the-death mentality if a favorable opinion of the country has 

preceded war’s outbreak. The measure of effectiveness for SPW’s success is 

whether China is able to conquer and replace another country’s culture226 and to 

resist SPW efforts of other countries.

In the information age, boundaries are more porous which allows for 

the dissemination of national culture with fewer logistical and technical 

restrictions. SPW can be conducted at a level of competition and contest over 

national culture where one really can win without fighting. The information era 

has created new ways to consider time, space, progress, and the tools of war. 

Entire war strategies can now be based strictly on the competition between the

national cultures of two countries. Information is used to destroy an opposing 

forces identification with and dependence on its national culture. Such abstract 

war can work as well as actual war in Yan’s opinion. The changing nature of 

access and influence in the information age has made China more protective of 

its culture which is an important element of China’s comprehensive national 

power.227

Chen Bingyan and Wang Yanzheng, graduate students at Shijiazhuang 

Army Command College; and Wang Zhenxing, a professor and master’s 

 

225 Ibid.

226 Ibid.

227 Ibid.
77

candidate advisor at the College, wrote a very good article on psychological 

warfare. Titled “Enhancing China’s Excellent Culture and Erecting a National 

Psychological Great Wall,” the article underscored the importance of “warding 

off the cultural expansion and psychological attacks of the West” and 

“promoting the transformation of advanced culture into an excellent national 

psychology.”228 The authors define national culture as the product of spiritual 

and material civilization created by a nation in the historical course of its 

existence and development.229

The authors note how information technology is influencing China’s 

advanced military culture. In the authors’ opinion

Life in society has entered an unprecedented information environment. 

The explosive development in high technology centered around 

information technology has been accompanied by the increased 

informatization of society. This type of information environment is the 

result of advances in society, and is an objective fact from which there 

is no turning back for any country or nation. However, the information 

environment is an artificial environment, and the content it transmits 

reflects the social cognitive values of different countries and interest 

groups.230

Building and promoting China’s national culture requires that China erect a 

national psychological Great Wall between itself and the West. China must 

“oppose those who separate the culture of Marxist thought from traditional 

Chinese culture and the world’s national cultures, or put them in opposition to 

each other, which risks restricting the methods of the culture of Marxist 

thought.”231 To that end, a correct orientation toward public opinion must be 

secured. 

China must do four things to maintain its culture according to Chen, 

Wang, and Wang. First it must establish dedicated institutions responsible for 

planning, modifying, and managing the work of SPW; second, research into 

issues of national psychology must be increased; third, specific cultural 

 

228 Cheng Bingyan, Wang Yanzheng, and Wang Zhenxing, “Enhancing China’s 

Excellent Culture and Erecting a National Psychological Great Wall,” China Military 

Science, 2002, No. 5, pp. 59-67.

229 Ibid.

230 Ibid.

231 Ibid.
78

education and propaganda work must be carried out; and finally, a professional 

information and guidance team (s) must be established.232

Other authors focused on the development of cultural awareness and 

techniques to persuade the media. Wang Lin, a Senior Colonel and Professor of 

Military Journalism and Communication at the PLA’s Nanjing Institute of 

Politics; Wang Yitao, a Captain and Xinhua PLA Branch Journalist; and Wang 

Guibin (no title provided) wrote a 2005 article that discusses media strategies to 

use in cultural wars with the West and other nations.233 Media warfare is 

defined as an information battle where adversaries fight for dominance of 

message output and maximum effect on communication. These messages can 

disguise hostility and aggressiveness and increase public opinion and support. 

Cultural characteristics to be studied include customs, religion, moral values, 

behaviors, literature, the arts, and so on that can achieve a desired cultural 

effect. Information selection criteria include cultural flaws of other nations.

234

The authors write that China needs to create professional institutes that 

conduct cultural effects research and in-depth preparatory work to keep 

research up-to-date and ensure speedy propaganda responses if needed. 

Spiritual and material cultural effects should be studied. In particular, there is a 

need to understand and use information platforms such as the Internet. Finally, 

appropriate cultural battle simulations must be developed to accumulate the 

necessary information and experience to improve one’s own defensive abilities 

in media warfare.235

Media strategies include directing the public’s attention to a focal point 

of common interest; using contrast, such as revealing and disclosing the 

illegitimacy of an adversary action and then explaining why friendly actions are 

both legitimate and inevitable; using the persuasive effect of strong cultural 

leaders, those active and influential in dispersing objective facts and subjective 

judgments (artists, scientists, teachers, and athletes, among others); and using 

the strategy of repetition of cultural effects specific to the given culture and its 

background.236

The Impact of Informatization on Military Culture

 

232 Ibid.

233 Wang Lin, Wang Yitao, and Wang Guibin, “A Study on the Strategy of Cultural 

Effects in Media Warfare,” China Military Science, 2005, No. 6, pp. 120-128.

234 Ibid.

235 Ibid.

236 Ibid.
79

The digital age has squarely impacted military culture in China as the 

preceding paragraphs indicate. Yao Gaohong, a professor and doctoral 

candidate advisor (and editor of the Journal of Nanjing’s Institute of Politics) 

and Du Yongji, a doctoral candidate at the Nanjing Institute of Politics, write 

that “for the construction of conditions for military culture which are adapted to 

the conditions of the informatized military, it is necessary that the conditions of 

traditional military culture are systematically reformed involving every aspect 

of the conditions of military culture.”

237

If reform is to involve every aspect of military culture, then weaponry 

and equipment, military organizations, military thought, and other aspects will 

be affected by the digital age. The PLA must “establish military values, modes

of thinking, and a cultural psychology which are adapted to the conditions of 

informatized war so that the transformation in cultural concepts is the premise 

upon which the new conditions of military culture are constructed.”238 This 

includes the ethics of informatized war, the rules of war, and the ways of using 

armed force. Yao and Du list the six elements of military culture as 

 Military theory

 Military systems

 Military values

 Military ethics

 Military psychology

 Military thinking.239

Yao and Du focus the conclusion of their article on the development of 

several issues. First is the obvious need to integrate military and social cultures 

(since informatization has blurred the boundaries between what is and is not 

military). Second is the development and understanding of twenty-first century 

trends caused by information technology (knowledge-based forces, intelligent 

weapons, the digital battlefield, and informatized war and deterrence 

strategies). Third is the requirement to understand an opponent’s military 

culture, particularly his military value pursuits and the direction of his strategic 

thinking. Finally, there is the need to develop new innovations in military 

theory since the first to do so will have the advantage in future military battles. 

This requires not only carrying on one’s own military cultural traditions but 

also learning from other military cultures. Yao and Du note that “gaining an 

 

237 Yao Gaohong and Du Yongji, “Main Trends of Military Cultural Development in 

the Twenty-First Century,” China Military Science, 2002, No. 4, pp. 41-48.

238 Ibid.

239 Ibid.
80

understanding of another country’s strategic culture and thinking is helpful for 

eliminating strategic misunderstandings and avoiding mistakes in strategic 

judgment.”240

Some PLA Views of US Culture

Zhang Xiaojun, senior colonel and professor at the People’s Liberation 

Army Foreign Languages Academy, and Xu Jia, a professor at the same 

academy, write often on military topics and strategic thinking. Their article 

under consideration here is on the topic of strategic culture. They define 

strategic culture as 

...the social messages carried by the system of strategic symbols. 

Strategic culture is made up of two parts. One part is the continually 

produced social messages carried by the system of antagonistic 

symbols related to a conflictive nature, a violent usage, a connotation of 

security, and the qualities of an enemy and of threat. The other part is 

the continually produced social messages carried by the system of 

antagonistic symbols related to priorities, reasonable choice, and the 

evaluation of results.241

The authors believe strategic culture falls under the topic of “grand 

culture.” It is subject to influence by spiritual culture, scientific and 

technological culture, institutional culture, and the material culture of a country. 

Its main categories include warfare concepts, national defense and security 

concepts, theories for gaining the upper hand, and so on. Zhang and Xu further 

go on to compare US and Chinese strategic culture in their article. They 

interpret Chinese strategic culture as dominated by pacifism and moral 

principles. They view US strategic culture as driven by profit and national 

interests.242

First, they write that Chinese traditional strategic culture emphasizes 

morality in warfare and values peace. This tradition respects inaction. 

Confucianist thinking was manifested in ancient military affairs and advocated 

benevolence and righteousness. Mohists were pacifists who advocated caution 

and fighting only for moral principles. These philosophies valued what was 

righteous and unrighteous. Sun Tzu’s words reflect this philosophy.243

 

240 Ibid.

241 Zhang and Xu.

242 Ibid.

243 Ibid.
81

Apparently they discard the views of Chinese authors noted above (especially 

Jin) who have a different view of Chinese military culture.

In contrast, Zhang and Xu believe that Western culture is driven by 

profit and not morality. National interests are the center piece of US 

government affairs and the standard pursued by strategic decision-makers. The 

authors believe economic interests are the starting point for US strategic culture 

since the US is a capitalist country ruled by pragmatists. This enhances an 

orientation toward material gain.244

Second, Zhang and Xu compare defensive and offensive thinking in 

China and the US. They believe that China’s strategic culture is more defensive 

and that even offensive actions are for defense. The US is offensively motivated 

and expansionist oriented, the authors write, and “expansion could ensure the 

growth of US capitalism, resolve contradictions in domestic economic 

contradictions, avoid divisions, and bring about national security.”

245

Third, the authors discuss the topic of strong and weak forces, which 

they describe as an important category in Chinese culture. Strong forces stand 

for attack and masculinity, and weak forces refer to defense and femininity. 

Chinese strategic culture is ideologically weak and uses weakness to gain 

victory according to Zhang and Xu. China believes that victory is gained from 

knowledge and not strength. Thus a weak defense can both hide one’s 

capacities and allow one to bide one’s time yet still allow for gaining mastery 

after an enemy has struck first. It represents the crystallization of the fusion of 

pacifist thought and dialectical thinking in strategic culture since it “focuses on 

the wisdom of seeking the complimentary in the contradictory.”246 US strategic 

culture, the authors note, stresses the opposite. It is focused on the worship of 

strength, the praise of attacks, and emphasis on competition and subjugation. 

There is a self-veneration of ideology and value concepts backed up by strong 

material forces.247 

Finally, the authors state that there is a difference in economic 

backgrounds and thus approaches in China and the US. China is more of an 

agricultural force and the US is a commercial force. The Chinese people are 

attached to their native land and are unwilling to leave it. Thus they do not 

engage in expansionism. They place emphasis on ground defense and have light 

regard for maritime defense. Agriculture is the reason the country became rich 

 

244 Ibid.

245 Ibid.

246 Ibid.

247 Ibid.
82

and made the military strong. Authors Zhang and Xu look at the US as a 

capitalist country rich in mercantilism, a country of immigrants, and for this 

reason US territory is always expanding. Expansion has been greatly assisted 

by an offensive naval force. Finally the authors write that the US uses the 

military to keep the country strong while China uses the prosperity of the 

country to make the military strong.248

In summation, Zhang and Xu note that China has a well established 

history of strategic culture. They write that Confucianist doctrine has held a 

dominant position since the Han Dynasty (which directly contradicts Chinese 

writers’ focus on the influence of Marxism) and that caution has ruled when 

force has been used. With regard to the US, the authors write that Americans 

think of themselves as pacifist but the figures show otherwise.249

Ren Xiangqun offered another view of strategic culture. He is an 

assistant researcher at the Department of War Theory and Strategic Studies at 

the Military Science College and is a Colonel with a PhD in Military Science. 

Ren quotes Li Jijun, a retired general and well-known Chinese strategist, to 

start his analysis. Li wrote that “strategic culture is strategic thinking and 

strategic theory formed on the foundation of a certain history and cultural

tradition of a people. This kind of thought and theory, according to Ren, is what 

guides strategic actions and impacts social culture and trends.”250 US 

mainstream cultural tradition is based on the thought, values, and behaviors of 

white, middle-class people. These are the political leaders, CEOs, university 

presidents, scientists, reporters, and novelists that have successfully influenced 

society. This tradition, according to Ren, focuses on manifest destiny in foreign 

affairs, individualism, commercialism, pragmatic philosophy, and social 

Darwinism.251

Chen, Wang, and Wang apparently agree with this assessment. They 

wrote in 2002 that 

The Catholic Puritans among the early European immigrants felt 

superior in that they felt they were ‘chosen by God’ and had a ‘manifest 

destiny to save the world’ all of which mixed in with their 

mercantilism, expansionism, practicality, and social Darwinism to 

 

248 Ibid.

249 Ibid.

250 Ren Xiangqun, “The Influence of Mainstream Cultural Traditions on US War 

Decisions,” China Military Science, 2004, No. 4, pp. 127-136.

251 Ibid. 
83

become the basis of the ideological culture of the United States and 

cognitive roots of the country’s hegemonic mindset.252

Ren and the Chen, Wang, and Wang collective mention social 

Darwinism. This is an adjunct to Darwin’s theory of “survival of the fittest” and 

refers to the US predilection that their social system will enable the “survival of 

the fittest” among the human species. They appear to use this concept 

interchangeably with the concept of manifest destiny, in both cases implying 

that the US sees a “right” (whether from God or nature) for imposing their 

system on others. At a Sun Tzu Art of War symposium, a Chinese moderator 

even went so far as to state that “if we can’t clear up social Darwinism, we 

can’t get rid of war. China must use Sun Tzu theory to solve the social 

Darwinism problem.”

These articles and others from China Military Science are revealing for 

their prejudicial/one-sided treatment and judgment of US actions and 

corresponding aggrandizement of Chinese generosity and benevolence. Chinese 

analysts ignore US acts of benevolence, such as US attempts to bring peace to 

Bosnia or stop genocide in other areas of the world. The Chinese authors ignore 

these actions and focus only on what they term as expansionist and material 

motives. Meanwhile China’s quiet moves into Africa and Central Asia are 

ignored. 

In similar fashion, China accuses the US of self-veneration. Clearly a 

country basing its ideology around the communist cult of personality (Mao, 

Deng, Jiang, etc.) is conducting self-veneration albeit of a different type. For a 

nation supposedly focused on the people, this is difficult to understand. US 

ideology venerates the achievements of the common man in science and other 

areas as well as presidents and statesmen. In fact, political leaders are often the 

focus of scorn in the US media. Thus the strategic culture of both nations leads 

to different debates and interpretations. This is hard to deny.

Another example of a prejudicial assessment comes from the work of 

Fang Yonggang. He notes that internally, officers and troops in the PLA are 

united and “democracy within the Party, people’s democracy, and inter-party 

democracy” are being promoted. Externally, the positive, proactive, and 

innovative reverence for the masses drives the PLA forward so that the 

prominent goal of “being of the people” is attained. This is inherently different 

from foreign military culture, Fang writes, particularly that of the West, whose 

 

252 Chen, Wang, and Wang.
84

values are oriented toward “serving a minority of the people” and “serving the 

capitalist class.”253

China and the US may not correctly assess each other perhaps out of 

ignorance, oversights, or the overriding influence of their national strategic 

culture on their perceptions. Yao and Du note that the different approaches that 

countries have to their security interests influence the formation of their 

military values and the selection of their ways of military thinking.254 The 

implication is that the more we understand strategic culture and the selection of 

security interests, the better we will be able to understand one another. 

Wang Lin, Wang Yitao, and Wang Guibin, mentioned earlier, write in

2005 about a method by which to better understand one another (even though 

they were discussing the conduct of cultural wars at the time!). They write that 

when examining the cultural roots and characteristics of the core spirit of an 

enemy, subjects must avoid cultural prejudice when dealing with targets. One 

must actively utilize empathy toward the cultural proclivities of the target. To 

be truly empathetic, seven steps must be followed. It is these same steps, 

however, that could be applied to understand one another better in peacetime. 

That is, the seven step recommendation would work in times of war to get at 

enemy mind sets; or in peacetime to better work with one another and eliminate 

potential points of misunderstanding (especially in times of crises!). These 

steps are: 

 One must share the inner state of someone and recreate that 

person’s inner image.

 One must recognize the types of cultural diversity in society.

 One must know oneself and individuals in a given culture.

 One must eliminate one’s own isolation from the environment.

 One must take on the other person’s perspective and thinking.

 One must acquire experience through empathy obtained from 

the five steps above.

 One must restore his or her inner state, and re-experience one’s 

own cultural state again. 255

These same steps are used to conduct media warfare, according to the authors.

 

253 Fang Yonggang.

254 Ibid.

255 Wang Lin, Wang Yitao, and Wang Guibin.
85

Other Important Aspects of Advanced Military Culture

The articles of Liu Tinghua, Yang Yuling, Fang Yonggang, and Wang 

Zhaohai in China Military Science also included several other issues worthy of 

consideration regarding advanced military culture. Liu Tinghua, a Director of 

the Research Office of the Historical Research Department of the Academy of 

Military Sciences, emphasizes the connection between strategy and history. In 

2002, he wrote on military ideological and cultural lessons learned from the 

Chinese classic work I Ching since many of the I Ching lessons (combat 

preparedness, unity of the people and army, and the “just” use of force) have 

become Chinese cultural traditions.

Liu writes about the I Ching concept that the “superior man, when 

resting in safety, does not forget that danger may come; when in a state of 

security, he does not forget the possibility of ruin; and when all is in a state of 

order, he does not forget that disorder may come.”256 To strengthen national 

defense, the superior man must educate the people and nourish them; think of 

what might come and prepare for it; and keep weapons in good repair in case of 

unforeseen contingencies. The goal is to be ever vigilant and mindful of 

adversities and prepare for the worst. Further, the army must insist upon 

participating only in just wars (i.e., the liberation of people) and using only 

competent generals who possess integrity; fostering harmonious relations with 

people to create a unified military front; instituting rigorous discipline; utilizing 

flexibility (subjective initiative) in commands; luring the enemy into terrain; 

staying positive in the face of momentary setbacks; gaining a firm 

understanding of the nature of war; and treating prisoners of war with 

respect.257 Chinese culture eventually absorbed most of these issues that were 

written about long ago.

However, Liu warns that the I Ching contains mysticism and irrational 

thought as well that must be countered by taking a scientific view. For example, 

there is the belief that a dangerous campaign will result if someone witnesses 

the immersion of a young fox’s tail in water as it crosses a stream. This type of 

thinking must be countered.258 In fact

Winning or losing a war is the result of a contest between soldiers and 

weapons and is influenced by terrain and weather conditions, along 

with how well commanders exercise their subjective initiative. It has 

 

256 Liu Tinghua, “Study of Military Ideology and Culture in the Book of Changes,” 

China Military Science, 2002, No. 6, pp. 35-40.

257 Ibid.

258 Ibid.
86

nothing to do with divination, which was the result of the low level of 

scientific advancement at the time which led to the search for 

psychological comfort by means of praying to gods for protection.259

The preservation of unity is a major traditional theme that the Chinese 

carried over into advanced military culture. It is a national cultural tradition of 

some importance that is most often reflected in Chinese discussions about

Taiwan. Yang Yuling, a PhD and the Director of the Military History and 

Culture Teaching and Research Section of the Xi’an Political Institute, wrote 

that “Culture plays a role that cannot be replaced by other social elements, 

namely the functions of coalescence, integration, assimilation, and 

standardization of the conduct and psychology of the social groups within a 

nation.”260 Culture, Yang believes, molds an identification psychology in 

people or a country through assimilation and acclimation, a “cognitive 

schematic” often referred to as nationality.261 Yang adds that “for thousands of 

years, national unity has always been viewed as the highest political objective 

and as being in the highest interests of the nation” and for this reason national 

reunification with Taiwan remains a priority.262

Yang adds that values represent the scale from which standards of 

social conduct are measured and tested. Upholding unity is one of these values. 

National spirit or unity is a key element of identification psychology, reflected 

as patriotism. National unity provides will and vitality for the nation, is 

embedded in China’s national spirit, and is “Chinese culture’s rational and 

systematic recognition of the state’s political objectives.”263 The cultivation of 

a cognitive psychology of shared culture should serve as “a strategic duty and 

basic stratagem for national reunification.”264

Finally, Yang writes that national identity involves political, economic, 

cultural, and military factors, which he terms a systematic construct. It is also a 

construct that must change with the times. While China must maintain and 

manage an enduring memory of its traditions, it must also respond to cultural 

challenges brought on by changing times.265

 

259 Ibid.

260 Yang Yuling, “On Cultural Identification and National Reunification,” China 

Military Science, 2005, No. 3, pp. 57-63.

261 Ibid.

262 Ibid.

263 Ibid.

264 Ibid.

265 Ibid.
87

Fang Yonggang wrote a comprehensive paper on advanced military 

culture and its aspects. He states that advanced military culture in the PLA has 

six subsystems: military thought, military ethics, military institutions, military 

science and technology, military strategy, and military mental life.266 His list is 

somewhat similar to that of Yao and Du mentioned earlier.

The first subsystem, military thought, refers to military culture at the 

level of reason and is expressed in philosophical and theoretical form. It reveals 

the innate connection between issues of war and economics, war and politics, 

war and culture, humans and weapons, and the laws of war.267

The second subsystem is military ethics. This subsystem is an internal

system of standards of conduct for the armed forces internally. Marxist military 

ethics guide the Chinese military while carrying forward China’s cultural 

traditions. Advanced military ethics obey the command of the Party, love of the 

military, respect for cadres, strict adherence to discipline, patriotic devotion, 

perseverance, integrity, hard work, and enlightened etiquette, providing a 

strong structural pillar for the fighting spirit of a PLA soldier.268

The third subsystem is the creation and development of military 

institutions—their form, nature, function, and implementation. These institutes 

integrate and standardize military activities and never cease to innovate and 

adapt to new technology and equipment or theories of fighting.269

The fourth subsystem is military science and technology. It consists of 

theory, ideology, consciousness, knowledge, quality, the capacity for 

innovation, systems of cognition, and a scientific attitude. It is in this subsystem 

that the factor of quality plays its major role (due to the cyber age) and edges 

out quantity in importance. Science and technology will have a major impact on 

increasing combat power and will require new types of thinking, ideological

concepts, ideas about work, and methods of leadership suited to the demands of 

informatized war.270

The fifth subsystem is military strategy which reveals the quality, 

traditions, and reality beneath military culture. The roots of strategy began long 

ago and form a unique cultural tradition in Chinese history. Mao first integrated 

Marxist strategy into the Chinese revolution and this began an innovation in 

 

266 Fang Yonggang.

267 Ibid. 

268 Ibid.

269 Ibid.

270 Ibid.
88

culture that allowed China to absorb lessons from the West. Chinese culture is 

thus adaptive and able to integrate traditional strategic culture with modern 

science and technology championed in the West.

271

Finally, there is the subsystem of mental life manifested mainly in 

military literature and art. This subsystem allows for the creation of personal 

qualities consisting of idealistic beliefs that motivate soldiers to make 

contributions. It elicits a consciousness of national defense in people and 

improves combat power.272

In addition to the six subsystems mentioned by Fang, he also listed five 

functions of advanced Chinese military culture. They are guiding ideology, 

uniting military morale, creating mental incentives, providing intellectual 

support, and guiding scientific methods.273

Major General Wang Zhaohai, Chairman of the Political Department at 

the Academy of Military Sciences, writes that military culture can be dissected 

into form, era, region, and class. Military culture can be divided by form into 

military spiritual culture, the culture of military systems, the culture of military 

conduct, and the culture of military equipment. By era it can be divided into 

traditional military culture and modern military culture. By region, it can be 

divided into Chinese military culture and Western military culture. By class 

attributes, it can be divided into landlord military culture, capitalist culture, and 

proletariat military culture.274 Military culture thus is an important concept that 

includes different aspects of military activity.

Conclusions

This discussion of Chinese military culture is, admittedly, limited to 

one journal. It has used only a few articles from a vast treasure trove of works 

on the issue. However, it serves as an introductory viewpoint on the topic and a 

contemporary one at that, fostered by the official journal of the Chinese 

Academy of Military Science. 

The discussion initially highlighted six so-called “points of interest” 

that focused on some specific items of Chinese military culture. These points of 

interest were (1.) a Chinese analyst’s opinion that “winning without fighting” is 

the “rarest of rarities” for Chinese history, where the sword has ruled. This 

 

271 Ibid.

272 Ibid.

273 Ibid.

274 Wang Zhaohai.
89

point of view is at odds with the most popular assessment of Chinese military 

cultural history, a history based on humanity and benevolence (2.) the 

important role that Marxism plays for both its impact on culture and on military 

thought processes. The latter point includes the concept of the dialectical 

thought process among other Marxist ideas (3.) the focus some Chinese 

analysts placed on combining technology with strategy. There is a realization 

that pure strategic thoughts are not enough in a world where technology is 

driving equipment and concepts (4.) the more traditional focus on the role that 

intellectuals played (Sun Tzu was an intellectual who became a strategist). The 

focus on thought may be the reason that strategy surfaced as the main element 

in Chinese traditional thinking. The study of ancient Chinese history also 

demonstrates the importance of innovation and creativity in Chinese thinking, 

to include borrowing the best elements from Western military culture. 

Hopefully, US theorists are learning from Chinese history as well. (5.) a focus 

on strategic psychological warfare and the use of persuasive techniques via the 

media to influence situations. This includes the use of persuasive technique 

simulations and (6.) the digital age’s impact on Chinese military culture in all 

its aspects (theory, ethics, science and technology, strategy, etc.), causing 

several significant shifts.

One conclusion that becomes evident upon reading Chinese military 

cultural material is that, for China, “military theory with the characteristics of 

our armed forces is the outcome of the combination of Marxist military theory 

with the concrete practice of China’s revolutionary war.”275 That is, not only 

ancient military theory but Western and some contemporary Chinese history 

have strongly influenced military tradition in China. Another conclusion is that 

the digital age has genuinely threatened traditional military culture in China 

forcing the PLA to develop what it terms as advanced military culture. 

The general discussion also includes definitions of several terms 

focused on culture: military culture, strategic culture, traditional and advanced 

military culture, and cultural wars. These definitions offer a general 

understanding of the importance of knowledge and values to the Chinese 

military as well as the important role that society at large plays in the formation 

of military culture. In addition the components of advanced military culture 

were described. Cultural warfare, for example, emphasized how to demonstrate 

empathy and truly get “into” a culture, requiring that the last step of the process 

was to “re-experience one’s own cultural state again.”

 

275 Zheng Shenxia, “Establish and Implement Scientific Development Outlook and Push 

Forward the Construction of Military Theory in an All-Round Way,” China Military 

Science, 2005, No. 4, pp. 1-9.
90

The discussion makes it clear that China’s analysts are attempting to 

distill years of military culture as they decide on the direction in which the 

PLA’s military culture should head as it transitions from traditional to advanced 

military cultural thinking. This fact alone should be of great interest to other 

nations. China’s focus on military culture comes at a time when the PLA is 

becoming an increasingly important player on the world stage. 

It is important for the US to study Chinese military culture not only to 

learn where it is headed but to understand what is of value from their ancient 

history. There are many aspects of Chinese military culture and theory that 

offer the Western analyst another way of viewing or solving a problem. The 

US, of course, should be as selective in choosing items from Chinese thought 

for its use as the Chinese are when choosing military concepts from a Western 

system. Wang Zhaohai noted that China “must not blindly accept foreign 

military culture when we seek to draw lessons from it, nor must we simply

exclude foreign military culture because it conflicts with our own, and thereby 

overlook the positive and beneficial aspects.”276 We must do the same.

China’s military cultural transition is occurring while its armed forces 

are transitioning from a mechanized to an informationized force. The PLA is 

learning how to operate in complex electromagnetic environments and how to 

conduct information warfare tactics. This revolutionary change in the conduct 

of warfare has left its mark on military culture and the evolution of advanced 

military culture is proof positive. China is very concerned over the penetration 

of its military culture by Western media and hopes to do better at constructing 

socialist culture with Chinese characteristics, creating cultural diffusion

hardware and software over which China has autonomous intellectual property 

rights, and, as author Wang Shudao noted, taking action to expose the 

hypocrisy of Western anti-Chinese forces. China’s approach must be proactive 

if it is to “propel China’s culture industry and media industry beyond China’s 

borders in an effort to take over the international culture market.”277

Finally, a look at China’s military culture, if properly analyzed, can 

expose predispositions and intentions that the US can utilize to better 

understand China’s military leaders and thus potentially avert conflict. The 

increasingly aggressive Chinese behavior and growing defense budget, and the 

reconnaissance activities by units such as PLA hackers, indicate that the 

 

276 Wang Zhaohai.

277 Wang Shudao, “Modern Cultural Diffusion and National Security,” China Military 

Science, 2005, No. 3, pp. 64-69. 
91

Chinese will be well-prepared to fight a future war in a strategic manner, one 

that other nations may not consider. As was noted earlier, what is scarier than 

inferior technology to some Chinese theorists is inferior thinking. It appears 

that in the case of the PLA, they are working hard to ensure that their thinking 

is not inferior but takes the best from East and West.

It is evident, based on the occasional conflicts that arise between China 

and the West, that both sides need to learn how to understand one another’s 

intentions better. A closer study of military culture and an open debate among 

the two sides on the topic may provide one avenue (among many) to do so. 

Hopefully this analysis has opened a few doors to understanding the current 

concerns and reactions of the PLA to the threats it perceives to its military 

culture as well as offering a reverse look at Wang Shudao’s position. That is, it 

is possible to expose the hypocrisy of China’s anti-Western forces just as he 

hoped to expose the hypocrisy of the US’s anti-Chinese forces. The dialectic 

works for either Chinese or Western thought.
92
93

CHAPTER FOUR: CHINA’S MILITARY AND HIGH-TECH 

DECEPTION

This chapter examines the Chinese concept of deception and its use today under 

conditions of informatization.

War is a game of deception.

278

Introduction

Chinese military theorists are quick to point out that information age

deception is a powerful weapon that has some old and many new uses. For one 

thing, high-tech systems have increased opportunities to deceive or to uncover 

deception at the political, diplomatic, economic, and military levels of war 

preparation. Deception, military planners note, can be used to fool an enemy in 

peacetime by increasing the fog of war or establishing a high-tech “smoke 

screen” behind which aggressive actions can begin to take shape.279 This 

indicates that preparations for deception activities still begin well before 

conflict occurs whether it is the study of opposing armies’ decision-making 

habits and equipment parameters or the development and employment of 

realistic decoys. 

Deception is historically ingrained in Chinese military thought. 

However, deception is also used against Chinese society on occasion. For 

example, the Chinese government uses virtual devices to deceive the population 

as necessary. A recent BBC report has details of something known as the “50 

cent party.” Bloggers receive 50 cents (50 Chinese cents or $.07 cents) for 

writing an entry that supports government policy. In this way paid 

commentators on policy issues help control public opinion and offset unpopular 

decrees. Online bloggers write entries with a positive spin about a policy in 

dispute. Such virtual deception has worked well, the report states, citing 

evidence from the public security bureau of the city of Jiaozuo in Henan

Province. Chinese authorities, realizing they could not block or monitor news in 

 

278 Wu Rusong and Wu Xianlin, chief editors, Sun Zi: The Art of War, Sun Bin: The 

Art of War, People’s China Publishing House, 1995, p. 24. 

279 Zhang Xianfend and Bie Yixun, “Visible Battlefield: New Trend in Informatized 

Strategic Camouflage,” Jiefangjun Bao, 11 May 2005, p. 11, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20051019502002.
94

some localities, proposed using their own commentators. Today estimates are 

that there are tens of thousands of these commentators, the report noted.280

A more well-known and recent Chinese public use of information 

deception occurred at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. During the dazzling 

opening ceremony, one of the most impressive opening ceremonies in the 

history of the Olympics, fireworks lit up the sky over the course of a mile 

leading to the National Stadium (also known as the Bird’s Nest). These 

fireworks were to represent footsteps leading to the stadium. A Beijing 

newspaper later revealed that a brighter set of footprints had been created and 

filmed much earlier in a special effects lab and this was shown on television 

instead of the real fireworks.281 Thus millions of viewers were deceived into 

believing what they saw on the TV screens was a live broadcast.

This chapter will define and discuss this all-important concept of 

deception. It will highlight some information age deception advances, 

camouflage techniques, high-technology reconnaissance deception, and the 

deception-stratagem link (Appendix Three defines four additional deception 

terms, “decoy,” “infrared decoy,” “deceptive electronic jamming,” and “radio 

communication deception”). The discussion will not further cover Chinese

deception issues against Chinese society.

How Does the Chinese Military Understand Deception?

The Chinese Military Encyclopedia defines the term deception in the 

following manner:

Deception: A technical term from ancient Chinese military science. 

First seen in Sun Zi – Laying Plans: ‘All warfare is based on 

deception.’ During the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring 

States Period, people broke free from the ideological fetters of humane 

and righteous warfare and ‘turned out surprises and lay in ambush, 

using both variations and deceptions in the use of force’ (Book of 

Han – Yiwenzhi). Military strategists suggested the idea of deception in 

the use of force in keeping with the scientific summarization of social 

reality at that time. Deception theory quite profoundly reflected the 

essence and laws of military struggles. Its basic substance was the use 

of pretense: ‘The military stands on deception’ (Sun Zi – Military 

 

280 Michael Bristow, “China’s Internet ‘Spin Doctors’,” BBC News, Beijing, 16 

December 2008.

281 Aaron Barnhart, “Not-So-Special Effects,” The Kansas City Star, 16 August 2008, p. 

F1.
95

Combat); ‘There is no lack of deception and fakery between warring 

positions’ (Hanfeizi – Nanyi). This is so because one simply cannot 

talk of virtue and morality in desperate battles of life and death – one

can only confuse the enemy through deceit and feints and by exposing 

what is false and hiding what is real in order to conceal one’s own 

plans. Only then can suddenness be achieved in military operations; 

only then can the enemy be attacked where he is unprepared; only then 

can one appear where the enemy is not anticipating; and only then can 

the initiative be grasped in military operations. Deception applies only 

to fighting an enemy: ‘Use deception to strive for victory over an 

enemy; there must be trust when ruling the masses’ (Notes of the 

Eleven Scholars on Sun Zi – Laying Plans, Wang Xi's Notes). 

Deception is an important substance in the military science of ancient 

China, and it has had a profound and lasting influence. (Qiu Xintian)282

According to Ma Jinsheng, Chinese author of the 1991 book Military 

Deception, military deception started 4,000 to 5,000 years ago in China. The 

concept has evolved over time and now constitutes a standard practice that 

involves covering up the truth, using ruses, and creating false impressions. It 

was not always this way. Initially, during China’s Western Zhou Period (around 

1100 B.C.), Ma notes that etiquette was extremely important and the idea was 

to be virtuous and not to start a war without a proper warning to the other side. 

Eventually the concept that “all is fair in war” took hold and deception became 

a major component in the planning and conduct of conflict. Survival won out 

over virtue and morals.283

One can safely assume, then, that Sun Tzu was a survivalist and not a 

moralist since he states most emphatically that “all warfare is based on 

deception.” The Art of War includes sections on attack by stratagem, use of 

spies, and so on in addition to sections on deception. This implies that an active 

instead of a passive position must be taken. A successful deception operation 

will utilize surprise and spies, the discipline of troops, and knowledge of enemy 

culture and its decision-making criteria.284 It must also be guided by strategy 

and research of the following issues before implementation:

 Study of one’s own position and the position of the enemy

 

282 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Academy of Military Science Press, Volume 3, July 

1997, p. 699.

283 Ma Jinsheng, Military Deception, Military Science Press, 1991. Since only a 

translation was available to the author and not the original text, exact pages cannot be 

listed. 

284 Ibid.
96

 Study of available resources

 Research of friendly military strength

 Study of how an enemy force would react to friendly military 

strength

 Study of how an enemy force might change its battle formation or 

plan

 Determination of whether the use of threats is justified in lieu of 

deception.

285

Deception’s goal is to confuse the enemy force and mislead it. The 

three components of deception are the side originating the deception, the target 

of deception, and the medium through which the deceptive action is delivered 

(the latter may be based on direct [rumors] input, indirect [leaflets] input, or 

false impressions [troop deployments, fortifications]). Deception can be visible 

(leaflets) or invisible (rumors), although Sun Tzu appears to favor visible 

methods according to Ma.286

With regard to strategic deception, Ma writes that it has five 

characteristics and three ways to carry it out. The five characteristics of 

strategic deception are: 

 Its scale is large.

 It may last for a long time.

 It can affect the overall progress and outcome of a war.

 It envisions that military deception will be carried out side by side with 

political and diplomatic deception.

 It is directed by a country’s high command.287

Strategic deception is carried out by spreading peace rumors, assuming 

a friendly gesture, and concealing war preparations; misleading an enemy as to 

the time and place of a war’s start; and misleading an enemy as to the place and 

type of aggression. Allies, friendly forces, and neutrals can also be made, 

unbeknownst to them, part of the deception plan.288

Basing strategy and tactics on deception is described by the editors of 

the book Campaign Stratagems as a law, one that allows planners to confuse the 

enemy, cause the enemy to make mistakes, and conceal their own intentions. 

 

285 Ibid.

286 Ibid.

287 Ibid.

288 Ibid.
97

The editors (or translators) interchangeably use the terms deception and 

scheme. In this book, deception is defined as actions such as cheating and 

swindling, while the term scheme is defined as unexpected tactics.289

The list of deceptive methods from Sun Tzu’s Art of War290 is familiar:

 When attacking, one must appear unable to attack.

 When using force, one must appear passive.

 When near, one should appear far.

 When far, the enemy should think one is near. 

 Hold out bait to entice the enemy.

 Feign disorder and crush him.

 If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. 

 If he has superior strength, evade him. 

 If the enemy has a choleric temper, seek to irritate him.

 Pretend to be weak so that he may grow arrogant.

 If he is at ease, give him no rest.

 If his forces are united, separate them.

 Attack him where he is unprepared and appear where you are not 

expected.291

The website East-Asia-Intel reported in November 2006 that, according 

to the Chinese paper Zhanqi Bao, China must prepare a good plan, learn to 

show what is false and hide what is true, and remain flexible in order to deceive 

an enemy force. The intelligence an enemy gathers must be consistent with its

subjective assessment. An enemy’s media reporting must be controlled as well 

with no contradictions existing between military and civilian points of view on 

the situation at hand. If deception is to succeed, subjective reasoning also 

comes into play when a situation changes rapidly. If the enemy force cannot see 

the real objective of the information’s initiator but only the false objectives laid 

out by friendly forces, then actions will be successful. In particular, China’s 

approach must be comprehensive for deception to succeed: 

We must collect and analyze the characteristics of enemy commanders, 

enemy units, and the battlefield. We must gain a clear understanding of 

the main reconnaissance measures and methods the enemy uses. We 

must take the intelligence collected and carefully analyze and study it, 

 

289 Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, Campaign Stratagems, National Defense 

University, 2002, p. 75.

290 Ibid.

291 Ibid.
98

think hard about the situations our forces could encounter on the move, 

tie in with our actual situation and formulate countermeasures, and take 

truly practical measures of deception, to include the object of the 

deception, its content, method, security measures, and the timetable for 

its implementation.292

The Information Age and Deception

Another work of importance on military deception is the 1998 book 

Military Deception Methods by Liu Bing Chen and Wang Gang. These authors 

make it clear that eleven years ago the integration of technology and deception 

was on the mind of the PLA. An unnamed person at the PLA’s Army Military 

Planning Institute’s “Military Deception Methodology Research Center” wrote 

the book’s introduction. Noting that the “new devil called ‘information 

warfare’ will be among us,” the introduction underscores the necessity of 

combining deception with technology. With concepts introduced such as “let 

technology install wings on military deception methodology,” the man-machine 

union in the author’s opinion will become the “fourth tidal wave of Eastern 

intelligence.”293

Western researchers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been 

acutely aware of the importance of deception to Chinese theorists for centuries. 

Chinese classics such as The Secret Art of War: The Thirty-Six Stratagems

emphasize often that deception is a military art form that can achieve military 

objectives. Further, military deception remains one of the key elements of 

Chinese information warfare theory and practice. In the information age, 

deception can play a huge role in perpetrating a catastrophic result for an enemy 

force. For example, encouraging someone to push the wrong button in an 

infrastructure complex via deceptive means could yield catastrophic results. It 

could initiate a cascade of events leading to the shutdown of vital systems.

Wars fought under high-tech conditions almost ensure, due to 

reconnaissance assets and precision-guided munitions, that once a force is 

discovered it will be annihilated. To deceive satellite reconnaissance requires 

technical advancements in camouflaging a force on various types of terrain, at 

sea, and in the air as well as a host of deceptive electronic methods to cause 

interpreters of satellite imagery to believe that what is true is false and what is 

false is true.

 

292 East-Asia-Intel.com website, accessed 6 October 2008. 

293 Liu Bing Chen and Wang Gang, Military Deception Methods, Kun Lun Publishing 

Press, 1998. Since only a translation was available to the author and not the original 

text, exact pages cannot be listed.
99

China’s military is studying how to deceive and manipulate the 

decision-making capability of foreign commanders in the field through the use 

of a series of high-tech developments. These include self-adapting biological 

materials that change texture and color like a chameleon and the creation of 

equipment that simulates military activity. There is also a focus on integrating 

high-technology equipment with stratagems (stratagems are designed to 

mislead enemy processes of perception, thinking, emotion, and will. They use 

objective realities together with subjective creativity to deceive or persuade). 

The deception chore has been made easier in some respects by the information 

age. Systems acquire, forward, and process information. Therefore, any 

measure designed to alter, control, or block information can conceivably 

deceive an enemy, especially a high-tech one. 

In addition to high-tech means and stratagems, camouflage has 

traditionally been one of the main methods to deceive an enemy force on the 

battlefield. Today a large role is played by what the Chinese term “engineering 

camouflage.” Camouflage conceals one’s own side, deceives the enemy, 

improves battlefield survivability, and protects the integrity of one’s combat 

operations. Simultaneously, camouflage interferes with enemy information 

systems, causes confusion among enemy decision-makers, degrades enemy 

high-tech weapon systems efficiency, and weakens an enemy’s overall combat 

capability.294

In the information age, camouflage, stratagems, and high-tech means 

have been supplemented with virtual, voice, and other forms of deception. 

Electronics now can perform what appears to be magic on the battlefield in the 

opinion of some Chinese theorists. Electronic camouflage uses electromagnetic 

and thermal technological measures to simulate and duplicate the environment 

and make friendly targets blend in with their background. This “hides what is 

true” and “displays what is false” about specific targets. Such camouflage can 

help thwart enemy electronic attacks and protect one’s own systems. Metal foil 

strips, angular radar reflectors, colored smoke screens, plasma, multifrequencyelectromagnetic screens, photochromatic coatings, and optical bait are 

representative of such measures. For example, smoke camouflage now includes 

smoke made up of metallic chemical compounds and plasma which, when 

 

294 Zhang Shengyu and Shen Yueguo, “Informatized Warfare Challenges the 

Camouflaging of Military Targets,” Jiefangjun Bao, 28 December 2005, p. 11, as 

translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20051230502001.
100

mixed with certain polymers in specific ratios, make smoke screens that can 

fluctuate to be consistent with the target and its background.295

With respect to information warfare, deception has several applications, 

two of which are written about frequently. They are the use of informationbased stratagems and information camouflage, both of whose effects can be 

multiplied through their integration with high-technology equipment. Other 

applications discussed here include fooling reconnaissance systems and 

utilizing “information-hiding technology.”

If national interests are at stake, one is not restricted by “righteous 

warfare” as the Chinese Military Encyclopedia entry for deception indicates.

Any means of scheming and deception are acceptable. Deception can include 

disguising one’s troops as enemy troops; taking secret actions; manufacturing, 

distorting, and fabricating facts; escaping unnoticed; luring the enemy from his 

base; harming someone through the hands of another; making troops appear 

disordered when they are in order; making troops seem hungry although they 

are well-fed; making troops seem poorly equipped when they are well-armed; 

making troops appear massed when they are scattered; and so on.296 Deception 

can increase combat efficacy and achieve victory at a smaller cost. This is the 

essential principle of basing strategy and tactics on deception.297

To transform what is real and what is false, to transform passivity into 

initiative, and to change disadvantage into advantage requires scheming and 

deception. According to Zhang and Zhang, points to consider when deploying 

scheming and deception in campaign stratagems include:

 Coordinating movement with statis

 Exposing to the enemy an intention and situation opposite to one’s 

actual intentions and conditions (polarities such as weak/strong, 

urgency/rest, false/real, open/hidden, etc.)

 Affirming the enemy’s intentions and, at times, doing what the 

enemy expects to fool him as you make alternate plans

 Integrating what is false and what is real (for example, pretend to 

attack at many points to hide the real target)

 

295 Dai Qingmin, Direct Information Warfare, National Defense University Publishing 

House, 2002. Translation credit belongs to Senior Chief Bart Zobel of the Navy 

Reserve Navy Information Operations Command. 

296 Zhang and Zhang, pp. 76-77.

297 Ibid., p. 77.
101

 Attending to differences in personality among commanders 

(quality, knowledge, experience, personality, psychological 

makeup, endurance, and adaptability). The personality and 

psychology of the commander is the priority and objective of 

“strategizing” today according to the authors.

298

Chinese commanders, in addition to these points, have a new challenge 

before them in the information age. That challenge is finding a way to integrate 

new technologies into their campaign stratagems. Commanders must develop 

integrative methodologies if they hope to keep pace with advancements made 

in other armies.

One of the sections of the book Campaign Stratagems focuses on the 

implications of forces being either real or virtual. Here virtual means both 

“digital” as it does today as well as things or situations that are contrived or 

fake. For example, an army could display its real force posture or a fake 

(virtual) posture to appear strong either via electrons or via a real force posture. 

A real force, one with imposing strength, could utilize virtual aspects of force 

(attacking a sector with a force that appears strong but is only a virtual or fake 

force) together with real force to win a battle. Or a weak army, unable to show 

a strong force posture, could attempt to use a virtual posture (contrived or fake 

show of force, for example) to convince another side that they possess a real 

strength posture. Force postures will also vary depending on the speed at which 

units advance. There could be time and space gaps that make a real force appear 

virtual (if it becomes fragmented) or a virtual force appear real (if gaps do not 

appear and an opponent thinks a force is larger than it really is). Further, not 

only material but moral strength could be real or virtual.299

Three sections follow that amplify this discussion of deception in the 

information age. They are a discussion of Chinese camouflage techniques, a 

discussion of Chinese high-technology reconnaissance, and a discussion of the 

stratagem-technology link designed to induce deception.

Camouflage and Deception

Camouflage is closely related to deception (hiding something enables 

deception!) and is the focus of this section. There are many definitions in the 

Chinese Military Encyclopedia that concern the term “camouflage.” For 

example, Chinese military professionals write about strategic, tactical, and 

thermal camouflage. Listed below are truncated definitions for strategic and 

 

298 Ibid., pp. 78-82.

299 Ibid., p. 61.
102

tactical camouflage taken directly from the Chinese Military Encyclopedia. 

These definitions will be followed by some recent opinions of Chinese 

camouflage experts.

Strategic Camouflage: Strategic camouflage is measures taken to deceive or 

confuse the enemy so as to conceal strategic intent and actions. Strategic 

camouflage is an important part of strategic support and an important measure 

in the struggle against strategic reconnaissance. Strategic camouflage includes 

the use of political, diplomatic, military, and scientific and technological 

measures to hide the truth and display what is false, to combine real and fake, 

to employ openness and secrecy together, and thus conceal a side’s strategic 

intent, strategic disposition, strategic actions, and strategic goals. It makes the 

enemy misperceive the situation and make mistakes in judgment, and in so 

doing protects one’s own side and creates conditions favorable for achieving 

strategic surprise. The plan for strategic camouflage is drafted, organized, and 

executed by the supreme headquarters.

The methods of strategic camouflage are numerous. Advanced 

camouflage materials and devices can be used for disguising military targets 

and economic targets of national importance, for changing the external 

appearance and characteristics of such targets, and for making it difficult for the 

enemy to determine the nature of the target quickly and accurately. This 

technique can also be combined with the use of false targets to make the enemy 

mistake them for real targets. To conceal strategic actions and intent, a side can 

spread false information, leak false intelligence, carry out diplomatic activities, 

shape public opinion, minimize signs of military activity, step up 

reconnaissance, and, depending on the situation, carry out electronic 

camouflage, deception, and feints. It can also have a small unit pose as a mainforce unit in “a feint to the east but an attack to the west” scenario.

The main requirements for strategic camouflage are:

1. Make full preparations and tight-knit plans, have centralized and 

unified direction, and get everyone involved with the plan to coordinate 

as one.

2. Make strategic camouflage extend throughout the war from start to 

finish. The enemy will conduct frequent reconnaissance before and 

during a war, and so strategic camouflage must be implemented 

continuously throughout the entire course of the war.

3. Research the opponent’s mental state and psychological weaknesses, 

focus efforts to confuse and deceive the enemy, make the enemy 

misperceive and be caught unprepared, and force the enemy into a 

passive position.
103

4. In camouflaging strategic targets and strategic actions, be flexible and 

use various methods, suit measures to conditions at hand, combine 

various measures, make various measures supplement each other, do 

not reveal weaknesses, and use measures which are feasible and 

effective.

5. Take strict measures for secrecy.

The struggle between strategic camouflage and strategic reconnaissance 

will become more intense. It is even more difficult to completely camouflage 

strategic intent in warfare under high-tech conditions. Strategic camouflage is 

not only applied on the vast battlefield but also in the use of political, 

diplomatic, and high-tech measures where it will receive even more 

emphasis.300

Tactical Camouflage: Tactical camouflage utilizes measures taken by combat 

formations, units, and elements to conceal themselves and deceive the enemy.

Tactical camouflage is a combat support measure.

Tactical camouflage normally focuses on concentrations of military

units, forces on the move, axes of movement, force dispositions, the main axis 

of attack or the main axis of defense, fighting positions, firepower systems, 

fortifications and obstacles, and other tactical targets, to include their locations, 

status, and use as well as other activities undertaken by military units.

