Democracy and Deterrence

Foundations for an 

Enduring World Peace

Dr. Walter Gary Sharp Sr.

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 2008
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited.

Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Sharp, Walter Gary.

Democracy and deterrence : foundations for an enduring world peace / Walter 

Gary Sharp, Sr.

 p. ; cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-58566-180-0

1. Deterrence (Strategy) 2. Democracy. 3. War—Prevention. I. Title.

327.172—dc22

Air University Press

131 West Shumacher Avenue

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5962

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil
Dedicated to my loving wife Anne Marie Sharp

from whom all good in my life flows



Contents

Chapter	 Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

 1 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS GLOBAL

INFLUENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 Features of a Liberal Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . 2

 Global Political Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

 2 CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

AND WAR AVOIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 Conventional Thinking on the Cause of War . . 21

 Conventional Approaches to War Avoidance . . . 24

 Deterrence as a Tool of War Avoidance . . . . . . . 31

 The Law of Conflict Management . . . . . . . . . . . 35

 The Future of Armed Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

 3 THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE . . . . . . . . 45

 The Early Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

 Contemporary Studies and Methodologies . . . . 49

 Explanations for the Democratic Peace

 Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

 Challenges and Alternate Rationales . . . . . . . . 72

 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

 4 WAR AVOIDANCE THROUGH INCENTIVES

AND DETERRENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

 Moore’s Postulate on the Cause of War . . . . . . 85

 Moore’s Incentive Theory of War Avoidance . . . 92

 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Chapter	 Page

 5 A VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

OF WAR AVOIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

 Paths to Peace: Domestic and International

 Factors In War Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

 An Analysis of the Role of Deterrence

 in the 1991 Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . 106

 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

 6 CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY . . . . . 123

 The Human-Development Benefits of

 Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

 Rating Freedom and Human Development

 among the Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

 7 CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY AND

DETERRENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Appendix

 A Freedom, Human Development, and

 Democracy Ratings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

 B A Brief History of US Foreign Policy

 Concerning the Spread of Democracy

 around the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 249

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

CONTENTS

vi
vii

Illustrations

Figure	 Page

 1 Changes in the percentage of the world’s population

under democratic, nondemocratic and not-selfgoverning or anarchic governments (1942–97) . . 9

 2 American foreign policy and changes in the percentage of the world’s population under democratic, nondemocratic, and not-self-governing

or anarchic governments (1942–97) . . . . . . . . . . 10

Tables

 1 Features of a model liberal democracy . . . . . . . . 5

 2 Approximate percentage of world’s population under

selected forms of government (1942–97) . . . . . . . 8

 3 Principal assumptions, strengths, and

weaknesses of selected approaches to war

avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 4 Summary of Rummel’s data on the democracy/

dyadic violence proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

 5 Summary of Rummel’s data on the democracy/

democide proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

 6 Summary of Moore’s incentive theory of war

avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

 7 Notional values for the baseline factors of

Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance . . . . . . 100

 8 Rummel’s principles of self-knowledge . . . . . . . . 108

 9 Index values for incentive and deterrence

factors for the 1991 Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . 117

 10 Conversion of scales used in table A1 to

normalized scales used in table A2 . . . . . . . . . . . 135

 11 Jurisdictions sorted by aggregated index value

of democracy (Da) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

 12 Legal systems and forms of government for

193 jurisdictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

CONTENTS
Table	 Page

 13 GDP, population, and related data for the

world’s top 15 economies, sorted by Da . . . . . . . . 145

 14 Heavily indebted poor countries sorted by Da . . . 146

 15 Legal systems and forms of government for

HIPCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

 16 Freedom House 16 worst regimes

sorted by Da . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

 A1 Freedom and human development ratings

for 267 national and territorial jurisdictions . . . . 167

 A2 Normalized freedom and human development

ratings for 193 selected jurisdictions . . . . . . . . . 214

 A3 193 selected jurisdictions sorted by aggregated

index value of democracy (Da), from highest

to lowest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

 B1 American foreign policies from isolationism

to engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

CONTENTS

viii
ix

Foreword

The causes of armed conflict have historically been viewed in 

primarily sociological terms, with political, religious, economic, 

and military factors sharing primacy. Few have examined the 

causes of warfare in the context of a deterrence model or, specifically, the deterrence factors inherent in the checks and balances of a democratic state and the absence of such factors in 

the nondemocratic state. More significantly, none before Prof. 

John Norton Moore has argued the value of democratic principles in deterrence and conflict avoidance.

In this important book, Dr. Gary Sharp analyzes the concepts 

in Moore’s seminal work The War Puzzle (2005), which describes 

Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance. Sharp carefully dissects Moore’s deterrence model and examines those incentives 

that discourage nondemocratic governments from pursuing violent conflicts. Arguing that existing democracies must make an 

active effort to foster the political environment in which new democracies can develop, Sharp discusses the elements critical to 

promoting democratization and thus strengthening systemwide 

deterrence at the state and international levels.

Sharp also examines the incentives for conflict avoidance (internal checks and balances) inherent in the democratic state and their 

relationship to war avoidance. In examining current democracies 

and comparing them statistically to nondemocratic states, Sharp 

calculates an aggregated index value of democracy based upon respected databases that rank the jurisdictions of the world on political rights, civil liberties, media independence, religious freedom, 

economic freedom, and human development. Demonstrating 

through his analysis that democracies are inherently more peaceful because of the internal checks and balances on the aggressive 

use of force, Sharp similarly demonstrates how nondemocracies 

require external checks and balances to preclude aggression. 

Sharp’s analysis and validation of Moore’s incentive theory of 

war avoidance is critical to an understanding of those foreign 

policy strategies that the United States and other democratic 

nations must embrace as they attempt to reverse a course of 

history in which 38.5 million war deaths were recorded in the 

twentieth century alone. By demonstrating how democracy, 
economic freedom, and the rule of law provide essential mechanisms to deter leaders from precipitous decisions concerning 

the use of force, Sharp has provided an invaluable service to 

the statesman and international lawyer alike. 

 JAMES P. TERRY*

 Colonel, USMC, Retired

 December 2007

*Col James P. Terry, USMC, retired, is chairman of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals 

in the Department of Veterans Affairs. He previously served as the principal deputy 

assistant secretary for legislative affairs in the Department of State and as legal counsel 

to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FOREWORD
xi

Walter Gary Sharp Sr. serves as a senior associate deputy 

general counsel for intelligence at the US Department of Defense, where he advises on legal issues related to intelligence, 

covert action, intelligence and counterintelligence policy, intelligence oversight, information security, information sharing, 

security classification policy, information operations, and computer network operations. 

Prior to his appointment, Dr. Sharp served as an associate 

deputy general counsel for international affairs at the Department of Defense; the director of legal research for international, 

comparative, and foreign law at the Law Library of Congress; the 

director of global and functional affairs within the Bureau of 

Legislative Affairs at the State Department; and a principal information security engineer at The MITRE Corporation. A veteran with 25 years of service, Dr. Sharp retired as a decorated 

US Marine Corps lieutenant colonel with prior enlisted service. 

His military assignments include commanding officer of a field 

artillery battery, senior prosecutor, deputy legal counsel to the 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and international law adviser for the commanding general of the Unified Task Force in 

Somalia during Operation Restore Hope. Dr. Sharp’s military 

decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, and his 

many awards for writing excellence and academic achievement 

include the Judge Advocate General’s School Alumni Association Annual Professional Writing Award and an American Bar 

Association Award for Professional Merit.

About the Author

Dr. Walter Gary Sharp Sr.
xii

Dr. Sharp is the author of numerous articles and three books: 

UN Peace Operations (1995), CyberSpace and the Use of Force

(1999), and Jus Paciarii (1999). He serves as an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center where he currently teaches a counterterrorism course, The Law of 24. He 

has also taught graduate-level seminars on United Nations 

peace operations and international peace and security. He lectures internationally in universities and other diverse public 

forums on wide-ranging topics of international law and national 

security law, such as international peace and security, conflict 

management, and peacekeeping operations. Born in Corpus 

Christi, Texas, Dr. Sharp graduated from the US Naval Academy with a bachelor of science in aerospace engineering. He 

also holds a doctor of jurisprudence from Texas Tech University School of Law, a master of laws in international and comparative law from Georgetown University Law Center, a master 

of laws in military law from The US Army Judge Advocate General’s School, and a doctor of juridical science from the University of Virginia School of Law. He has been married for 30 years 

and is the proud father of Gary and Amanda.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
xiii

Preface

War is a pernicious plague with a ubiquitous presence 

throughout human history. Many popular theories contribute 

to our understanding of the causes of war, but none have demonstrated any powerful correlation with the occurrence or nonoccurrence of war. However, philosophers and political scientists have reasoned for centuries and used large-scale statistical 

analyses to prove that democracies are a method of nonviolence. Historians have concluded that war is caused during a 

competition for power by a failure of states to take appropriate 

actions to preserve the peace, that is, a failure of deterrence. 

After studying war and the causes of war for decades, the 

distinguished jurist Prof. John Norton Moore has now postulated that the cause of major international armed conflict is the 

deadly synergy between the existence of a potentially aggressive nondemocratic regime and the absence of effective systemwide deterrence. This postulate on the cause of war is the foundation for Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance—that war 

is caused by a decision of human leadership and can be prevented by the totality of positive and negative incentives that 

effectively discourage leaders of nation-states at the individual, 

state, and international levels from committing aggression. Deterrence is Moore’s predominant theme. Democracies are deterred from aggressive action by internal checks and balances. 

Nondemocracies without internal checks and balances must 

be deterred from aggressive action by external deterrence incentives that target and affect the leaders of nation-states because they make the decision to commit aggression.

This study validates both Moore’s postulate on the cause of 

war and his incentive theory of war avoidance through a detailed examination of the democratic peace principle and deterrence and the creation of a mathematical formula that can be 

used to determine the probability of peace as well as to index 

or quantify deterrence factors. This study concludes that wars 

and their attendant human misery begin in the minds of national leaders whose power is unchecked by incentives and deterrence mechanisms at the individual, state, and international 

levels—mechanisms that are inherent in democracies where 
human freedom, economic freedom, and the rule of law provide 

a check on the power of national leaders.

Many great minds have affirmed the very unpretentious concept that promoting democracy, human freedom, economic 

freedom, and the rule of law are the significant contributing 

factors to world peace and human development. The absence of 

any meaningful argument to the contrary is remarkable. In validating both Moore’s postulate on the cause of war and his incentive theory of war avoidance, this book unequivocally demonstrates how a simple idea such as promoting democracy can 

reduce the occurrence of war and foster human development. 

This book demonstrates the power of democracy, deterrence, 

and the rule of law to create lasting world peace.

 WALTER GARY SHARP, SR.

 Senior Associate Deputy General 

 Counsel for Intelligence 

 Department of Defense

 December 2007

PREFACE

xiv
xv

Acknowledgments

This book is an edited version of my dissertation submitted 

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of juridical science (SJD) at the University of Virginia School 

of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia. While credit is conscientiously 

provided throughout this book for every thought not my own, it 

is nevertheless important to acknowledge the example and 

broad framework of thought provided by Prof. John Norton 

Moore in his incentive theory of war avoidance. His informal 

conversations, lectures at the University of Virginia School of 

Law and Georgetown University Law Center, and the volumes 

of work he has written on this and related issues have been immeasurably important in my developing a meaningful study. 

When any student embarks upon a course of study on an issue 

of extraordinary import such as the maintenance of international peace and security, there is always a mentor like Professor Moore who inspires and helps shape the study through his 

or her own thinking.

I would also like to thank the supervisory committee for my 

dissertation—Prof. Michael P. Dooley, Professor Moore, and 

then-principal deputy assistant secretary of state for legislative 

affairs Dr. James P. Terry—for their willingness to supervise 

and mentor me as well as their patience during the years it 

took me to complete my study.

Professor Moore has served as my mentor and role model for 

more than 20 years, and I shall always be indebted to him for 

endorsing my study in democracy, deterrence, and the rule of 

law at the University of Virginia School of Law, as well as agreeing to supervise my research and writing. His inspiration and 

example made this study possible, and I hope that in return 

this study makes at least some small contribution to the discussion on the relationship of democracy, deterrence, law, and 

world peace.

Finally, I must express my deepest gratitude to the entire Air 

University Press team that worked on this book: Demorah 

Hayes, Lula Barnes, Steve Garst, Mary Moore, Mary Ferguson, 

Joan Hickey, and Diane Clark. In particular, I take great pleasure in saying a special thanks to the chief editor, Demorah 
Hayes, who has demonstrated an extraordinary and wonderful 

talent for making my dissertation more readable.

It is important to emphasize that the opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied herein are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views 

of the Department of Defense or any other governmental agency 

or civilian institution.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xvi


Chapter 1

Liberal Democracy and

Its Global Influence

Democracy is less a system of government than it is a 

system to keep government limited, unintrusive; a system of constraints on power to keep politics and government secondary to the important things in life, the true 

sources of value found only in family and faith.

 —Pres. Ronald Reagan

 —Speech at Moscow State University, 1988

Since World War II, the United States has been committed 

to a foreign policy that seeks either to contain the spread of 

tyranny or, more recently, to actively promote the spread of democracy abroad. Every presidential administration since 1945 

has articulated a link between US national interests and its active engagement in international affairs.1 It is the explicit guiding principle of the current administration to shape “a balance 

of power that favors human freedom . . . [and] extend the peace 

by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”2

The causal relationship between free, open, democratic societies and peace is the subject of this study, which validates the 

democratic peace principle—the simple principle that nondemocracies are more prone to war than democracies. 

War has had a devastating effect on humankind, and the methods of warfare have grown progressively more destructive. The 

most extraordinary cost of war is the loss of and injury to human 

life, both combatant and civilian. There is also a corresponding 

economic cost in the loss of future wages of those killed and 

medical care for those injured. Additionally, there are the direct 

economic costs of waging war; the destruction of physical capital such as buildings, transportation infrastructure, and powerdistribution systems; and the economic burden of postwar reconstruction.3 Consider also the cost to humanity as described by 

Pres. Dwight Eisenhower: “Every gun that is made, every warship 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft 

from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and 

are not clothed.”4 As of 3 September 2007, the cost of the war in 

Iraq to the United States had exceeded $448 billion—enough to 

provide health care for over 268 million children for one year, hire 

an additional 7.7 million school teachers for one year, pay for over 

21.7 million students to attend public universities for four years, 

or build almost 4 million additional housing units for the poor or 

homeless.5 The question of how to prevent war is an urgent one, 

made increasingly so by the lethality of modern warfare and the 

threat of weapons of mass destruction.

This study concludes that wars and the human misery that 

accompanies them begin in the minds of national leaders whose 

power is unchecked by the incentives and deterrents inherent in 

democracy. The global spread of democracy is thus essential for 

creating lasting world peace. Where democracy does not yet exist, 

the presence of effective systemwide deterrents targeted at nondemocratic leaders can increase international security and peace.

Features of a Liberal Democracy

Before we consider the correlation between peace and democratic governance, we must carefully define the term democracy, 

which has been appropriated by some of the modern world’s 

most closed and tyrannical governments. (North Korea, for example, calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and 

the former Communist East Germany named itself the German 

Democratic Republic.) The term democracy itself is derived from 

the Greek word de-mokratia; demos means “people,” and kratia

means “government” or “rule.” Thus democracy refers to a form of 

government in which the right to make political decisions is exercised either directly by the people or through elected representatives. In a modern liberal democracy, the people exercise political 

power through chosen representatives within the framework of 

a constitutional distribution of power and a system of laws intended to hold those representatives accountable to the citizens 

and guarantee all citizens the enjoyment of certain individual or 

collective rights. Liberal democracy has also been defined as “a 

government of limited powers, operating under the rule of law in 

some meaningful system of checks and balances, which protects 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 

fundamental political, economic, and religious freedoms and in 

which minority rights are protected even from a majority.”6

Robert Dahl has described the modern democratic government 

as polyarchal, a term he uses to denote a “representative democracy with universal suffrage.”7 The polyarchal democracy has 

six distinguishing institutions, all of which a country must possess to be considered democratic: elected officials; free, fair, and 

frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of 

information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship.8

John Norton Moore identifies four features as elemental to the 

modern liberal democracy, emphasizing restraints on government power and protections for individual liberty:

1. The government’s powers are limited.

2. The government operates under the rule of law in some 

meaningful system of checks and balances.

3. Fundamental political, economic, and religious freedoms 

are protected.

4. Minority rights are protected from the majority.9

These contemporary definitions of democracy echo the essential principles of the US government enumerated by Thomas 

Jefferson in his first inaugural address (1801):

1. Equal and exact justice to all men

2. Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations

3. The support of the state governments in all their rights

4. The preservation of the general government in its whole 

constitutional vigor

5. A jealous care of the right of election by the people

6. Absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority

7. A well-disciplined militia

8. The supremacy of the civil over the military authority

9. Economy in the public expense

10. The honest payment of our debts and sacred preservation of the public faith
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

11. Encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its 

handmaid

12. The diffusion of information and arraignment of all 

abuses at the bar of the public reason

13. Freedom of religion

14. Freedom of the press

15. Freedom of person under the protection of the habeas 

corpus

16. Trial by juries impartially selected10

More recently, the Clinton administration’s 1999 document 

A National Security Strategy for a New Century reaffirmed and 

expanded Jefferson’s principles. In its discussion of promoting 

democracy and human rights, it asserts that a genuine, lasting democracy requires “respect for human rights, including 

the right to political dissent; freedom of religion and belief; an 

independent media capable of engaging an informed citizenry; 

a robust civil society; the rule of law and an independent judiciary; open and competitive economic structures; mechanisms 

to safeguard minorities from oppressive rule by the majority; 

full respect for women’s and workers’ rights; and civilian control of the military.”11 In a similar vein, Larry Diamond, codirector of the International Forum for Democratic Studies of 

the National Endowment for Democracy, defines a liberal democracy as a form of government that “encompasses not only 

a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with regular, free, 

and fair elections and universal suffrage, but organizational 

and informational pluralism; extensive civil liberties (freedom 

of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join 

organizations); effective power for elected officials; and functional autonomy for legislative, executive, and judicial organs 

of government.”12

Merging these various descriptions of democracy, we can define the features of a model liberal democracy (one that is fully 

democratic in all its institutions and laws) to include the political rights, civil liberties, and limited governmental powers 

summarized in table 1.
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 

Table 1. Features of a model liberal democracy

 A model liberal democracy . . .

Political rights

•  consists of a robust civil society that exercises its political powers

through representatives who are held accountable by the rule of law

and who are chosen through regular, free, fair, and multiparty elections that allow universal suffrage

Civil liberties

•  guarantees all citizens equal civil liberties that include freedom of

expression, freedom of the press, the right to form and join organizations, the right to political dissent, freedom of religion and belief,

freedom of the person (habeas corpus), and the right to a fair trial

•  respects human rights, to include women’s and workers’ rights

•  permits an independent media capable of engaging an informed

citizenry

•  safeguards minorities from oppressive rule by the majority

•  allows open and competitive economic structures

Limited 

governmental 

powers

•  consists of a civilian, multiparty government of limited powers

•  consists of a constitutional framework for the distribution of power

that yields functional autonomy for legislative, executive, and judicial organs of government

•  operates under the rule of law in some meaningful system of checks

and balances

•  creates effective power for elected officials

•  maintains civilian control of the military

Compiled from contemporary and historical descriptions of democracy discussed in this chapter.

To be a liberal democracy, however, it is not enough to simply 

have a constitution and legal system that contain some or even 

all the features of a model liberal democracy summarized in table 

1. These features must be institutionalized and implemented in 

practice. Consider, for example, the 1990 Interim Constitution of 

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, a constitution which contained many of 

the elements of a model liberal democracy.13 That constitution 

declared that the Iraqi people were the source of the government’s 

authority and legitimacy and acknowledged the national rights of 

the Kurdish people and the legitimate rights of all minorities. It 

also guaranteed the rights and liberties of all Iraqi citizens in full: 

private ownership and economic liberty; equality of all citizens 

before the law, without discrimination because of sex, blood, language, social origin, or religion; equal opportunity to all citizens; 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

presumption of innocence for the accused until proven guilty at 

a legal trial; freedom of religion; freedom of opinion and publication; freedom to meet, demonstrate, and form political parties; 

the right of political asylum for all militants persecuted in their 

countries for defending liberal principles; and an independent judiciary subject to no other authority than the law. In practice, 

however, Hussein’s Iraq did not remotely resemble a liberal democracy. The Interim Constitution embraced a socialist system 

and provided full immunity for the president, vice-president, and 

members of the Revolutionary Command Council. In its report 

Freedom in the World 2003, Freedom House named Iraq as one 

of the nine worst nations in the world for political rights and civil 

liberties.14 To be a liberal democracy, a nation’s constitution and 

legal system must contain fundamental elements of all the features of a model liberal democracy summarized in table 1 above, 

including the full protection of constitutionally enumerated political rights and civil liberties guaranteed through a constitutional 

distribution of power to prevent abuse or corruption. Hussein’s 

constitution certainly appeared to embrace the fundamental elements of a liberal democracy, but they were not institutionalized 

and implemented throughout the government in practice.

In contrast to a full liberal democracy, Freedom House defines an electoral democracy as a country that has met certain basic criteria for elections but fails to fully protect political 

rights and civil liberties. In an electoral democracy, “voters can 

choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals not designated by the government; 

voters have access to information about candidates and their 

platforms; voters can vote without undue pressure from the 

authorities; and candidates can campaign free from intimidation.”15 Irregularities during the electoral process do not automatically disqualify a country from being an electoral democracy. A liberal democracy is, by definition, also an electoral 

democracy; however, an electoral democracy is not necessarily 

a liberal democracy.16

A liberal democracy magnifies human freedom and limits government power. It is a form of government wherein the people 

exercise their political powers through civilian representatives 

who are chosen by regular, free, fair, and multiparty elections 

that allow universal suffrage. Representatives are held ac-
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 

countable by a constitutional distribution of effective, yet limited governmental power that ensures meaningful checks and 

balances for multiple autonomous governmental organs. Other 

defining characteristics of a liberal democracy include civilian 

control over the military, an independent media, a free-market 

economy, and a system of laws that guarantees all citizens, including minorities, the enjoyment of equal and extensive individual and collective human rights and civil liberties. Because 

of its system of checks and balances, the liberal democracy 

inclines toward peace.

Global Political Trends

The “ideologicalisms” which challenged us for the last 

50 years have all died away—fascism, Nazism, Communism—leaving only the dregs of abused and misused 

power in their wake. Yes, dictators remain, but they are 

relics of the past, and the “-isms” they practice can’t destroy us, can’t overthrow us, can’t end our way of life.

 —Secretary of State Colin Powell 

 —Senate Confirmation Hearing, 17 January 2001

Ours has not only been a century of bloody struggle between peoples and ideologies, but . . . it also has been a 

century of struggle for national sovereignty and for the 

individual’s democratic sovereignty within the state.

 —Freedom House

 —Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Global

 —Political Change in the Twentieth Century

We are in the midst of a remarkable global political trend toward democratic forms of government. At the turn of the twentieth century, approximately 1 percent of the world’s population was under the governance of a multiparty democracy, and 

19 percent was under a limited democracy (a government in 

transition toward democracy but falling short of being a full 

democracy by, for example, disenfranchising a substantial percentage of the adult population such as women).17 At the same 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

time, approximately 50 percent of the world’s population was 

under the rule of an absolute monarchy or autocracy (the rule 

by a single person with unlimited and absolute power), and approximately 30 percent had no self-government (that is, they 

lived under a government that does not derive its power from 

the people).18 This study focuses on the time period extending 

from the entry into force of the Charter of the United Nations 

(hereinafter UN Charter) in 1945 through 2000. Table 2 shows 

the approximate percentage of the world’s population living under nine major forms of government from 1942 through 1997.

Table 2. Approximate percentage of world’s population under selected forms of 

government (1942–97)

Form of government 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997

Multiparty democracy 10 25 50 45 40 35 35 35 35 45 55 60

Limited democracy 20 5 5 5 5 5

Communist 10 10 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 30 25 25

One party 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

Autocracy 10 5 5 5 5 5 5

Military junta 5 15 15 20 20 15 10 5

Absolute monarchy 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

No self-government 40 10 5 5

Anarchy 25 25

Adapted from Matthew White, Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, http://users.erols.com/

mwhite28/20centry.htm.

Note: This data provides a rough order of magnitude for trend analysis; it does not necessarily 

mean, for example, that there were no limited democracies in 1942 or no autocracies in 1997.

Figure 1 groups this data and plots the distribution by percent of the world’s population living under three broad categories of government: democratic, nondemocratic, and not selfgoverning or anarchic.

Figure 1 shows a significant decline from 1942 to 1947 in 

the percentage of the world’s population living in countries and 

territories that were not self-governing or anarchic and a significant increase in the percentage living under democratic forms 

of government. However, from 1947 to 1952, the rapid transition to democratic forms of government dramatically slowed, 

while a number of the remaining countries and territories that 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 

were not self-governing or anarchic began to transition to nondemocratic forms of government, principally Communism. By 

the mid-1950s, approximately half the world’s population was 

under democratic governance and approximately half was under nondemocratic rule. The percentage of the world’s population under nondemocratic forms of government continued to 

increase and peaked in 1967 through 1977, when a majority of 

the world’s population lived under nondemocratic governments. 

After 1977, this trend began to reverse. By 1987, approximately 

half of the world’s population was once again under democratic 

governance, with the other half remaining under nondemocratic 

rule. Since 1987, the percentage of the population living under 

democratic governments has continued to grow, while the influence of nondemocratic governments has continued to decline.

Not surprisingly, the growth in nondemocratic governance reflects the forceful efforts of the Soviet Union to spread Communism worldwide during the Cold War, and the eventual decline 

of nondemocratic governance corresponds to the waning global 

influence and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 

1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997

100

80

60

40

20

0

Democratic

Not-Self-Governing or Anarchic

Nondemocratic

Figure 1. Changes in the percentage of the world’s population under democratic, nondemocratic, and not-self-governing or anarchic governments (1942–

97). (Adapted from Matthew White, Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, http://

users.erols.com/mwhite28/20centry.htm.)
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

10

1980s. We can also see a possible correlation between the American foreign policies of internationalism, containment, and engagement during the same time period and the likely success of these 

policies in increasing the percentage of the world’s population under democratic governance.19 Figure 2 below compares American 

foreign policy (see appendix B for a brief overview) to the data 

presented in figure 1. This comparison presents some evidence 

that the American policies of internationalism and containment 

fostered, or at the very minimum coincided with, a remarkable 

growth in the percentage of the world’s population under democratic governance. The American Cold-War policy of containment 

helped eventually to stem the spread of Communism and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The figure also suggests 

that the American policy of engagement is continuing to foster 

growth in the percentage of the world’s population under democratic governance.

1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997

100

80

60

40

20

0

Approximate Cold War Era

American Foreign Policy

Containment

Internationalism Engagement

Democratic

Not-Self-Governing or Anarchic

Nondemocratic

Figure 2. American foreign policy and changes in the percentage of the world’s 

population under democratic, nondemocratic, and not-self-governing or anarchic 

governments (1942–97). (Adapted from Matthew White, Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/20centry.htm.)
11

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 

The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) documents in its February 2003 report that 

global trends toward greater peace and democracy continue. 

This report notes five very positive global trends:

1. The decline in the global magnitude of armed conflict, 

which began in the early 1990s, has continued, and few 

of the many societal wars that were contained since 1995 

have resumed.

2. Most democratic regimes established during the 1980s 

and 1990s have endured and a number of others continue to experiment with and expand democratic reforms, 

though the wave of democratization has leveled off.

3. Ethnonational wars for independence, which were the 

main threat to civil peace and regional security in the first 

post-Cold War decade, have declined to their lowest level 

since 1960. More armed conflicts over this issue were 

contained in 2001–02 than in any previous two-year period, often when rebels agreed to begin or resume negotiations.

4. Paralleling the shift toward democracy, there has been 

long-term improvement in respect for human rights.

5. International crises declined in number and intensity 

throughout the 1990s, many of them contained by diplomatic means.20

The 2003 CIDCM report concludes that the “trend in the total 

magnitude of global warfare . . . is likely to continue downward 

over the short-term,” but will likely “level off at some lower level.”21

However, while the CIDCM 2008 Peace and Conflict report notes a 

continued decline in the magnitude of armed conflicts when measured by their death toll, it also reports that the number of states 

involved in armed conflicts is on the increase and the movement 

toward democratic forms of government has stalled.22

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 

reports in its 2004 Yearbook that both the number and intensity of conflicts are on the decline:23

In 2003 there were 19 major armed conflicts in 18 locations worldwide, the lowest number for the post-cold war period with the exception 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

12

of 1997, when 18 such conflicts were registered. Only two of the 19 

conflicts were fought between states: the conflict between Iraq and the 

multinational coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom and the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan over 

Kashmir. Four of the 19 conflicts were in Africa and eight in Asia.

The principal source of major armed conflict in contemporary politics 

remains intra-state. The persistence of intra-state wars, and their resistance to quick solutions, was amply reflected in 2003. Longstanding conflicts in Colombia and Israel continued, despite the introduction of more offensive military strategies by the government parties in 

each country. While a more aggressive military stance thwarted opposition attacks and may have contributed to the reduction in fatalities in 

Colombia and Israel in 2003, it severely hampered efforts to facilitate 

progress toward peace in both.24

SIPRI counts wars that have produced 1,000 or more battlerelated deaths in any single year. In 2003, SIPRI counted 19 

such conflicts in Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Colombia, India (Kashmir), India-Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, 

Myanmar, Nepal, Peru, Philippines (two conflicts), Russia, Sri 

Lanka, Sudan, and Turkey.25

Freedom House has declared the twentieth century the 

“democratic century,” reporting a “dramatic expansion of democratic governance” with a corresponding significant expansion of market economies.26 In 1900, not a single state could 

be judged an electoral democracy by the standard of universal 

suffrage with competitive multiparty elections, and states with 

restricted democratic practices such as the United States and 

the United Kingdom numbered only 25 and accounted for only 

12.4 percent of the world’s population. However, by the 1950s, 

there were 22 democracies and 21 states with restricted democratic practices, accounting for 42.9 percent of the world’s population. By 2000, liberal and electoral democracies clearly predominated, with 119 such states governing 58.2 percent of the 

world’s population. Of the remaining governments in 2000, 16 

had restricted democratic practices, 10 were traditional monarchies, 40 were authoritarian regimes, five were totalitarian 

regimes, and two were protectorates.27

Freedom House concludes from this data that “humankind, 

in fits and starts, is rejecting oppression and opting for greater 

openness and freedom,” even though this move toward democ-
13

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 

racy and freedom has “frequently met with brutal repression.”28

Consider, for example, the case of the Democratic Republic of 

Timor-Leste (East Timor). In August 1999, the vote of the East 

Timorese people to seek independence from Indonesia was met 

with violence, looting, and arson, during which many East Timorese were killed and over 500,000 were displaced from their 

homes. In response, the UN Security Council established the 

UN Transitional Administration in East Timor in October 1999 

to oversee the transition to an independent state.29 The international community recognized East Timor on 20 May 2002 

as an independent state and the world’s newest democracy.30

Timor-Leste became the 191st member state of the UN on 27 

September 2002.31 Despite violence such as that in East Timor, 

the move toward democracy and human freedom has made the 

world more peaceful since “history indicates that stable and 

established democracies rarely war with one another.”32

Democratically elected governments can now be found “in all 

parts of the globe and in all major civilizations, although . . . 

no significant progress toward democracy has been made in 

China, where over 20 percent of the globe’s population lives.”33

Of the 88 countries graded as free in the Freedom House 2004 

annual report, 24 are in Western Europe, 23 in the Americas, 

17 in the Asia Pacific region, 12 in Central and Eastern Europe 

and the former Soviet Union, one in the Middle East and North 

Africa, and 11 in sub-Saharan Africa.34 The eight worst countries in the world, according to Freedom House, for the protection of political rights and civil liberties are Myanmar (Burma), 

Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and 

Turkmenistan.35

Freedom House also concludes that “once countries attain freedom, rarely do they regress, reinforcing the idea that democracy 

and its attendant institutions are the best insurance against tyranny.”36 It warns, however, that the rapid expansion of democracy since the mid-1970s makes many new democracies fragile 

during transition and that the gains in democratic governance 

could well be reversed.37 Newly democratic states have “weak 

civic cultures and undeveloped rule of law.”38 In 2004 Freedom 

House reported the “second consecutive year of a global decline 

in freedom for news media.” Their study Freedom of the Press 

2004: A Global Survey of Media Independence reports “some of 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

14

the most serious setbacks . . . in countries where democracy is 

backsliding, such as in Bolivia and Russia, and in older, established democracies, most notably Italy.”39 Freedom of the press 

improved, however, in Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Kenya.40

It has been reported that Russia is “backsliding in key areas 

of democratic governance and rule of law.”41 Pres. Vladimir 

Putin’s policies are calling into question Russia’s ability to protect private property and are seeking to “centralize power, leaving little room for a vibrant civil society, independent media, or 

political opposition.”42 In a 2004 assessment, Freedom House 

reports that Russia remains one of the most corrupt countries 

in the world, and it is headed in an increasingly authoritarian 

direction.43

Notwithstanding the backsliding in a number of extremely 

important countries such as Russia and the complete lack of 

progress toward democratization in China, the overall progress 

during the twentieth century from zero to 119 electoral democracies with universal suffrage was dramatic and extraordinarily 

promising, and democracy is still on the move. 

Other important trends toward democratic institutions transcend national borders. European Commission president Romano Prodi announced in 2002 his desire to create a more 

powerful European Union (EU), calling for the creation of the 

“first supranational democracy in the world” and “greater centralization of power” through a federalist constitution for the 

EU.44 On 18 June 2004, the EU agreed to a draft constitution that “brings together for the first time the many treaties 

and agreements on which the EU is based.”45 It also defines 

the powers of the EU and reserves a right of veto for member 

states.46 All 25 member states must ratify this draft constitution before it enters into force. However, several EU member 

states have had problems ratifying the draft constitution (two 

countries—France and the Netherlands—have rejected it), and 

the ratification process has failed. In June 2005, the European 

Council decided to launch a “period of reflection” on the future of Europe and, in June 2007, agreed to consider a “reform 

treaty” for the EU.47

As this study will show, the global spread of democracy is a 

significant development for the advancement of international 

peace and security. The democratic peace principle, which this 
15

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 

study will validate, explains why: democracies are conducive to 

nonviolence, as political scientists have proven through largescale statistical analyses.48

Historians have also concluded that war is caused during a 

competition for power by a failure of states to take appropriate 

actions to preserve the peace, that is, an absence or failure of 

deterrence.49 Both the presence or absence of democracy and 

the presence or absence of deterrence are strong correlates of 

the occurrence and nonoccurrence of war, but neither, when 

taken alone, fully defines the cause of war. After years of study, 

Moore has noted the powerful relationship between both factors and the occurrence of war.50 He postulates that the cause 

of major international armed conflict is the deadly synergy between the existence of a potentially aggressive nondemocratic 

regime and the absence of effective systemwide deterrence.51

Moore broadly defines effective systemwide deterrence as the 

totality of incentives external to the nondemocratic regime, 

that is, incentives created by other nations and the international system that prevent aggressive action.52

Moore’s postulate on the cause of war is the foundation for 

his incentive theory of war avoidance: war is caused by the decisions of human leadership and can be prevented by the totality 

of positive and negative incentives that effectively discourage 

leaders of nation-states at the individual, state, and international levels from committing aggression. Deterrence is Moore’s 

predominant theme: democracies are deterred from aggressive 

action by internal checks and balances, but nondemocracies 

without internal checks and balances must be deterred from 

aggressive action by external deterrence incentives that target 

and affect the leaders of nation-states because they make the 

decision to commit aggression.

This study validates both Moore’s postulate on the cause of 

war and his incentive theory of war avoidance through a detailed 

examination of the democratic peace principle and deterrence. 

It proposes a mathematical formula that can be used to determine the probability of peace and to index deterrence. To establish a framework for analysis, chapter 2 discusses conventional 

thinking on the causes of war and conventional approaches to 

war avoidance, introduces the concept of deterrence and the 

law of conflict management, and considers the possible nature 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

16

of future conflicts. Chapter 3 examines the democratic peace 

principle, including the early debate, contemporary studies, 

conclusions derived from the principle, challenges to the principle, and its significance. 

A thorough analysis of Moore’s postulate on the cause of war 

and incentive theory of war avoidance follows in chapter 4, which 

discusses how to create peace even in a world that includes nondemocratic governments. A mathematical formula describes 

Moore’s incentive theory and establishes a methodology for analysis and for predicting the probability of peace for a given nation. 

That formula is then applied in chapter 5 to a specific historical 

context, the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The analysis of the Gulf War validates Moore’s theory of war 

avoidance.While democracy is important as a means for establishing peace in the world, its true value extends far beyond the 

prevention of war. Chapter 6 discusses the correlative values of 

democracy, which promotes human freedom and development 

wherever it gains influence. This chapter introduces several 

important indexes that rate the nations of the world according 

to their levels of freedom and development. Finally, chapter 7 

reflects on the meaning and value of Moore’s incentive theory 

of war avoidance in the context of the foreign policy of nations 

and the purposes of regional and international organizations.

Building on Moore’s foundation, this study concludes that 

wars and human misery begin in the minds of national leaders whose power is unchecked by the deterrence features that 

occur naturally in democracies. However, people do not always 

live in a political environment where they can choose their form 

of governance or where democracies are able to develop naturally. Sometimes those environments must be shaped through 

the affirmative effort of other democracies; that is, democratic 

governments must encourage and assist in creating democratic 

institutions that will help other governments move toward liberal democracy—fully democratic in all their institutions and 

laws. To do so, nations as well as regional and international 

organizations should look to Moore’s incentive theory of war 

avoidance as guidance for national-security deterrence policy 

and charter principles because the spread of democracy and 

the rule of law worldwide strengthens world peace.
17

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. Complete citations are in the bibliography.)

1. In its infancy, the United States adopted an isolationist stance, electing 

not to involve itself in foreign disputes and international affairs. See appendix 

B for an overview of the development of US foreign policy from isolationism, to 

a limited internationalism, to Cold War–era containment, and finally to an active engagement in the spread of freedom.

2. President Bush, National Security Strategy, iv.

3. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “defense economics,” http://www

.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=118852.

4. President Eisenhower, “Chance for Peace” speech.

5. National Priorities Project, “Cost of War.” See also Kaysen et al., War 

with Iraq.

6. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, xxii.

7. Dahl, On Democracy, 90.

8. Ibid., 84–91.

9. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, xxii.

10. President Jefferson, inaugural address.

11. President Clinton, National Security Strategy, 25.

12. Diamond, Promoting Democracy, 10.

13. Iraq, Interim Constitution, articles 5, 10, 16, 19, 20, 25, 26, 34, and 60.

14. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003. Freedom House is a nonpartisan voice for democracy and freedom around the world founded nearly 

60 years ago by Eleanor Roosevelt and other Americans concerned with the 

mounting threats to peace and democracy. It has been a vigorous proponent 

of democratic values and a steadfast opponent of dictatorships of the far left 

and the far right. See the Freedom House mission statement and history at 

http://www.freedomhouse.org/aboutfh/index.htm.

15. See chapter 6 for a discussion of the Freedom House annual assessment of political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House defines electoral 

democracy in its report Freedom in the World 2003, “Methodology.”

16. Ibid.

17. White, Historical Atlas.

18. Ibid.

19. See discussion of American foreign policy in appendix B.

20. Marshall and Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2003, 1–2. The CIDCM at the 

University of Maryland conducts interdisciplinary research, policy analysis, 

and training on human rights issues, international development, and conflict 

resolution.

21. Ibid., 47.

22. Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2008: Executive Summary, 12–13.

23. SIPRI conducts research on international conflicts, global security, 

and conflict prevention and resolution (http://www.sipri.org).
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

18

24. SIPRI, “Press Release,” 10. This data is discussed in chapter 3, “Major 

Armed Conflicts,” of the SIPRI Yearbook 2004.

25. Ibid.

26. Freedom House, Democracy’s Century.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. UN, “East Timor.”

30. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “East Timor,” World Factbook 2003. 

31. UN, “Member States.”

32. Freedom House, Democracy’s Century.

33. Ibid., “End of Century Survey.”

34. Ibid., “Global Freedom Gains.”

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., Democracy’s Century.

38. Ibid., “End of Century Survey.”

39. Ibid., “Global Press Freedom Deteriorates.”

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., Nations in Transit 2004.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Deutsche Welle, “Prodi Unveils Vision.”

45. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News, “What the EU Constitution Says.” A provisional consolidated version of the draft treaty that establishes a constitution of Europe is available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/

shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/21_07_04cg00086.en04.pdf.

46. BBC News, “What the EU Constitution Says.” For a debate over whether 

this draft constitution is democratic, see BBC News, “Head-to-Head: Is EU 

Blueprint Democratic?” 20 June 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/

europe/3006156.stm.

47. Europa, “A Constitution for Europe.”

48. See, for example, Rummel, Power Kills, 25–84.

49. See, for example, Kagan, On the Origins of War, 6, 68–74, 205–14, 

269–74, 413–17, 546–48, 566–73.

50. Moore is viewed by many as the founder of the discipline of national 

security law.

51. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 840; and Moore, Solving the 

War Puzzle, xx, 39.

52. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 841; and Moore, Solving the 

War Puzzle, xx, 27.
19

Chapter 2

Conventional Theories of War

and War Avoidance

To avoid this State of War . . . is one great reason of 

Mens putting themselves into Society.

 —John Locke

—Two Treatises of Government

War is defined under modern international law as an armed 

conflict or hostilities between two or more governments or states,1

but it has been an ever-present feature of human history, long 

before the rise of the state. War has no doubt existed since the 

origins of humankind; we can document its existence from Sumerian writings that originate from about 3100 BC.2 Indeed the 

“written history of the world is largely a written history of warfare.”3 Historian Donald Kagan calculated in 1968 “that there 

had been only 268 years free of war in the previous 3,421.”4

War has always been considered the “prerogative right” of sovereign states.5 Many theorists have viewed it as simply another 

political instrument at the state’s or the ruler’s disposal. This view 

of war can be found in cultures as diverse as Imperial China and 

Enlightenment Europe. During the Ch’in (Qin) Dynasty (221–206 

BC), Chinese philosophers, influenced by Sun Tzu’s The Art of 

War (c. 490 BC), wrote that it “is impossible to gain profit without 

making efforts and to extend one’s territory by sitting idly. . . . The 

only way to attain that goal is to continue doing it through war” 

(emphasis added).6 Frederick the Great, king of Prussia (1740–86), 

also believed that a “successful king must understand the use—

and abuse—of military force as an instrument of policy” (emphasis 

added).7 Similarly, the Prussian philosopher and general Carl von 

Clausewitz (1780–1831) wrote that “war is not merely a political 

act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political 

commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”8 General Clausewitz viewed war as a “rational instrument of national 

policy” and a “part of the intercourse of the human race” that 
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

20

“can never be separated from political intercourse.”9 Clausewitz 

also developed a doctrine of total war or complete annihilation.10

He believed that a country at war must use all of its resources to 

ensure that an enemy’s military power is completely destroyed; 

the enemy’s will and capability to re-create military power must 

also be completely destroyed. Clausewitz believed that a “political 

animal is a warmaking animal.”11 According to his views, war is a 

natural, even inevitable, expression of political power.

Immanuel Kant, the Prussian philosopher, political theorist, 

and cynic about human nature, observed that the “state of 

peace among men living side by side is not the natural state,” 

but rather the “natural state is one of war.”12 However, Kant 

believed that peace could be established and maintained by 

institutionalizing certain principles that guide international relations and the internal structure of governments.13

The concept of total war—one that involves all of a nation’s 

resources and results in the destruction of all an enemy’s resources—continued to evolve after Clausewitz. Most new theories no longer regard war as a rational instrument of state

policy, and their proponents believe that total war “should be 

undertaken only if the most vital interests of the state, touching upon its very survival, are concerned.”14 Other theorists 

believe war is “a calamity and a social disaster” and deny war 

any rational character.15 In a sweeping history of warfare from 

490 BC to 1950 AD, Lynn Montross concludes that “the heart 

of man has never been changed by any weapon his mind has 

conceived” and “war is a disease of the body politic.”16

The future prevalence of warfare in society is a matter of 

debate. The noted jurist Eugene Rostow concludes that war 

is “probably a more pervasive factor in social and political life 

today [1993] than at any time since the seventeenth century,” 

and that “trend shows no sign of abating.”17 In sharp contrast, 

historian John Keegan has concluded after a lifetime of study 

that war “may well be ceasing to commend itself to human beings as a desirable or productive, let alone rational, means of 

reconciling their discontents,” and that humankind “does have 

the capacity, over time, to correlate the costs and benefits of 

large and universal undertakings.”18 Given the sheer horror of 

weapons of mass destruction, one can only hope that Keegan’s 

conclusion is correct. However, while Keegan believes that poli-
21

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

tics must continue and that war cannot, he unfortunately does 

not see an end to war in the near future.19

Conventional Thinking on the Cause of War

There are several conventional explanations for the cause of 

war. Many Western philosophers from Aristotle to Clausewitz 

have believed in the primacy of politics rather than culture as 

the cause of war. Clausewitz, for example, believed that a “political motive” existed as the “precipitating and controlling factor in warmaking” for all the wars of his time.20 John Jay acknowledges in The Federalist Papers No. 4 the role of nations in 

making war, but also argues that individual leaders will often 

go to war when it does not benefit the nation. According to Jay, 

the personal motives of the leader often override the political 

motives of the nation:

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting 

anything by it; nay, that absolute monarchs will often make war when 

their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects 

merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal 

affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their 

particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, 

which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in 

wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people.21

Alexander Hamilton also attributes many wars to the abusive 

actions of leaders in The Federalist Papers No. 6: “Men . . . 

have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have 

not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquility to personal 

advantage or personal gratification.”22 Hamilton also observes 

that “territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the 

most fertile sources of hostility among nations” and concludes 

that “perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin.”23

Montross concludes at the end of his study on war that the 

one constant factor in the cause and nature of war throughout 

history is the “minds of men,” that is, the decisions and motives 

of individuals. He believes that the history of tomorrow will be 

governed by the hearts and minds of people, not policy or tech-
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

22

nology.24 Similarly, the preamble to the constitution of the UN 

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 

makes three significant declarations about the cause of war:

1. Wars begin in the minds of men.

2. Ignorance of each other’s ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that 

suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world 

through which their differences have all too often broken 

into war.

3. World War II was made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual 

respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, 

through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the 

inequality of men and races.25

Most theories about the cause of war fall into one of two major conventional schools of thought: the first attributes war to 

“innate biological and psychological factors or drives” and the 

second to “social relations and institutions.”26 The first school 

of thought was developed by ethologists, who draw analogies 

from animal behavior, as well as psychologists and psychoanalysts. By studying monkeys and apes in captivity, ethologists 

have observed that aggressive behavior usually arises in the 

context of rivalry for possession, the intrusion of a stranger, 

or the frustration of an activity, but the applicability of these 

observations to humans is questioned by some ethologists and 

social scientists.27 Psychologist Sigmund Freud, in his correspondence with Albert Einstein later published as Why War?, 

asserts that “man has within himself a lust for hatred and destruction,” and the only way to offset this lust is a “well-founded 

dread of the form future wars will take.”28 Most psychologists 

believe that social adjustments designed to increase transparency and trust within relationships would reduce the likelihood 

of war by decreasing frustration, insecurity, and fear.29

A minority of social and behavioral scientists believe that 

man is naturally violent, but a majority “regard violent behaviour either as an aberrant activity in flawed individuals or as a 

response to particular sorts of provocation or stimulation, the 

inference being that if such triggers to violence can be identi-
23

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

fied and palliated or eliminated, violence can be banished from 

human intercourse.” Medical scientists have established that 

“aggression is a function of the lower brain, amenable to control by the higher brain,” but they are not sure how those two 

areas of the brain communicate. They suspect, however, those 

chemical imbalances or the presence of certain hormones in 

the brain heightens aggressive behavior.30

The second school of thought takes into account how humans 

behave differently in different social contexts and structures, 

such as the internal organization of a state or the international 

system of states. These analyses have been developed by two 

very different groups of political theorists: classical liberals of the 

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and socialists. Some classical liberals believed that political structures were of primary 

importance in determining the propensity of states to engage in 

war; they believed that the existence of a basic harmony of interests and economic cooperation among nations would minimize 

the incidence of wars. A major tenet of classical liberals was universal suffrage because they believed that people could vote any 

belligerently inclined government out of office.31

While classical liberals focused on political structures, socialists analyzed the socioeconomic system of states as the primary factor in determining the propensity of states to engage 

in war. Socialists such as Karl Marx attributed war to the class 

structure of society; Marx believed that war resulted from a 

clash of social forces created by a capitalist mode of production 

that develops two antagonistic classes, rather than being an 

instrument of state policy. Thus capitalist states would engage 

in war because of their growing needs for raw materials, markets, and cheap labor. Socialists believed replacing capitalism 

with socialism could prevent war, but world events have proven 

socialists wrong as well.32

These two schools of thought—war is caused by innate biological drives or social institutions—do not demonstrate any 

meaningful correlation with the occurrence or nonoccurrence 

of war. There are many variables not considered by these two 

schools: for example, the influence of national special interest 

groups such as the military or defense contractors that may 

seek glory through victory, greater resources, greater domestic 

political power, or justification for their existence.
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

24

Legal scholar Quincy Wright has conducted one of the “most 

thorough studies of the nature of war”33 and concludes that 

there “is no single cause of war.”34 In A Study of War, he concludes that peace is an equilibrium of four complex factors: 

military and industrial technology, international law governing 

the resort to war, social and political organization at the domestic and international level, and the distribution of attitudes 

and opinions concerning basic values. War is likely when controls on any one level are disturbed or changed.35 Similarly, the 

1997 US National Military Strategy identifies the root causes of 

conflict as political, economic, social, and legal conditions.36

Moore has compiled the following list of conventional explanations for war: specific disputes; absence of dispute settlement 

mechanisms; ideological disputes; ethnic and religious differences; communication failures; proliferation of weapons and 

arms races; social and economic injustice; imbalance of power; 

competition for resources; incidents, accidents, and miscalculation; violence in the nature of man; aggressive national leaders; 

and economic determination. He has concluded, however, that 

these causes or motives for war explain specific conflicts but fail 

to serve as a central paradigm for explaining the cause of war.37

In the final analysis, Wright is unequivocally correct—there 

is no single cause or explanation for war. However, there is one 

clear consistency in all wars: wars always begin through the 

calculated decisions of men or women, regardless of any cause, 

motive, or explanation. As the UNESCO constitution asserts, 

“wars begin in the minds of men.”38 People—national leaders—

are always at the core of any decision to wage war, and any 

strategy for preventing war must address these individuals.

Conventional Approaches to War Avoidance

Since there are multiple theories on the causes of war, there 

are also multiple philosophies and approaches to war avoidance 

and conflict prevention. The 1997 US National Military Strategy, 

for example, defines conflict prevention as the “reduction, mitigation, or neutralization of the causes of conflict,” but it acknowledges that the military can do little by itself to address the 

political, economic, social, and legal conditions that are the root 

causes of conflict. It states that the US effort to prevent conflict 
25

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

includes international arms control measures, transparency and 

confidence-building measures, international nonproliferation 

standards, and export controls on fissionable materiel. It also 

heavily emphasizes deterrence as the military’s most important 

contribution to conflict prevention and US national security. 

This strategy defines deterrence as “our demonstrated ability 

and willingness to defeat potential adversaries and deny them 

their strategic objectives.” Our deterrence capability provides 

the necessary environment “for normal political discourse and 

peaceful resolution of differences.”39 To organize the discussion, 

the various approaches to conflict prevention, including those 

articulated in the National Military Strategy, will be explored in 

the context of five constructs or frameworks for war avoidance.

