SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4555-15T4

PMG NEW JERSEY II, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

82 ISELIN, LLC and ZONING

BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE

TOWNSHIP OF WOODBRIDGE,

Defendants-Appellants.

______________________________

Argued March 12, 2018 – Decided July 17, 2018

Before Judges Accurso, O'Connor and Vernoia.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. 

L-4281-15.

R.S. Gasiorowski argued the cause for 

appellant (Gasiorowski and Holobinko, 

attorneys; R.S. Gasiorowski, on the briefs).

James M. Turteltaub argued the cause for 

respondent 82 Iselin, LLC (Carlin & Ward, 

PC, attorneys; James M. Turtletaub and Scott 

A. Heiart, of counsel and on the brief).

Timothy M. Casey argued the cause for 

respondent Zoning Board of Adjustment of the 

Township of Woodbridge (Russo & Casey, 

attorneys; Timothy M. Casey, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
A-4555-15T4

2

PER CURIAM

In this prerogative writs action, plaintiff PMG New Jersey 

II, LLC appeals from a May 23, 2016 order dismissing its

complaint and affirming defendant Woodbridge Township's Zoning 

Board of Adjustment's (Board) resolution granting approval of 

defendant 82 Iselin, LLC's

1 preliminary and final major site plan

to redevelop its property, as well as associated use and bulk 

variances. We affirm. 

Plaintiff and defendant own adjoining property at the 

Iselin Service Area, which is just off of the Garden State 

Parkway (parkway). Both parties' properties are accessible from 

only the parkway. On plaintiff's property is an Exxon gas 

station with six gas pumps covered by a canopy, and a 2,748 

square foot building that houses a mini-mart and a Subway 

restaurant. 

On defendant's property is a Shell gas station with four 

gas pumps covered with a canopy; there has been a gas station on 

defendant's property for over sixty years. There is also a 

1,610 square foot vacant building, which was previously used to 

repair cars.

 

1 Although the Board is also a defendant, for simplicity we 

refer to 82 Iselin, LLC as defendant.
A-4555-15T4

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Defendant's application seeks approval for redevelopment of

its property by demolishing the existing improvements and 

putting in a gasoline fueling station with six pumps covered by 

a canopy, the same size as plaintiff's fueling station. In 

addition, defendant seeks to replace the empty garage with a 

2,450 square foot building, which would house a mini-mart and a 

Dunkin' Donuts with drive-through capacity. The proposed 

building is 300 feet smaller than the building plaintiff uses to 

house its mini-mart and Subway. 

At the time of defendant's application, both parties'

properties were in the residential zone. The conditional uses

permitted in this zone at that time did not include those in 

which plaintiff and defendant engage on their properties, hence 

defendant's request for the use variances. After a lengthy 

public hearing, the Board unanimously voted to approve 

defendant's application and the variances it requested, although 

with some conditions, and subsequently issued a twenty-three 

page resolution explaining its decision.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs 

challenging the resolution. After a hearing, Judge Douglas J. 

Wolfson dismissed the complaint. In his oral opinion, he 

determined the Board's factual findings were supported by the 

record and, among other things, found:
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[T]here were more than adequate special 

reasons here. Not only is this property 

particularly suited for this type of . . . 

commercial use, it had been a gas station 

for . . . 60 years. It's really the only 

thing that this use can – that the property 

can be used for, accessible only to the 

Parkway and not accessible through the 

[nearby] residential neighborhood. . . . 

I'm satisfied that the property was, 

therefore, particularly suited for the uses 

that were proposed and that the evidence was 

ample in the record which [the Board] could

accept. . . .

I'm also satisfied that in conjunction with 

that . . . the attempt to modernize 

[defendant's property], upgrade it, make it 

safer, make it more aesthetically pleasing, 

enhancing the buffering, putting up the 

fence, doing all those things, are also 

positives that weigh into the factor of 

whether and to the extent special reasons 

can be established.

And, . . . I'm satisfied that yet another 

special reason is . . . [the] lack of 

reasonable adaptability of the property for 

the purposes for which it is permitted. . . . 

With regard to the negative criteria, the 

testimony is ample and sufficient from the 

expert planner of the applicant that there 

was no substantial detriment to the public 

good, the public at large, or the area. 

There's adequate buffering. There's the 

addition of sound [proof] fencing. There is 

modernization. There is no access to the 

site from the residential neighborhood. 

There is virtually zero impact to the 

residential areas in question. So, the 

first prong in the negative – negative 

criteria is not a problem.
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With regard to the second prong under Medici 

[v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 21 (1987)], the 

enhanced criteria, I'm satisfied it does not 

apply under Eagle Group [of Princeton v. 

Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Hamilton Tp., 

274 N.J. Super. 551, 564 (App. Div. 1994),]

because it would be "jarringly anomalous" to 

require that kind of reconciliation of an 

ordinance or master plan which is out of 

date, out of touch with, and not reasonably 

adaptable for the purposes for which the 

property was zoned in the first place.

But even if that were not true, I think it's 

sufficient[ly] reconcilable, given the fact 

that the ordinance itself is a mixed 

ordinance. It isn't purely residential. 

It's not purely office. And that the master 

plan does encourage commercial uses on the 

main – main highways, which the Parkway is. 

So I'm satisfied under all those 

circumstances that the decision of the Board 

adequately supports – is adequately 

supported by the record. . . . And I cannot 

conclude that the decision of the Board, 

based on all those circumstances and the 

facts that are accepted as true, which I am 

required to presume to be valid, was 

arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 

Therefore, the decision of the Board is 

sustained. 

In the May 23, 2016 order from which plaintiff appeals, the 

judge added to some of the above findings, noting:

4. The record had sufficient evidence to 

support the Board's findings that 

development of the Subject Property in 

accordance with the zoning was not 

reasonably adaptable and would therefore 

cause a hardship on the Applicant and to 
A-4555-15T4

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establish the requisite special reasons to 

approve the application;

5. The record had sufficient evidence to 

support the Board's finding that the 

Applicant provided sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate the application satisfied both 

prongs of the negative criteria to approve 

the application, even though Medici's 

enhanced burden was not applicable pursuant 

to the Eagle Rock case. . . .

On appeal, plaintiff's principal contentions are there was 

insufficient evidence to support the Board's approval of the "D"

variances, see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), and some of the setback 

"C" variances, see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c), and that the Board's 

approval of the application constituted impermissible rezoning. 

We have considered all of plaintiff's arguments and 

determined they are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion, see R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and 

affirm substantially for reasons set forth in Judge Wolfson's 

oral opinion and in the May 23, 2016 order. In addition, we 

make the following observation.

After the trial court issued its decision, both plaintiff's 

and defendant's properties were rezoned from R-6 residential to 

highway business B-3 zone. Under the applicable ordinance, a B3 highway business zone is designed "to provide areas for retail 

sales and services to accommodate the traveling public; . . . 

and to provide highway-oriented commercial uses in the proper 
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location." WOODBRIDGE TWP., N.J., CODE ch. 150 art. 3, § 150-

35(A) (2009). The permitted principal uses in this zone include

"drive-through, fast-food and take-out restaurant[s.]"

WOODBRIDGE TWP., N.J., CODE ch. 150 art. 3, § 150-35(C)(1) 

(2009).

Because defendant no longer requires a use variance to 

construct a Dunkin' Donuts, plaintiff's challenge to the Board's 

decision to grant a variance for such proposed use is thus moot. 

See Jai Sai Ram, LLC v. Planning/Zoning Bd. of the Borough of S. 

Toms River & Wawa, Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div.), 

certif. denied, 228 N.J. 69 (2016). 

Affirmed.