The basic requirements for tactical camouflage are: conform to the 

tactical intent of the commander and coordinate with unit actions; fully exploit 

terrain, weather, and materials; integrate the use of various camouflage 

measures; and take the initiative and never stop the camouflage effort. The 

main content of tactical camouflage includes plans for simulations or feints, 

implementation methods, measures to be taken, allocation of materials, 

camouflage discipline and requirements, and so on.

The main measures of tactical camouflage are: fully exploit terrain and 

other surface features, bad weather, darkness, and other conditions providing 

concealment; use camouflage patterns and smokescreens; exploit vegetation, 

use manmade screens, and acoustic and light concealment; conceal one’s own 

units and their combat actions; use mockups, noise-making devices, smoke 

generators, and other camouflage materials and construction techniques to set 

 

300 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Academy of Military Science Press, Volume 3, July 

1997, p. 726. Entry by Wang Peikun and Ye Teng.
104

up decoys, create fake battle positions and areas laid out as decoys; simulate the 

combat actions of units and elements; use a part of a force to execute a feint, a 

feint by firepower, or an electronic feint to confuse the enemy, pin him down or 

rouse him into action; and maintain strict discipline, block the leakage of 

information, and prevent the disclosure of military secrets.

In future warfare, with the extensive use of high-tech reconnaissance 

measures and precision-guided weapons, the place and role of tactical 

camouflage will be even more prominent. The organization and execution of 

tactical camouflage will be more complex, and technical measures will develop 

in the direction of integration, multi-functionality, and high effectiveness.301

PLA Camouflage Experts Speak Out

These two definitions of strategic and tactical camouflage offer an 

official but rather dated military interpretation of camouflage. As might be 

expected, there are other Chinese experts on camouflage that, through their 

positions as instructors or advisors to military officers, provide a more current

view on the topic. One of them is Li Xinguang, a Professor at the PLA’s 

General Staff Headquarters. Li states that the objective of informatized 

strategic camouflage is to “win an ‘informatized war’ by employing all the 

scientific and technical measures available to deceive and confuse the enemy 

based on the characteristics and patterns of an informatized and digitized 

battlefield.”302 He believes that if a country can hide its strategic targets, 

activities, and intentions, it will be able to accomplish its military objectives. 

To that end the Chinese must be good at hiding the true and displaying the 

false. The manipulation of another side’s cognitive tendencies is imperative. 

Strategic camouflage can be turned into a weapon that enables friendly forces 

to achieve strategic superiority and “make the enemy do what we want them to 

do.”303 Thus, Li Xinguang seems to echo once again the words of Li Bingyan 

regarding the cat and the pepper.

Strategic camouflage involves many processes according to Li. For 

example, if a country wanted to portray an atmosphere of peace and tranquility, 

it might engage in diplomatic maneuvers, propaganda campaigns, cultural 

events, or political actions. Such actions can help paralyze an enemy force and 

enable surprise blows against it.

304 [Author: Li’s use of peace proposals as an 

 

301 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Academy of Military Science Press, Volume 3, July 

1997, p. 742. Entry by Zhang Zuhui.

302 Zhang and Bie.

303 Ibid.

304 Ibid.
105

element of deception through diplomatic camouflage is disturbing and lowers 

international trust in Chinese diplomatic pronouncements. Suspicion is raised 

over the true objective of such proposals.]

Today high-technology surveillance accounts for over 90% of 

intelligence acquired on a high-tech battlefield. However, it does have its 

deficiencies and Li mentions four. They are: the inability to get a complete 

picture of an event at a specific moment in time; surveillance is dedicated to 

detection and identification; intelligence gathered by surveillance is usually 

biased; and surveillance is susceptible to interference.305

Li mentions five types of new stealth materials in his discussion. They 

are:

 Nanometer Stealth Material: It has unique electromagnetic, optical, 

thermal, and chemical characteristics along with good wave 

absorption capability.

 Multiband, Multifunction Stealth Material: These materials 

simultaneously absorb visible, near-, mid-, and far-infrared light 

and millimeter radar waves.

 Intelligent Stealth Material: It contains built-in sensing and 

information processing capability.

 Transparent Stealth Material: It is transparent to electromagnetic 

waves and neither reflects nor absorbs radar waves. It lets radar 

waves penetrate right through.

 Chameleon Material: This is an electric field-induced, color-change 

thin film. Once an electric field is applied the polymer film can 

change its color (to blue, gray, or white). An aircraft could thus 

change its color to blend into the background of the sky.306

Li also paid attention to active stealth technology in this 2005 article. This is a 

new technology that employs active means to evade detection by sound, light, 

electromagnetic waves, and heat. Li also discussed the effects of plasma and 

bionic stealth technologies. Plasma technology is important. Sometimes called 

the fourth state of matter, plasma technology is an electrically conductive 

material. It can lower radar detection to below 1%. It can even change the 

frequency of reflected radar waves to let the enemy acquire the wrong data for 

target position and speed. Plasma has a wide absorption bandwidth and is 

highly absorptive. Bionic stealth refers to “unique physiological and structural 

 

305 Ibid.

306 Ibid.
106

characteristics of an animal to achieve informatized bionic stealth of a strategic 

target.” For example, Li notes, the volume of a bee is less than one onehundredth of a sparrow. Yet the radar reflection cross section of a bee is sixteen

times that of a sparrow. Studying these peculiarities can enable the 

development of bionic technologies.307

All of these methods require innovation on the part of scientists 

involved with the projects. Scientists must focus on control over information 

throughout the entire process of strategic camouflage. The most important 

objective of strategic camouflage is to win the information war.

Another Chinese camouflage expert is Li Xiaoqi, director and professor 

of the Disguise Research and Teaching Group at the Command College of the 

Corps of Engineers. Li seeks to turn his students into disguise experts, and he 

uses such devices as audio and photo-electric technology to use disguise as 

deception. He has compiled national military standards for “disguise 

requirements for electronic targets” and has worked on projects such as 

“protection and disguise for urban targets” and “disguise and protection for 

large transportation hubs.”308 Here disguise and camouflage are synonymous.

Wang Xiangwei, head of the sixth office of a research institute 

(unidentified) under the Second Artillery and a deputy head of the All-Army 

Specialty Group on Camouflage, offers another expert opinion. He teaches

students that it should be a source of pride when camouflage they develop can 

pass for the real thing (camouflage battlefield deception) and when they can 

detect flaws that exist in a camouflage setup (deception detection operations). 

Most interesting about this article was the deception techniques described 

during a Red Force on Blue Force confrontation in training. First, the Blue 

Force (the US) could not detect the Red Force (China) because the latter was 

using camouflage so well. When the Red Force suddenly switched on its 

wireless communications system, which had remained silent, the Blue Force 

immediately took it out. After a 30 minute Blue Force attack, Blue returned to 

its base. During the return route, Red silently shot missiles at the force and the 

force’s airstrip and missile emplacements. It turns out that the Blue attack had 

been against false targets set up by Red. The Red Force had also “changed the 

 

307 Ibid.

308 Li Kaituo and Li Xiaofeng, “Li Xiaoqi, Dedicated to Raising ‘Disguise Experts,’” 

Jiefangjun Bao Online, 31 July 2008, p. 9, as translated and downloaded from the Open 

Source Center website, document number CPP20080801710007.
107

deception patterns of several of its important military targets, which had again 

disappeared without a trace.”309

Camouflage paint is another means China is using to neutralize 

surveillance from space and the air. Differences exist when viewing objects on 

the ground and from the air, explained Lu Xuliang, the Director of the 

Camouflage Material Research Office of the Engineering Corps Engineering 

Academy. There are four such difference, which are: different colors, different 

degrees of brightness, different shapes, and different textures. Lu’s team first 

collected background image information on a large area around a target that 

required camouflage protection. Then they calculated “comprehensive indexing 

data from the digital images for all sorts of colored spots in the background 

area.”310 Second, design personnel used special design software to process the 

data, using computer software to design the pattern, colors, brightness, and 

texture of the camouflage paint. Finally the selection of coating materials was 

the determining factor in whether the camouflage project would succeed or 

not.311

Camouflage paint does have its shortcomings, however. It can crack or 

peel. It must have a strong pressure-proof property to enable it to withstand 

constant rolling. It may not be allowed to fade, and it must resist ultraviolet 

light. All of these shortcomings indicate that surfaces must be repainted 

frequently. Lu’s team reportedly developed a camouflage paint that can be 

applied to concrete and sandy mud. The paint seeps .5 to .7 millimeters into the 

concrete or sandy object which prevents peeling or color fade up to ten years.312

High-Tech Reconnaissance and Deception

The PLA Daily makes it clear that China’s armed forces must learn to 

conduct deception and employ camouflage measures under conditions of a 

“complex electromagnetic environment.” There are excises held nearly every 

week or month by units somewhere in China under these conditions. In this 

 

309 Wang Tie, Wu Yanbing, and Qu Chen, “Expert on ‘Concealment and Deception’—

Profile of Wang Xiangwei, PLA Second Artillery Corps Outstanding Member of the 

Communist Party of China,” Jiefangjun Bao, 21 September 2005, p. 6, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20051004318001.

310 Ma Shengwei, Lu Zunhou, and Wang Ping, “While the Means of Reconnaissance 

Are Changing, Camouflage Techniques Must Also Change,” Jiefangjun Bao, 21 

February 2006, p. 11, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20060221510006.

311 Ibid.

312 Ibid.
108

environment, units learn how to counter reconnaissance activities of foreign 

armies and how to counter or deceive opponents with the use of signals and the 

electromagnetic spectrum. Special paint, decoys, deceptive radio signals, hiding 

among civilians (to include moving in civilian traffic), distorting the shape or 

appearance of important infrastructure sites, and other passive techniques 

receive the most attention. Active measures can include signal disruption or, as 

Defense News reported, blinding US satellites and thus preventing them from 

acquiring information.313

High-technology reconnaissance includes flat-plane reconnaissance as 

well as multi-dimensional reconnaissance from the air, on sea, underwater, and 

from space. Reconnaissance is also conducted by sound frequency and by 

microwave, infrared, laser, and other frequency bands thus providing multidimensional, multiple-frequency high-technology reconnaissance. The weak 

side in a high-technology war will not be at a complete loss, however, since it 

can use civilian identities or hide in civilian installations. Residing among 

civilians will remain a trump card by which the weaker side can defeat the 

enemy.314

Creating a counter surveillance capability to work against such 

technologies is a priority for all armed forces. In China, the focus is on 

implementing a strategic deception plan to interfere with surveillance 

capabilities. This will include transmitting a large volume of false and useless 

information that will draw an enemy force into making an incorrect or 

contradictory judgment.315 Establishing a competent counter surveillance force 

requires much practice in peacetime. For China, this can mean countering an 

enemy force’s use of unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles, satellites, or 

Google Earth.

More recently Chinese innovators have examined ways to fool Google 

Earth although the methods are not truly revolutionary to a Westerner. A Jinan 

Military District Red Army Corps commander thought about ways to do this 

 

313 Vago Muradian, “China Tried to Blind US Sats with Laser,” Defense News, 22 

September 2006, p. 1.

314 Cao Jiang, Wang Shengliang, and Peng Wei, “The Informatized Battlefield is More 

and More Transparent; How Do We Manage Modern Camouflaging?” Jiefangjun Bao, 

12 April 2007, p. 12, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20070412710006.809

315 Huang Shan, “China Studies Four Counter Surveillance Measures Owing to 

Intensified Collection of Information by Western Countries,” Huanqiu Shibao, 17 

January 2003, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, 

document number CPP20030122000059.
109

after viewing photos on Google Earth of his unit. He took these photos to his 

party committee meeting and then instituted new security means at the next 

troop exercise. With resolution now reaching .6 meters to 1 meter from regional 

satellite photos, Google is now working with the same level of resolution as 

that possessed by military satellites just ten years ago. The results of his 

innovations (not described in the article) proved to be successful. Google Earth 

did not find his unit during the next exercise due to the camouflage methods he 

practiced, at least not on the pictures he downloaded for his unit.

316

With regard to other measures to protect a unit from observation or to 

deceive an opponent, one of the best sources of historical information is the 

1998 book High-Tech and Modern Warfare. Chief Editor Li Yuankui includes a 

section on jamming and deception, regarding both as effective methods to deal 

with missile weapon attacks. Jamming radar guidance systems, jamming 

against infrared guidance systems, and jamming against laser guidance systems 

are the main technical approaches advocated by Li. Camouflage protection 

includes concealing targets, reducing the exposure of targets to cause guidance 

systems to lose targets, and utilizing decoys. Natural obstacles (buildings, 

terrain, etc.), antiradar protective screens, antiradar camouflage coating 

materials, and releasing antiradar smoke screens were suggestions to help 

attenuate the transmission of enemy radar waves and thus hinder the detection 

of friendly targets.317

In late 2006, Bingqi Zhishi published an interview in which experts 

expressed their views on countering reconnaissance satellites with jamming and 

camouflage. Hua Rong, a reputed expert on the topic, was asked if the US EP-3 

aircraft could pick up dialects and accents. Hua stated that the voice intercept 

system on the EP-3 has the ability to conduct electronic spoofing and use 

identical tones to distort the content of communications. Another expert, Zhao 

Feng, was asked if camouflage is still the primary means for countering 

reconnaissance satellites. Zhao stated that camouflage nets are now one and the 

same as the equipment itself and that nets can reduce detection by up to 90%. 

Furthermore, wide area smoke screen shielding is used for targets on large 

surface areas such as roads, bridges, loading zones, and assembly areas. The 

 

316 Jiefangjun Bao, Internet Version, 14 June 2007, as translated and downloaded from 

the Open Source Center website, document number FEA20070628207266.

317 Li Yuankui, editor, High-Tech and Modern Warfare, Military Yiwen Press, January 

1998, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document 

number CPP20061220320004.
110

smoke must contain traces of counter-laser control and guidance and counterelectronic control and guidance.318

To camouflage cars, tanks, and ships on the move, spotted cloth was 

recommended with two different sides and with inset insulation stickers. There 

is also what Zhao referred to as water fume defilade camouflage. Water fumes 

have a strong attenuating effect on visible lights, near infrared, intermediate 

infrared, and lasers he notes. Ferrous sulfate, potassium sulfate, and other 

additives will increase the absorption of infrared and radar waves. Nanoceramics and fire resistant composite materials can be used in place of 

traditional steel or aluminum structures to reduce radar signals as well. Low 

temperature camouflage paint can lower the temperature of some surfaces by 10 

degrees Celsius or more. A heat sensitive bio-camouflage material turns red at 

28 degrees Celsius; blue at 33 degrees; and black at low temperatures.319

When satellites track large targets, creating false appearances is a good 

technological solution. This can involve camouflaging with colors, changing 

shapes, creating false targets, covering buildings and equipment with 

camouflage, or camouflaging using shrubbery.320

The Stratagem-Deception Link

The Chinese PLA Officer’s Handbook offers a link between stratagems 

and deception in defining the science of military stratagem. The definition notes 

that

Strategic science, campaign science, and tactical science research the 

general principles of war guidance; however, the science of military 

stratagem researches how to flexibly apply these general principles in 

war. If the former’s research focuses on the ‘positive path,’ then the 

latter focuses on the ‘deceptive (or scheming) path’; if the former’s 

research focuses on the ‘constant,’ then the latter focuses on the 

‘variable...’

321

 

318 Lan Bai, interview with Hua Rong and Zhao Feng, “Confronting Satellite 

Reconnaissance,” Bingqui Zhishi, 1-31 December 2006, pp. 20-24, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20070111465001.

319 Ibid.

320 Ibid.

321 Chinese People’s Liberation Army Officer’s Handbook, Qingdao Publishing House, 

June 1991, p. 197. Translation support for the term “science of military stratagem” was 

provided by Dr. John Tai, an expert on Chinese affairs. Dr. Gary Bjorge of the Combat 
111

The stratagem-deception link is universal in China’s military literature. 

For example, the Chinese authored book On the Chinese Revolution in Military 

Affairs has several intriguing sections of value regarding strategy, stratagems, 

and deception. An example is a statement by Major General Li Bingyan, a 

stratagem specialist, regarding the flood of information available to modern 

analysts:

In the information age there is information excess, information 

overload, information surplus, information inflation, and information 

overflow, and that is a new factor of war friction. One philosopher said 

that absolute light and absolute darkness have the same effect—we 

cannot see anything. With information overflow, the modern battlefield 

is more richly colorful and an area for cunning and deception.322

That is, you can turn the lights out and be blind with no information; or you can 

shine xenon lights in someone’s eyes and blind them with too much 

information. In either case deception is easy to induce with too much or too 

little information on hand.

To Li, deception is deeply embedded in strategy. He adds that hightechnology warfare has hastened the appearance of many new characteristics of 

military strategy and, therefore, opportunities for deception. Six new features

are most prominent:

 Methods are new.

 Information is abundant. 

 Content is vast.

 Summaries are strong. 

 Preplanning is detailed. 

 Resolution is quick.323

Information technologies also allow deception theories to be tested in the lab. 

 

Studies Institute of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas made his PLA Handbook available for 

use.

322 Li Bingyan, “Applying Military Strategy in the Age of the New Revolution in 

Military Affairs,” On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, 

New China Press, 2004, pp. 2-31. 

323 Ibid.
112

Li’s most intriguing example of the combination of strategy and 

deception is his hypothetical question “How do you make a cat eat a hot 

pepper?” His answer was as follows: “You can stuff the pepper down the cat’s

throat (the most difficult), you can put the pepper in cheese and make the cat

swallow it, or you can grind the pepper up and spread it on the cat’s back. The 

latter method makes the cat lick itself and receive the satisfaction of cleaning up 

the hot pepper.”324 The cat is oblivious to the end goal. This is strategy imposed 

by deception. Li thus indicates that when a successful strategic move is 

implemented, the person or nation responding to the move is unaware of its 

overall impact and significance.

Li’s example reminds one of a scene in the movie “The Usual 

Suspects.” In the scene, Verbal, a cripple who is really the notorious killer 

Keyser Soze, dupes the police into believing he is a pitiful accomplice and 

bystander with little purpose in life. When the police interview Verbal, he 

appears fearful of Soze’s exploits and indicates that Soze is always able to 

disappear in an instant. In describing Soze’s exploits Verbal states that “the 

greatest trick the devil ever pulled was to make us believe he does not exist.” 

That is exactly what Verbal did to the police, using the strategy of deception by 

appearing to be something (a cripple) he wasn’t. He made the police believe he 

(Soze) didn’t exist. The police made fun of him and set him free. This type of 

deception, forcing the opposing side to do what you want while making it 

appear that they are holding the winning hand, represents the type of deception 

present in Li’s cat and hot pepper example. 

Li explains later in On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs that 

he defines IW differently than most IW specialists. He defines it as the use of 

information networks or informatized weapons to attack an enemy’s cognition 

systems. Cognition systems include knowledge systems plus belief systems. 

Knowledge systems refer to decision-making systems that understand or 

observe verifiable phenomena and change the phenomena into perceivable 

reality. Belief systems refer to systems that carry out guidance for testable 

empirical information and for information and awareness that cannot be tested 

or is difficult to test.325 In this case, attacking cognitive systems that observe 

phenomena or test information can be successful if it introduces deceptive 

material and thus alters the output of knowledge and belief systems according 

to Li.

 

324 Ibid.

325 Ibid.
113

Information (and therefore cognitive) supremacy allows for what Li 

terms “control power.” One must prevent the enemy from understanding your 

information while you know everything about the enemy’s situation. However, 

caution must be exercised here. The side with information inferiority can also 

control a situation. To do so, it must send information it wants the superior side 

to know and thereby influence it. If the inferior side sends nothing but 

misinformation to the superior side and the latter collects and acts on it, then 

the superior side is basing its next moves on bad information. Or the inferior 

side could use strategy to control an opponent. In this case, the inferior side 

would use information misdirection326 (make it appear a force is attacking from 

one side when it is attacking from another) to control how an information 

superior force can gather information at will but make bad decisions if the 

information isn’t credible. This is increasingly a deception method.

LTC Liu Aimin, a staff officer in a General Staff Department of the 

PLA, adds to this idea. He writes that deception warfare is rising quietly on 

virtual battlefields. By this he means the insertion of simulated information into 

an enemy’s command and control system. This could cause an enemy to 

mistake what is false for what is true, or it could throw an enemy command and 

control scheme into chaos. Liu concludes that “network deception will become 

an important combat measure on the future virtual battlefield.”327

Another IW writer who emphasizes deception is Dai Qingmin, former 

head of the Chinese General Staff’s Fourth Department (electronic warfare). 

Two deceptive aspects of the information age that he stresses are network 

psychological warfare (NPW) deception and using deception to attain

information supremacy.

Dai states that deception is an element of NPW. NPW is an operational 

activity that uses the theory of psychology, has computer networks as its 

carrier, and uses measures such as psychological propaganda, psychological 

deception, and psychological deterrence to break down the spirit of the enemy’s 

military and people.328 NPW combines traditional psychological-warfare 

thinking with modern network-information technology. This type of warfare 

can influence people’s awareness and feelings about politics, economics, 

culture, and military affairs via propaganda, intimidation, deception, 

enticement, bribery, and deterrence. 

 

326 Ibid.

327 Liu Aimin, “The Characteristics of Informationized War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue

(China Military Science), 1 August 2001, pp. 69-72, as translated and downloaded from 

the FBIS website on 20 November 2003.

328 Dai Qingmin, p. 142.
114

Virtual deception is of particular concern as a network psychological 

technique. Technology can edit or piece together different visual scenes and 

environments to create a picture or incident that confuses truth with falsehood. 

Information can be published under any name. Most important, NPW is 

extremely timely. It can take place literally minutes after an event. This can

make the substance of the material appear more pertinent, reliable, and effective 

without the benefit of a proper timeframe to check out the facts. In turn this has 

the potential to enhance psychological panic or create social chaos.329 Thus 

virtual deception can produce immediate strategic results.

Dai continues by noting that in joint operations under high-tech 

conditions, in order to achieve information supremacy, a difficult series of steps 

must be initiated. Each of the two sides must use all capabilities to include 

information deterrence, information interdiction, information deception, and 

information contamination. This makes the substance of command and 

coordination extensive and complicated.330 Dai’s reasoning is that an 

adversary’s attainment of total information supremacy can be contaminated and 

made counterproductive with the proper insertion of information that is 

deceptive and misleading.

In a later work in which Dai served as a co-editor with Xu Genchu, he 

continues to focus on deception. He and Xu write that to exert control over 

enemy personnel and weapon systems, it is necessary to use information 

deception and information obstruction.331 Deception plays a key role in both 

strategic IW and battlefield IW.

Authors Zhou Yun, Zou Zhenning, and Yang Zhiqiang, writing in 

Yangzhou Jianchuan Dianzi Kuikang, discuss a deception technique that China 

appears to be applying to computer network warfare. They write that 

information-hiding technology (another term for steganography) can be applied 

to a friendly C4ISR system in the form of text, digitized audio and images, or 

some other means in order to conduct the covert transmission of secret battle 

command messages “in order to prevent leaking information and forfeiting a 

 

329 Ibid., p. 143.

330 Ibid., p. 172.

331 This author reviewed the Table of Contents and selected terms from Editor Xu 

Genchu and Director Dai Qingmin’s Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, 

2005, Academy of Military Science Press. Translation support was provided by a 

private company.
115

chance for combat.”332 Information-hiding refers to the means to hide specific 

information instructions, orders, resolutions, situation maps, and so on in a 

digitized information-related host such as text, digitized audio, graphic images, 

video frequency signals, and meteor burst communications.333

Deception techniques can be used in both strategic IW and battlefield 

IW. Strategic information warfare’s main features include a broad scope, the 

involvement of special forms (psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, 

deception warfare, and media warfare) and targets (especially cognitive ones), 

and specialized personnel. The personnel involved in strategic warfare are not 

necessarily soldiers but may include civilian computer experts, international 

criminal groups, hackers, or terrorist organizations with ulterior motives.334

Some Chinese theorists believe that the US uses strategic deception quite often. 

They site the use of the media and political declarations in regard to the war 

with Iraq as well as US actions in Kosovo as prime examples. They also often 

state that US descriptions of the China threat are strategic deception measures 

designed to get more money for the defense budget.

Battlefield information warfare is information warfare occurring within 

battle or combat space. It includes comprehensive countermeasures in warning, 

detection and reconnaissance, information transmission and processing, 

weapons control and guidance, operations command and control, camouflage, 

deception, interference, and military stratagems.

335 The creation of information

power is a PLA battlefield goal. This can occur with the use of electronic 

camouflage, electronic deception, network deception, and “virtual reality 

warfare.” The goal is to conceal what is real and reveal what is false and to 

confuse, deceive, and arouse the enemy. This causes the enemy’s information 

to be false and judgments and decisions to be mistaken.336 Deceptive defensive 

methods include the combined use of technical means and tactical measures of 

information deception such as signal source deception, signal channel 

deception, and information (content) deception.

337

 

332 Zhou Yun, Zou Zhenning, and Yang Zhiqiang, “Application of Information Hiding 

Technology in Computer Network Warfare, Yangzhou Jianchuan Dianzi Duikang, 1 

February 2005, pp. 7-11, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20050819000214.

333 Ibid.

334 Xu and Dai, p. 82.

335 Ibid., pp. 82-83.

336 Ibid., pp. 85-87.

337 Ibid., pp. 88-90.
116

Other Chinese authors who wrote on deception and stratagems are Niu 

Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui in an article titled “Planning and Application of 

Strategies of Information Operations in High-Tech Local War.” They 

recommend applying deceptive schemes simultaneously or consecutively 

according to strategic or operational intentions. Actions taken should be 

coordinated and corroborated with one another to ensure the enemy will have 

no suspicion.338

These deceptive schemes and stratagems must interfere with, damage,

or destroy listening and anti-listening measures, camouflage and anticamouflage devices, reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance measures, and 

stealth and anti-stealth measures in the planning phase of an operation. 

Stratagems may be included in information flows to sever channels of 

communication while keeping friendly flows of information secure. The

processing phase requires stratagems that, in addition to their transmission task, 

include misleading and anti-misleading efforts targeting the enemy’s 

information processing system to cause the enemy to make decision-making 

errors.339

Finally, Zhou Min, in a paper for the Sixth International Seminar on 

Sun Tzu’s Art of War, notes that information warfare attack technologies 

include “information deception technology” which transmits false information 

to the enemy’s information systems, various sensors, and media. This includes 

various deception and camouflage technologies and stealth technology, and it 

causes the enemy to make erroneous decisions when the information is 

received.340

Conclusions

China’s long history has been embedded with references to deception 

since the time of Sun Tzu. Deception is used to achieve objectives and enhance 

concealment. The concept is now finding new uses through the addition of 

information technologies. Denial and deception techniques, countermeasures 

(anti-reconnaissance, anti-radar, anti-deception satellite systems, etc.),

camouflage, and disinformation are major areas in which the Chinese focus 

their efforts. Jamming unmanned aerial vehicles and other surveillance assets 

 

338 Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui, “Planning and Application of Strategies of 

Information Operations in High-Tech Local War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China 

Military Science), Number 4 2000, pp. 115-122, as translated and downloaded from the 

FBIS website on 9 November 2000.

339 Ibid.

340 Zhou Min, “The Basis for the Psychological Warfare Planning of Sun Tzu,” paper 

from the Sixth International Seminar on Sun Tzu’s Art of War,” November 2004. 
117

are being researched. So are technologies designed to alter the outlines of 

friendly equipment. When utilized in conjunction with stratagems and 

camouflage, information technologies become very powerful allies for 

deception efforts.

Stratagems induce cognitive mistakes into an enemy force, particularly 

into an opponent’s decision-making. “Killing with a borrowed sword” was 

originally used by feudal bureaucrats to cheat or outwit one another in a 

political sense. When extended to the military realm, it was used to divide and 

demoralize an opponent or to use a third party to defeat an enemy. 

The stratagem makes use of another person or country to rid one of an 

adversary and enables the person “behind the stratagem” to avoid dealing 

directly with the person or country. One can also induce two enemies to fight 

against one another via stratagems without either side realizing they are being 

used for such purposes.341

The same emphasis on stratagems is apparent in Chinese military 

thought today except that it is updated to include the use of advanced 

information technologies. Using advanced surveillance equipment to obtain a 

top-down image provides a “vision” for stratagem developers to work from and 

with. Stratagem designers provide input for computers which then develop

more strategic options. This requires sophisticated commanders who 

understand the most recent scientific and technological breakthroughs and how 

to integrate them with stratagems. Subjective initiative thus remains a key 

element for commanders to possess. Commanders must practice, master, and

utilize stratagems as needed. Chinese deception practitioners realize that 

stratagems are no longer enough, that stratagems must be combined with 

technology to enable the optimum level of combat efficiency on the 

information age battlefield. Thus, proficiency is required in the use of 

techniques such as using electronic feints, camouflage, and jamming; virus 

attacks; and space satellite jamming and deception in order to lead the enemy to 

draw the wrong conclusions and enable friendly forces to attain the goal of 

strategic deception.

When reading Chinese deception theories, especially with their focus 

on innovation, it becomes obvious that high-tech means such as new 

camouflage technological advances will be used in conjunction with 

 

341 Liang Shoulei, “Kill with a Borrowed Knife—Third of the Thirty-six Stratagems,” 

Guofang, Issue 5 2008, pp. 79-80, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source 

Center website, document number CPP20080819563003.
118

stratagems. Old means will also be used. Knowing that surveillance satellites 

are watching their every move, Chinese force deployments and maneuvers will 

inject abnormalities and ambiguities into their formations and advances to fool 

high-tech means much as they once fooled enemy reconnaissance agents on the 

ground. Speed of movement, hiding forces that appear only at the last minute, 

and other such techniques can be used to fool high-tech means by “showing the 

false and hiding the true.” But that is not all. These same actions will be used in 

conjunction with political, diplomatic, and economic activities to affect other 

areas of the battlefield, such as finance and logistics. Integrating these issues 

introduces huge questions into the mind of the opponent as he tries to determine 

the where, when, and why of Chinese military actions.

There are, of course, risks associated with the use of stratagems and 

camouflage in the information age. One risk is whether one’s advance 

contingency planning is accurate and complete and doesn’t end up backfiring 

on the plan’s developer. A second risk is the increased ability of satellite 

reconnaissance to uncover camouflage and other deception-type activities. A 

final risk is that enemy forces may be able to quickly identify and then 

annihilate friendly forces working camouflage issues.

342

Another cognitive method to deceive but not discussed in this chapter is 

the use of online fake news. According to a report in Huanqiu Shibao, there is 

all sorts of fake news floating around China. Some of the news is produced by 

people who are concerned about China’s military prowess and inflate news 

reports to make the military appear strong. Other reports are simply fake news 

that creates suspicion. Fake news confuses public opinion in China not to 

mention the violations of the professional ethics of news reporting. Fake news 

can also add fuel to the fire with regards to the China threat theory since, 

authors Jiang and Wang note, certain Western countries continue to trumpet 

threat theories.343

Thus, Sun Tzu’s admonition that “all warfare is based on deception” 

continues to have digital legs into the twenty-first century. The danger is that in 

an age of high-precision weaponry, huge explosive power, and influence over 

financial flows, the consequences of deception operations gone bad are 

hundreds of times more dangerous to nations in particular and mankind in 

general. China is treading on this dangerous path with its reputed/alleged cyber 

 

342 Zhang and Shen.

343 Jiang Xueqing and Wang Haifeng, “China Entangled in Fake Military News,” 

Huanqiu Shibao (Internet Version), 7 July 2006, as translated and downloaded from the 

Open Source Center website, document number CPP2060905465001.
119

incursions, using deception devices, into other nations’ computer network 

systems and equipment. 
120

CHAPTER FIVE: INTEGRATING HIGH-TECH INTO CHINA’S 

CAMPAIGN STRATAGEMS

This chapter summarizes key points from editors Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang 

Zhan Li’s 2002 book Campaign Stratagems. The focus of the chapter is the

integration of high-technology systems and stratagems.

344

The source of stratagem is knowledge.345

Introduction

When US planners gather to make decisions for an upcoming 

operation, they generate courses of action. A commander then examines his 

options and decides which course of action provides the best chance for 

success. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 

and Associated Terms, defines a course of action as 

1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A 

possible plan open to an individual or commander that would 

accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The 

scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in 

an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System concept development phase and the course-of-action 

determination steps of the joint operation planning process.346

When Chinese planners gather to make decisions, they generate 

potential stratagems for use by commanders instead of courses of action. A 

stratagem is designed to mislead an enemy’s perception, thinking, and 

emotional processes. By definition, it is designed to fool an enemy force 

whereas a course of action is designed to take advantage of a situation or, as the 

definition states, the scheme adopted to accomplish a mission. These definitions 

have been used for years but they differ in intent.

 

344 This author reviewed Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li’s Campaign Stratagems

and credits the content, concepts, and ideas to the book’s editor and authors of the 

individual chapters. The content of their book is reviewed based on translated material. 

Translation credit belongs to the Translation Doctors. Page numbers listed are those 

from the translation, not the original Chinese text.

345 Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, Campaign Stratagems, National Defense 

University, 2002, p. 249.

346 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 19 August, 2009), Internet 

version located at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/index.html.
121

Today, one factor that courses of action (COA) and stratagems share is

a reliance on information technology (IT) components. Due to rapid advances 

in science and technology, the Chinese see IT as a valuable asset and feel that 

“the contents of the stratagem are continuously changing and renewing; the 

methods of stratagem are becoming more comprehensive; the space 

encompassed by the stratagem is multi-directional; and the technological 

contents in stratagem methods are unique.”

347 Stratagems thus remain an 

effective way of planning for engagements with an opponent and for 

manipulating your opponent’s reactions. A key factor is that stratagems are 

changing with the times and generating electronic campaigns to fool or mislead 

opponents. 

To win with stratagem in the information age, the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) believes that a strategist must link technology, strength, and 

stratagem to control victory. A good strategist is a good thinker who is 

innovative, creative, and flexible in his use of stratagems. A good stratagem 

performs a host of cognitive tricks, to include deceiving, controlling, inducing, 

arousing, creating, innovating, or manipulating another person or an entire staff.

There is a methodology for developing a good stratagem. The 

methodology requires the close study of an opposing force’s field manuals, 

their wartime lessons learned, and their military philosophy. In the information

age, this includes studying another nation’s cyber plans and field operation 

procedures under high-technology conditions. Such study exposes preferred 

actions or defenses associated with electronic means that stratagems can 

exploit. 

Some Chinese writers openly state that the primary battlefields of 

future stratagem will be computer networks.348 Several nations (India, South 

Korea, Japan, Canada, Germany, England, Australia, and the US) have 

suggested that China may be getting a head start in this regard. They believe

China has been harvesting information through the use of Internet 

reconnaissance stratagems. It is suspected that Chinese reconnaissance

performs two functions: to expose an opposing force’s military plans and to 

study the conditions and vulnerabilities that lead to the successful use of 

Internet attacks. 

 

347 Zhang and Zhang, p. 249.

348 Ibid., p. 255.
122

The editors of the 2002 book Campaign Stratagems (a book published 

by China’s National Defense University Printing House), Zhang Xing Ye and 

Zhang Zhan Li, note that “the side being in a strategically superior position, 

planning first and fighting later, winning through strategy, is able to fully 

promote high-tech superiority...”

349 A human’s control over high-tech weapons 

and his or her ability to integrate weapons with stratagems makes one 

maximally effective.350

The focus of this chapter is on three aspects of Zhang and Zhang’s 

book: the elements, factors, and features of campaign stratagems; creative ways 

to integrate high-technology and stratagems; and ways to manipulate the 

thought process of enemy commanders. The chapter ends with a description of 

how the new battles of wits between opposing commanders will involve the 

integration of high-technology equipment, virtual deception, and stratagems. 

These stratagems will reduce the accuracy of an opponent’s analytical 

capabilities and his chances of success.

The Concept of Moulue

The editors of Campaign Stratagems state that in the Chinese language, 

mou is idea and stratagem while lue is plan and stratagem. Together, moulue is 

stratagem, trick, and/or tactic. The concept is adaptable to decision-making, 

subjective initiative, and deception, and it is applicable to politics, the 

economy, international affairs, and military affairs. 

Elements, Factors, and Features of a Campaign Stratagem

Elements

Strategic stratagems are different than campaign stratagems. They 

operate on the highest level and are able to exert influence via politics, the 

economy, and international and military affairs. Campaign stratagems are more 

closely related to military affairs.

351 While deception and campaign stratagem 

are closely related, deception was and remains a subset of campaign stratagem. 

Deception is a means to manipulate an enemy force. However, the editors of 

Campaign Stratagems feel deception is the most important element of campaign 

stratagem.352

 

349 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

350 Ibid., p. 5. 

351 Ibid., p. 17.

352 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
123

Li Qi writes in Campaign Stratagems that a campaign stratagem is 

when “the commanding officer, on the basis of certain strength, fully performs 

his subjective initiative, and manipulates and drives the enemy in the 

confrontation of intelligence, so as to create a situation that is favorable to his 

own troops but unfavorable to the enemy.”353 The goal of campaign stratagem 

is to achieve higher efficiency and to move away from a situation of simple 

static strength.

354 This requires taking advantage of differences in troop morale, 

topographical and meteorological conditions, and troop distribution and combat 

methods. The transformation from static strength to operational efficiency 

requires the exploitation of friendly campaign strength, enemy campaign 

strength, and the campaign environment. This analysis is commonly referred to 

as uncovering shi, the sum of all the factors that impact on the performance of 

the respective operational efficiency of two sides in a general confrontational 

situation.355 Campaign stratagem aims at creating a situation unfavorable to the 

enemy and favorable to the friendly side. Planning and creating this situation is 

an element referred to as the “core of campaign stratagem application.”356

A main element of campaign stratagem is the battle of wits. With action 

verbs such as manipulate, deceive, trick, and control, this is understandable. 

Editors Zhang and Zhang list three features of the battle. First is the 

competition of contradictory interests between two sides. Second is the manner 

in which decision-makers interact and attempt to influence one another. 

Knowing the decision-making process of one’s opponent allows for the 

manipulation of that process. Third is the commander’s personality and how he 

or she reacts under pressure in an uncertain environment. A study of hobbies, 

weaknesses, and flaws is “the best breach point for stratagems.”357 This implies 

that the Chinese conduct intense data-gathering on the personalities and 

interests of foreign commanders and leaders. 

There are three campaign stratagem methods. The first method is to 

“break up and unify,” changing the balance of static strengths of both sides in 

terms of time and space. The second method is to use special and regular 

forces, applying general concepts in irregular ways. The third method is to use 

deception and real actions (alternating between them). Integrating these three 

methods can improve chances of success. The editors periodically mention 

 

353 Li Qi, “Introduction to Campaign Stratagems,” in Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan 

Li, Campaign Stratagems, National Defense University, 2002, p. 9.

354 Ibid., p. 10.

355 Ibid., p. 11. See Appendix Two for a detailed description of shi and some present 

day variants of the 36 stratagems.

356 Ibid., p. 12.

357 Ibid., pp. 12-14.
124

these three methods throughout the text. When applying these methods, 

creativity and flexibility become the soul of a campaign stratagem’s “battle of 

wits” since stratagems are the primary means for the creation of a situation.358

Factors

Ancient Chinese history is flooded with examples of the use of 

stratagems. From their use, several factors have emerged. Those serving as the 

strongest factors for the development of campaign stratagems are the political 

environment, military thought and strategies, campaign development, military 

heritage and culture, and a commander’s character.

First, a liberal and active political environment, from a Chinese point of 

view, encourages commanders to utilize their subjective initiative to the utmost. 

Such environments offer the use of the full range of creativity and flexibility 

instead of a passive, mechanical approach to stratagem which marks a corrupt 

and rigid political environment. Second, military thought has a significant 

impact on campaign stratagems. Advanced or new modes of thinking are

required for stratagems to flourish, to employ flexibility, and to overcome 

enemy thinking. Third, campaigns develop when they take into consideration 

context and time, be it at the level of development of weapons and equipment, 

science and technology, or key operational methods. Most important for this 

work is that the development of science and technology offers many new 

innovations for the means and methods of campaign stratagem, where a 

combination of technology and stratagem is stressed. Simultaneously, the 

weaknesses and limitations of an enemy’s high-tech equipment must be 

exploited.359

The fourth factor is culture and military heritage. The editors believe 

that differences exist among Chinese and foreign stratagem experts due to 

objective conditions, each nation’s operational environment, and various 

cultural and military heritages. Under various conditions the concept of risk, for 

example, would be treated differently. Zhang and Zhang note that the PLA 

stresses being active and steady, pursuing certain victory, engaging in prudent

early engagement (cyber reconnaissance?), encouraging reasonable risk-taking, 

and avoiding unfavorable decisive battles. PLA thought processes based on 

dialectical materialism introduce the alternating patterns of breakup and unity, 

the coexistence of special and regular forces, and a transformation between fake 

and real actions. In the opinion of the editors, Western armies use common 

sense as the primary component of their stratagem thought process along with 

 

358 Ibid., pp. 14-15.

359 Ibid., pp. 44-46.
125

systems theory, information theory, control theory, images, intuitional thinking, 

associative thinking, and psychology and behavioral science.360

The fifth factor is the character of the commanding officer. Since 

stratagems are the product of creative thinking by the commander, he or she 

will be the subject of stratagems from the opposing side. His or her personal 

qualities help determine success or failure. Knowledge structure, modes of 

thought, and psychology determine what stratagems he or she will introduce or 

to which ones a commander will be susceptible. The editors cite Zhege Liang

here, who noted that “if a commander has no knowledge in meteorology, 

geology, forecast, and yin and yang or he does not read dispositional plans and 

has no information about the entire campaign, he will be a very poor 

commander.”361 The most important element is the commander’s mode of 

thinking, and commanders must master the dialectical method, logical thinking, 

thinking in images, three-dimensional thinking, unconventional thinking, and 

associative thinking if they want to make a proper analysis. These types of 

thinking enable a commander to comprehend the essence of a situation and 

apply the proper stratagems.

Features

Editors Zhang and Zhang listed six major features of campaign 

stratagems. The first, which has been mentioned already, is the battle of wits. In 

a battlefield situation there will be an intense struggle among commander’s 

strategies, stratagems and counter-stratagems, and deceptions and counterdeceptions. Second, there will be a desire on both sides to speculate since there 

are few truly advantageous situations where a commander totally understands 

the battlefield situation in front of him or her. This requires speculation and the 

adoption of the best alternative. This also requires “profound knowledge of 

dialectical principles” and a familiarity with the thirty-six stratagems of war.

362

Craftiness is a third feature of campaign stratagem. By craftiness is 

meant the use of ruses and manipulation. A fourth feature is innovation which 

is usually fused with craftiness. Innovation represents the vitality of campaign 

stratagem since it has no fixed form and is always changing.

363 A fifth feature 

of campaign stratagem is higher effectiveness. A stratagem’s use lowers an 

opponent’s operational efficiency and enables higher efficiency and thus higher

effectiveness on the part of friendly forces. A final feature of campaign 

 

360 Ibid., pp. 46-47.

361 Ibid., p. 47.

362 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

363 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
126

stratagem is risk. The danger in taking a risk is that if the enemy sees through a 

deceptive scheme then they can use it to lure friendly (Chinese) forces into a 

trap. Caution is urged as well as ambition.364

Creatively Integrating High-Technology and Stratagems

Wang Yungming, writing in Campaign Stratagems, notes that high 

technology developments such as precision-guided weapons, global-positioning 

systems, electromagnetic decoys, technologically advanced camouflage means, 

and advanced night vision equipment can be used to produce illusions (both 

real and virtual) and thus impact the development and use of campaign 

stratagems. These material developments induce change and result in new 

means to apply strategy. New battles of wits and improved wisdom and 

strategies are thus on the horizon. The soul of these revolutionary changes lies 

in the PLA’s ability to innovate and apply information-based creative 

thinking.

365

Two chapters in Campaign Stratagems focus on the development of 

stratagems under high technology conditions. Dr. Li Qi wrote Chapter Eight 

titled “Campaign Stratagem Application under High-Tech Conditions” and 

Colonel Liu Xubing wrote Chapter Nine titled “Demands on the Campaign 

Commander’s Qualities When Applying Stratagems under High-Technology 

Conditions.” Both authors, according to the postscript to the book, appear to 

work at the National Defense University’s Campaign Research Office.

Li believes that the development of technology has opened up more 

avenues for the use of campaign stratagems. He develops his argument by 

offering both the positive and negative aspects of high technologies. First, he 

discusses the challenges that high technologies introduce. These are: the 

transparency of the battlefield offered by real-time intelligence transmission 

which offsets surprise and concealment; the rapid reaction capability that 

technology offers, making it difficult to take advantage of stratagems; and the 

high lethality of high-tech weapons, making operations more procedural and 

difficult to include the application of stratagems.366

 

364 Ibid., p. 21.

365 Wang Yungming, “Campaign Strategy and Objective Conditions,” in Zhang Xing 

Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, Campaign Stratagems, National Defense University, 2002, pp. 

181-182.

366 Li Qi, “Campaign Stratagem Application under High-Tech Conditions,” in Zhang 

Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, Campaign Stratagems, National Defense University, 

2002, pp. 215-217.
127

In spite of these challenges, Li feels there are many opportunities for 

the use of stratagems. He states:

Under high-tech conditions, the expanded campaign space, the 

diversification of campaign forces, the proliferation of operational 

modes, and the complexity of engagement relationships have led to an 

increase in the number of uncertain factors in campaign operations, 

making campaign command more flexible. This in turn creates more 

opportunities for stratagem application in campaigns, opens up larger 

thinking space for strategizing, and provides more means for stratagem 

execution.367

Since the entire strategic depth is now open for exploitation, this creates more 

flexibility in target selection and the employment of stratagems. Engagement 

relationships are more complex due to the uncertain mix of symmetrical and 

asymmetrical operations.368

High technologies have enhanced the ability to cover and conceal 

forces as well as to expose them. On today’s battlefield, reconnaissance and 

surveillance technologies must battle against camouflage and deception 

technologies. Also possible is the surprise introduction of new technologies on 

the battlefield that may play a decisive role in attaining success. Perhaps most 

important of all, high technologies have greatly assisted in the enhancement of 

command and control organization and, thus, future stratagem planning. The 

end result is that technology is now assisting stratagems to become more useful 

and contemporary.369 Li Bingyan also stressed this point in On the Chinese 

Revolution in Military Affairs.

Li Qi writes that an understanding of “disposition” is crucial to 

stratagem application. This is similar to the concept of shi mentioned earlier 

and examined in Appendix Two. By disposition he is referring to force 

composition, battlefield environment, and campaign engagement methods. The 

concept of a force/superiority also has changed from concentrating forces such 

as troops and weapons to concentrating capabilities based on issues such as 

information mobility and long-range firepower. Capability superiority consists 

of the “mobile dispersal of entities (forces and weapons) and mobile 

concentration of capabilities.” As an example, Li used the Kosovo conflict 

where forces were dispersed all over Europe, the US, and space, yet operational 

 

367 Ibid., p. 217.

368 Ibid.

369 Ibid., pp. 219-220.
128

capabilities were focused on an area to form theater superiority in what the US 

termed “global force integration.” Long-range firepower and information 

mobility do not require the time or the infrastructure that ground troops require

to concentrate assets on an area. 

Li advocates the creation of a favorable battlefield posture that 

accounts for all dimensions (air, sea, land, electromagnetic, space, cyber, and 

psychological) and new developments (battlefield robots, smart unmanned 

strike platforms, laser weapons, electro-magnetic pulse weapons, smart 

weapons, and so on). Li pays special attention to the creation of information 

superiority by bringing into play high-tech systems. He notes that:

It is particularly true when the military information system as 

represented by C4ISR systems integrates into an organic whole various 

departments such as command, control, communications, intelligence, 

operations, and support units, troops at different levels, various 

weapons and equipment and facilities, and various operational and 

support actions. Such a military information system optimizes the 

structure of campaign force systems, their functions and operational 

modes, and strengthens their collective operational 

capabilities...information superiority is also a precondition for seizing 

the initiative of the entire campaign and for winning the final campaign 

victory.370

Superiority in the air and outer space battlefields must be attained as well. They 

are closely linked with information superiority since “aerial-spatial integration 

and space informatization have linked air and space battlefields closely with 

information fields.”371

Li considers the basic operational mode under high-tech conditions as 

the system-to-system contest. When analyzing enemy forces, then, it is 

necessary in Li’s opinion to 

focus on disrupting enemy forces’ systemic structures, breaking down 

their coordination and balance, and degrading their collective 

operational capabilities so as to create a favorable posture with our 

collective power trained against the enemy’s local power, our 

 

370 Ibid., p. 223.

371 Ibid., p. 224.
129

coordination against the enemy’s confusion, and our balance against 

the enemy’s imbalance.372

It is also important to match a campaign stratagem with the overall political, 

economic, and diplomatic situation. Only in this way can an enemy be 

convinced of an action, when the stratagem matches the strategic situation.373

Perhaps this is similar to Wang and Qiao’s concept in Chapter One of creating 

the proper moment in time or destiny.