In the first construct, there are five major tools for war avoidance: diplomacy, regional integration, international law, the 

UN, and international government.40 Diplomacy reduces the 

likelihood of conflict by seeking cooperation among states with 

competing interests, improving the rationality of the decisionmaking process and the effectiveness of cost-benefit analysis, 

eliminating misperceptions and irrational fears, and pursuing a 

balance of power. Since conflicts usually occur between neighbors, regional integration reduces the likelihood of conflict by increasing cooperation in economic, social, political, and security 

affairs, as in, for example, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO). International law reduces the likelihood 

of conflict by prohibiting the use of force between states under most circumstances other than self-defense and mitigates 

the harshness of conflict by regulating the conduct of war. The 

UN is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, and the UN Charter incorporates the three approaches of 

pacific settlement of disputes, collective security, and disarmament. However, these three approaches to international peace 

have not been very successful. Thus the UN secretary-general 

has also utilized diplomatic initiatives and peacekeeping forces, 

and the UN General Assembly has attempted to exert its influence by condemning undesirable state activities. Since the UN 

approaches have shortcomings and limited practicability in war 

avoidance, some have advocated eliminating war by completely 

reforming the international system and creating a world government with full legislative powers and an overwhelming military 
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

26

force that can overcome the relative anarchy of independent sovereign states. These approaches, however, are either far-fetched 

or have not been completely successful and appear highly unlikely to serve as the basis for an effective theory of war avoidance.

In the second construct, there are four theoretical approaches 

to conflict management through the establishment of world order: balance of power, collective security, world federalism, and 

functionalism.41 Balance of power is historically the most significant approach to world order. An international system of sovereign states tends toward a natural equilibrium when rival states 

strive toward an equal division of power, but this system does 

not provide an acceptable degree of security in the twenty-first 

century, in which we find an unequal division of power. 

Collective security is predicated upon the primacy of world 

order and depends upon an institutional arrangement in which 

member states agree to defend against an attack on any of the 

other members. In contrast to the balance of power approach 

where states act independently and in concert, collective security envisions the organization of the entire community. Collective security was the most prominent approach of the twentieth 

century. Some states, however, are uncomfortable with the fundamental requirement of collective security: any act of aggression against a member state must be treated as a threat to all 

member states regardless of the strategic implications of geography or the identity of the aggressor. 

World federalism is “a radical rejection of the multistate system” that seeks to eliminate states as obstacles to world order.42

World federalists seek a world government that would approximate a Western liberal state such as the United States, but these 

federalists ignore the political impracticality of changing the existing state system and creating an enforcement mechanism independent of the states while maintaining the ability of states to 

discipline individuals. Functionalism relies upon a “network of 

international organizations of varying size and shape, each tailored to the requirements for effective cooperative action” to deal 

with important social, economic, and technical problems that 

transcend national boundaries.43

Functionalism does not purport to eliminate states, but to 

make them more effective in working together and developing a 
27

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

more “complex pluralism.” However, this is a very slow process 

that relegates its relevance to the distant future.44 While these 

four theoretical approaches to establishing world order offer insights into conflict management, none offers a simple solution.

The third construct of war avoidance focuses on institutional 

modes of conflict management.45 Even though philosophers 

have advocated theories and practices of conflict management 

since the beginning of recorded history, war avoidance through 

institutional modes of conflict management did not emerge until the nineteenth century, when a sufficient number of sovereign states recognized the problems arising from their coexistence and the need for regulating interstate relations. The first 

major institutional development, albeit unsuccessful, was the 

Council of Europe, established in the early 1800s to provide a 

forum for multilateral diplomacy. The next major developments 

were the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which involved representatives from a large number of states who were 

all given diplomatic equality with the great powers. However, 

“the greatest achievement of the statesmen at the Hague was 

establishing the precedent that collective diplomacy should be 

oriented toward the further development and codification of international law, the formulation of procedures for the peaceful 

settlement of disputes, and the promotion of the principle that 

a pacific solution might be urged and facilitated by disinterested states in international disputes.”46

The international community attempted to create a system 

of collective security in the League of Nations after World War 

I, and although the League of Nations failed, it laid the groundwork for the UN. The UN “established a modified form of collective security by allowing disputants a variety of methods for 

solving their disputes, by giving the Security Council flexibility 

with respect to UN action in response to threats and breaches 

of the peace, and by allowing the development of regional security arrangements.”47 The UN also created mechanisms for 

the peaceful settlement of disputes, such as the International 

Court of Justice.48 However, the UN’s greatest contribution to 

international conflict management is its charter, which “outlaws the aggressive use of force while recognizing a state’s inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in Article 

51 and the Security Council’s obligation under Article 39 to 
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

28

maintain or restore international peace and security.”49 The 

UN Charter also authorizes the Security Council to use armed 

force to maintain international peace and security.50 Despite 

its weaknesses, the UN was the vehicle for transforming the 

international community “from a system of independent states 

allowed by international law to wage war and to slaughter their 

own citizens with impunity to a system of interdependent sovereign states that now attempts to govern itself, protect human 

rights, and enforce global peace.”51

The fourth construct includes nine approaches to regulating 

the initiation and conduct of war by establishing international 

norms that form the basis for the contemporary law of conflict 

management: 

1. Norms and procedures (such as the just war theory) for 

assessing permissibility of recourse to war

2. Norms that govern the conduct of war

3. Obligations to negotiate an end to ongoing war

4. Dispute resolution procedures

5. Deterrence by establishing criminal responsibility for the 

violations of certain norms

6. Institutional modes of controlling war through collective 

actions

7. Arms control and disarmament

8. Deterrence through alliances

9. National measures52

However, three conditions of overriding significance must be 

considered when applying these nine approaches as conflictmanagement tools. First is the tension created by the bipolar 

East-West division between Socialist states and Western democracies during the Cold War and the recognition of substantial evidence that totalitarian regimes are “more prone to resort 

to violence than democracies as a class.”53 Second is the additional emphasis on the maintenance of strategic stability and 

deterrence caused by the destructive power of nuclear weapons.54 Third, international law has not adapted well or quickly 
29

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

to the evolving shift in warfare from major armies on the march 

to low-intensity conflict, terrorism, and civil wars.55 While all of 

these nine approaches play a role in war avoidance, the principal focus during the Cold War was on nuclear arms control because of the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons.56

The fifth construct, developed by Moore, includes nine conventional approaches to war avoidance: (1) balance of power; (2) 

third-party dispute settlement mechanism; (3) global mechanism 

for collective security; (4) pacifism and passive resistance; (5) arms 

control; (6) functionalism; (7) world federalism; (8) diplomacy, negotiation, and getting to yes; and (9) public and third-track diplomacy.57 Each approach is based upon a principal assumption 

about the nature and cause of war. Each approach has strengths 

and weaknesses, summarized in table 3. While Moore has concluded that these nine approaches to war avoidance individually 

and collectively make important contributions toward international peace and security, they have not eliminated war. He believes these tools for war avoidance should be placed in a broader 

framework that serves as a central paradigm for explaining the 

cause of war, which will make these tools more effective.58

Table 3. Principal assumptions, strengths, and weaknesses of selected approaches 

to war avoidance

Approach to war 

avoidance

Principal assumption (PA),

strength (S), and weakness (W)

Balance of power

PA: equilibrium of power equals security and world peace

S: power is a component of deterrence; may predict state behavior

W: fails to focus on importance of government structures and 

fails to focus on all elements of deterrence

Third-party dispute settlement mechanism

PA: war is primarily a problem of disputes among nations which 

can be resolved by contract analysis

S: encourages third-party resolution and the rule of law

W: erroneous assumption on the cause of war; fails to focus on 

importance of government structures; fails to focus on all elements of deterrence

Global mechanism for 

collective security

PA: aggression can be prevented by institutional collective selfdefense

S: systemwide deterrence

W: free-rider problem (states who do not participate benefit); 

difficulties in collective community judgment regarding what is 

aggression; largely dependent on major powers; highly contingent and after-the-fact since existing UN system is weak
30

Approach to war 

avoidance

Principal assumption (PA),

strength (S), and weakness (W)

Pacifism

PA: war or violence is not a means of settling disputes; pacifism 

will end war

S: moral principle to be respected; strong humanitarian and 

religious basis

W: only effective if universally accepted

Passive resistance

PA: resistance that does not amount to violence can prevent 

war

S: may be effective in limited settings

W: will not stop aggressive totalitarian regime that does not 

share values

Arms control

PA: arms races cause war; arms control prevents war

S: enhances stability; very important for nuclear weapons

W: erroneous premise; fails to focus on government structures 

and systemwide deterrence; problems with verification, compliance, excessive reduction of forces, misperception of signals; 

overreliance may actually reduce deterrence

Functionalism

PA: network of international organizations and other interactions between states will yield cooperation

S: networks do enhance deterrence; approach enhances understanding between states

W: fails to focus on government structures and systemwide 

deterrence; can be exploited by aggressive regime

World federalism

PA: war is a function of the state system; therefore, war is eliminated if the state system is eliminated

S: theory could possibly eliminate international war (does not 

address civil wars)

W: erroneous premise; changing the state system simply redefines wars as civil wars; concentration of power may result in 

greater abuse; impossible to implement

Diplomacy, negotiation, 

and getting to yes

PA: diplomacy and negotiations can resolve all disputes without 

war

S: promotes diplomacy and rule of law; flexible tool that can 

resolve some disputes

W: erroneous assumption that wars result from disputes; creates 

a pattern of appeasement; fails to focus on government structures and systemwide deterrence

Public and third-track 

diplomacy

PA: nongovernmental actors can play a role in preventing and 

resolving conflict

S: unofficial and people-to-people; enhances understanding 

and confidence; may have access or opportunities not available 

to governments

W: may interfere with government-to-government relations

Adapted from John Norton Moore, seminars, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, 

VA, 22 January and 26 February 1997.

Table 3 (continued)
31

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

It is important to recognize that all of these conventional approaches are valuable tools in war avoidance. Given a particular 

set of circumstances, one of these approaches may avoid or mitigate war. Nevertheless, these approaches, either independently or 

collectively, cannot avoid war reliably and predictably enough to 

be considered a viable, comprehensive theory of war avoidance.

Deterrence as a Tool of War Avoidance

A recurring theme in the various approaches to war avoidance 

is deterrence. Kagan concludes in his comparative history On the 

Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace that war is caused 

during a competition for power by a failure of states to take appropriate actions to preserve the peace, that is, an absence or 

failure of deterrence.59 Kagan examines five historical examples: 

the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), the Second Punic War 

(218–201 BC), the First World War (1914–18), the Second World 

War (1939–45), and the Cuban missile crisis (1962).

The Peloponnesian War was caused by a Corinthian passion 

for vengeance, Spartan jealousy and fear, and the Athenian 

miscalculations that failed to account for this passion and fear. 

The Peloponnesian War was a failure of deterrence measures 

by all parties, which were either too weak or too strong or failed 

to account for irrational thought.60 The Second Punic War was 

a war of revenge by the Carthaginians, primarily in response 

to the harsh peace imposed on them by the Romans after the 

First Punic War. The Carthaginians resented this treatment, 

and the Romans did nothing to prevent or deter Carthage from 

becoming too powerful and threatening Roman interests.61

The primary cause for the First World War was the confluence 

of Germany’s clear and aggressive aspirations toward “world 

power” and “a place in the sun” and a failure in deterrence evidenced by the United Kingdom’s (UK) refusal to adjust its strategic military capacity.62 Similar to the Second Punic War, the 

Second World War was made possible by a failure of the victors 

to build a strong basis for peace after the First World War. The 

Allies built a weak League of Nations, the primary mechanism 

for maintaining peace after the First World War, and then failed 

to give it the national support it needed. Once again, there was 

a confluence of an aggressive Germany, which remained largely 
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

32

intact and grew bitter after the First World War, and a failure 

in deterrence evidenced by the UK’s misunderstanding of the 

causes of the First World War, its naive belief that sin and evil 

could be overcome by setting a good example, and its emphasis 

on understanding and patience over military deterrence.63

The Cuban missile crisis happened because Soviet premier 

Nikita Khrushchev was convinced that US president John F. 

Kennedy “lacked the will to use American military superiority when challenged.”64 Even though Khrushchev believed that 

the US military was superior to that of the Soviet Union, he 

persisted in the provocative buildup of nuclear arms in Cuba 

because Kennedy’s previous failure to respond more decisively 

to the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin Wall, and the flow of Soviet armaments to Cuba created a failure in deterrence.65

In short, Kagan concludes that the most fundamental cause 

of war is the competition for power that is driven by people’s 

wildly subjective sense of “honor, fear, and interest.”66 Deterrence can counter the competition for power, but “to be effective [deterrence] must counterbalance passion with passion, 

fear with fear.”67 Peace, Kagan concludes, does not keep itself. 

Nations must take affirmative action to create the right deterrence to war. States must take responsibility and bear the burdens needed to keep the peace, and they must be prepared to 

defend the peace.68

One important component of deterrence is an enforced international legal order. In an earlier analysis of effective deterrence, I concluded that if the international community does 

“not actively seek to deter aggression and violations of the laws 

of armed conflict, or if we fail to condemn aggression and prosecute war crimes, then we merely invite future wars and war 

crimes.”69 Furthermore, “simply having a normative international legal order . . . is insufficient to deter violations of those 

norms. The existence of proscriptive norms that are not enforced actually undermines the value of the entire legal system.”70 Effective deterrence within the international legal order 

is comprised of three indispensable elements:

First, the fundamental cornerstone of deterrence is a set of clear proscriptive norms. . . . Second, these proscriptive norms must be built 

upon by an established mechanism that facilitates individual and state 

accountability for violations of those norms. . . . Third, the world com-
33

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

munity’s demonstrated commitment to condemn all violations of these 

proscriptive norms consistently and unequivocally is the capstone that 

completes this deterrence structure. Without this capstone, proscriptive norms and organizations are without effect—that is, “unenforced 

law is ineffective.”71

In addition to a legal order, there are a number of other tools 

for effective deterrence, which Moore defines as “the totality of 

positive and negative actions influencing expectations and incentives of a potential aggressor”:

[They include] potential military responses and security arrangements, 

relative power, level and importance of economic relations, effectiveness 

of diplomatic relations, effective international organizations (or lack 

thereof), effective international law (or lack thereof), alliances, collective 

security, effects on allies, and the state of the political or military alliance structure, if any, of the potential aggressor and target state, etc. 

Most importantly, of course, there is a critical perception and communication component to deterrence since ultimately, it is the perception 

of the regime elite contemplating aggression that is most critical.72

Moore identifies effective military deterrence as “perhaps the 

most important single feature” of a comprehensive deterrence 

plan and identifies four key elements of military deterrence:

1. The ability to respond

2. The will to respond

3. Effective communication of ability and will to the aggressive regime

4. Perception by the aggressive regime of deterrence ability 

and will73

The fundamental importance of a potential aggressor’s perception cannot be overstated. Robert F. Turner, an expert in national 

security law, defines deterrence as a “function of two perceptions: strength and will.”74 The US Department of Defense (DOD) 

defines deterrence as a “state of mind,”75 and the US National 

Military Strategy states that deterrence “rests on a potential adversary’s perception of our capabilities and commitment.”76 In 

other words, military deterrence is based on negative incentives, 

or, as the DOD defines it, “the prevention from action by fear of 

the consequences . . . brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.”77
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

34

However, US military deterrence theory defines both negative 

and positive deterrent options, that is, options that discourage 

undesirable behavior and encourage desirable behavior. A deterrent option is “a course of action, developed on the best economic, diplomatic, political, and military judgment, designed 

to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or 

contemplated operations. (In constructing an operation plan, 

a range of options should be presented to effect deterrence. 

Each option requiring deployment of forces should be a separate force module.)”78

In a 1998 study, I proposed ways to strengthen systemwide 

deterrence to war. The study recognizes that international law 

prohibits an aggressive use of force against other states and 

imposes individual criminal responsibility on regime elites for 

waging aggressive war. However, it identifies a lacuna in international law that permits the combatants of an aggressor state 

to “kill in furtherance of an unlawful use of force . . . [with] absolute and complete immunity so long as they kill enemy combatants [UN military forces] in accordance with the jus in bello, 

i.e., the laws of armed conflict that govern the actual conduct 

of hostilities.”79 The study concludes that systemwide deterrence can and should be strengthened by imposing individual 

criminal responsibility on all combatants who engage in armed 

conflict against military forces serving under the authority of 

the UN.80 Regardless of whether one agrees with this specific 

recommendation, the underlying assumption is absolutely critical in shaping an effective deterrence strategy: to be effective, 

deterrence must be tailored to the individual circumstances 

and must focus on all individuals who make major international conflict possible.

Focusing deterrence and incentives on individuals, however, 

is not a new concept. Kant scholar Lewis Beck describes Kant’s 

argument in Perpetual Peace (1795): the first steps toward peace 

must be “taken by imperfect, warlike, perhaps despotic, rulers 

of states whose chief glory is self-aggrandizement,” and they 

“must be convinced that war is fatal to them.”81 As discussed 

earlier, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton also emphasized the 

role of personal ambition in war, thus underscoring the importance of focusing deterrence on individuals. Jay believed that 

absolute monarchs often make war “for purposes and objects 
35

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

merely personal,”82 while Hamilton believed that many leaders 

would not hesitate to “sacrifice the national tranquility” to secure personal gain.83

Contemporary discussions also emphasize the deterrence tool 

of holding individual leaders accountable for misdeeds in war. 

Edward Luttwak argues that when “belligerents see that no particular penalty is paid for opening fire first or using any and all 

means of warfare—even the wholesale destruction of cities by 

aerial or artillery bombardment—self-imposed restraints on the 

use of force are everywhere eroded.”84 Similarly, an Economist 

editorial on the extradition of former Chilean dictator Augusto 

Pinochet argues that “the ease with which dictators have escaped 

any consequences for their crimes has encouraged more to seize 

power and to commit further barbarities.”85 A detailed analysis 

of over 275 pages from contemporary studies and documents on 

deterrence theory and a thorough study of Moore’s and Kagan’s 

conclusions concerning deterrence demands a conclusion of 

great significance: to maintain international peace and security, 

states have the responsibility to take affirmative action to create 

and then clearly and effectively communicate positive and negative, institutional and scenario-specific deterrence incentives 

that target and personally affect potentially aggressive regime 

elites. Most importantly, states must clearly and effectively communicate to potentially aggressive regime elites the consistent 

and demonstrated capability and willingness of other states to 

respond to unlawful aggression with negative incentives such as 

military force and criminal prosecution.86

The Law of Conflict Management

War has been embraced as a legitimate form of violence 

throughout human history, at least until the very late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the first juristic restrictions on the right of states to resort to war evolved.87 Until 

the late nineteenth century, war was judged by many as just or 

unjust on a moral plane. Others, called realists, believed that 

war was beyond law and morality—war was simply self-interest, 

necessity, and survival. Realists believed that inter arma silent 

leges—in time of war the law is silent.88 In practice, the theory 
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

36

of just war offered no war-preventing effects because either 

side could argue its use of force was just.89

For adherents of a just war theory, the morality of war was judged 

first with reference to why states fought and second with reference 

to the means states adopted to fight the war. Medieval writers described these judgments as jus ad bellum, an analysis of whether a 

war itself is just or unjust, and jus in bello, an analysis of whether 

how a war is fought is just or unjust. Any conflict was evaluated 

on both planes; that is, a just war of self-defense could be fought 

unjustly, and an unjust war of aggression could be fought justly.90

All soldiers are morally equal, and within the limitations of jus in 

bello, they all have the right to kill other soldiers even if they are the 

soldiers of an aggressor clearly engaged in an unjust war.91 This 

dichotomy in the just war theory—that all soldiers in a conflict are 

morally equal under jus in bello even if the soldiers of one or more 

states are engaged in illegal warfare under jus ad bellum—is the 

“most problematic in the moral reality of war.”92 This dichotomy 

is problematic because it creates a disconnect between the lawfulness of the initiation of war and the conduct of war. For example, a 

belligerent who has initiated an illegal war may nevertheless lawfully kill hundreds of thousands of soldiers during the conduct of 

that war.

Although morality remains important in discussions of war, 

it is now safe to declare that the theory of just war on a moral

plane is dead. War can no longer be justified within the international community as morally just and thus permissible. A 

state’s right to resort to war is now defined by contemporary 

jus ad bellum on a legal plane. The decline of seeking a moral 

justification for war and the reliance upon a legal basis for the 

use of force began in the late 1800s.

A series of efforts began with the Hague Peace Conferences of 

1899 and 1907 to create juristic restrictions on a state’s right 

to resort to war. Article 1 of the Hague Convention III of 1907 

on the Opening of Hostilities required parties to provide a prior 

and unambiguous warning before resorting to war; however, 

this is simply a formalization of a state’s right to resort to war. 

In contrast, Article 1 of the Hague Convention II of 1907 on 

the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of 

Contract Debts prohibits the recourse to war for the recovery 

of a contractual debt.93 From 1913 to 1916, the United States 
37

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

entered into 19 bilateral treaties that required the parties to 

refer their disputes to a conciliation commission and not to begin hostilities prior to that commission’s report. Similarly, after 

World War I, parties of the Covenant of the League of Nations 

were prohibited from resorting to war until after they submitted a dispute to judicial settlement, arbitration, or the Council 

of the League of Nations. Parties were also required to wait 

for a three-month “cooling-off period” after an arbitral award 

or council’s report and were prohibited from resorting to war 

against states complying with the arbitral award or council’s 

report. Article 2 of the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1924) obligated states “in no 

case to resort to war” except in the case of self-defense or collective enforcement measures, but this protocol never became 

binding law. A number of European states also generally prohibited any attack, invasion, or war in Article 2 of the Locarno 

Treaty of 1925, but that treaty also had exceptions and lost its 

binding force in 1935.94

The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was the decisive turning 

point in the development of juristic restrictions on the resort to 

war. Almost all states in existence then became a party to this 

pact that prohibited war except in the case of self-defense. A 

number of Latin American states did not joint the pact, but they 

signed the Saavedra Lamas Treaty of 1933 that contained an 

identical restriction on the resort to war. The provisions of the 

Kellogg-Briand Pact quickly became customary international 

law and remain valid today. However, the provisions were not 

linked to a system of sanctions and did not prohibit the use of 

force, just the resort to war.95

Contemporary jus ad bellum is now codified in Articles 2(4), 

39, and 51 of the UN Charter.96 Indeed, contemporary jus ad 

bellum is now a concept of jus contra bellum, that is, the law 

against the aggressive use of force.97 Elsewhere I have interpreted the restrictions in the UN Charter on the use of force:

The Charter clearly outlaws the aggressive use of force while recognizing 

a state’s inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in Article 

51 and the Security Council’s obligation under Article 39 to maintain 

or restore international peace and security. If a state uses force against 

another state within the meaning of Article 2(4), it is unlawful unless 

it is an exercise of that state’s inherent right of self-defense or unless 
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

38

it is authorized by the Security Council under its coercive Chapter VII 

authority.

Articles 2(4), 39, and 51 must be read together to determine the scope 

and content of the Charter’s prohibition on the aggressive use of force, 

the responsibility of the Security Council to enforce this prohibition, 

and the right of all states to use force in self-defense. . . .

As an exercise of the international community’s inherent right of collective self-defense, Article 39 of the Charter imposes an obligation on the 

Security Council to maintain international peace and security.98

Articles 2(4) and 51 are customary international law and binding on all states,99 and decisions made by the Security Council 

under Article 39 are binding on all member states.100 Despite 

the watershed importance of the UN Charter for war avoidance, 

there have been significant problems in interpreting the charter’s provisions, for example, in determining what is a “threat 

or use of force,” what is the “territorial integrity or political independence” of a state, and what is an “armed attack.”101

The Future of Armed Conflict

If the last four millennia have any predictive value, then war 

and armed conflict will certainly plague humankind for many 

centuries to come. While Keegan has expressed hope that war 

“may well be ceasing to commend itself to human beings,”102

Richard Preston and Sydney Wise speak for many historians 

when they conclude that it “is certain that military force will continue to play a role in the world of the future.”103 Ralph Peters 

predicts there “will be fewer classic wars but more violence” that 

will be “shaped by the inabilities of governments to function as 

effective systems or resource distribution and control, and by the 

failure of entire cultures to compete in the post-modern age.”104

Some political scientists predict that the multipolar world in a 

high-technology twenty-first century of ethnic and militant nationalism could be far more dangerous than the bipolar world of 

the Cold War during the twentieth century.105

Future conflict, at least in the coming decades if not centuries, is a certainty, but we can only speculate about how 

or why future conflict may manifest itself or what dynamics 

could make long-time allies become enemies and traditional 
39

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

enemies become allies. Conflict in the twenty-first century will 

be more diverse and less predictable, and the range of potential 

adversaries will likely be larger than during the Cold War. Alliances may shift or crumble as the leadership of governments 

changes.106 Ideological differences and latent economic or geopolitical cleavages may give rise to new enemies, and changes 

in the economy, communications, and military technology may 

alter the balance of power.107 Conflicts could erupt if the EU 

were to fragment, the Russian economy collapse, the Middle 

East fall into anarchy, or the United States withdraw from the 

world stage.108 In 1998, Europe had seven of the world’s 10 

largest economies; by 2020, China may have the world’s largest economy, and Europe may only have two of the 10 largest 

economies.109 Such an extraordinary shift in China’s relative 

economic power could threaten its Asian neighbors, a weakened 

Russian state, or the European community enough to cause a 

major conflict in the twenty-first century. There are also environmental, politico-cultural, and techno-scientific “wild cards”: 

those unforeseen events that could cause instability and conflict. Historical wild cards have included the devastation of Europe by the Black Death, the storm that crippled the Spanish 

Armada, Hitler’s rise to power, the Russian revolution of 1917, 

and the discovery of atomic energy. Potential wild cards could 

include a highly lethal airborne virus that kills millions, rising 

global temperatures that cause massive crop failure, a global 

economic depression, revolutionary collapse of a world power, 

a new cold war along cultural or religious lines, or new sensor 

technology that renders the oceans transparent.110

Predictive analyses are truly insightful and fascinating to 

read because they posit trends in economic, social, political, 

military, and technological evolution, but they nevertheless 

represent conventional thinking on the cause of war and do 

not demonstrate any meaningful correlation with the occurrence or nonoccurrence of war. For example, the prediction that 

the Asia-Pacific region will become the new strategic center of 

gravity in international politics and the single largest concentration of international economic power outside of Europe or the 

Americas since the beginning of modernity (circa 1500) is very 

interesting and quite likely true; however, while analysts admit 

the implications of this development are “poorly understood,” 
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

40

they still conclude that this economic power yields a “capacity 

to generate conflict.”111 Although not relevant as a tool to predict the occurrence of future war, these predictive analyses are 

important because they do help suggest the nature of future 

conflict and the environment in which it may occur.

The nature of conflict in the twenty-first century is evolving 

and may include local conflicts “dominated by ethnic warfare 

and humanitarian crises arising from domestic anarchy.”112 A 

central focus of future conflict may also be along the fault lines 

between civilizations as between the West and Islam or between 

the economic haves and have-nots. The nature of warfare may 

shift from that of major armies to informal nonstate groups of 

police forces, criminal organizations, gangs, and terrorists; that 

is, there may be a shift in twenty-first-century conflict from 

the international to the civil and intranational and a shift from 

open warfare by states to terrorism and aggression from nonstate forces.113 Advances in technology mean that major standing armies and huge national budgets are no longer necessary 

to possess destructive weapons of holocaust dimensions. However, it is difficult to predict what additional conflicts or escalation of conflicts may unintentionally be sparked by the UN 

taking action intended to maintain international peace and security, by a state taking unilateral action intended to protect its 

national security interests, or by the UN or a state responding 

poorly to an unanticipated crisis.

Notes

1. McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 97–98.

2. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 115.

3. Ibid., 386.

4. Kagan, On the Origins of War, 4.

5. McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 44. See 

also Rostow, Toward Managed Peace, 41.

6. Hanzhang, Sun Tzu’s “Art of War,” 82–83.

7. Frederick II, Frederick the Great on the Art of War, 35.

8. Clausewitz, On War, 119.

9. Ibid., 13, 202, 402.

10. Montross, War through the Ages, 584.

11. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 3.

12. Kant, Perpetual Peace, vii–xvi, 10.

13. Ibid., viii.
41

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

14. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “war,” http://www.britannica

.com/eb/article-9110187.

15. Ibid.

16. Montross, War through the Ages, xiii, 9, 977.

17. Rostow, Toward Managed Peace, 25.

18. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 59.

19. Ibid., 386–92.

20. Ibid., 46.

21. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, Federalist Papers No. 4, 46.

22. Ibid., Federalist Papers No. 6, 54.

23. Ibid., 60.

24. Montross, War through the Ages, 1000.

25. UNESCO, Constitution, in Manual of the General Conference, 7.

26. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “war,” http://www.britannica.com/

eb/article-9110187.

27. Ibid.

28. Freud to Einstein, letter.

29. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “war,” http://www.britannica.com/

eb/article-9110187.

30. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 79–82.

31. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “war,” http://www.britannica.com/

eb/article-9110187.

32. Ibid.

33. Moore, “International Law of Conflict Management,” National Security 

Law, 49–50.

34. Wright, A Study of War, 1284.

35. Ibid.

36. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 11.

37. Moore, seminar, 22 January 1997.

38. UNESCO, Constitution, in Manual of the General Conference, 7.

39. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 14.

40. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “war,” http://www.britannica.com/

eb/article-9110187.

41. Claude, “Theoretical Approaches,” National Security Law, 31–45.

42. Ibid., 40.

43. Ibid., 42–43.

44. Ibid., 43–44.

45. Higgins, “Institutional Modes,” National Security Law, 193–305. 

46. Ibid., 193.

47. Ibid., 193–94.

48. Ibid., 269–81.

49. Sharp, Jus Paciarii, 280. See also the discussion later in the chapter 

of the international law embodied in the UN Charter that outlaws the use of 

aggressive force by states.

50. Ibid., 280–82, 290–93.

51. Ibid., 2.
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

42

52. The historical evolution of these nine principles and practices is summarized in Moore, “International Law of Conflict Management,” National Security Law, 52.

53. Moore, “International Law of Conflict Management,” 77.

54. Ibid., 78.

55. Ibid., 80.

56. Ibid., 80–81.

57. Moore, seminars, 22 January and 26 February 1997.

58. Ibid.

59. Kagan, On the Origins of War, 6, 9, 68–74, 205–14, 269–74, 413–17, 

546–48, 566–73.

60. Ibid., 68–73.

61. Ibid., 269–74.

62. Ibid., 205–14.

63. Ibid., 413–17.

64. Ibid., 546–48.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., 6–9.

67. Ibid., 74.

68. Ibid., 73, 212–14, 567.

69. Sharp, “Effective Deterrence,” 1.

70. Ibid., 4.

71. Ibid., 1, 5. This passage quotes Robert F. Turner, “Don’t Let Saddam 

Escape without Trial,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 31 August 1991. Turner’s 

point is “the real lesson . . . was not that ‘law’ was ineffective, but rather that 

unenforced law is ineffective.”

72. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 841.

73. Ibid.

74. Turner, “Deception and Deterrence,” 23.

75. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 157.

76. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 3.

77. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 157.

78. Ibid., 158.

79. Sharp, “Revoking an Aggressor’s License to Kill,” 1, 3.

80. Ibid., 1, 77–79.

81. Beck, introduction to Perpetual Peace by Kant, xiii.

82. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, Federalist Papers, No. 4, 46.

83. Ibid., No. 6, 54.

84. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” 109.

85. “Ex-Dictators Are Not Immune.”

86. The following studies and documents were analyzed: Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence, 1–22; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 92–125; Huth 

and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work”; Lebow and Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory”; George and Smoke, “Deterrence and Foreign Policy”; Achen 

and Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory”; Jervis, “Rational Deterrence”; Downs, 

“Rational Deterrence Debate”; United States, France, United Kingdom, and 

USSR, The London Charter; UN, Affirmation of the Principles of International 
43

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

Law; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence; UN Security Council, resolution for a report on Rwanda; 

Parks, “Memorandum of Law”; Turner, “Killing Saddam”; Churchill, The Hinge 

of Fate, 682–91; O’Connor, Diplomacy for Victory, 48–56; UN, Charter, Articles 

4–6; Department of the Treasury, Haitian Transaction Regulations; and Executive Order 12872.

87. Sharp, CyberSpace, 27, 30–33. See also McDougal and Feliciano, Law 

and Minimum World Public Order, 44, and Rostow, Toward Managed Peace, 

41.

88. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3.

89. Simma, UN Charter Commentary, 109.

90. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 21.

91. Ibid., 34–47.

92. Ibid., 21. But see also Sharp, “Revoking an Aggressor’s License to Kill” 

and Jus Paciarii; these earlier works detect a shift in the duality of jus ad bellum and jus in bello and posit that emergent international law is “revoking” an 

aggressor’s right to lawfully kill military forces serving the UN.

93. Simma, UN Charter Commentary, 109.

94. Ibid., 109–10.

95. Ibid., 110–11.

96. Ibid., 111. For a more detailed discussion of contemporary jus ad bellum and an explanation of the threshold between the lawful and unlawful 

use of force in UN Charter article 2(4), see discussions in Sharp, Jus Paciarii, 

279–93, and Sharp, CyberSpace and the Use of Force, 27–69. Following are 

relevant excerpts from the UN Charter:

Article 2. The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes 

stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles: 

. . .

(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Article 39. The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 

threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 

make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 

peace and security.

Article 51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 

of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 

Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the 

measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall 

be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way 

affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 

present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 

order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

44

97. Kotzsch, Concept of War, 83, 269–96.

98. Sharp, Jus Paciarii, 280–81.

99. Simma, UN Charter Commentary, 126–27, 666–67.

100. UN Charter article 25; Simma, UN Charter Commentary, 407–18.

101. See, for example, the discussions of interpretive challenges in Moore, 

“Use of Force,” 85–192; Simma, UN Charter Commentary, 106–28, 605–16, 

661–78; Brownlie, International Law, 251–305, 338–423; Sharp, CyberSpace, 

27; and Sharp, Jus Paciarii.

102. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 59.

103. Preston and Wise, Men in Arms, 1.

104. Peters, “Culture of Future Conflict,” 19.

105. Bloomfield and Moulton, Managing International Conflict, 34–35.

106. Lesser, “Introduction,” Sources of Conflict, 1–2.

107. Ibid.

108. Khalilzad and Shlapak, “Future Security Environment,” Sources of 

Conflict, 8, 11.

109. Ibid., 12.

110. Ibid., 33–36.

111. Ibid., 43.

112. Bloomfield and Moulton, Managing International Conflict, 34.

113. Ibid., 34–37.
45

Chapter 3

The Democratic Peace Principle

Force [is] the vital principle and immediate parent of 

despotism.

 —Thomas Jefferson

—First Inaugural Address, 1801

The principle that nondemocracies are more prone to war 

and democracies are inherently more peaceful and protective of 

human liberty has been developed and debated for centuries. 

The philosophers and political theorists who stirred these contentious political debates, often at great personal sacrifice, not 

only established the intellectual foundation for the principle 

that democracies are inherently peaceful but also had a powerful influence on the creation of American liberal democracy. 

Today the democratic peace principle is widely, though not universally, accepted and can be supported with empirical data.

The Early Debate

In the late 1600s, British philosopher John Locke published 

his Two Treatises on Government, which examine the proper 

use of political authority and were intended to counter the enemies of reason and freedom.1 His first treatise is a refutation 

of the divine right of kings and an argument for the natural 

rights, freedom, and equality of all human beings.2 Locke argues in his second treatise that an absolute monarchy has no 

basis in the consent of the governed and absolutism is not a 

political society at all but mere violence. His second treatise 

contends that government is a result of the people themselves 

agreeing to be governed and the power of the ruler is conditional, based on the security of the common good. Locke concludes that sovereignty rests with the people, and government 

must protect the property and person of the individual, as well 

as the individual’s freedom of thought, speech, and religion. 

Locke also strongly favors a separation of powers between an 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

46

executive and a duly elected legislature. The English government declared Locke a traitor because of his liberal writings; 

however, his work had an enormous influence on the great political documents of the United States such as the Declaration 

of Independence and the Constitution.3

Locke also recognizes that governmental power is related to 

peace, and he observes the potential for the abuse of power: 

“The great Question which in all Ages has disturbed Mankind, 

and brought on them the greatest part of those Mischiefs which 

have ruined Cities, depopulated Countries, and disordered the 

Peace of the World, has been, not whether there be Power in 

the World, nor whence it came, but who should have it.”4 In his 

extended discussions of how governments should use law as a 

tool to protect the people from whom they derive their power, 

Locke observes that “where-ever Law ends, Tyranny begins.”5

While recognizing the inherently peaceful nature of a government whose only exercise of war power is in self-defense and 

the protection of the innocent, Locke’s monumental work stops 

short of drawing a direct correlation between peace and democratic forms of government.6

In the mid-1700s, Charles de Montesquieu, a French jurist and political philosopher, argued the connection between 

liberal capitalism, democracy, and peace in his Spirit of the 

Laws, a comparative study of three types of government: republic, monarchy, and despotism.7 Montesquieu’s main theory 

of government structure is that the functions of governmental 

power—legislative, executive, and judicial—should be separated and balanced by each other’s authority. The Spirit of the 

Laws is of great historical importance and significantly influenced the writing of the US Constitution.8

In the late 1700s, Englishman Thomas Paine “forcefully asserted” the incompatibility of democracy and war in his work 

The Rights of Man.

9 Written in response to Edmund Burke’s 

denunciation of the French Revolution, The Rights of Man was 

a powerful influence for freedom in American and British political thought, especially among those who opposed the power of 

the British monarchy. The Rights of Man was banned in England, and Paine was forced to flee England to escape his indictment and eventual conviction for libel. 
47

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

Paine laments “the wretched condition of man, under the 

monarchical and hereditary systems of Government” and argues that governments must be founded on the principle that 

“every citizen is a member of the Sovereignty, and, as such, can 

acknowledge no personal subjection; and his obedience can be 

only to the laws.” If sovereignty were restored to the nation and 

its citizens rather than a monarch, “the cause of wars would be 

taken away.” Paine contends that a republican government is 

a deterrent to war: 

Why are not Republics plunged into war, but because the nature of 

their Government does not admit of an interest distinct from that of 

the Nation? Even Holland, though an ill-constructed Republic, and 

with a commerce extending over the world, existed nearly a century 

without war: and the instant the form of Government was changed in 

France, the republican principles of peace and domestic prosperity and 

economy arose with the new Government; and the same consequences 

would follow the cause in other Nations.10

Kant’s 1795 essay Perpetual Peace is the “most often cited 

classical source of the idea that democracy is an important 

force for peace.”11 In Perpetual Peace, Kant formulates his plan 

for peace: six “preliminary articles” prescribe what states must 

do to have peace, and three “definitive articles” of political philosophy explain how the constitutions of states should be written and how a league of nations should be structured under international law if peace is to be lasting.12 Section 1 of Perpetual 

Peace contains the six preliminary articles, which, if followed, 

will secure a perpetual peace among states:

1. No treaty of peace shall be held valid in which there is 

tacitly reserved matter for a future war.

2. No independent states, large or small, shall come under 

the dominion of another state by inheritance, exchange, 

purchase, or donation.

3. Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall in time be totally 

abolished.

4. National debts shall not be contracted with a view to the 

external friction of states.

5. No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or 

government of another state.
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

48

6. No state shall, during war, permit such acts of hostility 

which would make mutual confidence in the subsequent 

peace impossible: such are the employment of assassins 

(percussores), poisoners (venefici), breach of capitulation, 

and incitement to treason (perduellio) in the opposing 

state.13

In his preface to the definitive articles in section 2, Kant 

argues that war, not peace, is the natural order of relations 

among neighbors:

The state of peace among men living side by side is not the natural state 

(status naturalis); the natural state is one of war. This does not always 

mean open hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war. A state of 

peace, therefore, must be established, for in order to be secured against 

hostility it is not sufficient that hostilities simply be not committed; 

and, unless this security is pledged to each by his neighbor (a thing that 

can occur only in a civil state), each may treat his neighbor, from whom 

he demands this security, as an enemy.14

To establish a state of peace, Kant offers the following prescriptions:

First Definitive Article: The civil constitution of every state 

should be republican.

Second Definitive Article: The law of nations shall be founded 

on a federation of free states.

Third Definitive Article: The law of world citizenship shall be 

limited to conditions of universal hospitality.15

Kant observes in his closing addendum, “Perpetual Peace as a 

Moral and Political Ideal,” that the “establishment of universal 

and enduring peace constitutes not just a part but rather the 

entire final end of jurisprudence within the limits of mere reason” and that the “best constitution is one in which laws, not 

men, are sovereign.”16

The powerful influence of Locke, Montesquieu, Paine, and 

Kant on the views of the US founding fathers can be seen in 

The Federalist Papers. For example, Hamilton observes in Federalist Paper No. 6, “The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; 

the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of 

men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have 

so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, 
49

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other.”17 However, in asking the question “have 

republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies?” Hamilton observes that even if peace is in the true interest of republics, practice has been to the contrary because 

“momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more 

active and imperious control over human conduct than general 

or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice.”18

Contemporary Studies and Methodologies

This absence of war between democracies comes as 

close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.

 —Jack Levy

—“The Causes of War”

The early debate surrounding the democratic peace principle in the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, Paine, and Kant 

was based upon intuition, philosophy, reason, and observation driven by a metaphysical desire to understand and champion human liberty and freedom. When Kant wrote Perpetual 

Peace in 1795, “there was no democracy on earth and none had 

ever existed,” yet he imagined this abstract notion of a peaceful union of liberal republics more clearly than anyone else.19

Now peace researchers have proven with “scientific analysis, in 

thousands of tables and tens of thousands of basic examples 

and testimonies” what liberals have intuitively “imagined or felt” 

for two centuries: democracies do not fight democracies.20

A wide range of empirical research was begun in the twentieth 

century utilizing large-scale statistical methods and comparative case studies to correlate political systems with the occurrence and nonoccurrence of war. Now it is almost universally 

accepted that democracies are more peaceful in many respects 

than nondemocracies. A large number of studies support this 

conclusion. This discussion will summarize only a few of the 

major studies to demonstrate the depth and variety of the research that has analyzed and validated the democratic peace 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

50

principle. Later in the chapter we will consider challenges to 

the democratic peace principle.

In 1989 political scientists Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali 

published the results of a comprehensive study of the correlations between regime type and conflict involvement.21 This 

study was intended to replicate previous research on the democratic peace principle and to analyze it by reformulating the test 

hypotheses and analyzing the previous research on a broader 

range of empirical data to assess the extent to which previous 

findings may be sensitive to differing research methodologies 

or to being limited to certain time periods and units of analysis.22 The study used “two datasets, each covering nearly all independent political entities and nearly all militarized interstate 

disputes (including all wars) among these entities during the 

1816–1976 period.”23

The democratic peace principle proposes that democracies 

are more peaceful and less likely to initiate wars than nondemocracies (a national-level analysis) and that democracies do not 

fight other democracies (a dyadic-level analysis that compares 

democracies in pairs).24 Maoz and Abdolali specifically analyze 

these two hypotheses and also add a hypothesis about the effect of democracies within the international system (a systemlevel analysis), which they believe is a logical extension of the 

first two: “If politically free states do not fight one another, then 

the more democracies, the less international conflict.”25 They 

analyzed wide-ranging statistical data relating to the democratic peace principle in the framework of the following three 

questions:

1. Are politically and economically free states less conflict prone 

than states that are not free? (national-level analysis)

2. Are politically and economically free states less likely to 

fight one another than those that are politically nonfree? 

Are politically free states less likely to initiate international conflicts in general than those that are nonfree? 

(dyadic-level analysis)

3. Does the level of conflict in the international system decline as the number of politically free states increases?26

(system-level analysis)
51

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

The authors conclude that previous findings on the correlation between regime type and conflict involvement are “mixed”; 

however, the results are mixed primarily when considering the 

first question (national-level analysis) in the above list. Previous 

research does not demonstrate that democracies are involved

in fewer conflicts than nonfree states.27 Indeed, research suggests that free states “are neither more conflict prone nor less 

conflict prone than nonfree polities.”28 However, governments 

constrained by democratic political and economic structures 

are less likely to initiate violent conflicts than nonfree states.29

Also, the proportion of disputes that democracies participate in 

“that escalate to war is significantly lower than that of nondemocratic polities.”30 Therefore, the authors’ conclusions are consistent with the democratic peace principle. Although the answer to the first question (are free states more conflict prone?) 

is mixed, their conclusions with respect to the other questions 

(are free states less likely to fight each other? are free states 

less likely to initiate violent conflicts? does the level of conflict 

decline as the number of free states decreases?) nevertheless 

strongly and explicitly support the democratic peace principle. 

With respect to the three questions addressed by their study, 

Maoz and Abdolali conclude:

1. There are no relations between regime type and conflict involvement measures when the unit of analysis is the individual polity (i.e., a state characterized by a certain regime 

type over a given time span); this finding is robust. . . .31

1. . . .The proportion of the disputes in which [democratic 

states] participate that escalate to war is significantly 

lower than that of nondemocratic polities. . . . Democracies 

tended to be less likely to get involved in ongoing disputes 

both on the initiator’s side . . . and on the target’s side.32

[emphasis added]

2. There is a significant relationship between the regime 

characteristics of a dyad and the probability of conflict 

involvement of that dyad: Democracies rarely clash with 

one another, and never fight one another in war.33 [emphasis added]
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

52

3. Both the proportion of democratic dyads and the proportion of autocratic dyads in the international system significantly affect the number of disputes begun and under 

way. But the proportion of democratic dyads in the system 

has a [significant] negative effect on the number of wars 

begun and on the proportion of disputes that escalate to 

war.34 [emphasis added]

Interestingly, Maoz and Abdolali also conclude that autocraticautocratic polity interaction has “a significant negative effect on 

the number of wars begun.”35 Nevertheless, autocratic polities 

are not inherently peaceful and are involved in more conflicts 

than democracies. This comprehensive study unequivocally 

supports the proposition that democracies are more peaceful, 

less likely to initiate wars, and do not fight democracies.

In 1994 historian Spencer R. Weart conducted a detailed 

comparative case study of virtually all significant military confrontations between republics throughout history.36 Weart concludes that a “striking lack of wars between well-established 

democracies prevailed not only among modern states but also 

among earlier regimes commonly described as democracies.”37

Weart defines military confrontations as “state-supported organized violence across political boundaries,”38 which is equivalent to the definition of war under modern international law: 

armed conflict between two or more governments or states.39

Weart notes that the key dimension of this definition is the 

level of violence. Some studies have set a cutoff of 1,000 battle 

deaths to eliminate insignificant skirmishes. Weart concludes, 

however, that a cutoff as low as 200 battle deaths is enough to 

exclude such limited clashes.40

A standard definition of democracy spanning human history is more difficult. Weart recognizes that democracies have 

taken various forms throughout history and have not always 

been inclusive, denying voting rights to immigrants, transient 

laborers, women, and other groups; however, generally, Weart 

defines a democracy as a republic in which the body of citizens 

has decision-making rights.41 In determining what governments should be included as a democracy in his comparative 

study of military confrontations, Weart was “generously inclusive” so that he could “severely test generalizations about wars 
53

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

between democracies.”42 He draws the following four conclusions from his study:

1. Well-established democracies have never made war on 

one another.

2. Well-established oligarchic republics have hardly ever 

made war on one another. (In an oligarchy, a small group 

of people or families rule. An oligarchic republic falls 

somewhere between democracies at one end of the continuum and totalitarian regimes at the other.43)

3. Oligarchic republics do war with democracies.

4. Peace prevails only between the same kinds of republics, 

oligarchies, or democracies as the case may be.44

Weart thus arrives at two of the same conclusions as Maoz and 

Abdolali. First, similar republican regime types generally do 

not war with one another; that is, regimes are generally more 

peaceful in their relations with other states when based upon 

the principle that sovereignty resides in the citizenry. Second, 

in order to predict behavior based upon regime type, the regime 

must be “well-defined” and not “weakly and ambiguously defined or . . . undergoing transition,”45 or, as Weart puts it, the 

regime must be “well-established.”46 Nevertheless, Weart concludes that it “is not some general concordance between two 

nations that makes for peace, but something directly related to 

the regime itself.”47 This “something,” Weart explains, is a wellestablished political culture:

We could thus define a “well-established” regime in the everyday sense: 

one that has existed long enough to demonstrate a stable, continuous 

character. . . .

. . . [But the] duration of the regime has no obvious direct connection 

with war-making; it is presumably a surrogate for something more fundamental. . . . 

A well-established republic . . . is a regime where the political culture 

of the leaders . . . is such that they eschew lawless coercion of their 

fellow citizens, consistently tolerating dissent and negotiating compromises.48
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

54

Weart thus concludes that a noncoercive domestic political 

culture must be well-established in a republic before it can be 

predicted that such a regime is peaceful.49 A well-established 

political culture results in national political leaders acting “toward their foreign counterparts in the same way they act towards rival domestic political leaders.”50 It is not enough for a 

regime to have constitutional mechanisms and other democratic 

characteristics if those features are overshadowed by coercion 

and domination by force. Weart observes the universal validity 

throughout history of the principle that “republics and only republics have tended to form durable, peaceful leagues.”51

Bruce Russett, in one of the preeminent treatises on the democratic peace principle, observes that during Kant’s lifetime the 

concept of a world of democratic, peaceful nations was simply a 

hope or theory without empirical basis; the “strong norm that 

democracies should not fight each other seems to have developed only toward the end of the nineteenth century.”52 However, the empirical fact that democracies have rarely, if ever, 

gone to war with each other went largely unnoticed during most 

of the twentieth century because democracies were a substantial minority in the world and geographically dispersed. As the 

number of democracies increased in the international community, the empirical fact that peace prevails among democracies 

became harder to ignore by the 1970s and widely accepted by 

the end of the 1980s. Russett warns, however, that wide acceptance is not synonymous with universal acceptance, and 

the concept of peace among democracies has become confused 

with the claim that democracies are in general more peaceful in 

their interactions with all kinds of states.53

Russett defines war as “large-scale institutionally organized 

lethal violence” between sovereign states that crosses the commonly accepted threshold of 1,000 battle fatalities (an arbitrary but reasonable figure).54 A modern democracy is “usually 

identified with a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of 

citizens, a government brought to power in contested elections, 

and an executive either popularly elected or responsible to an 

elected legislature, often also with requirements for civil liberties such as free speech.”55 However, Russett cautions that a 

“simple dichotomy between democracy and autocracy of course 

hides” mixed systems that share features of both, and he re-
55

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

minds us that democracy did not mean the same to the ancient 

Greeks as it does to people in the twenty-first century. He notes 

that even in the nineteenth century, the United States, which 

was considered democratic by virtually any standard of the 

day, deprived women of the right to vote and disenfranchised 

blacks.56

To identify which states are democratic, Russett’s study 

evaluates the degree to which a state meets the evolving definitions of democracy and considers the “minimal stability or 

longevity” of the political system.57 In applying these criteria 

to approximately 71 interstate wars involving a total of nearly 

270 participants since 1815, he concludes that it is “impossible to identify unambiguously any wars between democratic 

states.”58 He also observes that most of the “doubtful cases 

arise within a single year of the establishment of democratic 

government.”59 Notwithstanding differing definitions of war 

and democracy, Russett’s analysis establishes that the “phenomenon of war between democracies [is] impossible or almost 

impossible to find.”60

Russett establishes three main principles in his incisive political analysis:

First, democratically organized political systems in general operate under restraints that make them more peaceful in their relations with 

other democracies. Democracies are not necessarily peaceful, however, 

in their relations with other kinds of political systems. Second, in the 

modern international system, democracies are less likely to use lethal 

violence toward other democracies than toward autocratically governed 

states or than autocratically governed states are toward each other. 

