U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–497PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

THE TRUMP-KIM SUMMIT:

OUTCOMES AND OVERSIGHT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 20, 2018

Serial No. 115–139

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia, Asian Studies 

Center, The Heritage Foundation ....................................................................... 10

Michael J. Green, Ph.D., senior vice President for Asia, Japan Chair, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 23

Mr. Abraham Denmark, director, Asia Program, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ............................................................................... 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

Mr. Bruce Klingner: Prepared statement .............................................................. 13

Michael J. Green, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 26

Mr. Abraham Denmark: Prepared statement ....................................................... 32

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Material submitted for the record ............................................... 64

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THE TRUMP-KIM SUMMIT:

OUTCOMES AND OVERSIGHT 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. YOHO. Good afternoon. 

The hearing will come to order. I’d like to thank everybody for 

being here today. 

For years, this committee has held—has led the effort in constraining the threat of North Korea’s nuclear belligerence. Congress has worked under successive administrations to pressure the 

Kim regime, and in conjunction with the administration in multilateral efforts, this has occasionally brought us to inflection 

points—opportunities to change the course of this stubborn conflict. 

The United States has reached another of these crossroads. Just 

over 1 week ago, President Trump met with Kim Jong-un, the current scion of the dictatorial Kim dynasty. 

The word ‘‘historic’’ has been endlessly used to describe the meeting and that much is true. The two countries have never conducted 

direct leader-level talks before, and regardless of how these talks 

resolve, we can all be grateful that we are further from conflict 

than we were at the end of last year, and I would guess, 2 months 

ago. 

Just over 1 week ago, President Trump met with Kim Jong-un, 

as we talked about, but simply holding a summit is not an accomplishment by itself. 

The administration has taken an important first step. But much 

work needs to be done. The joint statement that emerged from 

Singapore contains few specifics about how these talks will advance 

our ultimate goal—the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 

denuclearization of North Korea. The statement, as our witnesses 

will testify, is generally similar to many statements North Korea 

has agreed to in the past, while making no good-faith efforts toward ever giving up its nuclear weapons. 

While North Korea agreed to nothing new, the United States 

took the unprecedented step to indefinitely suspend our joint military exercises with our ally, the Republic of Korea. 

2

There has been widespread disappointment regardless of party or 

affiliation that the United States would make these concessions 

when North Korea’s only track record is for cheating and double 

dealing. 

Importantly, nothing would make China and Russia happier 

than for the United States to voluntarily scale back our strategic 

capabilities in northeast Asia. 

The White House has given some assurance that halting these 

exercises won’t affect readiness, and it’s encouraging that Secretary 

Mattis and the Pentagon are behind the idea. 

But Congress must ensure that our defensive options are not affected and that the exercises can resume at the first sign of trouble. 

We must be vigilant against threats from elsewhere in Asia. Our 

enemies will try to use the ongoing talks to advance their own 

goals, which may be at odds with our own. China is already pressing for the premature end of sanctions when North Korea has 

taken no concrete steps and has already eased trade restrictions 

along their shared border. 

The indefinite standoff between the United States and a nuclear 

North Korea is in China’s strategic interest. We can’t forget that 

Xi Jinping has broken his diplomatic standoff with Kim to maximize his influence in the ongoing talks. 

He certainly wouldn’t mind wiping out the progress that we have 

made, turning back the clock a year or 2 and maintaining control 

over the perpetual threat to the United States that he can modulate through economic leverage. 

So today we start a new chapter in a long-running endeavor of 

this committee. Some aspects of Congress’ role will stay the same. 

Ranking Member Sherman and I have worked together to press 

the administration to go after sanctions evaders large and small. 

It’ll be more important to maintain our sanctions pressure as these 

talks go on. 

We have written the administration—there are no banks that are 

too big to sanction. Targeting these bad actors will only strengthen 

the administration’s hand. 

But the Singapore summit has left us with many questions about 

how the negotiations will proceed in any denuclearization process 

that will emerge. 

Our objective today is to start formulating recommendations that 

we can make to the administration and identify priorities we must 

ensure are considered as these talks progress. 

We are thankful to be joined today by an expert panel who will 

advance their discussions and we look forward to hearing from you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]

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30497d-1.eps

The Trump-Kim Summit: Outcomes and Oversight 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Wednesday June 20, 2018 

Opening Statement of Chairman Ted Yoho 

For many years, constraining the threat of North Korea's nuclear belligerence has been a primary 

focus of Congress's foreign policy, and a major part of the Foreign Affairs Committee's work. 