Degrading an Enemy’s High-Tech Intelligence and Reconnaissance Capability

In order to effectively utilize campaign stratagems, friendly forces first 

must neutralize or manipulate the enemy’s intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Then friendly forces must adapt to the 

characteristics of a battlefield informatization environment and correctly 

employ stratagems such as the divide-concentrate strategy to move the enemy, 

the use of direct-indirect strategies to surprise the enemy, or alternating the use 

of feints and real strategies to deceive the enemy. Finally, Chinese forces must 

find weaknesses in enemy high technology systems and exploit them.374

Weaknesses can include blind spots in battlefield coverage (based on area 

coverage capabilities, time, or resolution), frequency or environmental 

constraints of certain systems, analysis constraints or bottlenecks (based on 

acquisition, transmission, and processing factors) of various military cultures,

self-protection mechanisms or system stability factors of certain assets, and, 

most important of all, limitations on the decision-making capabilities of 

commanders. This latter point includes decision-maker problems such as 

understanding an enemy’s true intent and resolve, being oversaturated with 

information so that analysis cannot be promptly or properly developed, and an 

overdependence on technical measures that ignores other sources of 

information. Each of these factors could limit the subjective creativity and 

innovation of a decision-maker who becomes paralyzed in the decision-making 

process.375

Li feels that there are several flexible means that make it hard for 

enemy ISR to collect information. They include the use of mobile targets, 

disguising real targets and creating fake targets, creating countermeasures, and 

exploiting weaknesses in an enemy’s rapid reaction capability. One must study 

enemy reconnaissance patterns and learn to control blind spots, to deploy in a 

 

372 Ibid.

373 Ibid., p. 228.

374 Ibid., p. 229.

375 Ibid., pp. 229-232.
130

dispersed manner to avoid detection or make deceptive shows of force, to mix 

false information with true information (to include exploiting the news media 

and computer networks to spread false information), to create information 

pollution and other forms of interference with an opponent’s systems, and to 

imitate the features of real targets. The overall goal is to reduce the accuracy of 

an opponent’s analytical capabilities.376

New technological breakthroughs could affect campaign stratagems in 

several ways. These include the achievement of surprise or placing an opponent 

in a very passive position where negotiation or destruction would appear to be 

the only options available. Technologies include super high-speed equipment 

such as planes that can outrun missile defenses, smart or unmanned technology 

that can operate in polluted or alien environments, laser or high-powered 

microwave equipment that could dispose of an opponent’s space systems or 

electronic equipment, or digitized information technology that can offer better 

decision-making or knowledge options to the user. Developed during peacetime 

these technologies could catch an opponent unprepared.377

Creative operational methods put uncertainty in the minds of an 

opponent and this curtails their reaction time. Using multiple points of 

engagement along with irregular and non-linear forces and structures, 

respectively, also induce uncertainty. Friendly (Chinese) forces must take 

advantage of a quickened operational pace to throw an opponent off balance 

and to control battlefield initiative. They must select times and places most 

beneficial to friendly forces to strike weak points as appropriate. Network 

attacks, special operations, and strikes against an enemy rear area serve as 

indirect attacks in support of direct attacks.378

Manipulating Adversary Commanders

One section of Campaign Stratagems (perhaps the most important) is 

HOW to manipulate enemy commanders. The section opens by stating that not 

only high technologies, but also control theory, information theory, 

psychological theory, organization and behavioral theories, and the 

methodology of system engineering science are required to guide a campaign 

stratagem’s planning and execution. This includes rationally selecting 

campaign objectives and, most important of all, deductively devising stratagem 

 

376 Ibid., pp. 233-234.

377 Ibid., pp. 235- 236.

378 Ibid., pp. 237- 238.
131

information to control the “intelligence-judgment-decision” process of the 

enemy.

379

Li states that there are two ways to set campaign stratagem objectives. 

The first is to determine what kind of battlefield posture one intends to create 

through stratagem application. This is a core element of stratagem application. 

A battlefield posture should be developed in accordance with the needs of an 

operational method to enable its realization. This type of posture is different 

from an initial campaign posture and a final campaign posture. The second way 

to set objectives is to manipulate an adversary commander’s judgments and to 

decide which judgments and decisions to use to control the enemy. This 

objective posturing includes one’s own targets, enemy targets, and 

environmental targets. Targets are controlled (that is, deceived or manipulated) 

via the following models:

 Fortified control targets—support original judgments and decisions

of enemy commanders

 Transforming control targets—shake original judgments and 

develop new judgments and decisions for an enemy commander 

under one’s control

 Fuzzy control targets—increase fuzziness through excess 

information or contradictory information so that enemy 

commanders have trouble making correct judgments

 Compound control targets—use fortified-fuzzy types or 

transforming-fuzzy types together.380

To deductively devise stratagem information requires the meticulous 

preparation of special information. An information developer’s application of a 

stratagem requires the creation, transmission, receipt, and processing of 

information as the developer intends. Stratagem information is based on the 

development of specific information for different control targets. Fortifiedfuzzy control targets require three things: supporting information to affirm the 

correctness of an enemy’s judgment; interfering information of an independent 

or contradictory nature; and the blocking of key information concerning 

friendly intentions. For transforming-fuzzy type control targets one should alter 

enemy commanders’ original judgments. They must be fed negative 

information, supporting information, interfering information, and, as with 

fortified-fuzzy targets, key information must be blocked.381

 

379 Ibid., pp. 239- 240.

380 Ibid., p. 239.

381 Ibid., p. 240.
132

There is a recommended procedure to follow to prepare special 

information. First, enemy commanders must be convinced of the truthfulness 

and rationality of stratagem information. To do this the following process must 

be followed:

 Stratagem information must conform to the current situation and 

overall campaign posture.

 Supporting, interfering, negative, and other information categories 

must be logical and support one another.

 Information coming from different angles pointing to one judgment 

will enable a commander to draw a clear conclusion.

 Deceptive information should have 80-90% true information.382

Second, the developer of a stratagem must do everything possible to 

control the enemy’s method of intelligence analysis and processing. This will 

put the stratagem developer in sync with the enemy’s “intelligence-judgmentdecision” process and induce the enemy to make decisions as one would expect 

him to do. The stratagem must consider the following points:

 Take into consideration an enemy’s belief system, formed from 

knowledge structures, subjective leanings, method of thinking, and 

personality to meet concerns and needs and influence judgments.

 Take into account the enemy’s decision-making organizational 

mechanisms. Anticipate distortions and insert redundancy of key 

information. Influence the basic characteristics of key individuals 

and links such as the intelligence processing procedures of the 

enemy. 

 Take into account when sending out the first batch of stratagem 

information that it should be highly seductive and influential, 

followed by supporting information.

 Take into account political, superior/boss, and environmental 

pressures and their impact on decision-making.383

The proper means to create and transmit stratagem information must be 

developed and coordinated. Stratagem information should reflect the 

coordination among various deployments, actions, or intentions that the 

information represents. Actual conditions must be used, and the location and 

timing of stratagem information must be coordinated. Stratagem development 

 

382 Ibid., p. 241.

383 Ibid., p. 242.
133

and other campaign actions must also be coordinated to fit into an enemy 

commander’s comprehensive view of the battlefield.384

Transmission channels must be carefully controlled. Those channels 

that China controls completely, partially, or not at all are called white, gray, and 

black respectively. If black channels uncover friendly stratagems, then the 

stratagems can be used against friendly forces. This is the worst of outcomes, to 

fall into a counter-stratagem trap. The use of white channels that the enemy 

considers as reliable is the best for transmitting information. Further, 

We [China] must pay a lot of attention to the cultivation and 

development of reliable channels during peacetime so as to develop 

enemy trust in these channels and to transmit stratagem information 

during war time. Under high-tech conditions, a strong enemy tends to 

highly trust, and heavily rely on, high-tech intelligence reconnaissance 

means. Therefore we must pay close attention to the characteristics of 

the enemy’s high-tech reconnaissance means and study effective 

deceptive measures.385

Invariably, Li adds, some stratagem information will be distorted or lost due to 

an inability to properly predict certain subjective or objective responses. As a 

result multiple channels must always be utilized. In addition, feedback channels 

must be established to monitor the success or failure of the stratagem and to 

avoid having a counter stratagem developed by an enemy. 

Friendly forces must keep track of stratagem conditions concerning 

their execution; enemy reactions; and external interference. This requires 

setting up proper review and reporting mechanisms, establishing a battlefield 

environment monitoring system, and creating channels to monitor and control 

enemy reactions. This latter point concerns both direct and indirect feedback 

channels. Direct feedback channels include:

 Cracking of enemy core secret codes through technical means

 Penetrating enemy core information networks allowing access to 

confidential communications

 Special agents who have penetrated the enemy’s senior ranks

 Defectors from enemy core agencies.386

 

384 Ibid., p. 243.

385 Ibid., p. 245.

386 Ibid., p. 246.
134

Indirect feedback channels refer to knowledge concerning enemy reactions via 

active intelligence and reconnaissance activities, which requires meticulous 

analysis to allow information extraction and prevent counter-manipulation. 

Exploratory, special, and firepower reconnaissance are other indirect 

methods.387

Adjustment and control measures should be in place to measure and 

adapt to feedback. Based on perceived deviations in enemy reactions, 

adjustments should be made if the enemy has not received stratagem 

information, the enemy is not paying enough attention to stratagem 

(information channels utilized are not valued highly by the enemy, etc.), the 

enemy rejects stratagem information (conflicts with other information, etc.), the 

enemy misunderstands the stratagem (information doesn’t conform with the 

intelligence-judgment-decision process, etc.), or the enemy sees through a 

friendly stratagem.388

One control measure that Li recommends is the development of an 

authoritative institution that answers directly to the campaign commander and 

carries out the unified organization and coordination of campaign stratagem 

actions. This institution would plan stratagem application, de-conflict campaign 

stratagem actions and other campaign actions, organize stratagem’s execution, 

and take responsibility to coordinate with relevant departments regarding 

stratagem application.389

High-Tech Stratagem Applications: Commander Characteristics

The author of Chapter Nine of Campaign Stratagems, Liu Xubing, 

writes that an army general must understand all types of connections and be 

knowledgeable in many fields. Otherwise he cannot be a wise general and 

implement stratagems. He adds that a reasonable/rational knowledge 

foundation is formed from two layers. The first layer is basic science, which 

includes the philosophy of Marxism, the basic culture of science, and the basics 

of military affairs. The second layer is the expertise layer, which includes the 

theory of tactics, the science of military leadership, and the theory of military 

stratagem.390

 

387 Ibid.

388 Ibid., p. 247.

389 Ibid., p. 248.

390 Liu Xubing, “Demands on Campaign Commander Quality When Applying 

Stratagems under High-Tech Conditions,” in Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, 

Campaign Stratagems, National Defense University, 2002, p. 261.
135

Knowledge is respected in China as reflected in the maxim that “the 

source of stratagem is knowledge.” The military campaign is the most stringent 

test of a general’s knowledge, strategies, and dispositions. Campaign stratagem 

is a highly creative thought process that tries to deceive an enemy’s electronic 

eyes and ears. Instead of relying purely on the human brain, commanders now 

must rely on both human brains and computers. The computer allows 

commanders to control information after gathering, analyzing, and storing it.391

A sound stratagem is equated with half of the success of a campaign in 

Liu Xubing’s opinion. Computers and the Internet further enhance chances of 

success of the “advanced technological stratagem.”392 Advanced technological 

knowledge, in particular information theory and system theory, has added 

wings to campaign stratagems and increased the reliability, accuracy, and 

timeliness of the application of stratagems. Stratagems use the scientific way of 

thinking, which is a way “to analyze, design, research, manage, and control 

such a complicated system and provide the most optimized ways and 

methods.”393 It is first necessary to defeat an enemy by thinking and only later 

by action.394 Simultaneously, what is termed “psychological position exchange” 

must be accomplished. This means making a parallel comparison with the 

opponent’s thought processes in order to imagine what he would do and think, 

that is to put yourself in your opponent’s shoes.395

Conclusions 

The use of a stratagem indicates that a force understands what the other 

side is about and how it thinks. The Chinese believe that new battles of wits 

are on the horizon, battles which involve high-technology equipment, virtual 

deception, and stratagems. New technological breakthroughs can impact the 

overall goal of a campaign which is to reduce the accuracy of an opponent’s 

analytical capabilities. Operational stratagems may be pitted against strategic 

stratagems or an integrated operational/strategic stratagem may evolve that 

attempts to fool an opponent’s analytical capabilities at each of these levels. 

The overall goal will be to control an opponent’s “intelligence-judgmentdecision” process. The Chinese are aware that the US, for example, relies on 

high-technology reconnaissance means and thus an effort will be made to 

influence them.

 

391 Ibid., pp. 249-253.

392 Ibid., p. 255.

393 Ibid., p. 263.

394 Ibid., pp. 263-264.

395 Ibid., p. 265.
136

The use of high-tech stratagems in combination with other measures is 

something that US officials must be prepared to confront. According to Zhang 

and Zhang, the PLA is developing institutions to prepare and monitor the use of 

stratagems. The PLA actively studies the analytical processes of foreign 

militaries to apply the proper stratagem techniques against them. Stratagem 

techniques enable the PLA to create a situation that is favorable to them. They 

are preparing for future “battles of wits” now in peacetime.

Before stratagem techniques can be applied there must be a proper 

analysis of adversary decision-making processes and an in-depth knowledge of 

adversary culture and thought. It also requires an acquaintance with several 

types of thinking to include dialectical, logical, three-dimensional, 

unconventional, and associative thinking. An understanding of force 

disposition, or the force composition, battlefield environment, and campaign 

engagement methods of an adversary, is also crucial to stratagem application 

along with an understanding of wartime capabilities.

The three steps involved with utilizing campaign stratagems are 

neutralizing an enemy’s ISR assets, adapting stratagems to the informatization 

environment, and finding weaknesses in enemy high-technology systems and 

thought processes. Five elements associated with successful campaign 

stratagem development are speculation, craftiness, innovation, high 

effectiveness, and risks. Deceptive techniques remain the most important for 

stratagem implementation. They put uncertainty in the mind of adversary 

commanders and thus curtail reaction time.

It is important that US national security personnel understand that these 

military capabilities can be applied to political, economic, and other fields of 

study. There may well be Chinese institutes in existence now that are involved 

in the study of campaign stratagems to manipulate US financial flows or to 

create other disruptive situations. The US and its allies must prepare now for 

such eventualities.
137

CHAPTER SIX: THE SICHUAN PROVINCE EARTHQUKE: 

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATIZED WAR

This chapter summarizes the PLA’s crisis management response to the May 

2008 earthquake in Sichuan. This response was termed a non-war military 

action that practiced informatized-war concepts.

To develop informatized troops, thinking must not be conservative, troops must 

master diversified tasks, issues should be viewed from a strategic viewpoint, 

problems must be anticipated, and failures and mistakes should be immediately 

summarized and learned. Innovation will continue to drive the PLA.396

Introduction

Crisis management has long been a topic of interest to US analysts. For 

a host of reasons explained below, China’s interest in and approach to the topic 

has been slow, sporadic, and unusually secretive. The Chinese weekly journal 

Liaowang published an article addressing the country’s inadequate approach to 

crises in 2003:

A crisis is an emergency condition created by unusual events. For the 

longest time, a crisis has frequently been regarded as a kind of partial 

and random phenomenon, and the majority of them have been handled 

by methods of monitoring; but what is lacking is the necessary advance 

attention, preventative monitoring, and control along the entire length 

of the process. If we are not able to consider the problem of crises in 

terms of strategic national security, the result will be that some 

emergency incidents, that originally could have been avoided or 

controlled, will ultimately and regretfully evolve into one series after 

another of social or even national crises.397

 

396 Editorial Department, “A Great Historic Responsibility—Written When Major 

Phased Victory in Anti-quake Operation is Achieved,” Jiefangjun Bao, 4 July 2008, p. 

1 as translated downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080707710001.

397 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, “Controlling Crises—Expanding the Strategic 

Vision of National Security,” Liaowang, 12 May 2003, No. 19, pp. 23-25, as translated 

and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20030522000092.
138

It is ironic that this article was published on the same day (May 12) but five 

years before the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.

Today domestic challenges in the form of natural disasters (floods, 

chemical spills, earthquakes, and nuclear accidents) and social and religious

unrest have served as motivators for China to rework its crisis management 

system, which they have done. A prime example is the 2005 “Regulations for 

Military Participation in Disaster Rescue” that outlined precisely what was 

expected of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in times of emergency. 

Another motivating factor was information age capabilities which have 

improved the PLA response mechanism. Simultaneously, however, the 

information age has enabled average citizens to receive images of a disaster or 

news instantaneously via text messaging or cell phone videos, thus prohibiting 

government secrecy in its prior form and further motivating a reform of China’s 

crisis management system. 

Currently the Chinese appear to view crisis management as a type of 

non-combat operation that has links to informatized warfare. This is because 

non-war military tasks possess a “high degree of similarity and commonality 

with informatized war. Only by possessing the core military capability of 

winning local wars under informatized conditions will there be an abundant 

capability foundation for completing other military tasks.”398 Some of the core 

military capabilities referred to are satellite technology, GPS systems, and other 

high-technology devices that have enabled the PLA to become a modernized, 

high-tech force. These same assets enable the PLA to combat natural disasters 

in a high-tech fashion. Such advances allowed for a high-technology response 

to the Sichuan earthquake and enhanced information security preparations for 

the Olympic Games. Further, the conduct of military non-war operations 

associated with disaster management enhances military preparedness.

This chapter will look at the development of China’s crisis 

management regulations and activities over the past few years. It will begin 

with a short historical perspective on the topic and then proceed to outline 

China’s adjustments to its crisis management system in the recent past. It will 

conclude with a look at China’s military response to the Sichuan Province 

major earthquake (also referred to as the Wenchuan earthquake, the county in 

which major damage occurred) of May 2008 and to the information age 

technologies that supported it.

 

398 Jie Zhengxuan, acronym for the PLA General Political Department’s Propaganda 

Bureau, “Engrave Loyalty to the Mission on the Earthquake-Fighting and Disaster 

Relief Battlefield,” Jiefangjun Bao, 3 July 2008, p. 6, as translated and downloaded 

from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080703710001.
139

Studying China’s crisis management system is important. It provides 

insights into the organizations, rules, and thought processes that the US will 

have to cooperate or contend with during a US-Chinese incident or over issues 

related to Taiwan. The study of the Sichuan earthquake crisis management 

incident, a remarkable PLA achievement for which the armed forces should be 

rightly proud, revealed that recent crisis management adaptations appear to be 

working. On the other hand, there remains a strong propaganda overtone to the 

Chinese understanding of transparency during such operations. Some old 

traditions live on.

A Short Historical Perspective

For over 50 years now, the US and China have faced off over Taiwan. 

This means that crisis management in one form or another has played a role in 

both sides’ negotiating strategy for many years. However, China has been slow 

getting off the mark with a crisis management system and organization that is 

visible and consistent. 

Xia Liping, Director and Research Fellow at the Center for 

International Strategic Studies, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, 

wrote an interesting article on US and Chinese crisis management techniques in 

2003. Xia explains how the US and China might work together in the crisis 

management field. He outlines five categories that require a good crisis 

management mechanism, categories into which crises might be divided:

The first category includes crises that arose from conflicts in China’s 

periphery. One example is the Korean War. The second consists of 

crises ignited by the Taiwan question, such as the Taiwan Strait crises 

of 1955, 1958, and 1996. The third category is made up of crises 

caused by incidents such as the plane collision incident of 2001 and the 

embassy bombing incident of 1999. The fourth category consists of 

crises that arose over a domestic matter within China, such as the June 

4 incident of 1989. The fifth category includes crises that arose over 

disputes involving the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons.399

 

399 Xia Liping, “Theory and Practice of Crisis Management in the United States—SinoUS Relations as Example,” Beijing Meiguo Yanjiu, 5 June 2003, No. 2, pp. 73-86, as 

translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20030715000184. 
140

Since China and the US differ widely in culture, values, strategy, 

policy, and decision-making mechanisms, it is difficult to imagine a process 

acceptable to both countries. However, Xia believes important issues to 

consider in handling crises can be divided into three areas: first, that neither 

side humiliates the other or sets one’s ambitions too high. The other side’s vital 

interests must be accommodated when possible; second, that signals must be 

clear and interpreted correctly; and third, a crisis management mechanism must 

be developed amenable to coordination and proper information transmission. A 

set of decision-making procedures, rules of operation, and contingency plans 

must be put in place to serve as an information communication mechanism 

between China and the US.400 In short, China and the US need to develop a 

crisis co-management system. However a crisis co-management system was not 

possible in 2003 when Xia wrote his article. China had no crisis management 

mechanism in place. Now two and a half years later China has started

developing the organizations, mechanisms, and legal apparatus appropriate for 

crisis management discussions.

A turning point regarding formalizing the natural disaster and crisis 

management relationship appears to be the 2003 Sixteenth National Congress 

of the Communist Party of China. It was decided that China needed a 

comprehensive mechanism of warnings and emergency responses. The actual 

building of these systems, mechanisms, and laws would begin in 2003. In May 

2004 the General Office of the State Council directed that the provinces must 

formulate their own master plans for emergencies. In July 2005 the State 

Council held a national emergency management conference. The first draft of 

the Law for Emergency Incidents and States of Emergency was developed as 

well.401

Chu Xiaobo was a Professor at the School of International Studies at 

Beijing University when he wrote on crisis management in 2005. He discusses

why China needs an updated crisis management system. He believes that China 

has entered a period of social crisis fostered by four issues: the convergence of 

old and new systems; an accelerated pace of development; the requirement to 

synchronize Chinese actions with the globalization movement; and the 

recognition of crisis consciousness apathy on the part of government officials 

and the people. As a result China can no longer be passive in responding to 

crises nor can it address crises as they occur. A warning, response, and recovery 

system must be established.402

 

400 Ibid.

401 Chu Xiaobo, “An Urgently Needed Crisis Management System for China,” China 

and World Affairs, No. 1, 2005, pp. 140-141.

402 Ibid., p. 140. 
141

Chu believes a crisis is identified in the following way:

Only events which threaten the fundamental construct of society, its 

values and its regulatory structure, and which occur when people must 

make critical decisions during periods of great temporal stress and 

uncertain circumstances such as natural disasters, disastrous accidents, 

public health incidents, and social security incidents.403

Crisis management, on the other hand, Chu notes should 

not only entail responding to emergencies after they occur but should 

be a complete operational mechanism for the various stages of an 

emergency prior to an incident, the onset of an incident, during the 

progression of an incident, and following an incident. It should 

specifically involve a series of issues, such as gaining precise control 

over crisis prevention, prediction and warning, crisis information 

reporting and dissemination, situational control, and reducing losses; 

post crisis revival and reconstruction; and the summation of 

experiences and lessons learned.404

These new systems and laws are being enacted, it should be pointed 

out, while China is changing from autarky to an integration philosophy with 

world markets; and from being a peasant-based society to a large-scale 

urbanized society. In the past the compartmentalization of government agencies 

made it more difficult for people to organize themselves and get correct 

guidance. Without organization people become apathetic and difficult to 

motivate, leaving crises for the government to handle.405 

This situation requires that China’s leadership recognize the need for 

further improvements and additions in the powers and responsibilities between 

government and local government, among government agencies, and between 

the government and the people. Procedures must be public and transparent, Chu 

underscores, and supervision and assessments need to be evidence-based. These 

various realms of crisis management must be legally regulated as well from the 

perspective of the rule of law to help avoid abuses of power.406

 

403 Ibid., pp. 141-142.

404 Ibid.

405 Ibid., pp. 144-145.

406 Ibid., p. 149.
142

According to Chu China needs to place its emphasis on the following 

areas: more emphasis on academic research; more individual government 

agencies working openly; more references available to individual government 

agencies and regions; and more lessons learned from different national realms. 

The need for a crisis management database organized at the national level is 

also mentioned. A keen watch on new crisis management trends should also be 

maintained.407 Chu believes that with the experiences of the Olympics in 2008 

in Beijing and the World Expo in 2010 in Shanghai that China will have a 

structural, legal, and mechanistic framework for crisis management in place 

within ten years, or by 2015.408

In February of 2006 China established a National Control Center for 

Coordinating Disaster Operations. The center has five functional departments 

and it intends to work out contingency plans for various potential accidents. 

The center hopes to publicize proper steps to take in case of large-scale

accidents and thus help the self-protection capabilities of ordinary citizens. In 

2005 in China there were 803,571 reported accidents resulting in 136,755 

deaths. Traffic accidents were the leading cause followed by coal-mining 

deaths.409

Also in February of 2006 it was announced that the television program 

“24 Hours” would return for a second season. The show is dedicated to crisis 

management and shows how staff at the Emergency Management Center 

(EMC) teaches people to escape natural disasters and overcome crises. The TV 

series highlights fictional stories based on real life.410

Recent Crisis Management Measures

Events of the recent past have brought crisis management situations 

into sharp focus for the Chinese leadership. The severe acute respiratory 

syndrome (SARS) epidemic of 2003, combined with the benzene spill in the 

Songhua River in 2005, frequent coal mining disasters and floods, and recent 

social unrest all have enhanced the importance of the topic. However, the 

information age has also played a key role in promoting changes to China’s 

crisis management system since technology has made it more difficult to keep 

 

407 Ibid., p. 153.

408 Ibid., p. 156.

409 Feng Yun, “Center Set Up for Disaster Operations,” Beijing China Daily (Internet 

Version-WWW), 0019 GMT 22 February 2006, as translated and downloaded from the 

Open Source Center website, document number CPP20060222052020.

410 “China’s Ground-Breaking TV Series on Crisis Management Returns for Second 

Run,” Beijing Xinhua, 1459 GMT, 9 February 2006, as translated and downloaded 

from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20060209074025.
143

crises secret. China’s citizens want immediate answers from their leaders on

developing situations that threaten their survival and that of their friends and 

relatives.

Zhong Kaibin, a Ph.D. candidate at Tsinghua University, wrote a very 

enlightening article on China’s past and present crisis management system in 

the Winter 2007 edition of China Security. Focusing mainly on China’s civilian 

crisis management system, it is without a doubt one of the best articles on the 

topic to date. Zhong lists ten problems with the system:

1. A lack of clarity about the roles that different levels and sectors 

should play

2. The persistence of self-interests among government players that 

place limitations on state actions where bureaucratic authority 

remains fragmented into horizontal and vertical power structures

3. Structural inefficiencies that result in an inability to create a clear 

crisis management system

4. A lack of clarity in the reporting process that discourages timely 

and accurate reporting

5. Legislative measures that inhibit effective communication both 

among government entities and with Chinese citizens (such as the 

over-classification of issues)

6. The failure to institute an atmosphere promoting accountability and 

transparency (officials reporting to superiors rather than to the 

people they govern)

7. The existence of power disparities and conflicts of interest between 

government and bureaucratic agencies

8. A lack of adaptability due to a dependence on an outdated national 

defense mobilization system

9. Tensions between a system designed to control and manage

information and a society that is “wired” with access to more 

information than officials allow

10. The absence of an integrated command and control system, listed 

by Zhong as the predominant problem.411

As a result of these problems, China’s responses to past crises have 

been wrapped in measures designed to deny or conceal them or to simply react

without prior planning. Zhong notes that the former encourages the latter. If 

you don’t have to deny incidents then there is less need to worry about planning 

 

411 Zhong Kaibin, “Crisis Management in China,” China Security, Winter, 2007, pp. 92-

96.
144

for them. Instead of planning that could have included preemptive measures,

simple reaction in secrecy was enough until the introduction of information age

technologies to the citizenry. In fact, Zhong notes, the reactions became 

propaganda opportunities for slogans such as “love the people—deliver water,” 

exhortations of medical personnel as “angels in white coats,” and the 

maintenance of an overall posture of “internal vigilance and outward calm.”412

Government Inspired Change

However, change is underway. Chinese officials have recognized that 

the development of a sound emergency system is linked to the development of 

a harmonious society, the latter a necessity in any Chinese response. Several 

mechanisms have been put in place since 2003 following the SARS virus scare. 

In 2005, for example, the State Council created a national plan for emergency 

responses. Emergencies are graded according to severity and emergency levels. 

The latter is further subdivided into natural disasters, public health incidents, 

and social security crises.413 In addition to this plan the government developed a

national level Emergency Management Office (EMO) in December 2005 to 

help with planning and response mechanisms.

414

Eight legal initiatives have also been implemented. The first initiative is

an amendment to China’s constitution that replaces the term martial law with 

“states of emergency.” This allows the President to declare states of emergency 

and increases opportunities for state funding for specific crises. Second, 

legislation has enabled the creation of emergency management system 

procedures. Third, all national and provincial departments must have a news 

spokesperson. Fourth, natural disaster fatalities will no longer be classified at 

both the national and provincial levels. Fifth, emergency management issues 

are allowed on the government’s official website as of 1 January 2006. Sixth, 

scientific research and technical training programs are undergoing revision. 

Seventh, measures for a more accountable and transparent government response 

in time of crisis have been created. Finally, more collaboration with the 

international community is encouraged.415

Zhong believes that China’s new leadership is eager to introduce 

reforms and exert its authority to control crises. Much work still remains, 

however. Zhong notes that the government needs to shift its approach toward 

prevention issues and the development of a strong structural system. Further, 

 

412 Ibid., p. 97.

413 Ibid., p. 98.

414 Ibid., pp. 98-99.

415 Ibid., pp. 99-100.
145

China must continue to encourage collaboration between multiple levels of 

government and agencies, and China must promote a sound emergency 

response that builds better social capital (getting more citizens to participate 

builds better social capital!). This latter point will require more interaction with 

non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

A Military Look at Crisis Management

The PLA has often been involved in the management and eventual 

solving of crises in China. Therefore it is no surprise that the Academy of 

Military Science’s 2001 book The Science of Military Strategy devoted a small 

section to crisis control. A crisis, authors Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi 

note, is “a state of danger in which there is the possibility of confrontation or 

military conflict between or among nations or political groups.”

416 It is also the 

outcome of the intensification of contradictions between two or more players. A 

crisis could turn into a war at any time. Therefore it is important to always 

strive for establishing and improving upon a nation’s crisis control 

mechanism.417 Internal crises were not mentioned in the book even though the

PLA is a major support element for most internal crises.

US military joint publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, defines a crisis and crisis management as

Crisis—an incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its 

territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that 

develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, 

political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and 

resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 3-0)418

Crisis Management—measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of 

resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act 

of terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally 

executed under federal law. Also called CrM. (JP 3-28)419

 

416 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, editors, The Science of Military Strategy, Military 

Science Publishing House, Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army, English version, 2005, p. 202.

417 Ibid., pp. 202-203.

418 Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Internet 

version, updated through 30 May 2008, p. 141, located at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

419 Ibid.
146

In Peng and Yao’s book, the term “crisis control” is used instead of 

crisis management. It is defined as “the control of tense political and military 

situations caused by the intensified contradictions of national interests.” It is an 

initiative taken by a crisis management subject to control various uncertain and 

unstable factors in the whole process of crisis.420

Peng and Yao note that a crisis is a dynamic process that goes through 

stages of inception, escalation, de-escalation, and termination. With regard to 

crisis control strategy, they list five aspects: 

 Develop confidence-building measures in peacetime to prevent the 

emergence of a crisis (periodical meetings of high-ranking 

officials, notices of military exercises, regular meetings on border

issues, and hot line links)421

 Increase transparency and information exchanges (make the 

following items public: diplomatic policy, military strategy, 

defense strength, troop buildups, and state of readiness figures that 

do not endanger national security)422

 Enhance personnel exchanges and contacts (hot lines, mutual visits, 

etc.)

 Develop joint disarmament and arms control mechanisms (maintain 

the strategic balance and control the arms race)

 Lay down regulations and set up supervisory organizations 

(develop scientific norms and supervisory organizations to ensure 

regulations are practiced).

423

If all of these mechanisms fail and the crisis is inevitable, then 

negotiations must ensue to hold off the crisis, prevent its escalation, and 

promote its termination.424 Principles of crisis control include finding an 

intersection point for the interests of both sides, compromising as appropriate 

without concession, keeping uninterrupted communication with each side open,

and adopting coercive measures (weapon embargos, economic sanctions, and 

military blockades) as required to prevent negative influences.425 In short, 

“dialogue is better than confrontation, political settlement is better than 

settlement by force or threat of force, and preventive controls are more 

 

420 Peng and Yao, p. 202.

421 Ibid., p. 203.

422 Ibid., pp. 203-204.

423 Ibid., p. 204.

424 Ibid.

425 Ibid., pp. 205-206.
147

desirable than coercive ones.”426 From a western point of view, most analysts 

would agree with Peng and Yao. US politicians would most likely hope that 

such ideas are made part of both Chinese and US views of crisis management 

matters.

The 2005 Military Regulation on Disasters

In 2005 the State Council and Central Military Commission of China 

wrote a military regulation designed to better control crises. The “Regulations 

on Military Participation in Disaster Relief” serves both as a military statue and 

as a national defense mobilization law for the PLA. Composed of 18 articles, it 

represents the “first law that has been issued since the founding of New China 

to standardize the military’s participation in disaster rescue efforts. The disaster 

rescue rules bring the military’s fulfillment of its mission of disaster rescue 

onto the legal track.”427 The rules focus on the following four areas:

 Standardizing coordination between the military and civilian aspect 

of government when the military participates in disaster rescues

 Providing explicit stipulations on the power and the procedures for 

arranging military forces and a joint command between the civilian 

government and the military

 Providing explicit stipulations on guarantees regarding

preparations, expenses, and supplies of materials and apparatuses 

for disaster rescue

 Providing a legal foundation for the establishment of an emergency 

mechanism for combating natural disasters.

428

Three articles in the regulation are of particular importance and have 

direct applicability to the PLA’s coverage of the Sichuan earthquake. First, the 

armed forces are directed to accomplish the following tasks in Article 3: 

 Rescue, transfer, or evacuate stranded personnel 

 Protect the safety of important targets 

 Rescue and transport important goods and materials 

 Participate in specialized emergency rescue work, including 

emergency road repair, marine search and rescue, nuclear-

 

426 Ibid., p. 206.

427 “Legal Basis for Troops’ Participation in Disaster Relief,” Jiefangjun Bao, 21 June 

2005, p. 1, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, 

document number CPP200506221000093.

428 Ibid.
148

biological-chemical rescue, epidemic situation control, and medical 

relief 

 Eliminate or control other significant dangers and disastrous 

situations and, if necessary, assist local people’s governments in 

advancing reconstruction work after the disaster.429

An analysis of newspaper coverage of the earthquake (still to come in this 

chapter) offers a look at whether the PLA accomplished these tasks.

Second, the regulation notes in Article 12 that “the local people’s 

governments and the troops carrying out disaster relief tasks shall share 

information about epidemic situations with each other and jointly undertake 

sanitation and epidemic prevention work.”430 Thus it appears that efforts to 

control information and state secrets are now less strict than in the past. In fact 

residents were told the opposite, to “share information.” 

Finally, in Article 15 of the regulation the following was reported:

The propagation and coverage of significant disaster relief operations 

participated in by the army shall be organized and implemented 

uniformly by competent authorities of the state and the army. News 

agencies conducting interviews and reports on disaster relief operations 

participated in by the army shall observe relevant regulations stipulated 

by the state and the army.431

Two Recent US-Chinese Military Crises

In addition to responding to natural disasters, China must have 

contingency plans prepared to respond to real world crises. Two such crises 

have arisen with the US, both coming before the implementation of the 2005 

crisis management regulation. However the incidents remain important for 

lessons learned.

Writing in 2007, Chinese analyst Wu Xinbo discussed Chinese crisis 

management techniques against the US in two specific and fairly recent

military incidents. Wu is a professor and deputy director of the Center for 

American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. He notes that China 

 

429 Text of regulations provided by the “regulations” page of the Jiefangjun Bao

website, translated and downloaded from Open Source Center website, document 

number CPP20061003325003.

430 Ibid.

431 Ibid.
149

exhibited five features in its responses to two crises with the US: the US Air 

Force’s accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 

May 1999 during the conflict over Kosovo; and the 1 April 2001 mid-air

collision between a US EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese F-8 fighter over the South 

China Sea. The features China displayed were: paying attention to assigning 

responsibility for the crisis, emphasizing sovereignty and national dignity,

appreciating symbolic gestures greatly, responding relatively slowly, and 

placing the Foreign Ministry in charge of crisis management.432 (Wu used the 

term management instead of control in his article)

First, China attempts to find out who is responsible for a crisis. If China

believes the other side is at fault, it will ask for reparations to fix the situation. 

Second, national dignity is very important to China since it was humiliated by 

the West and Japan during its recent history (“recent” is from the beginning of 

the twentieth century). Third, since national dignity is so important, Beijing 

may pay more attention to symbolic gestures than to substantive issues. Fourth, 

China’s relatively slow response may be due to the slow flow of information 

within the Chinese system and the implementation of an ad hoc crisis 

management system for each new crisis. Finally, with regard to having a 

Foreign Ministry spokesman, there is good and bad news. The good news is 

that there is only one voice speaking. The bad news is that, due to the lack of a 

good coordination mechanism, the spokesman may not get all the necessary 

information he or she requires.433

Wu recommends in his conclusions that the US and China set up some 

channel of communication ahead of time to handle such future crises. He also 

recommends quiet diplomacy over public diplomacy and keeping in mind a 

broader picture of bilateral relations when dealing with one another in crisis 

situations, thereby avoiding any temptation by one side or the other to seek 

excessive near-term gains and causing irrevocable damage to Chinese-US 

relations.

434

Also of interest for researchers and policy makers is Wu’s listing of 

sources for further study. He cites the Center for Crisis Management Studies at 

China’s Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in Beijing, 

for example. Such centers should provide a nice meeting point for countries to 

carry out Wu’s recommendation for developing channels of communication for 

further study of crisis management mechanisms. 

 

432 Wu Xinbo, “Understanding Chinese and US Crisis Behavior,” The Washington 

Quarterly, Winter 2007-08, p. 71.

433 Ibid., p. 72.

434 Ibid., p. 74.
150

The PLA’s Response to the Sichuan Earthquake of May 2008

The photos of the PLA’s earthquake relief effort on the pages of 

journals such as PLA Pictorial or National Defense tell the story of an armed 

force dedicated to mission success. The officers and soldiers responded 

professionally to the earthquake in a very short time to rescue survivors, bury 

the dead, provide tents for the homeless, and clear away debris to begin the 

rebuilding process. Photography from the stricken region shows vividly the 

difficulties in terrain elevation and harsh weather conditions under which the 

PLA operated. Soldiers marched miles with food bags on their backs and 

formed human chains to move people from isolated areas to safety. Measures 

for medical care, the control of epidemics, and the maintenance of law and 

order were also worked out. China should be proud of the response of its 

military.

To US listeners of National Public Radio (NPR), it appeared that the 

Chinese press coverage of the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008 was a fairly 

transparent event that offered a look at a contemporary PLA crisis management 

operation. By chance NPR had reporters in the area when the earthquake struck,

and these reporters had some access to local citizens. The Chinese press, on the 

other hand, did a good job of not just covering the stories of human interest but 

also in covering the PLA’s high-technology response. 

Before the Quake: Preparatory News Articles

Zhong Kaibin noted that the PRC has revamped its crisis management 

system and is working to improve its function and utility in several ways. The 

military did not fall behind in this matter and appeared to implement some of 

the 2005 “Regulations on Military Participation in Disaster Relief” in Sichuan. 

Here are some news reports in 2008 before the quake that support this fact:

1. On 18 February, Zhongguo Guofang Bao reported that the city of 

Ningbo had proceeded with its merger of military command centers 

and government emergency management centers. A combined 

military and civilian underground command center allows for 

sharing information among government offices, public security 

departments, and frontline troops. Reportedly the center has nine 

systems, to include a command automation system, a 

communication system, a closed-circuit television monitoring and 

control system, and a support system.435

 

435 “Summary: Ningbo City Merges Military, Civilian Emergency Command Centers,” 

Zhongguo Guofang Bao (Internet Version-WWW) in Chinese, 18 February 2008, as 
151

2. On 18 February, Jiefangjun Bao reported that troop capabilities in 

anti-disaster and relief work were being honed. Reporters were told 

how troops had responded to the heavy snow and sleet that had hit 

southern China a few weeks earlier. They made maps for relief 

work and repaired communication lines or used back-pack satellite 

telephones while waiting for repairs. Units also established a 

disaster information system with civilian units in order to get real 

time information to disaster-stricken areas.436

3. Qiu Yanhan, a delegate to the March 2008 Communist Party 

Conference in Beijing, proposed the establishment of a Permanent 

National Command for Emergency Management at one of the 

sessions. Such an institution would have five parts: first, the 

Legislative Suggestion and Routine Management Center to 

command, coordinate, operate, and manage emergencies; second, 

the Command and Coordination Center to work out preplans for 

handling national emergencies and to impose a unified command; 

third, the Monitoring and Situation Prediction Center to conduct 

monitoring, prediction analysis, and risk assessment of 

emergencies; fourth, the Training and Supervision Center to 

provide guidance to ministries and commissions as well as 

emergency response training and examinations; and fifth, the 

Resources Planning and Management center to mobilize and 

organize social forces, arrange and store materials, conduct postdisaster recovery and reconstruction, and so on.437

China’s Immediate Response—May 2008

In May 2008 the PLA’s rescue and disaster relief organization swung 

into high gear. Movement of PLA forces and resources near Sichuan began on 

the day the earthquake struck (12 May) and some reached the region within 24 

hours. Other forces from more distant regions began to arrive on the 13th and 

14th.

 

translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080221711004.

436 Wang Yongxiao and Li Yongfei, “SAF Base Hones Troops’ Capabilities in AntiDisaster and Relief Work,” Jiefangjun Bao (WWW-Text), 18 February 2008, as 

translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080221702009.

437 Qian Xiaohu and Yang Zurong, “Delegate Proposes to Establish a Permanent 

National Command for Emergency Management,” Jiefangjun Bao (WWW-Text), 4 

March 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, 

document number CPP20080305702006.
152

On the evening of 14 May, the State Council deployed 70 helicopters 

and 30 transport planes to the disaster region. More than 1170 wounded were 

evacuated that day. On 15 May, as rain stopped in the earthquake area, air 

rescue units conducted operations that were reported to be the largest in 

Chinese history. The rescue operation utilized airborne troops, air drops, and 

helicopter landings. Some 4,000 paratroops were taken to the disaster region.

The State Council announced that rescue units had reached all 58 towns and 

townships severely hit by the earthquake.438

One of the first reports about technological support referenced satellite 

repositioning on 16 May. The Xian Satellite Monitoring and Control Center 

shifted to its emergency response mode to “ensure the security of the operations 

of fifteen satellites of nine types.”439 It was reported that in the four days after 

the quake, the center input more than 10,000 emergency application orders to 

ensure continuous coverage.440

On 17 May it was reported that the PLA Quake Relief Command 

Group held its third meeting since the quake. Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of the 

Central Military Commission (CMC), analyzed the current situation, made 

plans for future work, and instructed troops to follow Chairman Hu Jintao’s 

instructions (following the latter’s trip to the area). General Staff Chief Chen 

Bingde, head of the PLA Quake Relief Command Group, encouraged troops to 

stay well organized and efficient. The prevention of epidemics was highlighted 

along with opening blocked roads, performing logistic support work, and 

transporting supplies.441

Also on 17 May Zhongguo Xinwen She reported on eight new kinds of 

search and rescue techniques. These included vertical drilling, slant hole 

 

438 Hou Yongde, “Chinese Military Took Actions Simultaneously in Three Ways to 

Perform Air Rescue Mission on the Largest Scale in History,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, 

1217 GMT 15 May 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20080515338016.

439 Sun Haixia, “China’s 15 Satellites of Nine Types Provide Support for Dealing with 

the Quake and Providing Relief to Disaster Victims,” Xinhua Domestic Service, 0435 

GMT 16 May 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20080516716009.

440 Ibid.

441 Cao Zhi, “PLA Quake Relief Command Group Further Studied Rescue and Relief 

Work—Xu Caihou Attended the Meeting and Delivered a Speech,” Xinhua AsiaPacific Service, 1359 GMT 17 May 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open 

Source Center website, document number CPP20080517136019.
153

digging, and crawlspace searches. The methods were developed by the Second 

Artillery Corps’ engineering regiment.442

On 18 May the China Daily reported how China’s Beidou-Compass 

Satellite Navigation and Communication System had helped the armed forces 

to navigate and how it had offered message communication services where 

other communication means had been destroyed. The first team into the area 

from Beijing (entering on 15 May) had 20 cell-phone-like terminals.443 On 18 

May a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Defense made his first 

appearance (ever) to announce information on what the armed forces were 

doing in the area. The spokesman’s appearance indicates that China’s legal 

announcement of improvements to the crisis management system (reported 

above by Zhong Kaibin that all national agencies must have a spokesman) is in 

fact being implemented. At the briefing, held by the State Council Information 

Office, reporters were briefed on the PLA’s work in the area of the quake. Yao 

Yonzhu, a researcher at the Academy of Military Science, stated that the 

spokesman’s appearance indicates that the armed forces are establishing an 

image of self-confidence and responsibility among the people.444 On 20 May a 

reporter wrote that China’s quick response indicated an increasing maturity in 

setting up an emergency management system. The transparent response has 

helped prevent widespread panic and maintain social order. Sending Premier 

Wen Jiabao immediately to the region also demonstrated the leadership’s 

immediate focus on the problem area, the reported noted.

445

Unofficial statistics indicate that by 1200 on 18 May, 113,080 PLA and 

Armed Police troops had been dispatched to the area; 1,069 aircraft sorties were 

flown; 92 military trains were dispatched; and 78,000 metric tons of materials 

were transported to the region. In addition, 21,566 people were pulled from the 

 

442 Xia Hongqing and Wang Yongxiao, “Second Artillery Corps’ Creative Search and 

Rescue Makes Show of Force in Beichuan Earthquake Relief Effort,” Zhongguo 

Xinwen She, 1317 GMT 17 May 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open 

Source Center website, document number CPP20080517136015.

443 Wang Xu, “Beidou Satellite System Delivers,” China Daily (Internet VersionWWW), 0008 GMT 18 May 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source 

Center website, document number CPP20080518968005.

444 Hao Yalin, Chang Lu, and Wang Yushan, “Spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of 

National Defense Makes First Appearance at a News Briefing to Announce Information 

on the Armed Forces,” Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service, 1403 GMT 18 May 2008, as 

translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080518163008.

445 Ding Yuanzhu, “Crisis Management Ideas Come of Age,” China Daily (Internet 

Version-WWW), 0005 GMT 20 May 2008, as translated and downloaded from the 

Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080510968040.
154

rubble; 34,051 people were provided medical treatment; 205,371 earthquake 

victims and tourists were transferred to other locations; 301 metric tons of 

material were airdropped; and 557 kilometers of roads were repaired.446

On 19 May Zhongguo Guofang Bao reported that government bodies 

were to coordinate with national defense mobilization commissions (reserve 

forces) and the people’s armed forces departments dedicated to help keep forces 

rolling into the area and supporting relief operations. Disaster relief troops from 

the Beijing, Nanjing, and Jinan Military Regions already on-station need this 

support.447 That same day Senior Colonel Hu Changming, the Ministry of 

Defense spokesman, along with other General Staff Department chiefs, held a 

press conference in the State Council Information Office to brief the country on 

the earthquake relief effort. He noted that the Chengdu, Jinan, Lanzhou, 

Beijing, and Guangzhou military regions as well as forces from the Navy, the 

Air Force, the Second Artillery Corps, and the People’s Armed Police Force 

had participated in the relief effort. More than 110,000 transportation vehicles 

and generators were transported to the region along with 115 medical teams and

anti-epidemic and psychological emergency response teams. Over 3,319,000 

pieces of clothing, food, warfare rescue medication, and tents were 

distributed.448

Apparently a four-tier response mechanism was established: the 

military earthquake resistance and disaster relief command center; the joint 

earthquake resistance and disaster relief command center in the Chengdu 

Military Region (MR); the command center for each jurisdiction; and the 

operational and disaster relief forces. Additionally, five jurisdictions were 

created. Ma Jian, deputy chief of the Operations Department of the General 

Staff Headquarters, briefed the military deployment for the earthquake. This 

was the first time one can remember the PLA providing such a briefing. Ma did 

so using a map that had five circles drawn for the five jurisdictions. The first 

jurisdiction covered the Wenchuan, Lixian, Maoxian, Yingxiu, and Dujiangyan 

counties and townships with 23,950 servicemen from Jinan MR and some from 

the Chengdu MR. The second jurisdiction covered Chongzhou and Pengzhou 

counties with 11,792 servicemen from the Jinan MR. The third jurisdiction 

 

446 Hao, Chang, and Wang.

447 Shen Yan, “Provide Strong Support to Disaster Relief Troops,” Zhongguo Guofang 

Bao Online, 19 May 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20080626711002.

448 China View News, “For the First Time China Releases its Military Deployment for 

the Earthquake Relief,” Zhongguo Pinglun Tongxun She (WWW-Text), 19 May 2008, 

as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080519436001.
155

covered Shenfang and Deyang counties with 14,290 servicemen from the air 

force, marines, and some Chengdu MR troops. The fourth jurisdiction covered

the Beichuan, Mianzhu, and Anxian counties with 8,838 servicemen from the 

Chengdu MR and the Second Artillery Corps. The fifth and final jurisdiction 

covered Pingwu and Qingchuan counties with 25,082 servicemen from 

undisclosed units covering an undisclosed area. The Armed Police reportedly 

had 25,770 people involved in the relief operation.449

Poor construction of the non-government buildings in the region caused 

intense criticism from concerned citizens. They felt that government buildings 

were better constructed than school houses, which led to the deaths of many 

students. Corner-cutting, corruption, and lack of government oversight were 

named as well. A suggestion for the future was to ensure that whoever was 

responsible for the construction of a building was identified as well as those 

who managed the construction. It was suggested that a plaque with the names 

of these responsible individuals be placed on each building.

On 22 May a Jiefangjun Bao report noted that the Communications 

Department of the General Staff, under the command of Chen Dong, ordered 

emergency-response plans to be activated shortly after the 12 May quake. This 

included the activation of satellite phones, faxes, and other data communication 

means. At 1520 on 12 May China Central TV opened a reserve image 

transmission channel in the Beijing-Chengdu direction. By 1800 on 14 May 

3,000 hand-crank electric generators and 2,000 satellite phones had been issued 

to the Chengdu MR.450 

Luo Yuan, deputy director of the World Military Research Department 

of the Academy of Military Sciences, and research fellows Li Xiaodong and Yu 

Xiaopeng discussed militarized rescue under conditions of a major natural 

disaster. They stated that the toughest challenge comes from meeting the 

demands for rapid, effective, and accurate fulfillment of various tasks. They 

noted that establishing quick response times, making correct decisions, and 

offering accurate information are as important as accumulating material 

supplies for victims.451

 

449 Ibid.

450 “Beijing Calling Wenchuan!” Jiefangjun Bao, 22 May 2008, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080523088003.