Furthermore, there are no clearcut cases of sovereign stable democracies waging war with each other in the modern international system. 

Third, the relationship of relative peace among democracies is importantly a result of some features of democracy, rather than being caused 

exclusively by economic or geopolitical characteristics correlated with 

democracy.61 [emphasis added]

Russett’s conclusions are consistent with the others discussed in 

this chapter and clearly support the democratic peace principle.

The most comprehensive analysis of the peaceful nature of 

democracies is found in the body of research by Rudolph Rummel, a political scientist nominated for the 1996 Nobel Peace 

Prize. Rummel defines war as “any military action in which at 

least 1,000 are killed in battle.”62 Similar to Weart and Russett, 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

56

Rummel defines democracy to include regimes with “periodic, 

competitive elections,” so that the powerful can be removed 

from power and citizens have equal rights regardless of class 

or status.63 He uses the term democracy to mean specifically 

a liberal democracy “where those who hold power are elected 

in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise 

(loosely understood as including at least two-thirds of adult 

males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights.”64

However, Rummel explains that the definition of a democracy 

for previous centuries has been loosened by researchers to include those states such as the United States in the 1800s and 

democratic classical Athens that do not meet the contemporary 

definition of a liberal democracy.65

Rummel observes that most of the literature in the international community addresses only the “war version” of the democratic peace principle, that is, the “idea or fact that democracies 

do not (or virtually never) make war on each other.”66 Indeed his 

initial work also focused on the “war version”; however, in the 

1980s Rummel discovered that “several times more people were 

killed in democide (genocide and mass murder) by governments 

than died in war.”67 Subsequently, his work expanded to include 

the study of violence within states as well as intrastate violence. 

Rummel’s work now validates through theory, evidence, and 

analysis the “general version” of the democratic peace principle: 

“democracy is a general cure for political or collective violence of 

any kind—it is a method of nonviolence.”68

The entirety of Rummel’s research through 1996 is summarized and documented in his 1997 book Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence, a powerful justification of the 

democratic peace principle. His book demonstrates that the realists—those who say foreign and domestic violence is in our 

blood and has always been and will always be with us—are 

simply wrong about war, lesser international violence, civil collective violence, genocide, and mass murder.69 In rebutting the 

realists, Rummel concludes that “there is one solution to each 

[situation of violence] and the solution in each case is the same. 

It is to foster democratic freedom and to democratize coercive 

power and force. That is, mass killing and mass murder carried 
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THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

out by government is a result of indiscriminate, irresponsible 

Power at the center.”70 He goes on to say that “democracy is a 

practical solution to war and all other kinds of collective, that 

is, political regime, violence.”71

Rummel posits six propositions supporting his conclusion 

that democracy is a method of nonviolence:

1. Interdemocratic Peace Proposition: Democracies do not 

make war on and rarely commit lesser violence against 

each other.

2. Democracy/Dyadic Violence Proposition: The more democratic two regimes, the less severe their violence against 

each other.

3. Democracy/Foreign Violence Proposition: The more democratic a regime, the less its foreign violence.

4. Democracy/Internal Collective Violence Proposition: The 

more democratic a regime, the less severe its internal collective violence.

5. Democracy/Democide Proposition: The more democratic a 

regime, the less its democide.

6. Power Kills: Nondemocracy is an engine of violence.

Interdemocratic Peace Proposition

To support his first proposition that democracies do not 

make war (and rarely commit lesser kinds of violence) on other 

democracies, Rummel reviews all the major twentieth century 

studies on the democratic peace principle.72 A 1964 study by 

criminologist Dean Babst finds “that for 116 major wars of 438 

countries from 1789 to 1941, not one war involved democracies on opposite sides.”73 Babst also finds that of “the thirtythree independent nations involved in World War I, ten were 

democracies and none fought against each other,” and of “the 

fifty-two independent nations participating in World War II, 

fourteen democracies were on the same side and one, Finland, 

fought with Germany against the Soviet Union.”74 Babst concludes in his pioneering work that “this study suggests that 

the existence of independent nations with elective governments 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

58

greatly increases the chances for the maintenance of peace. 

What is important is the form of government, not national 

character. Many nations, such as England and France, fought 

wars against each other before they acquired freely elected governments, but have not done so since.”75

J. David Singer and Melvin Small examine the results of all 

50 interstate wars among sovereign states between 1816 and 

1965 for which there were at least 1,000 total battle dead by analyzing opposing pairs of nations (dyads). Singer and Small find 

“no wars between democracies, except for only two ‘marginal 

exceptions,’ which are an ephemeral republican France attacking an ephemeral republican Rome in 1849 and a rightwarddrifting Finnish democracy joining Germany to attack Russia 

(and thus technically putting it at war with the Allied Nations in 

1941).”76 Based on these and other studies, such as the work 

of Maoz and Abdolali, Weart, and Russett, Rummel concludes 

that the “findings on the Interdemocratic Peace Proposition are 

robust, they are solid, they no longer can be denied.”77

Democracy/Dyadic Violence Proposition

According to the second proposition, the more democratic two 

regimes are, the less severe their violence will be against each 

other.78 To test this proposition, Rummel places nations on a continuum according to three basic types of political regime: democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian. He observes that democracydemocracy pairs should tend to have no severe violence between 

them, democracy-authoritarian pairs should tend to have some 

severe violence, and so forth, with totalitarian-totalitarian pairs 

having the most severe violence. Rummel concludes that if his 

proposition is true, “just reforming regimes in the direction of 

greater civil rights and political liberties will promote less violence.”79

This proposition is an extension of the logic of the interdemocratic 

peace proposition but was not the subject of direct analysis until 

proposed by Rummel. 

To initially test his proposition, Rummel uses the Freedom 

House 1976–80 ratings on civil liberties and political rights for each 

nation. Based on this limited study, Rummel concludes “there is 

a clear tendency for the violence to increase as the degree of democracy within the dyad decreases.”80 Rummel also reviews the 
59

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

work of other major studies, but since they measure force by a 

frequency count of wars and not severity of violence or the number of battle dead, these studies do not demonstrate any reliable 

proof of the democracy/dyadic violence proposition, although they 

are generally supportive.81 Rummel, however, compiles data from 

these studies (1900–80) and adds two operational variables that 

permit him to test his hypothesis for six dyads.82 The first variable 

is the “democraticness” of a dyad, which is the sum of the ratings 

of each dyad member, with democratic regimes having a value of 

zero, authoritarian regimes a value of one, and totalitarian regimes 

a value of two. The second variable is the sum of the number killed 

in battle for each member. Table 4 presents Rummel’s results.

Table 4. Summary of Rummel’s data on the democracy/dyadic violence proposition

        Type of dyad Democraticness Battle deada Number of

regimesb

democracy-democracy 0 1,567,100d c

democracy-authoritarian 1 1,567,108d 66

democracy-totalitarian 2

1,940,796d 107d

authoritarian-authoritarian 2

authoritarian-totalitarian 3 1,664,220d 40

totalitarian-totalitarian 4 2,560,202d 11

Adapted from R. J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (New Brunswick, 

NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 58.

aTotal battle dead for all regimes of the given dyad type that fought each other in wars.

bTotal number of regimes analyzed for the given dyad.

cThere was no war between any democracies.

dThe data is combined for democracy-totalitarian and authoritarian-authoritarian dyads because 

they have the same democraticness factor.

Rummel concludes that his analyses, including the data presented in table 4, “well support” the democracy/dyadic violence 

proposition, and he observes that the absence of war within the 

democratic-democratic dyad also supports the interdemocratic 

peace proposition, which “has been established as a fact of international relations.”83

Democracy/Foreign Violence Proposition

Rummel contends that the more democratic a regime, the 

less foreign violence it engages in, thus contradicting the belief 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

60

among many experts that democracies are neither more nor 

less likely to make war or commit violence than other types of 

regimes.84 According to Rummel, a careful reading of the relevant studies shows that this belief “does not well reflect the 

evidence” and instead reveals “that democracies are in fact the 

most pacific of regimes.”85 The fallacy of these studies is that 

they use the frequency of a democracy’s involvement in war as 

an indicator of its propensity to engage in war. If the crucial 

variable is shifted to emphasize the severity of violence, then 

it can be empirically proved that democracies are less violent 

than nondemocracies.86

Democracy/Internal Collective Violence Proposition

Rummel shifts his analysis from foreign violence to internal 

collective violence in support of the proposition that the more 

democratic a regime, the less severe its collective internal violence.87 Rummel is the first to correlate the form of government 

with the level of internal collective violence between a political regime and some opposing armed group.88 Rummel analyzes 18 directly relevant quantitative studies—all conducted 

for purposes other than analysis of the democratic peace principle—that correlate or cross-tabulate measures of democracy 

with domestic violence. Of these, five studies strongly support 

the principle that democracy sharply reduces the severity of 

domestic collective violence, genocide, and mass murder by 

governments; 12 are supportive; and only one is negative, but 

not strongly so.89

Rummel also collects data on all incidents of internal conflict and violence for all nations from 1976 to 1980. Using the 

Freedom House ratings of civil liberties and political rights, he 

finds that the more democratic a regime, the lower its peak level 

of internal violence; Rummel calls his finding “robust and noncontroversial.”90 Rummel considers this principle an “even more 

important fact” about democracy and violence than the principle 

that democracies reduce interstate violence and concludes that 

“democracy is inversely related to the intensity of collective internal violence, such as revolutions, bloody coups d’etats, political assassinations, antigovernment terrorist bombings, guerrilla 

warfare, insurgencies, civil wars, mutinies, and rebellions.”91
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THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

Democracy/Democide Proposition

Rummel continues his analysis of internal violence in his discussion of the democracy/democide proposition.92 In contrast to the 

collective violence proposition, which addresses conflict between 

the government and armed groups, the democracy/democide proposition asserts that the more democratic a government, the less it 

commits democide, defined as genocide and mass murder by a regime.93 After collecting data from a wide range of sources, Rummel 

conservatively estimates that governments murdered over 169 million people from 1900 to 1987. Higher estimates for specific regimes 

could push this figure up to nearly 341 million.94 The statistics are 

overwhelming: “fifteen megamurderers alone have murdered over 

151,000,000 people, almost four times the almost 38,500,000 war 

dead for all this century’s international and civil wars up to 1987.”95

Eight of the most totalitarian of these regimes account for nearly 

128 million murders or 84 percent of the democide in the twentieth 

century.96 Table 5 summarizes Rummel’s data.

Regimes Years Total democide

Megamurderers: 1900–87 151,491,000

    USSR 1917–87 161,911,000

    China (People’s Republic) 1949–87 135,236,000

    Germany 1933–45 120,946,000

    China (Kuomintang) 1928–49 110,075,000

    Japan 1936–45 115,964,000

    China (Mao Soviets) 1923–49 113,466,000

    Cambodia 1975–79 112,035,000

    Turkey 1909–18 111,883,000

    Vietnam 1945–87 111,670,000

    North Korea 1948–87 111,663,000

    Poland 1945–48 111,585,000

    Pakistan 1958–87 111,503,000

    Mexico 1900–20 111,417,000

    Yugoslavia (Tito) 1944–87 111,072,000

    Russia 1900–17 111,066,000

Lesser murderers 1900–87 117,707,000

                            World total 1900–87 169,199,000

Table 5. Summary of Rummel’s data on the democracy/democide proposition

Adapted from R. J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (New Brunswick, 

NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997).
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

62

After studying over 200 regimes guilty of democide during the 

period 1900–87, Rummel concludes:

The more totalitarian and less democratic a regime, the more its democide. A political regime’s domestic democide in general and its 

genocide in particular can be predicted to the degree that Power is 

indiscriminate and irresponsible. Power is the means through which 

a regime can accomplish its goals or whims. When a regime’s power 

is magnified through its forceful intervention in all aspects of society, 

including its control over religion, the economy, and even the family, 

then when conjoined with an absolutist ideology or religion, mass killing may appear to its rulers a practical and justified means of achieving their ends. . . . On the other hand, democratic elites generally lack 

the power to, and democratic culture anyway opposes, the outright 

extermination of people or social groups for whatever reason.97

Rummel also concludes that a nation’s social diversity; ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic, or national divisions; the relative size of its minorities; cultural nature; and level of education or economic development are uncorrelated with and do 

not predict foreign or domestic democide.98 The simple bottom 

line is that the “degree of a regime’s power along a democratic 

to totalitarian scale is a direct underlying structural cause of 

domestic democide, including genocide.”99

Power Kills

Rummel’s first five propositions support his final one: power 

kills; that is, nondemocracy is an engine of violence.100 His 

sixth proposition can be viewed as the deductive conclusion 

of the previous five. Rummel describes how behaviors between 

individuals and groups in a democratic regime “act to check 

and balance, to cross-cut and cross-pressure . . . and thus to 

severely limit the intensity of collective violence, and its spread 

across society.”101 In contrast, authoritarian and totalitarian 

regimes use violence to insure obedience and rule “by raw coercion and force; pervasive fear assures obedience.”102 Rummel presents overwhelming evidence in support of the principle 

that democracy is a method of nonviolence and concludes his 

book simply and eloquently with two words: “Power kills.”103

Rummel’s democratic peace clock reflects the world’s movement toward universal peace. As democracy spreads, we come 

closer to eliminating war, collective violence, and democide. A 1 
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THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

percent increase in the population living under democratic governance advances the clock 58.2 seconds. It was midnight, the 

darkest time of night, in the year 1900, when 0 percent of the 

world population lived under democratic governance. In 1950, 

when 31 percent of the world’s population was under democratic governance, it was 3:43 a.m. In 2000, 58.2 percent of 

the world’s population was under democratic governance, and 

the peace clock said 6:59 a.m. In 2006, Rummel advanced the 

clock to 8:15 a.m.—less than four hours to high noon, “when 

the sun shines full on the world, and when the entire world will 

be democratic, and therefore, the world will be at peace.”104

Explanations for the

Democratic Peace Principle

Democracy and free markets work, and the world 

knows it. And there is no finer example of this than 

America and her allies, who together comprise the 

strongest economies in the world, helping to reshape 

the entire world by [being] willing to trade openly and 

encourage others to do likewise. And there should be 

no question in any world leader’s mind that the first 

and most essential ingredient for success in this 21st 

century is a free people and a government that derives 

its right to govern from the consent of such people.

 —Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

—Senate Confirmation Hearing

—17 January 2001

Contemporary studies have demonstrated that democracies 

are inherently more peaceful than nondemocracies, which raises 

the question of why democracies are less prone to violence. Kant 

concludes in Perpetual Peace that the natural state of people 

living side by side is one of war and peace must therefore be 

established. A republican constitution can result in peace because the consent of the citizens is required to declare war.105

Doyle observes that mutual respect among constitutionally secure liberal democracies that yields cooperative foundations for 

relations is one of the reasons why democracies do not go to war 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

64

with democracies, and heuristic evidence suggests a “significant 

predisposition against warfare between liberal states.”106

Maoz and Abdolali rely heavily on Rummel’s earlier works 

to provide theoretical underpinnings for their own study. They 

agree with Rummel that “the constraints imposed by political 

and economic structures on elites’ expectations and behavior 

implies that politically free states should be less likely to initiate violent conflicts than nonfree states.”107 Their rationale 

is that open economies restrain conflicts between nations because, as Rummel suggests, open economies “tend to encourage exchange, rather than coercive and violent solutions.”108

Maoz and Abdolali also extend this logic to conclude that “politically free states will not initiate low-level conflicts that have 

a high potential to escalate into large-scale conflagrations, and 

in general, are less likely to initiate high-hostility conflicts.”109

Weart observes that the democratic peace principle can be 

explained, in principle, by psychological, cultural, social, economic, or structural forces; however, he concludes that recent 

research casts doubt on most of these forces.110 He believes the 

research shows that the democratic peace principle holds true 

because of the “bedrock characteristics of democracy itself: the 

formal structural mechanisms such as voting, and the political 

culture.”111 Other scholars using statistical analysis have concluded that the “inhibition against warfare is related to either 

constitutional structures or political culture.”112 Similarly, Weart 

and those scholars who have conducted comparative historical 

case studies have also concluded that democracies do not fight 

each other because domestically they have a shared republican 

political culture that channels direct pressure from the public, 

as well as bureaucratic and constitutional structures and social 

and economic systems which inhibit initiating war.113

Former Swedish deputy prime minister Per Ahlmark also 

echoes Rummel and others in his 1999 speech to the European 

Parliament:

We must not deceive ourselves by suspecting that [the democratic peace 

principle] is a statistical error or just a lucky coincidence. Democratic 

leaders’ freedom of action is limited by their citizens’ resistance to bearing the burdens and accepting the deaths of war. Several of the leading scholars explain the peace between democracies by referring to the 

cross pressures in free societies (the checks and balances, and so on) or 
65

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

to their political culture (debates, demonstrations, negotiations, compromises, tolerance, etc.). In a democracy it is impossible, or at least 

extremely difficult, to get enough support from the people to initiate a 

military confrontation with another democracy. Such people know each 

other too well. They trust each other too much. For democratic governments it is usually too easy and natural to talk and negotiate with one 

another—it would look and feel ridiculous or totally irresponsible to 

start shooting at a nation which is governed in the same way as your 

own country.114

Political scientist Charles Lipson believes that the war version of the democratic peace principle (democracies do not fight 

wars with each other) is “one of the most powerful findings in 

international politics and one of the most thoroughly tested. 

. . . [It is] now one of the best-established regularities in international politics, perhaps the best-established.”115 In Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace, 

Lipson discusses three basic explanations advanced to date to 

explain the democratic peace principle:

1. Citizens’ reluctance to bear the costs of war.

2. Shared values among democracies.

3. Unique domestic institutions, which restrain elected leaders.

According to the cost explanation, “citizens of a republic are 

less war-prone because they must bear the burdens themselves 

and can vote to avoid them. Monarchs and dictators, by contrast, can shift the costs of war onto their subjects, who have 

no voice in the decision.” According to the normative explanation, “liberal democracies share certain basic values, grounded 

in their domestic political life. They settle disputes through 

neutral courts rather than through blunt force or status differences.” Lipson says that the “institutional explanation underscores the constraints facing democratic policymakers. They 

face constitutional limits, must share power with other elected 

leaders, and can remain in office only by winning periodic elections, openly contested.”116

Lipson, however, believes that these three explanations are 

incomplete because they focus on the individual properties of 

a democracy. Instead, Lipson argues, the “democratic peace is 

fundamentally an interactive phenomenon. It is not about why 

one democracy or another is peaceful. It is about why two de-
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

66

mocracies so seldom fight each other.”117 He explains the democratic peace principle by concluding that “because democracies 

have unique ‘contracting advantages,’ they can usually avert 

or settle conflicts with each other by reliable, forward-looking 

agreements that minimize the dead-weight costs of direct military engagement. To do that, states must be confident their 

partners will live up to their promises or, if they do not, that 

they can protect themselves from the risks.”118 These contracting advantages allow “democratic states to build stable, peaceful relations, based on multiple self-enforcing bargains.”119

Lipson’s explanation is very helpful in that it further refines 

the contractual freedom inherent in the interplay between two 

democratic nations, but it does not add an additional explanation or rationale for the democratic peace principle. It simply 

helps us understand the democratic peace principle better.

Rummel recognizes Kant’s explanation that the public will

restrains decision makers from making war as probably the 

oldest and most persuasive.120 He adopts it as the first of his 

three levels of explanation for the democratic peace principle:

• First-level explanation: the people’s will

• Second-level explanation: cross-pressures, exchange culture, and in-group perception

• Third-level explanation, part 1: social field and freedom

• Third-level explanation, part 2: antifield and power

As Rummel reminds us, the democratic peace principle 

does not simply represent a dichotomous relationship between 

peaceful democracies and violent nondemocracies. Rather, 

there is a continuum of political regimes with totalitarian regimes at the most violent extreme, democratic regimes at the 

most peaceful, and authoritarian regimes in the middle.121 An 

understanding of these three regime types and their respective 

power structures is central to understanding Rummel’s three 

levels of explanation for the democratic peace principle.

Rummel defines three basic power structures in societies: coercive, authoritative, and bargaining. These three power structures, or some mix of them, regulate social relations between a 

government and its people. Coercive societies are commanded 
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THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

at gunpoint by totalitarian regimes who “use . . . threats of pain, 

negative deprivation, or some other negative outcome to get 

what is wanted.”122 These regimes are usually military dictatorships.123 However, some totalitarian systems have some form of 

regular elections with universal franchise, but the elections offer no real competition for significant offices, so the ruling party 

gets over 95 percent of the vote. These sham elections are used 

to “periodically showcase and institutionally legitimize the leadership.”124 No law is “above the regime and that which is not permitted the citizen is forbidden.”125 The most egregious examples 

of twentieth-century totalitarian governments include those of 

Joseph Stalin (USSR), Mao Tse-tung (China), Pol Pot (Cambodia), Kim Il Sung (North Korea), and Enver Hoxha (Albania).126

In contrast, authoritative societies are “structured traditionally, according to customary rules and laws.” Coercion exists, 

especially over cultural and religious norms, but the regime 

is seen as “legitimate, with a right to rule.”127 An authoritarian regime rules according to traditions and customs, such as 

power passing to the king’s oldest son when the king dies.128

Most authoritarian regimes usually have “no political parties, 

no elections, and no legislatures with meaningful power.”129

Almost all major national societies were authoritarian two centuries ago, ruled by monarchies or dynasties.130 Examples of 

twentieth-century authoritarian governments include Nepal, 

Bhutan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.

Fascist regimes such as those of Juan Peron (Argentina), 

Francisco Franco (Spain), and Benito Mussolini (Italy) fall somewhere between totalitarian and authoritative forms of government on Rummel’s continuum, and Adolf Hitler’s form of fascism approaches a totalitarian form of government.131 Other 

regimes that fall somewhere between totalitarian and authoritative forms of governments on Rummel’s continuum include 

those of Idi Amin (Uganda), Augusto Pinochet (Chile), Muammar al-Qaddafi (Libya), and Park Chung Hee (South Korea).132

The bargaining power structure is a democracy where most 

relations between the regime and the society are based on exchange. Democracies are characterized by an economic free 

market as well as freedom of speech and the press, and people 

are free to oppose the regime and compete for power. Whereas 

totalitarian regimes are typically Communist and promise uto-
pia and authoritarian regimes are typically monarchial and 

try to preserve traditions, democracies are libertarian. They 

are oriented to the present and try to respond to contemporary national problems and public demands.133 Examples of 

twentieth-century democracies include Sweden, Switzerland, 

Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. Oligarchic republics fall between democracies at one end of the 

continuum and totalitarian regimes at the other.134

Rummel’s explanations for the democratic peace principle 

are rooted in the bargaining power structure that characterizes democracies. Rummel’s first-level explanation, based upon 

the people’s will, “has to do with the representative nature of 

democracies and the costs of violence.”135 In a society that embraces competitive and periodic elections, a wide franchise, a 

secret ballot, and freedom of speech, the popular will serves as 

a constraint that inhibits leaders’ decisions to pursue violence 

because it is the people who bear the cost of violence, and it 

is the “natural desire of people to avoid the loss of their property, their loved ones, and their own lives.”136 However, Rummel finds that this explanation is “not sufficiently general to explain why democracy should be a method of nonviolence,” nor 

does it explain why an oligarchic republic “should not make 

war on those of its own kind.”137

Rummel’s second-level explanation of cross-pressures, exchange culture, and in-group perception is based upon how 

democratic institutions and culture influence decision makers.138 Generally, “democracy creates a political culture in which 

opposing groups and representatives must constantly make 

compromises. . . . [Where] by virtue of their institutions democratic people must, to maintain democracy, negotiate and compromise rather than fight, this becomes part of the cultural heritage.”139 Democracy creates an environment in which “people 

come to naturally behave, perceive, and expect” negotiation and 

compromise rather than violence. This behavior affects both 

domestic and international interactions of democratic peoples, 

thus creating a more peaceful environment within and between 

democracies.140 According to Rummel, the second-level explanation also explains the lack of wars between oligarchic republics 

because their shared cultural and democratic norms create an 

expectation of reciprocal conciliatory behavior.141

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THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

There are many internal pressures and tensions that help 

keep democracies nonviolent. The social, economic, and political diversity of a democratic society, for example, acts to 

restrain and isolate violence. Other important factors in keeping democracies nonviolent include the public will speaking at 

election time, constraints such as institutional checks and balances within government, and the presence of special-interest 

groups that lobby for or against policies and laws. All of these 

domestic pressures are magnified when democratic states face 

each other in a possible dispute, and when these domestic pressures are combined with shared commercial and other societal 

exchange interests, they create powerful cultural, societal, and 

institutional expectations and pressures that push democratic 

governments toward a peaceful resolution.142

Rummel describes his third-level explanation as “the most 

encompassing and powerful explanation of why democracy is a 

method of nonviolence.”143 This two-part explanation contrasts 

how interactions among individuals in a free society create a 

peaceful social field (part 1) and interactions among individuals 

in an unfree society create violence-prone social antifields (part 

2). Part 1 of Rummel’s third-level explanation focuses on the 

importance of the individual in any explanation of democracy’s 

effect on violence:144

By social field I mean all the spontaneous social relations [of individuals] comprising a society (examples of societies are families, social and 

work groups, nations, international organizations, and international 

relations) and the underlying individual mentalities that gives [sic] them 

significance and importance. If we wish to be technical about this field 

we can conceive and indeed measure its dimensions in terms of the 

distinguishing psychological, cultural, and social characteristics of individuals in that society and the diverse behaviors they manifest.145

The concept of the social field shifts the focus away from direct 

cause-and-effect analysis of any single or multiple social, economic, or political characteristics. In analyzing a social field, 

the focus is instead on a “medium in which forces of some sort 

operate and [in] which forces continuously vary depending on 

the region of the field,” allowing an observer to understand violence by considering the totality of the variables and how the 

effect of the variables is greater than simply the sum of their 

respective effects.146
Rummel explains how interactions within the social field 

take place in a free society:

The [social] field is produced by individuals (including individuals acting in some authoritative capacity on behalf of groups) cooperating or 

conflicting according to their meanings, values, and norms. What gives 

specificity to these—and, thus, focus to the forces involved—is the perceptions, expectations, disposition, capabilities, interests, and wills of 

these individuals. The field is thus a gestalt of a spontaneous society, 

one in which people are largely free to act as they see fit or wish. . . .

. . . [Within] such an exchange society, that is a social field, individuals 

and groups freely learn about and adjust to each other’s interests, and 

expectations are developed that evolve and accrue to the society as a 

whole. . . . As a result the social field is criss-crossed and cross-cut by 

the natural product of individuals acting spontaneously. This is a great 

multitude of different corporations, partnerships, family businesses, 

churches, schools, unions, institutes, parties, leagues, clubs and other 

associations, institutions, and small groups. All are organized to satisfy 

or further the particular shared interests of individuals. . . . No one 

group wholly dominates this free society.147

The central conclusion of social field analysis is that the more 

freedom individuals have to pursue their own interests, the 

more peace and nonviolence will result.148 This is true for a 

social field within a single nation, between two nations, and 

within the international community and applies equally to oligarchic republics.149

However, the dynamics within a social field are never static 

because a complete equilibrium of power among individuals 

does not always exist. Rummel uses the term conflict helix to 

describe the process of individuals seeking an equilibrium by 

adjustment and learning to find a simultaneous solution to 

their differing interests: “behavior between two people, groups, 

or regimes, cycles upward in mutual learning and successive 

adjustment, each cycle involving deeper cooperation and milder 

conflict, thus metaphorically creating the shape of a helix.”150

Rummel also notes that a “change in the power equations underlying a social relationship,” a “conflict that serves to readjust expectations,” or fundamental changes in relationships 

that alter “the process of adjustment itself” can also affect the 

peaceful equilibrium of a social field.151

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THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE
71

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

In contrast, when governmental structures become less democratic and more authoritative or totalitarian, the freedom of 

individuals to pursue their own interests declines, and the social field of a society migrates toward a social antifield. A social 

antifield, the opposite of a social field, exists when a social field 

created by individual freedom has been “largely replaced by an 

organization of society built and structured by government.”152

A social antifield begins when an organization or government 

tries to “impose on a society some common goal or task, no 

matter what it may be.”153

In part 2 of his third-level explanation (antifield and power), 

Rummel describes the Khmer Rouge, the notorious Cambodian 

ruling party from 1975 to 1979, as the strongest kind of social 

antifield. Under the leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge 

wanted to create a true Communist society and eradicate the 

“mental and spiritual pollution” of capitalism.154 During the 

pursuit of “communist nirvana,” close to two million Cambodians, or nearly one-third of the population, were murdered by 

the Khmer Rouge or died of disease and starvation.155

In a social antifield such as the Khmer Rouge’s Cambodia, the 

conflict helix collapses domestically, and international relations 

are reduced to the interaction between heads of state.156 Rummel describes the conversion of a social field into an antifield:

As social fields are converted into antifields a spontaneous society is 

turned into an organization. There is then a strict hierarchy of power, 

members are clearly divided into those who command and those who 

must obey, and coercion and force are the glue holding the organization 

together. By the very nature of this antifield, violence, democide, and 

war is [sic] its most likely outcome. Such is theory. The evidence supports this.157

Rummel’s three-level explanation for the democratic peace 

principle thus shows how the social and political cultures of 

democracies promote nonviolence, while the coercive nature of 

nondemocracies makes violent conflicts more likely. He summarizes his explanation by reaffirming the demonstrable link 

between democracy and the absence of war:

In sum, theoretical and empirical research establishes that democratic 

civil liberties and political rights promote nonviolence and is [sic] a 

path to a warless world. The clearest evidence of this is that there has 

never been a war between well-established democracies, while numer-
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

72

ous wars have occurred between all other political systems; and that 

of the near 170 million people that governments have murdered in our 

century, near 99 percent were killed by nondemocracies, and especially 

totalitarian ones.158

However, Rummel’s most powerfully concise explanation of 

why democracies are a method of nonviolence is embedded in 

the two-word title of his text—power kills.

Challenges and Alternate Rationales

Wide recognition is not, however, synonymous with 

universal acceptance. It [the relative rarity of violent 

conflict between democracies] became confused with a 

claim that democracies are in general, in dealing with 

all kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other nondemocratically constituted states.

 —Bruce Russett

 —Grasping the Democratic Peace:

 —Principles for a Post-Cold War World

After almost a decade of research, specifically searching for 

data or studies that would contradict or undercut the democratic peace principle, I have yet to find any meaningful challenge to Rummel’s six primary propositions that conclude democracy is a method of nonviolence. Some scholars have raised 

questions and challenges to the democratic peace principle, but 

no one has found any meaningful exception to the principle, 

such as a democracy dyad at war. When Per Ahlmark declared 

to the liberal democrats of the European Parliament that democracies do not fight democracies, he recognized that “some 

scholars have written articles (or chapters of books) claiming 

that there are such exceptions. But if you study those cases in 

detail you find either that the conflict is not an inter-state war 

but some sort of civil war; or that at least one of the participants is not a democracy; or that the number of people killed 

is very or fairly low, which means it is not a ‘war’ according to 

this definition [more than 1000 casualties].”159

Political scientist James Lee Ray conducted a detailed analysis of all consistently or prominently mentioned exceptions to 
73

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

the democratic peace principle. Of the 19 exceptions he studied, “only the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, 

the Boer War, and the Turkish-Cypriot War come sufficiently 

close to being international wars between democratic states to 

require extended discussion.”160 However, even in these four 

examples, both parties in each dyad were not sufficiently close 

to being a liberal democracy to create an exception to the democratic peace principle.161

Some studies which have criticized the research methodologies used to prove the democratic peace principle nevertheless 

support the principle that democracies are less likely to fight 

with other democracies. For example, Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker have criticized the ways in 

which some studies on militarized conflict have handled the 

analysis of time. Nevertheless, when the authors apply their 

own data-analysis methods, they conclude that “democracy 

clearly inhibits conflict.”162

Tucker and William Thompson evaluate two attacks on the 

democratic peace principle and conclude that the arguments 

do not hold up to scrutiny.163 The first of these attacks, by 

Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, argues that “for democratic 

dyads, the absence of war and the low probability of becoming 

involved in serious disputes are restricted to the post–World 

War II era and might be artifacts of the cold war.”164 The other, 

by Mansfield and Snyder, argues that “democracies eventually 

may become more peaceful but that, in their very early years, 

they are unusually prone to war involvement.”165

Farber and Gowa believe that the explanations for the democratic peace principle are weak, and their study “retest[s] the 

central hypothesis relating regime type and war/militarized 

disputes.”166 They discover that findings supporting the democratic peace principle “are not consistent over time” and develop 

an alternative explanation “predicated on common interests, 

for conflictual behavior that has a different effect before World 

War I and after World War II.”167 If accurate, their conclusion 

would mean that democratization does not necessarily lead to a 

more peaceful world, but that common interests between states 

do lead to a more peaceful world.168

Mansfield and Snyder contend that spreading democracy is 

naive because it fails to take into account the short- to medium-
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

74

term costs and risks since regime transition is unstable and may 

create an environment for war. They agree, however, that “wellestablished democracies (and stable autocracies) are less likely to 

fight within dyads consisting of similar type states.”169 They also 

conclude that in the “long run, the enlargement of the zone of 

stable democracy will probably enhance prospects for peace.”170

Tucker and Thompson acknowledge that these criticisms of 

the democratic peace principle “certainly are strong, just as 

their empirical evidence seems compelling.”171 They conclude, 

however, that “neither the arguments nor the evidence holds 

up well to close scrutiny,” and even though both studies help 

us to better understand the democratic peace principle, neither 

study “can undermine the premises that have served as a foundation for pursuing a better understanding of the democratic 

peace phenomenon.”172 However, Tucker and Thompson agree 

with the contention that regime transition creates an unstable 

environment in which war may occur.173 Others also recognize 

the danger of a democracy in transition. For example, Doyle 

concludes that liberal states are predisposed not to go to war 

with each other, but exceptions exist when one or both of the 

parties in a conflict are in transition and the “pacifying effects 

of liberalism” are not yet deeply ingrained.174

In his review of Weart’s Never at War: Why Democracies Will not 

Fight One Another, Stephen M. Walt claims that the evidence for 

the democratic peace principle is “ambiguous and its long-term 

validity uncertain.”175 Walt summarizes the two main challenges 

to the democratic peace principle. The first concludes that the 

“apparent pacifism between democracies may be a statistical artifact: because democracies have been relatively rare throughout 

history, the absence of wars between them may be due largely to 

chance.”176 Also the evidence supporting the democratic peace 

principle depends upon what time period is observed and how 

borderline cases are interpreted. The second challenge focuses 

on the causal logic of the democratic peace principle. Walt notes 

that when democratic states have come close to war, they have 

held back for “reasons that had more to do with strategic interests than shared political culture.”177 Walt criticizes Weart for 

selectively choosing which wars to analyze, not paying more attention to plausible alternative explanations, and dismissing a 

case that does not fit his thesis because one party did not per-
75

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

ceive the other to be the right kind of republic.178 Walt also argues that Weart’s analysis cannot take into account what may 

happen when the entire world contains only one type of government or shared political culture. There is no way to predict, according to Walt, how a government will react when challenged by 

a similar government.179

The weakness of Walt’s critique of the democratic peace principle, however, is that he focuses only on the similarity of political cultures as the predominant basis for why democracies do 

not fight democracies and are inherently nonviolent. He fails 

to consider key parts of the rationale for the democratic peace 

principle: the internal checks and balances in a democracy as 

well as the internal and external cross pressures on a mature 

democracy. He also fails to recognize the overwhelming statistical data collected in approximately 100 empirical studies during the twentieth century that validate the democratic peace 

principle. Walt does pose a very interesting hypothetical question: how might a democratic state interact with another democratic state in a world comprised predominantly or entirely of 

democracies? Russett also observes that a “system composed 

substantially of democratic states might reflect very different 

behavior than did the previous one composed predominantly 

of autocracies.”180 There is no empirical data based on a world 

that consists predominately or entirely of democracies; however, the nonviolent nature of democracies suggests that such 

a world would be more peaceful. Despite his pondering, Russett 

believes that a world of substantially democratic states would 

mean the end of wars and conquest as well as the reconstruction of the norms and rules of international order.181

Christopher Layne is also a critic of the democratic peace 

principle, which he claims rests on a shaky foundation:

[Though the] democratic peace theory identifies a correlation between 

domestic structure and the absence of war between democracies, it fails 

to establish a causal link. . . . The statistical evidence that democracies 

do not fight each other seems impressive but in fact, it is inconclusive, 

because the universe of cases providing empirical support for democratic peace theory is small, and because several important cases of 

wars between democratic states are not counted for reasons that are 

not persuasive.182
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

76

Layne’s criticism that the universe of cases supporting the 

democratic peace theory is small would be far more significant 

if those cases were a subset of the statistical evidence. However, contrary to Layne’s conclusion, the principle that democracies do not fight each other is supported by the universe of 

all relevant conflicts.

Russett identifies five alternative explanations for the democratic peace principle and explains why they do not invalidate 

the principle: 

1. Transnational and international institutions make peace.

2. Distance prevents war.

3. Alliances make peace.

4. Wealth makes peace.

5. Political stability makes peace.

According to the first alternative explanation, transnational 

and international institutions make peace by binding states 

through “common ties in a network of institutions crossing national boundaries.”183 Transnationalism, however, cannot be 

treated analytically or empirically as an independent cause of 

peace between democracies because it is substantially correlated 

with the open institutions of democracies. It is the “individual 

autonomy and pluralism within democratic states [that] foster 

the emergence of transnational linkages and institutions.”184

Distance prevents war because historically most wars were 

fought between neighboring states since the closeness provided 

a greater capability to wage war and the constant contact facilitated the interaction that created reasons to go to war. Accordingly, since democracies were few and far between before 

World War II and even for much of the post-1945 period, it is 

not surprising that democracies did not end up at war with one 

another. However, the distance argument is weakened as modern contiguous democracies, such as those of the EU and the 

Western Hemisphere, remain at peace.185

Alliances are said to make peace because states choose alliances based on common interests or a common enemy and are 

thus already peacefully inclined toward each other. Another 

theory is that alliances are peaceful because of the “active 
77

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

policy of a dominant major power to keep peace within the alliance.”186 Historically though, the Soviet Union and its militarized allies were likely to fight each other, whereas democratic 

allied states have not been likely to fight each other.

Wealth is said to make peace because (1) the disincentive for 

politically stable, economically advanced, and rapidly growing 

countries to fight a war is too great; (2) wealth is a result of 

trade and investment between countries; and (3) rapidly growing democracies do not have an incentive for conflict between 

them. Wealth, however, cannot be viewed as an independent 

cause of peace between democracies because trade, investment, wealth, and growth are all substantially correlated with 

the open institutions of democracies.187

Political stability is said to make peace since countries with 

“stable and durable political systems will lack incentives to externalize domestic discontent into conflict with foreign countries.”188 Unstable governments have “more to gain from scapegoating and diversion, and are more likely to do so when they 

confront an adversary that faces substantial domestic political 

problems.”189 It is important to note, however, that twentiethcentury democracies were generally more stable than were nondemocracies.190 Thus political stability also cannot be viewed as 

an independent cause of peace between democracies because it 

is substantially correlated to the democratic nature of the governments in question.

Although many scholars accept the premise that democracies do not make war on each other, they do not necessarily 

accept Rummel’s proposition that democracies are less likely 

to make war or commit violence than other types of regimes. 

Rummel addresses those who say that democratic states are as 

aggressive and prone to war as other forms of government and 

argues that a careful examination of the relevant studies and 

their methodologies “shows that democracies are in fact the 

most pacific of regimes.”191 For example, some studies which 

conclude that democracies are as war-prone as other types of 

regimes fail to emphasize the severity of the violence as a crucial variable and instead count frequency of war involvement or 

other violence as a relevant variable.192

The Freedom House ratings of all nations on civil and political rights and liberties also strongly confirm Rummel’s propo-
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

78

sition that the more democratic a regime, the less its foreign 

violence. When Rummel rated conflicts by their level of violence 

and compared that data to the Freedom House democracy ratings, he found that the “highest levels of violence significantly 

increased as the level of freedom (for free, partially free and 

non-free regimes) decreased.”193

Thus a careful review of the evidence strongly supports the 

democratic peace principle. Nondemocracies are more inclined 

to war and violent conflict; democracies are inherently more 

peaceful. The expansion of democracy and the concomitant decline of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are therefore crucial objectives for the creating of lasting peace in the world.

Notes

1. Locke, Two Treatises, preface.

2. Ibid., preface and Book I, chapter XI.

3. Ravitch and Thernstrom, The Democracy Reader, 38.

4. Locke, Two Treatises, Book I, para. 106.

5. Ibid., Book II, 323.

6. Ibid., 177.

7. Doyle, “Kant,” 225.

8. Ravitch and Thernstrom, The Democracy Reader, 41–42.

9. Doyle, “Kant,” 225n.

10. Paine, Rights of Man, 156–62.

11. Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?” 28.

12. Kant, Perpetual Peace, vii–viii.

13. Ibid., 3–9.

14. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 10.

15. Ibid., 10–23.

16. Ibid., 58.

17. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, Federalist Papers, No. 6, 56.

18. Ibid., 56–59.

19. Per Ahlmark, former deputy prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of 

UN Watch, speech, 8 April 1999.

20. Ibid.

21. Maoz and Abdolali, “Regime Types,” 33.

22. Ibid., 4.

23. Ibid., 10.

24. Ibid., 4–10.

25. Ibid., 8.

26. Ibid., 4.

27. Ibid., 4, 6, 8–20.

28. Ibid., 20.
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THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

29. Ibid., 6–8, 18.

30. Ibid., 18.

31. Ibid., 3.

32. Ibid., 18.

33. Ibid., 3.

34. Ibid., 3, 31.

35. Ibid., 31.

36. Weart, “Peace among Democratic and Oligarchic Republics,” 299–316.

37. Ibid., 299, 302, 311–12.

38. Ibid., 301.

39. McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 97–98.

40. Weart, “Peace among Democratic and Oligarchic Republics,” 301.

41. Ibid., 301–2.

42. Ibid., 302.

43. Rummel, Power Kills, 122.

44. Ibid., 302–3.

45. Maoz and Abdolali, “Regime Types,” 31.

46. Weart, “Peace among Democratic and Oligarchic Republics,” 304.

47. Ibid., 304.

48. Ibid., 305–6.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 300.

51. Ibid., 305–9, 311.

52. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 5, 9.

53. Ibid., 9–11.

54. Ibid., 12–14.

55. Ibid., 14.

56. Ibid., 15.

57. Ibid., 15–16.

58. Ibid., 16.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., 20.

61. Ibid., 11.

62. Rummel, Power Kills, 10.

63. Rummel, “What Is the Democratic Peace?”

64. Rummel, Power Kills, 11.

65. Ibid., 12.

66. Rummel, “What Is the Democratic Peace?”

67. Rummel, Power Kills, ix.

68. Rummel, “What is the Democratic Peace?”

69. Rummel, Power Kills, 3.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., 6.

72. Ibid., 25–49.

73. Ibid., 26.

74. Ibid.

75. Quoted in ibid., 27.
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

80

76. Ibid., 28.

77. Ibid., 44.

78. Ibid., 51–61.

79. Ibid., 52.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., 53–57.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., 59.

84. Ibid., 63–83.

85. Ibid., 64.

86. Ibid., 64–80.

87. Ibid., 85–89.

88. Ibid., 85, 91.

89. Ibid., 85.

90. Ibid., 86–87.

91. Ibid., 85.

92. Ibid., 91–98.

93. Ibid., 91.

94. Ibid., 92.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid., 93.

98. Ibid., 95–97.

99. Ibid., 97.

100. Ibid., 203–11.

101. Ibid., 203.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., 210.

104. Rummel, “Democratic Peace Clock.”

105. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 10, 12–13.

106. Doyle, “Kant,” 213.

107. Maoz and Abdolali, “Regime Types,” 6.

108. Quoted in ibid.

109. Maoz and Abdolali, “Regime Types,” 7.

110. Weart, “Peace among Democratic and Oligarchic Republics,” 299.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., 300.

113. Ibid., 311­–12.

114. Ahlmark, speech, 8 April 1999.

115. Lipson, Reliable Partners, 1.

116. Ibid., 2–4.

117. Ibid., 4.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid., 1.

120. Rummel, Power Kills, 6.

121. Ibid., 117.

122. Ibid., 118.
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THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

123. Ibid., 204.

124. Ibid., 124.

125. Ibid., 118.

126. Ibid., 118–19.

127. Ibid., 119.

128. Ibid., 204.

129. Ibid., 124.

130. Ibid., 119.

131. Ibid., 121.

132. Ibid., 205–6.

133. Ibid., 120–21.

134. Ibid., 122.

135. Ibid., 129.

136. Ibid., 131, 149.

137. Ibid., 134.

138. Ibid., 6–7.

139. Ibid., 138.

140. Ibid., 138–39.

141. Ibid., 140.

142. Ibid., 143–50.

143. Ibid., 153.

144. Ibid., 11.

145. Ibid., 157.

146. Ibid., 159.

147. Ibid., 160–61.

148. Ibid., 168–69, 184.

149. Ibid., 168–83.

150. Ibid., 170, 189n43.

151. Ibid., 173.

152. Ibid., 157, 162–63.

153. Ibid., 194.

154. Ibid., 196.

155. Ibid., 197.

156. Ibid., 199.

157. Ibid., 200–201.

158. Ibid., 114.

159. Ahlmark, speech, 8 April 1999.

160. Ray, “Wars between Democracies,” 269.

161. Ibid.

162. Beck, Katz, and Tucker, “Taking Time Seriously,” 1284.

163. Thompson and Tucker, “A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques,” 428.

164. Ibid., 429.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid.

168. Ibid., 430.

169. Ibid., 440.
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE

82

170. Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” 97.

171. Thompson and Tucker, “A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques,” 451.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

174. Doyle, “Kant,” 213n7.

175. Walt, “Never Say Never,” 146.

176. Ibid., 148.

177. Ibid.

178. Ibid., 148–49.

179. Ibid., 150.

180. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 138.

181. Ibid.

182. Layne, “Kant or Cant,” 38–39.

183. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 25.

184. Ibid., 26.

185. Ibid., 26–27.

186. Ibid., 27.

187. Ibid., 28.

188. Ibid., 29.

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid.

191. Rummel, “Democracies ARE Less Warlike,” 457–58.

192. Ibid., 459.

193. Ibid.
83

Chapter 4

War Avoidance through

Incentives and Deterrence

As Helen was to the Trojans, so has that man been to 

this [Roman] republic—the cause of war, the cause of 

mischief, the cause of ruin.

 —Cicero

—The Second Oration against

—Mark Antony, 44 BC

In his four-term presidency (1933–45), Franklin D. Roosevelt 

witnessed the domestic and international ravages of economic 

depression as well as the devastation of a great world war, 

which clearly confirmed for him the value of economic and human freedom, the benefits of democracy, and the role of America in maintaining international peace. In a letter of 2 December 1935, President Roosevelt wrote, “I do not know that the 

United States can save civilization but at least by our example 

we can make people think and give them the opportunity of 

saving themselves. The trouble is that the people of Germany, 

Italy and Japan are not given the privilege of thinking.”1 The 

constriction of human freedom in Germany, Italy, and Japan 

created the conditions for the ensuing war. During his annual 

address to Congress on 6 January 1941, Roosevelt eloquently 

captured his vision for a peaceful world, in which human freedom serves as the foundation of peace and prosperity:

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to 

a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world. The second 

is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere 

in the world. The third is freedom from want, which, translated into 

world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in 

the world. The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world 

terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point 

and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to 
WAR AVOIDANCE

84

commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere 

in the world.2

Roosevelt believed that human freedom is the foundation of 

world peace, and he attributed the cause of World War II, at 

least in part, to the fear, ignorance, and greed of Nazi Germany 

and Japan.3

There has never been a consensus on a single cause or explanation for war. Consequently, there has never been a consensus on a single approach to avoiding war.4 Nevertheless, Roosevelt passionately believed that democracy and human freedom 

throughout the world are the foundation of peace. His words 

and actions echo the ideas of the political philosophers, such 

as Locke, Montesquieu, Paine, and Kant, who first articulated 

and developed the democratic peace principle. More recently, 

as we have seen, this principle has been validated by empirical studies and the work of historians and political scientists 

such as Rummel, whose six propositions declare that democracies do not make war on and rarely commit lesser violence 

against each other; the more democratic two regimes, the less 

severe their violence against each other; the more democratic 

a regime, the less its foreign violence; the more democratic a 

regime, the less severe its internal collective violence; the more 

democratic a regime, the less its democide; and nondemocracy 

is an engine of violence.5 Rummel’s overarching conclusion is 

that democracy is a method of nonviolence, while power kills. 

Democracies are inherently peaceful because their internal 

checks and balances prevent the aggressive use of force. In 

sharp contrast, these internal checks and balances are missing 

in nondemocracies. The greatest implication of Rummel’s work 

is that “by creating democracies we create zones of peace”; a 

world of democracies is a world of peace, human freedom, and 

human development.

However, the world does not consist entirely of democracies and may not for many decades or even centuries, if ever. 

Accordingly, for the foreseeable future, the democratic peace 

principle can be only one “piece of the puzzle” to avoid war.6

So an extraordinarily important question remains: how does 

the international community avoid war and maintain world 

peace in a mixed environment of democracies, governments in 
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WAR AVOIDANCE

transition toward democracy but still politically unstable, and 

nondemocracies with no internal checks and balances to control the aggressive use of force? In short, how does the international community successfully avoid war in the twenty-first 

century? The solution to the “war puzzle” (what causes war 

and how can we avoid it?) has thus far eluded humankind, but 

scholars continue to pursue it. The remainder of this chapter 

will discuss one persuasive approach to solving the war puzzle: 

Moore’s explanation for the cause of war and his strategies for 

avoiding it. Moore’s incentive theory for war avoidance can be 

described by a mathematical formula that can be used to test 

the validity of the theory and ultimately to predict the probability of peace for a given nation. 

Moore’s Postulate on the Cause of War

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution established in 1984 to 

promote peace and reduce violent international conflicts.7 The 

USIP educates the public, supports government policy makers, 

facilitates international dispute resolution, and trains personnel in conflict prevention and resolution. The founding chairman of the USIP board, John Norton Moore, has done extensive 

research on the cause of war and methods of war avoidance. 

The culmination of his research is his authoritative 2004 text 

Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace. 

Moore also initiated one of the first efforts to demonstrate the 

full range of the correlative values of democracy with respect to 

human freedom and development. Democracy, in other words, 

is not valuable solely for its contributions to the prevention of 

war. Rather it helps to advance many objectives that contribute 

to human well-being, such as economic development, famine 

avoidance, and corruption avoidance:8

This evidence of the relationship between government structures and 

performance on the principal goals of mankind . . . is so compelling that 

leaders all over the world now pepper their speeches with references to 

democracy and the rule of law. . . . For all its power, however, the democratic peace proposition is by itself incomplete. In its most common 

formulations, it focuses only on the correlation between democracy and 

war, and this in turn fails to capture the real strength of the case for 
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democracy, the rule of law, and human freedom across virtually all of 

the most commonly shared goals of mankind.9

In Solving the War Puzzle, Moore surveys the theories of great 

thinkers such as Paine and Kant on democracy and the cause of 

war; scientific and historical comparative studies on the origin 

of war; research on deterrence theory; and the contemporary 

empirical work of Singer and Small, Russett, and Rummel. 