Congress has worked under successive administrations to pressure the Kim regime, and in 

conjunction with administration and multilateral efforts, this has occasionally brought us to 

inflection points-opportunities to change the course of this stubborn conflict. The United States 

has reached another of these crossroads. 

Just over one week ago, President Trump met with Kim Jong Un, the current scion of the 

dictatorial Kim dynasty. The word "historic" has been endlessly used to describe the meeting, 

and that much is true. The two countries have never conducted direct, leader level talks before, 

and regardless of how these talks resolve, we can all be grateful that we're farther from conflict 

today than we were at the end of last year. 

But simply holding a summit is not an accomplishment by itself Those of us who work to 

protect the United States from Kim's belligerence outside the administration have been left with 

some reasons to worry. 

The joint statement that emerged from Singapore contains virtually no specifics about how these 

talks will advance our ultimate goal -the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization 

of North Korea. In fact, the statement is generally similar to many statements North Korea has 

agreed to in the past, while making no good faith efforts towards ever giving up its nuclear 

weapons. 

In fact, while North Korea agreed to nothing new, the United States took the unprecedented step 

of indefinitely suspending our joint military exercises with our ally the Republic of Korea 

There's been widespread disappointment, regardless of party or atliliation, that the United States 

would make this concession when North Korea's only track record is for cheating and doubledealing. 

Even worse, nothing would make China and Russia happier than for the United States to 

voluntarily scale back our strategic capabilities in Northeast Asia. The White House has given us 

some assurances that halting the exercises won't affect readiness, and it's encouraging that 

Secretary Mattis and the Pentagon are behind the idea-but Congress must ensure that our 

defensive options are not affected, and that the exercises can resume at the first sign of trouble. 

We also need to be vigilant against threats from elsewhere in Asia. Our enemies will try to use 

the ongoing talks to advance their own goals, which may be at odds with our own. China is 
4


30497d-2.eps

already pressing for the premature end of sanctions when North Korea has taken no concrete 

steps, and has already eased trade restrictions along their shared border. The indefinite standoff 

between the United States and a nuclear North Korea is in China's strategic interest. 

We can't forget that Xi Jinping has broken his diplomatic standoff with Kim to maximize his 

influence in the ongoing talks. He certainly wouldn't mind wiping out the progress that we've 

made, turning back the clock a year or two, and maintaining control over a perpetual threat to the 

United States that he can modulate through his economic leverage. 

So today, we start a new chapter in a long running endeavor of this Committee. Some aspects of 

Congress' role will stay the same-Ranking Member Sherman and I have worked together to 

press the administration to go after sanctions evaders large and small, and it will be all the more 

important to maintain our sanctions pressure as these talks go on. 

But the Singapore Summit has left us with many questions about how the negotiations will 

proceed and any denuclearization process that will emerge. Our objective todays is to start 

formulating recommendations that we can make to the Administration, and identifying priorities 

we must ensure are considered, as the talks progress. We're thankful to be joined today by an 

expert panel who will advance this discussion. 
5

Mr. YOHO. And with that, members present will be permitted to 

submit written statements to be included in the official hearing 

record. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous material 

for the record, subject to length limitation in the rules, and the witnesses’ written statements will be entered into the hearing. 

I now turn to the ranking member for any opening remarks he 

may have. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

these hearings and I appreciate that opening statement. 

The question the people are asking is whether this was a winwin or Kim win. I think it’s clear that it is a Kim win, but this 

is just the first inning, and it is possible that as this goes forward 

it could be a win-win situation. 

Let us see what—and I’ve been considered a dove at the very 

edge of the pale of reasonableness by saying that these negotiations 

will be successful if we are able to monitor, freeze, and limit the 

nuclear program in North Korea and that we will not get CVID, 

at least not in my lifetime, and they tell me I am in good shape. 

I’ll see. 

So that—whereas everyone else in the foreign policy administration has said the CVID, which means complete irreversible 

verifiable demilitarization. 

So although I’ve been considered a dove on that, this thing 

passes is way more dovish than I am. What did we give up? We 

gave up, first, a meeting with the President of the United States, 

in Asia, boosting the credibility of the regime. 