451 Bie Tuolun and Bao Guojun, “On Militarized Rescue in Major Natural Disasters,” 

Jiefangjun Bao (WWW-Text), 1019 GMT 26 May 2008, as translated and downloaded 

from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080527705004.
156

Measuring Achievements and Continuing the Response—June 2008

In early June Chinese reporters began noting some of the PLA’s 

achievements in restoring normalcy to the earthquake region, an area described 

as three times the size of Taiwan or some 100,000 square kilometers. The PLA 

transported the injured, repaired roads and bridges, participated in restoring 

electrical power and water supplies, cleaned up debris, performed diseaseprevention work, erected tents, provided medical care to throngs of victims, set 

up temporary schools, and dispatched soldiers to be teachers among other 

duties. The reporters stated that the Western media was reporting positively on 

the PLA response and that the concern shown by the troops demonstrated the 

true meaning of the phrase that the military is made up of the “sons and 

brothers of the common people.”452

Another staff reporter covered the equipment that the PLA utilized in 

the rescue effort. The Mi-26 multi-purpose heavy-lift helicopter was cited for 

its ability to transport the necessary machinery and supplies across the Yansai 

Lake on Tangshan Mountain. Winged paragliders were used to jump from 

heights of 5,000 meters. The Beidou-terminal of the satellite navigation system 

became the only method of transmission for some rescue units that did not have 

standard-issue maritime satellite phones. PLA aerial reconnaissance planes flew 

over the disaster zone to take photographs and measurements with one-meter 

resolution. The General Surveying Administration produced large-scale, three 

dimensional maps for command posts. An emergency response mobile 

communications vehicle, with a 14-meter high rotating surveillance camera and 

satellite receivers, was used to send pictures and to conduct videoconferencing.

Medical field tents/containers treated and released, on average, one earthquake 

victim every eight minutes. Two blood transport vehicles shuttled between the 

front and rear areas, and more than 40 clean water trucks arrived in the disaster 

area.453

On 10 June CCTV-7’s military-themed documentary program reported 

on the dispatch of several elite communication units from the Chengdu Military 

Region to the quake area. One of the eight-man teams was the first to reach 

Wenchuan on the morning of 14 May, and it established an observation and 

communications post. Staff officer Colonel Wang Kai stated that maritime 

 

452 He Liangliang, “Let the World Recognize the PLA,” Renmin Ribao (Overseas 

Edition) (Internet Version-WWW), 6 June 2008, p. 1, as translated and downloaded 

from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080606710004.

453 Bai Chanping, “Sophisticated Military Equipment Demonstrates Remarkable 

Abilities in Disaster Areas,” Jiefang Ribao, 10 June 2008, as translated and downloaded 

from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080612066009.
157

satellite phones issued to the detachment did not work. The satellite dish 

worked only when a radio and satellite communications post was established 

three kilometers away from the magnetically charged conditions of the area.

454

On 12 June a series of articles were published in the Chinese press 

about the context and response of the PLA to the earthquake. One article was 

devoted to two changes in the coverage of this type of natural disaster. First 

were the government and general public responses and second the coverage of 

the media. With regard to media coverage it was noted that the Tangshan 

earthquake of 1976, occurring as it did during the 1966-1976 Cultural 

Revolution, received only a short notice from the Xinhua News Agency. The 

agency reported only that a quake had taken place 180 kilometers to the west of 

Beijing. There were 240,000 killed in that quake. When the earthquake struck 

on 12 May 2008, media coverage had changed dramatically. Within ten 

minutes, CCTV started non-stop coverage of the disaster and relief work. Some 

550 journalists, including 300 foreign reporters, converged on the area. China 

now has 221 million web surfers, the world’s largest contingent and a huge 

number of cell phones conducting text messaging. Blogs, chatrooms, and 

image-sharing portals are prevalent everywhere. Through this network 

concerned citizens expressed their opinions and recommendations.455

The military command in Chengdu set up a command post ten minutes 

after the quake and the Central Military Commission started to coordinate its 

response three minutes later. Premier Wen Jiabao was on a plane headed to the 

area within two hours and President Hu Jintao braved aftershocks to visit 

shortly thereafter. The Red Cross of China invited the National Audit Office to 

supervise the distribution of funds. Nearly 6 billion US dollars worth of funds 

and goods were collected from factories and local citizens. Instead of refusing 

international assistance the government accepted military-use synthetic aperture 

radar images for disaster assessments. And, for the first time in history, flags 

flew at half-staff from 19-21 May in national mourning for quake victims, some 

80,000 in all, and there was a moment of silence for them throughout the nation 

as well.

456

 

454 “Junshi Jishi Program,” CCTV-7, 1203 GMT 10 June 2008, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080704017001. 

455 Wang Aihua and Yu Zheng, “Interpreting the Sichuan Earthquake—A Different 

Picture from What We Used to See,” Xinhua, 0222 GMT 12 June 2008, as translated 

and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080612968118. It is now thought that one out of every two Chinese now has a 

cell phone, or some 650 million people.

456 Ibid.
158

The date 12 June also marked the end of a four-part series in Jiefangjun 

Bao on “The Great Wenchuan Earthquake—Practice and Thoughts on NonWar Military Actions” that ran from 9-12 June. This theme was prominent in 

the wrap-up discussions of political organs in the July time period.

Part One of the series gives credit to the high-quality and efficiency of 

command organs “guided by informatization.” The article notes that the allarmy emergency–response command mechanism was turned on just 13 minutes 

after the quake occurred. This implies that the army has not lost its superiority 

after the introduction of informatization in many units.457 Part Three of the 

series (Part Two could not be located) emphasized diversified capabilities. The 

PLA is now not just a defensive organization, the article noted, but one ready to 

assist with diverse security threats and military tasks. Specialized technical 

troops have new capabilities to contend with disasters.458 Part Four of the series 

noted that the PLA activated an equipment emergency-response support 

mechanism that offered different types of technologies and equipment and high 

scientific-technical content. This included the Xian Satellite Observation and 

Control Center, which readjusted 15 satellites to map meteorological cloud 

photos and for geomorphology surveys and navigational services. Remotesensing aircraft and unmanned aircraft flew to “information isolated islands” to 

rescue people. Finally, the National Development and Reform Commission 

activated its emergency equipment support plan and the Sichuan Province 

National Defense Mobilization Committee requisitioned engineering 

machinery.459

Also on 12 June a Xinhua article discussed the ten “firsts” of this 

natural disaster. These included: 

 A top-grade emergency response (by the National Commission for 

Disaster Reduction)

 

457 Wu Tianmin and Ding Haiming, “Key Lies in Building Core Military Capabilities, 

Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW), 9 June 2008, as translated and downloaded 

from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080611088001.

458 Wang Yongxiao, Hu Junhua, and Xia Hongqing, “Diversified Capabilities Needed 

to Accomplish Diversified Tasks,” Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW), 11 June 

2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document 

number CPP20080612088001.

459 Yu Chunguang and Wang Weidong, “Innovative Mechanism Increases Equipment 

Support Efficiency,” Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW), 12 June 2008, as 

translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080616088001.
159

 A large domestic and foreign donation of money and material

 A large volunteer effort

 The participation of foreign rescue personnel

 A national mourning for ordinary citizens

 The development of a post-quake reconstruction regulation (on 8 

June)

 The impression that China’s coverage of disasters was now more 

transparent. The mobilization of other provinces to help in the 

reconstruction effort

 A gigantic quake-formed lake was drained

 It was the first use of a large-scale airlift.460

At 1600 on 12 June the third news conference on the progress of the 

PLA in its disaster relief effort was held. PLA spokesman Senior Colonel Hu 

Changming said the military was moving and settling the masses, rescuing and 

treating the wounded, guarding against secondary disasters, carrying out 

sanitation and epidemic prevention measures, rendering psychological 

intervention services as required, helping the masses resume production and 

school students resume classes, and assisting local governments in maintaining 

social order.461

A 16 June report by the PLA’s Political Department was typically 

Marxist in nature and only of propaganda value. The article stated that the 

fundamental guarantee for succeeding in disaster rescue was the wise 

leadership of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, 

and Chairman Hu Jintao. Furthermore citizens were instructed to serve the 

people wholeheartedly and believe in a sacrificing and dedicated spirit. Core 

values of military personnel must be taken as the contemporary topic in 

political work. Party building in military units must continue and ideological 

work is encouraged.462

 

460 “‘Factbox’: the ‘Ten Firsts’ that Follow China’s Massive Quake,” Xinhua 1618 

GMT 12 June 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20080612968312.

461 Li Jingpo, “Ministry of National Defense News Spokesman Briefs Chinese, Foreign 

Reporters on Situation of Earthquake Control, Disaster Relief by Liberation Army, 

Armed Police Force,” Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW), 12 June 2008, p. 4, as 

translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP200806112710011.

462 “Carry Forward the Disaster Relief Spirit, Promote Military Force Building in All 

Aspects—Learning from the Disaster Rescue and Relief Actions for the Political Work 

in the Armed Forces,” Qiushi Online, 16 June 2008, as translated and downloaded from 

the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080619710003.
160

The success of the military effort in neutralizing many of the 

consequences of the Sichuan earthquake prompted the most interesting article 

with strategic significance for Western countries. Author Zhao Zongqi wrote

that building the core military capabilities of the PLA should translate into a 

capability to win local wars under informatized conditions and that the PLA 

should work to be able to deal with two strategic tasks and two major crises 

simultaneously. Reform measures will accelerate this improvement in 

capabilities. This will ensure social stability and the neutralization of threats 

from the West to split China. Chinese overseas investments and the potential 

need to evacuate persons living abroad require China to adjust its force 

deployment with intensified monitoring and control of strategic passageways 

and a strengthening of China’s sea mobilization and escort capability.463

Another area in which the PLA played a significant role was 

psychological counseling. The PLA, since May 20, assigned 360 psychological 

experts to the quake area. By 22 June the Joint Logistics Department of the 

Chengdu Military Area Command said it had offered face-to-face counseling to 

over 5,000 people affected by the quake. The psychological counseling 

included what was termed “affection and peace exchange phones” and 

established “expert psychological consultation stations.” Materials for 

psychological treatment were distributed and crisis intervention counseling was 

offered to people suffering from fear, anxiety, and depression.464

On 26 June it was reported at an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

convention in Beijing that UAVs had been used in several surveillance 

operations over Yansai Lake during relief operations. This provided important 

information for emergency disaster relief teams who were involved in draining 

the lake. However, the exact type of UAV used in the operation was not 

mentioned. Some characteristics of the relatively new “Dark Sword” UAV 

model were described for convention participants.465

 

463 Zhao Zongqi, “What Kind of Capabilities Do We Need to Accomplish Diversified 

Tasks,” Jiefangjun Bao, 17 June 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open 

Source Center website, document number CPP20080623088002.

464 Guo Xi, “Chengdu MAC Assigns 360 Psychological Experts to Quake-Hit Areas,” 

Jiefangjun Bao, 0930 GMT 24 June 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open 

Source Center website, document number CPP20080625705005. 

465 Lu Desheng, “Approaching ‘Winged Scout’ and Examining the Development of 

China’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Jiefangjun Bao, 26 June 2008, p. 12, as translated 

and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP 

20080626710006.
161

In another 26 June technical report, repair vehicles were highlighted. 

The Second Artillery Force’s rescue and relief troops utilized two types of 

repair vehicles. First, reporters described the optical cable rush repair vehicle, 

with cutting-edge hi-tech equipment for monitoring and testing optical cable 

failures and maintenance. It can identify failures and provide information on the 

wear and tear of optical cables, offering repair methods as well. Troops were 

able to unblock up to 100 kilometers of cable within three hours. Second, 

reporters described the communication and command support vehicle. It earned 

the nickname of “clairvoyant” and “clairaudient” in the quake rescue and relief 

operations. The vehicle has the ability to transmit voice, data, fax, and images, 

and it can map out scenarios, receive information, and offer technological 

diagnosis and inquiries.466

Another 26 June article noted that political workers from the Jinan MR 

used text messaging to relay information and conduct propaganda and agitation 

work. The political officers also formulated a “basic flow of daily grass-roots 

political work,” and officers installed phones for troops to call home.467

A final 26 June article stressed both the value of the Internet and the 

need to self-govern it with morality and respect for the law. Hu Jintao stated 

that the Internet is the key channel for people to get information. It serves as a

link for the party and the government to keep in contact with the people. In this 

regard the Internet played a very important role during the Sichuan earthquake, 

as the network media produced propaganda and open and transparent 

situational reports. Timely reports had a psychologically calming effect on the 

population. These government reports were the first since the enactment of the 

“Regulation on Information Publicity” of May 2008. Media networks need to 

guide public opinion and build networks of trust. One Internet user posted “10 

prohibitions” as a means for developing a User Self-Governance Convention on 

the Internet. This convention can become the key for network management the 

 

466 Xia Hongping, Zhang Qi, and Guo Yichuang, “New Equipment Excels in High 

Efficiency in Quake Rescue and Relief,” Jiefangjun Bao, 26 June 2008, as translated 

and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080627702005.

467 Yang Jilong, Meng Bin, and Huang Kunlun, “Becoming Fast, Solid, and Flexible—

Experience and Enlightenment of Several Political Workers at the Earthquake Fighting 

and Disaster Rescue and Relief Front,” Jiefangjun Bao, 26 June 2008, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080704088002.
162

article noted. The Internet “should not and cannot free itself from the restraints 

of law and morality.”468

On 27 June the PLA Air Force noted that it was producing three-meter 

wide and fifteen-meter long aerial photographs displaying the seismic belt of 

Longmen Mountain. To date the air force had taken 1,850 aerial photographs, 

produced 16,550 objective maps, and 431 copies of photographic interpretation 

reports. Four aircraft were used for aerial monitoring.469 

Cleaning Up After the Damage—July 2008

The General Political Department reported the majority of the PLA’s 

lessons learned from the earthquake experience in the July timeframe. It was 

obvious that several themes were being pushed by the propagandists. On 1 July 

it was reported that maritime satellite telephones were issued to publicity 

departments of the political departments of some major military units. This 

device is a mobile satellite communication device that covers the entire world 

and is used by all major media in their news reporting. It can perform real-time 

transmission of information in writing, photograph, voice frequency, or visual 

frequency.470 Also on 1 July, the Communist Party’s journal Qiushi Online

discussed the PLA’s ability to conduct diversified tasks. The authors were Li 

Shiming, the Commander in Chief of the Chengdu Military District Joint 

Earthquake Relief Headquarters and Commander of the Chengdu Military 

District, and Zhang Haiyang, Secretary of the Party Committee for the Chengdu 

Military District Joint Earthquake Relief Headquarters and Political Commissar 

of the Chengdu Military District. Therefore the article has a specific 

propaganda overtone but also one of first-hand knowledge of the situation.

Li and Zhang’s article stated that by 17 June the PLA had transferred 

more than 1.34 million victims and rescued over 3,336 survivors. This effort

 

468 Ji Guilin and Zhang Feng, “President Hu Jintao’s Important Speech on Intensifying 

Construction of New Media and Elevating Statuses and Functions of Network Media to 

a New Strategic Height—Historically Sacred Missions and New Development Chances 

Request Us to Intensify Construction of Network Media and to Form a New Pattern for 

Guiding Public Opinions,” Jiefangjun Bao, Online, 26 June 2008, p. 11, as translated 

and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080626710004. 

469 Zhang Jinyu and Li Jianwen, “PLA Air Force Puts Air Survey Means into Service in 

Quake Rescue and Relief,” Jiefangjun Bao, 27 June 2008, as translated and downloaded 

from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080630702002.

470 Zheng Wanxuan, “GDP Issues Information Transmission Equipment to Quake 

Rescue Troops,” Jiefangjun Bao, 1 July 2008, as translated and downloaded from the 

Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080702702002.
163

moved the people to shouts of “the PLA has come” and “the Party’s forces are 

here” according to their reporting. More than 20 specialized rescue, chemical 

defense, engineering, medical and epidemic prevention, reconnaissance, and 

communications branches were employed during the relief operation. More 

than 643 million square meters of polluted areas were purified and sterilized. 

Initially, 25,805 civil-military reserve personnel were utilized and by 17 June 

the number exceeded 48,000. The army and armed police mobilized 4,696 

helicopters and dispatched 96,800 medical personnel.471 With regard to hightechnology equipment it was reported that

Radar life-detection instruments, hundred-ton hydraulic jack devices, 

special rescue helicopters, naval satellite phones, data terminal 

communications, and other high-tech equipment were used in great 

quantities in the rescue operations. The army activated 15 satellite 

measurement and atmospheric charts of nine different types, 

implemented satellite communications, conducted general surveys of 

the earth’s surface, provided navigation service, and promptly provided 

the disaster area’s important information to headquarters. Satellite 

networks were employed for long-range diagnosis and treatment of 

wounded.472

On 3 July the PLA’s General Political Department (and in particular 

it’s Propaganda Bureau), praised the PLA’s relief efforts. Typical Communist 

Party propaganda verbiage was used to describe the soldier’s achievements. 

The soldiers worked with “resolve,” carried out a “sacred mission,” wrote a 

“historic chapter of loyalty to the mission,” drew “ideological and political 

nourishment” from the relief struggle, and carried on the “excellent tradition of 

obeying the Party’s commands.” The soldiers forged a combat spirit that 

showed no fear, the propagandists continued. Soldiers had the “hot blood of 

heroism” flowing in their bodies, they wholeheartedly served the people, and 

they served as the “sons and brothers of the people.” The Propaganda Bureau 

added that manifest in mission execution is the PLA’s excellent tradition of 

listening to and obeying the Party’s commands, serving the people, and 

heroically putting up a good fight generation after generation.

473

 

471 Li Shiming and Zhang Haiyang, “Vivid Earthquake Rescue Efforts Illustrate the 

PLA’s Ability to Complete Diversified Military Missions,” Qiushi Online, 1 July 2008, 

No. 13, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document 

number CPP20080703710009.

472 Ibid.

473 PLA General Political Department’s Propaganda Bureau, “Engrave Loyalty to the 

Mission on the Earthquake-Fighting and Disaster Relief Battlefield,” Jiefangjun Bao 
164

The Political Department noted that the PLA delivered battlefield 

awareness, information transmission, search and rescue, and medical treatment, 

and it integrated logistical support capabilities. Wind and Cloud, Resource, 

Beidou, and other such satellites provided continuous information support. The 

General Political Department itself organized psychological service expert 

groups to treat and guide victims of psychological stress. Finally, the 

department underscored the necessity of enhancing domestic public opinion 

and propagandizing to other countries. Military media in particular should be 

organized and capable of reporting on disaster recovery progress. Strategic 

arrangements of the Communist Party and Central Military Commission must 

be transmitted to settle the hearts of the people and encourage the morale of the 

officers and men.474

On 4 July the Jiefangjun Bao Online website (the website of the daily 

newspaper of the Central Military Commission of the PLA) produced an 

editorial that discussed the “phased” victory of the PLA’s earthquake operation.

It laid the groundwork for the discussion by reiterating Chairman Hu Jintao’s 

mission for the PLA of “providing three things and playing one role.” The army 

must provide a force guarantee for the Party to consolidate its governing status, 

provide a security guarantee for safeguarding this important strategic 

opportunity for development, and provide backing to safeguard national 

interests. The role the PLA must play is in preserving world peace and 

promoting common development. Building a diversified force allows the PLA 

to achieve its three historic missions: pushing forward modernization, 

accomplishing the reunification of the motherland, and safeguarding world 

peace. 475

One way the PLA has done this, the editorial notes, is through boosting 

capabilities to conduct and win local wars under informatized conditions. 

Military training is conducted under informatized conditions, high-tech 

weaponry has been developed, and a new type of military personnel cultivated. 

These types of soldiers are needed not only to fight natural disasters but other 

non-traditional threats as well, such as terrorism, secessionism, and extremism. 

During the relief operation, command, information, mobilization, and support 

 

Online, 3 July 2008, p. 6, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20080703710001.

474 Ibid.

475 Editorial Department, “A Great Historic Responsibility—Written When Major 

Phased Victory in Anti-quake Operation is Achieved,” Jiefangjun Bao, 4 July 2008, p. 

1, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document 

number CPP20080707710001. 
165

capabilities were important conditions to meet in order to accomplish nonmilitary operations. These operations had characteristics of informatized 

warfare. To develop informatized troops, thinking must not be conservative, 

troops must master diversified tasks, issues should be viewed from a strategic 

viewpoint, problems must be anticipated, and failures and mistakes should be 

immediately summarized and learned. In this manner innovation will continue 

to drive the PLA.476

On 8 July it was reported that the military transportation system of the 

PLA distributed information-based equipment such as the dynamic monitoring 

system, the Beidou satellite command system, and onboard intercommunication 

equipment to relief troops to enhance command and control capabilities of 

commanders.477 

On 12 July, in an article on the current situation in Sichuan, it was 

noted that there were nearly 70,000 people dead, 18,000 still missing, and five

million people homeless. Temporary housing was projected to be available for 

all of the homeless by 1 August. Farmers complained that their land was 

“borrowed” by the government and they fear it would not be returned to them. 

One Beichuan villager, pointing to shelters on farmland, criticized the PLA for 

flattening their land to build temporary shelters with no explanation of what 

would happen afterwards. This was one of the very few criticisms of the PLA. 

Seismologists were also blamed for not providing prior warnings, and some 

media were banned from discussing the issue of poorly constructed schools 

(termed “tofu buildings”).478

With regard to political work, a 16 July report in Qiushi Online (the 

semimonthly official journal of the Communist Party of China’s Central 

Committee) discussed what types of propaganda the Air Force’s Propaganda 

Department utilized in the response phase of the Sichuan earthquake. First, an 

information and propaganda center was established that launched mobilization, 

propaganda and education, and “on-site inspiration.” The department promoted 

slogans such as “heart to heart, breath to breath, live and fight together” and 

“carry forward the spirit of a sharp knife and compete to be a vanguard in 

earthquake resistance.” The department also performed the following tasks:

 

476 Ibid.

477 Zhang Cheng and Fan Juwei, “Quake Relief Transportation Troops Create Traffic 

Safety Records,” Jiefangjun Bao, 8 July 2008, as translated and downloaded from the 

Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080709702001.

478 Klaudia Lee, “Rubble and Strife,” South China Morning Post Online, 0023 GMT 12 

July 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, 

document number CPP20080712968034.
166

 Edited short “endure the quake” and disaster relief messages

 Produced “endure the quake” and disaster relief posters and 

postcards that were distributed to relief personnel

 Organized professional production crews to go deep into the 

disaster zone for on-site interviews

 Compiled and distributed education outlines and manuals

 Organized psychological experts to go to sites for consultations

 Established a website called “All the People of One Mind, Strength 

from Unity”

 Distributed daily the “Situation Update of Political Work” and the 

“Air Force Newspaper.”

479

The article also noted that political cadres served as team leaders and they could 

be found everywhere, especially in the most dangerous locations. The article 

concluded by stating that comprehensive use should be made of modern media 

means, such as TV, radio, and networks to increase the information content and 

political work of propaganda units.480

On 16 July the military’s earthquake-fighting and disaster relief 

command group held its sixth conference at which the results of the relief effort 

were discussed. The conference reported that they studied and implemented the 

intentions of Chairman Hu Jintao and the Central Military Commission (CMC) 

regarding how to carry out the relief action. The conference felt the military’s 

emergency response mechanism was timely, as was the establishment of a 

disaster relief command group. Unit actions were well-planned as were 

logistics and ideological and political work. Since 17 June, when the fifth 

conference took place, the CMC has switched its core work to the “eight tasks” 

outlined by Chairman Hu. The conference speakers noted that 

currently, earthquake-fighting and disaster relief emergency-response 

and emergency-handling tasks have basically been completed, victim 

groups have basically been settled in, disaster area production order has 

progressively been restored, the social situation is stable, and gearing 

 

479 Ge Shanbin, Liu Jiguang, and Luo Suying, “Several Revelations from the 

Earthquake Resistance and Disaster Relief Battle with Respect to Strengthening Force 

Building,” Qiushi Online, 16 July 2008, No. 14, as translated and downloaded from the 

Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080716710013.

480 Ibid.
167

support to the needs and restoring and rebuilding are going exactly 

according to plan.481

The Chengdu Military Region Joint Headquarters issued an article on 

22 July that stated the PLA established a joint command structure for the first 

time during the Sichuan earthquake relief effort. The lessons learned from this

non-combat operation are that commanders must: grasp the objective of 

operations from an overall perspective; aim to link and implement central and

unified command; establish clear and smooth relationships (cooperation and 

coordination) as the most important element in organization and command; and 

emphasize resolute decision-making and flexible command. It is also necessary 

to integrate several transmission methods to be effective, to include wired and 

wireless communications, satellite communications, meteorological survey 

support, navigation systems, and the command information networks of other 

military regions. These non-combat military operations must be incorporated 

into the legal track as soon as possible. To insure there are no communication 

problems, work must be accelerated on optical, short wave, satellite, and 

mobile communications-centered methods. Integrated information networks 

must be expanded and strengthened and all information must be capable of 

being quickly, stably, securely, and privately transmitted. Subjective hopes 

must be consistent with objective realities.482

On 23 July, a psychological service team of the Xi’an Political Institute 

of the PLA discussed its rescue and relief operation during the Sichuan 

earthquake. Its aim was to develop a psychological “protection mode” that 

would help troops operate when involved in rescue operations. The eight man 

team stated that there are six parts to the mission, and they listed three in the 

article: defining the basic task of psychological protection, improving the 

system of work for psychological protection, and improving the composition of 

the team that is to perform psychological protection.483

 

481 Shi Yongcai, “Military Earthquake-Fighting and Disaster Relief Command Group 

Holds Sixth Conference—Chen Bingde Gives Speech,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 16 July 

2008, p. 1, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, 

document number CPP20080716710001.

482 Chengdu Military Region Joint Headquarters for Earthquake Relief, “Rigorously 

Improving the Ability to Organize, Command Non-Combat Military Operations,” 

Jiefangjun Bao Online, 22 July 2008, p. 6, as translated and downloaded from the Open 

Source Center website, document number CPP20080722710007.

483 Guo Jiangshan, “Quake-Rescue-and-Relief Subjects Study Carried Out,” Jiefangjun 

Bao, 23 July 2008, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, 

document number CPP20080724702008.
168

Conclusions

There are several conclusions to be drawn from this short look at the 

PLA’s crisis management system. Many of them are positive when viewed 

from the perspective of the history of crisis management in China. 

First, it can be stated that the PLA has updated its crisis management 

mechanism in both its capabilities and its legal framework. Its capabilities have 

been enhanced through the introduction of information technologies especially 

satellite and communication assets. Its legal framework has been enhanced 

through updated regulations that apply to disaster and relief operations. In 

particular, the PLA fulfilled Articles 3 and 15, the former dealing with 

earthquake relief functions and the latter with the conduct of interviews on the 

situation in the earthquake zone. A Defense Ministry spokesman made his first 

appearance ever to announce information on what the armed forces were doing 

in the relief operation, and a General Staff spokesman from the Operations 

Department also addressed the progress of the operation and its parameters. In 

a November 2006 article, steps were also developed for some armed forces 

command elements to bypass a significant section of the chain of command in 

order to respond faster to emergencies and small-scale military conflicts. This 

move gives priority to the immediate release of information to people to help 

dispel rumors and irresponsible reporting.484 However, these crisis management 

developments are still in their infancy. Much work remains to be done.

Second, it is clear that new organizations are being constructed to deal 

with disasters. The following are some of the organizations noted in this 

chapter that are connected with crisis management: an Emergency Management 

Office (2005), the Center for Crisis Management Studies at China’s Institute of 

Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the National Development and 

Reform Commission, the National Commission for Disaster Reduction, and a 

proposal for a National Command for Emergency Management (proposed at the 

2008 Party Conference). During the earthquake, the following organizations 

were noted: 

 The PLA Quake Relief Command Group

 The Chengdu Joint Earthquake Resistance and Disaster Relief 

Command Center

 A command center for each of the five jurisdictions noted in a 

General Staff briefing

 

484 “China Shortens PLA Chain of Command in Emergency Response Plan,” Beijing 

Xinhua, 0658 GMT 15 November 2006, as translated and downloaded from the Open 

Source Center website, document number CPP20061115968071.
169

 An operational and disaster relief force organization

 The Sichuan Province National Defense Mobilization Committee.

Li Shiming, head of the Chengdu Military Region, listed the following 

organizations in his article on the situation in the region: the Chengdu Military 

District Joint Earthquake Relief Headquarters; the Joint Command Party 

Committee; the government emergency response system, the military combat 

readiness system, and the national defense mobilization “dual response” 

system; and civil-military emergency response battalions of seven military subdistricts that participated immediately.

Third, the Internet was put to good use to spread information about the 

relief operation, to express remorse at loss of life, and to thank people for their 

efforts in the quake area. The Internet has turned out to be a way the PLA can 

keep the people happy by providing them with the information they need in 

crisis situations. Keeping people happy was done in other ways as well, such as 

rescinding for some areas of China the one child policy since so many families 

lost their only child in the earthquake, usually in a schoolhouse setting. China’s 

leadership showed its interest in the people, being on the spot within hours of 

the quake.

Fourth, the PLA’s relief effort showed its ability to conduct a myriad of 

tasks. The Communist Party praised the PLA for its ability to conduct 

diversified tasks and this point will be developed further in the coming months 

and years as an important result of the relief effort according to reports. 

Fifth, it was clear from the summaries of officials who described the 

results and importance of the relief effort that this non-combat action served as 

a practice event for a war under informatized conditions. This issue was clearly 

a propaganda theme that the Political Department of the PLA was determined 

to publish. For example, the following reports emphasized this point in July 

2008:

 On 1 July reporters noted that “on the basis of improving the ability 

to win a localized war under informatized conditions, it is essential 

to strengthen research of the characteristics and laws governing 

non-combat military operations, organize troops to arrange for 

stability maintenance, and so on.”485

 On 3 July the PLA General Political Department wrote that local 

wars under informatized conditions put forth very high 

 

485 Li and Zhang.
170

requirements for multiple service branch joint operations and more 

often than not, non-war military tasks have multivariate 

participants and military-civilian joint actions.486

 On 4 July a Communist Party editorial noted that non-military 

operations represent a “whetstone” (knife stone) for sharpening 

armed forces’ capabilities in winning local wars under informatized 

conditions.487

 On 16 July reporters noted that “At the same time as improving the 

capability of winning local warfare under informatized conditions, 

we must emphasize highly the work to improve the capability of 

carrying out non-combat military tasks...”

488

 On 22 July the Chengdu military region headquarters wrote that 

aspects of non-combat military operations such as command 

organization, rapid mobilization potential, and mobility capabilities 

help form the potential to win localized wars under informatized 

conditions.

489

Zhao Zongqi, who also covered the topic of winning informatized wars 

in a 17 June article, stated that Chinese society and the PLA must work together 

to deal with two strategic tasks and two major crises simultaneously. The 

PLA’s work to handle the snow and earthquake crises of 2008 along with 

flooding and the Olympics indicates that it has successfully accomplished the 

latter half of this wish list. What Zhao meant by strategic tasks is unclear but 

hopefully they don’t involve warfare.

Finally, China received higher marks than usual for its transparency 

during this natural disaster. Many foreign reporters were allowed into the area. 

However, Chinese reporters and the PLA’s Political Departments cited no 

problems with the relief effort. Almost every report from the Chinese point of 

view was a positive report. It is very unusual for only positive reports to come 

out of a relief effort. Any country that has been engaged in a relief effort 

understands that unexpected problems always arise. The Chinese press was 

quiet on such matters. “Positive” transparency was achieved but perhaps not 

“total” transparency. They are two different things but then again the Chinese 

system is a different system from Western reporting and this is perhaps the best 

 

486 PLA General Political Department.

487 Editorial Department.

488 Ge Shanbin, Liu Jiguang, and Luo Suying, “Several Revelations from the 

Earthquake Resistance and Disaster Relief Battle with Respect to Strengthening Force 

Building,” Qiushi Online, 16 July 2008, No. 14, as translated and downloaded from the 

Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080716710013.

489 Chengdu Military Region Joint Headquarters for Earthquake Relief.
171

that we can get at the present time. Overall, the reporting was satisfactory. 

However, being prepared to conduct non-conflict activities and wartime 

activities are two different things. It is unknown how prepared the PLA is to 

conduct a wartime crisis management response but according to reports, the 

Sichuan earthquake gave them several leads on conducting informatized war 

under non-military conditions. 
172
173

CHAPTER SEVEN: CHINA’S LONG-RANGE ELECTRONIC 

PATROL

This chapter examines the active-defense and preemption/reconnaissance 

activities of the PLA that are targeted at multiple countries.490

The fiscal 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, passed yesterday 

by the House, contains a provision requiring the annual Military Power 

of the People’s Republic of China report to include a new section on 

Beijing’s “efforts to acquire, develop, and deploy cyberwarfare 

capabilities” in its assessments of China’s “asymmetric” warfare 

capabilities.—Early Bird, 14 December 2007.

Introduction

Since 2005, Chinese cyber attacks against US systems have increased 

at an alarming rate. However, the term “attack” carries unwanted connotations; 

these unwarranted incursions are more likely reconnaissance missions to collect 

intelligence on US military systems, to spot vulnerabilities or plant trapdoors or 

viruses in our systems, and to ensure that China’s People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) has an immediate advantage in the event of any war involving the US 

and China. If the incursions were “attacks” then our systems would be down 

and destroyed. Instead, these computer reconnaissance measures appear to 

conform to an old Chinese stratagem: “a victorious army first wins and then 

seeks battle. A defeated army first battles and then seeks victory.” 

Reconnaissance via computer to spot vulnerabilities before the first battle fits 

the stratagem well.

The US, of course, is not the only country accusing the Chinese of 

unwarranted incursions. Germany, England, France, Japan, Taiwan, and 

Australia, among others, have also been Chinese targets. When one views these 

events in light of open-source accounts of Chinese information operations (IO) 

theory over the past several years, there is much circumstantial evidence to find 

China guilty as accused. The only actual forensic evidence, of course, is 

classified and located in the security agencies of the countries that China has 

electronically invaded.

This article explains Chinese military thought that supports their cyber 

reconnaissance/attack activities. While other articles focus on who was attacked

and how many times, this article focuses more on the theory behind the attacks, 

 

490 This chapter first appeared as an article in Military Review, Nov-Dec 2008, pp. 47-

54.
174

especially the PLAs use of electronic stratagems for their computer network 

operations (CNO) and the use of surrogates such as patriotic hacker groups. 

The article reviews Chinese incursions and utilizes a temporal approach based 

on open source assessments provided by some of the most important Chinese 

IW theorists. 

The PLA has followed theory with practice. Computer network 

operations have become part of the peacetime strategic activities of the PLA. 

More worrisome is the purpose of these incursions. Is it reconnaissance? Or is 

the purpose of these incursions to place Trojan Horses or some other device 

into US and other partner systems to disable or destroy them in case of war? 

There is much to evaluate as one reads about Chinese IW developments and 

much to consider about Chinese potential intentions.

IW Units and the “Active Offense” 

While the exact reason for China’s cyber attacks is unknown, we can 

follow a cause-and-effect rationale in Chinese contemporary writings. The 

cause of China’s attachment to new information technologies and the 

“informatization” of their force is the dramatic impact the technologies have 

had on military affairs, most notably US use of technology in Iraq. The effect of 

these technologies on Chinese military thought, as demonstrated below, is their

belief that only countries that take the initiative in an information war or 

establish information superiority and control ahead of time will win. This 

requires reconnaissance and intelligence gathering before the first battle to set 

the stage for the use of cyber forces.

Historically, the PLA based its strategic philosophy on “active 

defense,” meaning that China would never attack someone first but would be 

ready to respond if attacked. That philosophy has changed over the past few 

years with the advent of the cyber age. There has been a continuous stream of 

open-source descriptions of both cyber units and offensive cyber operations in 

the Chinese military and civilian press. The PLA’s open recognition of a need 

for offensive operations reflects a significant break with traditional Chinese 

military thought. Further, the PLA has openly stated that US reliance on 

computer systems is a huge vulnerability ripe for exploitation. If the PLA hopes 

to offset America’s huge advantage in the practical application of IO theory (in 

Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan), it has to exploit that vulnerability. To 

understand this shift from defensive to offensive-minded operations 

chronologically, we must begin by looking at developments in 1999. 
175

1999

Nearly a decade ago, Chinese IO theorists were already discussing 

offensive actions. Zhu Wenguan and Chen Taiyi’s Information War, published 

in 1999, contains a section called “Conducting Camouflaged Preemptive 

Attacks.” The authors note that preemptive active offense is needed to disrupt 

and destroy enemy computer offensive forces.491 A part of preemption appears 

to be network surveillance, which involves collecting information on the 

performance, purpose, and structure of systems related to C4I, electronic 

warfare, and weapon systems. The authors note that, in the broadest sense, 

computer information surveillance is a part of computer information attack. 

They state:

To conduct computer surveillance, we can use computer information 

networks set up in peacetime and enter networks as different users to 

do the surveillance in an area broader than the battlefield. We can 

borrow the power of computer experts, especially hackers, to finish 

computer surveillance tasks...it can be seen that using hackers to obtain 

military information from computer networks is a very effective 

method. We should be familiar with network protocols and accumulate 

network intelligence.492

The authors add that the PLA established small brigades of offensive 

and defensive computer confrontation forces to conduct these attacks.493

Offensive training includes how to design and organize virus invasions and 

how to enter the other side’s computer networks. Offensive brigades must 

repeatedly study and analyze the enemy’s performance parameters. They must 

also be able to sort truth from deception, to pinpoint enemy computer-control 

centers, and to jam in targeted ways.494

In November of 1999 a Liberation Army Daily (Jiefanguin Bao) article 

stated that China may develop an IW branch of service—a “net force”—to 

complement the army, navy, and air force. While the article stated that this 

development was very likely to become a reality, there is no evidence to 

confirm the creation of such a branch of service today. The force’s task would 

 

491 Zhu Wenguan and Chen Taiyi, Information War, 1999, Chapter Five (Computer 

Operations). This chapter discusses offensive and defensive computer operations. No 

further information (publisher, etc.) was available.

492 Ibid.

493 Ibid.

494 Ibid. At one point in the discussion, the authors state that “we need to observe our 

military’s strategy of active offense and in computer confrontation training ensure both 

defense and offense are main partners...” 
176

be to protect net sovereignty and engage in net warfare. Elements of net warfare 

include “offensive and defensive” technologies, “scanning” technologies, 

“masquerade” (deception) technology, and recovery technology. Masquerade 

technology would assist a person who wanted to dissemble as a commander and 

take over a net.495

2000

The idea of focusing on reconnaissance and stratagem activities arose

as early as 2000. A Liberation Army Daily (Jiefanguin Bao) article notes that 

units at and above army level should focus their study on reconnaissance and 

early warning, command coordination, and the application of strategy.496 An 

article substantiating this thought appeared in the PLA’s authoritative journal 

China Military Science (similar in importance to Joint Force Quarterly). The

latter article notes that stratagems should create opportunities and favorable 

times for releasing viruses.497

Another China Military Science article clarified the offensive posture 

described in 1999. In it, General Dai Qingmin opines that offense is at least as 

important as active defense, and notes “as the key to gaining the initiative in 

operations lies in positively and actively contending with an enemy for 

information superiority, China should establish such a view for IO as ‘active 

offense.’” His view is that active offense is essential for maintaining 

information control, obtaining the initiative, and offsetting an opponent’s 

superiority. Offensive information methods can help sabotage an enemy’s 

information system.498

Dai, who became the head of the PLA General Staff’s Fourth 

Department (Electronic Warfare), also notes that IO stratagems can be 

formulated before launching a war to serve as “a sharp sword” that sabotages 

 

495 Leng Bingling, Wang Yulin, and Zhao Wenxiang, “Bringing Internet Warfare into 

the Military System is of Equal Significance with Land, Sea, and Air Power,” 

Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 11 November 1999, p. 7 as translated and 

downloaded from the FBIS website on 15 November 1999.

496

 Fan Changlong, “Stand in the Forefront of the New Military Revolution in 

Deepening Troop Training through Science and Technology,” Jiefangjun Bao

(Liberation Army Daily), 4 April 2000 p. 6 as translated and downloaded from the 

FBIS website on 6 April 2000.

497 Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui, “Planning and Application of Strategies of 

Information Operations in High-Tech Local War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China 

Military Science), Number 4 2000, pp. 115-122 as translated and downloaded from the 

FBIS website on 9 November 2000

498 Dai Qingmin, “Innovating and Developing Views on Information Operations.” 
177

and weakens a superior enemy while protecting or enhancing China’s fighting 

capacity. IW can serve as a type of invisible fighting capacity to evade combat 

with a stronger enemy.499 If a future IW goal is to defeat strong forces with 

weak forces using stratagems, then such methods are one of China’s 

asymmetric means to combat US high technology.500 Stratagems in this sense 

would be one of the “magic weapons” that Chinese strategic culture is always 

stressing.

Finally, Dai’s August 2000 article in China Military Science discusses

the use of electrons as stratagems and the development of an integrated 

network-electronic warfare capability. When combined with the active-offense 

concept, this article represents one of the most important IW articles written in 

China. 

Other less notable publications also discuss offensive operations. In a 

March 2000 Internet version of Computer and Information Technology, 

analysts at the PLA’s Electronic Engineering Institute at Hefei discuss the need 

for network confrontation teams and the requirement to conduct both defensive 

and offensive operations.501 In September 2000, the journal Guangjiao Jing

noted that the PLA had recently established IW departments within its 

headquarters organizations.502 Thus, the idea of offensive operations was not

limited just to Dai.

2001

The 2001 book Science of Strategy, published by China’s National 

Defense University, includes a section on offensive IW operations. It states that 

strategic IW should “use offense as a main strategy but be prepared for both 

offense and defense.” Further, it states “we should use the strategy of the 

preemptive strike and seize the initiative. Actively launching an information 

offensive is the key to seizing information superiority and the initiative on the 

battlefield.”503 In this sense, the thinking appears to apply mainly to wartime 

and not peacetime preemptive actions.

 

499 Ibid.

500 Ibid.

501 Yang Jian, Zhang Youhua, and Lu Zhankun, [no title], Jisuanji Yu Xinxi Jishu

(Internet version of Computer and Information Technology), Anhui Computer 

Subscriber Association and the Anhui Computer Society, 16 March 2000 as translated 

and downloaded from the FBIS website on 18 April 2000.

502 “China’s IW Capabilities,” Guangjiao Jing, Hong Kong, 16 September 2000. 

503 Ge Zhenfeng, Chapter 16, Section 4, p. 366. For translations of excerpts of this 

book, the author thanks Dr. Gary Bjorge, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas.
178

The Science of Strategy also describes the type of war to fight against 

networks. The book states that in a war of annihilation, nodes must be attacked 

to break up the network. Information and support systems must always be the 

first targets to offset operational balance followed by the stronger weapon 

systems. Science of Strategy notes that “after strikes to damage the net and 

continuous operations and persistent weakening of the enemy, then vigorously 

launch an annihilating attack.” Ground information warfare facilities, 

transmission means, perception platforms, and information-flow capabilities 

should be destroyed in that order. This type of attack enables one to “take away 

the firewood from under the cauldron.”504 While this scenario appears to apply 

to wartime conditions, it can easily be adapted to peacetime conditions as well.

Information technology has thus stimulated Chinese strategic thinking; 

military academics now argue that those who do not preempt will lose the 

initiative in what may be a very short-lived IO war. In modern conflicts, they 

suggest, it is easier to obtain the objective of war through one campaign or one 

battle than at any other time in history.505 This line of thinking provides further 

impetus for the PLA to conduct cyber reconnaissance activities in peacetime to 

“win victory before the first battle.” 

2002

An article from June 2002 states that PLA units were prepared to 

tamper “with information in terms of order, time, flow, content, and form; 

deleting information in parts, in order to create fragmented information; and 

inserting information to include irrelevant information in order to confuse and 

mislead each other.”506 The author adds that two sides in a computer 

confrontation may attempt to invade each other’s information networks by 

transplanting computer viruses to downloadable software that can be activated 

when necessary in order to sabotage each other’s computer systems.507

General Dai Qingmin wrote in 2002 that a priority for the PLA was to 

acquire offensive information operations equipment; and that the PLA must 

 

504 Ge Zhenfeng, Chapter 24, Section 6, p. 493.

505 Peng and Yao, pp. 418-419.

506 Wen T’ao, “PLA Bent on Seizing ‘Information Control’,” Hong Kong Ching Pao, 1 

June 2002, Number 299, pp. 44-46 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS 

website on 5 June 2002.

507 Ibid.
179

take and maintain the initiative.508 Other publications weighed in as well on this 

point. 

Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Bao), for example, carried an article 

in August of 2002 about the forms of network attacks. These were listed as 

“premeditated” (i.e., a persistent computer virus embedded in software), 

“contamination” (aimed at the quality of information), “strong” (refers to the 

forced modulation of computer viruses into electromagnetic waves), and 

“fission” (the strong regeneration capability of a virus). 509 All are capable of 

being inserted in peacetime except perhaps the “strong” variety.

2003

At the 2003 10th National People’s Congress, PLA representatives 

revealed that it would activate the first high-tech information warfare units 

(IWU) in Beijing that year. The report stated that the units would eventually be 

in all PLA armies. IWUs would be outfitted with high-tech equipment, have the 

ability to conduct network warfare on the Internet, and have the capability to 

transfer data via remote sensing satellites.510 How this “first” IW unit differs 

from the IW brigades under discussion in the 1999 Chinese book Information 

War is unknown. 

General Dai, writing in 2003, stressed once again the importance of 

carrying out information attacks.511 Dai wrote that IW is “precursory” (begins 

before other operations) and “whole course” (runs throughout an entire 

operation). Perhaps the current emphasis on gaining the initiative and on short 

wars are the main reasons that Dai gives the impression that preemption via IW 

is a necessity in future war.512 He notes:

Actions such as intelligence warfare, psychological warfare, and 

campaign deception in advance of combat seem to be even more 

important to the unimpeded implementation of planning and ensuring 

war. For this reason, information warfare must be started in advance of 

 

508Dai Qingmin, “On Integrating Network Warfare and Electronic Warfare,” Zhongguo 

Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Feb 2002, pp. 112-117 as translated and 

downloaded from the FBIS website on 24 June 2002.

509 Fan Yongsheng, Wu Xinghan, “War on Networks: Modern ‘Contradictory’ 

Offensive, Defensive Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 14 August 

2002, p. 11 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 14 August 2002.

510 “PLA to Organize First Information Warfare Units,” Mingpao News, 12 March 

2003, http://full.mingpaonews.com/20030312.

511 Direct Information War, p. 170.

512 Direct Information War, p. 169.
180

other combat actions before making war plans and while making war 

plans.513

It goes without saying that intelligence warfare includes surveillance. 

Specific reserve units also engage in IW activities. For example, in late 

2003 the monthly journal of the PLA Academy of Military Science, Guofang, 

gave specific instructions on network attack activities to reserve units. Author 

Li Mingrang states that information storm troop “fist forces” must be 

established from the talent of local communications, telecommunications, and 

financial departments; and from scientific research institutes and institutions of 

higher education. Stratagems must be developed to increase system 

survivability.514 Li adds:

There is no shortage of computer experts and network jockeys among 

them, any one of whom could become a network guerrilla who could 

open up a gunpowderless battlefield all by himself by harassing attacks 

on the network, namely by releasing large volumes of data from many 

directions concentrated on some enemy network station to jam up its 

network router and bring the network station to a standstill...and once 

there is a military requirement, either enter the network system to steal 

intelligence, or to activate viruses or detonate ‘bombs’ to achieve the 

combat target of destroying the network....515

Reserve forces are directed to work on offensive strategies.

In his 2003 book Deciphering Information Security, China’s “Father of 

Information Warfare,” retired Colonel Shen Weiguang, wrote about the 

development of an information security university with a military information 

security specialty. The specialty teaches, among some twenty plus topics, “A 

Study of Hacker Attack Methods,” “Network Intrusion Detection and 

Defending against Attack,” “Information Attack and Defense Tactics,” 

“Computer Virus Program Design and Application,” “Network Security System 

Structures,” and “Scanning for Hidden Troubles in Networks.”516 Many of these 

 

513 Ibid.

514 Li Mingrang, “Develop the Advantage of People’s War under the Conditions of 

Innovation and Informatization,” Guofang, 15 November 2003, pp. 7-8 as translated 

and downloaded from the FBIS website.

515 Ibid.

516 Shen Weiguang, Deciphering Information Security, Xinhua Publishing House, July 

2003, pp. 127-241.
181

topics would fit the definition of the PLA’s peacetime computer network 

operations incursion activities.

2005

In the 2005 book Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, 

General Dai and his associates defined 400 IO related terms, many related to 

preemptive or reconnaissance activities. Only computer network warfare is 

described here.

Computer network warfare is composed of computer network 

reconnaissance, computer network attacks, and computer network 

defense. Operations mainly involve the use of armed and equipped 

network warriors. The means of operations include various types of 

viruses, logic bombs, and chip weapons developed from computer 

technology. Computer network warfare will act as both a deterrent and 

a means of warfare, and it can have a large and profound impact upon 

the enemy’s politics, economics, and military. It is also an important 

means of battle for a less well-equipped military against one with 

formidable strengths in high technology.517

Dai also discussed the importance of the conduct of warfare, focusing 

on information deterrence as a concept to consider and develop further at the 

strategic level. Other who have written on the topic of information deterrence

include Shen Weiguang and the editors of the book Science of Military Strategy

(an entire chapter in the book was devoted to the topic). It is thought that 

information deterrence (intimidating someone by demonstrating one’s 

information power or might) can help achieve national and military strategic 

objectives. Deterrence methods include information technology, information 

weapons, and information-resource suppression. According to some Chinese 

authors, counter-information deterrence theories must also be considered. 