Moore concludes that none of these important studies or empirical findings by themselves have “coalesced into a general 

theory about [the causes of] war.”10 However, when examined 

conjointly in the context of cognitive psychology, these theories 

and studies not only identify the cause of war but also reveal 

how to avoid war; that is, they are all indeed pieces of the war 

puzzle. In his own words, Moore’s text “seeks to integrate the 

pieces of the puzzle now known into a broader and more predictive and workable theory about the causes of war.”11 In his 

preface, Moore modestly describes Solving the War Puzzle as 

likely an “incremental” contribution to the field that “may not 

have all of the pieces precisely in their final place”;12 however, 

this study will validate Moore’s theories on the cause of war 

and war avoidance through analysis and application.

Elsewhere Moore has identified the two key factors that have 

led to modern wars:

There is . . . significant evidence that major wars in the twentieth century have resulted in substantial part from a complex, interactive relationship between, on the one hand, a radical regime—typically but not 

inevitably of a non-democratic, single party, repressive, highly militarized nation—motivated and prepared to use force to achieve its objectives internationally, and, on the other hand, a failure of deterrence 

from the international system as a whole.13

Similarly, in a 1997 article, Moore identifies aggressive, nondemocratic regimes combined with the absence of effective deterrence as the cause of war:

Quite simply, I believe that the missing link that, in synergy with the 

democratic peace, largely explains major war, is deterrence, or more accurately, the system-wide absence of effective deterrence, in settings of 

major aggressive attack by non-democratic regimes. That is, major war 

is a synergy between aggressive attack (typically by a non-democratic 

regime prepared to undertake high risk aggression—but which does not 
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expect to lose), and an absence of effective system-wide deterrence that 

would have deterred a rational actor from the adventure. . . .

Major wars occur as a synergy between a regime initiating an aggressive 

attack (typically non-democratic), and an absence of effective systemwide deterrence. If the theory is correct, one would not expect a major 

war if either factor is absent.14

This theory on the cause of war is the result of years of scholarly studies in which Moore validates the work of political scientists such as Rummel, developer of the democratic peace 

principle, and historians such as Kagan, who has concluded 

that war is caused during a competition for power by a failure of states to take appropriate actions to preserve the peace, 

that is, an absence or failure of deterrence.15 Moore concludes, 

however, that while both of these approaches—the democratic 

peace principle and deterrence—are powerful correlates of the 

occurrence and nonoccurrence of war, neither, when taken 

alone, fully defines or explains the cause of war.16 When taken 

in the aggregate, these two approaches do indeed define and 

explain the cause of war, according to Moore. Moore thus postulates that the cause of major international armed conflict is 

the synergy between the existence of a potentially aggressive 

nondemocratic (totalitarian) regime and the absence of effective systemwide deterrence.17

Thus the two core components of Moore’s postulate on the 

cause of war are the democratic peace principle and effective 

systemwide deterrence. In his analysis of the democratic peace 

principle, Moore uses the accepted standard threshold of at 

least 1,000 battle-related casualties to define major international war, recognizing, however, that a standard of at least 

2,000 likely yields equally robust findings.18 International conflicts are between two or more sovereign nations; the category 

“does not include civil wars or colonial wars or those between a 

nation and a less than sovereign political entity.”19 He defines 

a liberal democracy as “a government of limited powers, operating under the rule of law in some meaningful system of checks 

and balances, which protects fundamental political, economic, 

and religious freedoms and in which minority rights are protected even from a majority.”20
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To explain the “principal internal mechanism responsible for 

the democratic peace” principle, Moore applies the theory of 

government failure, also known as public choice theory, which 

“posits that government decision makers will generally act rationally in pursuit of their interests, like actors elsewhere, and 

that the government setting, as with markets, provides mechanisms by which elites and special interest groups may be 

able to externalize costs on others.”21 In a democracy, internal 

checks and balances restrict the ability of leaders to externalize 

costs onto others. Nondemocracies, on the other hand, have no 

rule of law to act as a meaningful check on their national leaders, permitting those leaders to externalize costs on others and 

make decisions which benefit them personally:22

Saddam Hussein, deciding on action against the State of Kuwait, is 

in a setting where he will personally reap the benefits of a successful 

takeover of Kuwaiti oil, while he is able to externalize the risks of the 

conflict onto draftees, many of whom are from groups in Iraq . . . who 

oppose him. He will stay in power win or lose, and the benefits of a win 

would inure to him directly, while the costs would be significant but 

largely borne by others. Notice that in totalitarian systems the incentive 

structures for high risk endeavors such as war operate on both the cost 

and benefit sides of the equation. That is, Saddam will personally reap 

the tangible rewards of success and he will be able to largely externalize 

the costs of failure on others, even his enemies.23

Moore notes that war, along with “terrorism, democide, famine, poverty, environmental degradation, corruption, narcotics 

trafficking, infant mortality, and refugees,” is a characteristic 

failure of nondemocratic governments.24

If the theory of government failure holds true, then “one 

would expect to find that democracies are, in fact, getting into 

major wars principally, though not exclusively, as a result of 

aggression by nondemocratic states.”25 To test this theory, 

Moore conducted a study of major interstate wars since the 

adoption of the UN Charter in 1945 in which he concludes 

that “clear aggression by a democratic government in a major 

interstate war setting has been limited to a single instance out 

of approximately 29 major wars studied.”26 This instance occurred in 1956 when the United Kingdom, France, and Israel 

jointly attacked Egypt in the wake of Egypt’s nationalization of 

the Suez Canal and continuing Fedayeen raids on Israel. How-
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ever, Moore observes that the actions of the United Kingdom 

and France were aimed at restoring the status quo and were 

not aggression for territorial gain. Two additional cases reasonably characterized as aggression by a democracy are India’s actions in the 1971 Bangladesh War and the actions of Turkey in 

a 1974 intervention. However, the first of these two could also 

reasonably be classified as a humanitarian intervention, and 

the second was in response to a coup against the government 

of Cyprus encouraged by Greece.27 Moore concludes that “democratic nations predominantly get into major interstate war as 

a result of impermissible actions of nondemocratic nations 

rather than democratic nation aggression or simply through 

random distribution of blame or accident.”28

Moore has also analyzed all major interstate wars in which 

the United States was involved and concludes that the United 

States was the aggressor in only three (the Mexican-American 

War of 1846–48, the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the 

Iraq War of 2003). The first two, however, have features that 

strongly suggest the United States was acting in self-defense, 

and the third was clearly motivated by defense and humanitarian concerns.29 Moore’s conclusion that “democracies are usually not the aggressor in the initiation of major international 

wars runs counter to a widely held assumption with the social science community”; however, that community either measures how frequently democracies are engaged in war and fails 

to distinguish between the aggressor and defender or is unable 

to demonstrate statistically that democracies are as aggressive 

as nondemocracies in major international wars.30

Democracies become involved in major international wars 

when they fail to deter a nondemocratic national leader from 

engaging in an aggressive use of military force.31 We have already introduced the concept of deterrence and the importance 

of focusing deterrence on regime elites. Within the context of 

his postulate on the cause of war, Moore defines deterrence to 

include multiple tools and practices:

[Deterrence is] the totality of positive and negative actions influencing 

expectations and incentives of a potential aggressor, including: potential military responses and security arrangements, relative power, level 

and importance of economic relations, effectiveness of diplomatic relations, effective international organizations (or lack thereof), effective 
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international law (or lack thereof), alliances, collective security, effects 

on allies, and the state of the political or military alliance structure, if 

any, of the potential aggressor and target state, etc. Most importantly, 

of course, there is a critical perception and communication component 

to deterrence since ultimately, it is the perception of the regime elite 

contemplating aggression that is most critical.32

More recently in Solving the War Puzzle, Moore has defined deterrence as a system of external incentives:

Deterrence for our purposes is the totality of external incentives, that 

is, incentives from the international environment, which may be high 

or low, adequate or inadequate. Effective deterrence will be regarded as 

that aggregate of external incentives understood by a potential aggressor as adequate to prevent an aggressive action.33

Effective deterrence takes into account the culture of the potentially aggressive regime. It is “contextual, taking account of 

the myriad of relevant features affecting incentives and beliefs.” 

Effective deterrence is also flexible to meet the demands of specific situations. It seeks a “realistic mix of incentives sufficient 

to produce the desired action or inaction and recognizes that in 

some settings, an absence of flexibility may produce a contrary 

result.”34

Examining the level of deterrence that existed just prior to the 

principal wars of the twentieth century, Moore concludes that 

“in every case the potential aggressor made a rational calculation that the war would be won, and won promptly.”35 More specifically, “virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century, 

at least those involving conventional invasion, were preceded 

by . . . ‘double deterrence absence’ . . . [meaning that] the potential aggressor believed that they had the military force in place to 

prevail promptly and that nations that might have the military 

or diplomatic power to prevent this were not inclined to intervene.”36 This conclusion is supported by the work of historians 

such as Kagan, who analyzed the Peloponnesian War, World War 

I, Hannibal’s War, and World War II and concluded that each war 

could have been prevented by achievable deterrence and that 

each occurred in the absence of such deterrence.37

In sum, Moore’s postulate on the cause of war posits that 

the cause of major international armed conflict is the deadly 

synergy between the existence of a potentially aggressive nondemocratic (totalitarian) regime and the absence of effective 
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systemwide deterrence. Deterrence is the predominant theme: 

democratic regimes are deterred from aggressive action by their 

internal checks and balances, but nondemocratic regimes that 

lack internal checks and balances must be deterred from aggressive action by external incentives. 

Moore’s postulate provides an important insight for predicting the likelihood of war. For a given nation, the probability 

that it will go to war is a function of two variables: its form of 

government and the effectiveness of deterrence mechanisms 

targeted toward it. The less democratic the government and/or 

the less effective the systemwide deterrence, the greater the 

probability of war. The complex dynamics and subjectivities 

of this synergy do not lend themselves to precise quantitative 

analysis. However, it may be useful to express Moore’s postulate as a formula that shows the relationship between the 

two variables or core components. In the equation below, the 

probability of war (PW) is expressed as the sum of two factors: a 

nondemocratic form of government (GND) and a failure of effective systemwide deterrence (-DSW).

A Formula for Representing Moore’s 

Postulate on the Cause of War

PW = GND + (-DSW)

-PW = probability of war

-GND = nondemocratic form of government

-DSW = failure of effective systemwide deterrence

The likelihood of war increases as a government grows increasingly nondemocratic. The likelihood of war also increases 

as systemwide deterrence becomes less effective. However, 

highly effective systemwide deterrence mechanisms can reduce 

the probability of war even for a completely nondemocratic form 

of government. In the next section, a second formula based on 

Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance will refine the relationship among the form of government, deterrence, and the 

likelihood of war or peace. This formula will provide an analytical process for quantifying incentive and deterrence mechanisms, including those associated with the form of government, 

to predict the probability of peace for a given nation.
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Moore’s Incentive Theory of War Avoidance

The structure of world peace cannot be the work of 

one man, or one party, or one nation. . . . It must be a 

peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole 

world.

 —Franklin Roosevelt

 —Address to Congress, 1 March 1945

More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all war.

 —Franklin Roosevelt

—Undelivered address

Moore’s postulate on the cause of war serves as the foundation for his incentive theory of war avoidance, which describes 

the positive and negative incentives that can influence a regime’s decision to pursue war. Introduced in Solving the War 

Puzzle, his incentive theory “blends the core elements of idealist 

and realist perspectives” and specifically incorporates “among 

many other factors, the importance of form of government from 

the idealist model and the importance of deterrence from the 

realist model.”38 The idealist perspective reflects relative optimism and emphasizes third-party dispute resolution, international organizations, trade, and democratic governments as 

ways to encourage peace. The realist perspective, on the other 

hand, emphasizes the security issues that emerge from competition and power struggles among the world’s great powers.39

The conceptual and analytical framework for Moore’s incentive theory is based, at least in part, on the insights of Kenneth 

Waltz’s 1954 study that categorizes past explanations for the 

origins of war into three levels:

1. Individual level: violence, beliefs, and other subjectivities 

rooted in the individual

2. State or national level: variables accounting for war rooted 

in the form of government and other national variables
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3. International level: variables rooted in the broader international system40

Idealists have traditionally focused on the national level “with 

their interest in the form of government as a key variable” and 

on the international level “with their interest in both trade and 

international organization.” In contrast, realists have traditionally focused on the international level with their interest in “the 

anarchic international system, the security dilemma, great 

power relations, deterrence, and the characteristics of varying 

international systems.”41

Moore concludes in Solving the War Puzzle that war arises 

from the interaction of all three Waltzian levels (individual, 

state or national, and international), whereas some proponents 

of the democratic peace principle focus only on government 

structures to explain war and some traditional realists focus 

only on the international system. Both realists and democratic 

peace proponents tend to emphasize institutions and systems, 

whereas Moore reminds us that people—leaders—decide to 

pursue war:

Wars are not simply accidents. Nor, contrary to our ordinary language, 

are they made by nations. Wars are made by people; more specifically 

they are decided on by the leaders of nation states—and other nonnational groups in the case of terrorism—who make the decision to 

commit aggression or otherwise use the military instrument. These 

leaders make that decision based on the totality of incentives affecting 

them at the time of the decision. . . .

. . . [Incentive theory] tells us that we simply have a better chance of 

predicting war, and fashioning forms of intervention to control it, if we 

focus squarely on the effect of variables from all levels of analysis in 

generating incentives affecting the actual decisions made by those with 

the power to decide on war.42

Incentive theory focuses on the individual decisions that lead 

to war and explains the synergistic relationship between the 

absence of effective deterrence and the absence of democracy. 

Together these three factors—the decisions of leaders made 

without the restraining effects of deterrence and democracy—

are the cause of war:

War is not strictly caused by an absence of democracy or effective deterrence or both together. Rather war is caused by the human leadership 
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decision to employ the military instrument. The absence of democracy, 

the absence of effective deterrence, and most importantly, the synergy 

of an absence of both are conditions or factors that predispose to war. 

An absence of democracy likely predisposes by [its] effect on leadership and leadership incentives, and an absence of effective deterrence 

likely predisposes by its effect on incentives from factors other than the 

individual or governmental levels of analysis. To understand the cause

of war is to understand the human decision for war; that is, major war 

and democide . . . are the consequence of individual decisions responding to a totality of incentives.43

Moore constructs his incentive theory of war avoidance 

within the analytical framework of Waltz’s three levels of the 

origins of war: individual, state, and international. The first 

level of Moore’s incentive theory analysis is at the individual 

level of the decision maker, which “includes personal subjectivities, beliefs, experience, and psychological factors [behavioral 

predispositions].”44 The second level is at the state level and 

includes incentives that arise from different forms of government, such as the checks and balances inherent in democratic 

forms of government. The second level thus embraces the democratic peace principle.45 The third level is at the international 

level and includes incentives that arise from the international 

system, such as systemwide deterrence, levels of contiguity, bilateral trade, and economic, military, and political incentives.46

At the international level, systemwide deterrence is considered 

effective if it is capable of deterring a “rational actor.”47

To fully understand the interrelationship among Moore’s ideas 

about the cause of war and war avoidance, it is important to note 

that deterrence is the single variable that runs throughout all 

components and levels of his postulate on the cause of war and 

incentive theory of war avoidance. The second and third levels of 

his incentive theory of war avoidance, for example, embrace the 

two key components of his postulate on the cause of war: the 

democratic peace principle and systemwide deterrence. Moore 

emphasizes that the state of mind of a potential aggressor is based 

upon his or her perceptions of an aggregation of external incentives.48 Effective deterrence must include those external incentives that will be perceived as persuasive by a specific potential 

aggressor. Therefore, the first level of Moore’s incentive theory of 

war avoidance is an analysis of individualized incentives, motivations, and expectations, which will vary from decision maker to 
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decision maker. This level of analysis yields an individualized 

prism of behavioral, temperamental, emotional, and mental attributes through which the effect of incentives at the second and 

third levels must be analyzed. Table 6 summarizes the levels of 

analysis in Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance and shows 

their interrelationship with his postulate on the cause of war.

Table 6. Summary of Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance

Level of analysis in 

incentive theory of 

war avoidance

Elements

Corresponding 

component of

postulate on the 

cause of war

Level 1: the individual

includes the individual’s behavioral 

predispositions, personal subjectivities, 

beliefs, experience, and psychological 

factors

Level 2: the state includes incentives that arise from different forms of government

the democratic 

peace principle

Level 3: the international system

includes incentives that arise from the 

international system such as systemwide 

deterrence as well as levels of contiguity, 

bilateral trade, and economic, military, 

and political incentives

effective systemwide deterrence

Compiled from John Norton Moore’s published works on the incentive theory of war avoidance. For 

references, see the bibliography.

Moore’s postulate on the cause of war is described above as a 

formula [PW = GND + (-DSW)] showing that the probability of war 

(PW) is based on two factors: the form of government and the 

effectiveness of systemwide deterrence. A nondemocratic form 

of government (GND) and a failure of effective systemwide deterrence (-DSW) suggest a high probability for war (PW). Moore’s 

incentive theory of war avoidance can be described by a formula that provides an analytical process for determining the 

probability of peace for a given country. This predictive model, 

shown on the next page, quantifies and averages the multiple 

incentive and deterrence mechanisms that belong to the three 

levels of analysis in Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance. 

The probability of peace (PP) is expressed as the integration of 

all applicable incentive and deterrence mechanisms (collectively 
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referred to as factors [F]) at the individual (L1), state (L2), and international (L3) levels. Integration denotes a greater interaction 

and synergy of complex variables than simple summation.

The variable L1 includes the incentives and propensity that 

a national leader is believed to have or may have demonstrated 

toward war or peace based upon his or her “personal subjectivities, beliefs, experience, and psychological factors [behavioral predispositions].” The variable L2 includes the checks 

and balances that are internal to that national leader’s form of 

government. The variable L3 includes the incentives that arise 

from the international system, such as systemwide deterrence, 

levels of contiguity, bilateral trade, and economic, military, and 

political incentives. The rationality factor (R) serves as a multiplier to take into account the rationality of the national leader.

Once quantified and indexed, each of these variables (L1, L2, 

and L3) represents an average numerical value for a wide range 

of situational incentives and deterrence mechanisms (factors). 

The variable L1 and the factored sum of L2 and L3 are then averaged to reflect the integration and complex synergy of the three 

levels of analysis of Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance.

A Mathematical Representation of Moore’s Incentive 

Theory of War Avoidance

PP = L1 + R(L2 + L3)

3

PP = probability of peace

Fn = all applicable incentive and deterrence mechanisms (factors)

L1 = average of all applicable level 1 incentives and deterrence mechanisms

 (L1F1 + L1F2 + L1F3 + L1F4 + L1Fn)/n

L2 = average of all applicable level 2 incentives and deterrence mechanisms

 (L2F1 + L2F2 + L2F3 + L2F4 + L2Fn)/n

L3 = average of all applicable level 3 incentives and deterrence mechanisms

 (L3F1 + L3F2 + L3F3 + L3F4 + L3Fn)/n

R = rationality of national leader
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The complex and subjective nature of incentives and deterrence 

mechanisms in any given situation is not conducive to precise 

quantitative analysis. However, the mathematical representation 

of the incentive theory of war avoidance is useful as a model for 

predicting the probability of peace. By assigning quantifiable variables to the elements of an abstract theory, the formula renders 

the theory more concrete and transparent. It concisely organizes 

the elements and levels of Moore’s incentive theory into a working 

methodology that ensures all applicable factors are considered 

when evaluating the probability of peace or war. Most significantly, 

the mathematical formula compiles the subjective incentives and 

deterrence mechanisms and allows them to be quantified and indexed on a relative scale, yielding an indexed sum that can be 

averaged to measure the strength of a war avoidance strategy and 

predict the probability of peace or war.

A decimal (base 10) indexing system is applied to calculate the 

probability of peace (PP) using the formula. The probability of peace 

(PP) is indexed on a scale of 0–10. An index value of zero represents 

the greatest probability of war, and an index value of 10 represents 

the greatest probability of peace. For example, a war avoidance 

strategy that permits a totalitarian national leader to externalize 

the costs of war and fails to convince that leader that a state or 

group of states will respond to aggression with military force would 

have a very low index value after the calculations are completed. In 

contrast, a war avoidance strategy that fully embraces positive and 

negative incentives and deterrence mechanisms on the individual, 

state, and international level that personally target and encourage 

a national leader not to use aggressive force would have a very high 

index value after the calculations are completed.

The variable L1 indexes an average value, on a scale of 0–10, for 

the relevant incentives, deterrence mechanisms, and propensity a 

national leader is believed to have toward war or peace based upon 

his or her behavioral predispositions. An index value of zero represents a great propensity toward war, and 10 represents a great 

propensity toward peace. For example, if a totalitarian national 

leader has resorted to the aggressive use of force for purposes of 

value extension, such as acquiring wealth or territory, a number 

of times in the past, the variable L1Fn may be assigned a value 

of zero. In contrast, for an authoritarian national leader who has 

never resorted to the aggressive use of force in the past even when 
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repeatedly attacked, the variable L1Fn may be assigned a value of 

10. Similarly, a value of 10 may be assigned for a theocratic national leader whose religion strongly prohibits the aggressive use 

of force. All factors applicable at the individual level are indexed 

and averaged according to the formula L1 = (L1F1 + L1F2 + L1F3 

+ L1F4 + L1Fn)/n. For example, a theocratic leader whose religion 

discourages aggression may nevertheless have a record of initiating violent conflict. The factor representing his religious beliefs 

(L1Fn) will be assigned a high number, while the factor representing his record of aggression (L1Fn) will be assigned a low number. 

Both factors must be averaged into the value for L1. 

The variable L2 indexes, on a scale of 0–10, the level of internal 

checks and balances inherent in the country’s form of government. 

The form of government must be analyzed and indexed based upon 

the limits, if any, it imposes on its leader’s options or ability to use 

aggressive military force. An index value of zero represents no internal checks and balances, and an index value of 10 represents 

the maximum number of checks and balances available in a form 

of government. For example, for totalitarian, dictatorial, and authoritarian forms of government, the variable L2 would have an 

index value of zero after the calculations are completed since the 

national leaders maintain absolute, centralized political control 

and are subject to few, if any, internal checks and balances. In 

contrast, the variable L2 for a model liberal democracy would have 

an index value of 10 after the calculations are completed since its 

constitutional form of government contains the maximum number 

of checks and balances available in a form of government. All other 

governments would have an L2 value somewhere between zero and 

10 after the calculations are completed. To calculate L2, an index 

value of 0–10 must be assigned to each applicable factor or internal check and balance (Fn) for that form of government. Because 

a liberal democracy has the most limits and restraints on government power, the features that define the model liberal democracy, 

described in table 1 (chapter 1), can be used as factors for calculating L2. If other level-two factors apply, they should be assigned an 

Fn value as well and included in calculating the average according 

to the formula L2 = (L2F1 + L2F2 + L2F3 + L2F4 + L2Fn)/n. An electoral democracy or a limited, transitional democracy, for example, 

would have some of the features characteristic of a liberal democ-
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racy but come up short with others, so it might receive an L2 index 

value of five after the calculations are completed. 

The variable L3 indexes an average value, on a scale of 0–10, for 

the overall effectiveness of incentives that arise from the international system such as systemwide deterrence, levels of contiguity, 

bilateral trade, and economic, military, and political incentives. 

For example, the relationship between contiguous nations affects 

the likelihood of their fighting a war with each other. If two contiguous nations have no trade or economic ties, the factor L3Fn 

may be assigned a value of zero. In contrast, where contiguous 

nations have very strong bilateral trade and economic ties, the 

factor L3Fn may be assigned a value of 10. For nations that have 

a strong military alliance, the factor L3Fn may be assigned a value 

of 10. All international-level factors are then averaged according 

to the formula L3 = (L3F1 + L3F2 + L3F3 + L3F4 + L3Fn)/n.

As the formula for PP indicates, L2 and L3 must be factored by 

the rationality factor (R), which is indexed 0–1 to reflect the rationality of the national leader. The best indication of a leader’s rationality is how he or she has reacted within the international community in the past. An index value of zero represents a completely 

irrational national leader that, for example, has responded to the 

actions of other states in an unpredictable or unreasonable way. If 

R has a value of zero, the variables L2 and L3 will become zero when 

factored by R, completely negating any value otherwise attributed 

to the incentive and deterrence mechanisms of levels two and 

three. In other words, a completely irrational leader might not be 

restrained by any conventional incentive or deterrence mechanism 

at the state or international levels. In contrast, a value of one represents a completely rational national leader who has responded to 

the actions of other states in a predictable and reasonable way. A 

value of one does not negate or diminish the value otherwise attributed to the incentive and deterrence mechanisms of levels two and 

three. For those national leaders that fall somewhere in between, 

a value must be assigned based on their demonstrated behavioral, 

temperamental, emotional, and mental attributes. 

Table 7 summarizes the analytical process represented in 

the formula PP = [L1 + R(L2 + L3)]/3 and provides notional values for the baseline factors (Fn) of Moore’s incentive theory of 

war avoidance. These factors are a starting point for analysis. 
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For specific countries, other factors may be relevant as well 

and should be included in the calculation of PP.

Table 7. Notional values for the baseline factors of Moore’s incentive theory of 

war avoidance

Level of analysis Baseline factor used to determine PP

Notional

value

Level 1: the individual

(L1 = average of all 

applicable factors)

Personal subjectivities: wears a uniform and boasts 

of his or her warrior ethos 10

Personal subjectivities: takes great pride in his or 

her diplomatic skills to resolve disputes 10

Beliefs: strongly believes war is an extension of 

diplomacy 10

Beliefs: strongly believes war is immoral and illegal 10

Experience: has fought in and glorifies war 10

Experience: has never fought in war and seems 

repulsed by its destruction 10

Psychological factors (behavioral predispositions):

seems predisposed to be aggressive and confrontational in all international interactions10

Psychological factors (behavioral predispositions): 

international interactions are very reserved, never 

confrontational

10

Level 2: the state

(L2 = the value

attributed to the form 

of government)a

Totalitarian, dictatorial, and authoritarian forms of 

government 10

Electoral democracy 15

Limited, transitional democracy 15

Model liberal democracy 10

Level 3: the international system

(L3 = average of all 

applicable factors)

Level of contiguity: nations are contiguous 10

Level of contiguity: nations are thousands of miles 

apart and neither has means of power projection 10

Bilateral trade and economic incentives: no trade 

exists 10

Bilateral trade and economic incentives: nations 

strongly dependent on each other 10

Political incentives: aggressive behavior would 

bolster leader’s national image 10

Political incentives: aggressive behavior may cause 

military coup 10

Military incentives: potential victim of aggression 

has no security arrangements with major powers 10

Military incentives: potential victim of aggression 

has strong security arrangements with major powers 10

Compiled from John Norton Moore’s published works on the incentive theory of war avoidance. For 

references, see the bibliography.

aLike L1 and L3, L2 is an average of multiple factors. For convenience, this table presents the final 

L2 value (an average of multiple factors) for four forms of government.
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WAR AVOIDANCE

Using the notional values in table 7 as a guide for analysis, 

the formula PP = [L1 + R(L2 + L3)]/3 can be used to calculate 

the probability of peace in a given scenario based upon Moore’s 

incentive theory of war avoidance. This framework of analysis 

will be used in the next chapter to evaluate Moore’s incentive 

theory both in general and in the specific context of the 1991 

Persian Gulf War.

Notes

1. Roosevelt to Dodd, letter.

2. Roosevelt, “The Four Freedoms,” speech.

3. Roosevelt, undelivered address. Roosevelt planned to deliver this speech 

on 13 April 1945, the day following his sudden death.

4. See the discussion in chapter 2.

5. See the extended discussion of the democratic peace principle in chapter 3.

6. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 1–2.

7. USIP Web site.

8. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, xivn1, 2.

9. Ibid., 6–7.

10. Ibid., xviii–xix.

11. Ibid., xiii, xvii–xix.

12. Ibid., xiii.

13. Moore, Crisis in the Gulf, 337.

14. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 840.

15. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 1–8, 31; Kagan, On the Origins of War, 

6, 68–74, 205–14, 269–74, 413–17, 546–48, 566–73.

16. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 838.

17. Moore, Crisis in the Gulf, 337; Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 

840; and Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 39.

18. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 2, 94n8.

19. Ibid., 105–6n3.

20. Ibid., xxii.

21. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 833–34; and Moore, Solving the 

War Puzzle, 11. For previous discussions of Moore’s application of the theory 

of government failure and public choice theory to the democratic peace principle, see Sharp, “International Obligations,” 411, 414–16; and Sharp, “Revoking an Aggressor’s License to Kill,” 1, 60–61.

22. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 9–12.

23. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 834–35.

24. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 9.

25. Ibid., 13.

26. Ibid., 14.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 15.
WAR AVOIDANCE

102

29. Ibid., 15–16.

30. Ibid., 16–24.

31. Ibid., 27.

32. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 841.

33. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 27.

34. Ibid., 28–29.

35. Ibid., 30.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., 31.

38. Ibid., xix. For a previous discussion of Moore’s theory of war avoidance 

that focuses principally on democracy and deterrence, see Sharp, “Revoking 

an Aggressor’s License to Kill,” 1, 56–60. 

39. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, xvii–xviii.

40. Quoted in ibid., xix.

41. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, xix–xx.

42. Ibid., xx–xxi.

43. Ibid., 66–67.

44. Ibid., xx, 145.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 840; Moore, Solving the War 

Puzzle, 64.

48. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 28.
103

Chapter 5

A Validation of the Incentive

Theory of War Avoidance

Power, geopolitical interests, and strategic calculations 

greatly influence the decision-making calculus of all 

states, democratic or not. But we contend that there 

is a connection between democracy and foreign policy, 

and that much of international relations cannot be explained without reference to domestic-level variables.

 —Miriam Elman

 —Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?

Moore’s postulate on the cause of war attributes the cause of 

major international armed conflict to the deadly synergy between 

the existence of a potentially aggressive nondemocratic (totalitarian) regime and the absence of effective systemwide deterrence. 

His incentive theory of war avoidance affirms that war is caused 

by the decisions of human leadership and can therefore be prevented by positive and negative incentives at the individual, 

state, and international levels that effectively discourage leaders 

of nation-states from committing aggression. Deterrence is the 

predominant variable that permeates Moore’s theories. National 

leaders of democratic regimes are deterred from aggressive action by the internal checks and balances of their respective governments, but national leaders of nondemocratic regimes that 

lack internal checks and balances must be deterred from aggressive action by individual- and international-level incentives. 

The role of deterrence in Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance will be analyzed and validated in this chapter by applying the mathematical formula for calculating the probability of 

peace (PP = [L1 + R(L2 + L3)]/3) to the 1991 Persian Gulf War.1

Paths to Peace: Domestic and International

Factors in War Avoidance

In 1997, 10 scholars contributed to Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? an extensive critical examination of the 
VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

104

democratic peace principle that reaches a conclusion similar to 

Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance.2 Among the contributors are both critics and proponents of the democratic peace 

principle. Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance blends the 

idealist and realist perspectives on international conflict: along 

with the idealists, Moore emphasizes the form of government 

and with the realists, the importance of deterrence.3 Similarly, 

the contributors to Paths to Peace include both neoliberals 

who insist that “political ideologies and regime type determine 

states’ threat perceptions and influence their propensity to 

wage war” and neorealists who believe that the “international 

system drives state behavior.”4 Editor Miriam Elman concludes 

that proponents of the democratic peace principle who believe 

democracy is the “best way to ensure international cooperation and the absence of war” have overstated their case.5 She 

remains critical of the democratic peace principle:

Under certain conditions liberal peace can break down, especially when 

external threats are severe. . . . Regime structure is frequently not the 

most important domestic political variable to influence war and peace 

decisions; the norms and institutions of democracy may not always 

prevent wars and ensure stable peace between democracies; the democratic process often generates aggressive foreign policies; and nondemocratic norms and institutions do not invariably increase the likelihood 

of war.6

Although she acknowledges that “domestic politics in general, and the democratic process in particular, crucially affect war and peace decision making,” she argues that “peace 

among democracies can be attributed to influences other than 

shared democratic institutions and liberal norms.”7 Therefore, 

she believes “democracy [alone] may not be the answer we are 

looking for,” and “power, geopolitical interests, and strategic 

calculations greatly influence the decision making calculus of 

all states, democratic or not.”8 The democratic peace principle 

“underemphasizes the importance of different leaders’ views on 

national goals and the appropriate means to achieve them; that 

is, the theory neglects the role that extraordinary individuals 

often play in war and peace decision making.”9

Elman argues that “both international and domestic factors 

influence state behavior in crisis, even among democracies.”10

For example, Christopher Layne concludes that as France and 
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VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

Britain began to drift apart in the summer of 1839 over Near 

East interests involving Algeria, Egypt, and Syria in the Ottoman 

Empire, an Anglo-French war was avoided through a resolute 

British “deterrence model” which clearly communicated that 

any French actions in the Near East counter to British interests 

would be met by the use of a capable military force.11 Arie Kacowicz provides two case studies of the 1932–33 territorial dispute 

between Peru and Colombia and the 1989–92 border dispute between Mauritania and Senegal. He concludes that an “unstable 

or fragile peace is usually maintained by threats, deterrence, 

or a lack of will or capabilities to engage in violent conflict.”12

Specifically, he observes that a fragile peace was maintained in 

these instances due to domestic and international factors such 

as “the lack of material means to wage international wars; sudden leadership changes; the pacifying role of regional hegemons 

. . . and of international institutions . . . and a normative regional consensus in favor of peaceful settlement of disputes and 

respect of the existing international borders.”13

The extensive critical analysis provided by these scholars offers a strong validation of the major components of Moore’s 

postulate on the cause of war and incentive theory of war avoidance. Collectively, the contributors to Paths to Peace conclude 

that peace is maintained by domestic democratic institutions 

and international factors that bear upon the calculations of 

decision makers. Elman suggests that additional research is 

needed and that “we may need to go beyond the democratic 

peace” to understand peace and conflict management.14 Moore, 

to whom these scholars make no reference, provides this additional research. His body of research addresses the question “is 

democracy the answer?” by concluding that peace is a result of 

the checks and balances inherent in democratic regimes and

effective systemwide deterrence and incentives at the individual, state, and international levels that affect the decisions of 

human leadership. Moore’s theory thus goes beyond the democratic peace principle by arguing that where democracy does 

not exist, targeted deterrence can effectively minimize the occurrence of war.
VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

106

An Analysis of the Role of Deterrence in the 

1991 Persian Gulf War

We will persistently clarify the choice before every ruler 

and every nation.

 —Pres. George W. Bush

 —Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005

The effect of deterrence can be expressed in the formula introduced in the previous chapter, which mathematically represents Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance and can be 

used to predict the probability of peace: PP = [L1 + R(L2 + L3)]/3. 

Applying this formula to a test case, the Gulf War, will demonstrate its utility as a predictive tool. This application is not 

intended to suggest mathematical precision in calculating the 

probability of peace or war because the dynamics of incentives 

and deterrence mechanisms are complex and not precisely predictable. However, the formula provides a working methodology 

to ensure all applicable factors are considered when evaluating 

the likelihood that a particular leader or nation will go to war. 

Since we know in hindsight that Saddam Hussein was, in fact, 

not effectively discouraged from committing aggression against 

Kuwait by the positive and negative incentives applied to him, 

we can compare the actual outcome to the outcome predicted 

by the peace-probability formula, thereby validating or refuting the accuracy of the formula and Moore’s incentive theory of 

war avoidance. If Moore’s theory is validated, then the outcome 

of future situations can be predicted by quantifying deterrence 

mechanisms (L1, L2, and L3) and applying the formula to calculate the probability of peace.

The fundamental principles of deterrence must be incorporated into the analysis of incentives and deterrence mechanisms 

applicable to the Gulf War.15 For deterrence to be effective, 

Kant concludes that despotic rulers must believe war is fatal to 

them.16 According to Kagan, deterrence must “account for irrational thought” and “counterbalance passion with passion, fear 

with fear,” and nations must take “responsibility” and “affirmative action” to deter war.17 Moore emphasizes the singular importance of “military deterrence” and says that the “perception and 
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VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

communication” of the “totality of positive and negative actions 

influencing expectations and incentives” are fundamental elements of effective deterrence.18 He identifies four key elements of 

military deterrence: “the ability to respond, the will to respond, 

effective communication of ability and will to the aggressive 

regime, and perception by the aggressive regime of deterrence 

ability and will.”19 Turner also emphasizes the importance of a 

potential aggressor’s perception of “strength and will” and notes 

that “unenforced law is ineffective.”20 The DOD defines deterrence as a “state of mind,”21 and US military strategy emphasizes that deterrence “rests on a potential adversary’s perception 

of our capabilities and commitment.”22

The types of factors that must be considered in this analysis 

of deterrence include jealousy, fear, resentment, greed, naiveté, 

desire for fame and glory, motivations for revenge, the level and 

importance of economic relations, the effectiveness of diplomatic 

relations, the effectiveness of international law (to include clear 

proscriptive norms) and international or regional organizations 

to maintain peace, consistency in condemning aggression and 

prosecuting war crimes, relative balance of power, potential 

military responses and security arrangements, alliances, collective security arrangements, effects on allies, and the perceived will to use military force in response to aggression. Each 

of these factors may influence the success of deterrence and 

incentive mechanisms. States must apply scenario-specific deterrence incentives at all levels—individual, state, and international—that target and personally affect potentially aggressive 

regime elites. Since wars always begin through the calculated 

decisions of leaders, the choice of incentives must be based on 

the perception and personality of the relevant decision maker. 

As the UNESCO constitution states, “Since wars begin in the 

minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of 

peace must be constructed.”23

Rummel too recognizes the premise that war is rooted in the 

minds of leaders: 

Conflict is formed in the minds of men. It is fought there; it ends there. 

And peace is a relationship between minds. All else—the noise, destruction, deaths, weapons—are [sic] the manifestation of conflict. They are 

either the tools of mental combat or the side effects. To understand con-
VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

108

flict and peace is to then understand man’s mind. It is, basically, understanding yourself and what you share with others as a human being.24

Rummel defines a series of principles that assist in understanding the decision-making motivations and processes of leaders 

within the context of themselves, their interactions with others, interactions within their group (society), and interactions 

within their intergroups (international society). These five principles of self-knowledge are summarized in table 8. 

Table 8. Rummel’s principles of self-knowledge

Principle Elements Description

The subjectivity principle:

perception is subjective

perception

mental field

balance

Perception is a balance between the powers 

of one’s mental field and the outside world.

The intentionality principle: 

a person behaves to 

achieve

needs

attitudes

interests

sentiments

A person’s intentions gratify certain fundamental needs: sex, hunger, sleep, gregariousness, protectiveness, curiosity, security, 

and self-assertion. An attitude is some latent 

(inactive) goal and means. An interest is the 

same as an attitude except that it is active, 

driven by stimulated needs. Sentiments are 

clusters of attitudes sharing a similar goal.

The self-esteem principle: 

a person strives for selfesteem

superego

ego

self

will

The superego is the collection of attitudes 

we call morality. The ego is the organizing, 

administering aspect of one’s relationships 

and interaction with the outside world. The 

self is one’s total personality, integrated 

needs, attitudes, and sentiments. The will is 

one’s ability to make conscious choices and 

act on them.

The expectations principle: 

expectations guide a 

person’s behavior

prediction

credibility

A person’s expectations are really his or her 

predictions about the consequences of his 

or her actions. A person’s credibility is the 

degree to which others can expect him or her 

to follow through on promises or threats.

The responsibility 

principle: an individual is 

responsible for his or her 

own behavior

free will

morality

choice

Free will means that an individual has the 

final responsibility for his or her actions. Morality or superego is what a person believes 

he or she should, or should not, do. Choice 

means being able to choose from among 

a number of alternative behaviors and not 

being completely determined to select a 

particular one.

Compiled from R. J. Rummel, In the Minds of Men: Principles Toward Understanding and Waging Peace (Seoul, South Korea: Sogang University Press, 1984), 13, 16, 23, 25–26, 31–33, 39–41, 

45–46.
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VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

Rummel concludes that “groups and institutions and nations 

or governments do not perceive or have expectations. They are 

abstractions. . . . The core of any explanation of democracy’s 

effect on violence, therefore, has to be the individual.”25 Thus 

deterrence incentives must be consistent with the principles of 

self-knowledge and target the perceptions and personality of 

the decision maker.

The military forces of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded 

Kuwait on 2 August 1990. In response, an international coalition force led by the United States liberated Kuwait in the Gulf 

War.26 This discussion will identify and index known incentive 

and deterrence mechanisms, collectively referred to as factors 

(F), at the individual (L1), state (L2), and international (L3) levels that were in place before Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The 

analysis of the individual level will also index the rationality 

factor (R) for Hussein. The results will be compiled in table 9, 

and the formula PP = [L1 + R(L2 + L3)]/3 will be used to determine the probability of peace (PP), which will either validate or 

repudiate Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance.

Individual-Level (L1) Factors and the

Rationality Factor (R)

The first level of analysis assigns a value to the individual 

incentives, motivations, and expectations (L1), which vary from 

leader to leader. This analysis yields an individualized prism of 

behavioral, temperamental, emotional, and mental attributes—

the rationality factor (R)—through which the effect of incentives 

at the second and third levels must be analyzed and weighted. 

The variable L1 is an average of values assigned on a scale of 

0–10 to each of the relevant incentives and deterrence mechanisms, as well as the propensity a national leader is believed 

to have toward war or peace based upon his or her behavioral 

predispositions. An index value of zero represents a great propensity toward or probability of war, and an index value of 10 

represents a great propensity toward or probability of peace.

The capability of Iraq’s military before the invasion was formidable, according to the DOD final report to Congress on the war:

Iraq possessed the fourth largest army in the world, an army hardened in 

long years of combat against Iran. During that war Iraq killed hundreds 
VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

110

of thousands of Iranian soldiers in exactly the type of defensive combat 

it planned to fight in Kuwait. Saddam Hussein’s forces possessed highquality artillery, frontline T-72 tanks, modern MiG-29 and Mirage F-1 

aircraft, ballistic missiles, biological agents and chemical weapons, and 

a large and sophisticated ground-based air defense system. His combat 

engineers . . . [were] rated among the best in the world.27

A potentially aggressive state with no military capability would 

receive an index value of 10. For states with a military capability, the relative strength of that capability must be taken into 

account: the greater the capability, the lower the index value. 

For example, the greatest military capability in the world would 

receive an index value of zero, and other world-class military 

capabilities would receive a very low index value. In 1990 the 

Iraqi battle-hardened military was the largest in the Persian 

Gulf and the fourth largest in the world, with an experienced 

combat soldier as its national leader.28 The Iraqi military had 

an exceptionally strong capability to conduct aggressive war. 

Accordingly, for this factor (capability to engage in war, which 

is an indicator of the potentiality of war), Iraq should be assigned an index value of one.

Another factor to be quantified is a regime’s history of aggression. Hussein previously ordered an aggressive attack on 

the neighboring country of Iran in September 1980, and after eight years of war, Hussein used chemical weapons on Iranian forces. Hussein’s previous use of aggressive military force 

against a neighbor and his use of chemical weapons warrant 

an index value of zero.

Occupying Kuwait would significantly increase the financial resources and military power at Hussein’s disposal; if 

unchecked, he could have easily moved against Saudi Arabia, seizing its vast oil resources. His occupation of Kuwait 

alone would have permitted Hussein to disrupt the world oil 

supply and the economies of industrialized nations. These 

economic and political advantages of invading Kuwait were 

very important because Hussein’s million-member military 

was consuming enormous sums of money and by “mid-1990, 

Iraq had only enough cash reserves for three months of imports and an inflation rate of 40 percent.”29 Hussein was 

also in serious arrears with many international development 

loans that he had diverted to fund the Iraq-Iran war.30 These 
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VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

economic and political factors provided a very strong incentive for Hussein to invade Kuwait, thus warranting a very low 

index value, possibly even a zero. However, a rational leader 

would always have in mind the possibility of losing the war, 

which would somewhat counteract the incentive for war. Accordingly, this factor—the leader’s motivation—is assigned 

an index value of one.

Hussein “saw himself as the premier leader in (and of) the 

Arab world” and believed that his chemical-weapons capability 

balanced the power between Iraq and the Israeli nuclear-weapon 

capability. He also gave a number of threatening speeches just 

before his invasion of Kuwait and claimed that “Iraq alone had 

defended the ‘Arab nation’ against the age-old Persian threat.”31

Hussein’s public threats, his perception of the regional balance 

of power, and his self-aggrandizement concerning the role of 

Iraq in the Arab world indicate a state of mind predisposed to 

war, thus warranting an index value of three.

Hussein rose to power predominantly through the use of 

force. He was involved in an aborted assassination attempt of 

the ruler of Iraq in 1959, was later involved in a successful 

Ba’ath coup in Baghdad, and then masterminded the July 

1968 coup, after which he became the de facto ruler of Iraq by 

killing off any opposition.32 Hussein also treated his own people 

brutally. His willingness to use military force domestically in 

multiple coups, openly murder for personal gain, and use brutality against his own people all reflect his tyrannical disregard 

for human rights and life, a factor that should be assigned an 

index value of zero. During the summer of 1990, Hussein escalated from making verbal threats to deploying massive forces 

north of Kuwait. He also demanded money and territory from 

Kuwait. When neighboring Arab leaders attempted to mediate 

and resolve the crisis peacefully, Hussein’s representatives 

walked out of the meeting. Thus the use of diplomacy did not 

succeed in deterring Hussein from war. He continued to deploy 

the bulk of Iraq’s best combat power to within hundreds of meters of the Kuwaiti border, which permitted an attack with virtually no warning.33 Failed attempts to peacefully resolve the 

conflict, followed by significant troop movements, warrant an 

index value of zero.
VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

112

These six factors are not the only incentives or deterrence 

mechanisms that may have been at work in the buildup to 

the Gulf War. However, they are representative and clearly 

demonstrate that even subjective quantifications such as 

these can be made with some reasonable accuracy, and they 

demonstrate the predictive value of this type of analysis. In 

this L1 analysis, a clear pattern indicates a strong probability of war. The greater the number of factors that are considered, the greater weight and accuracy can be attributed to 

the L1 analysis.

The rationality factor (R) takes into account the rationality 

of the national leader and is assigned an index value of 0–1. A 

value of zero represents a completely irrational leader, while a 

value of one represents a completely rational leader. Hussein 

has been described by political psychologists as a “malignant 

narcissist.” The personality characteristics of a malignant 

narcissist include those of both the narcissist and sadist. A 

malignant narcissist has “an arrogant sense of grandiosity, 

sadistic cruelty, suspiciousness, and a lack of remorse.” A 

malignant narcissist is usually hostile and malicious, as well 

as highly ambitious and self-promoting, with a keen sense of 

self-preservation.34

In December 1990, Dr. Jerrold Post testified before the House 

Armed Services Committee about Hussein’s psychological profile: 

The record of Saddam Hussein’s leadership . . . reveals a judicious 

political calculator, who is by no means irrational, but is dangerous 

to the extreme. . . . Saddam has been consumed by dreams of glory 

since his earliest days. He identifies himself with Nebuchadnezzar, the 

King of Babylonia who conquered Jerusalem (586 B.C.) and Saladin 

who regained Jerusalem in 1187 by defeating the Crusaders. . . . Commitments and loyalty are matter of circumstance, and circumstances 

change. If an individual, or a nation, is perceived as an impediment or a 

threat, no matter how loyal in the past, that individual or nation will be 

eliminated violently without a backward glance, and the action will be 

justified by “the exceptionalism of revolutionary needs.”35

Post found no evidence that Hussein had a psychotic disorder 

and noted his patience and lack of impulsiveness. However, 

this conclusion does not mean that Hussein acted rationally:
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VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

While he is psychologically in touch with reality, he is often politically 

out of touch with reality. Saddam’s world view is narrow and distorted, 

and he has scant experience out of the Arab world. His only sustained 

experience with non-Arabs was with his Soviet military advisors and he 

reportedly had one brief trip to France in 1976. . . . While Hussein is not 

psychotic, he has a strong paranoid orientation. . . . Saddam Hussein 

is so consumed with his messianic mission that he probably overreads 

the degree of his support in the rest of the Arab world. . . . Saddam Hussein is a ruthless political calculator who will go to whatever lengths are 

necessary to achieve his goals.36

The psychological insights and profiles of Hussein by psychologists such as Immelman and Post are important to an L1 analysis and a determination of the rationality factor (R).37 Given 

their conclusions that Hussein was rational and calculating, 

yet ruthless, willing to use force, and politically naive, Hussein 

should be assigned a rationality factor (R) of 0.6.

State-Level (L2) Factors

The variable L2 indexes on a scale of 0–10 the level of internal checks and balances imposed by the form of government in 

question on its leader’s options or ability to use aggressive military force. An index value of zero represents no internal checks 

and balances, and a value of 10 represents the maximum number of checks and balances available in a form of government. 

In addition to evaluating the checks and balances available in a 

given form of government, an L2 analysis considers how those 

checks and balances work in practice.

In its 2003 report Freedom in the World, Freedom House 

named Iraq as an authoritarian regime and one of the nine 

worst nations in the world for political rights and civil liberties.38 When 193 countries or jurisdictions are ranked by an 

aggregated index value of democracy, Iraq is 190, meaning only 

three jurisdictions are less democratic than Iraq.39 While the 

L2 analysis for some countries would require an extensive review of the form of government and how its checks and balances work in practice, Hussein’s Iraq is an extreme example 

and easy to index. Under Hussein, Iraq was an authoritarian 

regime that in practice did not follow its own constitution and 

laws, and its leader was a ruthless murderer who killed those 
VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

114

who opposed him. Thus there were no functioning checks and 

balances in Hussein’s Iraq, and the L2 index value is zero.

An L2 analysis must also consider the role of the legal system in explaining and predicting government behavior. Iraq 

had a customary-law legal system, which is more subject 

to the abusive use of power than civil-law and common-law 

systems. Given the demonstrated abuse of power by Hussein, this factor should also receive an index value of zero. 

The form of government and the legal system in Iraq before 

the Gulf War offered no checks and balances or restraints on 

Hussein’s behavior.

International-Level (L3) Factors

The variable L3 indexes an average value on a scale of 0–10 

for the overall effectiveness of incentives that arise from the 

international system, such as systemwide deterrence, levels of 

contiguity, bilateral trade, and economic, military, and political 

incentives. An index value of zero indicates the least effective 

incentives, while a value of 10 indicates the most effective. As 

with the L1 analysis, a large number of factors can be considered, but only a few of the most significant ones will be addressed in this example to demonstrate the validity of incentive 

theory analysis.

There are clear proscriptive norms against the aggressive 

use of force by states. The UN Charter outlaws the aggressive 

use of force while recognizing a state’s inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in Article 51 and the Security 

Council’s obligation under Article 39 to maintain or restore international peace and security. If a state uses force against another state within the meaning of Article 2(4), that use of force 

is unlawful unless it is an exercise of that state’s inherent right 

of self-defense or unless it is authorized by the Security Council 

under its coercive Chapter VII authority. While there is considerable debate within the international community concerning 

the meanings of Articles 2(4), 39, and 51 in the UN Charter, 

the blatantly illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq 

in 1990 was universally condemned by the international community as a clear violation of charter norms.40 This factor—the 
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VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

existence of clear proscriptive norms—should be assigned an 

index value of 10.

The UN Charter also created an international collectivesecurity alliance mechanism. However, leading up to the 

Gulf War, the international community had not formed a 

military coalition in the face of aggression since its response 

to the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, and 

even then, just “five years after winning World War II, the 

United States was almost pushed off the Korean peninsula 

by the army of a third-rate country.”41 The effectiveness of 

the international collective-security mechanism in deterring 

aggression should be given an index value of three, given the 

relatively low likelihood of a UN military response to Iraq’s 

invasion of Kuwait.