Most importantly, I think, we, in effect, gave up sanctions, at 

least ratcheting those sanctions. For example, Mr. Chairman, you 

and I sent this letter—and without objection, I’d like to put it in 

the record. 

Mr. YOHO. Without objection. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Urging the administration—and this is dated May 

9th of this year—to impose tougher sanctions particularly on the 

larger Chinese banks that have been given a pass. 

This letter, to my knowledge had not been answered. But if 

Singapore is the answer, this letter is dead. We are not going to 

be sanctioning more. We are going to be sanctioning less. 

We are not going to be making it hard for Kim to breathe. We 

are going to be letting our foot off his neck. That is a huge win for 

Kim. 

And then, finally, and for reasons I do not understand, our President has branded the exercises—military exercises as provocative 

and as war games, and has suspended them, at least the big ones 

planned in August. 

We—if training isn’t important to the military, then perhaps the 

Armed Services Committee has it wrong and we can save many 

tens of billions of dollars by not doing training and not doing exercises. That is absurd. 

While I am talking about exercises, what we need is exercises involving Japan, the United States, and South Korea, and we have 

to tell our allies to ‘‘get over it.’’

6

The Japanese can’t say that they can be the third largest economy and yet will never do anything to protect South Korea, and 

South Korea can’t say there were terrible wrongs done over 70 

years ago and therefore they won’t do exercises with Japan. 

These two countries increase the burden on Americans, the cost 

to Americans, and the possible death of Americans by refusing to 

exercise together, and that—and what we need is the three countries working with exercises together. 

What did we get out of this hearing or, rather, this summit? We 

did not get a freeze on the production of fissile material. 

At Yongbyon, both the plutonium reactor and the enrichment 

centrifuges are working today. North Korea has more fissile material today than when the President went to Singapore, and they 

will have a little bit more by the end of this hearing. 

There is an implicit freeze on testing. But you don’t need to test 

nuclear weapons constantly once you have demonstrated that they 

work. North Korea has demonstrated that they work. Russia hasn’t 

done a nuclear test since 1990. That doesn’t make me sleep well, 

thinking that those weapons are unavailable for use should they, 

God forbid, be deployed. 

What we need is for North Korea to declare all of its nuclear missile facilities, we need to send inspectors, and we need a freeze, and 

if we don’t get then all we have is vague promises and a statement 

about a denuclearized Korean Peninsula that apparently means to 

the North Koreans that will happen when swords are beaten into 

plowshares and wherein the entire world gives up its military 

forces. 

So I look forward to learning from our experts what we can do 

to turn this into a win-win, notwithstanding the outcome of the 

first inning. 

I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. I thank the ranking member. Now we will turn to 

other members for opening statements. 

Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Let me just say for the record that I am very pleased with our 

President and I think that when I look at what’s going on now and 

especially in reference to what happened in Korea, forgive me if I 

say this, but it’s sort of like Yogi Berra’s ‘‘it’s deja vu all over 

again.’’

Having spent time in the Reagan White House and watched the 

same unrelenting negativity that the Democrats were playing 

against Ronald Reagan, who now they won’t admit that—seeing 

that he ended the Cold War—but at that time they did everything 

they could to cast aspersions and weaken America’s position in 

dealing with a Soviet Government, which at that time was our primary enemy in the world. 

In fact, Ted Kennedy, when Reagan was up for reelection, even 

went to Russia—the Soviet Union—and met with Andropov, who 

was the worst of all of their leaders—during the Cold War and 

tried to find and to work with him, how can we prevent Ronald 

Reagan from being reelected. 

And this talk about collusion with Trump, which they have been 

unable to prove, and have been put up and treated Ted Kennedy, 

7

after that episode, as if he was some kind of a hero, is really disconcerting for those who know history and have been here for a 

while. 

But now we have a President that’s trying to bring peace to 

Korea. My father fought in Korea. He fought in Korea before I was 

born. Actually, I was born in 1947. So he fought in Korea when I 

was 5 years old, all right. But I remember when I was coming back 

from a little stint in Vietnam when I was 19 and he told me how 

chaotic the situation was in Korea and how many people’s lives 

were being lost. 

Years later, he told me he could not believe that after all those 

years we had not brought peace to Korea, with all of the loss of life 

of the Americans. 

Well, let me just put it this way. This President has made more 

progress toward bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula than any 

other President, any other American leader, in our own lifetime. 