In Warfare Strategy Theory (2005), Yao Youzhi asserts that strategy 

has developed to the point where technological considerations dominate and the 

use of technology has become strategic. Any strategy that distances itself from 

focusing on high-technology weapons has no useful value, according to Yao. 

This also means that China must develop sound counterstrategies. 518 He 

writes: 

 

517 Ibid., p. 211.

518 Yao Youzhi, Editor-in-Chief, Warfare Strategy Theory, Liberation Army Press, 

2005, pp. 475-476.
182

It is necessary to be proficient at utilizing the information 

superhighway, creating misleading information, spreading the fog of 

war, and jamming and destroying the enemy’s strategic awareness,

thereby using strategy to control the adversary. It is necessary to be 

proficient at using electronic feints, electronic camouflage, electronic 

jamming, virus attacks, and space satellite jamming and deception, 

leading the enemy to draw the wrong conclusion and attaining the goal 

of strategic deception.519

While designed for wartime use, several of these techniques work as peacetime 

preventive and preemptive measures as well.

In “stovepipe” structured commands of the past, a force calculated its 

strength by adding together all of its parts. Today, Yao notes, a force’s combat 

strength is a product of operational elements where information technologies 

factor into a potentially exponential multiplication.

520

Yao writes that informationized warfare has changed the traditional 

significance of “attack, capture, control, and defend” because precision attacks 

have made possible the destruction of the enemy’s entire war system. The 

primary attack target has become an enemy force’s strategic information 

system. All activities now revolve around gaining battlefield supremacy, and 

information supremacy is the foundation of battle supremacy. Directly

destroying an enemy’s will has supplanted the annihilation of an enemy’s 

military capability. This focus on information invites completely new methods 

in future wars.521

2007

Author Zhang Zhibin notes in a 13 March 2007 Liberation Army Daily

(Jiefanguin Bao) article that the dialectical relationship between offense and 

defense in network warfare must place equal emphasis on each. A network 

deterrence theory implies that both capabilities are necessary, offense to scare 

any potential enemy force, and defense to thwart any attack. Zhang says:

Only by doing a solid job of positive defense can China ensure winning 

the initiative in network warfare. Thus, China should make unremitting 

efforts to seek such preemptive opportunities through developing 

 

519 Ibid.

520 Ibid., pp. 346-349.

521 Ibid., pp. 99-101.
183

network technology and systems and making corresponding network 

defensive operations research and implementation.522

Other articles from 2007 stress a need for PLA action to gain network 

control, including access, if possible. Two books on Chinese IO by this author, 

Dragon Bytes and Decoding the Virtual Dragon, mention this focus on control.

Probable Chinese Computer Attacks against the US

Over the past several years, Chinese IW and IO capabilities have 

become more visible and troubling. China has used these capabilities not only 

against the US but reportedly against Japan, Taiwan, Germany, England, and 

Australia as well. Due to the nature of CNO, exactly how many Chinese IW 

reconnaissance or offensive events have transpired or the actual intent of these 

incursions remains unknown. Those episodes that have leaked into the public 

domain include the following:

 Espionage conducted against the US Department of Defense (DoD) 

computers, reported in Time magazine. The report concerned a Chinese 

cyber espionage ring that federal investigators code-named Titan Rain. 

Its target was DoD computers.523

 Chinese attempts to blind a US satellite, reported in Defense News. The 

report discussed high-powered Chinese laser attacks on a US 

satellite.524

 Chinese hacker attacks on the US Naval War College’s net capability, 

reported in Federal Computer Week. This attack purportedly originated 

from China and took systems off-line.525

 The Chinese destruction of an old Chinese weather satellite with an 

anti-satellite missile, reported on National Public Radio. The report 

cited a Beijing People’s University commentator. He noted “satellite 

 

522 Zhang Zhibin, “Offense is Not Necessarily the Best Defense—Preliminary Study 

and Thinking on the Dialectical Relationship between Offense and Defense in Network 

Warfare,” Liberation Army Daily, 13 March 2007, as downloaded from the Open 

Source Center web site on 9 April 2007.

523 Nathan Thornburgh, “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies,” Time, 29 August 

2005, downloaded from http://www.time.com on 23 January 2007.

524 Vago Muradian, “China Tried to Blind US Sats with Laser,” Defense News, 25 

September 2006, p. 1.

525 Josh Rogin, “Network Attack Disables Naval War College,” Federal Computer 

Week, 30 November 2006, downloaded from http://www.fcw.com.
184

killing technology is logical in the development of missiles and an IW 

capability.”526

 A sophisticated computer attack on Tennessee’s Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory in October and November 2007. The assault was in the 

form of phony e-mails which, when opened, allowed hackers to 

penetrate the lab’s computer security.527

 Hacker attacks against Japan and Taiwan, reported in the Japanese and 

Taiwanese press.528 The reports noted that these attacks were 

retaliations for Japan’s anti-Chinese interpretations of history and for 

Taiwanese claims for independence.

On 5 September 2007 the Kansas City Star carried an article in which 

China denied cyber-attacking any country. Foreign Ministry spokesman Jian 

Yu noted that “the Chinese government has always opposed an Internetwrecking crime, including hacking, and cracked down on it according to the 

law.”529 He dismisses accusations of Chinese attacks on Pentagon computers as 

“groundless.” A Pentagon spokesman refused to say if the perpetrator was 

China, but Britain’s Financial Times quotes an unidentified senior US official 

as saying the source had been traced to the PLA. 

A week earlier, Germany’s Der Spiegel magazine reported that the 

PLA had infiltrated Germany’s government computer systems. The report said 

the “hackers” had been traced back to Guangzhou and Lanzhou.530 Thus 

circumstantial evidence continues to grow. It is difficult to believe that 

Germany, Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and America are all conniving to indict

China and portray it as a new threat. Indeed, through unprovoked cyber 

operations, China seems to have indicted itself without anyone’s assistance.

China’s Use of Surrogates 

One of China’s stratagems is to “attack with a borrowed sword.” 

Perhaps the use of patriotic hackers fits this stratagem in a preemption and 

 

526 Anthony Kuhn, National Public Radio, 19 January 2007, interview with Beijing 

representative.

527 “Oak Ridge National Lab Reports ‘Sophisticated’ Cyber Attack Netted Personal 

Data on Visitors,” The Associated Press, 6 December 2007, as downloaded from 

http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=8626732.

528 “Chinese Hackers Attack Taiwan Military Computers,” Taipei P’ing-kuo Jih-pao

(Internet Version) 15 May 2006, as reported in Open Source Center report 

CPP20060516310002.

529 Tim Johnson, “China Denies Cyber-Attack,” Kansas City Star, 5 September 2007, p. 

A5.

530 Ibid.
185

intelligence collecting way. A recent article in Time magazine discussed the use 

of the Network Crack Program Hacker (NCPH) group initiative to accomplish 

this goal. The article stated that the PLA had developed a competition for 

hackers and that the winner would receive a monthly stipend from the military. 

It noted that the NCPH group not only won the competition and received the 

stipend, but the PLA also used the NCPH to teach techniques and procedures to 

other members of the PLA’s cyber warfare team. A US branch of VeriSign, 

iDefense, has noted that China’s NCPH created 35 programs to implant Trojans 

(which take partial control of computers) and that these programs attacked US 

government agencies. VeriSign’s iDefense accused the NCPH of siphoning off 

thousands of unclassified US documents. Such activity would fit the PLA’s 

preemption focus.

531

The concept of “People’s War” also fits nicely with so-called patriotic 

hacking. “People’s War” in the cyber age means that citizens get involved with 

hacking or cyber attacking an enemy’s systems. Presently over 250 hacker 

groups operate in China.532 In this sense, quantity could create a quality all its 

own with the variety and intensity of incursions they could conduct. None 

could be traced directly to the PLA if hacker groups or private citizens are 

involved (or for that matter, military members or military reservists conducting

cyber operations from their home computers). Again, circumstantial evidence is 

all that one has to go on, but that evidence is becoming overwhelming.

Conclusions

Chinese CNO theory over the last several years from even open source 

material indicates that China wants to become proficient in the active-offense, 

cyber reconnaissance, cyber-stratagem, and computer exploitation activities in 

case the PLA has to go to war. If China feels it can gain the initiative by 

obtaining information superiority or by preventing cyber strikes, then the 

coming years may involve challenges from that sector. While it remains easy to 

measure the intent of steel in the form of a tank, it is much harder to measure 

the intent of a Chinese electron. Is it inserting a virus, conducting 

reconnaissance, or disabling a system? The world will move into uncertain 

territory as nations attempt to conduct responses to and develop consequence 

management actions for truly disruptive electronic intrusions. 

 

531 Simon Elegant, “Enemies at the Firewall,” Time, downloaded from 

http://www.time.com/time on 19 December 2007.

532 Conversation with Mr. Scott Henderson, whose book Dark Visitor is probably the 

best open source work on Chinese hackers.
186

The Chinese note that IO tactics and techniques allow more emphasis 

on the principle of offense than on traditional methods of warfare. A weaker 

force, for example, can inflict much damage on a superior force with a properly 

timed and precisely defined asymmetric information attack. China portrays 

itself regularly as the weaker side of the US-Chinese relationship. It thinks that 

offensive operations such as information deterrence, information blockade, 

information power creation (electronic camouflage, network deception, etc.), 

information contamination, information harassment, nodal destruction, system 

paralysis, and entity destruction are key to victory in a modern conflict with 

America.

One should remember that this analysis stems only from open-source 

information and public comments from the PLA, and that China’s 

understanding of the intersection of strategy and information technology, 

especially as it relates to actual conflict, is not extensive in a practical sense.

The Chinese have little recent experience with conflict. Their forces have not 

fought an actual war in decades. From a theoretical perspective, however, 

China has written extensively on the use of information technology and 

information preemption and given both much thought. Chinese cyber intrusions 

indicate that the Chinese are gaining a lot of practical and theoretical 

experience in peacetime.

The PLA’s open-source comments can be interpreted either as an 

attempt to work with the West or to vigorously oppose it. Perhaps the PLA is 

being very open and transparent in its cyber strategies, perhaps more open than 

in any other area of military operations. (The PLA appears more open with its 

IW thinking, for example, than Russia). If the PLA’s intent is to oppose the 

West, it may in fact be concealing rich information warfare concepts in PLA 

“rules and regulations” (the PLA’s equivalent of doctrine) within the general 

staff directorates and research institutes. China’s IW rules and regulations are 

not available to other nations, while unclassified US doctrine is available to 

anyone on the Internet. The PLA keeps its rules and regulations close to its

chest. In this case, lack of doctrinal transparency introduces unwanted 

ambiguity. America and other nations under threat of PLA incursions may react 

harshly to some scenarios developed by the Chinese and, thus, unintentionally

set off a conflict.

How and when China might use its active-offensive concepts for 

purposes other than reconnaissance is unclear, but, as general concepts, they are 

worrisome. It does not bode well for future cooperation and stability if Chinese 

theorists really do believe (as they openly state) that China can offset an 

opponent’s information superiority only if China strikes first. China will no 
187

doubt continue to use technology in conjunction with innovative stratagems to 

try to deceive our high-tech systems or perhaps even to force errors in the 

cognitive processes of US decision-makers. We must continue to be on the 

lookout for these attempts.
188

CHAPTER EIGHT: A CRITIQUE OF THE BOOK 

INFORMATION WARFARE IN CHINA

This chapter highlights key aspects of the thinking of several important 

information warfare specialists in China, looking at both theory and 

technology.533

The core for a real update to our ideas lies in a transformation to our 

way of thinking.534

Introduction

In 2005, Shen Weiguang, the father of information warfare (IW) in 

China, edited a book titled Information Warfare in China.

535 Shen collected 

chapters from some of the most prominent writers in China on IW issues. 

Among them were Li Bingyan, master strategist; Wang Baocun, expert on the 

revolution in military affairs and foreign IW; and Wang Pufeng, a former 

director of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science’s Strategy Research 

Department. The ten authors in the volume focused solely on IW-related issues, 

to include: IW theory; changes in the nature of warfare; computer network 

operations (CNO); IW definitions; attacks on thought and spirit in peace and 

war; organizational development; information security; counters to adversary 

IW; innovative thinking; and the education of IW personnel. 

This chapter discusses each author’s thoughts. The chapter is divided 

into two parts. The first part describes theory-related input from specialists. The 

second part describes technical-related input. Authors are identified along with 

their chapter titles.

 

533 This author reviewed Shen Weiguang’s book Information Warfare in China and 

credits the content, concepts, and ideas to the book’s editor and authors of the 

individual chapters. The content of their book is reviewed based on translated material. 

534 Feng Yi, “Considerations Regarding Information and Network Security for the 

Chinese Military,” Information Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, New 

Military Affairs Reference (Special Edition), pp. 100-115.

535 Shen Weiguang, Editor, Information Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, 

New Military Affairs Reference (Special Edition). About page references in this 

chapter: after a reference to the inclusive pages wherein a chapter is found in the 

original Chinese text, additional citations and quotes taken from the chapter are listed as 

“ibid.” A translation was utilized for this chapter and therefore it is not possible to 

identify the exact page where the citation can be located in the original text, only the 

chapter pages.
189

Part One: Theory 

IW Theoretician Shen Weiguang: Shen writes that information warfare 

is encouraging a revolution in military philosophy. This revolution would be 

marked by a leap from tangible to intangible warfare, the latter being a war 

fought in invisible space and capable of being conducted without bloodshed.

536

IW is making humanity seek ideal wars with minimal destruction. 

During IW, Shen adds, groups are pitted against one another to contest

for control over information space and to contend for information resources. 

Wars would seek to attain control or a balance point on behalf of one’s 

interests. Strategically this involves destroying an adversary’s will to fight. 

Battles would involve upsetting an adversary’s decision-making process. 

Tactics would involve paralyzing an adversary’s system of strength. Fights over 

the information frontier would be of the following types: invasion, confusion, 

deterrence, and destruction.537

In the 2000 book Ideal War, Shen proposed the establishment of an 

Internet Nation, an information factory, an information gendarme, and 

information-based armed forces. Ideal war, the least destructive form of war, 

reflects a country’s comprehensive national power and the latest achievements 

in science and technology. Robot war, clone war, leader war, star wars, virtual 

war, ideological war, media wars, and cognitive wars all reflect the features of 

ideal war. 

Other books by Shen include The Third World War: Total Information 

Warfare in 1990 and Cognitive Warfare in 1993. In these works he proposed 

that the real significance of IW lay in the methods to attack thought and 

spirit.538 This is because there is no dividing line between war and peace when 

it comes to propaganda wars. There are always attempts to influence the 

emotions, motivation, judgment, and decision-making of the masses. 

Developed countries with access to broadcasting, television, and computer 

networks expand their information frontier through the dissemination of 

political will and political values abroad. The only defense against these actions 

is People’s War where the people’s spirit fights an intangible war to defend 

China’s information sovereignty and information frontier.539

 

536 Shen Weiguang, “The Profound Impact of Information Warfare on Civilization and 

Strategic Countermeasures,” Information Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, 

New Military Affairs Reference (Special Edition), pp. 258-295.

537 Ibid.

538 Ibid.

539 Ibid.
190

External threats to China (such as Shen’s belief that the West intends to 

interfere with China’s information security) and internal threats such as hackers 

and organized crime are daily events to monitor, in Shen’s opinion. He is 

particularly concerned with internal threats, noting that local and regional 

problems could be disseminated over the Internet and thus become national 

problems. Chinese people have at times recklessly engaged in propaganda 

online which could incite a chain reaction of discontent. Perhaps most 

important, however, is that information strategies, policies, and rules and 

regulations have lagged behind progress in the incorporation of information 

technology in China. Many Chinese now possess information tools that are not 

regulated.540

Master Strategist Li Bingyan: Li’s chapter was titled “The Framework 

of the Informationization Buildup of China’s Armed Forces.” His main thesis is 

that information technology can narrow the digital divide between the 

information-haves and have-nots among nation-states. This would be 

accomplished, Li notes, by presenting precise requirements for information age

force purchases. Li writes that he is “anxiously awaiting the establishment of 

something on the order of a ‘Government Agency for the Design of Future 

Operations’” and a discipline called the “science of demand.”541

The focus of friendly information systems in Li’s opinion should be to 

gain control of an adversary’s command and control system. Chinese systems 

must be reliable and properly designed before being put to use. This requires, 

first of all, determining the PLA’s strategic goals. Future information-based 

battlefield environments and the nature of capabilities required to win future 

wars must be clarified. It is vital to study history and avoid mistakes made by 

others if a system’s developmental stage is to be shortened. Modes of thinking 

need to change as well. Second, introducing new systems requires the 

shattering of mechanized forces so that an information-based force can evolve. 

Forces, management, and operations are all equally important in this 

transformation.542

Li emphasizes that the change from an industrial to an information 

society is not focused solely on technology. He states that China must be 

careful not to neglect the changes to culture and philosophical methodologies 

that an information society produces. An all-round ideological revolution is 

 

540 Ibid.

541 Li Bingyan, “The Framework of the Informationization Buildup of China’s Armed 

Forces,” Information Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, New Military Affairs 

Reference (Special Edition), pp.15-37. 

542 Ibid.
191

required, one that takes the human aspect into account. He notes that the US 

had produced such a revolution, replacing Newtonian theory with chaos and 

complexity theory. 

Other recommendations for building an information-based military 

include learning how to solicit bids for orders based on operational demands, in 

particular how to work with civilian information-technology experts; learning 

how to continually update software; and learning how to select personnel for 

IW at the local level “as early as possible. We need to get our hands on them 

while they are little.”543 Thus, in addition to setting up networks, a knowledge 

system must be constructed that teaches people how to adjust their thinking to 

the information age. Outdated obstructions from another era, such as 

mechanized ways of doing business and dated cultural tendencies, must be 

eliminated as information technology is incorporated into the PLA’s way of life 

and equipment.544

Li observes that all military activities are either movement activities or 

cognitive activities. Information technology activities are located principally in 

the cognition domain of soft warfare. Instead of counting divisions to weigh 

military capabilities, information technology “calculates competencies and 

communication capabilities.”545 He noted that technology and hardware can be 

purchased on the market, thereby “leapfrogging” over industrial age 

developments, but this cannot happen in education. Habits of thought and 

cultural developments are inherited and cannot be skipped over. Li is confident 

that in the next three to five years the number of personnel in the Chinese 

military graduating from institutions of higher learning may surpass the number 

graduating from similar institutions in developed countries. 

Finally, Li envisions a melding of military cultures in the East and the 

West based on factors such as the East’s craving for science and technology and 

the West’s search for wisdom and knowledge; and the fact that warfare is 

undergoing a change from destroying the enemy to “controlling the enemy and 

looking out for your own interests.”546 Li summarizes his thoughts by noting 

that “the incorporation of information technology in the military requires 

placing emphasis on technology, but also upon wisdom and strategy.”547

 

543 Ibid.

544 Ibid.

545 Ibid.

546 Ibid.

547 Ibid.
192

Strategy Expert Wang Pufeng: Wang writes that theory is the guide for 

action and thus he begins his discussion with a look at IW theory. He defines 

IW using the 1997 edition of Military Terms, a Chinese military book. The 

definition states that 

IW is confrontational actions in the information realm performed by 

two hostile parties. They primarily contend for information resources, 

gaining the initiative in the production, transmission, and processing of 

information, and destroying the enemy’s information transmission, as a 

means of containing or winning the favorable terms created by the 

war.548

Wang only considers wartime IW in his comments. Wartime IW includes 

electronic warfare, missile warfare, intelligence warfare, psychological warfare, 

and command and control warfare, which Wang believes is the core component 

of IW. The key to any action in war, Wang notes, is to gain information 

supremacy or to control information that can lead to control over another 

force’s information initiative. IW, which is an operational term to Wang, is 

integrated into hard and soft warfare and into technology and tactics. It also 

includes aspects outside of military operations such as war mobilization and 

information confrontation actions in areas such as politics, diplomacy, 

economics, and science and technology. IW, due to its importance, could 

become an independent form of military operation or an independent stage of 

warfare or an independent act of warfare.

549 This is a most important 

development in Wang’s opinion.

Further, Wang stresses that the battle for control and for the 

information initiative is key. Wang writes that controlling information is

defined as “the volume of information acquired within a defined domain of 

time or space that is far greater than that of an opponent. One’s flow of 

information must also be greater than that of an opponent.”

550

To gain control over an enemy, “three links and five measures” must be 

followed. The three links are that information acquisition capability determines 

information volumes; that information transmission capability determines 

information flow; and that information processing and utilization capabilities

determine the value of information. The five measures are reconnoitering an 

 

548 Wang Pufeng, “My Views on a Number of Matters Pertaining to the Study of 

Information Warfare,” Information Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, New 

Military Affairs Reference (Special Edition), pp. 36-47.

549 Ibid.

550 Ibid.
193

anti-reconnaissance site; interfering with anti-interference; destructing an antidestruction site; annihilating an anti-annihilation site; and controlling an anticontrol site.551

Command and control warfare in future wars will be reflected in the 

scientific and artistic nature of a commander’s strategic intent and operational 

programs. These programs will include the development: of a good information 

infrastructure on the battlefield; of operational secrecy and military deception; 

of unobstructed communication links; of electronic warfare, network warfare,

psychological warfare, and physical destruction; and of special operations.552

Wang concludes stating that China must innovate or it will fall behind. 

It must improve battlefield reconnaissance capabilities, put effort into network 

warfare, and develop precision weapons. It must pay attention to quantum and 

optical computer developments; micro-nano technologies; gene technologies; 

supersonic technologies; ion invisibility technology; unmanned platform 

technology; and developments in directed energy technology.

553 The revolution 

in military technology has produced a corresponding revolution in military 

thinking, operational methods, and structural organization to which the PLA 

must adapt according to Wang.

554

RMA and IW Expert Wang Baocun: The basic goal of the 

informatization buildup of the Chinese armed forces, according to Wang, is the 

comprehensive integration of mechanized forces “materials and energy” with 

informatized forces “information and knowledge.”The development of C4I 

systems, the integration of early warning and interdiction systems, and the 

development of command and control and precision strike systems are priority 

items that enable structure and function to be integrated.555

There are several ways that talent will be developed for this task. They

are the development of new courses in IW and information technology, the 

increased use of attack and defend options in IW exercises, and the 

development of new military organization. Wang advocates a “one objective, 

two paths, and five pillars of support” methodology for China’s informatization 

buildup. The objective of the buildup is to enhance China’s information 

 

551 Ibid.

552 Ibid.

553 Ibid.

554 Ibid.

555 Wang Baocun, “A Limited View of the Informationization Buildup of China’s 

Military,” Information Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, New Military 

Affairs Reference (Special Edition), pp. 116-153.
194

capabilities to allow information and knowledge to serve as the main factors in 

combat power. The two paths are comprehensive integration and the use of 

virtual reality environments. The five support pillars are “information 

technology, informatized weapons and equipment, informatized military 

personnel, a structural organization amenable to the rapid flow and use of 

information, and completely new military theory with informatized war theory 

at its core.”

556

Informatized war occurs in strategic space’s six spectrums, those being 

in Wang’s view land, sea, air, space, information, and knowledge. In these

spaces information is more likely to control firepower and mobility than at any 

time in history. Informatized weaponry offers the promise of greatly increased 

survival rates for planes, tanks, and ships. 

There are six principles that will ensure the buildup of the PLA’s 

forces. All are well-known to US analysts and leaders. They are:

 The principle of being guided by information. Without information 

one cannot strike accurately or implement concepts such as an 

information monopoly, protection, attacks, support, or umbrella, all 

of which provide an advantage over an enemy.

 The principle of comprehensive integration. Multiple systems must 

be integrated into one major system, as Admiral William Owens 

proposed years ago. Computer information processing technology 

will be the foundation for this integration.

 The principle of virtual practice. This principle allows nations to 

simulate future battlefields and future training and indicates when 

and how a force may face trouble. Combat laboratories accelerate 

the informatization buildup and enable operational theory and 

equipment to turn quickly into informatized operational 

capabilities.

 The principle of the integration of proximal and distal. This means 

being constantly ready for both immediate and long-term potential 

threats, since the latter can materialize quickly in the information 

age.

 The principle of concurrent push and pull. Military theory is 

pulling from the front. High technology is pushing from behind. 

These two factors keep the buildup moving.

 The principle of using the commercial world to promote the 

military. The civilian sector is driving the military sector more than 

 

556 Ibid.
195

at any time in history. China’s strategies of national informatization 

and the nation’s information infrastructure should guide the PLA’s 

military buildup.557

Wang then provides his advice on methods to accelerate the 

informatization buildup of the PLA. First, he recommends strengthening 

macro-control and establishing organizations to lead the effort. Elements of this 

organizational aspect were accomplished, he notes, with the 1993 Joint 

Conference on National Economic Informatization; the 1996 Leading Group 

for Informatization under the State Council; and the 2001 Leading Group for 

National Informatization. Still, a decision-making body with authority, an 

implementation body for the informatization buildup, an advisory body of 

experts for the buildup (to include senior experts in information theory and 

technology), and leading groups for the buildup composed of leaders primarily 

from the Communications Departments of the war zones need to be 

developed.558

Second, unified planning at top state levels must be strengthened. A 

“gold combination” of comprehensive electronic systems should become the 

main element of combat power. In particular, systems integration must be 

standardized. This includes basic frameworks, port technology, upgrading and 

updating capabilities, and various types of software platforms and test 

standards. There must be a method established for demonstrations and 

assessments.

Third, there must be major theoretical innovations. Information 

network structures; information operations “fist” forces that test digitized 

departments and units; future war problems (such as digital blockades in the 

early stages of a conflict); a tactical framework that supports critical directions 

in preliminary planning; the cultivation of high-caliber personnel; and an 

investigation into the characteristics and use of People’s War ideology, along 

with joint topics, must be developed.559

Fourth, a focus should be put on informatized war requirements for the 

future as the military’s organizational structure is reformed. What is important 

today are structural adjustments, optimized and enhanced technical content, and 

an increase in the number of technical units, especially those for computer 

network warfare. Information security defense and electromagnetic frequency 

 

557 Ibid.

558 Ibid.

559 Ibid.
196

management forces are very important. Aerospace units must undergo 

enhanced research.560

Fifth, Wang recommends the creation of a mechanism for producing 

military personnel that is really people-centered since new personnel are the 

carriers of knowledge and information. Sixth, the focus must be on accelerating 

the buildup, especially for informatized systems and equipment as these are 

priority tasks. China must concentrate its development on communication 

systems that expand network coverage, on deception systems, and on the fusion 

of communication systems with other systems. Otherwise comprehensive 

control will not be possible. Reconnaissance, command and control, 

intelligence, electronic countermeasures, and early warning detection systems 

are other points of interest. Additional major developments include aerospace 

countermeasure weapons, destructive computer viruses, and directed energy 

and electromagnetic energy weapons.561

Mei Jun: To construct the proper military reform and have a chance to 

succeed in future wars requires an in-depth understanding of future war’s

nature, according to Mei. The RMA is really a revolution of the informatization

of warfare. The goal of past wars, which was to strike enemy personnel, has 

changed slightly. Now the goal may be to force people to give up through a 

demonstration of technological might and control over events that perhaps 

don’t even occur on the battlefield. Once control over willpower is lost an 

enemy force can become paralyzed and his combat capabilities decline 

drastically. Gaining control involves not just control over the carriers of 

information but also of the “meaning and effectiveness of information.”562

The two major aspects of information warfare are information attacks 

and information defense. Informatized war, as distinct from information 

warfare, is characterized by high precision firepower. Information warfare 

includes electronic warfare, psychological war, and network warfare. 

Cognitive issues include “disrupting the effectiveness of information, especially 

the disruption of the understanding and use of information by the human brain.” 

Such activities can be directly effective because they bypass many technical 

difficulties. Mei accuses the US of using laser holographic technologies during 

the Gulf War to concoct such a cognitive attack.

563

 

560 Ibid.

561 Ibid.

562 Mei Jun, “Understanding and Considerations of the Buildup of Information 

Warfare,” Information Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, New Military 

Affairs Reference (Special Edition), pp. 217-228.

563 Ibid.
197

Mei states that the search continues to transform IW into a “trump 

card” (Mei defines an IW trump card as “something involving a new 

mechanism or concept; it can be strategic, offensive, targeted, extremely 

effective, or acting as a deterrent.”); to make use of the successful experiences 

of foreign militaries; and to seek out asymmetrical developmental solutions for 

an IW buildup. The buildup will be on two levels: the strategic battle force that 

implements the task of gaining information superiority during battle; and the 

combined armed forces that support and cover tactical forces in combat.564

The main task of IW in battle, in addition to achieving information 

superiority, is to disrupt the strategic electronic information goals that the 

enemy relies upon for support and means. This requires a concentrated buildup 

of IW forces, concentrated means of control, and the concentrated use of 

strategic battle power. With regard to electronic destruction capabilities, “trump 

cards” must receive priority development. Intensive microwave interference 

equipment, electromagnetic pulse weapons, and laser anti-satellite equipment 

represent three types of such weapons. The idea behind this concept is to 

achieve a new strategic advantage (or shi).565

Mei writes that whoever achieves an advantage in the fight for network 

space will possess the strategic initiative in the twenty-first century. A 

paralyzed network will cause losses to the national economy, create social 

chaos, and reduce combat capabilities among other consequences. Two fronts 

will be at work, a strategic network warfare front based on the Internet that 

focuses on political and economic networks; and a battlefield network front that 

focuses on the closed and local interconnected networks on the battlefield. The 

latter are usually isolated from the Internet. More importantly, “if viruses have 

already been planted in battlefield networks beforehand, then various means of 

triggering them can be employed at the right time in order to conduct 

attacks.”566

Part Two: Technology-Related Issues 

Kong Lingtong: Kong states that network attacks are an entirely new 

combat means that will impact the outcome of future wars. The goal of war 

now is to control the enemy instead of annihilating him. Making an enemy 

become incapacitated means influencing the thinking and will of people’s 

ability to make decisions about war, to push an enemy into a dark box so that 

 

564 Ibid.

565 Ibid.

566 Ibid.
198

adversaries cannot “know the enemy” or “know thyself” which prevents them 

from converting war potential into war capability. Network platforms are 

special because they are not restricted by time, space, peace, or war.567

It will be necessary to mobilize people quickly during future network 

wars, Kong adds, and this will require new information-related developments in 

People’s War theory. Civilians will provide not only a new impetus to network 

conflict but also offer political, military, and technical advantages. Higher 

education focused on the sciences is a must if China wants to encourage and 

protect its talent, especially in the area of software. China must develop its own 

operating systems. Then Kong (in a rather disturbing revelation from a US 

perspective) quotes Zhu Qingshi, president of the University of Science and 

Technology of China and academician with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 

Zhu states that he had visited Silicon Valley and all he saw were former

students. Turnover for these types of people, he notes, is like giving someone 

else an atomic bomb.568 [Author: US analysts would view this comment with 

alarm. It can also be interpreted as the Chinese bleeding Silicon Valley dry of 

important information technology data.]

Kong adds that China must not let others lead it around. Instead China 

must prepare asymmetric responses to counter foreign advantages. China must 

“design programs which coerce the enemy into playing according to our rules.” 

The US is still weak in network administration, countering attacks by hackers, 

and understanding the risks of electronic commerce. China must make multiple 

preparations to exploit these weaknesses and to construct retaliatory operations. 

This includes the use of Special Forces to destroy enemy network centers and 

information nodes. Controlling these centers and nodes and establishing an 

invincible position are dependent upon one’s power of understanding and how 

alert and resourceful one is.569 Such thoughts feed into the PLA’s new mode of 

thinking.

Feng Yi: Feng writes, like others, that whoever controls information 

controls the initiative. To do so and to thwart the IW threat against China posed 

by Taiwan and other countries requires four things. First, China must decide 

upon the major focus of its development for short-term and long-term 

information security. Second, China must unify planning and implement 

development programs for IW technology and equipment. Third, China must 

 

567 Kong Lingtong, “Network Warfare and Our Strategies in Response,” Information 

Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, New Military Affairs Reference (Special 

Edition), pp. 89-99.

568 Ibid.

569 Ibid.
199

intensify its development of defensive IW technology. Finally, China must 

accelerate the strengthening of its comprehensive IW capabilities in the PLA. 

To make these changes requires a revolution in China’s military thinking, 

particularly at the highest level of leadership.570

Network-based modes of thought will eventually be integrated into 

cognitive networks. This means that an understanding of an issue, the cognitive

side, must be in sync with technological achievements if new systems are to 

experience their most positive efficiency. This is not a short-term process as the 

issues before us are often difficult to compute, Feng notes, such as how much 

network security is required for systems to be safe and how to prepare for the 

increasing variety of network attacks. Attackers are often anonymous; they can 

strike civilian facilities before military ones; and they may attack decisionmakers as well as computers. Determining the scale of the requirements to 

construct an effective defense is a very complex process due to the rapid 

advance in commercial products that can be used to attack systems.571

To strengthen China’s military defenses in the digital realm, the 

following principles should be followed. First, there must be a synchronized 

buildup of network security systems. Second, the management structure should 

be based on the “top-down and regional” principle. Third, there must be a 

sound legal and regulatory system for information security. Finally, network 

security objectives must include such actions as prepare and protect, monitor 

and respond, and stabilize and develop. Only with dedicated management can 

China’s security organizations be effective.572

China’s information space must be closely analyzed. Feng believes 

specialists should look at the conditions present in information space, examine 

what detection methods are available to monitor information space, develop 

defensive anti-deception capabilities for information space, and develop a 

survivable system structure for China’s information space. These conditions are 

actually reconnaissance, detection, and deception mechanisms. The latter 

mechanism is the trickiest since it is designed to create success in the mind of 

an enemy force when in fact his actions have failed. For example, the enemy 

force could believe that he is in your system when he is actually in a virtual 

system where his perceptions are monitored, manipulated, or disrupted.

 

570 Feng Yi.

571 Ibid.

572 Ibid.
200

Input into China’s network space perception system is examined by 

sniffers, login documents, protocol traps, infiltration detection systems, user 

databases, system messages, threat databases, and operational commands 

distributed in network equipment. Output includes the determination of the 

infiltrator’s identity, threat sources and malicious activity assessments, 

classification of threats, rates of attack, evaluation of an attack’s efficiency, and 

decision-making support and simulations. Data fusion and data mining are the 

two types of technology most often depended upon for “network space posture 

perception.”573

Computer Expert Ma Yexi: Ma’s chapter was titled “Computer Network 

Warfare: Functions, Means, and Developmental Trends.” Ma writes that 

information networks are a prime target for attack during an information war, 

especially those associated with C4ISR systems, national transportation centers, 

and communication centers. Successful attacks on these targets can affect an 

adversary’s strategic decision making.574

Ma defines computer network war (CNW) as “the general term for 

various types of computer network attacking and defending operations 

conducted throughout network space using advanced information 

technology.”575 Such attacks on national strategic command and control 

networks, communication networks, intelligence networks, and various civilian 

networks have a direct impact on national politics, the military, the economy, 

and diplomacy.576

Computer network warfare is hard to trace and its intent is hard to 

determine. The functions of CNW include deterrence, reconnaissance, 

disruption, deception, and protection. CNW’s ability to distract an adversary or 

enable superiority (and convince an opponent that capabilities and advantages 

lie with friendly forces) can cause CNW to become a “network deterrent” that 

forces opponents to respect the rules of the game. Reconnaissance of military 

networks allows friendly forces to steal military intelligence. Once passwords 

are acquired, programs can be configured to steal data and preconfigured 

programs can steal information. Adversary systems must also be monitored for 

information leaks. Ma writes that in the US the authority for, legitimacy of, and 

target selection for the use of network warfare have yet to be clearly 

 

573 Ibid.

574 Ma Yexi, “Computer Network Warfare: Functions, Means, and Developmental 

Trends,” Information Warfare in China, Xinhua Publishing, 2005, New Military Affairs 

Reference (Special Edition), pp. 229-257. 

575 Ibid.

576 Ibid. 
201

demonstrated. [Author: Perhaps this is a main reason why China attempts to 

conduct so many reconnaissance operations against the US.]

Disruption includes the use of viruses, hacker attacks, and information 

interference or physical destruction to either keep systems from working 

properly or to paralyze or destroy them. Deception involves the use of false 

electronic intelligence, false electronic resolve, and false electronic 

deployments to entice an opponent into making erroneous judgments or to take 

an action beneficial to friendly forces. Finally, Ma adds, the protection of 

friendly systems can involve attacking adversary systems to improve the 

defensive capabilities of one’s own computer networks. Strikes should be made 

against important nodes of adversarial networks. Other defensive means to 

preserve the normal acquisition, transmission, and processing of information 

include camouflage, confidentiality, hardening, and backups.577

The basic form of CNW, Ma notes, is attacking and defending physical 

entities, operating systems, and protocols. Attack means include system 

infiltration, computer virus attacks, deception attacks, denial of service attacks, 

attacks on physical entities, and network attacks. Of particular interest are 

information-deception attacks. Ma states that these are “the combined use of 

hacker attacks and computer virus attacks on the enemy’s computer networks 

based on the use of such technology as computer images, electronic displays, 

voice recognition and synthesis, sensory transmission, and virtual reality in 

order to distribute and transmit false messages and false commands...”578

Defensive measures include access control, network isolation, network 

surveillance, encryption, and physical protection.579

Ma notes that gaining information superiority is critical to determining 

victory in future war. Network superiority is comprised of ensuring sound 

network operations, network security, ensuring military information is not 

harmed, weakening or disrupting an enemy’s ability to use its networks, and 

ensuring the control of one’s networks. This also further develops one’s 

sovereignty. Control of one’s networks allows for gaining the initiative and 

preventing an adversary force from infiltrating Chinese networks.580

Countermeasure Experts Feng Yi and Zhang Jie: China must work 

hard, the authors note, to develop countermeasures to US equipment since 

China doesn’t have the ability at the present time to follow the same path as the 

 

577 Ibid.

578 Ibid. 

579 Ibid.

580 Ibid.
202

US military-industrial complex and develop high-tech equipment. For example, 

the Chinese ability to counter GPS technology is now a key to countering 

satellite guided weapons. The weapons can’t work properly without a good 

GPS system. The Chinese note that the GPS receiver on an opponent’s missile 

cannot work normally or may not even work at all if an interfering signal with a 

noise level intensity equal to or greater than 80 decibels is used. This greatly 

reduces the missile’s hit accuracy.

581

Chinese scientists also report that a GPS interference device with a 

transmission power of five watts can prevent a GPS receiver on cruise missiles 

from working within a radius of 50 kilometers; and that an omni-directional 

radio interference device with a transmission power of 100 watts can disrupt 

GPS receivers within a 1,000 kilometer radius.582

China’s counter technology path is following the development of six 

concepts: anti-satellite equipment, counter warning systems/reconnaissance 

equipment, counter-GPS systems, electronic warfare technology, and 

concealment devices. Simultaneously, a knowledge military must be developed 

along with a sensor force, precision strike force, and intelligence and logistic 

forces

583 in order to implement new modes of thinking.

The struggle to control information is at the heart of IW. 

Countermeasures will be key to ensuring that the struggle comes out in China’s 

favor. Fast-breaking developments in civilian technology will also play an 

important role here.584

Conclusions

The key thoughts of Shen and his co-authors reflect many of the same 

methods and points of emphasis as other writers in The Dragon’s Quantum 

Leap. Control, knowledge, trump cards, psychological operations, and 

countermeasures were all highlighted and usually by multiple authors. 

The struggle to control information is at the heart of IW. Controlling 

information was defined as “the volume of information acquired within a 

defined domain of time or space that is far greater than that of an opponent. 

One’s flow of information must also be greater than that of an opponent.” Li

 

581 Feng Yi and Zhang Jie, “China’s Military Countermeasures against the 

Development of Informatized Equipment,” Information Warfare in China, Xinhua 

Publishing, 2005, New Military Affairs Reference (Special Edition), pp. 202-216. 

582 Ibid.

583 Ibid.

584 Ibid.
203

underscored that warfare is changing from destroying the enemy to “controlling 

the enemy and looking out for your own interests.” Kong Lingtong wrote that 

network attacks are an entirely new combat force the goal of which is to control 

the enemy instead of annihilating him. To control an adversary, China must 

prepare asymmetric responses to counter foreign advantages and “design 

programs which coerce the enemy into playing according to our rules.”

With regard to knowledge, Li envisioned that a melding of East-West 

military cultures is occurring. This is due to factors such as the East’s craving 

for science and technology and the West’s search for wisdom and knowledge. 

Each can help the other. China realizes that without innovation in its science 

and technology potential it will fall further behind the West. The PLA’s 

battlefield reconnaissance capabilities must improve, more effort must be put 

into network warfare, and precision weapons must be developed. It must pay 

attention to all of the new technologies that are now emerging. 

The revolution in military technology has produced a corresponding 

revolution in military thinking, operational methods, and structural 

organization. There is a new focus on the attainment and use of knowledge. 

Shen focused on the application of knowledge with his prediction that robot 

war, clone war, leader war, star wars, virtual war, ideological war, media wars, 

and cognitive wars all reflect the features of ideal wars of the future. Wang 

Baocun stated that the informatization buildup relies on the comprehensive 

integration of mechanized forces “materials and energy” with the informatized 

forces “information and knowledge” focus. 

Mei Jun wrote that a knowledge military must be developed 

simultaneously with a sensor force, guiding mobile force, precision strike force, 

and an intelligence and logistics force. Electronic destruction capabilities will 

be one of the important “trump cards” that must receive priority development. 

The idea behind the development of trump cards is to achieve a new strategic 

advantage (or shi) over an adversary. Mei wrote that whoever achieves 

advantages in the fight for network space will possess the strategic initiative in 

the twenty-first century, implying that control over network space is also a 

trump card. This is because a paralyzed network can cause losses to the national 

economy, create social chaos, and reduce combat capability among other 

consequences.

Feng Yi notes that China’s information space must be closely analyzed

for the penetration of adversarial psychological operations specialists. Chinese 

specialists should look at the conditions present in information space, examine 

what detection methods are available to monitor information space, develop 
204

defensive deception capabilities for information space, and develop a 

survivable system structure for China’s information space. The deception 

mechanism is designed to create success in the mind of an enemy force when in 

fact his actions have failed.

Feng Yi and Zhang Jie note that China’s counter technology path must 

develop six concepts: anti-satellite equipment, counter warning 

systems/reconnaissance equipment, counter GPS systems, electronic warfare 

technology, and concealment devices. Countermeasures will be key to ensuring 

that the struggle comes out in China’s favor. 

Finally, Ma Yexi wrote that computer network war includes

deterrence, reconnaissance, disruption, deception, and protection. CNW’s 

ability to distract an adversary or enable superiority (and convince an opponent 

that capabilities and advantages lie with friendly forces) can cause CNW to 

become a “network deterrent” that forces opponents to respect the rules of the 

game. It fully represents the integration of knowledge with materials and 

energy.
205

CHAPTER NINE: TAIWAN EXAMINES CHINESE 

INFORMATION WARFARE

This chapter summarizes the views of several Taiwanese specialists who focus 

on Chinese information warfare (IW) tactics, organization, and policy.

585

Currently Communist China is pushing a revolution in military affairs and 

information war is at its core. In this military thinking the “pre-emptive strike” 

strategy is a very important component.586

Introduction

Taiwanese military specialists have studied Chinese IW topics for over 

two decades. Due to their common language, culture, and close proximity with 

the mainland, the Taiwanese are capable of discerning nuances in the People’s 

Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) approach to IW that might escape a Western 

analyst. Some of the interesting PLA IW concepts that Taiwanese military 

professionals have discussed, for example, include:

 Acupuncture war

 Highly-controlled war

 Strategic information war

 Political work Web sites

 Intangible war

 Net force

 Surgical war

Understanding the PLA’s potential use of information technology and 

IW theory is key to the future security strategy of the Republic of Taiwan 

(ROC). It is mandatory for Taiwanese government and civilian professionals to 

study Chinese IW intensely and be able to predict and foresee the PLA’s

potential use of IW against Taiwan in both peacetime and wartime.

This chapter will examine Taiwan’s analysis of several issues 

(asymmetric war, IW theory, political work and psychological war, media war, 

and PLA IW institutes) associated with PLA IW. Also covered in this chapter 

will be Taiwan’s view of the PLA’s focus on the revolution in military affairs 

and how that revolution has transformed the PLA from a mechanized to an 

 

585 This chapter first appeared as an article in High Frontier, Vol. 5, Number 3, 2009, 

pp. 26-35.

586 Lin Tsung-ta, Strategic Dominance Initiative of the PRC’s Information War, Crystal 

Books, May 2005, page unknown.
206

informatized force. These developments impact the PLA’s policy, organization, 

education, structure, and theory of IW.

A Taiwanese View of the PLA’s Revolution in Military Affairs

The Chinese military has studied the meaning and impact of the 

revolution in military affairs (RMA) for more than two decades. While it might 

be assumed that China’s understanding of the RMA would be similar to that of 

the US or other nations, it is not. For example, in 2001 retired Chinese Major 

General Wang Baocun defined the term as a process of military 

informationalization where theory and practice are the focus. He added that 

Chinese progress toward an RMA is signaled by its command, control, 

communications, computers, and intelligence modernization, network-based 

war-gaming, IW personnel training and field exercises, and informationalized 

equipment.587 Thus Wang’s Chinese perspective indicates that the information 

revolution is the key component of the current RMA. US analyst Richard O. 

Hundley of RAND defined the RMA in 1999 as “a paradigm shift in the nature 

and conduct of military operations which either renders obsolete or irrelevant 

one or more core competencies of a dominant player; or creates one or more 

new core competencies, in some new dimension of warfare; or both.”588

The US and Chinese differences most likely are a direct reflection not 

only of capabilities but also of culture. The US lead is in technology while the 

Chinese rely on theory and strategy to enable (in their opinion) their inferior 

force to overcome US superiority. Further, Wang is not the only Chinese 

military figure with an opinion on the RMA. One Chinese author noted that the 

RMA is really a cognition system revolution and a new phase in military 

strategy research. Another author added that the RMA involves a series of 

changes to military theory, methods of operations, weaponry, systems 

organization, command organization, and so on; an understanding closer to 

most US RMA concepts.

One thing is certain: the Chinese hope to develop an RMA concept 

with “Chinese characteristics.” A Chinese general noted that “Only with 

superior thought processes and superior moves, and by seeking a 

developmental strategy of ‘imbalance’ will we truly be able to avoid traveling 

the ‘path that the enemy expects.’ In the realm of IW, trying to keep up with the 

 

587 Wang Baocun, “China and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” China Military 

Science, No. 5 2001, pp. 149, 154.

588 O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations, RAND, 1999, p. 9.
207

Jones’ by developing whatever they possess will lead to falling into traps set by 

others...”589

Taiwan’s understanding of the Chinese RMA does not necessarily 

coincide with these views completely. Major Li An-yao, who was serving in the 

Air Force Command of the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan when he 

wrote about this topic, stated that the revolution in military affairs has changed 

China’s strategic views on international security and on constructing fast 

response and projection capabilities. He listed five characteristics of the 

Chinese Communist’s revolution in military affairs that concern Taiwan: the 

gap in military technologies has affected China’s national security and forced 

the PLA to place priority on technological development; the transformation has 

forced adjustments in battle thought, theory, equipment, and training (this point 

coincides with Chinese theorists noted above); a “show of weakness” by the 

PLA can help thwart the China threat theories being developed; the study of 

asymmetrical and unrestricted warfare has developed deterrents and counters to 

Western developments (currently such thinking includes the use of a 

preemptive strike); and IW can help win a future war in the Taiwan Strait since 

it is marked by high technologies, a brief time period, and few casualties.590

Li was impressed with the contributions of former Chinese leader Deng 

Xiaoping to new thinking and its impact on current projections. Deng 

emphasized People’s War (PW) under modern conditions and he recommended 

a shift in the center of gravity in Chinese decision-making to economic 

construction and the development of science and technology. Today top-level 

decision-makers in China understand fully the importance of economic 

modernization alongside military modernization. Modernization helps China 

change its way of conducting a war. Li writes that the Chinese link IW to a 

technical form of war defined by the widespread use of information 

technologies. People’s War refers to a political form of war defined by the 

righteous nature of a war. China’s RMA must be laced with such Chinese 

characteristics in accordance with the societal shift in the forms of technology 

and war from the mechanized to the information age.591

 

589 Dai Qingmin, “Discourse on Armed Forces Informationization Building and 

Information Warfare Building,” On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. 

Shen Weiguang, New China Press, 2004, pp. 39-47. 

590 Li An-yao, “PLA Thinking on War, ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ with Chinese 

Characteristics,” Taipei K’ung-chun Hsueh-shu Yueh-k’an, Internet Version, 25 April 

2008 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center (OSC) website, 

document number CPP20080421312006.

591 Ibid.
208

However, Li also pointed out China’s RMA weaknesses. First among 

them is the age of the military leadership. Next are obstacles in the 

development of new weapons and equipment such as increased costs, the lag in 

domestically produced weapons, the technical integration of weapons 

purchased from foreign nations, and the reliability of precision guidance 

components. Finally, China lacks experience in offensive operations and in 

Navy and Air Force operations. Li concluded by noting that Taiwan “must pay 

close attention to the direction of China’s army building, study the course and 

results of PLA military reform, and draw upon the experience of the rise of the 

Chinese Communists following the path of overcoming strength with 

knowledge as soon as possible.”592

Major Hsu Hsieh-jung was another Taiwanese officer who wrote about 

China’s RMA concept. While noting that the PLA must expedite its “military 

reform with Chinese characteristics,” Hsu believes China must also take into 

account the recent successes of the US and its coalition partners in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and elsewhere. In those locations, decapitation operations were 

utilized against the leadership of the regimes. These actions indicate one must 

innovate (the soul of the RMA to Hsu) and learn from other experiences such as 

those of the US if it wants to avoid perilous situations.593

One of those lessons, Hsu writes, is that China must be adept at 

“highly-controlled warfare” since it was a special characteristic of the war in 

Iraq. The PLA’s Academy of Military Science noted that the 2003 US-Iraq war 

was characterized by “a high control level, high demand for control, and a high 

degree of control.” War is evolving from general war to highly controlled war. 