Since the Iraqi army was not only the fourth largest in the 

world but also the largest in the Persian Gulf area, a regional 

response by predominantly Arab nations was unlikely. As a 

potential deterrence mechanism, the military strength of the 

aggressor’s neighbors should be assigned an index value of 

two. Similarly, since the Kuwaiti military forces were “hopelessly outmatched” by the battle-hardened Iraqi army,42 an 

index value of one should be assigned to reflect the imbalance 

of military power between the two parties in a potential military conflict. Because Iraq and Kuwait are contiguous, Iraq 

could easily project military power into Kuwait; thus the factor of geography should be assigned an index value of zero.

The UN has had a practice of implementing trade sanctions, and it is likely that Hussein realized trade sanctions 

would be imposed if he invaded Kuwait. However, the deterrence value of trade sanctions is limited because their effect 

on the leader is usually minimal. In this case, the sanctions 

would have been felt primarily by the people of Iraq and may 

have caused domestic unrest, but the impact on Hussein 

would have been negligible, given the ruthless way in which 

he ruled Iraq. Accordingly, this factor should be given an 

index value of two.

There is considerable debate concerning how effectively the 

United States conveyed its willingness to defend Kuwait with 

military force in response to an Iraqi invasion. From 1980 

through 1988, the United States provided substantial covert 
VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

116

support to Iraq in its war with Iran even though Iraq had invaded Iran contrary to the same charter principles by which 

Iraq was later condemned when it invaded Kuwait. According 

to the New York Times, the United States never stated or even 

hinted that it would respond to Iraqi aggression with force, 

inadvertently giving Hussein “the green light to attack.”43

This absence of deterrence was reinforced with a conciliatory 

meeting between Hussein and US Ambassador April Glaspie 

on 25 July 1990.44 According to a transcript published in a 

Pakistani newspaper, Glaspie told Hussein in their first and 

only meeting that the United States has “no opinion on your 

Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait,” and 

the “Kuwait issue is not associated with America.”45 Moreover, 

Bush administration officials testified before Congress on 31 

July 1990, arguing against legislation to impose economic 

sanctions on Iraq. Hussein watched Washington very closely 

prior to his invasion of Kuwait and continued to receive very 

reassuring and conciliatory messages reinforcing his belief 

that the United States would not use military force to defend 

Kuwait.46 While it would perhaps have departed from standard diplomatic practice, a clear signal that the United States 

would respond and destroy Iraq if it invaded Kuwait may have 

had considerable deterrence value.

The credibility of the Iraqi transcripts is questionable. What 

was actually said and, more importantly, what was perceived 

to have been said, given the previous US covert support for Iraq 

as well as language and cultural differences between two people 

who just met for the first time, will never really be known. Gen 

Colin Powell’s assessment of the situation is that we “had Arab 

states saying nothing was going to happen, and the United 

States saying that if anything did, it was not our concern.”47 At 

one point before the invasion, reporters asked President Bush 

if he intended to send troops, and his response was that “I am 

not contemplating any such action.”48 Given the lack of clarity in US intentions and the standard diplomatic policy of not 

taking positions on border disputes between friendly countries, 

the highest value this factor—clear communication from the 

United States that it would respond with force—should be assigned is a three.
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VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

Table 9 summarizes the above incentive-theory analysis by 

collating the index values for the incentive and deterrence factors relevant to the Gulf War.

Table 9. Index values for incentive and deterrence factors for the 1991 Persian 

Gulf War

Level of analysis in 

Moore’s incentive 

theory of war avoidance

Incentive and deterrence factor Index 

value

Level 1: the individual

(L1 equals the average of 

the applicable factors)

Formidable Iraqi military capability1

Previous use of aggressive military force against a 

neighbor and use of chemical weapons

0

Potentially bankrupt domestic economy in contrast 

to favorable economic and political advantages of 

going to war

1

Perceived balance of regional power and selfaggrandizement of Iraq’s role in the Arab world

3

Willingness to use military force domestically, 

openly murder for personal gain, and brutalize his 

people

0

Failed attempts at dispute resolution followed by 

significant escalation of massing troops on Kuwaiti 

border

0

L1 = (L1F1 + L1F2 + L1F3 + L1F4 + L1Fn)/n L1 = .833

Level 2: the state (L2

equals the average of 

factors associated with 

the form of government)

Authoritarian government with a national leader 

who does not follow the constitution or laws and 

murders his opposition

0

Customary-law legal system0

L2 = (L2F1 + L2F2 + L2F3 + L2F4 + L2Fn)/n L2 = 0

Level 3: the international 

system (L3 equals the 

average of the applicable 

factors)

Clear international prohibition on the aggressive 

use of military force to invade and occupy another 

nation

10

Likelihood of an effective international collectivesecurity response

3

Likelihood of a regional collective-security 

response

2

Imbalance of power between Iraq and Kuwait1

Level of contiguity between Iraq and Kuwait and 

Iraq’s capability to project military power

0

Effective implementation of trade sanctions2

Communication of the willingness of the United 

States to defend Kuwait with military force in 

response to an Iraqi invasion 

3

L3 = (L3F1 + L3F2 + L3F3 + L3F4 + L3Fn)/n L3 = 3
VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

118

Using the analytical process captured in the formula PP = 

[L1 + R(L2 + L3)]/3, the variable L1 and the sum of L2 and L3

factored by (R) can be averaged to determine the probability of 

peace (PP) just prior to the Gulf War:

PP = L1 + R(L2 + L3)

 3

.878 = .833 + .6(0 + 3)

 3

According to this analysis, the probability of peace leading up to 

the Gulf War would have been .878 on a scale of 0–10, with zero 

representing the greatest probability of war and 10 representing 

the greatest probability of peace. A value of .878 is an extraordinarily strong indication that war is likely.

Additional Applications of the

Peace-Probability Formula

The case of Iraqi aggression during the Gulf War was an extreme case. To further test Moore’s analytical process as expressed in the formula PP = [L1 + R(L2 + L3)]/3, consider the 

opposite extreme: the probability that a completely rational 

US leader would use aggressive military force in a hypothetical border dispute between the United States and Canada over 

the drainage of brackish water. For analysis purposes, assume 

all factors are maximized for effective systemwide deterrence. 

Assume a rationality factor of one for a leader who behaves 

completely rationally. The analysis of individual-level (L1) factors yields an index value of 10, and the index value of statelevel (L2) factors for a liberal democracy is also 10. Because the 

United States respects the constraints of international law and 

the UN Charter on the use of force, the international-level (L3) 

factor has an index value of 10.

The probability of peace (PP) for this hypothetical scenario is 

calculated as follows:

PP = L1 + R(L2 + L3)

 3

 10 = 10 + 1(10 + 10)

 3
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VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

The probability of peace is 10, indicating the greatest probability of peace. 

The incentive theory analyses of the Gulf War and a hypothetical conflict between the United States and Canada validate the 

analytical process expressed in the peace-probability formula 

based on Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance. This analytical process can be used for general and specific deterrence 

applications. For general deterrence purposes, each national 

leader could be analyzed and assigned a value for individuallevel (L1) factors according to his or her propensity toward war 

or peace in an effort to identify systemic weaknesses in systemwide deterrence that could be addressed by international and 

regional organizations as well as nation-states. A comprehensive analysis that indexes multiple factors at the individual, 

state, and international levels could potentially identify other 

weaknesses or possible trouble spots that could be addressed 

by strengthening systemwide deterrence. For specific deterrence in potential war settings, the international community 

and nation-states could use the formula to calculate the probability of war or peace and identify weaknesses of deterrence 

incentives specific to that war setting. Both applications could 

be used by national leaders and policy makers at the international and national levels as a predictive tool to analyze and 

strengthen systemwide deterrence incentives. If deterrence 

and incentive indexes were created and maintained through 

detailed analysis, they could be a very meaningful and useful 

tool for maintaining international peace and security. The next 

chapter introduces indexes that could serve as a model for a 

deterrence index. These well-established indexes, maintained 

by internationally recognized organizations such as Freedom 

House and the Fraser Institute, measure the indicators of political freedom, economic freedom, and quality of life for all the 

nations and jurisdictions of the world. Similarly, a deterrence 

index that measures relevant factors for all jurisdictions could 

provide crucial data to support efforts to prevent war.

Notes

1. The formula for the probability of peace is introduced in chapter 4.

2. Elman, Paths to Peace.
VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

120

3. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, xix.

4. Elman, “Testing the Democratic Peace Theory,” Paths to Peace, 473–74.

5. Ibid., “Preface,” vii.

6. Ibid., “Testing the Democratic Peace Theory,” 474.

7. Ibid., 474, 502.

8. Ibid., 503, 506.

9. Ibid., “Introduction,” 36–37.

10. Ibid., 6.

11. Layne, “Lord Palmerston,” Paths to Peace, 85–90.

12. Kacowicz, “Peru vs. Colombia,” Paths to Peace, 335–36.

13. Ibid., 335.

14. Elman, “Testing the Democratic Peace Theory,” 502–06.

15. See discussion in chapter 2.

16. Beck, introduction to Perpetual Peace by Kant, xiii.

17. Kagan, On the Origins of War, 73–74, 212–14, 567.

18. Moore, “Toward a New Paradigm,” 811, 841.

19. Ibid.

20. Turner, “Deception and Deterrence,” 23.

21. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 157.

22. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 3.

23. UNESCO, Constitution, in Manual of the General Conference, 7.

24. Rummel, In the Minds of Men, 10.

25. Ibid., Power Kills, 154.

26. For a detailed account of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the response of 

the international community, see US DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War.

27. Ibid., ii.

28. Ibid., 9.

29. Ibid., 3.

30. Ibid., 4.

31. Ibid., 3.

32. Ibid., 5.

33. Ibid., 6­–8.

34. Immelman, “The Clinton Chronicle.”

35. Post, “Explaining Saddam Hussein.”

36. Ibid.

37. Although these two references postdate Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait 

in August 1990, they provide an example of the insights into the behavioral, 

temperamental, emotional, and mental attributes that can be used in incentive theory analysis.

38. Karatnycky, “Liberty’s Expansion.”

39. See chapter 6 for a discussion of legal systems. Table 11 ranks jurisdictions according to their aggregated index value of democracy, a value that 

is explained in chapter 6.

40. US DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 21–31.

41. Ibid., xxv.

42. Ibid., 1.

43. Gelb, “A Bush Green Light to Iraq?”
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VALIDATION OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY

44. Ibid.

45. The United States has not released any official transcripts of the meeting. For the transcript published in a Pakistani newspaper, see Omar, “Is the 

US State Department Still Keeping April Glaspie under Wraps?”

46. Gelb, “A Bush Green Light to Iraq?”

47. Powell, My American Journey, 462.

48. Quoted in ibid., 461.

123

Chapter 6

Correlative Values of Democracy

Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.

 —Kofi Annan

 —Former UN Secretary-General, 1998 

 The significance of the democratic peace principle is inescapable, and it has extraordinary implications for humankind and 

world peace. Since democracy is a method of nonviolence, Rummel argues, “by creating democracies we create zones of peace.”1

Within these zones, “there is no war, virtually no military action, 

the very least internal political violence, and almost no genocide 

and mass murder.”2 Indeed, if “ever all nations were to become 

democratic we have the promise of eliminating war and sharply 

reducing the amount of political violence” throughout the world.3

A world of all democracies is a world of peace.

The value of democracy, however, extends beyond the prevention of war; the spread of democracy has implications for 

human freedom and development as well. As Moore notes, government “structures rooted in democracy, the rule of law, and 

human freedom perform impressively better than totalitarian 

and authoritarian models” for a range of major human goals 

such as improved human rights, economic development, environmental protection, famine avoidance, control of terrorism, 

corruption avoidance, control of mass refugee flows, democide avoidance, reduction of infant mortality, and expansion of 

women’s rights. Simply stated, “democracy and the rule of law 

are, quite centrally, a crucial goal for achieving common human aspirations.”4 Conversely, “nondemocratic structures and 

a lack of human freedom go hand in hand with a wide variety 

of [government] failures, including war, terrorism, democide, 

famine, poverty, environmental degradation, corruption, narcotics trafficking, infant mortality, and refugees.”5 Not only is 

a world of all democracies a world of peace, it is also a world of 

human freedom and human development.
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

124

The Human-Development Benefits of Democracy

In terms of economic development, democracies “consistently 

outperform autocracies in the developing world,” and “the most 

prosperous states in the world are well-established democracies.”6

Even low-income democracies perform better than low-income autocracies: citizens live an average of nine years longer, are 40 percent more likely to attend secondary school, benefit from 25 percent higher agricultural yields, have 20 percent fewer infant deaths, 

enjoy more stable annual gross domestic products with fewer large 

drops from year to year, live with less government corruption, and 

are less likely to experience humanitarian emergencies. For example, in 2003 80 percent of all “internally displaced persons” lived 

under authoritarian governments.7 The fact is that poor democracies not only have fewer violent conflicts than poor authoritarian 

nations, they also “do a better job of generating material benefits 

for their citizens.”8 Democracies in the developing world outperform their authoritarian counterparts because their governmental 

institutions enable power to be shared, have internal checks and 

balances, spur the flow of information, are less corrupt, are adaptable, and adjust well to changing circumstances.9

For example, Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen has 

shown that democracies usually act decisively when faced with 

crop failures and potential shortages in the food supply. Thus 

mass starvation due to famine has not occurred under any 

democratic government: 

One of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no 

substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic 

form of government and a relatively free press. They have occurred in ancient kingdoms and in contemporary authoritarian societies, in primitive 

tribal communities and in modern technocratic dictatorships, in colonial 

economies governed by imperialists from the north and in newly independent countries of the south run by despotic leaders or by intolerant 

single parties. But famines have never afflicted any country that is independent, that goes to elections regularly, that has opposition parties to 

voice criticism, that permits newspapers to report freely and to question 

the wisdom of government policies without extensive censorship.10

Former deputy prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of UN 

Watch Per Ahlmark notes that “the crucial factor is freedom” because where “there is an active opposition and a free press, governments cannot neglect tens of thousands of people starving to 
125

CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

death.”11 In contrast, when the “opposition is silenced and mass 

media give voice only to the propaganda of the dictator, the fate 

of millions of people dying from famine could be kept secret and 

ignored—because of ideology, incompetence, systematic lying and 

total lack of compassion.”12

Johan Norberg’s 2001 book In Defence of Global Capitalism

validates the economic benefits of democracy. A former anarchist, Norberg has become a strong advocate of globalization, 

which he defines as the “process whereby people, communications, trade, investments, democracy and the market economy 

are tending more and more to cross national boundaries.” He 

concludes that we “need a government which protects liberty 

and prevents the powerful from oppressing individuals” and 

that a “representative democracy is preferable to all other systems, for this very purpose of protecting the rights of the individual.”13 Norberg also concludes that democratic reforms and 

economic liberalization have improved the quality of life of the 

impoverished around the world. In India, for example, democracy and freedom of choice have empowered women and enabled a greater number of children to attend school.14

Norberg tells of a trip to a number of Asian countries in the 

1960s by a Swedish author and a documentary filmmaker who 

observed “poverty, abject misery and imminent disaster” and 

left thinking there was no hopeful future for those people. Returning, however, to India and China in the 1990s, they saw 

how people had extricated themselves from poverty, hunger, 

and filth. The biggest change was in people’s thoughts and 

dreams: television and newspapers had brought them ideas 

from around the world. Norberg attributes this development to 

the movement toward greater individual liberty. He describes 

how globalization has caused this change:

The freedom to choose and the international exchange have grown, 

investments and development assistance have transmitted ideas and 

resources. In this way benefit has been derived from the knowledge, 

wealth and inventions of other countries. Imports of medicines and new 

health care systems have improved living conditions. Modern technology and new methods of production have moved production forward and 

improved the food supply. Individual citizens have become more and 

more free to choose their own occupations and to sell their products. We 

can tell from the statistics how this enhances national prosperity and 

reduces poverty among the population. But the most important thing of 
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

126

all is liberty itself, the independence and dignity which autonomy confers on people who have been living under oppression.15

The average world citizen’s income doubled between 1965 and 

1998, and in the past half-century over 3 billion people were liberated from poverty. In fact, world poverty fell more during the 

past half-century than in the preceding 500 years. The average 

life expectancy of people in developing countries also more than 

doubled between 1900 and 1998, and infant mortality dropped 

by two-thirds between 1950 and 1995. Calorie intake in the developing world rose by 30 percent from the 1960s to the late 

1990s. Global food production doubled in the last half-century, 

and world hunger declined by almost 25 percent from the 1970s 

to the late 1990s. Illiteracy also diminished by 55 percent in developing countries between 1926 and 1970. Norberg attributes 

all of these remarkable improvements in human development to 

globalization and the growth in individual liberty and parallels 

these developments with world democratization.16

Democratization and globalization have also challenged one 

of the “world’s cruelest injustices”—the oppression of women.17

The cultural contacts and interchange of ideas caused by globalization upset old traditions, habits, and laws whereby women in 

many parts of the world have been regarded as man’s property 

and subjected to violence; have had little control over their lives; 

and have been unable to own or inherit property, file for divorce, 

and pursue the same education as men. Globalization allows 

women to become more prosperous and independent. Democratization “gives women a voice in politics, and in more and more 

countries the laws have been reformed in favour of greater equality between the sexes.” The difference between the proportion of 

women and men enabled to attend school has “diminished by 

more than half in two decades,” and on average worldwide, 46 

percent of basic education pupils are now girls. The average life 

expectancy of women in the developing world has also “increased 

by 20 years during the past half-century.”18

Economic freedom brings prosperity, growth, higher living 

standards, equality, and longer life expectancies, and it reduces 

government corruption. Capitalism and free trade also often 

cause improvements in environmental protection in developing 

countries.19 Economic freedom and globalization have caused 
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CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

“communist dictatorships in the east and the military dictatorships of the Third World . . . and the walls they had raised against 

ideas, people and goods” to collapse.20 However, while democracy 

and capitalism have reduced these and other enormous problems throughout the world, poverty and deprivation remain. In 

2000, 3 million people died of a single disease—AIDS.21 In 2001, 

approximately 20 million people lived as fugitives from oppression, conflicts, or natural disasters, and about 20 countries have 

grown poorer since 1965.22 The 2004 report The State of Food 

Insecurity in the World, published by the UN Food and Agriculture 

Organization (FAO), estimates that 852 million people worldwide 

were undernourished in 2000–2002 (815 million in developing 

countries, 28 million in countries in transition, and 9 million in 

industrialized countries). During the second half of the 1990s, 

the number of chronically hungry people in developing countries 

increased at a rate of almost 4 million per year. Still today, over 5 

million children die every year from undernourishment and deficiencies in essential vitamins and minerals.23 The 2004–5 World 

Employment Report by the UN International Labour Organization 

(ILO) estimates that about half the world’s workers—1.39 billion 

people—do not earn enough to lift themselves above the poverty 

line of two US dollars a day.24 Nevertheless, where liberal policies 

have been allowed to operate the longest, poverty and deprivation 

have become the exception and not the rule.25

Rating Freedom and Human

Development among the Nations

The correlative values of democracy can be validated by several well-established indexes or rating systems. Respected organizations such as Freedom House, the Heritage Foundation, 

the Fraser Institute, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have collected extensive data that evaluates 

and indexes various factors pertaining to democratic governance, economic freedom, and human development.

The Rating Organizations 

Since 1972 Freedom House has published Freedom in the 

World, an annual assessment of political rights and civil liberties 
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

128

for countries around the world; the survey is currently reporting 

on 193 countries and 15 territories.26 While Freedom in the World

analyzes freedom of the press as one of its criteria, since 1980 

Freedom House has also completed a more extensive annual survey of media independence around the world; the current survey covers 194 countries and territories.27 Similarly, from 1986 

through 2006, Freedom House published an annual assessment 

of freedom of religion that covered over 90 percent of the world’s 

population living in 74 countries and Tibet.28

The Heritage Foundation, a research and educational institute 

founded in 1973, conducts research to support conservative public policies that reflect its core principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, 

and a strong national defense.29 Since 1994 the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal have jointly published an annual 

assessment of economic freedom for 161 countries. The Index of 

Economic Freedom measures 10 economic factors such as trade 

freedom, property rights, and freedom from government.30

The Fraser Institute is an independent, nonpartisan public 

policy organization that examines the impact of competitive 

markets and the effect of government interventions on markets.31 It supports economic freedom and less government intervention. Since 1996 the Fraser Institute has coordinated 

the development of an annual economic freedom report that 

evaluates multiple measures to determine how well a nation’s 

policies encourage economic freedom; the most recent report 

evaluated 141 countries.32

The UNDP is a UN organization that provides expertise and support services to governments and UN teams in five areas: democratic 

governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery, energy and environment, and HIV/AIDS.33 Since 1990 the UNDP has 

published an annual Human Development Report featuring the human development index, which measures a country’s success in 

three dimensions of human development: long and healthy lives for 

its citizens, education, and a decent standard of living.34 The Human Development Report highlights issues and policies that address 

economic, social, political, and cultural development challenges.35

Each year the report focuses on a different issue. The 2003 report, 

which will be discussed here, analyzes the root causes of failed development by focusing on four sets of issues: the economic reforms 
129

CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

needed to create macroeconomic stability; the strong institutions 

and governance required to enforce the rule of law and control corruption; the need to provide social justice and involve people in 

decisions that affect them and their communities; and the need to 

address structural constraints that impede economic growth and 

human development.36

The Rating Data: Table A1

Table A1 (appendix A), Freedom and Human Development 

Ratings for 267 National and Territorial Jurisdictions, collates 

recent data from the four institutions described above to facilitate a comparative analysis of the data along with each jurisdiction’s government type and legal system. This comparative 

analysis will present another perspective from which to evaluate the democratic peace principle. Because of its length, table 

A1 is provided in appendix A. Following is an explanation of 

each column in the table. 

Column A. Column A identifies 267 jurisdictions found around 

the world. This list is primarily drawn from the CIA World Factbook 2003, with a few modifications. For example, the list of 

jurisdictions in table A1 includes the Socialist Federal Republic 

of Yugoslavia, which no longer exists and is not included in the 

2003 Factbook. Table A1 also lists the Israeli-occupied territories 

of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip separately even though both 

are governed by the Palestinian Authority and usually listed as 

a single jurisdiction. Like the Factbook, the list in table A1 does 

not include Tibet, which is claimed by the People’s Republic of 

China as one of its administrative subdivisions. Other lists of jurisdictions in the world may also vary from table A1, depending 

on how various jurisdictions are grouped and counted. A parenthetical date in column A identifies the date of admission to the 

UN for the 191 member states.37

Column B. Column B identifies the geographic region of each 

jurisdiction using the six regions of the world recognized by the 

US Department of State:38

1. Africa (AF): 59 jurisdictions (48 nations, 11 nonnations)

2. East Asia and the Pacific (EAP): 59 jurisdictions (30 nations, 29 nonnations)
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

130

3. Europe and Eurasia (EUR): 66 jurisdictions (52 nations, 

14 nonnations)

4. Near East (NE): 21 jurisdictions (19 nations, two nonnations)

5. South Asia (SA): eight jurisdictions (eight nations, zero 

nonnations)

6. Western Hemisphere (WH): 54 jurisdictions (34 nations, 

20 nonnations)

The State Department assigns some nonnation jurisdictions to 

the geographic region where the territory is located and some 

to the geographic region where its parent nation is located. For 

purposes of consistency and to maintain a geographic focus, 

all nonnation jurisdictions in table A1 are assigned to the geographic region where they are physically located.

Column C. Column C provides the Freedom House (FH) “state 

of freedom” country rating for 2004, which is based on data from 

2003.39 Jurisdictions are evaluated on a checklist of questions 

on political rights and civil liberties derived primarily from the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Each jurisdiction is assigned a rating for political rights and a rating for civil liberties on 

a scale of 1–7, with one representing the highest degree of freedom 

and seven the lowest. The political-rights checklist asks detailed 

questions about the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. The civil-liberties 

checklist asks detailed questions about freedom of expression and 

belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and 

personal autonomy and individual rights. The average of the two 

ratings determines the overall status for a jurisdiction: free (F) for 

averages of 1.0–2.5, partly free (PF) for averages of 3.0–5.0, or not 

free (NF) for averages of 5.5–7.0.40 For each jurisdiction reported 

on by Freedom House, column C shows the “state of freedom” 

country rating (F, PF, or NF), followed by its numerical rating for 

political rights and civil liberties.41

Column D. Column D shows the Freedom House country rating for media independence for 2003, based on data from 2002.42

Jurisdictions are evaluated on the degree to which they permit 

the free flow of information. Each jurisdiction is assigned a rating for media independence on a scale of 1–100. Jurisdictions 

scoring 1–30 are regarded as having a free (F) media, 31–60 as 
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CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

having a partly free (PF) media, and 61–100 as having a not-free 

(NF) media. A rating of one thus represents the highest degree of 

freedom and 100 the lowest. To determine a jurisdiction’s rating, 

Freedom House examines detailed criteria in three categories: 

the legal environment, political influences, and economic pressures on the media.43

Column E. Column E shows the Freedom House Center for 

Religious Freedom country rating for freedom of religion and belief in 2000, which is based on data from 1999. The report rates 

74 countries which contain over 90 percent of the world’s population on a scale of 1–7, with one representing the highest degree 

of religious freedom and seven the lowest. Jurisdictions with a 

rating of 1–3 are considered free (F), 4–5 are partly free (PF), and 

6–7 are unfree (UF). The criteria used to rate freedom of religion 

are primarily developed from the International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All 

Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 

Belief, and the European Convention on Human Rights.44

Column F. Column F shows the Heritage Foundation (HF) 

and Wall Street Journal country rating for 2004, which is based 

on data from 2003.45 In the 2004 Index of Economic Freedom, 

based on 2003 data, countries are evaluated and assigned an 

individual score on a scale of 1–5 for 10 factors of economic 

freedom. A score of one indicates the greatest degree of freedom 

for that factor, and five indicates the least. Then the 10 individual scores are averaged to yield an overall economic freedom 

score of 1–5. An overall score of one signifies “an economic 

environment or set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom, while a score of five signifies a set of policies 

that are least conducive to economic freedom.” Countries are 

then scored as free (F) if their average is 1.99 or less, mostly 

free (MF) if their average is 2.0–2.99, mostly unfree (MU) if their 

average is 3.0–3.99, and repressed (R) if their average is 4.0 or 

higher. For each jurisdiction reported on by the Heritage Foundation, Column F shows the 2003 “state of economic freedom” 

country rating (F, MF, MU, or R) and the overall numerical average, derived from the data provided by the Heritage Foundation.46

Column G. Column G provides the Fraser Institute (FI) country rating from the Economic Freedom of the World: 2003 Annual 
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

132

Report, which presents data from 2001. Countries are indexed 

on a scale of 10–1 according to the degree of economic freedom 

in five major areas:

1. Size of government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises

2. Legal structure and security of property rights

3. Access to sound money

4. Freedom to exchange with foreigners

5. Regulation of credit, labor, and business

Within these areas, the Fraser Institute compiles 38 distinct 

data points for each country. Each data point is assigned a 

value of 10–1, with 10 signifying the highest degree of economic 

freedom and one signifying the lowest. The data points within 

each area are then averaged to determine a rating for each 

area. The country rating is the average of the ratings for each 

of the five areas.47 For each jurisdiction reported on by the 

Fraser Institute, Column G shows the 2001 “state of economic 

freedom” country rating, derived from the data provided by the 

Fraser Institute.

Column H. Column H identifies the UNDP Human Development 

Index (HDI) for 2001, which is published in the 2003 UNDP Human Development Report.

48 The index measures three dimensions 

of human development for 175 countries: “living a long and healthy 

life, being educated, and having a decent standard of living.”49 The 

index assigns a summary rating to each country on a scale of 1–0: 

a value of 0.8–1.0 represents high human development; 0.5–0.799 

represents medium human development; and 0.0–0.499 represents 

low human development.50 The Human Development Report compiles this data to better understand and analyze the root causes 

of failed development. One of its key conclusions is that “strengthening governance and institutions and adopting sound social and 

economic policies are all necessary,” although far from sufficient by 

themselves, to achieve human development.51

Column I. Column I compares two sets of data. First, it classifies each of the 191 UN member states (as of 2003) and Taiwan according to political system, using the following schema:
133

CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

1. Democracies (DEM): Political systems whose leaders are 

elected in competitive multiparty and multicandidate 

processes in which opposition parties have a legitimate 

chance of attaining power or participating in power. (119 

countries, 62.0 percent of total world population governed 

by democracies)52

2. Restricted democratic practices (RDP): Primarily regimes in 

which a dominant ruling party controls the levers of power, 

including access to the media, and the electoral process in 

ways that preclude a meaningful challenge to its political 

hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, states 

with restricted democratic practices included countries 

which denied universal franchise to women, racial minorities, and the poor and landless. (16, 8.3 percent)

3. Monarchies (three types): Constitutional monarchies (CM), 

in which a constitution delineates the powers of the monarch and in which some power may have devolved to 

elected legislatures and other bodies (0, 0.0 percent); traditional monarchies (TM) (10, 5.2 percent); and absolute 

monarchies (AM), in which monarchic power is exercised 

in despotic fashion. (0, 0.0 percent)

4. Authoritarian regimes (AR): Typically one-party states 

and military dictatorships in which there are significant 

human rights violations. (40, 20.8 percent)

5. Totalitarian regimes (TOT): One-party systems that establish effective control over most aspects of information, 

engage in propaganda, control civic life, and intrude into 

private life. Typically, these have been Marxist-Leninist 

and national socialist regimes. (5, 2.6 percent)

6. Colonial and imperial dependencies (C): Territories that were 

under the domination of the large imperial systems that predominated in the first half of the century. (0, 0 percent)

7. Protectorates (P): Countries that have by their own initiative sought the protection of a more powerful neighboring 

state or are under the temporary protection and jurisdiction of the international community. (2, 1.0 percent)53
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

134

Second, column I identifies a more specific description of the 

government type, such as republic, constitutional monarchy, or 

military dictatorship, as classified by the CIA World Factbook.

54

Columns J and K. Column J identifies whether a jurisdiction is one of the world’s 121 civil-law jurisdictions (CI), 82 common-law jurisdictions (CO), or 64 customary-law jurisdictions 

(CU), as of 2003. This information is derived from an analysis 

of the more detailed description of a jurisdiction’s legal system 

found in column K.55

The Rating Data: Table A2

While table A1 (columns C–H) collates six significant data 

points from Freedom House, the Heritage Foundation, the Fraser 

Institute, and the UNDP, these four institutions did not collect 

data on all 267 jurisdictions or even on all the same jurisdictions. 

Also the six data points from table A1 are indexed on five different scales: 1–7, 1–100, 1–5, 10–1, and 1–0. For some indexes, 

the lowest value represents the highest level of human freedom 

or development, and for others the highest value represents the 

highest level of human freedom or development. Accordingly, it 

is difficult to use table A1 for comparative analyses.

Table A2 (appendix A) provides a more convenient tool for comparative analyses by normalizing the data on a decimal (base 10) 

indexing system for Hong Kong, Taiwan, and all 191 UN member 

states, the great majority of which are indexed in table A1 by at least 

three sets of data points or ratings. For these 193 jurisdictions, the 

same information in table A1 is provided in table A2, Normalized 

Freedom and Human Development Ratings for 193 Selected Jurisdictions. Since the five different index or rating scales used in table 

A1 are linear, the data is normalized in table A2 by simply expanding or contracting each scale to correspond to a single indexed scale 

of 0–10, where a rating of zero represents the lowest level of human 

freedom or development and a rating of 10 represents the highest 

level of human freedom or development. In two cases, the original 

scale had to be inverted because zero represented the best rating 

or highest level of freedom. Table 10 shows how each scale used in 

table A1 is converted for table A2. For each scale used in table A1, 

the conversion factor (CF) is applied to the conversion equation to 

determine the scale for table A2.
135

Table 10. Conversion of scales used in table A1 to normalized scales used in 

table A2

Column C scale Column D scale Column E scale

Table A1 Table A2 Table A1 Table A2 Table A1 Table A2

1 9.10a 111 9.10 1 1.10

2 8.3333 110 9.0909 2 8.3333

3 6.6666 120 8.0808 3 6.6666

4 4.9999 130 7.0707 4 4.9999 

5 3.3333 140 6.0606 5 3.3333 

6 1.6666 150 5.0505 6 1.6666

7 9. 0 160 4.0404 7 1. 0

170 3.0303

180 2.0202

190 1.0101

100 9 .0

CF = 1.6666b CF = .10101 CF = 1.6666 b

A2 = (7-A1)CF A2 = (100-A1)CF A2 = (7-A1)CF

Column F scale Column G scale Column H scale

Table A1 Table A2 Table A1 Table A2 Table A1 Table A2

1 10 10 9.10 .1 10

2 7.5 19 8.8888 .9 19

3 5.0 18 7.7777 .8 18

4 2.5 17 6.6666 .7 17

5 .0 16 5.5555 .6 16

15 4.4444 .5 15

14 3.3333 .4 14

13 2.2222 .3 13

12 1.1111 .2 12

11 9 .0 .1 11

.0 10

CF = 2.5 CF = 1.1111 CF = 10

A2 = (5-A1)CF A2 = (A1-1)CF A2 = (A1)CF

aFor each rating scale in table 2, a value of 10 represents the highest rating and 1 represents the 

lowest. 

b - The actual conversion factor is 1.66 (a repeating decimal).
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

136

The normalized data is provided in columns C through H of 

table A2, and then each normalized rating is averaged to calculate an aggregated index value of democracy (Da) for each 

jurisdiction, found in column K of table A2.

The Rating Data: Table A3

Table A3 (appendix A), Selected Jurisdictions Sorted by Aggregated Index Value of Democracy (Da), sorts the jurisdictions 

by the Da from highest to lowest or most democratic to least.

The aggregated index value of democracy (Da) is an aggregate 

of as many as seven data points: Freedom House ratings on political rights, civil liberties, media independence, and freedom 

of religion; the Heritage Foundation ratings on economic freedom; the Fraser Institute ratings on economic freedom; and the 

UNDP index on human development. Accordingly, correlations 

and observations based on the ranking of jurisdictions by Da

must take into consideration the number of data points actually 

used to calculate Da. A value for Da based upon only a few data 

points should not be given as much weight as a Da calculated 

on all seven data points. Table 11 provides a quick reference to 

all 193 jurisdictions, sorted by Da. Column A shows the relative 

ranking of each jurisdiction identified in column B. Columns C 

and D identify the political and legal systems respectively. Column E identifies the number of data points used for the calculation of Da, and Column F shows the Da for each jurisdiction. 

The greater the number of data points used to calculate Da, the 

greater relative relevance of Da vis-à-vis other jurisdictions.

Table 11. Jurisdictions sorted by aggregated index value of democracy (Da)

A = ranking D = legal system

B = jurisdiction E = number of data points used to calculate Da

C = political system F = Da

A B C D E F

1 Andorra DEM CI 3 9.76

2 Palau DEM CO 3 9.73

3 San Marino DEM CI 3 9.73

4 Marshall Islands DEM CO 3 9.69

5 Liechtenstein DEM CI 3 9.66
137

A B C D E F

16 Tuvalu DEM CO 3 9.49

17 Micronesia DEM CO 3 9.46

18 Monaco DEM CI 3 9.18

19 Kiribati DEM CO 3 9.16

10 Nauru DEM CO 3 9.16

11 New Zealand DEM CO 6 9.12

12 Dominica DEM CO 4 9.11

13 United States DEM CO 7 9.11

14 Ireland DEM CO 7 9.10

15 Finland DEM CI 7 9.07

16 Switzerland DEM CI 6 9.01

17 Netherlands DEM CI 7 8.99

18 Australia DEM CO 6 8.94

19 Denmark DEM CI 6 8.94

20 Luxembourg DEM CI 6 8.94

21 Iceland DEM CI 6 8.92

22 Canada DEM CO 6 8.87

23 Norway DEM CI 7 8.86

24 United Kingdom DEM CO 7 8.85

25 Saint Lucia DEM CO 4 8.84

26 Sweden DEM CI 7 8.79

27 Saint Kitts and Nevis DEM CO 4 8.67

28 Estonia DEM CI 7 8.62

29 Grenada DEM CO 4 8.60

30 Austria DEM CI 7 8.58

31 Saint Vincent & Grenadines DEM CO 4 8.57

32 Portugal DEM CI 6 8.50

33 Belgium DEM CI 7 8.48

34 Cyprus DEM CI 6 8.43

35 Germany DEM CI 7 8.41

36 Bahamas DEM CO 6 8.37

37 Italy DEM CI 6 8.32

38 Malta DEM CO 6 8.26

39 Spain DEM CI 7 8.25

40 Barbados DEM CO 6 8.23

Table 11 (continued)
138

A B C D E F

41 Chile DEM CI 7 8.23

42 Japan DEM CI 7 8.19

43 France DEM CI 7 8.08

44 Slovenia DEM CI 6 8.05

45 Samoa DEM CO 4 8.02

46 Lithuania DEM CI 7 7.99

47 Uruguay DEM CI 6 7.98

48 Costa Rica DEM CI 6 7.97

49 Czech Republic DEM CI 6 7.97

50 Cape Verde DEM CI 5 7.94

51 Sao Tome & Principe DEM CI 4 7.81

52 Poland DEM CI 7 7.78

53 Slovakia DEM CI 6 7.77

54 Latvia DEM CI 7 7.74

55 Hungary DEM CI 7 7.69

56 Taiwan DEM CI 6 7.65

57 Korea, Republic of DEM CI 7 7.64

58 Mauritius AR CU 6 7.64

59 Belize DEM CO 6 7.59

60 South Africa DEM CU 7 7.58

61 Vanuatu DEM CO 4 7.58

62 Panama DEM CI 6 7.53

63 Israel DEM CU 7 7.49

64 Greece DEM CI 7 7.34

65 Botswana DEM CU 7 7.30

66 Hong Kong DEM CO 5 7.29

67 Suriname DEM CI 5 7.21

68 Jamaica DEM CO 6 7.13

69 Guyana DEM CO 6 7.10

70 Serbia & Montenegro DEM CI 3 7.02

71 Trinidad & Tobago DEM CO 6 7.01

72 El Salvador DEM CI 7 6.99

73 Croatia DEM CI 6 6.98

74 Mongolia DEM CI 6 6.94

75 Bulgaria DEM CI 7 6.85

Table 11 (continued)
139

A B C D E F

176 Argentina DEM CI 7 6.84

177 Peru AR CI 6 6.81

178 Solomon Islands DEM CO 4 6.81

179 Thailand DEM CI 6 6.80

180 Brazil DEM CI 7 6.78

181 Namibia DEM CI 7 6.77

182 Philippines DEM CI 7 6.77

183 Antigua & Barbuda RDP CO 4 6.72

184 Mexico RDP CI 7 6.71

185 Seychelles DEM CU 4 6.69

186 Bolivia DEM CI 6 6.54

187 Dominican Republic DEM CI 6 6.51

188 Ghana DEM CU 6 6.46

189 Romania DEM CI 7 6.40

190 Papua New Guinea DEM CO 5 6.34

191 Mali DEM CU 6 6.19

192 Benin DEM CU 6 6.18

193 Nicaragua DEM CI 6 6.16

194 Fiji DEM CO 6 6.15

195 Timor-Leste P CI 4 6.14

196 Singapore AR CO 7 6.06

197 Macedonia DEM CI 6 6.02

198 Senegal RDP CI 6 5.98

199 Lesotho RDP CU 5 5.94

100 Albania DEM CI 6 5.93

101 Sri Lanka DEM CO 7 5.89

102 Paraguay DEM CI 6 5.88

103 Ecuador DEM CI 6 5.76

104 Honduras DEM CI 6 5.72

105 Madagascar DEM CI 6 5.67

106 Tonga RDP CO 3 5.62

107 India DEM CO 7 5.59

108 Kuwait TM CU 6 5.58

109 Bosnia & Herzegovina P CI 5 5.43

110 Moldova DEM CI 6 5.43

Table 11 (continued)
A B C D E F

111 Guatemala DEM CI 7 5.42

112 Bahrain TM CU 6 5.39

113 Kenya AR CU 6 5.34

114 Armenia DEM CI 6 5.29

115 Georgia DEM CI 6 5.24

116 Colombia DEM CI 7 5.16

117 Tanzania RDP CU 7 5.15

118 Uganda AR CU 6 5.14

119 Turkey DEM CI 7 5.09

120 Ukraine DEM CI 7 5.06

121 Jordan RDP CU 6 4.98

122 Mozambique DEM CI 5 4.98

123 Malaysia RDP CO 7 4.97

124 Indonesia DEM CI 7 4.93

125 Venezuela DEM CI 6 4.91

126 Comoros RDP CU 4 4.84

127 Burkina Faso AR CU 5 4.75

128 Malawi DEM CU 6 4.66

129 Morocco TM CU 7 4.65

130 Oman TM CU 6 4.65

131 Zambia AR CU 6 4.63

132 Gabon AR CU 6 4.62

133 United Arab Emirates TM CU 6 4.56

134 Niger DEM CU 6 4.45

135 Russia DEM CI 7 4.45

136 Sierra Leone DEM CU 6 4.37

137 Gambia AR CU 5 4.36

138 Nigeria DEM CU 7 4.35

139 Tunisia AR CU 6 4.29

140 Lebanon AR CU 6 4.19

141 Qatar TM CU 5 4.18

142 Nepal DEM CO 7 4.16

143 Congo, Republic of AR CU 6 4.09

144 Bangladesh DEM CO 7 4.08

145 Kyrgyzstan DEM CI 6 4.05

Table 11 (continued)

140
141

A B C D E F

146 Brunei Darussalam TM CO 4 4.04

147 Maldives AR CO 4 4.04

148 Algeria AR CU 6 3.94

149 Kazakhstan AR CI 6 3.94

150 Cambodia RDP CI 5 3.89

151 Djibouti DEM CU 5 3.85

152 Azerbaijan AR CI 6 3.75

153 Côte d’Ivoire AR CU 6 3.69

154 Egypt RDP CU 7 3.67

155 Ethiopia AR CU 5 3.61

156 Yemen RDP CU 5 3.55

157 Pakistan AR CO 7 3.54

158 Guinea-Bissau DEM CI 6 3.49

159 Chad RDP CU 6 3.48

160 Burundi AR CU 5 3.40

161 Cameroon RDP CU 6 3.40

162 Togo DEM CU 6 3.39

163 Mauritania AR CU 6 3.38

164 Rwanda AR CU 6 3.33

165 Guinea AR CU 5 3.26

166 Tajikistan RDP CI 5 3.26

167 Swaziland TM CU 5 3.19

168 Belarus AR CI 6 3.13

169 Haiti DEM CI 6 3.12

170 Central African Republic DEM CU 6 3.11

171 China AR CI 7 2.99

172 Bhutan TM CO 5 2.96

173 Zimbabwe RDP CU 7 2.95

174 Angola AR CI 4 2.89

175 Iran AR CU 7 2.86

176 Syria AR CU 6 2.72

177 Equatorial Guinea AR CI 5 2.55

178 Saudi Arabia TM CU 6 2.43

179 Congo, Democratic 

Republic of the AR CU 5 2.40

Table 11 (continued)
A B C D E F

180 Vietnam TOT CI 6 2.35

181 Uzbekistan AR CI 6 2.30

182 Cuba TOT CI 6 2.11

183 Lao People’s Democratic 

Republic TOT CU 5 2.06

184 Libya AR CU 5 2.01

185 Afghanistan TOT CU 3 1.99

186 Eritrea AR CU 4 1.96

187 Liberia DEM CU 3 1.82

188 Turkmenistan AR CI 6 1.67

189 Myanmar AR CI 7 1.51

190 Iraq AR CU 3 1.28

191 Sudan AR CU 5 1.24

192 Somalia AR CU 3 1.23

193 Korea, Democratic People’s 

Republic of TOT CI 5 0.08

Compiled from data in tables A1 and A2.

Table 11 (continued)

Correlation between Legal System and

Form of Government

The data summarized in table 11 suggests a correlation between type of legal system and form of government. For example, of the five totalitarian regimes (TOT) listed in table 11, 

three have a civil-law (CI) system and two have a customarylaw (CU) system; none have a common-law (CO) system. Of the 

38 authoritarian regimes (AR), 10 have a civil-law system, and 

25 have a customary-law system; only three have a commonlaw system. In contrast, only 15 of the 122 democracies have a 

customary-law system. Table 12 summarizes the relationship 

between legal systems and forms of government. For the purposes of this analysis, the two protectorates according to the 

1999 Freedom House designations—Timor-Leste and Bosnia 

and Herzegovina—are counted as democracies. The international community recognized Timor-Leste as an independent 

142

CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY
143

CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

democratic state on 20 May 2002,56 and Bosnia and Herzegovina continues making progress as an emerging federal democratic republic.57

Table 12. Legal systems and forms of government for 193 jurisdictions

Form of government

Legal system

Civil

law

Common

 law

Customary

law

Democracies (DEM): 124 (counting two 

protectorates) 75 34 15

Restricted democratic practices (RDP): 16 74 73 79

Traditional monarchies (TM): 10 70 72 78

Authoritarian regimes (AR): 38 10 73 25

Totalitarian regimes (TOT): 5 73 70 72

Total: 193 jurisdictions 92 42 59

Compiled from data presented in tables A1 and A2.

While almost 88 percent of all democracies have either a civil- or 

common-law system, the remaining 12 percent have a customarylaw system. However, democracies with a customary-law system 

all have a very low or average Da. In contrast, no totalitarian regime 

and only about 8 percent of all authoritarian regimes have a common-law system. Almost 63 percent of the 43 authoritarian and 

totalitarian regimes have a customary-law system.

Table 11 suggests another interesting correlation between type 

of legal system and value of Da. For example, all governments 

with a Da of 7.65 or higher are democracies and have either a 

civil-law or common-law system. When jurisdictions are ranked 

in order of Da from highest to lowest, as in table 11, there are no 

customary-law systems in the top 56 jurisdictions (those with 

the highest Da), and there are only 10 customary-law jurisdictions in the top 110 jurisdictions. The remaining 49 customarylaw systems are found in jurisdictions with mostly authoritarian 

and totalitarian forms of government with a Da of 5.39 or less.

A contemporary common-law legal system is generally an adversarial system of British heritage where law was developed by 

custom interpreted by courts. This system now relies upon legislation and court decisions as primary sources of law interpreted 
144

by judicial decision based upon custom and judicial precedent. 

A common-law system emphasizes the rights of individuals. A 

contemporary civil-law legal system is generally an inquisitorial 

system of Roman heritage where law was developed by adopting 

historic Roman codes. This system now relies upon legislation 

as the primary source of law, which is strictly interpreted by 

judicial decision. Although not controlling, judicial precedent is 

often considered and even sometimes cited in civil-law jurisdictions. Civil-law systems normally emphasize social stability.

A customary-law legal system, however, is “indigenous, fragmentary (on a geographical basis), binding only on those who accept it 

as the law applicable to them.”58 Customary law “emphasises status, duties, and community values, whereas human rights provisions emphasise individual rights and freedoms and equality and 

reflect internationally accepted value.”59 A customary-law system 

is a conservative, patriarchal legal system that is generally inconsistent with liberal, egalitarian principles.

The data in table 11 illustrates that civil-law and common-law 

systems are most often found in democracies. These systems are 

more conducive to the political and economic growth of democracies and are more compatible with democratic forms of government and economic freedom. Customary-law systems, on the 

other hand, are most often found in authoritarian and totalitarian 

regimes. These systems are more conducive to the political and 

economic stagnation of nondemocracies and are more compatible 

with nondemocratic forms of government. By their very nature, 

customary-law systems, which emphasize community values over 

individual rights, are not as conducive to political, economic, and 

religious freedom and are more subject to the abusive use of power 

than their civil-law and common-law counterparts. 

Correlation between Da and Economic Performance

Because democracies perform better than nondemocracies 

according to a number of quality-of-life indicators, we can expect that Da—an aggregate of seven data points that measure 

political rights, civil liberties, media independence, freedom of 

religion, economic freedom, and human development—will have 

a strong correlation to indicators of human development such 

as economic achievement. For example, the top seven major inCORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY
145

CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

dustrialized nations, called the Group of Seven (G-7), account 

for about two-thirds of the world’s economic output.60 The G-7 

members are, in order of size, the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada. Not surprisingly, the G-7 members all have a high Da. Russia officially 

became a member of the group in 1997, making it the Group of 

Eight (G-8); however, Russia has the G-8’s smallest economy. 

Table 13 shows the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 

for the world’s top 15 economies along with their percentage of 

the world’s population (1999),61 government type, legal system 

type, and Da.

Table 13. GDP, population, and related data for the world’s top 15 economies, 

sorted by Da

Jurisdiction

GDPa

(in millions)

Ranking

by GDP

Percent 

of world 

populationb

Government 

typec

Legal 

system 

typec Da

d

United States 

(G-8) 9,152,098 71 14.60 DEM CO 9.11

Australia 9, 404,033 14 10.31 DEM CO 8.94

Canada (G-8) 9, 634,898 79 10.52 DEM CO 8.87

United Kingdom 

(G-8) 1,441,787 74 10.98 DEM CO 8.85

Germany (G-8) 2,111,940 73 11.40 DEM CI 8.41

Italy (G-8) 1,170,971 76 10.96 DEM CI 8.32

Spain 9, 595,927 10 10.66 DEM CI 8.25

Japan (G-8) 4,346,922 72 12.10 DEM CI 8.19

France (G-8) 1,432,323 75 11.00 DEM CI 8.08

Korea, Republic 

of 9, 406,940 13 10.78 DEM CI 7.64

Brazil 9, 751,505 78 12.80 DEM CI 6.78

Mexico 9, 483,737 11 11.60 RDP CI 6.71

India 9, 447,292 12 116.7 DEM CO 5.59

Russia (G-8) 9, 401,442 15 12.50 DEM CI 4.45

China 9, 989,465 77 21.20 AR CI 2.99

aUS State Department, “The Size of the G-8 Economies,” http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/

group8/g8size.htm.

bUnited Nations, 1999 population rankings for 20 most populous countries, http://www.un.org/

esa/population/pubsarchive/india/20most.htm. cSee table A1.

dSee table A2.
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

146

As table 13 shows, the G-8 member states, which were responsible for two-thirds of all of the world’s economic output 

in 1999 despite representing only 14.06 percent of the world’s 

population, are all democracies. Not only are they democracies, 

but they all have a Da of greater than eight except for Russia, 

which has a Da of 4.45. Also of significance, all 15 of the world’s 

top economies are either common-law or civil-law jurisdictions. 

Even though the top four economic powers are common-law 

jurisdictions, 10 jurisdictions have civil-law systems; the other 

jurisdiction, India, has a common-law system. 

China, an authoritarian regime with a Da of 2.99, is the most 

notable exception in table 13 as the only nondemocracy among 

the top 15 world economic powers. However, China’s performance in economic measures is better than in political measures. While China has an average normalized value of 1.34 for 

political rights, civil liberties, media independence, and freedom of religion in table A2 (an average of columns C, D, and E), 

it has an average normalized value of 4.2 for economic freedom 

(an average of columns F and G) and a normalized value of 7.21 

for human development (column H). China was most likely the 

seventh largest economic power in the world in 1999, despite 

its largely nondemocratic practices, because it was the world’s 

largest nation with 21.2 percent of the world population and 

because it started incorporating free market concepts into its 

domestic economic policies. China trailed six democracies that 

had almost 20 times the economic output of goods and services 

with almost half the population.

The 42 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) listed in table 14, 

identified by the World Bank in 2004, are neither predominantly 

nondemocratic nor democratic.62 Thirty-four of these countries 

are from Africa, four from Latin America, three from Asia, and one 

from the Middle East. Table 14 sorts these countries by Da.