We should be proud of him and we should—it should be unacceptable that this unrelenting hostility and negativity to the point 

that foreigners look at us and believe that the Democratic Party is 

trying to wish that our President didn’t succeed in this peace effort. 

That’s how loud and aggressive and unacceptable that criticism has 

been. 

We should be applauding our President now for what he’s down 

with Kim because he’s opened the door—doesn’t mean he’s succeeded—but he’s opened the door, just like Reagan opened the door 

with the Soviet Union and many of the tactics he’s used have been 

the same. 

So I appreciate that. Three cheers for our President and what 

he’s done with Korea. 

Mr. YOHO. Appreciate your comments, and we pride ourselves on 

being bipartisan on this committee, and we are going to have bipartisan discussions, as you can hear today. 

We next go to Mr. Bera—Dr. Bera—from California. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate my colleagues. I wasn’t in Congress when—I 

think I was in high school when President Reagan was, you know, 

addressing the Cold War. In hindsight, you know what? I am 

happy that the Cold War ended and President Reagan deserves a 

lot of credit for that. 

I also know someone who’s traveled to the Korean Peninsula 

three times in the last 10 months who had breakfast with the vice 

foreign minister yesterday from Korea. 

Look, I’ll give kudos to President Trump for engaging in dialogue. You know, Madeleine Albright said you don’t have to like the 

person sitting across the table from you but you have to be willing 

to start a conversation and a dialogue, and that conversation has 

started. 

The devil now is in the details and, you know, the Republic of 

Korea and the United States, there is no space between how we are 

viewing this dialogue. 

We are going to be very tough and, you know, I think the President and, hopefully, the administration will be as tough, walking 

hand in hand, with our Korean allies. 

8

The end goal here is denuclearization in a verifiable manner, and 

I am not ready to say I trust Kim Jong-un. I think we can look 

back on, you know, prior agreements and prior breaking of those 

agreements. 

But we shouldn’t be afraid to engage in a dialogue and move forward, and we should do so with our eyes wide open. We should, 

you know, stick to that end goal of a verifiable denuclearized 

Korea. 

It may take time, as opposed to hastily rushing through things 

for an election cycle or political gain. Let’s get this right, and it 

shouldn’t be Democratic or Republican. This is about the United 

States of America and creating a more peaceful world. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your comments. 

We will next go to Mr. Adam Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll keep it to a 

minute. 

Let me just say there is a DIME thing for getting things done—

diplomatic, information, military, and economic. 

When you’re working against an adversary, the economic and especially the military piece is super important to back up the diplomatic piece, and this is where we are at. We are at the diplomatic 

part right now. 

But the important part to see success on that is to continue to 

keep the economic pressure up and to continue to have viable and 

strong and aggressive military action if necessary. It is that military piece that will compel a diplomatic solution and it is that economic piece that will create enough pain to also compel a solution. 

So as we go down however long this process is, and we are going 

to continue to do oversight of it, it is important that we not let up 

on those things that force us to the table in the first place, to continue to march down to a successful conclusion and I wish—I know 

left and right, Democrats and Republicans, wish this President 

luck to get it done. We certainly hope so. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your comments. 

Next, we will go to Mr. Gerry Connolly from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our 

panel. 

I just want to say all of us hope that talking directly to North 

Korea will have payoff, and that payoff, as set by the President, 

has to be absolute denuclearization absolutely verifiable. 

I believe that’s a standard that will not be met. I believe that we 

have approached this in a naive way in which Kim Jong-un has 

gotten all the benefits and we have gotten nothing. 

I hope that can be reversed. I hope we can ultimately get what 

it is we seek. But to be naive and to develop amnesia about the 

history of negotiations—denuclearization negotiations with North 

Korea is dangerous for the peninsula and puts everybody, North 

and South and the Sea of Japan, at risk. 

So the stakes are very high here and the expectations have been 

set by the President in ripping up the Iran nuclear agreement, 

which wasn’t good enough, even though it was working. 

9

Well, we don’t have anything working with respect to North 

Korea, other than a handshake and photo op. I hope to see and expect much more. 

I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Next, we will go to Ann Wagner from Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Pardon me. 

I appreciate this hearing on the Trump-Kim summit and I want 

to thank our witnesses for being here today. 