This change is felt not only in military affairs but also in the emphasis on 

control over political, economic, and other sectors to include psychological 

control. Highly-controlled war is a new form of warfare in which “the direct 

purpose is to control a political regime and in which political, economic, 

diplomatic, and other resources are integrated effectively to control the scale, 

form, means, and results of the war, with the backing of absolute military 

superiority.”594 War is expanding from tangible to intangible war as a result.595

 

592 Ibid.

593 Hsu Hsieh-jung, “An Investigation of the Impact of the Second Gulf War on the 

PRC’s New Revolution in Military Affairs,” Hsien-ping Hsueh-shu Pan-nien-k’an, 

online 1 December 2007 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center 

website, document number CPP20080701312002.

594 Ibid.

595 Ibid.
209

Other ways in which China’s RMA differs from Western countries 

include:

 Pursing a different strategic purpose than the West (which pursues 

world hegemony in China’s opinion).

 Utilizing different motivations than the West to stay in line with the 

profound changes in modern warfare.

 Starting from a different technological point than the West, since 

China is still going through the late stages of mechanization.

 Utilizing different operational RMA forms, such as leapfrog 

developments instead of the West’s gradual development.596

For these reasons, Hsu notes, the PLA cannot copy the model of 

advanced Western countries. It must be familiar with the laws of the RMA and 

apply their contextual situation to it in order to avoid being trapped in an arms 

race with the West as happened to the former Soviet Union. Study of the Iraq 

war and US successes in Kosovo convinced China that the idea of winning 

local wars under high-tech conditions had evolved to that of winning 

informatized war based on high-tech conditions.597

A Taiwanese View of the PLA’s Asymmetric War Concept

In the information age, stratagems and psychological operations of all 

types can play havoc with an opponent especially when combined with the use 

or even potential use of exotic weapons. Chinese asymmetric warfare 

operations fit this description and they are not restricted by time and space. 

Stratagems used in the time of Sun Tzu are equally applicable in the virtual 

environment of today. 

Asymmetric warfare is a method for China to deal effectively with its 

current potential superpower opponent, the US. Surgical war, paralyzing war, 

and unrestricted warfare operations are all examples of asymmetric warfare 

operational measures that the Taiwanese ascribe to the PLA. Taiwanese author 

Chen Wei-K’uan used the definition of a PLA military strategist, Kuo Yungbing, to define asymmetric warfare as “operations in which any two opposing 

parties in a war can try their best in using their own advantages in strategy, 

weapons technology, and applications of their arms and services as much as 

 

596 Ibid.

597 Ibid.
210

possible to locate and attack the vulnerabilities of the opponent fiercely and 

overwhelmingly.”598

Chen states that stratagems are one of the most typical ways that China 

uses asymmetric warfare. He notes that a stratagem is used “to force an enemy 

to make mistakes which can then be taken advantage of.” He quoted from a few 

Chinese military classics to demonstrate this point:

 In the art of warfare, a psychological offense is better than 

capturing a city, and a psychological war is preferable to an armed 

war.–Zhu Ge Liang

 A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief 

may be robbed of his presence of mind.—Chapter VII: 

Maneuvering, Sun Tzu’s Art of War 

 All warfare is based on deception.—Chapter I: Laying Plans, Sun 

Tzu’s Art of War

 In war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is 

weak—Chapter VI: Weak Points and Strong, Sun Tzu’s Art of War

 In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but 

indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory—

Chapter V: Energy, Sun Tzu’s Art of War

 Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not 

expected—Chapter I: Laying Plans, Sun Tzu’s Art of War

 In war practice dissimulation and you will succeed.—Chapter VII: 

Maneuvering, Sun Tzu’s Art of War

 Thus the highest form of generalship is to frustrate the enemy’s 

plans.—Chapter III: Attack by Stratagem, Sun Tzu’s Art of War

 The key to overcome an enemy relies more on the use of strategy to 

deceive the enemy than the use of force. Thus, people who are 

good at commanding the troops are those who can deceive and who 

also can avoid being deceived.—Chapter on Deception, Jie Xuan’s 

100 Stratagems of War.

Chen focused on technological aspects of asymmetric warfare 

operations that aim to paralyze an opponent before their destruction, if the latter 

scenario was even needed. First are soft-kill weapon systems, which include 

electronic jamming equipment, computer viruses, directed-energy weapons, 

 

598 Chen Wei-k’uan, “A Study of Our Due Perception of the PLA’s Asymmetric 

Warfare,” Taipei K’ung-chun Hsueh-shu Yueh-k’an, 25 July 2007 as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080507312001.
211

laser beam weapons, and non-directed-energy weapons. Second are precision 

and remote tactical missile attacks, not only aimed at troop assembly points or 

hardware construction targets but also aimed to paralyze command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(C4ISR), radar reconnaissance systems, and command center targets. Third is 

the development of an electronic warfare (EW) capability, electromagnetic 

pulse weapons, and the ability to construct a comprehensive surgical warfare 

infrastructure (based on importing weapons from Russia at an increased 

tempo). Surgical warfare aims to attack the vulnerability of high-tech weapons 

systems to achieve final victory, namely, attacking one point to cripple the 

whole system. Finally, the development of a space warfare capability puts the 

crowning touch on China’s asymmetric warfare capability: the ability to 

sabotage or destroy an enemy’s space systems.

Chen’s conclusion was that China is headed quickly in the direction of 

winning a regional war under high-tech conditions via asymmetric warfare 

operations. It is unfortunate that he did not go into more detail as to how the 

two areas he covered (stratagems and technology) might be integrated.

Another author, Chung Chien, wrote that a symmetric war involving 

the PLA and other nations may last for a long time and is not an option sought 

by China. An asymmetric warfare operation, on the other hand, has the 

opportunity to last but a matter of hours or weeks and would be a preferred 

operation, one “without bloodshed.” Two types of operations that Chung 

mentioned the PLA might enact were: a PLA long range blockade of Taiwan’s 

sea lines of communication, cutting Taiwan’s logistic life-line through the 

Spratlys; and an electromagnetic pulse attack that would shut down all services 

in Taiwan and make command and control impossible.599

A Taiwanese View of the PLA’s Information Warfare Concept

Taiwanese professor P’an Chin-chang wrote in 2007 that the PLA 

views informatized warfare (another way of saying IW) as “a war pattern which 

refers to that included under nuclear deterrence in the information age, where 

two sides in a war use information as the lead, comprehensively use 

information to integrate platforms and informatized weapons, and conduct joint 

combat efforts by multiple services and branches in all-dimensional space, 

 

599 Chung Chien, “High-Tech War Preparation of the PLA, Taking Taiwan without 

Bloodshed,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 1 September 2000, as translated and downloaded 

from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20050411000204.
212

including land, sea, air, space, and electronics.” 600 Informatized warfare 

includes precision combat, network combat, special operations, and space 

combat. Such combat includes direct attacks that “jump over time and space” 

and aim to take multi-dimensional control of battlefields and to destroy and 

paralyze the opponent’s combat system.601 Informatized warfare will require the 

comprehensive integration of four capabilities: sensing the battlefield, 

information transmission, rapid mobility, and accurate strikes.602 The PLA’s IW 

focus is on the control of information. The ability to manipulate information 

and seize information supremacy is the preeminent quality in future war, 

according to P’an. 603

This was not always the view that Taiwan took of PLA IW theory and 

practice. In fact, Taiwan’s views of the PLA’s IW capability have evolved over 

time. In the late 1990s, Lin Chin-ching, director of the Telecommunications 

Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) in Taiwan, served as a 

prominent spokesman for IW issues and continued to do so for several years. 

He listed three ways that China might strike at Taiwan’s digital infrastructure.

First, he stated that China’s goal was to paralyze Taiwan “by destroying its 

command and control system using an electromagnetic device the size of a 

briefcase.”604 Second, citing EW theory, he said China would use “acupuncturepoint-prodding,” the ancient Chinese martial art theory of taking out an enemy 

with a strike on a pressure point. Finally, he noted that China would try to steal 

Taiwan’s military secrets via the Internet or the use of computer viruses.605

In response to the Chinese IW threat, Lin says Taiwan set up a Strategy 

Planning Committee for IW. He noted that Taiwan had also established 

Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT); established a 

telecommunication and information security committee; stipulated laws and 

relations concerning telecommunications and information security; improved 

procedures to access computers; and installed warning devices on all networks 

 

600 Pan Chin-chang, “On the Role of Psychological Warfare as a Part of the PLA’s 

Informatized Warfare Operations,” Lu-chun Hsueh-shu Shuang-yueh-k’an, 4 June 2007 

as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20071119312002.

601 Ibid.

602 Ibid.

603 Ibid.

604 Maubo Chang, Taiwan Central news Agency, 1350 GMT 21 May 1999, as 

translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

FTS19990521000902.

605 Ibid.
213

to strengthen the awareness of computer personnel about potential threats.606

Taiwan is also trying to make people aware of the Chinese potential to spread 

false news about the stock market through the mass media and cause confusion 

or panic in society.607

In 2000 Lin predicted that the next five years would be crucial for the 

development of IW capabilities on both sides of the Strait. He noted that China 

had established an IW simulation center, developed viruses to be used in 

attacks against networks, and imported foreign information technology and 

equipment. By 2005 he believed the PLA could establish a neural network 

center to execute joint simulations; develop battlefield command systems to 

provide better troop mobility; develop a tactical data link system; digitize and 

mobilize command and control systems; strengthen satellite communications 

research and development; and establish an optical fiber communications 

network. As a “communist totalitarian nation,” China will also use the entire 

nation’s effort to mobilize IW’s development.608

Also in 2000, Taiwan Defense Minister Wu Shih-wen stated that a 

military unit in charge of cyber warfare would be established. The unit would 

be responsible for protecting Taiwan’s computer systems from hackers and for 

denying access to unauthorized individuals. Lin Chin-ching added that all 

officers under the rank of lieutenant general would be tested on their knowledge 

of IW and computer information, and that their test results would be taken into 

consideration when their files are reviewed for promotion.609 The initial 

military cyber unit would be a battalion sized unit of specialized troops with a 

focus on the development of IW and EW capabilities, especially C4ISR. These 

areas will account for 23 percent of the defense budget according to Lin.610

 

606 Lin Jui-yang, “The ROC Armed Forces Strengthen Security over Information,” 

Chung-Yang Jih-Pao, 17 August 1999, p. 3 as translated and downloaded from the 

Open Source Center website, document number FTS19990818000447.

607 Seiji Yajima, Interview in Japanese Journal with Lin Chin-ching, Sankei Shimbun, 5 

November 1999, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center (OSC) 

Web site, document number FTS1999110500047.

608 Lin Chin-ching, “Comparison of PRC-ROC Information Warfare Capabilities, 

Ch’uan-Ch’iu Fang-Wei Tsa-Chih, 1 March 2000, pp. 68-73, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20000725000181.

609 Maubo Chang, Central News Agency, 1456 GMT, 22 November 2000, as translated 

and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20001122000162.

610 Brian Hsu, (no title provided) Taipei Times, 23 November 2000, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20001124000107.
214

In 2005 another Taiwanese author with the last name of Lin, Lin 

Tsung-ta, who by reputation is one of Taiwan’s most outstanding scholars on 

Chinese IW, wrote a book titled All Out War on the PRC’s Information 

Warfare. He focused on Chinese IW’s asymmetric character, its use of civilian 

entities and applicability to People’s War theory, and its preemptive and 

deterring qualities. Chinese IW requires “attacking vital points,” words that are 

conceptually similar to Lin’s focus on acupuncture war.611

Lin noted that China’s National Defense Science and Technology 

Information Center divides IW into three parts. The first is EW/command and 

control warfare equipment. The second is offensive information weaponry, 

described as: computer virus weapons, nano-machines, chip microbes; hackers; 

high energy radio frequency guns; and power damaging munitions. The third 

type of weaponry is defensive weapons, to include: network sentries; 

information defense encryption systems; firewalls; and multi-layer Internet 

defense networks. Further, Lin added that combat power in the opinion of many 

Chinese scholars lies in the control and counter-control of information since 

those who control information control the initiative on the battlefield in future 

wars.612

There are new types of People’s War, Lin stated, such as hacker force 

and propaganda force People’s War. Like military forces they can obtain 

military intelligence, bolster morale, and interfere with an enemy information 

system. Combat goals can be reached simply by damaging another side’s 

economy. People’s IW is an asymmetric and non-violent type of national war. 

China is deepening the study of “Network People’s War” mobilization 

education to make every Netizen (Internet citizen) a “network combatant.” 

Mobilizing IW talent in the military and in society will be the key to future 

successes. As of 2005, the PLA had carried out deliberations on organizational 

institutions for People’s War, civilian mobilization plans, strategies and tactics, 

and training for Network People’s War. Strategies provide an intangible combat 

power asset that compensates for insufficiencies in material conditions 

according to Lin. Legal systems, secrecy, market competition, and intellectual 

property rights are other ways to add intangible power to the PLA’s arsenal.613

 

611 Lin Tsung-ta, All Out War on the PRC’s Information Warfare, Crystal Books, May 

2005 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document 

number CPP20071102320002.

612 Ibid.

613 Ibid.
215

People’s IW uses asymmetric operational methods to enable opening 

up a second battlefield for the PLA far from the combat zone and in the 

enemy’s rear area. Moreover the goal of Chinese People’s War 

is to proactively protect international information infrastructures while 

attacking enemy rear political, economic, and military information 

systems, damaging the enemy’s economic order in the rear, weakening 

the enemy’s combat potential, and further influencing the progression 

of war. During this process, enterprises and individuals nationwide use 

their computers, communications equipment, and other information 

systems’ signals and resources to provide sustained support to the 

nation’s information infrastructure in the strategic rear.614

Finally, People’s War strategy relies heavily on military modernization. 

Economic growth is crucial and a high-tech national defense industry must be 

developed. Lin notes that China intends to pursue international exchanges to 

increase its national defense economic potential.615

In September 2007 Major General Tschai Hui-chen, the director of 

Information Assurance for Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and deputy 

chief of the General Staff for Communications, Electronics, and Information 

(J6), spoke at a conference at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. MG Tschai noted in a 

section of her report to conference attendees that with regard to threats and 

challenges before Taiwan, China remains the greatest concern in both areas. 

She discussed general information security threats, strategic information 

warfare threats, and general security threats posed by China’s emphasis on IW. 

Of interest is that in her report, she covered many of the topics listed in 

Taiwan’s view of Chinese IW from the mid-1990s: deterrence, paralysis, 

network force, asymmetric war, strategic information war, long-range precision 

war, and network psychological war.616 Thus it appears that Taiwan’s concerns 

with regard to Chinese IW have not changed much over the years other than to 

stress that the Chinese are more advanced in both their budgetary spending on 

and development of information technology. 

Naturally, even though the general categories Major General Tschai 

listed have remained basically the same, each is much more sophisticated and 

advanced than it was in the 1990s. 

 

614 Ibid.

615 Ibid.

616 Tschai Hui-chen, “A Discussion of Information Warfare from a Taiwanese 

Perspective,” IO Sphere, Special Edition 2008, pp. 15-21.
216

A Taiwanese View on the PLA’s Political Work and Psychological War

The PLA has always been expert at the use of psychological warfare 

techniques, particularly the application of psychological pressure. The firing of 

missiles near Taiwan into the Taiwan Strait in 1996 and the development of an 

Anti-Secession Law in 2005 exerted psychological pressure on Taiwan to “toe 

the line” and to abandon any thoughts of independence from the mainland. A 

recent episode of psychological pressure involved the former Russian 

Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier Varyag. Chinese sailors and civilians 

refurbishing the carrier state that it will soon be renamed the Shi Lang (after the 

Chinese general who took possession of Taiwan in 1681, which was the first 

time China paid attention to the island).617 

Mr. P’an Chin-chang, a teacher at Taiwan’s National Defense 

University in 2007, wrote a few excellent articles on the PLA’s “informatized” 

political work and use of psychological warfare techniques. P’an described the 

PLA’s political work database and political work Web site that enhances the 

combat functions of informatized political work. The PLA believes, he writes, 

that informatized warfare is not just competition in weapons and equipment but 

also in ideology, will power, political strength, spiritual factors, and 

psychological capacity. Information “includes not only military information 

transmitted by digitized weapons and equipment but also political and 

ideological information to be used to launch psychological offensives against 

the enemy. Informatized warfare involves not only the competition of military 

force but also non-military competition of political and psychological 

power.”618 

P’an stated that on 20 October 2005 the PLA inaugurated its political 

work Web site. No longer would paper be the only way to convey teaching 

materials. The Web site’s operations center is located at the General Political 

Department in Beijing. The six major functions of the Web site are operational 

guidance, news and information dissemination, propaganda and education, 

study and training, culture and entertainment, and communication and 

interaction. The site offers online lectures, distance learning, and even 

psychological counseling.619

 

617 See http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20080109/aspx. 

618 P’an Chin-chang, “A Study of the PLA’s Informatized Operations for Political 

Work,” Kung-chun Hsueh-shu Yueh-kan, online, 25 July 2007 as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080616312009. 

619 Ibid.
217

The site is carrying “some 3,000 items per day, the Web site is updated 

every minute, there are 44 channels, including nine interactive and onlineposting channels, which carry 382 second-level columns, 2,530 third-level 

columns, 53 large-sized databases, numerous books, videos, and games, more 

than 1,000 kinds of newspapers and journals, and every article document can be 

opened and refreshed instantly.”620 National Defense University has developed 

six types of software for political work command platforms for the site and is 

researching over thirty projects concerning the informatization of political 

work.621

The PLA is studying other aspects of political work as well. A 

symposium held at Nanjing’s Academy of Political Science in December 2004, 

for example, highlighted eight aspects of the informatization of political work. 

P’an described the findings as: developing the theory of informatization of 

political work; training professionals; applying information technology to 

political work; developing and enriching information resources; allocating 

information equipment and facilities to political work; constructing political 

work for an information network; formulating policies, laws, ordinances, and 

standards for the informatization of political work; and enhancing informationrelated capabilities of political work cadres. The Nanjing Academy stressed the 

importance of political competition in future wars, citing competition in 

political stratagem, media propaganda, and psychological manipulation as well 

as legal competition.622

Psychological warfare, a major aspect of informatized warfare and 

political work, is now a part of the PLA’s state strategy, P’an added. This has 

resulted in the development of the following categories: political psychological 

warfare, economic psychological warfare, military psychological warfare, 

diplomatic psychological warfare, religious psychological warfare, cultural 

psychological warfare, propaganda psychological warfare, and deterrent 

psychological warfare. All of these types of psychological warfare can be used 

to enhance “beheading” an enemy force instead of attacking it with 

conventional forces.623

 

620 Ibid.

621 Ibid.

622 Ibid.

623 P’an Chin-chang, “On the Role of Psychological Warfare as a Part of the PLA’s 

Informatized Warfare Operations,” Lu-chun Hsueh-shu Shuang-yueh-k’an, 4 June 2007 

as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20071119312002.
218

Regarding the future development of psychological warfare, the PLA 

proposes:

 Establishing psychological warfare command institutes

 Creating psychological warfare specialty troops

 Setting up psychological warfare research institutes

 Cultivating a team of psychological key members

 Developing psychological warfare technologies and devices

 Establishing special psychological warfare training venues

 And establishing psychological warfare platforms with computer 

networks.624

The use of these facilities will enable the PLA to stealthily substitute 

one thing for another, to replace and edit people and landscapes in a virtual 

world, and to produce some false and shocking scenes to deceive and incite 

discontent. Network confrontation training is required to improve the conduct 

of network psychological warfare and help develop countermeasures against its 

use by enemy forces. Troops are developing and conducting simulated training 

using sound, light, electronics, and information technologies.625

When fighting an enemy force, the deputy director of the Political 

Work Research Institute of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, Gong 

Fangbin, wrote that:

A study by the PLA General Staff Department also concluded that the 

actual cases of the several high-tech wars in recent years have shown 

that information technology, when applied to the psychological warfare 

battlefield, has promoted the development of instant psychological 

warfare propaganda operations, the invention of intellectual equipment 

for psychological warfare, the diversification of the means of 

psychological warfare, and the integration of psychological warfare and 

armed warfare.626

Political cadres must be capable of buttressing local opinion and 

demoralizing enemy attitudes. With regard to local opinion, cadres must be able 

to manipulate information and launch the “three types of warfare” (legal, public 

opinion, and psychological) before a military operation begins. This will ensure 

that the people are on the side of the armed forces and that they will trust that 

 

624 Ibid.

625 Ibid.

626 Ibid.
219

the war being fought is a just war, according to P’an’s interpretation of the 

PLA’s work. With regard to demoralizing the enemy, P’an cites PLA Professor 

Zhang Zhaozhong, who noted that it is necessary to “distort the enemy’s 

cognition system through IW and psychological warfare, and thus win a war 

without really fighting a battle, or by fighting fewer battles, or by fighting only 

small-scale battles.”627

Zhong also stressed the importance of strategic IW as a new form of 

war that can take on an independent posture and even be launched several 

months or years before an armed invasion takes place. Targets of strategic IW 

include national political, monetary, communications, and other crucial sectors 

down to single weapon systems such as aircraft carriers. Developments can lead 

to the use of strategic deception, strategic psychological warfare, strategic 

deterrence, or strategic information attacks.628

Not all is well with political work in the PLA, however, according to 

P’an. He notes that duplicate organizations still exist, coordination is difficult, 

lateral communication is not as prevalent as top-down communications, and 

communication equipment is still susceptible to damage. These constraints 

continue to limit the effectiveness of the PLA’s political work Web site. 

However, the PLA will continue to use military force alone in the absence of 

other psychological factors to continue to intimidate Taiwan. 629

A Taiwanese View on the PLA’s Media Warfare

Closely related to political work and psychological operations is the 

concept of “media warfare.” A relatively new field of research in terms of 

terminology, media warfare appears to be an updated version of “propaganda 

work” whose importance, the PLA ascertains, has not diminished. As Mao 

noted, “the Red Army’s priority in conducting its propaganda work is to expand 

its political influence and win the trust of the majority of our people...the Red 

Army’s propaganda work is the first and most important work for the Red 

Army.”630 In a high-tech environment, the PLA is concerned that its officers 

and soldiers will have to overcome a psychology of fear, panic, isolation, and 

 

627 P’an Chin-chang, “A Study of the PLA’s Informatized Operations for Political 

Work.”

628 Ibid.

629 Ibid.

630 Liu Wan-lin, “An Investigation into the Impact of the PRC’s Military Media 

Warfare on the ROC Military,” Taipei Hai-chun Hsueh-shu Yueh-k’an, 22 April 2008, 

as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080602312005.
220

pessimism. Solid media warfare prepared ahead of time can help alleviate some 

of these concerns.631

Taiwan researcher Liu Wan-lin discussed how China had closely 

followed the two Gulf Wars and drawn several important conclusions. The PLA 

believes that the media must be managed and controlled to establish an 

effective propaganda system that puts pressure on an opponent. The true nature 

of a war must be publicized, as well as world opinion about the war and the 

PLA’s policy. World opinion should be prepared ahead of time since modern 

war is a political and diplomatic process as well as a military process, according 

to Liu’s analysis of Chinese media. Media warfare can create opportunities and 

conditions that help win a war by influencing national strategy and military 

strategy simultaneously.632

Media warfare is an aspect of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s 

three warfare concept for political work that includes media war, legal war, and 

psychological war. Due to media wars strategic significance, the General 

Political Department of the PLA issued a new “PLA Political Work 

Regulation” and directed military educational organizations to increase their 

focus on this topic. More than 50 software suites on political work, battlefield 

propaganda methods, and so on have been created. The Academy of Military 

Science created a “Research Center for Cross-Strait Issues” and a “Research 

Institute for Political Work.”633

At the regional level, the Nanjing Military Region’s officers and 

soldiers were provided a booklet titled “Concise Handbook of Law-Abiding

Combat Operations” and the Nanjing Political Academy opened a new course 

called “Media Warfare.” The PLA’s Xi’an Political Academy handed out 

materials on “100 Questions and Answers on Media Warfare, Psychological 

Warfare, and Legal Warfare.” They prepared a course on “Political Warfare 

Operational Command Automation” and established more than 10 new research 

and teaching divisions to include a psychological warfare department, a 

military security protection department, a wartime political warfare work 

division, and an information technology and political warfare work division.634

Media warfare measures can help China win the consent and support of 

the international community. The PLA hopes to offset the use of deceptive 

propaganda by a potential opponent and thereby assure that the direction of the 

 

631 Ibid.

632 Ibid. 

633 Ibid.

634 Ibid.
221

media and public opinion is on the side of the PLA. The PLA will also continue 

to contain Taiwan, in Liu’s opinion, via the use of the US while promoting its 

“One China” policy.635

A Taiwanese View of the PLA’s Electronic Warfare Assets

Taiwanese officers and professors frequently write on the PLA’s 

electronic warfare capabilities. They cover topics such as the PLA’s 

capabilities, troops, EW attack potential, and Taiwanese responses. Navy 

Commander Hsu Keng-wei wrote on the PLA’s EW attack options in 2008 and 

his article will be highlighted here.636

Hsu stated that the PLA has built a dense network of electronic 

monitoring stations and radar early warning installations opposite Taiwan. The 

function of these assets is to surveil, detect, and jam Taiwanese anti-air, early 

warning, and control facilities. Recently, the PLA has succeeded in reverse 

engineering the EW equipment of several countries which has greatly improved 

their capabilities. They have also learned how to attach EW equipment to 

unmanned aerial vehicles. Hsu added that the “East China Electronic Warfare 

Network” has learned how to integrate all EW troops stationed in Zhejiang and 

Fujian and focus them on Taiwan.637

Taiwan scholars believe that by 2012 the PLA will have 

electromagnetic pulse weapons capable of paralyzing Taiwan’s electronic 

business, aviation controls, banks, the stock market, and the Internet if war 

erupts. A computer network attack could also take the form of a preemptive 

move by the PLA to jam and paralyze US support before a war begins. 

Hsu named the HD 5, HD 6, and TU-154 aircraft as EW 

reconnaissance and jamming platforms designed for use against Taiwan’s air 

and sea fleets. In addition to the multitude of EW platforms available to the 

PLA, recent Chinese successes in space have added to Taiwan’s concerns. 

 

635 Ibid.

636 Hsu Keng-wei, “How to Effectively Counter the PRC Military’s Electronic Warfare 

Attacks,” Taipei Hai-chun Hsueh-shu Yueh-k’an, 22 April 2008, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20080602312007. For a more detailed examination of the PLA’s EW capabilities 

(too extensive for this brief survey), see Liu Yi-Chung, “How to Enhance the EW 

Capabilities of the ROC Military to Satisfy War Requirements across the Taiwan 

Strait,” Taipei Hai-chun Hsueh-shu Yueh-k’an, 1 June 2006, as translated and 

downloaded from the Open Source Center website, document number 

CPP20061004312001.

637 Ibid.
222

These successes, from Hsu’s perspective, indicate that China can collect a huge 

amount of information on Taiwan and “establish an electronic order of battle to 

weaken our military’s EW capability...and further destroy our EW facilities for 

command, control, communication, and intelligence.”638 The PLA regularly 

practices working in an intense EW environment in their military exercises 

which has increased their practical experience in this area. In acupuncture war, 

Hsu concludes, using EW can enable “the first battle being the final battle.”639

A Taiwanese View of China’s Military Information Warfare Institutes

Taiwanese reporter Liao Wenzhong, in a set of two articles on China’s 

military net force, listed a series of institutes and programs in China associated 

with the IW effort. He set the stage for his first article by citing the January 

2002 PLA release of its Seventh Generation Training and Evaluation Outlines

in which it disclosed that the PLA had formed a science and technology 

experimental force in order to respond to twenty-first century warfare 

challenges.640 The force included a space, net, EW, and psychological warfare 

force that serves as the basic force for IW. The PLA would be responsible for 

offensive network warfare and EW while other aspects (network security, 

psychological warfare, and intelligence warfare) would be the responsibility of 

other government departments.

This was far from the beginning of the Chinese effort, as the following 

timeline for IW developments demonstrates. Much of the work began in the 

early 1990s. All of these references were included in Liao’s two articles.

1992 Chinese authorities develop the “China Internet Plan” controlled by the 

mainland.641

1997 The Communist Party of China (CPC) creates the National 

Informatization Leadership Group.642

1997 The General Office of the State Council upgraded and renewed the 

project for the main computers of the general office. For the top secret portion 

of the project, multi-field encryption, transmission encryption, mandatory 

 

638 Ibid.

639 Ibid.

640 Liao Wenzhong, “China Military Net Force: National Security, Public Security, and 

the People’s Liberation Army,” Taipei Ch’uan-Ch’iu Fang-Wei Tsa-Chih, 1-31 March 

2007, pp. 58-65 as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website, 

document number CPP20071023318001.

641 Ibid.

642 Liao Wenzhong, “China Military Net Force: National Security...”
223

identification cards, mandatory access control, and the use of equipment with 

low electromagnetic leaks were instituted.643

1998 The State Council created the Ministry of Information Industry;644 and 

the Third Research Institute of the Ministry of Public Security created the State 

Research Center of Anti-Computer Invasion and the Prevention of Viruses. The 

Third Research Institute trains information security agents to be responsible for 

the prevention and handling of computer viruses and basic testing. It takes on 

projects from the State 863 Plan and the Design Plan of the Gold Shield Project 

Security Support System.645

1999 The CPC started to create “information warriors.”646

1999 The Central Military Commission of the PLA established the first 

psychological warfare research and teaching section at the Xi’an PLA Political 

College. Courses taught included military and social psychology, psychology 

under high-tech conditions, network warfare and psychological warfare, and 

psychological warfare theories and practices.647

2001-2003 The PLA created research centers within related IW forces or 

research institutes in five large cities, Zhengzhou (IW simulation research 

center), Jinan (IW confidentiality research center), Beijing (IW operations 

research center), Nanjing (IW intelligence research center), and Xian (IW 

operations research center). The IW operation research center in Beijing has 

worked with the “special information research center,” formerly known as the 

psychic function research center.648

2002 The IW division of the national strategic level of the CPC determined 

that the PLA would be responsible for EW and IW, also known as integrated 

network and electronic warfare; the 4th Department of the General Staff is to 

form a net force composed of the PLA and information militia from the 

 

643 Liao Wen-chung, “China Military net Force: Network Decapitation Strike 

and Public Security Net Force,” Taipei Ch’uan-Ch’iu Fang-Wei Tsa-Chih, 1-30 April 

2007, pp. 58-65, as downloaded and translated from the Open Source Center website, 

document number CPP20071016318001.

644 Liao Wenzhong, “China Military Net Force: National Security...”

645 Liao Wen-chung, “China Military Net Force: Network Decapitation...”

646 Liao Wenzhong, “China Military Net Force: National Security...”

647 Ibid. 

648 Ibid. 
224

National Defense Mobilization Commission and civil information technology 

industry, officials, and academia.649

2002 It is predicted that there are 46 million Internet users in China.650

2002 The Ministry of Defense set up scholarships and accepted more than 200 

students from different universities to study and then work for the military after 

graduation.651

2002 The PLA presented the concept of a “local war under informatized 

conditions” to replace the term “local war under high-tech conditions.”652

2002 The formation of an information militia for all of China was finished. 

Organizationally, it has four components: an EW unit, a network warfare unit, a 

hacker unit, and an information rescue unit. Wartime tasks include extensive 

reconnaissance, information defense, and information attacks.653

2003-2004 Large information technology companies in developed in cities on 

the east coast of mainland China create national defense information militia 

units.654

2003 The CPC and State Council approved the Ministry of Public Security’s 

effort to build the “Gold Shield Project,” which would transform the entire 

information management sector of the public security system into an electronic 

version.655

2003 The State Development and Reform Commission of the State Council 

approved the 1203 Project of the Ministry of Public Security, the public key 

infrastructure, and authorization management systems.656

2004 The Ministry of Public Security and departments of public security in six 

provinces and municipalities were connected to security application systems 

with the PKI/PMI platform.657

 

649 Ibid.

650 Liao Wen-chung, “China Military Net Force: Network Decapitation...”

651 Liao Wenzhong, “China Military Net Force: National Security...”

652 Ibid. 

653 Ibid. 

654 Ibid.

655 Liao Wen-chung, “China Military Net Force: Network Decapitation...”

656 Ibid.

657 Ibid.
225

2004 The number of Internet crime cases rose from 2,700 in 2000 to 13,600 in 

2004; the number of network police and “network security guards” in China 

rises to 230,000. China recognizes the need for an independent Chinese 

Internet.658

2005 News networks in the US focusing on propaganda against China were 

modified, meaning that a guerilla war at the enemy’s rear had been formed.659

2005 A Network Security Information Agency was organized, a social 

mechanism more like informants for intelligence agencies. They monitor social 

situations, perform social control, and conduct special case investigations of 

network use. Among network friends they are referred to as “net spies.”660

2005 The Information Office of the State Council and the Ministry of 

Information Industry jointly issued the Provisions on the Administration of 

Internet News and Information Services. Anti-government speeches are not 

allowed under this provision.661

2005 There were close to 130 million Internet users in China.662

2006 The CPC declares that a wireless local area network (WLAN) 

Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) Association has been created 

in Beijing. It is the Chinese National Standard for WLAN to which China has 

independent intellectual property rights.663

2006 The People’s Liberation Army Daily reports that the Second Artillery 

Force has created an “informatized blue army” formed by professional 

electronics information officers. The army’s task is to simulate electronic and 

network attacks against the red army.664

2006 China cracks down on Internet crime and requires network users to go 

online with their actual names, identification, and registration.665

 

658 Ibid.

659 Liao Wenzhong, “China Military Net Force: National Security...”

660 Liao Wen-chung, “China Military Net Force: Network Decapitation...”

661 Ibid.

662 Ibid.

663 Liao Wenzhong, “China Military Net Force: National Security...”

664 Liao Wen-chung, “China Military Net Force: Network Decapitation...”

665 Ibid.
226

Other organizations and programs do exist but no dates were provided 

for their founding. In his article on network decapitation, Liao listed state 

(party) and PLA organizations. At the state level there is the Network and 

Information Security Team of the Informatization Work Office of the State 

Council. It is responsible for coordinating all institutes responsible for 

information security, such as the Ministries of Public Security, State Security, 

Information Industry, and the State Certification and Accreditation 

Administration, among others. The Public Information Network Security 

Supervision Bureau and the Net Supervision Division are in charge of the 

national network for information security. Some responsibility is also shared 

with the Division of Network and Information Security under the Information 

Communication Bureau for network secrets protection and security.666

With regard to the PLA, Liao noted that it is the 4th Department of the 

General Staff that is responsible for compiling IW textbooks in China. The 

PLA has conducted many red versus blue IW exercises. It was noted that the 

formation of the “blue army” by the PLA is meant to copy the combat 

methodology of the Red Team in the US’s “IW development center.” Military 

exercises with IW subthemes, such as “Vanguard 206B,”showed how different 

sub-phases, characteristics, armed services, branches, and transportation 

equipment could be integrated through the information power of an electronic 

warfare troops’ “net force.”667

The PLA believes there will be a battle for virtual territory and for the 

material battlefield. The true “net force” lies in the information militia of the 

Information Mobilization Office under the State Mobilization Commission. It 

will continue to try to become independent of the world of networks by 

developing a China Internet as well. Liao concluded the article by noting the 

following

The ‘net force’ is a brand new type of ‘Grand War’ scheme that 

combines high-tech knowledge with politics, economy, psychology, 

and information networks and that is ‘all people being soldiers, the 

integration of peace and warfare, and dual usage for the military and 

civilians.’ The combat types of the ‘net force’ include both offense and 

defense. It must cooperate with strictly designed psychological warfare, 

and must possess the capability of acquiring 24-hour accurate 

intelligence. Furthermore, it requires a set of rapid and dense ‘network 

 

666 Ibid.

667 Liao Wen-chung, “China Military Net Force: Network Decapitation...”
227

platforms’ for intelligent attacks on enemies at any time, covering the 

whole field and from all directions.668

China’s independent and dedicated “net force” will be able to hide while 

Taiwan’s Microsoft system will be exposed. Taiwan will have to figure out 

how to deal with this as soon as possible.

In the article on network security, Liao also discussed organizations

and the PLA. The CPC formed an Information Mobilization Office under the 

National Defense Mobilization Commission that is parallel to the Defense 

Ministry. The office is mainly responsible for the overall mobilization of 

Chinese manpower and resources during wartime. Thus the military can 

“incorporate the local information forces through the information mobilization 

offices to generate combat power, and achieve the goal of utilizing the civil 

forces for military purposes and integrating peacetime and wartime.” Civil 

forces include the information industry, communications management posts, 

communications science and technology, information education, broadcasting 

and TV, and satellite communications.669

The CPC’s Department of Information Industry has a secret office that 

“recruits and absorbs computer geniuses” in computer science. These 

individuals are termed “network warriors” and have the freedom to test 

computer programs. They are taught to monitor Internet surfers or become 

hackers, software designers, or decoders. Others are sent abroad to settle in a 

foreign country and become a station for China’s IW efforts in that country.670

The Psychological Warfare Institute concluded that psychological 

warfare must be integrated from the beginning of a conflict. It must be 

combined with precision strikes and utilize the media to influence public 

opinion and enhance the strength of deterrence; must utilize network warfare 

throughout while preventing the enemy from breaking into friendly units; and 

must have a design aligned with national policies, strategies, and stratagem. 

The strategic office of the CMC plans and conducts the CPC’s military strategy 

and psychological warfare effort. The latter is the base for strategic warfare and 

uses the Internet and networks as representative operational techniques.671

China’s State Council has proposed that it will use McWILL (Multicarrier Wireless Internet Local Loop) as its broadband wireless Internet system, 

 

668 Ibid.

669 Liao Wenzhong, “China Military Net Force: National Security...”

670 Ibid.

671 Ibid.
228

to which it has independent intellectual property rights. It can cover a radius of 

19 kilometers and its urban single station coverage can be one to three 

kilometers. It can maintain good communication while moving at 72 miles per 

hour.672

An organization that the PLA created is the Institute of Technology. It 

was created from the Communications Engineering College, the College of 

Engineering Force, the Meteorological College of the Air Force, and 63 other 

related research institutes with General Staff affiliations. The director of the 

Institute of Technology was the director of the 4th Department of the General 

Staff (it is unknown if this affiliation has remained). The Institute founded a 

Research Center for Internet Technology for the entire army and allocated more 

than 400 experts and professors to the center. The institute plans to accept 60 

students with doctorate degrees each year to enrich its faculty. Research 

projects are focused on the organizational structure of the military, weapons 

and equipment, campaign and tactics, education, training, and logistical 

support.673

Conclusion

There are areas of agreement between Taiwanese and Western analysts 

as to the direction of Chinese IW. One obvious area of agreement is both 

groups focus on the Chinese interest in gaining “control” of cyber operations. 

Information supremacy is another area of common agreement. Another 

common point regarding terminology is the use of both groups of the term 

“strategic information warfare.” Taiwanese IW experts do, however, extract a 

different terminological understanding in some instances than do Western 

analysts and these differences lead to different degrees of emphasis.

Some of the interesting PLA IW concepts that Taiwanese military 

professionals highlight in the discussion above included:

 Acupuncture war, which establishes the examination of critical 

points in a network that, much like the pressure points in martial 

arts, when taken out, can shut down an entire system.

 Highly-controlled war, which is a new form of warfare that 

attempts to control the scale, form, means, and results of a war with 

information.

 Strategic information war, which is understood to be the integration 

of political, economic, military, diplomatic, and other areas to 

 

672 Ibid.

673 Ibid.
229

produce an overall or comprehensive information victory. The 

targets of strategic IW include national political, monetary, 

communications, and other crucial sectors down to single weapon 

systems such as aircraft carriers.

 Political work Web sites, which have established distant learning 

capabilities and data-bases for quick access to information not 

readily available in the past.

 Intangible war, which focuses on strategies, market competition, 

legal systems, and intellectual property rights. These are areas of 

importance that the West must not overlook.

 Network warriors are computer geniuses in computer science who 

have the freedom to test computer programs. They are taught to 

monitor Internet surfers or become hackers, software designers, or 

decoders. Others are sent abroad to settle in a foreign country and 

become a station for China’s IW efforts in that country.

Further, it is important to remember that China obtained Microsoft’s 

code. We do not have the code that the Chinese will use internally and probably 

never will. This allows them to “interact” with our systems and code to a 

degree unimaginable in the past and in a way that we cannot replicate with their 

system. 

Other Taiwanese observations of PLA capabilities in 2008 were also of 

interest. For example, when reviewing China’s military strategies after the 17th

National Party Congress, several points were made by Taiwanese officials, 

especially in regard to the PLA’s military strategy, for which Taiwan must be 

prepared. First, military strategy toward Taiwan revealed the requirement “to 

win a partial war under informatization conditions” by 2050.674 The three step 

strategy to do so involves creating a solid information base by 2010, achieving 

a quantum leap in technology around 2020, and achieving the goal of winning 

an informatization war by the middle of the twenty-first century. 

Further, Taiwan must consider not just “how” the PLA has turned from 

a semi-mechanized force to an informatized force but more importantly what 

this implies for their mode of operations and application of military strength 

against Taiwan. Increased reconnaissance, monitoring, and long-range 

capabilities will increase the PLA’s overall capacity and impact on Taiwan’s 

 

674 Liu Wen-hsiang and Wu Chien-te, “Investigation into the PRC’s Taiwan Military 

Strategy after the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC),” 

Taipei K’ung-chun Chun-kuan Shuang-yueh-k’an, as translated and downloaded from 

the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080819312002.
230

current assumptions about CPC invasion options. Decisive battle may be 

replaced by “hide-and-seek” operations under informatization conditions that 

use deterrence, blockades, paralysis, and other information measures. Harassing 

attacks may be supplemented with a “threat put forward to take massive 

military action to force us into political peace talks.”675

Taiwan is rightly concerned with the aggressive direction that the 

Chinese have taken with their informatized force. A close eye must be kept on 

the scientific and technological advances that the PLA is making and how it 

will integrate them with their military forces’ operations and strategy.

 

675 Ibid.
231
232

CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The purpose of The Dragon’s Quantum Leap was to describe the 

PLA’s new mode of thinking. This was accomplished through examining 

specific articles dedicated to the topic and through examining selected 

applications of new, digital-oriented thought in the fields of deception, 

reconnaissance, stratagems, military culture, and other areas. The PLA

continues to make progress toward an informatized mode of thought. This is 

evident in PLA military field exercises and in their professional discussions in 

military journals where practice and theory are furthered.

The apparent goal of the PLA’s newly-developed digital 

prowess/quantum leap is to allow it to be fully prepared to achieve electronic 

shi (electronic strategic advantage)676 early in the twenty-first century. An 

electronic advantage could be attained by uncovering vulnerabilities in a 

potential enemy’s digital systems through electronic reconnaissance activities 

or by disseminating viruses to vulnerable systems. Both activities would likely 

occur in peacetime to allow the PLA an initial advantage if war broke out. With 

electronic shi the PLA can utilize the Sun Tzu concept of “win victory before 

the first battle.” Victory is won by having identified the vulnerabilities capable 

of crashing or destroying a potential adversary’s information systems before the 

first shot is fired. Has the attainment of this advantage already happened? An 

adversary of China may not know until their systems crash or are destroyed.

Perhaps the most important document indicative of China’s 

transformation and quantum leap in thought was the PLA’s 2009 Chinese 

Defense White Paper. In this document, the term mechanization, which usually 

was the centerpiece of prior White Papers, was used only seven or eight times 

while the terms informatized and informatization were mentioned nearly 50 

times. The emphasis on the latter terms clearly indicates that these concepts 

now serve as the theoretical and developmental path for the armed forces.

Of course, this has not been an entirely smooth journey for the PLA. 

The transformation and application of informatized thought has had its 

 

676 For a more detailed examination of the concept of electronic shi, see Timothy L. 

Thomas, “China’s Cyber Tool: Striving to Attain Electronic Shi?”, forthcoming in Law, 

Policy and Technology: Cyberterrorism, Information Warfare, and Digital 

Immobilization, Pauline C. Reich and Eduardo Gelbstein, Editors, IGI Global 

publishers, 2010.
233

problems. However, the PLA fully recognizes the current shortcomings of its 

force in relation to the technically-advanced forces of the West. The PLA has 

worked to overcome these shortcomings, highlighting the need for officers to 

think strategically and operationally and to be creative and innovative in all 

areas of military affairs. Innovation and creativity are key to the thoughtful 

development of new technological ways to affect strategic, operational, and 

tactical issues. This includes, for example, how information technologies can 

enhance deception, campaign stratagems, and crisis management techniques. 

By 2009 most of the problems from earlier years were solved. In May 

the PLA announced that it would hold a massive information warfare exercise 

in the second half of 2009. For the first time the exercise would involve troops 

from four military regions. The exercise was 

aimed at assessing and improving the PLA’s overall combat capacity in 

the context of information warfare. It will put to the test the PLA’s 

capacity in command and decision-making, joint operations of land and 

air troops, operations in complicated electro-magnetic conditions, 

assault operations, simulated battles, and comprehensive exercises by 

specialist units.677

The conclusions that follow summarize the general changes uncovered 

in the preparation of this book that are reflective of the PLA’s new mode of 

thinking. These changes appear to have the required digital legs to take China

to new levels of achievement and advancement. However, readers should 

remember that while this new mode of thought may represent a quantum leap 

for China in the opinion of this author, it may or may not for other analysts or 

for other nations. Context matters as does a willingness to move outside one’s 

own “template and paradigm” comfort zone.

Indicators of New Modes of Thought

The PLA’s focus on cognitive issues (especially strategic issues) over 

its long military history undoubtedly has buttressed its search for new modes of 

thought in the information age. Thinking is a way that the PLA can defeat 

western technology, a way for the inferior to defeat the superior. The authors of 

Unrestricted Warfare noted, for example, that “...proposing a new concept of 

weapons does not require relying on the springboard of new technology, it just 

demands lucid and incisive thinking. However, this is not a strong point of the 

 

677 Yang Yang, “China to Hold Massive Military Drill in Second Half of 2009,” 

downloaded from http://english,cri.cn/6909/2009/05/05/1361s481984.htm
234

Americans, who are slaves to technology in their thinking.”

678 It is unnerving to 

imagine some of the new strategic methods the Chinese government or PLA 

may be developing to influence world affairs through digits (manipulating the 

Stock Market, engaging in currency exploitation or real estate deals, using 

blackmail to control the price of rare earth elements, etc.). The work of Marx 

and Engels inadvertently (or presciently!) support the view of adapting to the 

information age. It was Engels who noted that “The theoretical thinking of each 

era, including the theoretical thinking of our times, is a historical product. It has 

completely different forms in different times and has completely different 

content.”

679 China is working to uncover both the forms and the content of IW.

One Chinese author cited earlier in this book noted that “In 

confrontations on the future battlefield, what is scarier than inferior technology 

is inferior thinking.” This reminder shines light on the PLA and the fact that 

new modes of thought are not limited to geopolitical issues, although the latter 

certainly does influence the former. 

The US focus on technology at the expense of thought is welldocumented and recognized, even by Americans. It is also represented in the 

legislation America passes and in hearings on Capitol Hill. Technology is often 

the key or only focus. The fiscal 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, for 

example, passed by the House, contains a provision requiring the US’s annual 

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China report to include a new 

section on Beijing’s “efforts to acquire, develop, and deploy cyber warfare 

capabilities” in its assessments of China’s “asymmetric” warfare capabilities.680

A study of new modes of thought is not a part of this or most organizational 

agendas in Washington. This is understandable from the vantage point of the 

US’s reliance on its military-industrial complex to solve most problems. No one 

pays attention to the military-thinking complex until it is late in the game, as 

the US counterinsurgency effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan proved. The 

surge played as large a role in success in Iraq as did technology.

In abbreviated form, some of the major changes uncovered or captured 

in the transformation discussion in The Dragon’s Quantum Leap include:

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is placing more emphasis on the 

offense (which contradicts China’s stated goal of defense).

 

678 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Pan American Publishing 

Company, Panama City, Panama, 1999, p. 15.

679 Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Beijing, The People’s Press, 1995, Second 

Chinese Edition, Vol. 4, p. 248. 

680 Early Bird, 14 December 2007.
235

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking focuses more on the strategic 

environment, as they have done historically, than US analysts who 

focus on the operational environment. China doesn’t do PMESIIPT.681

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is emphasizing increased military 

and civilian technological integration.

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is developing CULTURAL battle 

simulations to accumulate the necessary information and 

experience to improve offensive and defensive abilities in the 

conduct of media warfare.

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is emphasizing informatized nonwar military operations and military operations other than war 

(MOOTW) as the US did years ago. However, they are doing so, as 

they note, under informatized conditions.

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is emphasizing what the Chinese 

term “advanced (informatized)” military culture.

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is stressing combinations of 

means, “cocktail mixtures” that range beyond the traditional 

battlefield. This is a worrisome point and ties in with MOOTW 

strategies.

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is applying Sun Tzu’s concepts, 

especially ways for the inferior to defeat the superior with 

information age developments. Packets of electrons now can “win 

victory before the first battle.” (see Appendix Two for a section on 

“The Shi of Virtual Reality” that covers this topic in more detail)

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is being discussed openly in the 

Chinese press. This is not a covert undertaking yet it is one we do 

not comprehend or understand even when it is in black and white. 

Perhaps this is because some western analysts are stuck in their 

own templates and paradigms.

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is exploiting the integration of 

cognitive and technological topics.

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is taking into account lessons 

learned from watching other militaries, especially the US and its 

coalition partners. From these observations the Chinese have 

developed a huge opposing force (OPFOR) known as the “blue 

Force” that engages the PLA with informatized warfare theory and 

equipment. 