Table 14. Heavily indebted poor countries sorted by Da

Jurisdiction Government type Legal system Da

Sao Tome and Principe DEM CI 7.81

Guyana DEM CO 7.10

Bolivia DEM CI 6.54
147

Jurisdiction Government type Legal system Da

Ghana DEM CU 6.46

Mali DEM CU 6.19

Benin DEM CU 6.18

Nicaragua DEM CI 6.16

Senegal RDP CI 5.98

Honduras DEM CI 5.72

Madagascar DEM CI 5.67

Kenya AR CU 5.34

Tanzania RDP CU 5.15

Uganda AR CU 5.14

Mozambique DEM CI 4.98

Comoros RDP CU 4.84

Burkina Faso AR CU 4.75

Malawi DEM CU 4.66

Zambia AR CU 4.63

Niger DEM CU 4.45

Sierra Leone DEM CU 4.37

Gambia AR CU 4.36

Congo, Republic of AR CU 4.09

Côte d’Ivoire AR CU 3.69

Ethiopia AR CU 3.61

Yemen RDP CU 3.55

Guinea-Bissau DEM CI 3.49

Chad RDP CU 3.48

Burundi AR CU 3.40

Cameroon RDP CU 3.40

Togo DEM CU 3.39

Mauritania AR CU 3.38

Rwanda AR CU 3.33

Guinea AR CU 3.26

Central African Republic DEM CU 3.11

Angola AR CI 2.89

Congo, Democratic Republic of 

the AR CU 2.40

Vietnam TOT CI 2.35

Table 14 (continued)
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

148

Jurisdiction Government type Legal system Da

Lao People’s Democratic Republic TOT CU 2.06

Liberia DEM CU 1.82

Myanmar AR CI 1.51

Sudan AR CU 1.24

Somalia AR CU 1.23

Compiled from data presented in tables A1 and A2.

Of these 42 HIPCs, 19 are either authoritarian or totalitarian, 

17 are democratic, and six have restricted democratic practices. Also, 30 of these countries have a customary-law system, 

11 have a civil-law system, and one has a common-law system. 

Table 15 summarizes the distribution of types of legal systems 

and governments for these 42 HIPCs.

Table 15. Legal systems and forms of government for HIPCs

Form of government

Legal system

Civil

law

Common

law

Customary

law

Democracies (DEM): 17 17 1 19

Restricted democratic practices (RDP): 6 11 15

Authoritarian regimes (AR): 17 12 15

Totalitarian regimes (TOT): 2 11 11

Total: 42 regimes 11 1 30

Compiled from data presented in tables A1 and A2.

The nature of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes and 

the fact that they predominantly have customary-law systems 

explain why those 19 HIPCs are so poor. The remaining 23 

governments, which are either democracies or have restricted 

democratic practices, could be poor because their transition to 

Table 14 (continued)
149

CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

democracy is too recent for democratic practices to encourage 

a thriving economy. For example, in table 14 the first 10 HIPC 

democracies or countries with restricted democratic practices 

all have values of Da ranging from 5.67 through 7.81, which 

might suggest a productive economy. However, even though 

the democratic system is in place as evidenced by the relatively 

high Da, it may not have had the time to work yet. These countries could also have small populations or populations that 

need the technical and educational skills to enter the international market, which take time to develop.

Alternatively, the 23 democratic or RDP governments could 

be so poor because of their respective legal systems. Fourteen 

of them have strong customary-law systems. Furthermore, the 

one common-law democracy and five of the remaining civillaw countries also have a strong customary- and religious-law 

influence. The remaining three—Honduras, Bolivia, and Nicaragua—have midlevel Da values; however, all three of these 

countries have had very volatile political histories and have 

only recently developed democratic forms of government.63 Ultimately, the explanation is likely a combination of all these dynamics, although the correlations discussed here do illustrate 

that civil-law and common-law systems are more conducive 

to liberal political and economic growth, while customary-law 

systems are more conducive to the political and economic stagnation of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

The World’s Worst Governments

Freedom House lists Burma, China, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, 

Eritrea, Iraq, Laos, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, 

Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam as 16 

of the worst governments in its 2003 report The World’s Most 

Repressive Regimes.

64 Since the data for Da is principally based 

on Freedom House data, it is no surprise that these 16 nations 

have the lowest Da numbers. As table 16 shows, these 16 nations demonstrate the correlation between government type, 

legal system, and Da. Nearly all have authoritarian or totalitarian governments; one has a traditional monarchy. None has 

a common-law system, and half have the least progressive of 

legal systems—customary law. 
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

150

Table 16. Freedom House 16 worst regimes sorted by Da

Jurisdiction

Government 

type

Type of legal 

system

Number of

data points 

used to

calculate Da Da

China AR CI 7 2.99

Syria AR CU 6 2.72

Equatorial Guinea AR CI 5 2.55

Saudi Arabia TM CU 6 2.43

Vietnam TOT CI 6 2.35

Uzbekistan AR CI 6 2.30

Cuba TOT CI 6 2.11

Lao People’s Democratic 

Republic TOT CU 5 2.06

Libya AR CU 5 2.01

Eritrea AR CU 4 1.96

Turkmenistan AR CI 6 1.67

Myanmar AR CI 7 1.51

Iraq AR CU 3 1.28

Sudan AR CU 5 1.24

Somalia AR CU 3 1.23

Korea, Democratic People’s 

Republic of TOT CI 5 0.08

Compiled from data presented in tables A1 and A2.

Transparency International ranks 146 nations in its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which surveys business people 

and country analysts to measure their perceptions of the degree of corruption in those nations.65 A score of 10 means a nation is highly clean, and a score of zero means highly corrupt. 

In 2004 the 14 cleanest countries (in order of decreasing score) 

were Finland, New Zealand, Denmark, Iceland, Singapore, 

Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Australia, the Netherlands, the 

United Kingdom, Canada, Austria, and Luxembourg—all with 

a CPI score of 8.4 or higher. These 14 nations also all have a 

Da of 8.79 or higher except for Singapore, which has a Da of 

6.06. The 14 most highly corrupt nations (in order of decreasing score) were Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
151

CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Indonesia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 

Azerbaijan, Paraguay, Chad, Myanmar, Nigeria, Bangladesh, 

and Haiti—all with a CPI score of 2.0 or lower. These 14 nations also have a Da of 4.93 or lower except for Georgia and 

Paraguay, which have Da values of 5.24 and 5.88 respectively.

In their 2003 Trafficking in Persons Report, the US Department of State places 15 countries in tier 3, which includes those 

countries “whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards [for eliminating trafficking of persons] and are 

not making significant efforts to do so”: Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Greece, 

Haiti, Kazakhstan, Liberia, North Korea, Sudan, Suriname, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.66 Eleven of these countries have a Da of 

5.43 or less. However, one common-law and three civil-law democracies are also in tier 3 and have a Da of 6.51 or higher.

In the 2003 report, the State Department also designates 

seven countries as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, 

Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.67 These seven countries 

all have a Da of 2.86 or less; five are authoritarian regimes with 

customary-law systems, and two are totalitarian regimes with 

civil-law systems.

This chapter validates the correlations between democracy 

and a wide range of major human goals. The degree to which a 

government protects political rights, civil liberties, media independence, freedom of religion, and economic freedom—the core 

elements of a liberal democracy—is an important indicator of 

its association with nonviolence, peace, human freedom, and 

human development. The correlations established in this chapter also demonstrate the important role of the legal system in 

explaining and predicting government behavior. Civil-law and 

common-law systems can be found in all forms of government, 

but are most often found in democracies, where they foster political and economic growth. Customary-law systems, however, 

are more conducive to the political and economic stagnation 

of nondemocracies and are more subject to the abusive use of 

power than their civil-law and common-law counterparts. Not 

surprisingly, customary law is the most common legal system 

for authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Democracy and the 

rule of law are valuable not only for their ability to reduce the 

occurrence of war. Good governance, which can be equated by 
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

152

and large with democratic governance, is indeed the key factor 

for promoting human development.

Notes

1. Rummel, Power Kills, 23.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. See also Maoz and Abdolali, “Regime Types,” 3–35. They observe 

that if “politically free states do not fight one another then the more democracies, the less international conflict.”

4. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, xxii, 2, 60.

5. Ibid., 9. Moore also notes that “preliminary evidence suggests that the 

principal problem nations with respect to trafficking in illegal drugs have 

been nondemocratic” (102n1).

6. Siegle, Weinstein, and Halperin, “Why Democracies Excel,” 58–59.

7. Ibid., 59–66.

8. Ibid., 62.

9. Ibid., 63–66.

10. Sen, “Freedom and Needs.”

11. Ahlmark, speech, 8 April 1999.

12. Ibid.

13. Norberg, In Defence of Global Capitalism, 8.

14. Ibid., 12–13.

15. Ibid., 21–23.

16. Ibid., 23–39, 58–63.

17. Ibid., 40.

18. Ibid., 40–43.

19. Ibid., 63–67, 81, 221–22.

20. Ibid., 58.

21. Ibid., 55–56. Liberal democracies have not purged themselves of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS. It is estimated that over 1 million people (approximately one out of every 250 people) in the United States have the HIV infection or AIDS. See the Web site of the American Foundation for AIDS Research 

at http://www.amfar.org.

22. Ibid., 55.

23. UN FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2004, 6, 8.

24. UN ILO, World Employment Report 2004–05, 24.

25. Norberg, In Defence of Global Capitalism, 56.

26. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World (About the Survey).”

27. Ibid., “Freedom of the Press.”

28. Ibid., “A History.” This religious freedom report is now being published 

by the Hudson Institute.

29. The Heritage Foundation, “About Us.”

30. Ibid., 2007 Index.

31. The Fraser Institute, Web site.

32. Ibid., “The Economic Freedom of the World Project.”
153

CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

33. UN, “United Nations Development Programme.”

34. UNDP, Human Development Report 2003, 2.

35. Ibid., “Human Development Reports.”

36. Ibid., Human Development Report 2003, 1.

37. UN, “Member States.” In 2003, there were 191 member states in the 

UN. However, the Freedom House reports used in this study refer to 192 

states because they include Taiwan.

38. US Department of State, “Countries.”

39. A spreadsheet containing all the Freedom in the World country ratings 

from 1972 through 2007 is available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/

uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls.

40. Freedom House, “Methodology,” Freedom in the World 2004.

41. The ratings for each jurisdiction as well as a discussion of specific 

conditions in that jurisdiction can be found in Freedom House, “Country 

Reports,” Freedom in the World 2004.

42. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2003.

43. Ibid., “Methodology,” Freedom of the Press 2003.

44. Marshall, Religious Freedom in the World.

45. Miles, Feulner, and O’Grady, 2004 Index of Economic Freedom.

46. Ibid., 51.

47. Gwartney and Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World: 2003 Annual 

Report, 6.

48. UNDP, Human Development Report 2003, 237.

49. Ibid., 60.

50. Ibid., 237–39.

51. Ibid., vi.

52. At the end of 2000.

53. Freedom House, Democracy’s Century.

54. CIA, World Factbook 2003.

55. Ibid.

56. CIA, “East Timor,” World Factbook 2003. See also the official government Web site of Timor-Leste at http://www.timor-leste.gov.tl/, which 

proudly declares it to be the “world’s newest democracy” after 450 years of 

continuous foreign occupation.

57. CIA, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” World Factbook 2003.

58. Care, “Conflict between Customary Law and Human Rights in the 

South Pacific.”

59. Ibid.

60. US Department of State, “The Group of Seven and the Group of 

Eight.”

61. UN Population Division, “The Twenty Most Populous Countries.”

62. The list of countries eligible for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative 

changes. The current list can be found on the World Bank Web site at http://

www.worldbank.org/hipc/.

63. CIA, “Bolivia,” “Honduras,” and “Nicaragua,” World Factbook 2003.

64. Freedom House, The World’s Most Repressive Regimes, vii.

65. Transparency International, Corruptions Perception Index 2004.
CORRELATIVE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY

154

66. US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2003, 15, 21.

67. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, ix. As a 

result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush formally rescinded Iraq’s 

status as a state sponsor of terrorism on 24 September 2004.
155

Chapter 7

Conclusion: Democracy and Deterrence in 

the Twenty-First Century

There are those, I know, who will reply that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and mind, is 

nothing but a dream. They are right. It is the American 

Dream.

 —Archibald MacLeish

—A Continuing Journey

Americans are one of the most religious peoples on 

Earth. Because they know that liberty, just as life itself, 

is not earned but a gift from God, they seek to share 

that gift with the world.

 —Pres. Ronald Reagan

—Moscow State University, 1988

The sole duty for all governments is to care for their people. 

Good governance and a national legal system that embodies 

the rule of law and permits robust economic development are 

the keys to the future of any sovereign nation and the future 

of human liberty and development as well. To govern successfully, national leaders must earn the trust of their people and 

the international community. Leaders must represent their 

people, treat them justly, and protect their liberty, standard of 

living, health, and economic condition. The people of a nation 

are the economic engine in a free market that builds the nation 

through domestic commerce and international exports. The 

people of a nation serve as the potential market base that attracts imports and business development by the international 

community. National leaders must do everything within their 

power to establish and preserve an honest and transparent 

government and legal system that includes a constitution and 

a set of laws empowering all the men and women of their nation 

to reach their full human potential. Leaders must guarantee 
CONCLUSION

156

all citizens, including all minorities, extensive human rights 

and civil liberties. This is an extraordinary vision and challenge, but the peoples of the world—regardless of their heritage, culture, religion, nationality, gender, or race—deserve no 

less. Some leaders, however, fall short in this duty, and some 

abuse their power. Thus leaders must be held accountable by 

domestic and international incentives that ensure meaningful 

checks and balances for governmental power. 

The United States is the greatest political achievement in human history. It has adopted the extraordinary vision and challenge of preserving human rights and civil liberties domestically 

and abroad. Pres. George W. Bush’s second inaugural address 

embraces the theme of promoting and protecting human liberty 

around the world and acknowledges the role of human liberty 

in US national security and international peace. The speech 

echoes the work of Locke, Montesquieu, Paine, Kant, Russett, 

Rummel, and Moore and is consistent with the core principles 

of this study. Bush’s words attest to the real-world implications of Moore’s postulate on the cause of war and incentive 

theory of war avoidance:

There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred 

and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward 

the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human 

freedom. . . . 

The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success 

of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the 

expansion of freedom in all the world. . . .

Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of selfgovernment, because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission that created 

our nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is 

the urgent requirement of our nation’s security, and the calling of our 

time. So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the 

growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and 

culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. This is 

not primarily the task of arms, though we will defend ourselves and our 

friends by force of arms when necessary. . . .

We will persistently clarify the choice before every ruler and every nation: 

The moral choice between oppression, which is always wrong, and freedom, 
157

CONCLUSION

which is eternally right. America will not pretend that jailed dissidents prefer their chains, or that women welcome humiliation and servitude, or that 

any human being aspires to live at the mercy of bullies. . . .

All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States 

will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you 

stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.1

Bush’s speech recognizes one of the basic principles expressed in this study and incorporates it as a central element 

of US foreign policy: the spread of democracy is a strategy of 

war avoidance, and the free world must actively facilitate the 

growth of democracy to ensure its own security.2 Bush highlights the importance of human freedom, self-governance, and 

deterrence in shaping peace in today’s world. The president’s 

theme is consistent with Moore’s postulate on the cause of war, 

which argues that war is caused by the synergy between the 

existence of a potentially aggressive nondemocratic (totalitarian) regime and the absence of effective systemwide deterrence. 

To avoid war, as Moore’s incentive theory suggests, positive 

and negative incentives must be used to discourage leaders 

from committing aggression. Thus Bush asserts the role of the 

United States in seeking, supporting, and defending human 

freedom and the growth of democracies in every nation and 

culture as a means to end tyranny in our world. 

Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance is an important analytical tool and framework to accomplish the foreign-policy objectives of securing peace and liberty in the world. This study 

validates Moore’s theory and advocates both general and specific 

deterrence applications of the theory. The analytical formula for 

calculating the probability of peace in specific crisis settings along 

with the indexing and rating of each national leader in the world 

according to his or her propensity for aggression can serve as a 

predictive tool to analyze and strengthen systemwide deterrence 

incentives generally as well as in a specific crisis setting. The retrospective analysis of Saddam Hussein’s behavior leading up to 

the Gulf War can serve as a model for analyzing and predicting 

the behavior of other national leaders. The analytical process proposed in this study can be applied to highly individualized situations and personalities, making it an ideal tool for the threats of 
CONCLUSION

158

the twenty-first century, which are more changeable and unconventional than the threats of the Cold War era. 

Moore’s incentive theory can be used to guide the foreign and 

national-security policy of nations and the charter principles of 

regional and international organizations. Democracies are inherently peaceful because of internal checks and balances that 

discourage the aggressive use of force; however, nondemocracies 

need external checks and balances—effective systemwide deterrence measures—to prevent aggression. Thus the more democracies in the world, the greater the level of international peace 

and security. Similarly, the more incentives that provide systemwide deterrence at the individual, state, and international levels, 

the greater the level of international peace and security.

Democracies also promote human freedom and development. Most people naturally migrate toward democratic forms 

of government if allowed to choose, or at least they desire to 

choose the form of government under which they live. However, throughout the world, many nondemocratic rulers use 

force to assume power and then harshly abuse the law, using 

military and police forces to suppress the freedom and diminish the well-being of their peoples. In these cases, democracy 

is not able to develop naturally through the free choice of the 

people. Sometimes democracy must be encouraged through the 

actions of other free nations within the international community, who must actively facilitate, through military intervention 

when necessary, the political environment in which people can 

freely choose their form of government and new democracies 

can develop. Free nations must make an active effort to promote global democratization and strengthen systemwide deterrence at the individual, state, and international levels.

Actively promoting democracy includes providing incentives 

for nondemocratic forms of government to transition toward 

democracy, creating an environment for democracies to develop 

in ways consistent with diverse religions and cultures, and assisting willing governments in their transition to democracy. 

All democratic states, prodemocracy regional and international 

organizations, and the UN should be actively engaged in developing comprehensive strategies to promote democratic forms 

of government. Where that is not possible, they should work to 

establish systemwide deterrence incentives at all levels. This 
159

CONCLUSION

is the path to international peace. Moore concludes that enhancing deterrence against war and terrorism “requires a focus 

on all elements of deterrence, from maintenance of a strong 

military to appropriate . . . advance communication about unacceptable actions.”3 He also argues that we should enhance 

collective security; strengthen the UN; focus deterrence on all 

levels, especially regime elites; and perhaps designate a special 

representative to the president to more effectively coordinate 

US democracy-assistance programs.4

Free nations must also work to solidify and spread the rule of 

law, which is essential to maintaining peace in the world. International legal scholar Philip Allott describes the transformative 

power of law:

In the making of the human world, nothing has been more important 

than what we call law. Law is the intermediary between human power 

and human ideas. Law transforms our natural power into social power, 

transforms our self-interest into social interest, and transforms social 

interest into self-interest. . . . 

Law is a wonderful, and insufficiently appreciated, human invention. . . . 

The hallowed ideal characteristics of democracy are all better seen as ingenious methods for using law to restrain law.5

Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has observed 

that the “rule of law is fundamental to the existence of a free 

society. . . . [It] secures our liberty and separates civilization 

from anarchy.”6 She concludes:

To preserve liberty, then, we must preserve the rule of law, we must 

hold those who violate it accountable. But holding these individuals 

“accountable” does not necessarily mean prosecution. There is a tension between the international obligation to prosecute certain crimes 

and the countervailing interests of national sovereignty in choosing to 

pursue accountability through some combination of amnesty and public acknowledgment of the crimes. Neither approach will be appropriate 

for all situations; indeed, it is doubtful that there can be any adequate 

response to mass atrocities. . . . 

Instead, we must take the route that best vindicates the rule of law in each 

situation, pursuing justice while nurturing burgeoning democracies.7

The rule of law is the key underpinning of human liberty and democracy; it restrains, channels, and transforms natural power in 

socially beneficial ways. Law is also a key component of effective 
CONCLUSION

160

deterrence because it creates incentives for individuals, including national leaders, to behave in certain ways and holds accountable those who violate social and legal norms. As O’Connor 

notes, law can be used to enforce international standards of behavior in ways that also nurture the growth of democracy.

The spread of democracy encourages peace and human development. Should free states therefore take up arms to achieve 

these clearly desirable ends? Rummel asks similar questions: 

“To wage peace you should foster freedom. But how? Encourage revolution? Intervene in dictatorships and throw out tyrants? Make war for democracy?” He answers those questions 

with a resounding no:

People should be left alone to form their own communities or states, to 

live their own lives. If they prefer to live in authoritarian societies (as 

many do) or under totalitarian governments, that is their choice. . . .

Promoting freedom does not mean, then, forcibly converting others into 

accepting an exchange society and libertarian government; nor does it 

mean waging a crusade against other societies or governments or ideologies. Instead, fostering freedom means to facilitate procedurally and 

institutionally people making their own choices about how they want to 

live, whether with freedom or not, as long as they do not try to impose 

their choice on others.8

Rummel is correct. People should, in general, be left alone to 

organize their communities according to their own values and 

customs, and it should not be US national policy to promote 

freedom through the use of force. However, under extreme situations such as democide and genocide, military intervention may 

be necessary when deterrence fails. While people should be able 

to choose their own form of government, and some may freely 

choose to live in authoritarian societies, it is doubtful that they 

choose to be slaughtered, and military intervention may be necessary to protect a population from megamurderers. It should 

not, however, be the primary tool for spreading democracy. 

Instead Rummel defines 10 “vectors of action” that facilitate 

freedom, five at the state level and five at the international level:

State Level

1. Enhance and guarantee freedom of choice and mobility of 

citizens and groups.
161

CONCLUSION

2. Decentralize government power.

3. Expand the horizontal distribution of power.

4. Increase the political participation of communities and 

peoples.

5. Decrease government’s social and economic control and 

intervention.

International Level

1. Facilitate and guarantee through the United Nations a 

right to emigrate.

2. Encourage and aid efforts through the United Nations for 

national self-determination and independence.

3. Represent people in the United Nations, as well as 

states.

4. Gradually strengthen United Nations peacekeeping and 

peacemaking machinery.

5. Increase the global power of the United Nations (transform the United Nations into a minimum libertarian government monopolizing force).9

Rummel’s “grand master principle” for waging peace is “whether 

at the state or international level, promote the maximum freedom of individuals, groups, and states, consistent with a like 

freedom for others.”10

After more than a decade of research on the interrelationship 

between government, law, and war in the work of scholars and 

philosophers from Kant to Moore and Rummel, it is evident to 

this author that promoting democracy, human freedom, economic freedom, and the rule of law are the significant contributing factors in promoting world peace and human development. The absence of any meaningful argument to the contrary 

is remarkable. Where democracy, freedom, and the rule of 

law do not prevail, deterrence mechanisms must be erected 

against the aggressive tendencies of many nondemocratic leaders. These conclusions are consistent with Moore’s work on the 

cause of war and war avoidance. His many decades spent sorting through and analyzing the complexities of empirical data, 
CONCLUSION

162

economic theory, metaphysical reasoning, and the dynamics of 

human behavior as they relate to international peace and security have revealed how democracy, human freedom, economic 

freedom, and the rule of law interact to promote world peace 

and human development. The implications of Moore’s theory of 

war avoidance are profound. If the premise of Moore’s theory 

had been actively embraced by the United States and other 

democratic nations as a major foreign policy strategy 100 years 

ago, as it is now by the United States, one wonders how many 

of the 169 million murders of innocent people by their own government (using Rummel’s conservative estimates) could have 

been prevented and how many of the 38.5 million war deaths 

during the twentieth century could have been avoided. For 

example, Hussein’s aggression against Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War demonstrate a failure of systemwide deterrence. Had Moore’s principles for effective, targeted deterrence 

measures been adopted, particularly the requirement to clearly 

communicate the consequences of unacceptable actions, the 

invasion and war might have been prevented. 

Wars and their attendant human misery begin in the minds 

of national leaders whose power is unchecked by incentives and 

deterrence mechanisms. Because such restraints are inherent in 

democratic forms of government, war is comparatively rare where 

human freedom, economic freedom, and the rule of law thrive. 

The spread of democracy in the twenty-first century is therefore of 

utmost importance in advancing human welfare. Actively encouraging the expansion of freedom is the responsibility of democratic 

nations. Democracy is, as Bush stated in his first inaugural address, “a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations. Our 

democratic faith is more than the creed of our country, it is the 

inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a 

trust we bear and pass along. . . . If our country does not lead the 

cause of freedom, it will not be led.”11

Though democracy is indeed taking root in many nations, the 

free world cannot rest. For all the progress made in the democratization of the former Soviet bloc and in other parts of the 

world, a recent Freedom House study reports that democracy 

and good governance are threatened or unattainable in many 

places. Russia can “no longer be considered a democracy at 

all” by most standards, and democratic development in smaller 
163

CONCLUSION

countries such as Thailand and Bangladesh has been derailed.12

These disturbing developments underscore the significance of 

the war avoidance strategies outlined in this study: encourage 

the spread of democracy and the rule of law while establishing 

positive and negative incentive and deterrence mechanisms to 

restrain those who govern nondemocratic nations.

Notes

1. Pres. George W. Bush, second inaugural address.

2. The spread of democracy has not always been an imperative of US foreign policy. Appendix B traces the history of American foreign policy from a 

position of isolationism to the proactive stance held by recent presidential administrations.

3. Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 87.

4. Ibid., 87–89.

5. Allott, “Law and the Re-Making of Humanity,” 19–20, 27.

6. O’Connor, “Vindicating the Rule of Law,” 31.

7. Ibid., 38.

8. Rummel, In the Minds of Men, 281.

9. Ibid., 283.

10. Ibid., 285.

11. Pres. George W. Bush, first inaugural address.

12. Freedom House, country reports, Countries at the Crossroads 2007.

165

Appendix A

Freedom, Human Development, 

and Democracy Ratings

Note: The tables in this appendix present data discussed in chapter 6, which 

explains the purposes and sources of this data.

Acronyms and Abbreviations in Tables A1–A3

AF Africa

AM absolute monarchy

AR authoritarian regime

C colonial and imperial dependency

CI civil law

CM constitutional monarchy

CO common law

CU customary law

Da aggregated index value of democracy

DEM democracy

EAP East Asia and the Pacific

EUR Europe and Eurasia

F free

FH Freedom House

FI Fraser Institute

HDI Human Development Index

HF Heritage Foundation

M monarchy

MF mostly free

MU mostly unfree

NE Near East

NF not free

P protectorate

PF partly free

R repressed

RDP restricted democratic practices

SA South Asia

SAR special administrative region

TM traditional monarchy

TOT totalitarian regime

UF unfree

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

WH Western Hemisphere

167

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Afghanistana(19 Nov 1946) SA NF, 6/6 NF, 74 TOT, transi- tional CU

The Bonn Agreement calls for a judicial commission to rebuild the justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law, and Afghan legal traditions

Albania(14 Dec 1955) EUR PF, 3/3 PF, 50 MU, 3.10 5.6 M, .735

DEM, emerging democracy

CI

Algeria(8 Oct 1962) NE NF, 6/5 NF, 62 MU, 3.31 4.2 M, .704 AR, republic CU

Socialist, based on French and Islamic law; judicial review of legislative acts in ad hoc constitutional council composed of various public officials, including several supreme court justices

American Samoa (US territory)

EAP CO

Andorra(28 Jul 1993) EUR F, 1/1 F, 8

DEM, parliamentary democracy

CI

Based on French and Spanish civil codes; no judicial review of legislative acts

Table A1. Freedom and human development ratings for 267 national and territorial jurisdictionsaMost data in table A1 is from 2003. An explanation of each column is provided in chapter 6.
A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Angola(1 Dec 1976) af NF, 6/5 NF, 72 Not graded in 2003b L, .377

AR, republic; nominally a multiparty democracy with a strong presidential system 

CI

Based on Portuguese civil-law system and customary law; recently modified to accommodate political pluralism and increased use of free markets

Anguilla(UK territory) WH CO Based on English com- mon lawAntarctica (administered by member nations of the 1951 Antarctic Treaty)

WH

Consultative management by parties to the Antarctic Treaty

CU

Administered through meetings of the consultative member nations of the Antarctic Treaty. Decisions from these meetings are carried out by these member nations (within their areas) in accordance with their national laws

Antigua and Barbuda(11 Nov 1981)

WH PF, 4/2 PF, 45 M, .798

RDP, constitutional monarchy with UK-style parliament 

CO Based on English com- mon law

Argentina(24 Oct 1945) WH F, 2/2 PF, 39 F, 3 MU, 3.48 6.5 H, .849 DEM, republic CI Mixture of US and West European legal systems

Table A1 (continued)

bThe Heritage Foundation has suspended the evaluation of some countries because deteriorating conditions prevent the collection of accurate or 

measurable data.

168
169

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Armenia(2 Mar 1992) EUR PF, 4/4 NF, 65 PF, 4 MF, 2.63 M, .729 DEM, republic CI Based on civil-law system Aruba (part of the Netherlands) WH Parliamentary democracy CI

Based on Dutch civillaw system, with some English common law influence

Ashmore and Cartier Islands (Australian territory) EAP CO

The laws of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Northern Territory of Australia valid where applicable

Australia(1 Nov 1945) eap F, 1/1 F, 14 MF, 1.88 8.0 H, .939

DEM, democratic, federal-state system recognizing the British monarch as sovereign 

CO Based on English com- mon law

Austria(14 Dec 1955) EUR F, 1/1 F, 23 F, 2 MF, 2.08 7.6 H, .929 DEM, federal republic CI

Civil-law system of Roman origin; judicial review of legislative acts by the Constitutional Court; separate administrative and civil/penal supreme courts

Azerbaijan(2 Mar 1992) EUR NF, 6/5 NF, 73 PF, 5 MU, 3.39 M, .744 AR, republic CI Based on civil-law system 

Table A1 (continued)
170

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Azores(autonomous region of Portugal) EUR CIBahamas(18 Sep 1973) WH F, 1/1 F, 11 MF, 2.25 6.6 H, .812

DEM, constitutional parliamentary democracy 

CO Based on English com- mon law 

Bahrain(21 Sep 1971) NE PF, 5/5 NF, 68 MF, 2.08 7.1 H, .839

TM, constitutional hereditary monarchy 

CU

Based on Islamic law and English common law 

Baker Island (US territory) EAP CO US laws valid where applicable Bangladesh(17 Sep 1974) SA PF, 4/4 NF, 65 UF, 6 MU, 3.70 5.6 M, .502

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CO Based on English com- mon law 

Barbados(9 Dec 1966) WH F, 1/1 F, 14 MF, 2.41 5.8 H, .888

DEM, parliamentary democracy; independent sovereign state within the Commonwealth 

CO

English common law; no judicial review of legislative acts 

Bassas da India (possession of France) AF CI Laws of France valid where applicable 

Table A1 (continued)
171

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Belarus (Byelorussia)(24 Oct 1945) 

EUR NF, 6/6 NF, 82 PF, 5 MR, 4.09 H, .804 AR, republic CI Based on civil-law system 

Belgium(27 Dec 1945) EUR F, 1/1 F, 9 F, 3 MF, 2.19 7.4 H, .937

DEM, federal parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch 

CI

Civil-law system influenced by English constitutional theory; judicial review of legislative acts

Belize(25 Sep 1981) WH F, 1/2 F, 23 MF, 2.69 6.3 M, .776

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CO English law 

Benin(20 Sep 1960) af F, 2/2 F, 28 MU, 3.44 5.6 L, .411

DEM, republic under multiparty democratic rule

CU Based on French civil law and customary law

Bermuda (UK territory) WH

Parliamentary British overseas territory with internal selfgovernment 

CO English law 

Bhutan(21 Sep 1971) SA NF, 6/5 NF, 70 UF, 6 M, .511

TM, monarchy; special treaty relationship with India 

CO

Based on Indian law and English common law

Table A1 (continued)
172

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Bolivia(14 Nov 1945) WH PF, 3/3 F, 30 MF, 2.59 6.5 M, .672 DEM, re- public CI Based on Spanish law and Napoleonic CodeBosnia and Herzegovina(22 May 1992) 

EUR PF, 4/4 PF, 49 MU, 3.30 M, .777

P, emerging federal democratic republic 

CI Based on civil-law system 

Botswana(17 Oct 1966) af F, 2/2 F, 30 F, 2 MF, 2.55 7.1 M, .614

DEM, parliamentary republic 

CU

Based on Roman-Dutch law and local customary law; judicial review limited to matters of interpretation

Bouvet Island (territory of Norway)

AF CI Laws of Norway valid where applicable 

Brazil(24 Oct 1945) WH F, 2/3 PF, 38 F, 2 MU, 3.10 5.8 M, .777 DEM, federa- tive republic CI Based on Roman codesBritish Indian Ocean Territory (UK territory)

AF CO UK laws valid where applicable 

British Virgin Islands (UK territory)

WH CO English law 

Brunei Darussalam(21 Sep 1984)

eap NF, 6/5 NF, 76 H, .872

TM, constitutional sultanate 

CO

Based on English common law; for Muslims, Islamic Sharia law supersedes civil law in a number of areas 

Table A1 (continued)
173

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Bulgaria(14 Dec 1955) EUR F, 1/2 F, 30 PF, 4 MU, 3.08 5.3 M, .795

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CI

Civil law and criminal law based on Roman law

Burkina Faso(20 Sep 1960) af PF, 4/4 PF, 39 MU, 3.28 L, .330

AR, parliamentary republic 

CU

Based on French civil-law system and customary law 

Burundi(18 Sep 1962) af PF, 5/5 NF, 76 Not graded in 2003 5.1 L, .337 AR, republic CU Based on German and Belgian civil codes and customary lawCambodia(14 Dec 1955) eap NF, 6/5 NF, 64 MF, 2.90 M, .556

RDP, multiparty democracy under a constitutional monarchy established in September 1993 

CI

Primarily a civil-law mixture of Frenchinfluenced codes from the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, royal decrees, and acts of the legislature, with influences of customary law and remnants of Communist legal theory; increasing influence recently of common law 

Cameroon(20 Sep 1960) af NF, 6/6 NF, 65 MU, 3.63 5.6 L, .499

RDP, unitary republic; multiparty presidential regime

CU

Based on French civil-law system, with commonlaw influence

Table A1 (continued)
A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Canada(9 Nov 1945) WH F, 1/1 F, 17 MF, 1.98 8.1 H, .937

DEM, confederation with parliamentary democracy 

CO

Based on English common law, except in Quebec, where civillaw system based on French law prevails

Cape Verde(16 Sep 1975) af F, 1/1 F, 30 MF, 2.86 M, .727 DEM, republic CI Derived from the legal system of Portugal Cayman Islands (UK territory)

WH British crown colony CO British common law and local statutes 

Central African Republic(20 Sep 1960)

af NF, 7/5 NF, 67 MU, 3.38 4.9 L, .363 DEM, republic CU Based on French law 

Chad(20 Sep 1960) af NF, 6/5 NF, 67 MU, 3.54 5.6 L, .376 RDP, republic CU

Based on French civillaw system and Chadian customary law

Channel Islands(consists of British Crown dependencies of Guernsey and Jersey)

eUR CO

Table A1 (continued)

174
175

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Chile(24 Oct 1945) WH F, 1/1 F, 22 F, 3 F, 1.91 7.3 H, .831 DEM, republic CI

Based on Code of 1857 derived from Spanish law and subsequent codes influenced by French and Austrian law; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court

China, People’s Republic of(24 Oct 1945)

eap NF, 7/6 NF, 80 UF, 6 MU, 3.64 5.5 M, .721 AR, Commu- nist state CI

A complex amalgam of custom and statute, largely criminal law; rudimentary civil code in effect since 1 January 1987; new legal codes in effect since 1 January 1980; continuing efforts are being made to improve civil, administrative, criminal, and commercial law 

Christmas Island (territory of Australia)

EAP CO

Under the authority of the governor general of Australia and Australian law 

Clipperton Island (possession of France) WH CI Laws of France valid where applicable 

Table A1 (continued)
176

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Cocos (Keeling) Islands (territory of Australia)

EAP CO Based on the laws of Australia and local laws 

Colombia(5 Nov 1945) WH PF, 4/4 NF, 63 PF, 4 MU, 3.13 5.4 M, .779

DEM, republic; executive branch dominates government structure 

CI

Based on Spanish law; a new criminal code modeled after US procedures was enacted in 1992–93; judicial review of executive and legislative acts 

Comoros(12 Nov 1975) af PF, 5/4 PF, 43 M, .528

RDP, independent republic 

CU

French and Sharia (Islamic) law in a new consolidated code 

Congo, Democratic Republic of the (formerly Zaire)(20 Sep 1960)

af NF, 6/6 NF, 82 Not graded in 2003 3.9 L, .363

AR, dictatorship; presumably undergoing a transition to representative government 

CU

Based on Belgian civil-law system and tribal law

Congo, Republic of the(20 Sep 1960)

af PF, 5/4 PF, 55 MU, 3.90 4.5 M, .502 AR, republic CU

Based on French civil-law system and customary law 

Table A1 (continued)
177

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Cook Islands (self-governing in free association with New Zealand)

EAP

Self-governing parliamentary democracy 

CO

Based on New Zealand law and English common law 

Coral Sea Islands (territory of Australia)

EAP CO Laws of Australia valid where applicable 

Costa Rica(2 Nov 1945) WH F, 1/2 F, 14 MF, 2.71 7.1 H, .832

DEM, democratic republic 

CI

Based on Spanish civil-law system; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court

Côte d’Ivoire(Ivory Coast)(20 Sep 1960)

af NF, 6/5 NF, 68 MU, 3.18 5.9 L, .396

AR, republic; multiparty presidential regime established 1960 

CU

Based on French civil-law system and customary law; judicial review in the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court

Croatia(22 May 1992) EUR F, 2/2 PF, 33 MU, 3.11 6.0 H, .818

DEM, presidential parliamentary democracy

CI Based on civil-law system 

Cuba(24 Oct 1945) WH NF, 7/7 NF, 94 UF, 6 MR, 4.08 H, .806 TOT, Com- munist state CI

Based on Spanish and American law, with large elements of Communist legal theory

Table A1 (continued)
178

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Cyprus(20 Sep 1960) EUR F, 1/1 F, 18 MF, 1.95 6.2 H, .891 DEM, republic CI

Based on common law, with civil-law modifications 

Czech Republic(19 Jan 1993)

EUR F, 1/2 F, 23 MF, 2.39 6.9 H, .861

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CI

Civil-law system based on Austro-Hungarian codes; legal code modified to bring it in line with Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe obligations and to expunge Marxist-Leninist legal theory 

Denmark(24 Oct 1945) EUR F, 1/1 F, 11 MF, 1.80 7.6 H, .930

DEM, constitutional monarchy 

CI

Civil-law system; judicial review of legislative acts

Djibouti(20 Sep 1977) af PF, 5/5 NF, 65 MU, 3.23 L, .462 DEM, republic CU

Based on French civillaw system, traditional practices, and Islamic law 

Dominica(18 Dec 1978) WH F, 1/1 F, 14 M, .776

DEM, parliamentary democracy; republic within the Commonwealth 

CO Based on English com- mon law 

Table A1 (continued)
179

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Dominican Republic(24 Oct 1945)

WH F, 3/2 PF, 33 MU, 3.51 6.6 M, .737

DEM, representative democracy 

CI Based on French civil codes 

Ecuador(21 Dec 1945) WH PF, 3/3 PF, 41 MU, 3.60 5.0 M, .731 DEM, republic CI Based on civil-law systemEgypt(24 Oct 1945) NE NF, 6/6 NF, 79 PF, 5 MU, 3.28 6.5 M, .648 RDP, republic CU

Based on English common law, Islamic law, and Napoleonic codes; judicial review by Supreme Court and Council of State (oversees validity of administrative decisions) 

El Salvador(24 Oct 1945) WH F, 2/3 PF, 38 F, 3 MF, 2.24 7.2 M, .719 DEM, republic CI

Based on civil and Roman law, with traces of common law; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court 

Equatorial Guinea(12 Nov 1968)

af NF, 7/6 NF, 81 MU, 3.69 M, .664 AR, republic CI

Partly based on Spanish civil law and tribal custom 

Table A1 (continued)
180

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Eritrea(28 May 1993) af NF, 7/6 NF, 83 L, .446

AR, transitional government CU

Primary basis is the Ethiopian legal code of 1957, with revisions; new civil, commercial, and penal codes have not yet been promulgated; also relies on customary and post-independence laws and, for civil cases involving Muslims, Sharia law 

Estonia(17 Sep 1991) EUR F, 1/2 F, 17 F, 1 MF, 1.76 7.5 H, .833

DEM, parliamentary republic 

CI

Based on civil-law system; no judicial review of legislative acts 

Ethiopia(13 Nov 1945) af PF, 5/5 NF, 64 MU, 3.33 L, .359 AR, federal republic CU Currently transitional mix of national and regional courts Europa Island (possession of France)

AF CI Laws of France valid where applicable 

Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) (UK territory; also claimed by Argentina)

WH CO English common law 

Faroe Islands (part of Denmark) EUR CI Danish law

Table A1 (continued)
181

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Fiji(13 Oct 1970) eap PF, 4/3 F, 29 MU, 3.06 6.1 M, .754 DEM, republic CO Based on British system Finland(14 Dec 1955) EUR F, 1/1 F, 10 F, 1 MF, 1.95 7.7 H, .930 DEM, republic CI

Civil-law system based on Swedish law; Supreme Court may request legislation interpreting or modifying laws

France(24 Oct 1945) EUR F, 1/1 F, 17 F, 3 MF, 2.63 6.7 H, .925 DEM, republic CI

Civil-law system with indigenous concepts; review of administrative but not legislative acts 

French Guiana (department of France)

WH CI French legal system 

French Polynesia (territory of France)

EAP CI Based on French system 

French Southern and Antarctic Lands (territory of France)

AF CI Laws of France valid where applicable 

Table A1 (continued)
182

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Gabon(20 Sep 1960) af PF, 5/4 PF, 58 MU, 3.43 5.2 M, .653

AR, republic; multiparty presidential regime

CU

Based on French civil-law system and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court

Gambia(21 Sep 1965) af PF, 4/4 NF, 65 MU, 3.54 L, .463

AR, republic under multiparty democratic rule 

CU

Based on a composite of English common law, Koranic law, and customary law

Gaza Strip(governed by the Palestinian Authority)

NE NF, 86 M, .731 CU

Treaty with Israel permits self-government of West Bank and Gaza Strip by Palestinian Authority

Georgia(31 Jul 1992) EUR PF, 4/4 PF, 54 PF, 4 MU, 3.19 M, .746 DEM, republic CI Based on civil-law system Germany(18 Sep 1973) EUR F, 1/1 F, 15 F, 3 MF, 2.03 7.3 H, .921 DEM, federal republic CI

Civil-law system with indigenous concepts; judicial review of legislative acts in the Federal Constitutional Court

Ghana(8 Mar 1957) af F, 2/2 F, 30 MU, 3.40 5.8 M, .567

DEM, constitutional democracy 

CU

Based on English common law and customary law

Table A1 (continued)
183

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Gibraltar (UK territory) EUR CO English law Glorioso Islands (possession of France)

AF CI Laws of France valid where applicable 

Greece(25 Oct 1945) EUR F, 1/2 F, 28 PF, 4 MF, 2.80 6.7 H, .892

DEM, parliamentary republic

CI

Based on codified Roman law; judiciary divided into civil, criminal, and administrative courts 

Greenland (part of Denmark) EUR

Parliamentary democracy within a constitutional monarchy 

CI Danish law

Grenada(17 Sep 1974) WH F, 1/2 F, 14 M, .738

DEM, constitutional monarchy with Westminster-style parliament 

CO Based on English com- mon law 

Guadeloupe (department of France)

WH CI French legal system 

Guam (US territory) EAP CO Modeled on United States; US federal laws apply 

Table A1 (continued)
184

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Guatemala(21 Nov 1945) WH PF, 4/4 PF, 58 F, 3 MU, 3.16 6.3 M, .652

DEM, constitutional democratic republic 

CI

Civil-law system; judicial review of legislative acts

Guernsey (British Crown dependency)

EUR CO

English law and local statute; justice is administered by the Royal Court 

Guinea(12 Dec 1958) af NF, 6/5 NF, 74 MU, 3.24 L, .425 AR, republic CU

Based on French civil-law system, customary law, and decree; legal codes currently being revised

Guinea-Bissau(17 Sep 1974) af PF, 6/4 PF, 60 MU, 3.90 4.4 L, .373

DEM, republic, multiparty since mid1991 CI

Guyana(20 Sep 1966) WH F, 2/2 F, 21 MU, 3.13 6.3 M, .740

DEM, republic within the Commonwealth CO

Based on English common law with certain admixtures of RomanDutch law

Haiti(24 Oct 1945) WH NF, 6/6 NF, 79 MU, 3.78 6.0 L, .467 DEM, elected government CI Based on Roman civil- law system Heard Island and McDonald Islands (territory of Australia)

EAP CO Laws of Australia valid where applicable 

Table A1 (continued)
185

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Holy See(Vatican City) (established as an independent state in 1929)

EUR Ecclesiastical CU

Based on code of canon law and revisions to it 

Honduras(17 Dec 1945) WH PF, 3/3 PF, 51 MU, 3.53 6.1 M, .667

DEM, democratic constitutional republic 

CI

Rooted in Roman and Spanish civil law with increasing influence of English common law; recent judicial reforms include abandoning Napoleonic legal codes in favor of the oral adversarial system

Hong Kong (special administrative region [SAR] of China)

eap PF, 5/3 MF, 1.34 8.6 H, .889 DEM, limited democracy CO Based on English com- mon law 

Howland Island (US territory) CO US laws valid where applicable Hungary(14 Dec 1955) EUR F, 1/2 F, 23 F, 3 MF, 2.60 7.0 H, .837

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CI Rule of law based on Western model 

Iceland(19 Nov 1946) EUR F, 1/1 F, 8 MF, 2.00 7.6 H, .942

DEM, constitutional republic 

CI Civil-law system based on Danish law

Table A1 (continued)
186

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

India(30 Oct 1945) SA F, 2/3 PF, 45 PF, 5 MU, 3.53 6.1 M, .590 DEM, federal republic CO

Based on English common law; limited judicial review of legislative acts

Indonesia(28 Sep 1950) eap PF, 3/4 PF, 56 PF, 5 MU, 3.76 5.6 M, .682 DEM, republic CI

Based on RomanDutch law, substantially modified by indigenous concepts and by new criminal-procedures code

Iran, Islamic Republic of(24 Oct 1945)

NE NF, 6/6 NF, 76 UF, 7 MR, 4.26 5.7 M, .719

AR, theocratic republic 

CU

Constitution codifies Islamic principles of government 

Iraq(21 Dec 1945) NE NF, 7/5 NF, 95 Not graded in 2003 AR, transi- tional CU

In transition following 2003 defeat of Saddam Hussein regime by USled coalition 

Ireland(14 Dec 1955) EUR F, 1/1 F, 16 F, 1 MF, 1.74 8.0 H, .930 DEM, republic CO

Based on English common law, substantially modified by indigenous concepts; judicial review of legislative acts in Supreme Court

Isle of Man (British Crown dependency)

eur

Parliamentary democracy CO English common law and Manx statute 

Table A1 (continued)
187

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Israel(11 May 1949) NE F, 1/3 F, 27 F, 3 MF, 2.36 6.5 H, .905

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CU

Mixture of English common law, British Mandate regulations, and, in personal matters, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim legal systems 

Italy(14 Dec 1955) EUR F, 1/1 F, 28 MF, 2.26 7.0 H, .916 DEM, republic CI

Based on civil-law system; appeals treated as new trials; judicial review under certain conditions in Constitutional Court

Jamaica(18 Sep 1962) WH F, 2/3 F, 20 MF, 2.81 7.0 M, .757

DEM, constitutional parliamentary democracy 

CO Based on English com- mon law

Jan Mayen (territory of Norway)

eur CI Laws of Norway valid where applicable 

Japan(18 Dec 1956) eap F, 1/2 F, 17 F, 2 MF, 2.53 7.1 H, .932

DEM, constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary government 

CI

Modeled after European civil-law system, with English-American influence; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court

Jarvis Island (US territory) eap CO US laws valid where applicable 

Table A1 (continued)
188

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Jersey(British Crown dependency)

eur CO

English law and local statute; justice is administered by the Royal Court 

Johnston Atoll (US dependency) eap CO US laws valid where applicable Jordan(14 Dec 1955) NE PF, 5/5 NF, 65 MF, 2.73 6.9 M, .743

RDP, constitutional monarchy 

CU

Based on Islamic law and French codes; judicial review of legislative acts in a specially provided high tribunal

Juan de Nova Island(possession of France)

af CI Laws of France valid where applicable 

Kazakhstan(2 Mar 1992) EUR NF, 6/5 NF, 73 PF, 4 MU, 3.70 M, .765 AR, republic CI Based on civil-law system Kenya(16 Dec 1963) af PF, 3/3 NF, 68 MU, 3.26 6.6 L, .489 AR, republic CU

Based on Kenyan statutory law, Kenyan and English common law, tribal law, and Islamic law; judicial review in High Court; constitutional amendment of 1982 making Kenya a de jure one-party state repealed in 1991 

Table A1 (continued)
189

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Kingman Reef (US territory) eap CO US laws valid where applicable Kiribati(14 Sep 1999) eap F, 1/1 F, 26 DEM, republic COKorea, Democratic People’s Republic of(17 Sep 1991)

eap NF, 7/7 NF, 96 UF, 7 R, 5.00

TOT, authoritarian socialist; one-man dictatorship 

CI

Based on German civil-law system with Japanese influences and Communist legal theory; no judicial review of legislative acts

Korea, Republic of(17 Sep 1991)

eap F, 2/2 F, 29 F, 2 MF, 2.69 7.1 H, .879 DEM, republic CI

Combines elements of continental-European civil-law systems, Anglo-American law, and Chinese classical thought 

Kuwait(14 May 1963) NE PF, 4/5 PF, 54 MF, 2.70 6.9 H, .820

TM, nominal constitutional monarchy 

CU

Civil-law system, with Islamic law significant in personal matters

Kyrgyzstan(2 Mar 1992) EUR NF, 6/5 NF, 71 PF, 4 MU, 3.36 M, .727 DEM, republic CI Based on civil-law system Lao People’s Democratic Republic(formerly Laos)(14 Dec 1955)

eap NF, 7/6 NF, 80 MR, 4.45 M, .525 TOT, Com- munist state CU

Based on traditional customs, French legal norms and procedures, and socialist practice 

Table A1 (continued)
190

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Latvia(17 Sep 1991) EUR F, 1/2 F, 18 F, 3 MF, 2.36 6.6 H, .811

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CI Based on civil-law system 

Lebanon(24 Oct 1945) NE NF, 6/5 NF, 71 PF, 4 MU, 3.13 M, .752 AR, republic CU

Mixture of Ottoman law, canon law, Napoleonic code, and civil law; no judicial review of legislative acts

Lesotho(17 Oct 1966) af F, 2/3 PF, 42 MU, 3.50 M, .510

RDP, parliamentary constitutional monarchy 

CU

Based on English common law and Roman-Dutch law; judicial review of legislative acts in High Court and Court of Appeal

Liberia(2 Nov 1945) af NF, 6/6 NF, 79 DEM, republic CU

Dual system of statutory law based on Anglo-American common law for the modern sector and customary law based on unwritten tribal practices for indigenous sector 

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya(14 Dec 1955)

NE NF, 7/7 NF, 89 MR, 4.55 M, .783

AR, military dictatorship (in theory, governed by the populace through local councils)

CU

Based on Italian civillaw system and Islamic law; separate religious courts; no constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts

Table A1 (continued)
191

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Liechtenstein(18 Sep 1990) EUR F, 1/1 F, 11

DEM, hereditary constitutional monarchy on a democratic, parliamentary basis 

CI Local civil and penal codes

Lithuania(17 Sep 1991) EUR F, 1/2 F, 18 F, 2 MF, 2.19 6.2 H, .824

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CI

Based on civil-law system; legislative acts can be appealed to the constitutional court 