I was in the Korean Peninsula last August in kind of the height 

of North Korea’s belligerence and I met with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and we discussed our shared hope for a peaceful 

resolution to last summer’s ballistic missile test. 

We have made tremendous progress since then, trading in 

threats for talks, and I believe there is real and genuine hope that 

we can move toward denuclearization. 

I understand full well the history of the 1994 agreed framework, 

the Six-Party Talks, and the Leap Day agreement. So, of course, 

the U.S. cannot grant concessions without tangible steps toward 

Denuclearization and threat reduction. 

But negotiations with the Kim regime are a serious opportunity 

to reduce the risk of war in the Asia Pacific and I look forward to 

tangible outcomes as the two parties continue negotiations. 

I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your comments. 

And here we are. We are getting ready to have you guys. Welcome to the Trump-Kim summit outcomes and oversight and—

okay. 

And before we get into that, Mr. Chabot has a comment he wants 

to make. 

Mr. CHABOT. I’ll be very brief. I wasn’t going to talk but then I 

think I better. 

For the last year and a half, many of the President’s critics literally were warning that he was going to trigger World War III 

with respect to some of the aggressiveness toward North Korea. 

He substantially ratcheted up the sanctions against North Korea 

along with the United States Congress and it actually worked to 

a considerable degree. We are not there yet, but I think it’s heading in the right direction. 

President Trump warned that, unlike previous U.S. administrations, both Democrat and Republican, North Korea would abandon 

its nuclear weapons. 

Again, we haven’t seen it actually happen yet. But I hope and 

pray that we are on our way because I think we all do want to 

avoid war, if at all possible. 

So my advice to the President would be to keep the ratchetedup sanctions in place. The nuclear weapons and his program has 

to go first before any of the sanctions are relieved. But we shouldn’t 

trust this government in North Korea as far as we can throw them, 

as far as I am concerned. 

They think nothing of starving and torturing and killing their 

own people and throwing them into gulags and just essentially forgetting about them. 

10

So if you’re going to do that to your own people, lying and cheating with an adversary—the United States and our allies, in this 

case—they won’t think twice about that. 

So we need to be very wary. That being said, I give President 

Trump great credit for surprising a lot of people who thought he 

was going to take us into war and may actually end up in peace 

for the region and the world, and that’s what we hope happens. 

I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. And I appreciate those comments and, you know, like 

I said, this is the Trump-Kim summit—the outcome’s oversight—

and as we were talking about earlier, so many of the things that 

you guys tell us goes into written form, whether it’s resolutions or 

President—or letters to the President or to Treasury or to the State 

Department, and so I look forward to having your input, because 

we know what hasn’t worked in the past. 

And so I think it’s time for outside of the box and this is pretty 

much outside of the box thinking and techniques, and, you know, 

people aren’t familiar with that or used to that or comfortable with 

that. 

We know, like I said, in the past what didn’t work and we had 

career diplomats negotiating and negotiating, and here we are with 

the threat of a nuclear war on that peninsula further than we have 

ever been. 

So we are thankful today to be joined by Mr. Bruce Klingner, 

who has been in front of this committee often, who is the senior 

research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation Asia 

Studies Center. 

Prior to working at the Heritage Foundation, Mr. Klingner 

served 20 years in the CIA in the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Thank you for being here. 

Dr. Mark Green, who is the senior vice president and Japan 

chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and director of Asian studies at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign 

Service at Georgetown University. 

Previously, he has also served on the staff of the National Security Council. Thank you for being here. 

And Mr. Abraham Denmark, who is the director of the Asia program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 

Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Mr. Denmark served as Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and has held several 

positions in the U.S. intelligence community, and more importantly, another person here is Ms. Denmark, your mother, who’s 

going to be watching you. 

So we are expecting big things out of you. Thank you, ma’am, for 

being here. 

And with that, you guys have been here enough. You know how 

the timer works. You know how the lights work. Press your button 

so we can hear you, and Mr. Klingner, go ahead. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW FOR NORTHEAST ASIA, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, 

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. KLINGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sherman, and distinguished members of the panel. 

11

It’s truly an honor to be asked to appear before you again on 

such an important issue of national security. The U.S.-North Korea 

Summit was historic, and the first step of what would be a long 

process to cut the Gordian Knot of regime security threats to the 

United States and its allies. 