 

681 PMESII-PT is an analysis of the operational environment in terms of political, 

military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information with the addition of physical 

environment and time variables.
236

 The PLA’s new mode of thinking is switching from a branch 

source, level by level (tactical to operational to strategic) thought 

process to a joint, integrated process.

These changes in China’s mode of thinking have been quietly 

developing over the past ten years. For the PLA, informatized warfare concepts 

have opened more new avenues for innovative thinking and creative 

conceptualization than at any time in the past. Retired General Wang Pufeng 

stressed the idea of thinking a few years ago in a military journal. Wang, a 

former head of the Academy of Military Science’s War Theory and Strategy 

Research Department, states that thinking and ideas are not the same thing. 

Thinking is the process of using a method to arrive at a reasonable 

understanding of something. An idea is the result of the thinking process. 

Strategic informatized thinking is a comprehensive process (providing new 

ideas for plans and operations) that stresses informatized characteristics and 

methods.682

Wang listed three factors that cannot be lacking when measuring the 

quality of strategy: accurately knowing the situation, possessing abundant 

knowledge, and possessing outstanding ability and keenness in perception (that 

is, a discerning or sagacious person). New modes of thought motivated by 

information age developments ensure these factors will be dramatically 

improved.683

To know the situation, information must be understood, the amount and 

flow of information must be controlled, information must be quickly processed 

and utilized, the good differentiated from the bad, and one must be able to see 

what is coming from a small clue. Knowledge must be gained from both direct 

experience and history. Ability refers to wisdom and knowledge while sagacity 

involves both strategic planning and management. The latter two (ability and 

sagacity) are the most essential for strategic thought in Wang’s opinion.684

The Integration of Military and Civilian Technologies and Thought

No chapter in this book covered this topic. However, during the 

research for this work, the topic appeared on several occasions and clearly 

became worthy of mention. Informatized thought has found new ground for 

expansion due to the growing integration of military and civilian thought over 

 

682 Wang Pufeng, “On Strategic Thinking,” China Military Science, 2004, No. 3, pp. 

86-91.

683 Ibid.

684 Ibid.
237

cyber issues, an integration occurring at an ever-quickening pace. The forecast 

by the authors of Unrestricted Warfare that there would be closer integration of 

military and civilian assets and personnel (civilian hackers, computer 

industries, etc.) in the future has come true. Time magazine, for example, 

published an article demonstrating this integration. Reporter Simon Elegant 

wrote that “a picture is emerging of a coordinated effort by Chinese-military 

authorities to recruit hackers...” As proof of his accusation, Elegant refers to an 

interview with a Chinese hacker, Withered Rose, in a Sichuan University 

campus newspaper. The story not only relates information about Rose but 

details links between hackers and the military. Rose later won a militarysponsored hacker contest and the PLA subsequently hired him to represent the 

Sichuan Military command in competitions that bring military and civilian 

practitioners closer together.685

An examination of statistics and other reporting measures indicate that 

Chinese society is also on the cusp of some revolutionary, quantum-leap type 

changes in information technolgies. China now has some 298 million Internet 

users686 and over 600 million mobile phone subscribers.687 Both figures exceed 

such numbers in the US by a wide margin. Access has offered Chinese students 

a wider variety of data and expanded their reach to things and thoughts once not 

available. People, in this sense, take quantum leaps in their capability to access 

and share information in a society where information access was once very 

tightly controlled.

Statistics back up claims that China’s social network and computer use 

are increasing at a quickening pace. The Chinese search engine Baidu is now 

the fourth most visited site in the world according to one report. It has 60% of 

the Chinese market compared with Google’s 20%. Rebecca MacKinnon, a 

professor at the University of Hong Kong, notes that the Chinese will drive how 

the Internet evolves in the coming years since they soon will have the largest 

number of users. Tudou and 6rooms are more popular than YouTube in China; 

Xiaonei is a Facebook near equivalent; and web portals such as Qihoo are there 

for comparison against Yahoo. Users are younger than in the US. Their social, 

 

685 Simon Elegant, “Enemies at the Firewall,” Time, 6 December 2007, downloaded in 

May 2009 at http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1692063,00.html

686 Robin Wauters, “Meanwhile Internet Usage in China Still Booming,” 14 January 

2009, located at http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/01/14/meanwhile-internet-usage-inchina-still-booming/

687“China Mobile Phone Subscribers Pass 600 Million Mark,” Textually.org, 24 July 

2008, located at http://www.textually.org/textually/archives/2008/07/020854.htm 
238

cultural, and political clout are still to be judged.688 Most important is that these 

developments are changing society’s mode of thinking much like the military.

The common man now realizes he can participate to an extent never imagined 

in assisting the government with state matters (collecting data and other 

information across the globe) and in accessing new opportunities. 

Finally, with regard to computing expertise, China reports that its 

quantum computing capability is now beginning to show improvement. For 

example, author Gregory Huang described the dreams and aspirations of the 

Chinese to quickly develop a quantum computing device in the journal New 

Scientist. In an interview with Pan Jian-Wei of the University of Science and 

Technology (UST) of China, Huang described how Pan is trying to combine 

“quantum memory with a new architecture known as cluster states.”689 

Quantum computing inspires researchers to use quantum mechanics to perform 

tasks that current computers cannot. As Huang explains

The power of a quantum computer comes from the fact that a quantum 

particle can exist in more than one state at a time. So unlike a data bit in 

an ordinary computer, which can have the value of either 0 or 1, a 

quantum bit (or qubit) can simultaneously have the value 0,1 or any 

“superposition” of the two. So perform a calculation using qubits and 

you get a huge number of calculations for the price of one.690

When the quantum theory known as entanglement is added to the 

quantum phenomenon, Huang notes, it can link the properties of several qubits. 

Then, in principle, it is possible to represent more numbers than there are atoms 

in the universe.691 Problems do exist, however. In this case the problem is the 

stability of an “entanglement.” It turns out they are very fragile. “Cluster 

states,” where each step has its own calculation, is Pan’s attempt to overcome 

this problem and maintain stability with the use of photons for quantum 

communication. No entanglement manipulations are necessary, as they are 

prepared and left alone. This does, however, require preparing more 

entanglements before the calculations start.692 This progress indicates that 

Chinese scientists are moving quickly forward and making progress in many 

technical areas to which new thinking (or the application of old stratagems) can 

be applied.

 

688 Gregory Huang, “Boys from the Wang Ba (Internet Bar),” New Scientist, 10 

November 2007, pp. 66-67.

689 Gregory Huang, “Master of Qubits,” New Scientist, 10 November 2007, p. 69.

690 Ibid.

691 Ibid.

692 Ibid., p. 70.
239

Future War

The most prominent US author on the topic of Chinese future war is 

Michael Pillsbury. In his 1997 book Chinese Views of Future Warfare, only 

one chapter dealt specifically with future military trends while his 2000 book 

on China Debates the Future Security Environment was more specific. Here 

Pillsbury covered the broad category of forecasting future wars from a Chinese 

perspective and discussed topics such as force structure, the revolution in 

military affairs, power projections, and future People’s War theories. Nothing 

approaching Pillsbury’s work has subsequently appeared. 

Bits and pieces of the future war puzzle do appear from time to time in 

Chinese journals and, when assembled, they make an intriguing mosaic. For 

example, in regard to futuristic systems, there is Chinese interest in quantum 

and optical computer developments; micro-nano technologies; gene 

technologies; supersonic technologies; ion invisibility technology; unmanned 

platform technology; and developments in directed energy technology among 

many other high-technology projects. These developments indicate steady 

progress. The Chinese also discussed the development of a laboratory of future 

war and, from 2005 to 2007, the development of a command post of the future, 

network war, and virtual space. Bio technologies and other issues (twenty-first 

century inertial technologies, electromagnetic pulse bombs, thermobaric 

weapons, laser units, merciful (non-lethal?) weapons, and space weapons) were 

also topics of discussion between 2000 and 2008. 

Shen Weiguang mentioned future war weapons in his work on 

Information Warfare in China. He predicted that robot war, clone war, leader 

war, star wars, virtual war, ideological war, media wars, and cognitive wars 

will all reflect the features of what he termed ideal wars of the future. Other 

authors in Shen’s book stated that countermeasures will be key to ensuring that 

a future struggle comes out in China’s favor. Feng Yi and Zhang Jie wrote that 

China’s counter technology path must develop five concepts: 

 Anti-satellite equipment

 Counter warning systems/reconnaissance equipment

 Counter GPS systems

 Electronic warfare technology

 Concealment devices. 

Concluding Thoughts

The examination of these selected aspects of China’s new mode of 

thinking offers various portraits that could be painted. For example, is China 

aggressive or helpful in its new mode of thinking? The former picture could be 
240

painted by China’s network reconnaissance and development of digital 

stratagems and deception. The latter picture could be painted by China’s 

apparent desire to work hard at developing its crisis management techniques 

and interest in working closer with the west. Books like Unrestricted War also 

help, in a strange way, to move discussion forward due to the PLA authors open 

critique of future conflict. 

On the whole, however, China’s new mode of thinking is worrisome. It 

has produced many new issues to which the west must pay attention. Network 

psychological warfare, Chinese-specific adaptations to new information 

technologies, and the concepts of system attack warfare and pre-emptive strikes 

with electrons will require our constant attention. The Chinese recognize that 

information technologies can be used in politics, on the battlefield, or in 

combinations of political and military means.

The revolution in military and information technology, of course, has

produced a corresponding revolution in military thinking, operational methods, 

and structural organization. Retired Chinese Major General Wang Baocun 

wrote that the informatization buildup relies on the comprehensive integration 

of a mechanized force’s “materials and energy” and an informatized force’s 

“information and knowledge.” First priority must be placed on the development 

of C4I systems, the integration of early warning and interdiction, command and 

control, and precision strikes.

Ma Yexi wrote that computer network war (CNW) of the future must 

include deterrence, reconnaissance, disruption, deception, and protection 

methods. CNW’s ability to enable superiority (and convince an opponent that 

capabilities and advantages lie with friendly forces) can cause CNW to become 

a “network deterrent” that forces opponents to respect and play by China’s rules 

of the game. Finally, Mei Jun wrote that “trump cards” must receive priority 

development. They must focus on electronic destruction capabilities. Intensive 

microwave interference equipment, electromagnetic pulse weapons, and laser 

anti-satellite equipment represent three types of trump card weapons. Mei wrote 

that whoever achieves advantages in the fight for network space will possess 

the strategic initiative in the twenty-first century, implying that control over 

network space is a critical trump card. A paralyzed network can cause losses to 

the national economy, create social chaos, and reduce combat capability among 

other consequences.

With regard to the US focus on technology, authors Qiao and Wang 

write that war will not follow a fixed race course based on technology and 
241

weaponry as the US believes. Focused and lucid thought can still allow the 

inferior to defeat the superior in their opinion.

Technology use in politics or economics, in consort with economics, 

can be a deadly pairing for use against other nations. Perhaps most important 

for national security personnel studying the PLA is that stratagems can be 

applied to political, economic, and other fields of study. One can hypothesize 

that Chinese civilian institutes in existence now are involved in the study of 

stratagems to manipulate US financial flows or to create situations against 

which the diplomatic community must react. Therefore, the US and its allies 

must think about such contingencies and eventualities in peacetime. Stratagems 

can be silent manipulators that cause decision-makers to do as the Chinese 

desire.

China’s interest in culture must also be monitored. In the words of one 

author, China must construct socialist culture with Chinese characteristics; must 

create cultural diffusion hardware and software over which China has 

autonomous intellectual property rights; and, most important for Western 

audiences, China must take action to “propel China’s culture industry and 

media industry beyond China’s borders in an effort to take over the 

international culture market.”693 China is already engaged in spreading its 

culture beyond its borders. For example, is the spread of the Confucius 

Institutes an aggressive or helpful project? Based on the thought of “taking over 

the international culture market” the project would be deemed aggressive. 

There are now 282 Confucius Institutes in 272 classrooms in 88 countries 

according to a Chinese source. There are 87 such institutes in 205 classrooms in 

12 countries in the Americas alone.694 If the purpose of the institutes is to 

broaden cooperation and understanding, then they certainly would be viewed as 

helpful.

The battlefield has become a testing ground for many technological 

advances. Today’s battlefield is characterized by continually changing direction 

and many irregular factors due to the existence of so many technological 

advances that can be purchased “off the shelf” by nation-states or insurgents. 

Outcomes on the battlefield will depend as much on creative thought in the 

application of technological advances as on the technology itself. Chinese 

authors recognize that the PLA must create power for itself on the battlefield by 

creating situations and developing them as they intend. Thinking matters in 

 

693 Wang Shudao, “Modern Cultural Diffusion and National Security,” China Military 

Science, 2005, No. 3, pp. 64-69. 

694 Information downloaded from http://college.chinese.cn/node_1941.htm. The author 

would like to thank Mr. Scott Henderson of FMSO for pointing out this website.
242

such cases. For example, the PLA is working to find technological ways to 

obscure the outlines of military equipment in the field to prevent their 

acquisition by enemy targeteers and thus attain deception. These new 

technological advances are combined with stratagems or perception 

management techniques to provide new and innovative ways to fool potential 

enemy decision-makers. Stratagems are designed to induce cognitive confusion 

into an opponent’s decision-making process and cause enemy commanders to 

make decisions based on false information. Using advanced surveillance 

equipment to obtain a top-down image of an area provides a “vision” for 

stratagem (perception management) developers to work from and with. 

Stratagem designers then provide input to computers to produce more 

technologically based strategic deception options. However, this requires 

sophisticated commanders who understand how to exploit the most recent 

scientific and technological breakthroughs and combine them with stratagem 

and deception techniques to enable the optimum level of combat efficiency. 

The Chinese government and PLA’s use of potential combinations of 

technical, political, and battlefield elements buttressed by new modes of 

thought must continue to be a top priority area of study for western analysts and 

their consideration of Chinese strategy. The Chinese most likely have continued 

to work with the thoughts of selected officers like Qiao and Wang. Perhaps they 

have developed new elements and new combinations of unrestricted warfare 

techniques. For example, in order to “win victory before the first battle” China 

may be considering a combination of the following means: cyber preemption + 

control of financial resources + network reconnaissance + new concepts of 

weapons (ways to crash the stock market, for example) + high-tech campaign 

stratagems + high-tech deception. Qiao and Wang added other stimulating and 

at times scary messages for Western audiences (not the least of which is that 

war with the US is “inevitable”). Western analysts need to think and be aware 

of these proclivities if they hope to counter them.

In conclusion, the West’s technological advantage is still applicable 

and far superior to that of the PLA. However, the PLA’s transformation leap 

and reliance on new modes of thought has the nation postured to conduct 

informatized war in both peacetime and wartime. It is the peacetime use of 

informatized concepts that should worry the West most since this is where the 

West is the most vulnerable. 

While there are many reasons to fear China’s peacetime use of 

informatized warfare, two stick out. They are China’s interest in using a 

combination of methods to manipulate the information and financial security of 

another nation in China’s favor; and the ability of China to conduct 
243

reconnaissance and offensive activities anonymously and, if detected, to declare 

plausible deniability. Such activities make China a wily and confident 

adversary who is willing to take enormous risks to “design programs which 

coerce the enemy into playing according to our [China’s] rules.” Chinese 

analysts also have written that in some cases Chinese systems will be defended 

by attacking adversary systems. Such thoughts imply that deception and 

offensive actions are at the heart of many Chinese IW moves. 

The West must ensure to its utmost ability that China’s risk-taking is 

forecasted and monitored properly. If not, Western leaders may fall prey to 

some ancient stratagem that has been technologically developed and hidden; or 

an unintended conflict may emerge over issues that can be settled outside of the 

battlefield. The PLA’s ideas expressed in this work indicate that western 

nations must prepare now some realistic methods for better uncovering and 

exposing Chinese designs. Otherwise, the Chinese will have no obstructions on 

their path to attaining electronic shi and the strategic electronic advantage the 

term implies. 

Hopefully, analysts will continue their interest and study of the PLA 

and its new thinking deep into the twenty-first century. Western analysts must 

become as adept at studying the Chinese as the Chinese are at studying us. Only 

in this way will the west truly comprehend if someone is trying to impose a 

stratagem on them in an act of aggression; or if someone is just trying to help 

alleviate a crisis or confrontation. If the world truly is on the cusp of witnessing 

the emergence of China the world’s most influential power, then Chinese 

specialists should be able to find employment for many years to come.
244

APPENDIX ONE: IW ARTICLES IN CHINA MILITARY 

SCIENCE: 2007-2009

The titles listed in English below are from the journal China Military 

Science and are representative of the IW content of this PLA journal. Dragon 

Bytes listed the IW articles in this journal from 1999-2003. Decoding the 

Virtual Dragon listed IW articles from 2004-2006. This section thus updates 

that list. The titles in this section are listed as they appeared in China Military 

Science, starting with the most current issue available and working backward to 

No. 1, 2007. As noted earlier, all PLA journals and newspapers continue to 

write extensively on the subject of informatization in China. 

To continue a procedure initiated in Dragon Bytes, only those titles 

with “high-tech,” “digitalization,” “precision,” “network,” “system of systems” 

“information,” or some other clear IW related term in the title are listed. Any 

Chinese discussion of US IO is also listed as are articles about psychological 

operations since they are an ingredient of Chinese IW. 

Number 6, 2009 (not available at time of printing) 

Number 5, 2009

“On Relations between Military Soft Power and Comprehensive National 

Power and State’s Soft Power,” Long Fangcheng and Li Decai, pp. 120-129

“Study of Network Warfare in Terms of International Law,” Zheng Guoliang 

and Zheng Ming, pp. 130-135.

Number 4, 2009

“Air Superiority in Local Wars under Informatized Conditions,” Wu Wenjun 

and Tan Fuzhi, pp. 77-83.

“On Fire Warfare under Informatized Conditions,” Li Yun, pp. 84-89, 97.

Number 3, 2009

“Analysis of New Changes in Principles of Information Warfare,” Wang Hui 

and Geng Haijun, pp. 18-23.

“On the Nature and Categories and Forms of Information Operations,” Dong 

Xuezhen and Tian Yuping, pp. 24-35.

“Considerations on Innovative Development of Military Armament Science 

under Informatized Conditions,” Guo Shizhen, pp. 79-90.

“Fundamentals in Theories of PLA Informatization,” Li Jing, pp. 100-105.

Number 2, 2009
245

“Transformation of Military Science Research Patterns under Informatized 

Conditions,” Geng Weidong and Jiang Shaosan, pp. unknown at time of 

printing.

“Recent Development in the Study of the Idea of People’s War under 

Informatized Conditions,” Wang Wei and Yang Zhen, pp. unknown at time of 

printing.

Number 1, 2009

None

Number 6, 2008

None

Number 5, 2008

“Study of the Law of Army Informatization Building,” Li Yanbin, et al, pp. 

unknown.

Number 4, 2008

“On the Content and Method System of Military Training under Information 

Conditions,” Chai Yuqiu and Zhou Daolei, pp. 21-26.

Research into Fundamental Issues of Operations under Information Conditions

(special section in this issue of China Military Science that included the 

following four articles)

“On the Changes of Relations between Strategy and Campaign-Combat in 

Modern War,” Cui Yafeng, pp. 27-37.

“A Study of the Complex Systems Theory of Information War,” Zhu Xiaoning 

and Xia Liang, pp. 38-48.

“A Systematic Analysis of the Factors that Affect the Generation of Combat 

Capability,” Yang Xin and Zhang Zhiyu, pp. 49-61.

“On the Fundamental Issues of Complex Electromagnetic Environments,” 

Wang Ruqun, pp. 62-70.

Number 3, 2008

“On Creative Development of National Defense Science and Technology 

Theory under Informatized Conditions,” Li Decai and Ou Lishou, pp. 42-51.

“Outline of Strategic Theory of Army Informatization Building,” Niu Li and 

Zhang Sanhu, pp. 52-59.

“On the Trend of Transformation of Operations Theory under Informatized 

Conditions,” Li Zhilin, pp. 60-68.

Number 2, 2008
246

“Military Soft Power in the Field of Vision to Win Informationalized Wars,” 

Wang Lianshui and Ni Heliang, pp. 63-67.

“Science and Technology: the First Combat Power of the Information Age,” 

Song Li, pp. 115-126.

Number 1, 2008

“Promote a Better and Faster Scientific Development of Informationalization in 

Political Work,” Shen Guoquan, pp. 98-105.

“On the Weak Defeating the Strong under Information Conditions,” Peng 

Hongqi, pp. 142-148.

Number 6, 2007

“Revolution in Military Thinking in the Information Age,” Deng Yifei, pages 

unknown.

Number 5, 2007

“Get Hold of the Essence of the New Revolution in Military Affairs and 

Advance the Integration of Information Technology and Military Science,” Ren 

Haiquan, pp. 77-85.

“Understand the Characteristics and Laws of Military Training under 

Information Conditions and Promote Further Development in the 

Transformation of Military Training,” Cui Yafeng, pp. 109-115.

Number 4, 2007

“Implement the Scientific Development Concept and Advance the Training of 

Talents under Information Conditions,” Cadres Department of the PLA General 

Political Department, pp. 78-82.

“A Study of Issues in Military Training under Information Conditions,” Wang 

Xibin, pp. 88-95.

“A Study of the Basic Characteristics of Modes of Thinking in Information 

Warfare,” Li Deyi, pp. 101-105.

Number 3, 2007

None

Number 2, 2007

None

Number 1, 2007

“Ensure Historical Orientation and Promote All-Round Innovation of Army 

Informationalization,” Dai Qingmin, pp. 77-83.
247

“On Building Soft Military Power,” Wang Xingsheng and Wu Zhizhong, pp. 

92-98.

“On Logistics Information Warfare—Offense and Defense of Military Losistic 

Supply Chain,” Li Li, Chen Hong, and Wang Jinfa, pp. 99-108.
248

APPENDIX TWO: ON DEVELOPING VIRTUAL SHI AND A 

VIRTUAL THIRTY-SIX STRATAGEMS

This appendix examines the term “shi” and the thirty-six stratagems of war. 

Both concepts form a part of the foundation of classic Chinese thought. The 

appendix focuses on the concepts applicability in the information or cyber 

age.695

Introduction 

China’s history and culture is rich in military wisdom and philosophy. 

An examination of the thought processes that support this wisdom offers 

templates, insights, and models from which to do three things: better evaluate 

the Chinese military’s potential intentions and methods; work with the PLA 

based on this understanding; and develop new Western military concepts. 

This appendix examines two Chinese concepts of importance that may 

assist in these endeavors. The term shi (pronounced like the English word 

“sure”) is one such concept. The word shi appears eighty or more times in 

Chinese dictionaries and each time it is expressed by a different Chinese 

character with a different meaning (but is still pronounced shi).

696 Shi (as is the 

case with many Chinese pinyin expressions) can be expressed linguistically via 

four tones, which are: neutral, ascending, descending, or descending-ascending. 

For each tone there are twenty or so different Chinese characters. For example, 

the words ten, teacher, non-commissioned officer, time of day, to begin, to be, 

to test, to make, to see, to know, room, and thing are all pronounced via one of 

the four tones of shi. Each one is expressed/written with a different Chinese 

character. Therefore it is important to know just which Chinese character of shi

one is speaking about and defining. 

In the case of this chapter, different Chinese and English speaking 

authors have translated the shi character under examination in several different 

ways adding to the confusion. Shi is defined as energy, power, momentum, and 

strategic advantage, among other translations. An examination of this shi

character is discussed below. 

 

695 This author reviewed the articles herein and credits the content, concepts, and ideas 

to the primary authors noted. Translation credit belongs to a private company used by 

FMSO for the article by Ren Li and to the Open Source Center for the remaining 

articles. 

696 Discussion with Chinese language instructors Marn-Ling Wang and David Dai at the 

US Defense Language Institute, July 2009.
249

Why should this concept be of any concern? Noted Western Sinologist 

Roger Ames has called the concept of shi “the key and defining idea in SunTzu: The Art of Warfare.” Ames translates the term as “strategic advantage.” 

He also notes that shi “is a level of discourse through which one actively 

determines and cultivates the leverage and influence of one’s particular 

place.”697 The popular Western Sinologist Ralph Sawyer defines this type of shi

as the “strategic configuration of power.”

698 Other Western and Chinese 

specialists’ definitions of the same character are offered as well, with some 

specialists agreeing and some disagreeing with the concepts of strategic 

advantage and strategic configuration of power.

The other concept under consideration is that of a stratagem, most often 

discussed in conjunction with the thirty-six stratagems of war. A stratagem is 

designed to mislead enemy processes of perception, thinking, emotion, and 

will. It is used to deceive an opponent and result in a favorable tactical 

advantage. Shi and stratagem are important military concepts adaptable to the 

age of electrons as reviews of recent Chinese articles indicate.

The examination of shi that follows is based on different linguists’ 

translations of the concept in The Art of War, on the views of experts on the 

topic, and on definitions from dictionaries or philosophical compendiums. Such 

an examination allows one to consider all the linguistic variants of the term. 

The concept is also examined from the contemporary context of what might be 

expected from the “strategic configuration of electrons” or from one of the 

other definitions of shi. 

The section on the thirty-six stratagems examines the views of a 

strategic thinker at the Chinese Academy of Military Science. His discussion 

compares the Art of War and the Thirty-Six Stratagems. The comparison 

enlightens a Western reader’s understanding of Chinese “informationized” 

military thought and culture and how stratagems are also being applied in the 

age of electrons. 

In essence, this appendix explains how concepts developed thousands 

of years ago are still applicable today and worthy of further consideration.

The Difficulty in Understanding the Concept of Shi

A Chinese term that has eluded a precise Western definition is “shi” 

(also spelled “shih”; the spelling of shi or shih used in the following pages is 

 

697 The Book of War, The Modern Library, New York, 2000, p. 50.

698 Ralph D. Sawyer, The Art of War, Fall River Press, 1994, pp. 143-147.
250

dependent on the spelling used by individual authors who are quoted). It is a 

concept familiar to the Chinese and foreign students of Chinese philosophy, 

such as US sinologists. But it is a concept hardly ever encountered by others 

not in these categories. 

William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim, authors of The Philosophy of 

Chinese Military Culture: Shih vs. Li, write that shih was the defining theme in 

The Art of War and that “the essence of shih was the dynamic power that 

emerged in the combination of men’s hearts, military weapons, and natural 

conditions.”699 Thus, while the significance of shi is clear to major writers and 

translators, what is exactly meant by shi is not! Further, if these scholars 

consider shi to be the key and defining theme of the Art of War, then analysts 

should pay attention to the term and investigate why it is of such significance to 

these scholars and linguists.

Ralph Sawyer writes in his edited version of The Seven Military 

Classics of Ancient China that shih’s definition varies with its use in the Art of 

War; is interrelated with developments in Legalist thought; can represent 

tactical power where strategic power appears inappropriate in scope; and is 

defined differently by most expert US translators.700

Roger Ames believes shih can be traced back to Legalist, Confucian, 

and even Taoist philosophical sources.701 In his1993 Sun Tzu: The Art of War

volume, Ames explains the difficulty in correctly translating shih in ancient 

texts in the following way:

These texts, emerging as they do out of concrete historical experience, 

tend to communicate through the medium of image, historical allusion, 

and analogy. What constitutes evidence and makes things clear in the 

text is often an effectively focused image, not a theory; an inexpressible 

and inimitable experience, not an argument; an evocative metaphor, not 

a logically demonstrated truth. The style, then, respects the priority of 

the unique particular–a defining characteristic of emergent harmony.702

Dr. Michael Pillsbury, one of America’s foremost authorities on the 

PLA and author of several comprehensive works on Chinese military thought, 

 

699 William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military 

Culture: Shih vs. Li, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 11.

700 Ralph D. Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of China, Westview Press, 1993, pp. 

429-432.

701 Roger Ames, Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare, 1993, Ballantine Books, p. 281.

702 Ibid., p. 73.
251

used his study of PLA materials to explain several components of shi that 

appear key to understanding the concept: 

 Shi assesses your side’s potential, the enemy side’s potential, 

weather, and geography to identify the moment in a campaign 

when an advantage can be gained over an opponent. Shi is a certain 

moment in the campaign when you could take the advantage from 

the enemy (He Diqing, Campaign Course Materials, AMS 2001); 

 Shi is created in five ways, through maneuver, posture, position, 

psychology, and calculations. The timing and speed of creating shi

in war has changed under conditions of high-tech warfare (Yue 

Lan, “High Tech Warfare and Contemporary Military Philosophy,” 

Liberation Army Daily Press, 2000) 

 Shi is the moment when it becomes apparent one side can win the 

war (Guo Shengwei, Deng Xiaoping’s Military Stratagems, Central 

Party School, 2000) 

 Shi according to the Tang founder used psycho-shi, geo-shi, and 

shaping-shi (Zhang Wenru, China’s Strategic Culture, Beijing 

University Press, 1997); 

 and shi can be created with stratagems (Li Bingyan, Stratagem and 

Transformation, 2004).

703

Definitions of shi by a host of US sinology and Chinese experts are 

quite varied as Sawyer and Ames suggest. Thirteen Western and ten Chinese 

definitions of shi follow. Each represents a different way of explaining the 

concept:

Western:

 Roger Ames, a leading interpreter of Chinese philosophy and 

culture, from The Art of War: shih is strategic or battle 

advantage.704

 Ralph D. Sawyer, translator and commentator on Sun Tzu’s 

The Art of War: shi is the strategic configuration of power, a 

strategic concept; advantage from superior position and power 

(an army’s overall capacity [endurance, spirit, equipment, 

command, etc.] instead of just numbers) of the force 

involved.705

 

703 This information was taken from a slide presentation that Dr. Pillsbury sent to this 

author. 

704 Ames.

705 Sawyer.
252

 Samuel B. Griffith, translator and commentator on The Art of 

War: shih means force, influence, authority, energy. Griffith 

used “energy” as the translation for Chapter Five of the Art of 

War. He stated in a footnote that shih could mean energy or 

potential in some cases and situation in others.706

 Lionel Giles, The Art of War: Giles also translated the term 

shih as energy.

 Mark McNeilly, author of Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern 

Warfare: shih is translated as energy. His footnote is identical 

to Griffith’s and he clearly used Griffith’s entire translation in 

his work.707

 Denma Translation Group’s The Art of War: shih is the power 

inherent in a configuration.708

 Francois Jullien, author of The Propensity of Things: shi is the 

potential that originates not in human initiative but instead 

results from the very disposition of things.709

 William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim, authors of The 

Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture: shi is the dynamic 

power that emerged in the combination of men’s hearts, 

military weapons, and natural conditions.710 Also used to mean 

the following: threaten, manipulate, deter, power, force, 

influence, situation’s natural features, tendency, trend, gestures, 

and a person’s circumstances.711

 Dr. Gary Bjorge of the US Army’s Combat Studies Institute: 

Shi is “like the force of rushing water that lifts stones from a 

stream bed, like a drawn crossbow, and like round rocks rolling 

down a steep mountain slope;” it offers a sense of potential 

energy in a situation and the existence of momentum and 

force.712

 

706 Samuel B. Griffith, The Art of War, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 90.

707 Mark McNeilly, Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare, Oxford University Press, 

2001. McNeilly provided commentary on Griffith’s translation.

708 The Denma Translation, The Art of War, Shambhala, 2003, explanation of shih on a 

card sold with the book.

709 Francois Jullien, The Propensity of Things, Zone Books, New York, 1999, p. 13.

710 William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military 

Culture, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 11.

711 Ibid., p. 15.

712 Gary J. Bjorge, Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA’s Huai Hai 

Campaign, Leavenworth Paper Number 22, [no date given], p. 53.
253

 Alastair Iain Johnston, author of Cultural Realism: shi is 

actualized military power.713

 T. W. Kuo, Sun Tzu: Manual for War: Kuo used the term 

“force” for his definition of shih.

714

 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007: shi is 

the strategic configuration of power, also understood as the 

alignment of forces. There is no direct Western equivalent of 

the term, according to the report.715

 Dr. Michael Pillsbury, 2009: see two pages prior for his 

citations from PLA materials.

Chinese:

 Chinese-English Dictionary: shi is power, force, influence; 

momentum, tendency; outward appearance of a natural object; 

situation, state of affairs, circumstances; sign, gesture; male 

genitals.716

 Lin Wusun, translator of Sun Zi: The Art of War, Sun Bin: The 

Art of War (advertised as “two great Chinese military classics 

in one volume”): shi is momentum and the term xing is 

disposition.717

 Chinese Encyclopedia of Philosophical Terms: shi is “an 

inevitable trend in historical development.”718 Shi and reason 

are inseparable, the “divine reasoning in the intention.” Shi is 

“availing oneself of advantage to gain control, a natural 

interest” while law is the basis for governing with shi. Shi

“changes with each passing day and cannot return to its former 

self.”719

 Tao Hanzhang, Chinese General: shi is “the strategically 

advantageous posture before a battle that enables it to have a 

flexible, mobile, and changeable position during a 

 

713 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 97.

714 T. W. Kuo, Sun Tzu: Manual for War, 1989, ATLI CORP, p. 47.

715 Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 

2007, US Government Printing Office, p. 7.

716 Wang Zuomin and David Crook, chief editors, Chinese-English Dictionary, Beijing 

Foreign Language Institute of English, 1992, p. 625.

717 Wu Rusong and Wu Xianlin, chief editors, Sun Zi: The Art of War, Sun Bin: The 

Art of War, People’s China Publishing House, 1995, pp. 32-34.

718 Feng Qi, Chinese Encyclopedia of Philosophical Terms, Revised Edition, Shanghai 

Lexicographical Publishing House, 2001, p. 1355.

719 Ibid.
254

campaign.”720 Chapter Five (Shi) in Tao’s translation of The 

Art of War was translated as “posture of the army.”721

 Sui Yun, translator for the ASIAPAC book The Art of War: shi

is defined as “momentum.”722

 Tienzen Gong, in the online article “Satellite Killer, 

Unbreakable Codes, and More:” literally, the word shi means 

“holding forces with hands.” Those with shi can control a 

boulder rolling down a mountain. A general must control and 

articulate shi, creating shi for friendly forces and controlling 

the shi of enemy forces and reducing it to nothing.723

 Chinese Golden Treasure Book on The Art of War: shi is 

defined as momentum in the Chinese book published by the 

China Society of the Art of War.724

 Li Rulong at the 6th International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art 

of War: Shi (energy/power) strategy has always been a 

significant proposition. “Acting according to the situation,” 

“planning and concocting the power,” and “selecting men and 

employing strategic power” have always been important 

subjects for study by strategists throughout the ages... “power” 

is actually a kind of potential energy; once the external 

condition is provided, this energy will demonstrate a mighty 

power and become a force. Such an understanding can be allied 

to all fields of social practice including military affairs.725

 Xinhua Zidian (New China Dictionary): Power, authority, 

might (abuse one’s power to take advantage of others); a 

condition that is manifested, appearance (pertaining to the 

natural world [physical features of a place, terrain, precipitous 

mountains], pertaining to movement [posture, gesture, sign, 

signal], pertaining to politics, military affairs, or other areas 

[current situation, trend of the times, the way things are going, 

 

720 Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu’s Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation, Sterling 

Innovation, 2007, p. 124.

721 Ibid., p. 44.

722 The Art of War, ASIAPAC BOOKS PTE LTD, 2003, p. 123.

723 Tienzen Gong, “Satellite Killer, Unbreakable Codes, and More,” www.chineseword-roots.org, accessed on 15 January 2009.

724 Golden Treasure Book, The Art of War By Sun Zi, Xiyuan Publishing House, 2004.

725 Li Rulong, “A Brief Discussion of the ‘Shi’ Strategy,” The 6th International 

Symposium on Sun Zi’s Art of War, selected paper abstracts, pp. 71-72.
255

general trend, take advantage of circumstances to attack a 

fleeting enemy); male genitalia (castrate)726

 Chinese book Campaign Stratagems: Shi is situation, status, 

and state of affairs; the combination of the friendly situation, 

enemy situation, and the environment; trend in affairs; the 

integrated situation that has an impact on the effective 

performance of military strength; sum of all factors impacting 

the performance of the operational efficiency of both sides; 

general confrontational situation; hub of increase and decrease 

in operational efficiencies of two sides; the key factor 

determining the rise and fall of operational efficiency.

727

Thus, the complexity of the term is clearly identifiable from the 

definitions. Posture of the army, strategic advantage, strategic configuration of 

power, the alignment of forces, availing oneself of advantage to gain control, 

potential from the disposition of things, momentum, energy, force, power, 

influence, and “holding forces with hands” were all used to define shi. 

Ames writes that the translator, informed by context, must select the 

most appropriate definition.728 In his view, the term shih is so difficult to 

translate since it can “combine in one idea the following cluster of 

meanings:”729

1. aspect, situation, circumstances, conditions

2. disposition, configuration, outward shape

3. force, influence, momentum, authority

4. strategic advantage, purchase730

Shih begins from the recognition that war unfolds within a broad field of unique 

natural, social, and political conditions, according to Ames, which are always 

changing. It includes intangibles such as morale, opportunity, timing, 

psychology, and logistics. Thus, with so many explanations, after awhile the 

analyst begins to question what is NOT shi. 

 

726 New China Dictionary, 1971, p. 395. Translation of the definition provided by Mr. 

Bart Zobel.

727 Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, Campaign Stratagems, National Defense

University, 2002.

728 The Book of War, p. 50.

729 Ibid., p. 51.

730 Ibid. 
256

Dr. Bjorge, mentioned above, wrote that Su Yu’s shaping of the 1948 

Huai Hai campaign involved the fact that Su “believed that given the existing 

shi, simultaneously applying these Sunzian precepts would produce a major 

victory rapidly and set the stage for subsequent operations.” If the energy of a 

good fighting man is like the momentum acquired by a round stone rolled down 

a mountain, then for Su and the situation before him (the capabilities and 

locations of the forces involved, the terrain features, and the Nationalists desire 

to relieve the Seventh Army) was like the mountain slope. Su’s force had 

momentum and conditions presented the opportunity for even more. Physical 

and psychological energy flowed for him.731

Ralph Sawyer adds to this explanation, noting that shih is “a measure of 

the relative power an army derives from positional advantage combined with its 

overall combat strength.” Positional advantage can include terrain, firepower, 

morale, superior provisions, and other force multipliers. The release of strategic 

power can vary based on these many factors.732

Shi has uses for other than military purposes since it has some eighty 

definitions as noted above. In March 2008 Qi Zhu, a Chinese national residing 

in California, published her doctoral dissertation on “Shi in Architecture: The 

Efficacy of Traditional Chinese Doors.”733 Qi used the Chinese Encyclopedia of 

Philosophical Terms which she states categorizes the ideogram shi in two ways. 

Shi is considered to be either a philosophical concept construed as power or 

authority derived from a dictatorial position (shi born out of political 

hierarchical systems); or as an aesthetic concept described as an elusive and 

marvelous force animating an artifact.734 She adds that Jullien understands shi

as “a potential or force spontaneously born out of a disposition” and his 

understanding, to her, recaptures a solid understanding and meaning of shi.

735

In the Introduction to his translation of The Art of War, Samuel Griffith 

mentions that “only the shih—the chariot-riding nobility—and their immediate 

retainers carried primitive shields of lacquered leather or varnished rhinoceros 

hide. The footmen wore padded jackets...”736 Only the shih were allowed to 

ride in chariots. Perhaps this is how “power” became associated with shih in 

that the nobility were referred to in this way. Qi’s comment that shi is a 

 

731 Bjorge, p. 144.

732 Ralph Sawyer, Sun Pin Military Methods, Westview Press, 1995, p. 64.

733 Qi Zhu, “Shi in Architecture: The Efficacy of Traditional Chinese Doors,” doctoral 

dissertation at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 25 March 2008.

734 Qi Zhu, p. 1 of the Introduction to her doctoral dissertation. 

735 Ibid., p. 2-3.

736 Griffith, p. 10.
257

“philosophical concept construed as power or authority derived from a 

dictatorial position” is then more understandable.

Shi as a situation or disposition may be a reflection of a historical 

thought process and conceptualization. These expressions and perceptions,

when studied today, imply that the Chinese expressions and perceptions are 

more comprehensive and holistic than their Western counterparts. The Chinese 

mind, it appears, has been taught by its philosophical and cultural base to first 

locate the disposition or setting of reality before focusing on a solution to an 

actual problem at hand.

As an example of this conceptualization, The Geography of Thought

describes a simple experiment where people of Western and Oriental races look 

at fish in an aquarium and describe what they see. The first sentence from an 

Oriental’s viewpoint was a description of the environment (“It looked like a 

pond”) whereas the Western mind was three times as likely to first mention the 

type of fish they saw.737 This indicates that the Oriental mind is taking in the 

big picture, the disposition of things. Likewise, this propensity to examine a 

broader disposition appears to be reflected in Chinese theorists’ descriptions 

and definitions of strategy, which are broader than US descriptions of the 

concept. Whereas US strategists focus on ideas or ways, ends, and means, 

Chinese strategists tend to first look at objective factors existing in the world 

today with reference to a particular country (level of science and technology, 

amount spent on defense, location of forces, geo-political setting, etc.) and how 

to subjectively manipulate these circumstances. An examination of the Chinese 

military’s concept of strategy in the book The Science of Military Strategy

offers frequent references to comprehensive overviews (the configuration of a 

setting) of subject areas, to include:

 Comprehensive national power (CNP)

 Comprehensive sea power (CSP)

 Comprehensive strategic interest (CSI)

 Comprehensive strategic targets (CST) 

 Comprehensive strategic benefits (CSB)

 Comprehensive cyberized war (CCW)

 Comprehensive confrontation capacity (CCC) 

 Comprehensive national defense construction (CNDC)

 Comprehensive support efficiency (CSuE)

 And comprehensive national strategy (CNS). 

 

737 Richard E. Nisbett, The Geography of Thought, Free Press, 2003, p. 90.
258

Mott and Kim did not focus as much on shih’s comprehensive qualities 

as they did on a number of other qualities associated with shih. They write that

Shih, an intangible power, encourages people who enjoy it and 

discourages those who lack it...Shih carries many meanings 

distinguishable within Chinese culture largely from the context. The 

most familiar meanings are power, force, or influence. Another 

common usage refers to a situation’s natural features or a person’s 

circumstances. Some Chinese use the term to suggest a tendency, trend, 

or series, or even people’s gestures. The Chinese use shih in political 

theory, military strategy, the Wei-Chi game, and daily life to express a 

special form of power or influence.738

Shi is described in the next section as a way to visualize, explain, and 

comprehend one’s current reality. It is the extension of shih from the age of 

mechanization to the age of informatization.

The Shi of Virtual Reality

It is informationized shi that should concern analysts today. The PLA is 

learning how to use the potential of electrons as they move from a mechanized 

to an informationized military force. Such a transformation involves an 

assessment of the electronic potential of other armed forces. Ames noted years 

ago that security, in the Chinese view, can only be found by continually 

redefining one’s own strength, adjusting to an enemy force’s new 

developments, and reevaluating where one’s strategic advantage lies. 

Understanding these conditions allows a commander to once again control a 

situation, according to Ames.739 The PLA’s focus on “highly controllable war” 

indicates his analysis is on the right path.

With so many words to choose from, it is easy to make a shi definition 

fit an information or cyber age concept. The Chinese and other nations have 

written about the disposition and potential of electrons for years. For example, 

Western explanations of shi using the image of a boulder sitting on a mountain 

top or a crossbow pulled taut with the arrow waiting to be let go are examples 

of “potential.” It is potential energy waiting to be let go. The Sun Pin notes that 

the bow and crossbow, able to kill a soldier over a hundred paces away, 

exemplify strategic advantage.740 Then what must be the strategic advantage of 

electrons that can be used to guide a precision weapon to its target that is over 

 

738 Mott and Kim, p. 15.

739 The Book of War, p. 56.

740 Ibid., p. 52.
259

continents away! Digital age warfare also fits with the observation of Sun Tzu 

that “war is such that the supreme consideration is speed.”741

In terms of the information age, a Trojan Horse virus in a computer 

could represent “potential.” A Trojan Horse is a virus that “is a form of 

malware that appears to perform a desirable function but in fact performs 

undisclosed malicious functions that allow unauthorized access to the host 

machine.”742 If a hacker can gain access to a server through a backdoor and 

insert a Trojan Horse, and execute it at a time of his or her choosing, then the 

virus contains the characteristics of the drawn bow, sitting there and awaiting 

release. 

Disposition and strategic advantage may be situations exploited by 

civilian hackers whose activities cannot be directly traced to the PLA or to 

government authorities and whose actions, so long as not internal oriented, are 

tolerated. This is the shi of the hacker. Further, the hacker uses packets of 

electrons as stratagems to develop strategic advantage into a force or power as 

Li implies.

There are also some very specific applications of shi to the PLA’s 

experience. One such reference was an article on the strategic use of electrons 

in Jiefangjun Bao. The article noted that if form is the foundation and 

prerequisite for shi (translated as force), then shi also holds and directs form. 

The author added “not only should network warfare power be flexibly 

combined at a specific time and space, its use must be delayed for the best 

moment to attack or defend.”743

The use of force (shi) depends on the potential of a state’s ability to 

conduct strategic network warfare. Network warfare cannot exclude strategies 

and even has a higher requirement for them, according to the authors. Force 

involves the strength or weakness to control the direction and flow of 

information; the amount of data possessed by combatants; the degree of 

network architecture redundancy and the speed of recovery after being 

attacked; the different combat objectives of forces with different powers; and 

adopting a corresponding military strategy to attack, defend, hide, or move. All 

of these elements relate back to the ability to master a large number of attack 

 

741 Ibid., p. xxiii.

742 Trojan Horse, Wikipedia, accessed 16 January 2009.

743 Liu Wanxin, Dang Wanlong, and Zhang Dan, “Network Attack and Protection Also 

Need Strategies,” Jiefangjun Bao, 2 January 2008, p. 6, as translated and downloaded 

from the Open Source Center website, document number CPP20080102436002.
260

computers or botnets. This ability can manifest itself as one’s strategic 

advantage.

Mott and Kim discussed shih strategy and future war near the end of 

their book. They noted that the PLA has adapted its doctrine, organization, and 

strategy to the high-tech environment they witnessed in the Gulf War and that 

there are several trends the PLA is following. They are: improving a joint 

warfare capability; restructuring the ground forces; transforming the education 

system; establishing a modern logistic system to support joint warfighting; 

adopting a standard organization for effective management; and adopting 

simulations and modern training systems.744 

Both Ames and Tao Hanzhang addressed the intangibles of shi. Ames 

noted that several factors implied by shih go beyond the physical. They are 

morale advantage, terrain advantage, and opportunity advantage.745 Tao wrote 

that a commander must make use of advantageous terrain, seize upon favorable 

opportunities for fighting, and have superiority in the quality of troops.746 Put in 

terms of the information age, this would indicate that troops must understand 

the terrain of the computer, seize opportunities where they exist such as in 

reconnaissance of networks (thereby setting the stage to win the fight before the 

first battle), and maintaining the morale advantage, which the Chinese feel they 

have accomplished through the renovation of their political system to now 

include media, legal, and psychological warfare types. A morale advantage can 

also be created or exploited when one works in the absence of any defining 

international cyber laws.

But it is Ames who appears to understand the concept of shi best and 

what it means for the PLA today. He noted that:

All determinate situations can be turned to advantage. The able 

commander is able to create differentials and thus opportunities by 

manipulating his position and the position of the enemy. By developing 

a full understanding of those factors that define one’s relationship with 

the enemy, and by actively controlling and shaping the situation so that 

the weaknesses of the enemy are exposed to one’s acquired strength, 

one is able to ride the force of circumstances to victory.747

 

744 Mott and Kim, p. 229.

745 The Book of War, pp. 57-58.

746 Tao, p. 130.

747 The Book of War, p. 55.
261

The transformation of the PLA from a mechanized to an informationized force 

fits the criteria of trying to turn a situation to its advantage. Of concern to 

Western societies should be the question of whether “shaping the situation” 

now involves attempting to control market societies and manipulate the 

electronic flows of free societies? Tao notes that in China there is the saying: 

“With only one man guarding the mountain pass, ten thousand men are not able 

to pass.”748 Can one well-placed and educated computer specialist serve this 

purpose today, and stop the flow of ten thousand (and more) decisions in the 

market place?

A Comparison of Two Books: the Art of War and Thirty-Six Stratagems

Ren Li, a senior colonel in 2003 and director of the Fourth Research 

Department for War Theory and Strategic Research at the Academy of Military 

Science in Beijing, compared and contrasted two books: Sun Tzu’s Art of War

versus the Thirty-Six Stratagems (precise author unknown).749 His analysis is 

one of the most interesting recent commentaries on these two classics.

Ren notes that the origins of the Art of War are quite clear, having been 

written during a time of social reform during the Spring and Autumn Period 

(722-481 B.C.) and Warring States Period (approximately 475 B.C. to 221 

B.C.). The Art of War focuses on the importance of a fighting spirit, one in 

which “taking the initiative in launching attacks, probing deep within enemy 

territory, rapid combat, quick victories, and conquering a foe to augment one’s 

own strength” were representative of the times.750 The book was written more 

for generals and sovereigns than for the simple soldier. 

The Art of War discusses basic theoretical problems related to war. It 

consists of thirteen chapters that are comprehensive, precise, and systematic, 

discussing the patterns in military affairs extensively and forming a system for 

viewing classical Chinese military science. A cornerstone of modern thought 

adopted from the Art of War is caution in going to war, as demonstrated by the 

very few instances over the past 50 years in which China decided to conduct 

combat operations. Other cornerstones of the book are strategic thought, power, 

and strategic initiative, preparations, and measures. 

 

748 Tao, p. 128.

749 Ren Li, “Contrast and Analyze Sun Zi’s Art of War and Thirty-Six Stratagems, 

China Military Science, 2003, No. 3, pp. 126-132. All references herein are to this 

article.

750 Ibid.
262

Sun Tzu’s ten guiding principles for war include rapid victory; 

achieving victory by unusual means (energy, indirect method); grasping the 

initiative (weak points and strong); military deception; flexible mobility; 

concentration of power (weak points and strong); suddenness or surprise; 

hiding one’s intentions; striking against weak points; and seizing the initiative 

(maneuver).