Luxembourg(24 Oct 1945) EUR F, 1/1 F, 14 F, 1.71 7.7 H, .930

DEM, constitutional monarchy 

CI Based on civil-law system 

Macau (SAR of China) EAP PF, 6/4 Limited democracy CI Based on Portuguese civil-law system Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of(8 Apr 1993)

EUR PF, 3/3 PF, 50 PF, 4 MU, 3.04 M, .784

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CI

Based on civil-law system; judicial review of legislative acts 

Madagascar(20 Sep 1960) af PF, 3/3 PF, 38 MU, 3.14 5.6 L, .468 DEM, republic CI

Based on French civillaw system and traditional Malagasy law

Table A1 (continued)
192

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Malawi(1 Dec 1964) af PF, 3/4 PF, 57 MU, 3.46 4.8 L, .387

DEM, multiparty democracy 

CU

Based on English common law and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court of Appeal

Malaysia(17 Sep 1957) eap PF, 5/4 NF, 71 PF, 4 MU, 3.16 6.4 M, .790

RDP, constitutional monarchy

CO

Based on English common law; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court at request of supreme head of the federation

Maldives(21 Sep 1965) SA NF, 6/5 NF, 64 M, .751 AR, republic CO

Based on Islamic law with admixture of English common law primarily in commercial matters

Mali(28 Sep 1960) af F, 2/2 F, 24 MU, 3.34 5.8 L, .337 DEM, republic CU

Based on French civillaw system and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in Constitutional Court (formally established on 9 March 1994)

Malta(1 Dec 1964) EUR F, 1/1 F, 13 MF, 2.51 6.4 H, .856 DEM, republic CO

Based on English common law and Roman civil law

Table A1 (continued)
193

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Marshall Islands(17 Sep 1991)

eap F, 1/1 F, 10

DEM, constitutional government in free association with the United States

CO

Based on adapted Trust Territory laws; acts of the legislature; and municipal, common, and customary laws 

Martinique (department of France)

wh CI French legal system 

Mauritania(27 Oct 1961) af NF, 6/5 NF, 61 UF, 6 MF, 2.94 L, .454 AR, republic CU

Combination of Sharia (Islamic law) and French civil law 

Mauritius(24 Apr 1968) af F, 1/2 F, 24 MF, 2.99 7.3 M, .779

AR, parliamentary democracy 

CU

Based on French civil-law system with elements of English common law in certain areas 

Mayotte (territorial collectivity of France) af CI French law Mexico(7 Nov 1945) WH F, 2/2 PF, 38 PF, 4 MF, 2.90 6.2 H, .800 RDP, federal republic CI

Mixture of US constitutional theory and civil-law system; judicial review of legislative acts

Table A1 (continued)
194

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Micronesia, Federated States of(17 Sep 1991)

eap F, 1/1 F, 17

DEM, constitutional government in free association with the United States

CO

Based on adapted Trust Territory laws; acts of the legislature; and municipal, common, and customary laws 

Midway Islands (US territory) eap CO US laws valid where applicable Moldova, Republic of(2 Mar 1992)

EUR PF, 3/4 PF, 59 PF, 4 MU, 3.09 M, .700 DEM, republic CI

Based on civil-law system; Constitutional Court reviews legality of legislative acts and governmental decisions of resolution 

Monaco(28 May 1993) EUR F, 2/1 F, 9

DEM, constitutional monarchy 

CI Based on French law

Mongolia(27 Oct 1961) eap F, 2/2 PF, 36 F, 3 MF, 2.90 M, .661 DEM, parlia- mentary CI

Blend of Soviet, German, and US systems of law that combines aspects of a parliamentary system with some aspects of a presidential system; constitution ambiguous on judicial review of legislative acts

Table A1 (continued)
195

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Montserrat (UK territory) WH CO English common law and statutory law Morocco(12 Nov 1956) NE PF, 5/5 PF, 57 PF, 4 MF, 2.93 5.8 M, .606

TM, constitutional monarchy 

CU

Based on Islamic law and French and Spanish civil-law system; judicial review of legislative acts in Constitutional Chamber of Supreme Court 

Mozambique(16 Sep 1975) af PF, 3/4 PF, 47 MU, 3.28 L, .356 DEM, republic CI

Based on Portuguese civil-law system and customary law 

Myanmar (formerly Burma)(19 Apr 1948)

eap NF, 7/7 NF, 94 UF, 7 R, 4.45 3.8 M, .549 AR, military regime CI

Namibia(23 Apr 1990) af F, 2/3 PF, 37 F, 2 MF, 2.96 6.7 M, .627 DEM, republic CI Based on Roman-Dutch law and 1990 constitution Nauru(14 Sep 1999) eap F, 1/1 F, 26 DEM, republic CO

Acts of the Nauru Parliament and British common law 

Navassa Island (US territory) wh CO US laws valid where applicable Nepal(14 Dec 1955) SA PF, 5/4 NF, 65 PF, 5 MU, 3.53 5.7 L, .499

DEM, parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy 

CO

Based on Hindu legal concepts and English common law

Table A1 (continued)
196

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Netherlands(10 Dec 1945) EUR F, 1/1 F, 15 F, 1 MF, 2.04 7.8 H, .938

DEM, constitutional monarchy 

CI

Civil-law system incorporating French penal theory; constitution does not permit judicial review of acts of the States General

Netherlands Antilles (part of the Netherlands) wh Parliamentary CI

Based on Dutch civillaw system, with some English common-law influence 

New Caledonia (territory of France)

eap CI

1988 Matignon Accords grant substantial autonomy to the islands; formerly under French law 

New Zealand(24 Oct 1945) eap F, 1/1 F, 8 MF, 1.70 8.2 H, .917

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CO

Based on English law, with special land legislation and land courts for the Maori 

Nicaragua(24 Oct 1945) WH PF, 3/3 PF, 40 MF, 2.94 6.4 M, .643 DEM, republic CI

Civil-law system; Supreme Court may review administrative acts 

Niger(20 Sep 1960) af PF, 4/4 PF, 53 MU, 3.43 5.6 L, .292 DEM, republic CU

Based on French civil-law system and customary law

Table A1 (continued)
197

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Nigeria(7 Oct 1960) af PF, 4/4 PF, 53 PF, 5 MU, 3.95 5.6 L, .463

DEM, republic transitioning from military to civilian rule 

CU

Based on English common law, Islamic Sharia law (only in some northern states), and traditional law 

Niue (selfgoverning in free association with New Zealand)

eap

Self-governing parliamentary democracy 

CO

English common law; self-governing, with the power to make its own laws

Norfolk Island (territory of Australia)

eap CO

Based on the laws of Australia, local ordinances and acts; English common law applies in matters not covered by either Australian or Norfolk Island law 

Northern Marianas (commonwealth in political union with United States)

eap

Commonwealth; selfgoverning with locally elected governor, lieutenant governor, and legislature 

CO

Based on US system, except for customs, wages, immigration laws, and taxation 

Table A1 (continued)
198

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Norway(27 Nov 1945) EUR F, 1/1 F, 9 F, 1 MF, 2.35 7.1 H, .944

DEM, constitutional monarchy 

CI

Mixture of customary law, civil-law system, and common-law traditions; Supreme Court renders advisory opinions to legislature when asked

Oman(7 Oct 1971) NE NF, 6/5 NF, 73 MF, 2.80 7.4 M, .755 TM, monar- chy CU

Based on English common law and Islamic law; ultimate appeal to the monarch

Pakistan(30 Sep 1947) SA NF, 6/5 PF, 58 UF, 6 MU, 3.40 5.4 L, .499 AR, federal republic CO

Based on English common law with provisions to accommodate Pakistan’s status as an Islamic state

Palau(15 Dec 1994) eap F, 1/1 F, 9

DEM, constitutional government in free association with the United States 

CO

Based on Trust Territory laws; acts of the legislature; and municipal, common, and customary laws 

Palmyra Atoll (US territory) eap CO US laws valid where applicable Panama(13 Nov 1945) WH F, 1/2 PF, 34 MF, 2.83 7.2 M, .788

DEM, constitutional democracy 

CI

Based on civil-law system; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court of Justice

Table A1 (continued)
199

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Papua New Guinea(10 Oct 1975)

EAP PF, 3/3 F, 25 5.8 M, .548

DEM, constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democracy 

CO Based on English com- mon law 

Paracel Islands (occupied by China but claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan)

EAP CI

Paraguay(24 Oct 1945) WH PF, 3/3 PF, 55 MU, 3.39 6.3 M, .751

DEM, constitutional republic 

CI

Based on Argentine codes, Roman law, and French codes; judicial review of legislative acts in Supreme Court of Justice 

Peru(31 Oct 1945) WH F, 2/3 PF, 35 MF, 2.83 6.7 M, .752

AR, constitutional republic 

CI Based on civil-law system

Philippines(24 Oct 1945) EAP F, 2/3 F, 30 F, 3 MU, 3.05 6.6 M, .751 DEM, republic CI Based on Spanish and Anglo-American lawPitcairn Islands (UK territory) EAP CO Local island bylaws 

Table A1 (continued)
200

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Poland(24 Oct 1945) EUR F, 1/2 F, 18 F, 2 MF, 2.81 6.0 H, .841 DEM, republic CI

Mixture of continental (Napoleonic) civil law and holdover Communist legal theory; changes being gradually introduced as part of broader democratization process; limited judicial review of legislative acts, but rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal are final; court decisions can be appealed to the European Court of Justice in Strasbourg 

Portugal(14 Dec 1955) EUR F, 1/1 F, 15 MF, 2.38 7.2 H, .896

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CI

Civil-law system; the Constitutional Tribunal reviews the constitutionality of legislation 

Puerto Rico (commonwealth associated with United States)

wh F, 1/2 Common- wealth CI Based on Spanish civil code; within the US fed- eral system of justice 

Qatar(21 Sep 1971) NE NF, 6/6 NF, 61 MF, 2.86 H, .826

TM, traditional monarchy 

CU

Discretionary system of law controlled by the amir, although civil codes are being implemented; Islamic law dominates family and personal matters 

Table A1 (continued)
201

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Reunion (department of France)

af CI French law 

Romania(14 Dec 1955) EUR F, 2/2 PF, 38 F, 3 MU, 3.66 4.7 M, .773 DEM, republic CI

Former mixture of civil-law system and communist legal theory; now based on the constitution of France’s Fifth Republic 

Russian Federation(24 Oct 1945)

EUR PF, 5/5 NF, 66 PF, 4 MU, 3.46 5.0 M, .779 DEM, federa- tion CI Based on civil-law system; judicial review of legislative acts 

Rwanda(18 Sep 1962) af NF, 6/5 NF, 80 MU, 3.36 5.2 L, .422

AR, republic; presidential, multiparty system 

CU

Based on German and Belgian civil-law systems and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court

Saint Helena (UK territory) af COSaint Kitts and Nevis(23 Sep 1983)

WH F, 1/2 F, 18 H, .808

DEM, constitutional monarchy with Westminster-style parliament 

CO Based on English com- mon law 

Table A1 (continued)
202

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Saint Lucia(18 Sep 1979) WH F, 2/1 F, 8 M, .775

DEM, Westminster-style parliamentary democracy 

CO Based on English com- mon law 

Saint Pierre and Miquelon (self-governing territorial collectivity of France)

wh CI

French law with special adaptations for local conditions, such as housing and taxation 

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines(16 Sep 1980)

WH F, 1/2 F, 17 M, .755

DEM, parliamentary democracy; independent sovereign state within the Commonwealth 

CO Based on English com- mon law 

Samoa(formerly Western Samoa)(15 Dec 1976)

eap F, 2/2 F, 24 M, .775

DEM, constitutional monarchy under native chief 

CO

Based on English common law and local customs; judicial review of legislative acts with respect to fundamental rights of the citizen

San Marino(2 Mar 1992) EUR F, 1/1 F, 9

DEM, independent republic 

CI

Based on civil-law system with Italian law influences

Table A1 (continued)
203

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Sao Tome and Principe(16 Sep 1975)

af F, 2/2 F, 19 M, .639 DEM, republic CI

Based on Portuguese legal system and customary law

Saudi Arabia(24 Oct 1945) NE NF, 7/7 NF, 80 UF, 7 MU, 3.05 M, .769 TM, monar- chy CU

Based on Islamic law, several secular codes have been introduced; commercial disputes handled by special committees

Scotland (administrative division of the UK)

eur CO

Senegal(28 Sep 1960) af F, 2/3 PF, 38 MU, 3.00 5.8 L, .430

RDP, republic under multiparty democratic rule 

CI

Based on French civillaw system; judicial review of legislative acts in Constitutional Court; the Council of State audits the government’s accounting office

Serbia and Montenegro(1 Nov 2000)

EUR F, 3/2 PF, 40 Not graded in 2003 DEM, republic CI Based on civil-law system 

Seychelles(21 Sep 1976) af PF, 3/3 PF, 50 H, .840 DEM, republic CU

Based on English common law, French civil law, and customary law 

Table A1 (continued)
204

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Sierra Leone(27 Sep 1961) af PF, 4/3 NF, 61 MU, 3.73 5.2 L, .275

DEM, constitutional democracy 

CU

Based on English law and customary laws indigenous to local tribes

Singapore(21 Sep 1965) eap PF, 5/4 NF, 66 PF, 4 MF, 1.61 8.5 H, .884

AR, parliamentary republic 

CO Based on English com- mon law

Slovakia(19 Jan 1993) EUR F, 1/2 F, 21 MF, 2.44 6.0 H, .836

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CI

Civil-law system based on Austro-Hungarian codes; legal code modified to comply with the obligations of Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe and to expunge MarxistLeninist legal theory 

Slovenia(22 May 1992) EUR F, 1/1 F, 19 MF, 2.75 6.1 H, .881

DEM, parliamentary democratic republic 

CI Based on civil-law system 

Solomon Islands(19 Sep 1978)

eap PF, 3/3 F, 25 M, .632

DEM, parliamentary democracy tending toward anarchy 

CO

English common law, which is widely disregarded 

Table A1 (continued)
205

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Somalia(20 Sep 1960) af NF, 6/7 NF, 80

AR, no permanent national government; transitional, parliamentary national government 

CU

No national system; Sharia and secular courts are in some localities 

South Africa(7 Nov 1945) af F, 1/2 F, 25 F, 2 MF, 2.79 6.8 M, .684 DEM, republic CU

Based on Roman-Dutch law and English common law 

South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands(UK territory; also claimed by Argentina)

wh CO

UK laws valid where applicable; the senior magistrate from the Falkland Islands presides over the Magistrates Court 

Spain(14 Dec 1955) EUR F, 1/1 F, 16 F, 3 MF, 2.31 7.0 H, .918

DEM, parliamentary monarchy 

CI Civil-law system, with regional applications

Spratly Islands (occupied and claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines)

eap CI

Table A1 (continued)
206

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Sri Lanka(14 Dec 1955) SA PF, 3/3 PF, 52 PF, 4 MU, 3.06 6.3 M, .730 DEM, republic CO

Highly complex mixture of English common law, Roman-Dutch, Muslim, Sinhalese, and customary law

Sudan(12 Nov 1956) af NF, 7/7 NF, 84 UF, 7 Not graded in 2003 M, .503 AR, authori- tarian regime CU

Based on English common law and Islamic law; as of 20 January 1991, the now defunct Revolutionary Command Council imposed Islamic law in the northern states; Islamic law applies to all residents of the northern states regardless of their religion; some separate religious courts 

Suriname(4 Dec 1975) WH F, 1/2 F, 26 MU, 3.96 M, .762

DEM, constitutional democracy 

CI

Based on Dutch legal system incorporating French penal theory 

Svalbard (territory of Norway) eur CISwaziland(24 Sep 1968) af NF, 7/5 NF, 74 MU, 3.18 M, .547

TM, monarchy; independent member of Commonwealth 

CU

Based on South African Roman-Dutch law in statutory courts and Swazi traditional law and custom in traditional courts

Table A1 (continued)
207

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Sweden(19 Nov 1946) EUR F, 1/1 F, 8 F, 2 F, 1.90 7.1 H, .941

DEM, constitutional monarchy 

CI

Civil-law system influenced by customary law 

Switzerland(10 Sep 2002) EUR F, 1/1 F, 10 F, 1.84 8.0 H, .932 DEM, federal republic CI

Civil-law system influenced by customary law; judicial review of legislative acts, except with respect to federal decrees of general obligatory character 

Syrian Arab Republic(24 Oct 1945)

NE NF, 7/7 NF, 80 MU, 3.88 5.2 M, .685

AR, republic under military regime since March 1963 

CU

Based on Islamic law and civil-law system; special religious courts

Taiwan (multiparty democratic regime not recognized as an independent state)

eap F, 2/2 F, 24 F, 2 MF, 2.43 7.1

DEM, multiparty democratic regime headed by popularly elected president and unicameral legislature 

CI Based on civil-law system

Tajikistan(2 Mar 1992) EUR NF, 6/5 NF, 76 R, 4.15 M, .677 RDP, republic CI

Based on civil-law system; no judicial review of legislative acts 

Table A1 (continued)
208

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Tanzania, United Republic of(14 Dec 1961)

af PF, 4/3 PF, 47 PF, 4 MU, 3.29 6.2 L, .400 RDP, re- public CU

Based on English common law; judicial review of legislative acts limited to matters of interpretation

Thailand(16 Dec 1946) eap F, 2/3 PF, 36 MF, 2.86 6.7 M, .768

DEM, constitutional monarchy 

CI

Based on civil-law system, with influences of common law

Timor-Leste(East Timor)(27 Sep 2002)

eap PF, 3/3 F, 22 PF, 5 P, republic CI

Togo(20 Sep 1960) af NF, 6/5 NF, 74 MU, 3.73 5.1 M, .501

DEM, republic under transition to multiparty democratic rule 

CU French-based court system 

Tokelau (territory of New Zealand)

eap CO New Zealand and local statutes 

Tonga(14 Sep 1999) eap PF, 5/3 PF, 32

RDP, hereditary constitutional monarchy 

CO Based on English law 

Trinidad and Tobago(18 Sep 1962)

WH PF, 3/3 F, 25 MF, 2.45 7.1 H, .802

DEM, parliamentary democracy 

CO

Based on English common law; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court

Table A1 (continued)
209

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Tromelin Island (possession of France)

af CI Laws of France valid where applicable 

Tunisia(12 Nov 1956) NE NF, 6/5 NF, 78 MF, 2.94 6.4 M, .740 AR, republic CU

Based on French civillaw system and Islamic law; some judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court in joint session 

Turkey(24 Oct 1945) EUR PF, 3/4 PF, 55 PF, 5 MU, 3.39 5.3 M, .734

DEM, republican parliamentary democracy 

CI

Derived from various European continental legal systems 

Turkmenistan(2 Mar 1992) EUR NF, 7/7 NF, 92 UF, 7 R, 4.31 M, .748 AR, republic CI Based on civil-law system Turks & Caicos Islands (UK territory)

wh CO

Based on laws of England and Wales, with a few adopted from Jamaica and the Bahamas 

Tuvalu(5 Sep 2000) eap F, 1/1 F, 16

DEM, constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democracy 

CO

Table A1 (continued)
210

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Uganda(25 Oct 1962) af PF, 5/4 PF, 45 MF, 2.70 6.7 L, .489 AR, republic CU

In 1995, the government restored the legal system to one based on English common law and customary law

Ukraine(24 Oct 1945) EUR PF, 4/4 NF, 67 F, 3 MU, 3.49 4.6 M, .766 DEM, republic CI

Based on civil-law system; judicial review of legislative acts 

United Arab Emirates(9 Dec 1971)

NE NF, 6/6 NF, 74 MF, 2.60 7.5 H, .816 TM, federa- tion CU

Federal court system introduced in 1971; all emirates except Dubayy (Dubai) and Ra’s al Khaymah are not fully integrated into the federal system; all emirates have secular and Islamic law for civil, criminal, and high courts 

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland(24 Oct 1945)

EUR F, 1/1 F, 18 F, 2 MF, 1.79 8.2 H, .930

DEM, constitutional monarchy 

CO

Common-law tradition with early Roman and modern continental influences; has judicial review of acts of Parliament under the Human Rights Act of 1998

Table A1 (continued)
211

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

United States of America(24 Oct 1945)

WH F, 1/1 F, 17 F, 1 F, 1.85 8.3 H, .937

DEM, constitution-based federal republic; strong democratic tradition 

CO

Based on English common law; judicial review of legislative acts 

Uruguay(18 Dec 1945) WH F, 1/1 F, 30 MF, 2.55 6.7 H, .834

DEM, constitutional republic 

CI Based on Spanish civil- law system

Uzbekistan(2 Mar 1992) EUR NF, 7/6 NF, 86 UF, 6 R, 4.29 M, .729

AR, republic; authoritarian presidential rule, with little power outside the executive branch 

CI

Evolution of Soviet civil law; still lacks independent judicial system 

Vanuatu(15 Sep 1981) eap F, 2/2 F, 21 M, .568

DEM, parliamentary republic 

CO

Unified system being created from former dual French and British systems 

Venezuela(15 Nov 1945) WH PF, 3/4 NF, 68 R, 4.18 5.3 M, .775 DEM, federal republic CI

Based on organic laws as of July 1999; open, adversarial court system

Vietnam(20 Sep 1977) eap NF, 7/6 NF, 82 UF, 6 MU, 3.93 M, .688 TOT, Com- munist state CI Based on Communist legal theory and French civil-law system 

Table A1 (continued)
212

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Virgin Islands (US territory) wh CO Based on US laws Wake Island (US territory) eap CO US laws valid where applicable Wales (administrative division of the UK)

eur CO

Wallis and Futuna (territory of France)

eap CI French legal system 

West Bank(governed by the Palestinian Authority)

NE NF, 86 M, .731 CU

Treaty with Israel permits self-government of West Bank and Gaza Strip by Palestinian Authority

Western Sahara(disputed territory) NE

Legal status of territory and issue of sovereignty unresolved (contested by Morocco and Polisario Front)

CU

Table A1 (continued)
213

A

Jurisdiction

(date admitted

to UN)

B

Region

C

FH rating: 

political/ 

civil (1–7)

D

FH rating: 

media

(1–100)

E

FH rating: 

religion 

(1–7)

F

HF rating: 

economic

(1–5)

G

FI rating: 

economic 

(10–1)

H

UNDP 

HDI

(1–0)

I

Government 

type

J

Type 

of legal 

system

K

Description of 

legal system

Yemen(30 Sep 1947) NE PF, 5/5 NF, 69 MU, 3.70 L, .470 RDP, republic CU

Based on Islamic law, Turkish law, English common law, and local tribal customary law

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic ofc

eur AR CI

Zambia(1 Dec 1964) af PF, 4/4 NF, 63 MU, 3.50 6.8 L, .386 AR, republic CU

Based on English common law and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in an ad hoc constitutional council

Zimbabwe(25 Aug 1980) af NF, 6/6 NF, 88 F, 3 R, 4.54 4.0 L, .496

RDP, parliamentary democracy 

CU

Mixture of RomanDutch and English common law 

c

Table A1 (

Yugoslavia is no longer a state; it splintered into the five states of the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 

Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro.

continued)
214

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Afghanistan SA NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 2.6263 TOT CU 1.99

Albania EUR PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 5.0505 MU, 4.75 5.1111 M, 7.35 DEM CI 5.93Algeria NE NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 3.8383 MU, 4.225 3.5555 M, 7.04 AR CU 3.94Andorra EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 9.2929 DEM CI 9.76Angola af NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.8282 L, 3.77 AR CI 2.89Antigua and Barbuda WH PF, 4.9999/8.3333 PF, 5.5555 M, 7.98 RDP CO 6.72Argentina WH PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 6.1616 PF, 6.6666 MU, 3.8 6.1111 H, 8.49 DEM CI 6.84Armenia EUR PF, 4.9999/4.9999 NF, 3.5353 PF, 4.9999 MF, 5.925 M, 7.29 DEM CI 5.29Australia eap PF, 10/10 PF, 8.6868 MF, 7.8 7.7777 H, 9.39 DEM CO 8.94Austria EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 7.7777 PF, 8.3333 MF, 7.3 7.3333 H, 9.29 DEM CI 8.58Azerbaijan EUR NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.7272 PF, 3.3333 MU, 4.025 M, 7.44 AR CI 3.75Bahamas WH PF, 10/10 PF, 8.9898 MF, 6.875 6.2222 H, 8.12 DEM CO 8.37Bahrain NE PF, 3.3333/3.3333 NF, 3.2323 MF, 7.3 6.7777 H, 8.39 TM CU 5.39Bangladesh SA PF, 4.9999/4.9999 NF, 3.5353 UF, 1.6666 MU, 3.25 5.1111 M, 5.02 DEM CO 4.08Barbados WH PF, 10/10 PF, 8.6868 MF, 6.475 5.3333 H, 8.88 DEM CO 8.23Belarus (Byelorussia) EUR NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 1.8181 PF, 3.3333 R, 2.275 H, 8.04 AR CI 3.13Belgium EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 9.1919 PF, 6.6666 MF, 7.025 7.1111 H, 9.37 DEM CI 8.48Belize WH PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 7.7777 MF, 5.775 5.8888 M, 7.76 DEM CO 7.59Benin af PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 7.2727 MU, 3.9 5.1111 L, 4.11 DEM CU 6.18

Table A2. Normalized freedom and human development ratings for 193 selected jurisdictions
215

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Bhutan SA NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 3.0303 UF, 1.6666 M, 5.11 TM CO 2.96

Bolivia WH PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 7.0707 MF, 6.025 6.1111 M, 6.72 DEM CI 6.54Bosnia and Herzegovina EUR PF, 4.9999/4.9999 PF, 5.1515 MU, 4.25 M, 7.77 P CI 5.43Botswana af PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 7.0707 PF, 8.3333 MF, 6.125 6.7777 M, 6.14 DEM CU 7.30Brazil WH PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 6.2626 PF, 8.3333 MU, 4.75 5.3333 M, 7.77 DEM CI 6.78Brunei Darussalam eap NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.4242 H, 8.72 TM CO 4.04Bulgaria EUR PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 7.0707 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.8 4.7777 M, 7.95 DEM CI 6.85Burkina Faso af PF, 4.9999/4.9999 PF, 6.1616 MU, 4.3 L, 3.30 AR CU 4.75Burundi af PF, 3.3333/3.3333 NF, 2.4242 Not graded in 2003 4.5555 L, 3.37 AR CU 3.40Cambodia eap NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 3.6363 MF, 5.25 M, 5.56 RDP CI 3.89Cameroon af NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 3.5353 MU, 3.425 5.1111 L, 4.99 RDP CU 3.40Canada WH PF, 10/10 PF, 8.3838 MF, 7.55 7.8888 H, 9.37 DEM CO 8.87Cape Verde af PF, 10/10 PF, 7.0707 MF, 5.35 M, 7.27 DEM CI 7.94Central African Republic af NF, 0/3.3333 NF, 3.3333 MU, 4.05 4.3333 L, 3.63 DEM CU 3.11Chad af NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 3.3333 MU, 3.65 5.1111 L, 3.76 RDP CU 3.48Chile WH PF, 10/10 PF, 7.8787 PF, 6.6666 MF, 7.725 6.9999 H, 8.31 DEM CI 8.23

Table A2 (continued)
216

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

China, People’s Republic of 

eap NF, 0/1.6666 NF, 2.0202 UF, 1.6666 MU, 3.4 4.9999 M, 7.21 AR CI 2.99

Colombia WH PF, 4.9999/4.9999 NF, 3.7373 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.675 4.8888 M, 7.79 DEM CI 5.16Comoros af PF, 3.3333/4.9999 PF, 5.7575 M, 5.28 RDP CU 4.84Congo, Democratic Republic of the (formerly Zaire)

af NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 1.8181 Not graded in 2003 3.2222 L, 3.63 AR CU 2.40

Congo, Republic of the af PF, 3.3333/4.9999 PF, 4.5454 MU, 2.75 3.8888 M, 5.02 AR CU 4.09Costa Rica WH PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 8.6868 MF, 5.725 6.7777 H, 8.32 DEM CI 7.97Côte d’Ivoire(Ivory Coast) af NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 3.2323 MU, 4.55 5.4444 L, 3.96 AR CU 3.69Croatia EUR PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 6.7676 MU, 4.725 5.5555 H, 8.18 DEM CI 6.98Cuba WH NF, 0/0 NF, 0.6060 UF, 1.6666 MR, 2.3 H, 8.06 TOT CI 2.11Cyprus EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.2828 MF, 7.625 5.7777 H, 8.91 DEM CI 8.43Czech Republic EUR PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 7.7777 MF, 6.525 6.5555 H, 8.61 DEM CI 7.97Denmark EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.9898 MF, 8.0 7.3333 H, 9.30 DEM CI 8.94Djibouti af PF, 3.3333/3.3333 NF, 3.5353 MU, 4.425 L, 4.62 DEM CU 3.85Dominica WH PF, 10/10 PF, 8.6868 M, 7.76 DEM CO 9.11

Table A2 (continued)
217

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Dominican Republic WH PF, 6.6666/8.3333 PF, 6.7676 MU, 3.725 6.2222 M, 7.37 DEM CI 6.51

Ecuador WH PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 5.9595 MU, 3.5 4.4444 M, 7.31 DEM CI 5.76Egypt NE NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 2.1212 PF, 3.3333 MU, 4.3 6.1111 M, 6.48 RDP CU 3.67El Salvador WH PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 6.2626 PF, 6.6666 MF, 6.9 6.8888 M, 7.19 DEM CI 6.99Equatorial Guinea af NF, 0/1.6666 NF, 1.1919 MU, 3.275 M, 6.64 AR CI 2.55Eritrea af NF, 0/1.6666 NF, 1.7171 L, 4.46 AR CU 1.96Estonia EUR PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 8.3838 PF, 10 MF, 8.1 7.2222 H, 8.33 DEM CI 8.62Ethiopia af PF, 3.3333/3.3333 NF, 3.6363 MU, 4.175 L, 3.59 AR CU 3.61Fiji eap PF, 4.9999/6.6666 PF, 7.1717 MU, 4.85 5.6666 M, 7.54 DEM CO 6.15Finland EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 9.0909 PF, 10 MF, 7.625 7.4444 H, 9.30 DEM CI 9.07France EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.3838 PF, 6.6666 MF, 5.925 6.3333 H, 9.25 DEM CI 8.08Gabon af PF, 3.3333/4.9999 PF, 4.2424 MU, 3.925 4.6666 M, 6.53 AR CU 4.62Gambia af PF, 4.9999/4.9999 NF, 3.5353 MU, 3.65 L, 4.63 AR CU 4.36Georgia EUR PF, 4.9999/4.9999 PF, 4.4646 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.525 M, 7.46 DEM CI 5.24Germany EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.5858 PF, 6.6666 MF, 7.425 6.9999 H, 9.21 DEM CI 8.41Ghana af PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 7.0707 MU, 4.0 5.3333 M, 5.67 DEM CU 6.46Greece EUR PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 7.2727 PF, 4.9999 MF, 5.5 6.3333 H, 8.92 DEM CI 7.34Grenada WH PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 8.6868 M, 7.38 DEM CO 8.60Guatemala WH PF, 4.9999/4.9999 PF, 4.2424 PF, 6.6666 MU, 4.6 5.8888 M, 6.52 DEM CI 5.42

Table A2 (continued)
218

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Guinea af NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.6262 MU, 4.4 L, 4.25 AR CU 3.26

Guinea-Bissau af PF, 1.6666/4.9999 PF, 4.0404 MU, 2.75 3.7777 L, 3.73 DEM CI 3.49Guyana WH PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 7.9797 MU, 4.675 5.8888 M, 7.40 DEM CO 7.10Haiti WH NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 2.1212 MU, 3.05 5.5555 L, 4.67 DEM CI 3.12Honduras WH PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 4.9494 MU, 3.675 5.6666 M, 6.67 DEM CI 5.72Hong Kong (SAR of China)

eap PF, 3.3333/6.6666 MF, 9.15 8.4444 H, 8.89 DEM CO 7.29

Hungary EUR PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 7.7777 PF, 6.6666 MF, 6 6.6666 H, 8.37 DEM CI 7.69Iceland EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 9.2929 MF, 7.5 7.3333 H, 9.42 DEM CI 8.92India SA PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 5.5555 PF, 3.3333 MU, 3.675 5.6666 M, 5.90 DEM CO 5.59Indonesia eap PF, 6.6666/4.9999 PF, 4.4444 PF, 3.3333 MU, 3.1 5.1111 M, 6.82 DEM CI 4.93Iran, Islamic Republic of NE NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 2.4242 UF, 0 MR, 1.85 5.2222 M, 7.19 AR CU 2.86Iraq NE NF, 0/3.3333 NF, 0.5050 Not graded in 2003 AR CU 1.28Ireland EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.4848 PF, 10 MF, 8.15 7.7777 H, 9.30 DEM CO 9.10Israel NE PF, 10/6.6666 PF, 7.3737 PF, 6.6666 MF, 6.6 6.1111 H, 9.05 DEM CU 7.49Italy EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 7.2727 MF, 6.85 6.6666 H, 9.16 DEM CI 8.32Jamaica WH PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 8.0808 MF, 5.475 6.6666 M, 7.57 DEM CO 7.13Japan eap PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 8.3838 PF, 8.3333 MF, 6.175 6.7777 H, 9.32 DEM CI 8.19

Table A2 (continued)
219

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Jordan NE PF, 3.3333/3.3333 NF, 3.5353 MF, 5.675 6.5555 M, 7.43 RDP CU 4.98

Kazakhstan EUR NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.7272 PF, 4.9999 MU, 3.25 M, 7.65 AR CI 3.94Kenya af PF, 6.6666/6.6666 NF, 3.2323 MU, 4.35 6.2222 L, 4.89 AR CU 5.34Kiribati eap PF, 10/10 PF, 7.4747 DEM CO 9.16Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of

EAP NF, 0/0 NF, 0.4040 UF, 0 MR, 0 TOT CI 0.08

Korea, Republic of eap PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 7.1717 PF, 8.3333 MF, 5.775 6.7777 H, 8.79 DEM CI 7.64Kuwait NE PF, 4.9999/3.3333 PF, 4.6464 MF, 5.75 6.5555 H, 8.20 TM CU 5.58Kyrgyzstan EUR NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.9292 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.1 M, 7.27 DEM CI 4.05Lao People’s Democratic Republic(formerly Laos)

eap NF, 0/1.6666 NF, 2.0202 MR, 1.375 M, 5.25 TOT CU 2.06

Latvia EUR PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 8.2828 PF, 6.6666 MF, 6.6 6.2222 H, 8.11 DEM CI 7.74Lebanon NE NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.9292 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.675 M, 7.52 AR CU 4.19Lesotho af PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 5.8585 MU, 3.75 M, 5.10 RDP CU 5.94Liberia af NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 2.1212 DEM CU 1.82Libyan Arab Jamahiriya NE NF, 0/0 NF, 1.1111 MR, 1.125 M, 7.83 AR CU 2.01Liechtenstein EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.9899 DEM CI 9.66

Table A2 (continued)
220

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Lithuania EUR PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 8.2828 F, 8.3333 MF, 7.025 5.7777 H, 8.24 DEM CI 7.99

Luxembourg EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.6868 MF, 8.225 7.4444 H, 9.30 DEM CI 8.94Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of

EUR PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 5.0505 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.9 M, 7.84 DEM CI 6.02

Madagascar af PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 6.2626 MU, 4.65 5.1111 L, 4.68 DEM CI 5.67Malawi af PF, 6.6666/4.9999 PF, 4.3434 MU, 3.85 4.2222 L, 3.87 DEM CU 4.66Malaysia eap PF, 3.3333/4.9999 NF, 2.9292 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.6 5.9999 M, 7.90 RDP CO 4.97Maldives SA NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 3.6363 M, 7.51 AR CO 4.04Mali AF PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 7.6767 MU, 4.15 5.3333 L, 3.37 DEM CU 6.19Malta EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.7878 MF, 6.225 5.9999 H, 8.56 DEM CO 8.26Marshall Islands eap PF, 10/10 PF, 9.0909 DEM CO 9.69Mauritania af NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 3.9393 UF, 1.6666 MF, 5.15 L, 4.54 AR CU 3.38Mauritius af PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 7.6767 MF, 5.025 6.9999 M, 7.79 AR CU 7.64Mexico WH PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 6.2626 PF, 4.9999 MF, 5.25 5.7777 H, 8.00 RDP CI 6.71Micronesia, Federated States of

eap PF, 10/10P PF, 8.3838 DEM CO 9.46

Moldova, Republic of EUR PF, 6.6666/4.9999 PF, 4.1414 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.775 M, 7.00 DEM CI 5.43Monaco EUR PF, 8.3333/10 PF, 9.1919 DEM CI 9.18

Table A2 (continued)
221

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Mongolia eap PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 6.4646 PF, 6.6666 MF, 5.25 M, 6.61 DEM CI 6.94

Morocco NE PF, 3.3333/3.3333 PF, 4.3434 PF, 4.9999 MF, 5.175 5.3333 M, 6.06 TM CU 4.65Mozambique af PF, 6.6666/4.9999 PF, 5.3535 MU, 4.3 L, 3.56 DEM CI 4.98Myanmar (formerly Burma) eap NF, 0/0 NF, 0.6060 UF, 0 MR, 1.375 3.1111 M, 5.49 AR CI 1.51Namibia af PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 6.3636 PF, 8.3333 MF, 5.1 6.3333 M, 6.27 DEM CI 6.77Nauru eap PF, 10/10 PF, 7.4747 DEM CO 9.16Nepal SA PF, 3.3333/4.9999 NF, 3.5353 PF, 3.3333 MU, 3.675 5.2222 L, 4.99 DEM CO 4.16Netherlands EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.5858 PF, 10 MF, 7.4 7.5555 H, 9.38 DEM CI 8.99New Zealand eap PF, 10/10 PF, 9.2929 MF, 8.25 7.9999 H, 9.17 DEM CO 9.12Nicaragua WH PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 6.0606 MF, 5.15 5.9999 M, 6.43 DEM CI 6.16Niger af PF, 4.9999/4.9999 PF, 4.7474 MU, 3.925 5.1111 L, 2.92 DEM CU 4.45Nigeria af PF, 4.9999/4.9999 PF, 4.7474 PF, 3.3333 MU, 2.625 5.1111 L, 4.63 DEM CU 4.35Norway EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 9.1919 PF, 10 MF, 6.625 6.7777 H, 9.44 DEM CI 8.86Oman NE NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.7272 MF, 5.5 7.1111 M, 7.55 TM CU 4.65Pakistan SA NF, 1.6666/3.3333 PF, 4.2424 UF, 1.6666 MU, 4.0 4.8888 L, 4.99 AR CO 3.54Palau eap PF, 10/10 PF, 9.1919 DEM CO 9.73Panama WH PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 6.6666 MF, 5.425 6.8888 M, 7.88 DEM CI 7.53Papua New Guinea eap PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 7.5757 5.3333 M, 5.48 DEM CO 6.34Paraguay WH PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 4.5454 MU, 4.025 5.8888 M, 7.51 DEM CI 5.88

Table A2 (continued)
222

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Peru WH PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 6.5656 MF, 5.425 6.3333 M, 7.52 AR CI 6.81

Philippines eap PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 7.0707 PF, 6.6666 MU, 4.875 6.2222 M, 7.54 DEM CI 6.77Poland EUR PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 8.2828 PF, 8.3333 MF, 5.475 5.5555 H, 8.41 DEM CI 7.78Portugal EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.5858 MF, 6.55 6.8888 H, 8.96 DEM CI 8.50Qatar NE NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 3.9393 MF, 5.35 H, 8.26 TM CU 4.18Romania EUR PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 6.2626 PF, 6.6666 MU, 3.35 4.1111 M, 7.73 DEM CI 6.40Russian Federation EUR PF, 3.3333/3.3333 NF, 3.4343 PF, 4.9999 MU, 3.85 4.4444 M, 7.79 DEM CI 4.45Rwanda af NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.0202 MU, 4.1 4.6666 L, 4.22 AR CU 3.33Saint Kitts and Nevis WH PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 8.2828 H, 8.08 DEM CO 8.67Saint Lucia WH PF, 8.3333/10 PF, 9.2929 M, 7.75 DEM CO 8.84Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

WH PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 8.3838 M, 7.55 DEM CO 8.57

Samoa(formerly Western Samoa)

eap PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 7.6767 M, 7.75 DEM CO 8.02

San Marino EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 9.1919 DEM CI 9.73Sao Tome and Principe af PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 8.1818 M, 6.39 DEM CI 7.81Saudi Arabia NE NF, 0/0 NF, 2.0202 UF, 0 MU, 4.875 M, 7.69 TM CU 2.43

Table A2 (continued)
223

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Senegal af PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 6.2626 MU, 5 5.3333 L, 4.30 RDP CI 5.98

Serbia and Montenegro EUR PF, 6.6666/8.3333 PF, 6.0606 Not graded in 2003 DEM CI 7.02Seychelles af PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 5.0505 H, 8.40 DEM CU 6.69Sierra Leone af PF, 4.9999/6.6666 NF, 3.9393 MU, 3.175 4.6666 L, 2.75 DEM CU 4.37Singapore eap PF, 3.3333/4.9999 NF, 3.4343 PF, 4.9999 MF, 8.475 8.3333 H, 8.84 AR CO 6.06Slovakia EUR PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 7.9797 MF, 6.4 5.5555 H, 8.36 DEM CI 7.77Slovenia EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.1818 MF, 5.625 5.6666 H, 8.81 DEM CI 8.05Solomon Islands eap PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 7.5757 M, 6.32 DEM CO 6.81Somalia af NF, 1.6666/0 NF, 2.0202 AR CU 1.23South Africa af PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 7.5757 PF, 8.3333 MF, 5.525 6.4444 M, 6.84 DEM CU 7.58Spain EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.4848 PF, 6.6666 MF, 6.725 6.6666 H, 9.18 DEM CI 8.25Sri Lanka SA PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 4.8484 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.85 5.8888 M, 7.30 DEM CO 5.89Sudan af NF, 0/0 NF, 1.1616 UF, 0 Not graded in 2003 M, 5.03 AR CU 1.24Suriname WH PF, 10/8.3333 PF, 7.4747 MU, 2.6 M, 7.62 DEM CI 7.21Swaziland af NF, 0/3.3333 NF, 2.6262 MU, 4.55 M, 5.47 TM CU 3.19Sweden EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 9.2929 PF, 8.3333 MF, 7.75 6.7777 H, 9.41 DEM CI 8.79Switzerland EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 9.0909 MF, 7.9 7.7777 H, 9.32 DEM CI 9.01Syrian Arab Republic NE NF, 0/0 NF, 2.0202 MU, 2.8 4.6666 M, 6.85 AR CU 2.72

Table A2 (continued)
224

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

Taiwan (multiparty democratic regime not recognized as an independent state)

eap PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 7.6767 PF, 8.3333 MF, 6.425 6.7777 DEM CI 7.65

Tajikistan EUR NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.4242 MR, 2.125 M, 6.77 RDP CI 3.26Tanzania, United Republic of af PF, 4.9999/6.6666 PF, 5.3535 PF, 4.9999 MU, 4.275 5.7777 L, 4.00 RDP CU 5.15Thailand eap PF, 8.3333/6.6666 PF, 6.4646 MF, 5.35 6.3333 M, 7.68 DEM CI 6.80Timor-Leste(East Timor) eap PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 7.8787 PF, 3.3333 P CI 6.14Togo af NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.6262 MU, 3.175 4.5555 M, 5.01 DEM CU 3.39Tonga eap PF, 3.3333/6.6666 PF, 6.8686 RDP CO 5.62Trinidad and Tobago WH PF, 6.6666/6.6666 PF, 7.5757 MF, 6.375 6.7777 H, 8.02 DEM CO 7.01Tunisia NE NF, 1.6666/3.3333 NF, 2.2222 MF, 5.15 5.9999 M, 7.40 AR CU 4.29Turkey EUR PF, 6.6666/4.9999 PF, 4.5454 PF, 3.3333 MU, 4.025 4.7777 M, 7.34 DEM CI 5.09Turkmenistan EUR NF, 0/0 NF, 0.8080 UF, 0 MR, 1.725 M, 7.48 AR CI 1.67Tuvalu eap PF, 10/10 PF, 8.4848 DEM CO 9.49Uganda af PF, 3.3333/4.9999 PF, 5.5555 MF, 5.75 6.3333 L, 4.89 AR CU 5.14Ukraine EUR PF, 4.9999/4.9999 NF, 3.3333 PF, 6.6666 MU, 3.775 3.9999 M, 7.66 DEM CI 5.06

Table A2 (continued)
225

A

Jurisdiction

B

Region

C

Normalized 

FH rating: 

political/civil 

D

Normalized 

FH rating: 

media 

E

Normalized 

FH rating: 

religion

F

Normalized 

HF rating: 

economic 

G

Normalized 

FI rating: 

economic

H

Normalized 

UNDP HDI

I

Government

typea

J

Type of 

legal 

systemb

K

Da

United Arab Emirates NE NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 2.6262 MF, 6.0 7.2222 H, 8.16 TM CU 4.56

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

EUR PF, 10/10 PF, 8.2828 PF, 8.3333 MF, 8.025 7.9999 H, 9.30 DEM CO 8.85

United States of America WH PF, 10/10 PF, 8.3838 PF, 10 MF, 7.875 8.1111 H, 9.37 DEM CO 9.11Uruguay WH PF, 10/10 PF, 7.0707 MF, 6.125 6.3333 H, 8.34 DEM CI 7.98Uzbekistan EUR NF, 0/1.6666 NF, 1.4141 UF, 1.6666 MR, 1.775 M, 7.29 AR CI 2.30Vanuatu eap PF, 8.3333/8.3333 PF, 7.9797 M, 5.68 DEM CO 7.58Venezuela WH PF, 6.6666/4.9999 NF, 3.2323 MR, 2.05 4.7777 M, 7.75 DEM CI 4.91Vietnam eap NF, 0/1.6666 NF, 1.1818 UF, 1.6666 MU, 2.675 M, 6.88 TOT CI 2.35Yemen NE PF, 3.3333/3.3333 NF, 3.1313 MU, 3.25 L, 4.70 RDP CU 3.55Zambia af PF, 4.9999/4.9999 NF, 3.7373 MU, 3.75 6.4444 L, 3.86 AR CU 4.63Zimbabwe af NF, 1.6666/1.6666 NF, 1.2121 PF, 6.6666 MR, 1.15 3.3333 L, 4.96 RDP CU 2.95

aFor more information, see description of government in table A1.bFor more information, see description of legal system in table A1.