Hopefully, this time is different. But it is a well-trod path that 

has previously led to disappointment. The summit was heavy on 

pomp and circumstance but light on substance. There was nothing 

new in the Singapore Communique, as you pointed out. 

Each of the four major components was in previous accords with 

North Korea and were stronger or more encompassing in the previous iterations. 

Most notably, the North Korean pledge to work toward complete 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is weaker than the September 2005 Six-Party Talks joint statement. 

And despite pre-summit statements by the administration that 

North Korea was moving toward accepting the U.N.-required concept of CVID, there was no evidence of that in the Communique. 

The joint statement did not include any reference to missiles, 

BCW, verification, or human rights—all topics that the administration stated would be discussed during the summit. 

Also of concern was President Trump’s unilateral decision, without consulting our allies, to cancel what was deemed the ‘‘provocative’’ U.S.-South Korea ‘‘war games,’’ terms that Washington had 

always rejected when North Korea used them. 

This was a major unilateral concession to Pyongyang for which 

the U.S. received nothing in return. North Korea did not codify its 

nuclear and missile test moratorium in the Singapore Communique 

nor did Pyongyang reciprocate with a freeze of its own large scale 

annual winter and summer training cycles. 

For years, the U.S. had correctly rejected North Korea’s freeze 

for freeze proposal in which North Korea would suspend its prohibited nuclear missile tests in return for Washington and Seoul suspending the allied conventional military exercises. 

As I wrote in 2015, canceling the combined exercises would degrade U.S. and South Korean deterrence and defense capabilities, 

necessitated by North Korea’s previous attacks and threats. 

Last week, my Heritage Foundation colleague, retired U.S. Army 

Lieutenant General Thomas Spoehr concluded that ‘‘canceling military exercises before North Korea has taken any concrete steps to 

demonstrate its intentions would be troubling. These exercises are 

necessary to ensure the interoperability and integration of operations and ensure readiness and preparedness.’’

General Spoehr assessed that ‘‘suspending these large joint exercises for an extended period of time, particularly for more than 6 

months, could erode the readiness of U.S. and South Korean forces 

to successfully work together to defend South Korea. If the pledge 

by the President encompasses lower level exercises, the negative 

impact on readiness will be more immediate and severe.’’

Now, as we move forward, U.S. diplomats will now work to add 

meat to the bones of the Singapore Communique, and I’ll summarize a few of the recommendations in my written testimony. 

12

CVID—North Korea should unequivocally and publicly accept the 

U.N.-required abandonment of the regime’s nuclear missile, and 

BCW programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. 

Require detailed, carefully-crafted text. Past negotiations with 

North Korea were flawed because the final agreement was short, 

vague, and didn’t clearly delineate the definitions and responsibilities, as was the case with arms controls treaties with the Soviet 

Union and Warsaw Pact. 

And the two sides differ over seemingly straightforward phrases 

such as ‘‘denuclearization’’ and the ‘‘Korean Peninsula.’’

We need to get it in writing. There has been a long history of 

American negotiators believing North Korea agreed to something 

based on our perception of a discussion or a verbal assurance by 

the regime. Oral agreements with North Korea are not worth the 

paper they are printed on. Distrust but verify. North Korean cheating on previous agreements makes it even more important to have 

more robust and intrusive verification regime than in the past, and 

again, I would point to the arms control treaties we had—START, 

INF, and CFE—with the Soviet Union as an example. 

We need to maintain pressure until significant progress is 

achieved. U.S. negotiators should make clear the differences between negotiable trade sanctions such as constraints on resources, 

import and export of the U.N. resolutions, and nonnegotiable U.S.-

targeted financial measures, which are law enforcement measures. 

The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act Sections 401 and 402 allow the U.S. to suspend sanctions for up to 1 

year or remove sanctions only if North Korea has made progress 

on several stipulated issues. 

The U.S. and South Korea should not sign a peace treaty until 

the North Korean nuclear threat is eliminated and the conventional threat reduced. The North has extensive military forces 

along the DMZ and we should use measures such as those in the 

CFE treaty and the CSBM agreement to minimize that threat. 

There should be no normalization of diplomatic relations without 

progress on human rights. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry concluded that North Korea’s human rights violations were so widespread and systemic and egregious that they constituted crimes 

against humanity, and Kim Jong-un is on the U.S. sanctions list 

for human rights violations. 