The origins of the other book Ren reviewed, the Thirty-Six Stratagems, 

are somewhat murky. Ren writes that the earliest publication of the Thirty-Six 

Stratagems “appears to be a letterpress edition released by Rui Qinlou of 

Chengdu and printed by Xinghua Printers in 1941.”751 He feels the Thirty-Six 

Stratagems were written over a long period of time since the stratagems were 

used in the drama of the Yuan (1271-1368) and Ming (1368-1644) periods and 

in the novels of the Ming and Qing (1644-1912) periods. The period of time in 

which the Thirty-Six Stratagems was published was less innovative, more 

utilitarian, and less aristocratic than the time the Art of War was published. 

Thirty-Six Stratagems favored the deterministic nature of stratagems and 

practicality over theory. Stratagem titles are taken from theatrical songs, 

common sayings, and slang typical of novels of the period.752

Today, the Thirty-Six Stratagems has a broad range of readers in mind. 

The variety of publications based on the book is staggering in Ren’s opinion (to 

include a popular variant similar to the US explosion in the “such and such for 

dummies” series of books). Current fascination with the Thirty-Six Stratagems

is on its applied aspects rather than its theoretical research. It has expanded into 

every aspect of Chinese life. A few Chinese titles based on the thirty-six 

stratagems include the following:

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Business

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Diplomacy

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Making Money in the Stock Market

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Enterprises

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems in Commerce

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Love

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Networks

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for QQ (an instant messaging program) 

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Conversation

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Graduate School Examinations

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Getting an MBA

 

751 Ibid.

752 Ibid.
263

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for Bargaining Down Prices

 The Thirty-Six Stratagems for the Art of War between a Husband and 

Wife753

Perhaps for its overall popularity the Thirty-Six Stratagems has been labeled 

the “Art of War of the People.” Some worry that since the book focuses on 

deception and trickery, that the work may harm the trust that exists between 

people and businesses. Paradoxically, according to Ren, the military has shown 

little interest in The Thirty-Six Stratagems as a military work and thus its 

influence has been minimal on military science. Most Western audiences would 

not think that to be the case.754

The Thirty-Six Stratagems is devoted to maneuvers and strategies 

against an enemy on the battlefield. It is composed of a title of the stratagem, an 

explanation of the stratagem, and commentary. To Ren, the titles and 

explanations were not written at the same time as the commentary nor were 

they written by the same person. In some instances the commentaries do not 

correspond to the stratagems in question.755

The point of the Thirty-Six Stratagems is to offer answers to military 

problems when there are no hard and fast rules for doing so. The epilogue to the 

book states that “the stratagem with myriad fluctuations and which is the most 

cunning, bizarre, and unfathomable, is certainly the 36th Stratagem. This is the 

one which determines the greatness of a general.” This stratagem discusses 

when retreat is the best option. The discussion indicates that surrender is total 

failure, peace is partial failure, and retreat can mean “turning defeat into 

victory.”756

The six categories (under which there are six stratagems each) are: 

when in a superior position; stratagems for confrontation; stratagems for attack; 

stratagems for confused situations; stratagems for gaining ground; and 

stratagems for desperate situations. The first three categories refer to favorable 

circumstances and the latter three categories refer to unfavorable circumstances. 

The Thirty-Six Stratagems uses the philosophy of the book I Ching as the basis 

for many of its ideas. Twenty-nine of the thirty-six stratagems quote sections 

from the I Ching and the remaining seven stratagems touch upon I Ching logic, 

according to Ren.757

 

753 Ibid.

754 Ibid.

755 Ibid.

756 Ibid.

757 Ibid.
264

Ren concludes his 2003 article with the following passage:

The Art of War and the Thirty-Six Stratagems are two military treatises 

created at the beginning and end of China’s feudal period, respectively, 

and in this they are branded with the characteristics of these two 

different eras. The Art of War comprehensively reveals the basic 

patterns of war, and provides the foundation for military science in 

ancient China together with a series of concepts and standards for it. It 

is the bedrock of Chinese military history. Thirty-Six Stratagems

focuses upon forging and expounding upon military strategies, with 

reference to the ideas of the I Ching. Actual examples are provided, and 

it is concise and practical, making it worthy of being listed among the 

top-ranked treatises in Chinese military history.758

Stratagems and Virtual Reality

It seems apparent that an understanding of the disposition or 

configuration of forces also leads Chinese theorists, based on this 

understanding, to develop stratagems that exploit such dispositions. The 

stratagem could be visualized as the potential that forms in the mind of a 

commander after considering the disposition of forces and terrain at his 

disposal. 

In a year 2000 article in the Chinese journal China Military Science, for 

example, authors Major General Niu Li, Colonel Li Jiangzou, and Major Xu 

Dehui (all from the Communications and Command Institute) defined IW 

stratagems as “schemes and methods devised and used by commanders and 

commanding bodies to seize and maintain information supremacy on the basis 

of using clever methods to prevail at a relatively small cost in IW.”759 They 

offered ten specific stratagems that can be applied to IW. These stratagems take 

into account disposition (muddy the flow, go with the flow, control time, etc.) 

and strategic advantage (to intimidate, demonstrate, use decisive technical 

equipment, all-round strength, deception, etc.): 

(1) Thought-Directing—Direct others’ thinking in the wrong decision by 

attacking cognitive and belief systems and force commanders to make errors. 

 

758 Ibid.

759 Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui, “Planning and Application of Strategies of 

Information Operations in High-Tech Local War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China 

Military Science), Number 4 2000, pp. 115-122, as translated and downloaded from the 

FBIS website on 9 November 2000
265

(2) Intimidation through Momentum-Building—Generate heavy 

psychological pressure via intimidation by signaling inevitable victory, 

concentrating forces, and coordinating information networks. This is to be 

achieved by creating a situation favorable to China and unfavorable to the 

enemy. Intimidation is to be achieved via momentum building, achieved by 

enhancing one’s own position, situation, and posture while blocking the flow of 

information to the enemy.

(3) Information-based Capability Demonstrations—Intimidate by 

demonstrating capabilities, an action that should not appear to be intentional. 

The right time, occasion, and modality must be chosen to make information 

believable to the enemy. 

(4) Prevailing over the Enemy with Extraordinary Means—Adopt active 

and effective measures to generate surprise, and use decisive technical

equipment and means of information warfare. 

(5) Using Fictitious Objects to Hide the True Picture—Hide true reality by 

creating a fictitious reality. Simulate combat forces using high-tech means.

(6) All-Encompassing Deception—Apply deceptive schemes simultaneously 

or consecutively according to strategic or operational intentions. 

(7) Prevailing over the Enemy with All-round Strength—Use all means of 

information warfare to maintain supremacy. Electronic soft attacks 

(reconnaissance satellite systems, etc.), hard attacks (informationized precisionguidance weapons, strategic bombings), and C3I battlefield control and 

management must all be present.

(8) Going with the Flow—Mislead the enemy by pretending to follow his 

wishes. 

(9) Releasing “Viruses” to Muddy the Flows—Release viruses to 

contaminate information flows. A virus attack is “a technical act, which will 

have to be based on the use of stratagems in order to play an important role in 

IW.” Stratagems should create a favorable time for releasing viruses. 
266

(10) Controlling the Time Element—Control of the time element is crucial. 

Conducting information “inducement,” “deception,” concealment,” and 

“containment” operations will help achieve the desired amount of control. 760

Conclusions

This brief discussion of two concepts, shi and stratagem, is anything 

but definitive. It is included to remind analysts that there are undergirding 

pillars of Chinese thought such as these two examples that have survived 

through the ages and continue to influence contemporary thought and thus 

operations. The discussion attempts to put under one roof a number of ideas 

associated with the concepts and, most importantly, demonstrate their 

applicability in the age of informatization.

What strikes one immediately in the case of shi is the overwhelming 

number of definitions associated with the term. Ames broke his categorization 

of shi into four clusters. It is possible to arrange the definitions offered here in 

three different ways.

First there is the category of what will be termed “strategic posturing.” 

Several definitions are included here from the discussion, to include posture of 

the army, strategic advantage, strategic configuration of power, availing oneself 

of advantage to gain control, “potential from the disposition of things,” and 

“holding forces with hands.” 

A second category, represented by power and influence, is more closely 

associated with the concept of a ruler’s abilities and the definition found in the 

Chinese Encyclopedia of Philosophical Terms. The third group includes 

momentum, energy, and force and is more aptly summarized simply as the 

release of energy. 

Li Rulong provided an interesting Chinese summary and combination 

of all of these concepts when he noted that “‘power’” is actually a kind of 

potential energy; once the external condition is provided, this energy will 

demonstrate a mighty power and become a force. Such an understanding can be 

allied to all fields of social practice including military affairs.”

Ames’s concept of strategic advantage evolves from potential energy 

aligned with the correct external condition. He wrote

 

760 Ibid.
267

When looked at spatially from outside one’s own ‘skin,’ shih is that set 

of conditions that is defining of one’s situation. It is one’s context in 

relationship to oneself. When looked at from an internal perspective, 

shih is one’s own place and posture relative to one’s context. When 

looked at temporally, taking into account the full calculus of 

dispositions, shih is the tension of forces and the momentum that brings 

one position in immediate contact with another.761

Stratagems are included, as they have been in other works by this 

author, to once again stress their importance in understanding the essence of 

Chinese thought. Stratagems imply deception and lie at the heart of Chinese 

strategic thought. If one ignores the influence of stratagems then one ignores 

perhaps THE basic pillar of Chinese thought.

 

761 Ibid., p. 81.
268

APPENDIX THREE: MORE DECEPTION-RELATED TERMS IN 

THE CHINESE MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA

This appendix examines four terms on deception: decoy, infrared decoy, 

deceptive electronic jamming, and radio communication deception. These are 

truncated versions of the definitions that originally appeared in the 1997 

Chinese Military Encyclopedia. 

The Chinese Military Encyclopedia has definitions of other terms 

associated with deception. These include deceptive electronic jamming; 

camouflage inspection; radar camouflage and radar countermeasures; radio 

communication deception and radio communication disguise; strategic 

camouflage, strategic surprise, and strategic surprise attack; tactical camouflage 

and thermal camouflage; radar decoy; decoy; camouflage operations vehicle, 

light camouflage, and camouflage units; and computer security among others. 

Four terms were selected from the Chinese Military Encyclopedia for 

inclusion in this appendix. They are “decoy,” “infrared decoy,” “deceptive 

electronic jamming,” and “radio communication deception.” As with the 

definitions of camouflage, these are abbreviated versions of the definitions 

taken directly from the encyclopedia.762

Decoy: A decoy is a mockup showing characteristics of a target, built and 

emplaced so as to deceive and confuse the enemy. Decoys are categorized as 

two types, standard or expedient. The use of decoys to simulate targets and set 

up false battle positions can divert the enemy’s attention, lure the enemy’s 

reconnaissance and assaults, and cover and conceal real targets. It can disperse 

the enemy’s firepower and reduce losses to real targets. The degree of realism 

of a decoy is a major factor in the deception of enemy reconnaissance and 

assaults. To make an effective decoy normally requires the following: a decoy 

must be set up in a place which meets the same tactical and technical 

requirements as a real target, and the decoy must be sited a safe distance from 

real targets; the timing of decoy construction and the length of time the 

construction takes must be about the same as for a real target; a decoy must 

have the same surface dimensions and shape as a real target, as well as similar 

thermal radiation characteristics, electric wave reflection characteristics, optical 

and acoustic characteristics, and tracks evidencing movement; and a decoy 

needs imperfect camouflage. A decoy must normally be small, lightweight, 

with a solid and simple structure, and must be easy to carry, set up, and 

 

762 The Foreign Military Studies Office has a copy of the Chinese Military 

Encyclopedia in its office holdings. 
269

recover. Decoys are mainly mockups of technical equipment and personnel, 

false constructions, false landmarks, and apparatus which simulate the optical, 

acoustic, thermal, and radar wave characteristics of real targets.

Mockups of artillery pieces, tanks, motor vehicles, aircraft, rocket 

launchers, and personnel are categorized according to the materials and 

methods of construction as inflatable, prefabricated for assembly, foam 

expansion type, and expedient material mockups. Inflatable decoys are made of 

plastic or rubber film or fabric and rubber composites. Their external 

appearance is realistic, and this facilitates the simulation of curved and pipeshaped components. Inflatable decoys are lightweight and small. They can 

simulate technical equipment, tents, and other small and medium-sized targets.

Inflatable decoys are the most widely used decoy. Decoys prefabricated for 

assembly are made with wood, metal, fiberglass, plastic, and some fabric skin.

Their external appearance is very realistic. When part of it is destroyed, it can 

easily be repaired or replaced. Prefabricated decoys are suitable for simulating 

buildings, aircraft bunkers, weapons and equipment, and other large or 

medium-sized targets. Foam expansion decoys are constructed with 

polyurethane plastic foam. They may be either flexible or rigid. A flexible 

expansion decoy packed into a case is only one-tenth the size of the real target 

it imitates. When the case is opened, the decoy re-assumes a size close to that 

of a real target. A rigid expansion decoy can assume its shape after being 

soaked on site at normal outside temperature. Normally this takes only a few 

minutes. The decoy can withstand a certain amount of wind, rain, and snow. A 

rigid expansion decoy has a realistic external appearance. This type of decoy 

has attracted attention since the 1970s. Mockups of technical equipment can be 

made on site with wood, bamboo, metal, PVC panels, straw, woven mats, or 

concrete. Use of such decoys made with expedient materials is extensive 

because of the broad source of materials and the cheapness of construction.

Decoy constructions include false fortifications, bridges, command 

posts, and airfields. Normally such decoy constructions are fabricated on site 

using expedient materials and as part of a unified plan from a higher echelon.

The simplest and most reliable way to set up a decoy construction is to install 

partially camouflaged decoy weapons, decoy vehicles, decoy boats, and decoy 

access roads at a site from which a unit has just withdrawn. The main types of 

decoy constructions are false trenches, false communication trenches, and false 

bunkers and covered works of various kinds. The three main types of decoy 

bridges are expedient bridges, false subsurface bridges, and false lightweight 

bridges. A decoy expedient bridge consists of a simple framework with cloth, 

reed mats, or mats of tree branches, stretching from bank to bank. A decoy 

submerged bridge has a false access road, an exposed portion on shore, and 
270

marker panels on the surface of the water. A decoy lightweight bridge can 

withstand a light load, and personnel and mockups of technical weapons can 

pass over it. Decoy airfields are categorized as either daylight or night 

airfields. A daylight decoy airfield consists of a fake runway, taxiways, aircraft 

parking aprons, hangars, a fuel depot, a tower, and so on built on a scale 

approximately the same as that of a real airfield. A night decoy airfield mainly 

uses lights to present the image of a real target airfield and its relative position.

A decoy airfield is normally set up on the flight route to a real airfield, so that 

enemy aviators will discover it before they arrive at the real airfield. To make 

the decoy airfield realistic, normal operating status can be simulated by having 

small aircraft take off and land on a simple runway and by simulating an access 

road, airfield roads, etc.

Decoy landmarks are normally false objects constructed and emplaced 

to be quite obvious, such as a solitary tree, a bridge, a road intersection, a 

prominent building, or a fake river bend, lake, or farm field. To enhance the 

realism of a decoy landmark, the real landmarks must be camouflaged carefully 

at the same time a real target is camouflaged.

Simulation apparatus is equipment that simulates sound and light, heat, 

and radar return signals. Sound and light simulation apparatus is mainly used 

to simulate the sound and flash of artillery fire. Normally this is done with a 

gunpowder charge producing a sound equivalent to that of an artillery shot.

Mixed into the charge is a suitable amount of a pyrotechnic agent to simulate 

the flash of a nighttime shot. Heat simulation apparatus is used to simulate the 

heat emissions of a target which would generate heat and a target’s surface 

temperature. Radar return signal simulation is the simulation of the radar 

effective scattering cross-section aimed at a target and of the background.

Besides using angle reflectors to simulate bridges, airfields, levees, water 

landmarks, and industrial targets, other angle reflectors can be set up in or near 

decoy targets to constitute full-size decoy targets.763

Infrared Decoy: An infrared decoy is a one-time use opto-electronic jamming 

device which can be dropped into the air or onto the sea surface and which can 

produce strong infrared radiation similar to that produced by the target which is 

being protected, so as to deceive point source detecting infrared seeking 

missiles and enable the target to evade attack. Infrared decoys are widely used 

for self-defense by aircraft and ships.

 

763 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Academy of Military Science Press, Volume 5, July 

1997, p. 495. Entry by Tao Xiaodi.
271

Infrared decoys are categorized according to their radiation generating 

mechanism as pyrotechnic compound decoys, solid fuel decoys, hot air balloon 

decoys, and infrared compound chaff. Pyrotechnic compound decoys produce 

a large amount of smoke and infrared radiation by way of a chemical reaction 

in the mixing and combustion of substances such as incendiary and oxydizing 

agents. Solid fuel decoys use the combustion of solid fuel to produce infrared 

radiation. These decoys burn some combustible substance to produce infrared 

radiation which is very close on the spectrum to the infrared energy produced 

by the target being protected. Hot air balloon decoys are specially made 

balloons filled with a gas at high temperature and released into the air to act as 

a decoy. Infrared compound chaff is metallic strips used for radar jamming. 

One side is coated with smokeless rocket propellant, which is a combustible 

material that burns when the chaff is released in the air producing a “hot 

cloud.” This type of decoy can deceive infrared seeking missiles and it can jam 

radar.

Infrared decoys are also called infrared jammers or infrared tracers.

They are a type of smoke and flame decoy where the smoke and flame agent is 

usually a compound of powdered magnesium, nitrocellulose, and 

polytetrafluoroethylene. The external appearance of an infrared decoy is 

usually the same as that of a chaff jammer. Because most infrared seeking 

missiles use a point source detection, center of mass tracking mechanism, when 

such a missile discovers several infrared targets within the field of vision of its 

seeker, it will track the equivalent center of radiation of the targets.

An infrared decoy is used in the following manner. When a missile 

inbound on the attack is detected, an infrared decoy is released into the air by 

the carrier (aircraft or military ship) being targeted. The decoy’s combustible 

agent ignites and burns quickly creating a false target emitting infrared 

radiation. As the distance between the decoy and the target gradually increases, 

the target moves further towards the edge of the field of vision of the missile’s 

seeker, and ultimately it leaves the field of vision altogether. The missile loses 

the target and shifts its tracking to the decoy. In actual warfare, an aircraft or 

military ship will normally release a large number of infrared decoys to ensure 

its safety.

Ideally, an infrared decoy’s infrared emission should be in the 

operating band of infrared guided missile seekers (1 to 5 microns or 8 to 14 

microns) and have a spectral distribution similar to that of the target being 

protected. It should also radiate at an intensity five to seven times or more 

greater than that of the target being protected. Its ignition time is normally 0.5 

seconds or less. Burn duration refers to the length of time the decoy maintains 
272

the specified intensity of infrared radiation. Burn duration must be greater than 

the length of time it takes for the protected target aircraft or ship to flee the 

missile seeker’s field of vision to a safe distance from where the missile will 

strike the decoy. Infrared decoys for use by aircraft have a shorter burn time, 

often 8 to 12 seconds. Infrared decoys for use by ships have a longer burn time, 

about 40 seconds to one minute.764

Deceptive Electronic Jamming: This type of jamming causes enemy 

electronic equipment to receive false information, leading to misjudgment and 

wrong decisions/actions on the part of the enemy. Deceptive electronic 

jamming is categorized by how the interference is produced, either as active 

deceptive jamming or passive deceptive jamming. Deceptive electronic 

jamming can be categorized by its deception pattern as either camouflaged 

deception or deception by “pretending to be what it is not.” Camouflaged 

deception is achieved by changing or simulating one’s own electromagnetic 

signals, concealing the truth, and displaying something false. Deception by 

“pretending” is achieved by presenting electromagnetic signals which the 

enemy takes to be its own, tapping into the enemy’s communication channels 

and transmitting false information to the enemy. For example, deceptive 

jamming aimed at radar mainly uses false target interference, angle deception 

interference, range deception interference, and speed deception interference, 

with the goal being to disrupt radar’s ability to detect and track targets.

Deceptive jamming of radio communication is also called communication 

jamming. This involves posing as a station on the enemy’s communication net 

and establishing contact with the enemy’s main station or other stations;

sending the enemy false orders, false messages, and false images; and thereby 

duping the enemy. Deceptive jamming of the enemy’s opto-electronic 

equipment mainly involves: emitting range deception and encoding deception 

laser signals; setting up false targets to diffuse strong laser signals; deceiving 

the enemy’s laser sensing equipment and laser guidance equipment; and 

emitting infrared-coded pulse jamming, dropping infrared lures, and disrupting 

the enemy’s ability to lock onto and track targets with infrared tracking and 

guidance equipment. Compared with suppressive jamming, deceptive jamming 

has the advantages of easier concealment and being difficult for the enemy to 

sense. But deceptive jamming is very focused, and before it is used, ample 

intelligence about the enemy’s electronic equipment is essential.765

 

764 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Academy of Military Science Press, Volume 5, July 

1997, p. 412. Entry by Yang Wenxuan.

765 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Academy of Military Science Press, Volume 6, July 

1997, p. 738. Entry by Zhang Baolin.
273

Radio Communication Deception: This type of deception involves 

measures taken to confuse the enemy in the process of radio communication.

Normally radio communication deception is organized centrally by a 

headquarters. The goals are to induce misjudgment and wrong actions on the 

part of the enemy and to conceal one’s own intent and the location and 

disposition of one’s own forces.

Radio communication deception requires content and action which is as 

close as possible to reality, with measures for adaptation which ensure that 

one’s own communication systems operate normally. It requires tight security 

measures. Radio communication deception measures include radio feints, radio 

communication disguise [spoofing], and radio camouflage.

The usual method of carrying out a radio feint is to set up a radio net in 

an area where there are no combat operations, make frequent contact on the net, 

demonstrate one’s presence to the enemy, create a false impression, and 

achieve, as the expression goes, “a feint to the east but an attack to the west.”

As one’s own units redeploy and move, radio stations remain in place and 

continue operating as normal to confuse the enemy. On axes of secondary 

importance, send fake radio traffic to attract the enemy’s attention and cover the 

operations of radio stations on the main axis of operations. Within radio nets, 

set up false linkages and change their locations at appropriate times to cause 

misperception on the part of the enemy, and thus conceal the composition and 

disposition of one’s own forces.

Radio communication disguise is based on knowledge of the enemy’s 

radio links, patterns of operation, and characteristics. Radio communication 

spoofing imitates enemy radio stations, infiltrates enemy radio nets, sends false 

intelligence reports, or intercepts enemy radio messages.

Radio camouflage is the use of measures to make it impossible for 

enemy radio reconnaissance to obtain any real intelligence. The main methods 

of radio camouflage are: change radio call signs and frequencies to make the 

enemy misjudge where the various stations in a net are located; use remote 

radio transmitters to make it difficult for the enemy to determine where stations 

are located and what the command relationships are; send fake messages within 

the net during peacetime, and in wartime when real message traffic increases, 

reduce the number of fake messages so as to conceal one’s operational 

deployment.766

 

766 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Academy of Military Science Press, Volume 3, July 

1997, p. 623. Entry by Yuan Chuangquan.
274

APPENDIX FOUR: TABLE OF CONTENTS OF FIVE CHINESE 

TEXTS OF POTENTIAL INTEREST

This appendix lists the table of contents from several texts not used in this book 

but perhaps of interest to readers who focus on Chinese military affairs and are 

interested in future study.

(1) INTERNET WAR

(A Brief History of How the Internet Changed the World)

Jiuzhou Press, 2009

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART 1: HOW THE INTERNET CHANGED THE WORLD

Chapter 1: What it would be like if we lost the Internet // 002

It would be like the world lost Southeast Asia // 002

When the Internet was down for two hours // 003

Chapter 2: 18 years that changed the world // 004

Brief history of the great Internet // 005

The world became a global village // 007

Eight incidents that changed the world // 009

Chapter 3: Ten great forces that changed the world // 011

Section 1: The new world of equality // 012

The beginning of the dream of equality // 012

Information equality // 013

Cultural equality // 015

Equality of participation // 015

Section 2: We approach the medium // 017

Begin by talking about blogs // 018

The power of We Media // 019

Every citizen is a reporter // 021

Section 3: Always open and innovative // 022

An open platform for innovation // 023

Promoting growth in innovation // 023

A case of Internet innovation: Google's organizational innovation // 

024

 
275

Section 4: The re-revolution of knowledge // 025

Reconstructing collective intelligence // 026

New methods of sharing knowledge // 027

Coordinating collective intelligence // 029

Controlling collective intelligence // 030

Section 5: Unbounded mobility // 031

Cell phones of the future // 032

Abrupt rise of US mobile connectivity // 034

Future growth in Asia // 035

Swift growth of global 3G // 037

Section 6: Bringing the whole world together // 038

Thoroughly fused with the real world // 038

The power of three integrated networks // 039

Section 7: New forces in politics // 040

The future of Internet politics // 041

China's Internet Political Ecology // 042

The governments of all countries must surf the Internet // 044

Section 8: Economic growth engines // 046

The Internet economy bubble has burst // 047

Unique rules of the Internet economy // 048

Hastening economic globalization // 050

New points of growth in the global economy // 050

Reforming and elevating the traditional economy // 052

Main trends in future economics // 053

Section 9: The sudden rise of Internet culture // 054

What is Internet culture? // 054

Boarding a train headed for springtime // 055

Transforming Chinese cultural life // 055

Section 10: Molding a brand new society // 056

True virtual society // 057

Transforming modern society // 061

Real society made electronic // 061

How do the younger generations live? // 063

Social networks // 063

The world welcomes the SMS age // 065

Chapter 4: Profoundly changing the world of the future // 066

Section 1: The Internet revolution has already begun // 066

Technology drives the Internet revolution // 067

The application revolution that is currently evolving // 069

A smart earth is emerging // 071

Internet – people net – material net // 071

Section 2: Leading future social change // 071
276

Tools for social change // 072

Changing mainstream society // 073

Changing the course of history // 074

Accelerating social movements // 075

PART 2: WORLD-CHANGING INTERNET WAR // 076

Chapter 5: Inevitable Internet War // 077

War is migrating to the Internet // 077

Battlefield – weapons – trials of strength // 079

Chapter 6: Battles of contention for control of the Internet // 082

Section 1: Who controls the Internet? // 082

The US has ultimate control // 083

How might the US control the Internet? // 085

US Internet hegemony // 086

Section 2: Protracted war to fight for master control of the Internet // 088

Who will shake US control? // 089

The Internet world is facing balkanization // 091

Competition on the next generation Internet // 092

Competition between Chinese and US Internet standards // 094

Section 3: Gradually casting off US control // 097

US domain name hegemony will be broken // 097

Internet data that bypasses the US // 097

Chinese language standards gain an international voice // 098

Chapter 7: Offensive and defensive ideological Internet warfare // 100

Section 1: The leading position of ideological warfare // 102

Inevitable ideological conflicts // 102

The Internet determines victory in ideological warfare // 103

Ideological trial of strength on the Internet // 106

Section 2: The "color revolution" starts with the Internet // 107

The measures of the "nonviolent revolution" come "rolling in" // 108

Important measures of the color revolution // 109

US Internet media helps promote the "color revolution" // 112

The "Glite revolution" in Myanmar's "saffron revolution" // 113

Section 3: The culture war under ideological infiltration // 115

Culture migration and hegemony // 116

Chapter 8: Financial wars in the virtual world // 121

Section 1: Virtual currency in the Internet world // 121

A model for "virtual currency" appears // 122

The circulation of currency in the virtual world // 123

Virtual currency creates real wealth // 124

Financial life in the virtual world // 125
277

Section 2: A virtual Bretton Woods system // 126

The virtual market in "Second Life" // 127

A virtual real financial system // 131

Prosperous virtual economic business // 132

China's Internet "goldsmith" industrial chain // 135

Section 3: Currency wars in the virtual world // 137

Virtual financial crises and currency inflation // 137

Virtual currency assaults real currency // 139

War of contention for a "hard currency" virtual currency // 143

Virtual financial markets are enveloped in the flames of war // 145

All countries are enhancing oversight of financial markets // 148

Chapter 9: The Internet will determine victory in future wars // 149

Section 1: The Internet is changing modern wars // 149

The new border areas of national territory // 149

The Internet is changing the shape of war // 150

US methods of operation in Internet warfare // 152

Section 2: All countries welcome Internet military wars // 155

The first fight on the Internet // 155

The first great war on the Internet in history // 156

The flames of war spread on the Internet // 157

The PLO and Israel rekindle the flames of war on the Internet // 158

The US is making preparations for Internet wars // 159

Have war preparations already been made? // 160

Section 3: The new terrorism contention on the Internet // 161

The Internet is becoming a battlefield for fighting terrorism // 162

Al-Qaeda made a good start in the Internet terrorism war //164

The life-and-death trial of strength of the Mumbai terrorist attack // 167

"Terrorist 007" sets off Internet holy war // 168

Launching "stealth attacks" on the Internet // 168

The War on Terrorism on the Internet // 169

Terrorists in the great war of civilian hackers // 170

Chapter 10: The war of public opinion in the Internet world // 172

Section 1: Trial of strength between China and the West on the Internet // 172

Chinese netizens reveal a true counterattack // 172

The war of resistance between Chinese and French netizens // 174

Intense debate between Chinese and German netizens // 176

Section 2: War of words between Chinese, Japanese, and Korean netizens // 

177

Wars of words frequently erupt between Chinese and Japanese netizens 

// 178

Great Internet debate between Chinese and Korean netizens // 179

Online disputes between Korean and Japanese netizens // 183
278

Section 3: The public opinion battle on the Internet during the US general 

election // 185

Treating the Internet as an important battlefield for trials of strength // 

186

Super ability to generate money on the Internet // 187

Taking advantage of the broad masses in the Internet's net communities 

// 188

Effective online crisis public relations // 190

Chapter 11: The fight to safeguard data on the Internet // 191

Section 1: The fight for data on the Internet // 192

Tremendous capacity for storing data // 192

"Data" can control everything // 195

The sword hanging over the head of China's Internet // 197

Section 2: Google Earth's intelligence warfare // 200

Sensitive photos are extremely easy to obtain // 202

Threatening the secrets on Chinese soil // 203

Who gave the "earth" to Google? // 204

Google Earth has leaked a series of military secrets // 206

All countries are opposed to "overt Google spying" // 206

Section 3: The fight to safeguard information in people searches // 209

The surge of people searches // 209

The violence of human flesh searches // 211

How to protect your information privacy // 213

Chapter 12: Eye-catching new and old media warfare // 215

Section 1: Cataclysmic change in the structure of media propagation // 215

The rise of Internet media // 216

The Internet has broken the "tripartite confrontation" // 218

Changes in the structure of the US media // 220

Profound changes in the structure of China's media // 222

Section 2: In wars between new and old media, as one falls, another rises // 224

The newspaper industry is no match for the Internet assault // 225

In the US the new media is assaulting the old media // 228

In Japan, the new and the expensive on the Internet attack media 

magnates // 230

Murdoch fights the Internet // 231

Traditional media's struggle to protect copyright // 232

Section 3: Competition and cooperation between the new and old media // 233

Survival of the fittest among the traditional media // 234

The nirvana of new life in the traditional media // 236

The age of multimedia fusion symbiosis // 237

Chapter 13: The war for hegemony between Internet empires // 239

Section 1: The start of diplomatic wars between empires // 240
279

Distribution of power between future empires // 240

Microsoft buys Yahoo in a move for hegemony // 243

The war between Microsoft and Google // 244

The flames of wars of hegemony rise on all directions // 247

Section 2: The whole world should confront and suppress Google // 248

Search engines past and present // 249

Confronting Google's search hegemony // 251

Microsoft is trying hard to catch up // 254

Section 3: The Opium Wars of the Internet age // 255

History's warning about the pitfalls of the US GPS // 256

Microsoft's "Opium Wars" // 257

Opposing the expansion of Microsoft // 261

Chapter 14: A picture of the situation in China's Internet wars // 263

Section 1: Entering the age of oligarchs contending for hegemony // 263

Quacks fighting around the clock // 263

Territorial expansion of the Tencent empire // 265

The fight to defend the territory of the Tencent kingdom // 268

Baidu's all-out war // 270

Telecommunications magnates invade the Internet // 273

Section 2: Fighting back in self defense at the front door // 274

The fight to defend instant messaging territory // 274

The fight to resist the search engine invasion // 278

The dispute of the web portal warlords // 283

Section 3: Smoke from the online public relations war fills the air // 286

Search engines under online public relations // 286

Controlling online public opinion through online public relations // 288

Online hatchet men confuse 100,000 forums // 292

Cases of online hatchet men making trouble // 295

PART 3: STRATEGY FOR GAINING THE UPPER HAND IN THE 

INTERNET WORLD

Chapter 15: Competition of strength on the invisible field // 299

Section 1: Warming wine on the athletic field while talking about heroes // 299

Feudal warlords all have literary excellence // 300

The fight between China's dragon and India's elephant // 301

Section 2: The gap between the rich and the poor // 304

Dividing the earth into two worlds // 304

Online inclination under globalization // 306

Okinawa charter on information society // 306

The burden that Africa is unable to bear // 306

Opportunities for developing countries // 307
280

Section 3: China, the first offspring of the world // 308

What is the first offspring of the world still lacking? // 308

The age of value application has arrived // 309

Unprecedented turning point in history // 310

Facing tremendous historic challenges // 311

Chapter 16: The Internet strategies of leaders around the world // 311

Section 1: The big powers of Europe and the US are like a coiling dragon and 

crouching tiger // 312

The US is trying hard to stay in the lead // 312

The European Union has established an Electronic Europe // 314

Ambitious Electronic England // 314

The strategy for Germany's information society // 315

The level of informatization is highest in Denmark // 316

Section 2: Asia's despotic neighbors stand in great numbers // 316

Japan is founding a country based on information technology // 316

A networked Korea faces the 21st century // 318

Singapore's sixth blueprint creates a miracle // 319

Section 3: Developing countries rise with a force that is palpable // 320

Electronic Russia // 320

The quick ascent of India's great elephant // 321

China's dragon soars into the air // 322

Brazil's online economy springs up // 323

The swift rise of African nations // 324

Chapter 17: Dangerous virtual reality // 325

Section 1: Dangerous territories in the online world // 326

Pornographic cancer is difficult to eradicate // 326

Poisonous weeds grow thickly in the virtual world // 326

Gaming violence sets off social violence // 329

Criminal cases sometimes occur in the virtual world // 330

Section 2: Network space is crisis-ridden // 330

Online violence is rampant // 331

False information is arbitrarily disseminated // 332

Online evil cannot be stopped // 334

Vulgar online cultural garbage // 334

Section 3: Secret worries about China's Internet // 335

Daggers and poisons // 336

The power of public opinions online cannot be overlooked // 338

Network management faces many problems // 340

Chapter 18: The path to governance from a strategic elevation // 341

Section 1: Basic facts about governing the international Internet // 341

Three methods for governing the Internet // 342

Ideas from various countries about governing the Internet // 342
281

Main practices for governing the Internet // 343

Main traits for governing the Internet // 349

Section 2: The circumstances of various countries' Internet governance // 354

Section 3: The circumstances of various countries' Internet legislation // 367
282

(2) A REVIEW OF WORKS ON US MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

THEORY

Zhang Xiaojun, Chief Editor

Shi Shi Publishing House, 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Part I History, Strategy, and Military Intelligence

Chapter 1 Historical Consideration of US Foreign Intelligence Activities

– A Review of “US Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of 

American History”

Chapter 2 Intelligence and Decision Making

– A Review of “Surprise Attack – Lessons for Defense 

Planning”

Chapter 3 Intelligence Is Everywhere

– A Review of “Senseless Secrets”

Chapter 4 Writings by the Layman

– A Review of "The Uses and Limitations of Intelligence”

Chapter 5 Knowledge – Organization – Action

– A Review of “Strategic Intelligence for American World 

Policy”

Chapter 6 A Review of "Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of 

Intelligence”

Part II Military Intelligence, War, and National Security

Chapter 1 A Review of “Intelligence and Military Operations”

Chapter 2 How Is War Made?

– A Review of “Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported 

History of the Persian Gulf War”

Chapter 3 Tip of the Iceberg

– A Review of “Intelligence in the Cold War: Organization, 

Role, International Cooperation”

Chapter 4 A Review of “Intelligence Services in the Information Age”

Chapter 5 Communications Systems and Intelligence

– A Review of “The First Information War”

Chapter 6 A History of Deception in World War II
283

– A Review of “Strategic Deception in the Second World 

War”

Part III A Study of Military Intelligence Analysis

Chapter 1 Revealing the Source of Faults in Intelligence Analysis

– A Review of “Psychology of Intelligence Analysis”

Chapter 2 A Study of the Intelligence Estimate System and Its Problems

– A Review of “Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and 

Problems of National Intelligence Estimating”

Chapter 3 Methods and Techniques for Intelligence Analysis Inference

– A Review of “The Basis and Reasons for Intelligence 

Analysis”

Chapter 4 A Review of “The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War”

Chapter 5 New Deliberations on Research into Surprise Attack Warning

– A Review of “Intelligence and Strategic Surprises”

Chapter 6 When to Make Good on Promises

– A Review of “Broken Promises”

Chapter 7 A Review of “Captain Without Eyes”

Part IV Politics, Culture, and Intelligence

Chapter 1 Whom Intelligence Outcomes Serve

– A Review of “Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New 

Century”

Chapter 2 A Review of “Intelligence Control”

Chapter 3 Scrutinizing the Secrecy of the US Government and the 

Public’s Right to Know

– A Review of “Secrecy Warfare”

Chapter 4 Scrutinizing the Culture of Secrecy of the US

– A Review of “The Culture of Secrecy: Contention Between 

Government Secrecy and the Public’s Right to Know”

Chapter 5 A Review of “National Insecurity”
284

(3) A STUDY OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Li Naiguo

Military Science Press, 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 Information (1)

Section 1 Introduction to Information (1)

Section 2 Formation and Development of Information Science (15)

Section 3 Information Exchange (18)

Section 4 Types of Information Exchanges (23)

Section 5 Functions, Models, and Key Elements of Information 

Exchanges (31)

Section 6 Development Patterns for Information Exchanges. (37)

Section 7 Developing Information Collection and Utilization 

Capabilities (38)

Chapter 2 Intelligence (41)

Section 1 Introduction to Intelligence (41)

Section 2 Categories of Intelligence (43)

Section 3 Role of Intelligence (45)

Section 4 Brief History of Intelligence (49)

Chapter 3 Military Intelligence (60)

Section 1 Strategy (60)

Section 2 Strategic Intelligence (73)

Section 3 Campaign Intelligence (79)

Section 4 Tactical Intelligence (84)

Chapter 4 Military Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (88)

Section 1 Military Intelligence Collection (88)

Section 2 Overt Intelligence Material Collection (91)

Section 3 Military Intelligence Reconnaissance (96)

Section 4 Development Trends in Intelligence Activities (110)

Chapter 5 Recognizing Military Intelligence (120)

Section 1 Necessity for Recognizing Military Intelligence (120)

Section 2 Substance of Recognizing Military Intelligence (121)

Section 3 Methods of Recognizing Military Intelligence (125)

Section 4 Requirements for Recognizing Military Intelligence (129)

Chapter 6 Studying Military Intelligence.(142)

Section 1 Steps for Studying Military Intelligence (144)

Section 2 Substance of Studying Military Intelligence (146)

Section 3 Methods of Studying Military Intelligence (150)
285

Chapter 7 Forecasting Military Intelligence (192)

Section 1 Brief History of Forecasting (194)

Section 2 Forecasting Theory (198)

Section 3 Approaches for Forecasting (203)

Section 4 Forecasting Methods (208)

Section 5 Forecasting Principles (214)

Chapter 8 Writing Military Intelligence Reports (230)

Section 1 Writing Original Bulletins (231)

Section 2 Writing Modified Bulletins (237)

Section 3 Writing Composite Bulletins (244)

Chapter 9 Information Warfare (255)

Section 1 Military Informationization (255)

Section 2 Basic Meaning of Information Warfare (255)

Section 3 Intelligence Warfare (261)

Section 4 Network Warfare (271)

Section 5 Psychological Warfare (281)

Section 6 Precision Warfare (292)

Section 7 Smart Warfare (296)

Section 8 Main Characteristics of Information Warfare (303)

Section 9 Concerning the Matter of Properly Understanding 

Information Warfare (316)

Section 10 Characteristics of Military Intelligence in the Age of 

Information Warfare (326)

Section 11 Military Intelligence in the Information Age (333)

References (345)
286

(4) THE THEORY OF MILITARY STRATEGY 

Fan Zheng Jiang and Ma Bao An 

Beijing National Defense University Publishing House, 2007/11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 The Implications, Composition, and Characteristics of Military 

Strategy 1

Section 1 The Basic Implications of Military Strategy 1 

Section 2 The Constitutive Elements of Military Strategy 8 

Section 3 The Major Characteristics of Military Strategy 15 

Section 4 Hierarchical Structures and Classifications of Strategy 22 

Chapter 2 The Nature, Missions, and Tasks of Military Strategy 31 

Section 1 The Political Nature of Military Strategy 31 

Section 2 The Missions and Tasks of Military Strategy 42 

Chapter 3 The Objective Environment of Military Strategy 59 

Section 1 The Significant Impact of Strategic Environment on Military 

Strategy 60

Section 2 The Strategic Environment and China’s Security Threats in 

the Early 21st Century 66

Section 3 The New Requirements of Strategic Environmental 

Development for Military Strategy 80

Chapter 4 The Fundamental Theory of Military Strategy 86 

Section 1 The Influence of Military Thought on Military Strategy 86 

Section 2 The Direction of Strategic Thought on Military Strategy 104 

Chapter 5 The Foundation of Strength upon which Military Strategy is 

Built 112 

Section 1 The Dependency of Military Strategy on the Nation’s 

Strategic Capabilities 112

Section 2 The Requirements of Military Strategy for the Nation’s 

Strategic Capabilities 120

Section 3 Focusing on Implementing a Strategic Mission to Develop 

the Nation’s Strategic Capabilities 135

Chapter 6 Deciding, Planning, and Devising Military Strategy 144 

Section 1 Scientifically Making Strategic Decisions 144 

Section 2 Deliberately Establishing Strategic Plans 154 

Section 3 Precisely Constructing Strategic Deployments 156 

Section 4 Comprehensively Organizing Strategic Guarantees 171 
287

Section 5 Seizing Key Points and Contriving General Situations 176 

Chapter 7 Strategic Applications on MOOTW (Military Operations Other 

Than War) 181

Section 1 The Strategic Position of MOOTW 182 

Section 2 The Major Forms of MOOTW 192 

Section 3 The Operation Principles of MOOTW 199 

Chapter 8 Restraint in and Management of Military Matters 206 

Section 1 Proactively Creating a Positive Security Environment 207 

Section 2 Focusing on Using Strategic Applications of Military 

Deterrence 217 

Section 3 Appropriately Managing Military Matters 225 

Chapter 9 The Direction of War and the Control of War Situations 232 

Section 1 Accurately Recognizing the Characteristics of War 232 

Section 2 Carefully and Decisively Determining the Direction of War 

238

Section 3 Committing to the Use of Crack Troops 245 

Section 4 Proactively Maneuvering through the Developments of War 

250 

Section 5 Ending the Battle in a Timely Fashion 260 

Chapter 10 The Guiding Ideology of Battle 267 

Section 1 Establishing Information-Based Joint Operations 267 

Section 2 Conducting Offensive Attacks with Independence and 

Flexibility 277 

Section 3 Proactively Performing Comprehensive Sabotage on the Vital 

Systems of the Enemy 285

Section 4 Decisively Conducting Critical Battles 292 

Chapter 11 Constructing a Modernized Military 297 

Section 1 Important Guidelines Based on the Concept of Scientific 

Development 297

Section 2 Fundamental Objectives Based on Winning InformationBased Battles 304

Section 3 Making Information-Based Construction a Central Task 312 

Section 4 The Basic Approach to Applying Hybrid Types of Leap 

Developments 321

Section 5 Achieving Overall Transformation with Intensive Integration 

and Breakthroughs 327

Chapter 12 War Mobilization and Reserve Force Establishment 332 

Section 1 The Fundamental Principle of War Mobilization 332 

Section 2 Preparation for War Mobilization 339 

Section 3 The Implementation of War Mobilization 345 

Section 4 Demobilization 356 

Section 5 Establishing a Reserve Force362 
288

Main References/Bibliography 370 
289

(5) MILITARY INFORMATION SUPERIORITY THEORY

Zhao Xiao Song and Wei Yu Du 

Beijing National Defense University Publishing House, 2008/11, 2000 

copies 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 Discussion of Information Definition 1

1 Shannon Information Theory Represents the Origin of Information 

Definition 2

2 Information Definition within the Context of Philosophy 18

3 Representationalism and Reflectionism Represent the Foundation of 

Information Definition 22

4 Existence Form Theory Represents the Foundation of Information 

Definition 28

5 Knowledge of Cooperative-Intelligence Aids Information Definition 

31 

6 Comprehensive Analysis of a Variety of Types of Information 

Definition 37 

7 A Discussion on Information Definition 44 

Chapter 2 Information Function and Value 49 

1 The Basic Functions of Information 50 

2 The Theory of Information Value 56 

Chapter 3 Basic Characteristics of Information 72 

Chapter 4 Theory of Information Movement 81 

1 Natural Information, Biological Information, and Social Information 

81 

2 The Processes and Models of Information Movement 83 

3 The Modes of Information Movement 98 

4 The Characteristics of Information Movement 101 

5 The Law of Information Movement 106 

Chapter 5 The Structure and Expression of Information 119 

1 The Basic Concepts of Information Structure 120 

2 The Information Structure of Organizations 125 

3 The Basic Elements of Information Structure 128 

Chapter 6 Status and Levels of Information 137 

1 Two-State Information 138 

2 Three-State Information139 

3 Four-State Information 141 

4 Five-State Information 144 
290

Chapter 7 Information and Cognition 147 

1 The Basic Concepts of Cognition 149 

2 The Structure of Cognition 154 

3 The Processes of Cognition 157 

4 The Manner and Strategy of Cognition 159 

5 Meta-Cognition 159 

6 The Characteristics of Cognition 162 

7 Basic Theory of Knowledge 167 

8 Information and Knowledge 175 

9 Data Management, Information Management, and Knowledge 

Management 181 

Chapter 8 The Quality of Information 189 

1 Quality 189 

2 The Quality of Information 197 

3 The Assessment of Information Quality 205 

Chapter 9 Information Space 216 

1 The Concept of Information Space 218 

2 The Major Distinctions of Information Space 238 

Chapter 10 Military Information 265 

1 The Definition of Military Information 267 

2 The Characteristics of Military Information 281 

3 The Functionalities of Military Information 283

Chapter 11 The Revolution of Military Information 289 

1 The Four Elements of Military Information 290 

2 Quantitative Changes in Military Information 292 

3 Qualitative Changes in Military Information 295 

4 Revolution and War in Military Information 300 

Chapter 12 The Space of Military Information 315 

1 The Concept of Military Information Space 316 

2 The Basic Composition of Military Information Space 320 

3 The Characteristics of Military Information Space 328 

Chapter 13 The Process of Military Information 332 

1 The Basic Theory of Process 332 

2 The Basic Process of Military Information 340 

3 Process Optimization of Military Information 379 

Chapter 14 Describing Military Information 387 

1 The Classification of Military Information 388 

2 The Description of Military Information 391 

Chapter 15 The Relevant Factors Which Impact the Effectiveness of 

Military Information 396

1 The Relevant Factors Which Impact the Content Quality of Military 

Information 397 
291

2 The Relevant Factors Which Impact the Communication Efficiency 

of Military Information 400 

3 The Relevant Factors Which Influence the Effectiveness of Military 

Information 415 

4 The Impact on Enemy Information Battle Operations 418 

5 Comprehensive Analysis of Four Types of Related Factors 419 

Chapter 16 The Concept of Military Information Superiority 424 

1 The Basic Characteristics of High-Quality Military Information 425 

2 The Basic Definition of Military Information Superiority 427 

3 The Basic Elements of Military Information Superiority 437 

4 The Basic Characteristics of Military Information Superiority 439 

Chapter 17 The Assessment of Military Information Superiority 442 

1 The Assessment of the Level of Information 442 

2 The Assessment Thread of Military Information Superiority 442 

3 The Principle of Establishing a Military Information Superiority 

Evaluation Index System 480

4 The Establishment of a Military Information Superiority Evaluation 

Index System 483 

5 The Evaluative Model of Military Information Superiority 492 

Chapter 18 Achieve Military Information Superiority 500 

1 Improve the Level and Quality of Military Information 501 

2 Speed up the Communication Rate of Military Information 516 

3 Increase Effectiveness of Using Military Information 527 

4 Develop Offensive and Defensive Capabilities of Military 

Information 542 

Main References 542 

Postscript 553
292

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mr. Timothy L. Thomas (BS, Engineering 

Science, USMA; MA, International Relations,

University of Southern California) is a senior 

analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Mr. Thomas 

conducts extensive research and publishing in 

the areas of peacekeeping, information war, 

psychological operations, low intensity conflict,

and political-military affairs. Mr. Thomas was a 

US Army foreign area officer who specialized in 

Soviet/Russian studies. His military assignments 

included serving as the Director of Soviet Studies at the United States Army 

Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany; as an inspector of Soviet tactical 

operations under the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and 

as a brigade S-2 and company commander in the 82nd Airborne Division. He 

has written three books on information warfare topics, focusing on recent 

developments in China and Russia. Mr. Thomas is an adjunct professor at the 

US Army’s Eurasian Institute; an adjunct lecturer at the USAF Special

Operations School; and a member of two Russian organizations, the Academy 

of International Information and the Academy of Natural Sciences.
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