Table A2 (continued)
226

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Andorra (28 Jul 1993) EUR DEM, parliamentary democracy CI 9.76San Marino (2 Mar 1992) EUR DEM, independent republic CI 9.73Palau (15 Dec 1994) eap DEM, constitutional government in free association with the United States CO 9.73Marshall Islands (17 Sep 1991) eap DEM, constitutional government in free association with the United States CO 9.69Liechtenstein (18 Sep 1990) EUR DEM, hereditary constitutional monarchy on a democratic parlia- mentary basis CI 9.66Tuvalu (5 Sep 2000) eap DEM, constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democracy CO 9.49Micronesia, Federated States of (17 Sep 1991) eap DEM, constitutional government in free association with the United States CO 9.46Monaco (28 May 1993) EUR DEM, constitutional monarchy CI 9.18Nauru (14 Sep 1999) eap DEM, republic CO 9.16Kiribati (14 Sep 1999) eap DEM, republic CO 9.16New Zealand (24 Oct 1945) eap DEM, parliamentary democracy CO 9.12Dominica (18 Dec 1978) WH DEM, parliamentary democracy; republic within the Common- wealth CO 9.11United States of America (24 Oct 1945) WH DEM, constitution-based federal republic; strong democratic tradition CO 9.11Ireland (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, republic CO 9.10Finland (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, republic CI 9.07Switzerland (10 Sep 2002) EUR DEM, federal republic CI 9.01Netherlands (10 Dec 1945) EUR DEM, constitutional monarchy CI 8.99

Table A3. 193 selected jurisdictions sorted by aggregated index value of democracy (Da), from highest to lowest
227

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Luxembourg (24 Oct 1945) EUR DEM, constitutional monarchy CI 8.94Australia (1 Nov 1945) eap DEM, democratic federal-state system recognizing the British monarch as sovereign CO 8.94Denmark (24 Oct 1945) EUR DEM, constitutional monarchy CI 8.94Iceland (19 Nov 1946) EUR DEM, constitutional republic CI 8.92Canada (9 Nov 1945) WH DEM, confederation with parliamentary democracy CO 8.87Norway (27 Nov 1945) EUR DEM, constitutional monarchy CI 8.86United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (24 Oct 1945) EUR DEM, constitutional monarchy CO 8.85Saint Lucia (18 Sep 1979) WH DEM, Westminster-style parliamentary democracy CO 8.84Sweden (19 Nov 1946) EUR DEM, constitutional monarchy CI 8.79Saint Kitts and Nevis (23 Sep 1983) WH DEM, constitutional monarchy with Westminster-style parliament CO 8.67Estonia (17 Sep 1991) EUR DEM, parliamentary republic CI 8.62Grenada (17 Sep 1974) WH DEM, constitutional monarchy with Westminster-style parliament CO 8.60Austria (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, federal republic CI 8.58Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (16 Sep 1980) WH DEM, parliamentary democracy; independent sovereign state within the Commonwealth CO 8.57Portugal (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, parliamentary democracy CI 8.50Belgium (27 Dec 1945) EUR DEM, federal parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch CI 8.48Cyprus (20 Sep 1960) EUR DEM, republic CI 8.43Germany (18 Sep 1973) EUR DEM, federal republic CI 8.41

Table A3 (continued)
228

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Bahamas (18 Sep 1973) WH DEM, constitutional parliamentary democracy CO 8.37Italy (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, republic CI 8.32Malta (1 Dec 1964) EUR DEM, republic CO 8.26Spain (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, parliamentary monarchy CI 8.25Chile (24 Oct 1945) WH DEM, republic CI 8.23Barbados (9 Dec 1966) WH DEM, parliamentary democracy; independent sovereign state within the Commonwealth CO 8.23Japan (18 Dec 1956) eap DEM, constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary government CI 8.19France (24 Oct 1945) EUR DEM, republic CI 8.08Slovenia (22 May 1992) EUR DEM, parliamentary democratic republic CI 8.05Samoa (formerly Western Samoa) (15 Dec 1976) eap DEM, constitutional monarchy under native chief CO 8.02Lithuania (17 Sep 1991) EUR DEM, parliamentary democracy CI 7.99Uruguay (18 Dec 1945) WH DEM, constitutional republic CI 7.98Costa Rica (2 Nov 1945) WH DEM, democratic republic CI 7.97Czech Republic (19 Jan 1993) EUR DEM, parliamentary democracy CI 7.97Cape Verde (16 Sep 1975) af DEM, republic CI 7.94Sao Tome and Principe (16 Sep 1975) af DEM, republic CI 7.81Poland (24 Oct 1945) EUR DEM, republic CI 7.78Slovakia (19 Jan 1993) EUR DEM, parliamentary democracy CI 7.77Latvia (17 Sep 1991) EUR DEM, parliamentary democracy CI 7.74

Table A3 (continued)
229

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Hungary (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, parliamentary democracy CI 7.69Taiwan (multiparty democratic regime not recognized as an independent state) eap DEM, multiparty democratic regime headed by popularly elected president and unicameral legislature CI 7.65Mauritius (24 Apr 1968) af AR, parliamentary democracy CU 7.64Korea, Republic of (17 Sep 1991) eap DEM, republic CI 7.64Belize (25 Sep 1981) WH DEM, parliamentary democracy CO 7.59South Africa (7 Nov 1945) af DEM, republic CU 7.58Vanuatu (15 Sep 1981) eap DEM, parliamentary republic CO 7.58Panama (13 Nov 1945) WH DEM, constitutional democracy CI 7.53Israel (11 May 1949) NE DEM, parliamentary democracy CU 7.49Greece (25 Oct 1945) EUR DEM, parliamentary republic CI 7.34Botswana (17 Oct 1966) af DEM, parliamentary republic CU 7.30Hong Kong (SAR of China) eap DEM, limited democracy CO 7.29Suriname (4 Dec 1975) WH DEM, constitutional democracy CI 7.21Jamaica (18 Sep 1962) WH DEM, constitutional parliamentary democracy CO 7.13Guyana (20 Sep 1966) WH DEM, republic within the Commonwealth CO 7.10Serbia and Montenegro (1 Nov 2000) EUR DEM, republic CI 7.02Trinidad and Tobago (18 Sep 1962) WH DEM, parliamentary democracy CO 7.01El Salvador (24 Oct 1945) WH DEM, republic CI 6.99Croatia (22 May 1992) EUR DEM, presidential parliamentary democracy CI 6.98Mongolia (27 Oct 1961) eap DEM, parliamentary CI 6.94

Table A3 (continued)
230

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Bulgaria (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, parliamentary democracy CI 6.85Argentina (24 Oct 1945) WH DEM, republic CI 6.84Peru (31 Oct 1945) WH AR, constitutional republic CI 6.81Solomon Islands (19 Sep 1978) eap DEM, parliamentary democracy tending toward anarchy CO 6.81Thailand (16 Dec 1946) eap DEM, constitutional monarchy CI 6.80Brazil (24 Oct 1945) WH DEM, federative republic CI 6.78Namibia (23 Apr 1990) af DEM, republic CI 6.77Philippines (24 Oct 1945) eap DEM, republic CI 6.77Antigua and Barbuda (11 Nov 1981) WH RDP, constitutional monarchy with UK-style parliament CO 6.72Mexico (7 Nov 1945) WH RDP, federal republic CI 6.71Seychelles (21 Sep 1976) af DEM, republic CU 6.69Bolivia (14 Nov 1945) WH DEM, republic CI 6.54Dominican Republic (24 Oct 1945) WH DEM, representative democracy CI 6.51Ghana (8 Mar 1957) af DEM, constitutional democracy CU 6.46Romania (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, republic CI 6.40Papua New Guinea (10 Oct 1975) eap DEM, constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democracy CO 6.34Mali (28 Sep 1960) af DEM, republic CU 6.19Benin (20 Sep 1960) af DEM, republic under multiparty democratic rule CU 6.18Nicaragua (24 Oct 1945) WH DEM, republic CI 6.16Fiji (13 Oct 1970) eap DEM, republic CO 6.15Timor-Leste (East Timor) (27 Sep 2002) eap P, republic CI 6.14

Table A3 (continued)
231

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Singapore (21 Sep 1965) eap AR, parliamentary republic CO 6.06Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of (8 Apr 1993) EUR DEM, parliamentary democracy CI 6.02Senegal (28 Sep 1960) af RDP, republic under multiparty democratic rule CI 5.98Lesotho (17 Oct 1966) af RDP, parliamentary constitutional monarchy CU 5.94Albania (14 Dec 1955) EUR DEM, emerging democracy CI 5.93Sri Lanka (14 Dec 1955) SA DEM, republic CO 5.89Paraguay (24 Oct 1945) WH DEM, constitutional republic CI 5.88Ecuador (21 Dec 1945) WH DEM, republic CI 5.76Honduras (17 Dec 1945) WH DEM, democratic constitutional republic CI 5.72Madagascar (20 Sep 1960) af DEM, republic CI 5.67Tonga (14 Sep 1999) eap RDP, hereditary constitutional monarchy CO 5.62India (30 Oct 1945) SA DEM, federal republic CO 5.59Kuwait (14 May 1963) NE TM, nominal constitutional monarchy CU 5.58Bosnia and Herzegovina (22 May 1992) EUR P, emerging federal democratic republic CI 5.43Moldova, Republic of (2 Mar 1992) EUR DEM, republic CI 5.43Guatemala (21 Nov 1945) WH DEM, constitutional democratic republic CI 5.42Bahrain (21 Sep 1971) NE TM, constitutional hereditary monarchy CU 5.39Kenya (16 Dec 1963) af AR, republic CU 5.34Armenia (2 Mar 1992) EUR DEM, republic CI 5.29Georgia (31 Jul 1992) EUR DEM, republic CI 5.24

Table A3 (continued)
232

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Colombia (5 Nov 1945) WH DEM, republic; executive branch dominates government struc- ture CI 5.16Tanzania, United Republic of (14 Dec 1961) af RDP, republic CU 5.15Uganda (25 Oct 1962) af AR, republic CU 5.14Turkey (24 Oct 1945) EUR DEM, republican parliamentary democracy CI 5.09Ukraine (24 Oct 1945) EUR DEM, republic CI 5.06Jordan (14 Dec 1955) NE RDP, constitutional monarchy CU 4.98Mozambique (16 Sep 1975) af DEM, republic CI 4.98Malaysia (17 Sep 1957) eap RDP, constitutional monarchy CO 4.97Indonesia (28 Sep 1950) eap DEM, republic CI 4.93Venezuela (15 Nov 1945) WH DEM, federal republic CI 4.91Comoros (12 Nov 1975) af RDP, independent republic CU 4.84Burkina Faso (20 Sep 1960) af AR, parliamentary republic CU 4.75Malawi (1 Dec 1964) af DEM, multiparty democracy CU 4.66Oman (7 Oct 1971) NE TM, monarchy CU 4.65Morocco (12 Nov 1956) NE TM, constitutional monarchy CU 4.65Zambia (1 Dec 1964) af AR, republic CU 4.63Gabon (20 Sep 1960) af AR, republic; multiparty presidential regime CU 4.62United Arab Emirates (9 Dec 1971) NE TM, federation CU 4.56Russian Federation (24 Oct 1945) EUR DEM, federation CI 4.45Niger (20 Sep 1960) af DEM, republic CU 4.45

Table A3 (continued)
233

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Sierra Leone (27 Sep 1961) af DEM, constitutional democracy CU 4.37Gambia (21 Sep 1965) af AR, republic under multiparty democratic rule CU 4.36Nigeria (7 Oct 1960) af DEM, republic transitioning from military to civilian rule CU 4.35Tunisia (12 Nov 1956) NE AR, republic CU 4.29Lebanon (24 Oct 1945) NE AR, republic CU 4.19Qatar (21 Sep 1971) NE TM, traditional monarchy CU 4.18Nepal (14 Dec 1955) SA DEM, parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy CO 4.16Congo, Republic of the (20 Sep 1960) af AR, republic CU 4.09Bangladesh (17 Sep 1974) SA DEM, parliamentary democracy CO 4.08Kyrgyzstan (2 Mar 1992) EUR DEM, republic CI 4.05Brunei Darussalam (21 Sep 1984) eap TM, constitutional sultanate CO 4.04Maldives (21 Sep 1965) SA AR, republic CO 4.04Kazakhstan (2 Mar 1992) EUR AR, republic CI 3.94Algeria (8 Oct 1962) NE AR, republic CU 3.94Cambodia (14 Dec 1955) eap RDP, multiparty democracy under a constitutional monarchy established in September 1993 CI 3.89Djibouti (20 Sep 1977) af DEM, republic CU 3.85Azerbaijan (2 Mar 1992) EUR AR, republic CI 3.75Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) (20 Sep 1960) af AR, republic; multiparty presidential regime established 1960 CU 3.69Egypt (24 Oct 1945) NE RDP, republic CU 3.67Ethiopia (13 Nov 1945) af AR, federal republic CU 3.61

Table A3 (continued)
234

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Yemen (30 Sep 1947) NE RDP, republic CU 3.55Pakistan (30 Sep 1947) SA AR, federal republic CO 3.54Guinea-Bissau (17 Sep 1974) af DEM, republic, multiparty since mid 1991 CI 3.49Chad (20 Sep 1960) af RDP, republic CU 3.48Cameroon (20 Sep 1960) af RDP, unitary republic; multiparty presidential regime CU 3.40Burundi (18 Sep 1962) af AR, republic CU 3.40Togo (20 Sep 1960) af DEM, republic under transition to multiparty democratic rule CU 3.39Mauritania (27 Oct 1961) af AR, republic CU 3.38Rwanda (18 Sep 1962) af AR, republic; presidential, multiparty system CU 3.33Tajikistan (2 Mar 1992) EUR RDP, republic CI 3.26Guinea (12 Dec 1958) af AR, republic CU 3.26Swaziland (24 Sep 1968) af TM, monarchy; independent member of Commonwealth CU 3.19Belarus (Byelorussia) (24 Oct 1945) EUR AR, republic CI 3.13Haiti (24 Oct 1945) WH DEM, elected government CI 3.12Central African Republic (20 Sep 1960) af DEM, republic CU 3.11China, People’s Republic of (24 Oct 1945) eap AR, Communist state CI 2.99Bhutan (21 Sep 1971) SA TM, monarchy; special treaty relationship with India CO 2.96Zimbabwe (25 Aug 1980) af RDP, parliamentary democracy CU 2.95Angola (1 Dec 1976) af AR, republic; nominally a multiparty democracy with a strong presidential system CI 2.89Iran, Islamic Republic of (24 Oct 1945) NE AR, theocratic republic CU 2.86

Table A3 (continued)
235

A

Jurisdiction

(date of admission to UN)

B

Region

C

Government type 

D

Type of 

legal system 

E

Da

Syrian Arab Republic (24 Oct 1945) NE AR, republic under military regime since March 1963 CU 2.72Equatorial Guinea (12 Nov 1968) af AR, republic CI 2.55Saudi Arabia (24 Oct 1945) NE TM, monarchy CU 2.43Congo, Democratic Republic of the (formerly Zaire) (20 Sep 1960) af AR, dictatorship CU 2.40Vietnam (20 Sep 1977) eap TOT, Communist state CI 2.35Uzbekistan (2 Mar 1992) EUR AR, republic; authoritarian presidential rule, with little power outside the executive branch CI 2.30Cuba (24 Oct 1945) WH TOT, Communist state CI 2.11Lao People’s Democratic Republic(formerly Laos) (14 Dec 1955) eap TOT, Communist state CU 2.06Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (14 Dec 1955) NE AR, military dictatorship CU 2.01Afghanistan (19 Nov 1946) SA TOT, transitional CU 1.99Eritrea (28 May 1993) af AR, transitional government CU 1.96Liberia (2 Nov 1945) af DEM, republic CU 1.82Turkmenistan (2 Mar 1992) EUR AR, republic CI 1.67Myanmar (formerly Burma) (19 Apr 1948) eap AR, military regime CI 1.51Iraq (21 Dec 1945) NE AR, transitional CU 1.28Sudan (12 Nov 1956) af AR, authoritarian regime CU 1.24Somalia (20 Sep 1960) af AR, no permanent national government; transitional, parliamen- tary national government CU 1.23Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of (17 Sep 1991) eap TOT, authoritarian socialist; one-man dictatorship CI 0.08

Table A3 (continued)

237

Appendix B

A Brief History of US Foreign Policy

Concerning the Spread of Democracy 

around the World

This study argues that free nations should actively encourage the spread of democracy to unfree nations. A brief overview of US foreign policy will show how the United States has 

evolved from an isolationist nation to one that actively supports the spread of democracy as an instrument of international peace and security. Pres. George Washington advocated 

in his farewell address of 17 September 1796 that the United 

States “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of 

the foreign world” to avoid being entangled in the wars and controversies of other nations.1 Similarly, Pres. Thomas Jefferson, 

who also served as the first US secretary of state, advocated 

isolationism in his first inaugural address of 4 March 1801 by 

endorsing “honest friendship with all nations, [and] entangling 

alliances with none.”2 This early American isolationism was the 

most effective policy available at the time to protect a young 

republic from the conflicts that continued to plague the European powers.3

As the colonies of the European powers continued to surround the United States in the Western Hemisphere, Pres. 

James Monroe extended Washington and Jefferson’s concept 

of isolationism on 2 December 1823 in his annual message to 

Congress.4 He declared that the United States would consider 

it a hostile act for any European power to colonize any independent nation in the Western Hemisphere or to extend monarchy 

to the Americas and that the United States would respect existing European colonies.5 This form of early-American isolationism—remaining active yet neutral in world affairs—continued 

into the twentieth century, when contemporary isolationists 

“urged that our role in world affairs be confined to commerce, 

which they thought made for peace; to preaching the universal 

recognition of human liberty; and to setting a good example 

for less noble people and states.”6 Isolationism was so rooted 
APPENDIX B

238

in the American ethos in the early twentieth century that few 

Americans perceived any national interest in the outcome of 

World War I when the war began.7

Pres. Woodrow Wilson, however, passionately believed that 

an active yet neutral, isolationist approach to international 

politics would have to be radically reformed to rid the world of 

war. He believed that a concert of power, not a balance of power, 

was the key to peace. He envisioned a collective-defense and 

dispute-settlement framework embodied in a well-organized 

and permanent international organization of states inspired by 

American idealism. Even more persuaded after the failure of 

US neutrality and peacemaking to bring an end to World War I, 

Wilson led the United States into the war in April 1917 for the 

principal reason of creating such an international organization 

as a part of the peace process. Wilson believed that an international system of order based on a concert of power managed 

by a collective of states in accordance with the rules necessary 

for peaceful cooperation was in the supreme national interest 

of the United States. He also believed that such a collective of 

states was the only possible goal worthy of US entry into the 

war. Wilson announced a League of Nations to Congress on 8 

January 1918 as a part of his concept for peace, and it became 

an integral part of the peace negotiations with the Germans 

later that year.8

The Treaty of Versailles established the League of Nations, 

which met for the first time in 1920 with 42 nations present. 

The League of Nations failed, however, primarily because the 

United States refused to become a member, and it dissolved itself in 1946.9 Domestically, the US government and the American people were unable to break away from their interpretation 

of Washington’s isolationist warning to avoid permanent foreign alliances. However, this was a significant failure on their 

part to adapt to the changes in the world balance of power. The 

US attempt to “escape down the rabbit-hole” of isolationism after World War I precipitated the failure of the League of Nations 

and was the ultimate cause of World War II.10

Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt was an internationalist in the 

Wilson tradition, and during the years before World War II, he 

followed his mentor’s footsteps by kindling the foreign policy 

debate over isolationism versus internationalism. In his fa-
239

APPENDIX B

mous 1937 “quarantine” speech, Roosevelt announced that 

undeclared war and lawlessness were “creating a state of international anarchy” that America could not “escape through 

mere isolation or neutrality.”11 However, Roosevelt was not able 

to overcome America’s strong sense of isolationism even after 

World War II began in 1939, and the United States did not enter 

the war until after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941.12

After Roosevelt died in office on 12 April 1945, Pres. Harry 

Truman succeeded in developing a national consensus that 

Wilson was right all along, and his isolationist opponents were 

disastrously wrong. Truman launched a diplomatic initiative 

before the end of the war to establish the UN, which was supported overwhelmingly by the US Senate and Congress.13 The 

UN came into being on 24 October 1945 after its charter was 

ratified by a majority of the signatories.

The thin veneer of postwar support by the Soviet Union for 

the UN and the ideals of democratic principles quickly dissolved the alliance of the Allied powers.14 As the USSR moved 

to forcibly establish control over much of Eastern Europe and 

to spread Communism worldwide, a period of intense political 

tension as well as economic and diplomatic struggle known 

as the Cold War began.15 Western fears of Soviet advances in 

Europe gave rise to the Truman Doctrine of containment announced on 12 March 1947, which offered economic and military aid to countries threatened by external aggression or internal subversion by Communist forces.16 During a Harvard 

commencement speech on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State 

George C. Marshall proposed a plan to help European countries recover from the war, build their economies, and stem the 

spread of Communism. To fund the Marshall Plan, Congress 

authorized over $12.5 billion over the next 40 months. Containment became the central concept defining US foreign policy 

throughout the Cold War.17 In 1949, Truman also supported 

the creation of NATO, a regional collective defense alliance intended to enhance peace by preventing the spread of Communism in Europe.18

Every US president since Truman has continued to actively 

contain the spread of Communism and support the spread of 

democracy worldwide as an instrument of international peace 

and security. In 1954, Pres. Dwight Eisenhower supported the 
APPENDIX B

240

creation of and US entry into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a regional collective defense alliance similar 

to NATO intended to enhance peace by preventing the spread 

of Communism in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific area.19

In 1955, Eisenhower also supported the creation of the Central 

Treaty Organization (CENTO), a mutual defense alliance signed 

by Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, and Britain; the United States 

did not join CENTO but participated as an observer.20 On 5 January 1957, Eisenhower expanded the Truman Doctrine strategies 

of economic and military aid by asserting the right of the United 

States to use armed force to help any Middle Eastern nation 

defend itself against armed aggression by a Communist state.21

Eisenhower also imposed an economic blockade on Cuba and 

created a Cuban counterrevolutionary force when Fidel Castro 

came to power in January 1959, bringing Communism to the 

Americas.22

In 1961, Pres. John F. Kennedy told a joint session of Congress that Communism was seeking to capture the “minds and 

souls as well as lives and territories” of people in developing 

countries.23 He created the Peace Corps to promote world peace 

by sending American volunteers to perform humanitarian work 

in developing countries, and he actively promoted democracy 

through the US Information Agency. Kennedy also announced 

to Congress that the United States would provide military support against guerrilla warfare “where the local population is too 

caught up in its own misery to be concerned about the advance 

of Communism.”24 In April 1961, Kennedy unsuccessfully attempted to rout Communism in the Western Hemisphere when 

he backed an invasion by about 1,300 Cuban exiles, who were 

quickly defeated by the Cuban army when they landed in the 

Bay of Pigs to overthrow Castro.25 In 1962, Kennedy told the 

Soviets there could be no peace between the two superpowers 

until the USSR carried out its promise at the end of World War 

II to allow free elections in Eastern Europe.26 On 22 October 

1962, Kennedy ordered a naval and air quarantine on the shipment of military equipment to Cuba to successfully counter a 

Soviet buildup of offensive missiles on the island.27

Pres. Lyndon Johnson embraced a doctrine that declared the 

principles of Communism as incompatible with the principles 

of the inter-American system and approved of using American 
241

APPENDIX B

troops to prevent the establishment of a Communist government 

anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.28 He continued the US 

postwar policy of containment and was moderately successful in 

his efforts to improve relations between the United States and the 

USSR. In 1964, Johnson significantly expanded the presence 

of the US military in Southeast Asia to fight the Communistsupported civil war in Vietnam. In 1965, he ordered the Marines 

to the Dominican Republic to reinstall its freely elected president 

after his ouster in 1963 by a Communist-inspired coup.29

Pres. Richard Nixon announced in July 1969 that after 

Vietnam US combat troops would not bear the main burden 

of defending other nations, but the United States would use 

nuclear deterrence to provide military security for Japan and 

other friendly Asian nations. This policy became known as 

the Nixon Doctrine.30 However, Nixon later expanded the war 

in Vietnam by authorizing the 1970 invasion of Cambodia to 

pursue North Vietnamese troops and assisting a South Vietnamese invasion of Laos in 1971. In 1972, Nixon authorized 

deep-penetration bombing raids over North Vietnam, the mining of major North Vietnamese ports, and air strikes against 

North Vietnamese railroad lines. When secret peace negotiations broke down in December 1972, Nixon ordered massive 

bombing against Hanoi and Haiphong until the North Vietnamese returned to the negotiating table in early 1973.31 Nixon and 

the premier of the People’s Republic of China declared in their 

1972 Shanghai communiqué that the United States and China 

were agreed in opposing “any hegemonic power in Asia.”32

When the USSR probed the United States in the early 1970s to 

determine what its position would be should the USSR attack 

Chinese nuclear plants, Nixon secretly warned the USSR not 

to do so. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Communistsupported Egypt attacked Israel, Nixon supported Israel and 

put the American strategic nuclear forces on alert after the 

USSR moved nuclear weapons to Egypt.33

Pres. Gerald Ford’s policies toward the USSR, especially 

those policies such as the Helsinki Accords, which recognized 

existing borders between states including those that separated 

West and East Germany, were strongly opposed by many in the 

United States. He also ordered the evacuation of American security and embassy personnel as the North Vietnamese began 
APPENDIX B

242

the last offensive of the Vietnam War and captured Saigon.34

Ford did, however, order a major show of military force in May 

1975 when he ordered the Marines to rescue the crew of the 

US merchant ship SS Mayaguez, who had been taken hostage 

by the Communist Khmer Rouge regime of Cambodia. He also 

ordered air strikes of the Cambodian mainland and naval assets to recover the SS Mayaguez. Although the crew had been 

moved and the rescue attempt was unsuccessful, Cambodia 

returned the crew.35 In his last year of office, Ford declared 

that the United States would never permit any Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.36

When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pres. Jimmy 

Carter ordered a partial embargo of US grain sales to the USSR 

and suspended the ratification of the second Strategic Arms 

Limitation Treaty (SALT II) in protest. In his State of the Union 

address on 23 January 1980, Carter also declared that the 

Persian Gulf’s oil reserves are a vital US national interest and 

claimed that the United States would be justified in preventing 

outside domination of the region by military intervention.37

Pres. Ronald Reagan expressed fervent anticommunism, 

such as when he denounced the USSR in his 1993 “Evil Empire” speech as “the focus of evil in the modern world.”38 His 

firm and resolute containment doctrine and foreign policy have 

been credited with contributing to the demise of Communism 

in the USSR.39 Reagan committed the United States to provide 

meaningful political and material support to democratic liberation movements around the world that fought against the 

Communist oppression that destroys freedom and the human 

spirit. Under Reagan, the United States intervened in Nicaragua 

and Grenada to contain Communism and provided support to 

the Afghan resistance. Nevertheless, Reagan was also noted 

for improving relations with the USSR despite his hard-line 

doctrine against Communism. The containment policy started 

by Truman ended circa 1989–90 as most of Eastern Europe’s 

Communist regimes collapsed.40

Pres. George H. W. Bush led the United States and the international community through an extraordinary transition 

period as Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the 

USSR, marking the end of the Cold War. He believed that since 

“the Cold War began with the division of Europe,” it “can only 
243

APPENDIX B

end when Europe is whole.”41 He was the first Western leader 

to declare his determination for “a Europe whole and free.”42

Bush signed a mutual nonaggression pact (the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States) with the USSR that served as a symbolic conclusion to the Cold War, and he forged an economic 

and political partnership with the USSR as it reformed toward 

democracy and capitalism. He also provided foreign aid to former Soviet-bloc nations of Eastern Europe to support their 

economic and political transformation. President Bush was an 

internationalist who took the world beyond containment. He 

believed that the international community must be actively engaged in maintaining international peace and security and was 

willing to commit US military forces to fight aggression and 

conduct humanitarian missions.43 For example, he led an alliance of nations against Iraq when it invaded Kuwait and an 

international coalition in Somalia to use military force for fooddelivery missions.

Pres. Bill Clinton built upon the internationalist legacies of 

Wilson and Roosevelt and the engagement policies of Reagan 

and Bush in developing his policy of democratic enlargement. 

Clinton’s strategy of engagement and leadership abroad had 

three core objectives: “enhancing American security, bolstering 

[US] economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights abroad.”44 Clinton stated that US security “depends 

upon the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide, 

without which repression, corruption and instability could engulf a number of countries and threaten the stability of entire 

regions.”45 In 1994, he demonstrated his resolve to use military 

force in support of democracy when he deployed a large military 

force to Haiti to reinstate that country’s first elected president. 

At the last minute, Haitian military leaders stepped down and a 

conflict was avoided. Clinton then orchestrated an international 

military presence to maintain peace. In November 1995, Clinton 

hosted successful peace talks between the warring parties in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina and then arranged for an international 

military presence there as well to preserve the peace.46

In his inaugural address on 20 January 2001, Pres. George W. 

Bush declared that “America’s faith in freedom and democracy 

was a rock in a raging sea” during the twentieth century and 

affirmed that the United States will continue to “lead the cause 
of freedom.”47 He also announced that the United States will remain “engaged in the world . . . shaping a balance of power that 

favors freedom” and democracy and will “defend our allies and 

our interests” and “meet aggression and bad faith with resolve 

and strength.”48 In response to the catastrophic terrorism of 11 

September 2001, Bush has demonstrated his resolve to actively 

work with the international community to maintain peace and 

security and to commit US military forces when necessary to 

defend vital American interests. Bush declared in his administration’s first National Security Strategy that freedom, democracy, and free enterprise constitute “a single sustainable model 

for national success.”49 Bush also articulated a strong national 

strategy of internationalism and engagement by declaring the 

United States “will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner 

of the world” and by recognizing that “alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving 

nations.”50 Key elements of Bush’s National Security Strategy

include strengthening alliances; expanding free markets, free 

trade, and democratic infrastructures; and working with others 

to defuse regional conflicts. However, to meet the security threat 

posed by rogue states and terrorists that is “more complex and 

dangerous” than the threat of the USSR during the Cold War, 

Bush also unmistakably declared a guiding principle of preemption where necessary to meet that threat: “The United States has 

long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 

sufficient threat to our national security . . . even if uncertainty 

remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United 

States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”51

 This brief discussion of the evolution of US national policy 

from isolationism to internationalism, containment, and engagement highlights those key policies and events that demonstrate how the global support for democracy has permeated 

US foreign policy since 1945. Table B1 summarizes the key 

doctrines and their proponents.

APPENDIX B

244
245

Table B1. American foreign policies from isolationism to engagement

President

(term of office) Foreign policy doctrine

Isolationist doctrines

George Washington

(1789–97)

Isolationism: The United States will avoid permanent foreign alliances in order to escape involvement in other nations’ wars.

Thomas Jefferson

(1801–09)

Isolationism: The United States will seek honest friendship with 

all nations, and entangling alliances with none.

James Monroe

(1817–25)

Monroe Doctrine: The United States will consider it a hostile act 

for any European power to colonize any independent nation in 

the Western Hemisphere or to extend monarchy to the Americas; the United States will respect existing European colonies.

Internationalist doctrines

Woodrow Wilson

(1913–21)

Internationalism: The United States considers an international 

system of order based on a concert of power managed by a 

collective of states in accordance with the rules necessary for 

peaceful cooperation to be in its supreme national interest.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

(1933–45)

Internationalism: The United States cannot escape war through 

mere isolation or neutrality.

Containment doctrines

Harry Truman

(1945–53)

Truman Doctrine: The United States will contain Communism by 

providing economic and military aid to countries threatened by 

external aggression or internal subversion by Communist forces.

Dwight Eisenhower

(1953–61)

Eisenhower Doctrine: The United States has the right to use 

armed force to assist any nation in the general region of the 

Middle East requesting assistance against armed aggression by 

a Communist state.

John F. Kennedy

(1961–63)

Containment and Humanitarianism: The United States will use 

military force to prevent the spread of Communism in the Western Hemisphere, provide military support to developing countries 

against Communist-sponsored guerrilla warfare, and promote 

world peace through humanitarian service and the spread of 

democracy.

Lyndon Johnson

(1963–69)

Johnson Doctrine: The United States will use military force to 

prevent the spread of Communism in the Western Hemisphere.

Richard Nixon

(1969–74)

Nixon Doctrine: The United States will not permit American combat troops to bear the main burden of defending other nations, 

but it will continue to provide military security for Japan and 

other friendly Asian nations through its nuclear deterrent.

Gerald Ford

(1974–77)

Containment: The United States will not permit any Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.
President

(term of office) Foreign policy doctrine

Jimmy Carter

(1977–81)

Carter Doctrine: The United States considers the Persian Gulf’s 

oil reserves a vital national interest and will use military intervention to prevent outside domination of the Persian Gulf region.

Ronald Reagan

(1981–89)

Reagan Doctrine: The United States will provide meaningful political and material support to democratic liberation movements 

around the world that fight Communist oppression.

Engagement doctrines

George H. W. Bush

(1989–93)

Engagement: The United States will remain actively engaged 

in maintaining international peace and security and will commit 

military forces to fight aggression and accomplish humanitarian 

missions.

Bill Clinton

(1993–2001)

Democratic Enlargement: The United States will use military 

force for the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide 

as an important element of US security.

George W. Bush

(2001–present)

Active Engagement, Global Leadership, and Preemption: The 

United States will be engaged in the world to shape a balance of 

power that favors freedom and democracy, defend US allies and 

interests, and meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and 

strength. The United States will, if necessary, use military force 

in self-defense to act preemptively to forestall or prevent hostile 

acts by terrorists and other adversaries, even if uncertainty 

remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.

Note: This table presents a synopsis of each administration’s foreign policy as 

expressed in speeches and other public statements or texts. Quotation marks are 

omitted. The sources of these statements are identified throughout the discussion 

in this appendix.

Notes

1. President Washington, farewell address.

2. President Jefferson, inaugural address.

3. Rostow, Toward Managed Peace, 120.

4. President Monroe, annual message to Congress.

5. Rostow, Toward Managed Peace, 17, 118–20.

6. Ibid., 53–54.

7. Ibid., 169.

8. Ibid., 195–218.

9. Ibid., 367.

10. Ibid., 45, 234, 273–78.

11. President Roosevelt, speech.

APPENDIX B

246

Table B1 (continued)
247

12. Rostow, Toward Managed Peace, 271–74.

13. Ibid., 278.

14. Ibid., 298.

15. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “Cold War.”

16. President Truman, message to Congress.

17. American Reference Library, s.v. “containment policy.”

18. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”

19. Ibid., s.v. “Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.”

20. American Reference Library, s.v. “Central Treaty Organization.”

21. President Eisenhower, special message to Congress.

22. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “Dwight David Eisenhower.”

23. President Kennedy, special message to Congress.

24. Ibid.

25. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “Bay of Pigs invasion.”

26. Rostow, Toward Managed Peace, 13.

27. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “Cuban missile crisis.”

28. American Reference Library, s.v. “Johnson Doctrine.”

29. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “Lyndon Baines Johnson.”

30. President Nixon, informal remarks with reporters. 

31. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “Richard Milhouse Nixon.”

32. Rostow, Toward Managed Peace, 13.

33. Ibid., 319.

34. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “Gerald Rudolph Ford.”

35. American Reference Library, s.v. “SS Mayaguez incident.”

36. Second Carter-Ford presidential debate.

37. President Carter, State of the Union address.

38. President Reagan, speech, National Association of Evangelicals.

39. Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. “Ronald Wilson Reagan.”

40. American Reference Library, s.v. “Reagan Doctrine” and “Ronald Reagan.”

41. Pres. George H. W. Bush, speech.

42. Ibid.

43. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “George Herbert Walker Bush.”

44. President Clinton, A National Security Strategy, 3.

45. Ibid., 25.

46. Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia, s.v. “William Clinton.”

47. Pres. George W. Bush, first inaugural address.

48. Ibid.

49. Pres. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy, iv.

50. Ibid., v–vi.

51. Ibid., 13–15.

APPENDIX B

249

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AF	 Africa

AM	 absolute monarchy

AR 	 authoritarian regime

C	 colonial and imperial dependency

CENTO	 Central Treaty Organization

CI	 civil law

CIA	 Central Intelligence Agency

CIDCM	 Center for International Development and

Conflict Management

CM	 constitutional monarchy

CO	 common law

CPI	 Corruption Perceptions Index

CSIA	 Center for Science and International Affairs

CU	 customary law

Da aggregated index value of democracy

DEM	 democracy

DOD	 Department of Defense

EAP	 East Asia and the Pacific

EU	 European Union

EUR	 Europe and Eurasia

F	 free

FAO	 Food and Agriculture Organization

FH	 Freedom House

FI	 Fraser Institute

G-7	 Group of Seven

G-8	 Group of Eight

GDP	 gross domestic product

HDI	 Human Development Index

HF	 Heritage Foundation

ILO	 International Labour Organization

JP	 Joint Publication

M	 monarchy

MF	 mostly free

MU	 mostly unfree

NATO	 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NE	 Near East

NF	 not free
ABBREVIATIONS

250

P	 protectorate

PF	 partly free

R	 repressed

RDP	 restricted democratic practices

SA	 South Asia

SALT	 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

SAR	 special administrative region

SEATO	 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SIPRI	 Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute

TM	 traditional monarchy

TOT	 totalitarian regime

UF	 unfree

UK	 United Kingdom

UN	 United Nations

UNDP	 United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO	 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and

Cultural Organization

US	 United States

USIP	 United States Institute of Peace

USSR	 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WH	 Western Hemisphere
251

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265

11 September 2001, 244

Abdolali, Nasrin, 50–53, 58, 64

Afghanistan, 12, 242

Africa, 12–13, 129, 146

aggregated index value of democracy 

(Da), 136, 143–46, 149–51

Ahlmark, Per, 64, 72, 124

AIDS. See HIV/AIDS 

al-Qaddafi, Muammar, 67

Albania, 67

Algeria, 12, 105

Allies (World War II), 31, 33, 38–39, 63, 

77, 90, 107, 239

Allott, Philip, 159

Amin, Idi, 67

Angola, 150

Argentina, 67

arms control, 25, 28–30

Asia/Asian, 12–13, 39, 125, 129–30, 

146, 241

Asia–Pacific, 39

Australia, 150

Austria, 150

authoritarian regimes and systems, 12, 

14, 58–59, 62, 66–68, 72, 78, 97–98, 

113, 123–24, 133, 142–44, 146, 148–

49, 151, 160

authoritative societies, 66–67, 70–71

autocracy, 8, 54, 74–75, 124

Azerbaijan, 151

Babst, Dean, 57

Bahrain, 67

balance of power, 1, 25–26, 29–30, 39, 

107, 111, 238, 244

Bangladesh, 151, 163

Bangladesh War, 89

bargaining power structure, 67–68

Bay of Pigs, 32, 240

Beck, Lewis, 34

Beck, Nathaniel, 73

Belgium, 68

Belize, 151

Berlin Wall, 32

Bhutan, 67

Boer War, 73

Bolivia, 14, 149

Bosnia and Herzegovina, 142–43, 151, 

243

Burma, 13, 149, 151

Burundi, 12

Bush, George H. W., 116, 242–43

Bush, George W., 106, 156–57, 162, 

243–44

Cambodia/Cambodian, 61, 67, 71, 241–

42

Canada, 68, 118–19, 145, 150

capitalism/capitalist, 23, 46, 71, 125–

27, 243

Carter, Jimmy, 242

Castro, Fidel, 240

causes of war, ix, xiii–xiv, 15–16, 21–22, 

24, 29–30, 32, 39, 47, 49, 83, 85–87, 

89–95, 103, 105, 156–57, 161

Center for International Development 

and Conflict Management (CIDCM), 

11

CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 129, 

134

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 

240

Chad, 151

checks and balances, ix, xiii, 2–3, 5, 7, 

15, 64, 69, 75, 84–85, 87–88, 91, 94, 

96, 98, 103, 105, 113–14, 124, 156, 

158

Chile/Chilean, 35, 67

China/Chinese, 13–14, 19, 39, 61, 67, 

125, 129, 146, 149, 241

CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency

CIDCM. See Center for International 

Development and Conflict Management

civil-law democracies, 151

civil-law jurisdictions, 134, 144, 146

civil-law systems, 114, 142–44, 146, 

148–49, 151

civil liberties, ix, 4–7, 13, 54, 58, 60, 71, 

113, 127, 130, 136, 144, 146, 151, 

156

Index
INDEX

266

Civil War, 72–73

classical liberals, 23

Clausewitz, Carl von, 19–21

Clinton, Bill, 4, 243

coercive societies, 66

Cold War, 9–11, 28–29, 38–39, 73, 158, 

239, 242–44

collective security, 25–27, 29–30, 33, 

90, 107, 115, 159, 239–40

common-law democracy, 149, 151

common-law jurisdictions, 134, 146

common-law systems, 114, 142–44, 

146, 148–49, 151

Communism/Communist, 2, 7, 9–10, 

67, 71, 127, 239–42

conflict helix, 70–71

conflict management, xii, 15, 26–28, 35, 

105

Congress, 83, 92, 109, 116, 237–40

containment, 10, 239, 241–44

correlative values of democracy, 16, 85, 

123, 127

corruption, 6, 14, 85, 88, 123–24, 126, 

129, 150, 243

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 

150–51

costs of war, 1–2, 65–66, 68, 97

Côte d’Ivoire, 151

Council of Europe, 27

country ratings, 130–32

CPI. See Corruption Perceptions Index

Cuba, 13, 32, 149, 151, 240

Cuban missile crisis, 31–32, 240

customary law, 144, 149, 151

customary-law jurisdictions, 134, 143

customary-law systems, 114, 142–44, 

148–49, 151

Da. See aggregated index value of democracy

Dahl, Robert, 3

democide, 56–57, 61–62, 71, 84, 88, 94, 

123, 160

democracies, ix, xiii, 1, 8, 12–16, 28, 45, 

49–60, 63–69, 71–78, 84, 88–89, 

104, 123–24, 133, 142–44, 146, 148–

49, 151, 157–59

democracy definitions, 2–7, 52–56, 87

democracy/democide proposition, 57, 61

democracy/dyadic violence proposition, 

57–59

democracy/foreign violence proposition, 

57, 59

democracy/internal collective violence 

proposition, 57, 60

democratic governance, 2, 9–10, 12–14, 

63, 127–28, 152

democratic peace, 65, 72, 74, 85–86, 

93, 105

democratic peace clock, 62–63

democratic peace principle/theory, xiii, 

1, 14–16, 45, 49–51, 54–57, 60, 63–

66, 68, 70–76, 78, 84–85, 87–88, 93–

94, 104–5, 123, 129

dyadic-level analysis, 50–52, 57–

59, 72–74

national-level analysis, 50–51

system-level analysis, 50

Democratic Republic of the Congo, 150

democratization, ix, 11, 14, 73, 126, 

158, 162

Denmark, 150

Department of Defense (DOD), 33, 107, 

109

deterrence/deterrents, ix, xiii–xv, 2, 15–

16, 25, 28–35, 47, 83, 86–87, 89–97, 

99, 103–7, 109, 112, 114–19, 155, 

157–63, 241

military deterrence, 32–34, 106–7

systemwide deterrence, ix, xiii, 

15, 29–30, 34, 87, 91, 94–96, 

99, 103, 105, 114, 118–19, 

157–58, 162

Diamond, Larry, 4

dictators/dictatorships, 7, 35, 65, 67, 

98, 124–25, 127, 133–34, 160

diplomacy, 25, 27, 29–30, 111

DOD. See Department of Defense 

Dominican Republic, 151, 241

Doyle, Michael, 63, 74

East Asia, 129

East Timor/East Timorese, 13, 142

Eastern Europe, 13, 239–40, 242–43

economic benefits of democracy, 125

economic freedom, ix–x, xiv, 3, 5, 119, 

126–28, 131–32, 136, 144, 146, 151, 

161–62

Economic Freedom of the World report, 

131

economic growth, 129, 144, 149, 151

Egypt, 88, 105, 241

Einstein, Albert, 22
INDEX

267

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1, 240

electoral democracy, 6, 12, 14, 98 

Elman, Miriam, 103–5

engagement, 1, 10, 66, 243–45

Equatorial Guinea, 149

Eritrea, 149

EU. See European Union

Europe/European, 13–14, 19, 27, 37, 

39, 64, 72, 130–31, 237, 239, 242–

43. See also Eastern Europe

European Union (EU), 14, 25, 39, 76

famine, 85, 88, 123–25

Farber, Henry, 73

Federalist Papers, 21, 48

Finland, 57, 150

First Punic War, 31

First World War. See World War I

Ford, Gerald, 241–42 

foreign policy. See United States: foreign 

policy

France, 14, 47, 58, 88–89, 104, 113, 

145

Franco, Francisco, 67

Fraser Institute, 119, 127–28, 131–32, 

134, 136

Frederick the Great, 19

Freedom House, 6–7, 12–14, 58, 60, 67, 

77–78, 113, 119, 127–28, 130–31, 

134, 136, 142, 149–50, 162

Freedom in the World reports, 6, 113, 

127–28

freedom of the press, 4–5, 13–14, 67, 

124, 128, 130, 136, 144, 146, 151

freedom of religion, ix, 3–6, 45, 56, 87, 

128, 131, 136, 144, 146, 151

freedom of speech, 45, 54, 56, 67–68, 83

Freud, Sigmund, 22

functionalism, 26, 29–30

Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 37

genocide, 56, 60–62, 123, 160

Georgia, 151

Germans/Germany, 2, 31, 57–58, 61, 

83–84, 145, 238, 241

Glaspie, April, 116

globalization, 125–26

Gowa, Joanne, 73

Great Britain, 12, 31–32, 68, 88–89, 

105, 145, 150, 240

Greece, 89, 151

Grenada, 242

gross domestic product (GDP), 145–46

Group of Eight (G-8) nations, 145–46

Group of Seven (G-7) nations, 145

Gulf War. See Persian Gulf War

Hague Peace Conference, 27, 36

Haiti, 151, 243

Hamilton, Alexander, 21, 34–35, 48–49

Hannibal’s War, 90

Helsinki Accords, 241

Heritage Foundation, 127–28, 131, 134, 

136

Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, 

8–10

Hitler, Adolf, 39, 67

HIV/AIDS, 127–28

Hoxha, Enver, 67

human development, ix, xiv, 84, 123–

24, 126–29, 132, 134, 136, 144, 146, 

151–52, 160–62

human development index, 128, 132

Hussein, Saddam, 5–6, 88, 106, 109–

16, 157, 162

Iceland, 150

incentive theory of war avoidance, ix, xiii–

xv, 15–16, 26, 31, 85, 91–97, 99–101, 

103–6, 109, 114, 119, 156–58, 162

individual-level analysis, 92, 94, 

96–101, 103, 106, 109, 112–

14, 118–19

international-level analysis, 93–

94, 97, 99, 103, 114, 118

state-level analysis, 94, 96, 98–

101, 103, 106, 109, 113–14, 

118

incentives, ix, xiii, 2, 15, 33–35, 77, 89–

97, 99, 103, 105–7, 109, 112, 114, 

119, 156–58, 160, 162

Index of Economic Freedom, 128, 131

India, 12, 89, 125, 145–46

Indonesia, 12–13, 151

interdemocratic peace proposition, 57–59

international law, xi–xii, 19, 24–25, 27–

28, 32–34, 37–38, 47, 52, 90, 107, 

118

internationalism/internationalist, 10, 

238, 243–44

Iran, 109–10, 116, 151, 240

Iraq, 2, 5–6, 12, 14, 88–89, 109–11, 

113–16, 149, 151, 240, 243
INDEX

268

Iraq-Iran War, 110

Iraqi Interim Constitution, 5–6

isolationism/isolationist, 237–39, 244

Israel/Israeli, 12, 88, 111, 129, 241

Italy, 14, 67, 83, 145

Japan, 61, 83–84, 145, 239, 241

Jay, John, 21, 34

Jefferson, Thomas, 3–4, 45, 237

Johnson, Lyndon B., 240–41

Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, 

243

jus ad bellum, 36–37

jus contra bellum, 37

jus in bello, 34, 36

just war, 28, 36

Kacowicz, Arie, 105

Kagan, Donald, 19, 31–32, 35, 87, 90, 106

Kant, Immanuel, 20, 34, 47–49, 54, 63, 

66, 84, 86, 106, 156, 161

Katz, Jonathan N., 73

Kazakhstan, 151

Keegan, John, 20, 38

Kellogg-Briand Pact, 37

Kennedy, John F., 32, 240

Kenya, 14

Khmer Rouge, 71, 242

Khrushchev, Nikita, 32

Kim Il Sung, 67

Kuwait, 67, 88, 106, 109–11, 114–16, 

162, 243

Laos, 149, 241

Layne, Christopher, 75–76, 104

League of Nations, 27, 31, 37, 238

legal systems, 5–6, 32, 114, 129, 134, 

136, 142–45, 148–49, 151, 155

liberal democracy, 2–7, 16, 45, 56, 63, 

65, 73, 87, 98, 118, 151

Liberia, 12, 151

Libya, 13, 67, 149, 151

limited democracy, 7–8

Lipson, Charles, 65–66

Locarno Treaty, 37

Locke, John, 19, 45–46, 48–49, 84, 156

Luttwak, Edward, 35

Luxembourg, 150

Mansfield, Edward, 73

Mao Tse-tung, 61

Maoz, Zeev, 50–53, 58, 64

Marshall, George C., 239

Marshall Plan, 239

Marx, Karl, 23

Mauritania, 105

media independence. See freedom of the 

press

Mexican-American War, 89

Middle East, 13, 39, 146, 240

monarchy, 8, 12, 21, 34, 45–47, 49, 65, 

67–68, 133–34, 149, 237

Monroe, James, 237

Montesquieu, Charles de, 46, 48–49, 84, 

156

Montross, Lynn, 20–21

Moore, John Norton, ix, xiii–xv, 3, 15–

16, 24, 29–30, 33, 35, 85–97, 99–

101, 103–6, 109, 118–19, 123, 156–

59, 161–62

Mussolini, Benito, 67

Myanmar, 12–13, 151

National Military Strategy, 24–25, 33

National Security Strategy, 4, 244

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization

natural power, 159. See also social 

power

Near East, 105, 130

Nepal, 12, 67

Netherlands, 14, 150

New Zealand, 150

Nicaragua, 149, 242

Nigeria, 151

Nixon, Richard, 241

nondemocracies, ix, xiii, 2, 8–10, 15–16, 

45, 49–50, 57, 60, 62–63, 66, 71–72, 

77–78, 84–91, 95, 103–4, 123, 144, 

146, 151, 157–58, 161, 163

Norberg, Johan, 125–26

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 25, 239–40

North Korea, 2, 13, 61, 67, 115, 149, 151

North Vietnam/North Vietnamese, 241. 

See also Vietnam War

Norway, 150

O’Connor, Sandra Day, 159–60

oligarchic republics, 53, 68, 70

Oman, 67

pacifism, 29–30, 74

Paine, Thomas, 46–49, 84, 86, 156
INDEX

269

Pakistan, 12, 61, 240

Paraguay, 151

Park Chung Hee, 67

Peace Corps, 240

Pearl Harbor, 239

Peloponnesian War, 31, 90

Peron, Juan, 67

Persian Gulf, 110, 115, 242

Persian Gulf War, 16, 89, 101, 103, 106, 

109, 112, 114–15, 117–19, 157, 162 

Peru, 12, 105

Peters, Ralph, 38

Philippines, 12

Pinochet, Augusto, 35, 67

Pol Pot, 67, 71

political rights, ix, 4–6, 13, 58, 60, 71, 77, 

113, 127, 130–31, 136, 144, 146, 151

polyarchal democracy, 3

Post, Jerrold, 73, 112–13

postulate on the cause of war, xiii–xiv, 

15–16, 85, 87, 89–92, 94–95, 103, 

105, 156–57

poverty, 88, 123, 125–28

Powell, Colin, 7, 63, 116

Preston, Richard, 38

probability of peace, 15–16, 85, 91, 95–97, 

99–101, 103, 106, 109, 118–19, 157

probability of war, 91, 95, 97, 109, 112, 

118–19

Prodi, Romano, 14

public choice theory. See theory of government failure

Putin, Vladimir, 14

Qatar, 67

rationality factor, 96, 99, 109, 112–13, 118

Ray, James Lee, 72

Reagan, Ronald, 1, 155, 242–43

realists, 35, 56, 92–93, 104

regional integration, 25

restricted democratic practices, 12, 133, 

148–49

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 83–84, 92, 238–

39, 243

Rostow, Eugene, 20

rule of law, x, xiv–xv, 2–5, 13–14, 16, 

29–30, 85–88, 123, 129–30, 151, 

155, 159, 161–63

Rummel, R. J., 55–64, 66–72, 77–78, 

84, 86–87, 107–9, 123, 156, 160–62

principles of self-knowledge, 108–9

Russett, Bruce, 54–55, 58, 72, 75–76, 

86, 156

Russia, 12, 14, 58, 61, 145–46, 162. 

See also Soviet Union

Saavedra Lamas Treaty, 37

SALT II. See Strategic Arms Limitation 

Treaty II

Saudi Arabia, 13, 67, 110, 149

SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Second Punic War, 31

Sen, Amartya, 124

Senegal, 105

Shanghai communiqué, 241

Sierra Leone, 14

Singapore, 150

Singer, J. David, 58, 86

Small, Melvin, 58, 86

Snyder, Jack, 73

social antifields, 66, 69, 71

social fields, 66, 69–71

social power, 159. See also natural power

Somalia, xi, 149, 243

South Asia, 130

South Korea, 67, 108, 115

Southeast Asia, 240–41

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

(SEATO), 240

Soviet bloc, 162, 243

Soviet Union (USSR), 9–10, 13, 32, 57, 

61, 67, 77, 239–44. See also Russia

Spain, 67

Spanish-American War, 73, 89

Sri Lanka, 12

SS Mayaguez, 242

Stalin, Joseph, 67

Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute (SIPRI), 11–12

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) 

II, 242

Sudan, 12–13, 149, 151

Sun Tzu, 19

Suriname, 151

Sweden, 68, 124, 150

Switzerland, 68, 150

Syria, 13, 105, 149, 151

Tajikistan, 151

terrorism/terrorist, 29, 40, 60, 88, 93, 

123, 151, 159, 244

Thailand, 163
INDEX

270

theory of government failure, 88

theory of war avoidance. See incentive 

theory of war avoidance

Thompson, William, 73–74

Timor-Leste. See East Timor/East 

Timorese

total-war doctrine, 20

totalitarian systems and regimes, 12, 

28, 30, 53, 58–59, 61–62, 66–68, 71–

72, 78, 87–88, 90, 97–98, 103, 123, 

133, 142–44, 148–49, 151, 157, 160

Transparency International, 150

Treaty of Versailles, 238

Truman Doctrine, 240

Truman, Harry S., 239–40, 242

Tucker, Richard, 73–74

Turkey, 12, 61, 89, 151, 240

Turkish-Cypriot War, 73

Turkmenistan, 13, 149, 151

Turner, Robert, 33, 107

Uganda, 67

United Kingdom (UK). See Great Britain

United Nations (UN), xii, 8, 13, 22, 25, 

27–30, 34, 37–38, 40, 88, 114–15, 

118, 123–24, 127–29, 131–32, 134, 

145, 158–59, 161, 239

UN Charter, 8, 25, 27–28, 37–38, 

43n.96, 88, 114–15, 118, 239

UN Development Programme 

(UNDP), 127–28, 132, 134, 136

UN Educational, Scientific, and 

Cultural Organization 

(UNESCO), 22, 24, 107

UN Security Council, 13, 27–28, 

37–38, 43n.96, 114

United States (US), ix, 1–3, 12, 24–26, 

32–34, 36, 39, 46, 48, 55–56, 68, 83, 

85, 89, 107, 109, 115–16, 118–19, 

145, 156–57, 159–60, 162, 237–46

foreign policy, ix, 1, 10, 103–4, 

157, 160, 162, 237–46

US Information Agency, 240

United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 

85

USSR. See Soviet Union 

Uzbekistan, 149, 151

Vietnam, 149

Vietnam War, 241–42

Wall Street Journal, 128, 131

Walt, Stephen M., 74–75

Waltz, Kenneth, 92–94

Washington, George, 237–38

Weart, Spencer R., 52–55, 58, 64, 74–75

Western Hemisphere, 76, 130, 237, 

240–41

Wilson, Woodrow, 238–39, 243

Wise, Sydney, 38

world federalism, 26, 29–30

world government, 25–26

World War I, 27, 31–32, 37, 57, 73, 90, 

238

World War II, 1, 22, 31, 57, 73, 76, 84, 

90, 115, 238–40

Wright, Quincy, 24

Yom Kippur War, 241
Democracy and Deterrence

Foundations for an Enduring World Peace

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