In conclusion, the U.S. and its allies must keep its shield up and 

its sword sharp until the threat necessitating their need is removed 

or reduced. 

President John F. Kennedy declared the cost of freedom is always high, but Americans have always paid it. We share common 

values and common cause with our South Korean ally. 

So yesterday, today, and tomorrow (foreign language spoken) ‘‘we 

go together.’’ Thank you again for the privilege of appearing before 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]

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'llie 

Hefitage Foundation 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

The Trump-Kim Summit: Outcomes and Oversight 

Testimony before 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

June 20, 2018 

Bruce Klingner 

Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia 

The Heritage Foundation 

214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE • Washington, DC 20002 • (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

The Trump-Kim Summit: Outcomes and Oversight 

Bruce Klingner 

My name is Bruce Klingner. Tam Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage 

Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as 

representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

A presidential meeting, particularly the first with an enemy nation, is considered the highest coin in 

the realm of diplomacy. Previous presidents felt that it wasn't worth spending on North Korea 

without clear evidence that the regime had committed to addressing allied security concerns. Such 

was the case in 2000 when President Bill Clinton turned down a summit invitation from Pyongyang 

because the regime refused to negotiate the tenns of a missile agreement prior to the presidential 

visit 

What return on investment did the U.S. get from President Trump spending this valuable, once-in-alifetime presidential currency in a meeting with Kim Jong-un? The Singapore Communique was 

disappointing, particularly given the pre- and post-summit hype. 

There was nothing new in the joint statement Each of the four major components of the Trump-Kim 

communique were in previous accords with North Korea and most were stronger or more 

encompassing in previous iterations. Most notably, the North Korean pledge "to work toward 

complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" in the Singapore Communique is weaker than 

the September 2005 Six Party Talks Joint Statement. 

The Trump Administration emphasizes that the summit is only the beginning of a process. As such, 

it is the return to the tirst step in the well-trodden path of diplomacy with North Korea. Hopefully 

this time will tum out differently than the eight previous failed agreements with the regime. 

Comparison of the Singapore Communique with previous North Korean agreements: 

Singapore Communique: "The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new US.-DPRK 

relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity. 

October 12, 20(!11- US-DPRK Joint Communique: "The United States and the DPRK have 

decided to take steps to fundamentally improve their bilateral relations in the interests of 

enhancing peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region ... [and] prepared to undertake a new 

direction in their relations." 

Singapore Communique: ''The United States and the DPRK will join their etl'orts to build a lasting 

and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula." 

• October 12, 2000- US-DPRK Joint Communique: "to reduce tensions on the Korean 

Peninsula and formally end the Korean War by replacing the 1953Armistice Agreement with 

permanent peace arrangements." 

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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Singapore Communique: Reaftlnning the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK 

commits to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 

Treaty on the Non-Prol(f'eration of Nuclear Weapons: Article II -Each non-nuclear-weapon 

State Party to the Treaty undertakes not... to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 

Joint Declaration ofSouth and North Korea on the Denuclearization '!{the Korean 

Peninsula (1992): "South and North Korea shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, 

possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons ... South and North Korea shall not possess 

nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities'' 

• Si.x Party Talks Joint Statement (September 200-'i}: 

The six parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the 

verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. 

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) committed to abandoning 

all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to 

the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to IAEA 

(International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards. 

Si.x Party Talks Joint Statement (February 2111J7) 

Within 60 days, North Korea will "Shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility 

for the purpose of abandonment; Invite the IAEA to return to the country to conduct 

all necessary monitoring and verification as agreed between the TAEA and the DPRK; 

Discuss a list of all its nuclear programs and materials, including the plutonium 

extracted from fuel rods that will be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement; and 

in the follow-on phase, the DPRK will provide a complete declaration of all nuclear 

programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities." 

Singapore Communique: "The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW /MIA 

remains including the immediate repatriation of those already identified'' 

October 12, 21JIJII- US-DPRK Joint Communique: "The U.S. side expressed appreciation 

for DPRK cooperation in recovering the remains of U.S. servicemen still missing from the 

Korean War, and both sides agreed to work for rapid progress for the fullest possible 

accounting." 

• Note: U.S. teams previously operated in North Korea to recover and remove to the United 

States the remains of U.S. military personnel from the Korean War. Between 1995 and 2005, 

33 recovery operations were conducted in North Korea and 200 sets of remains were 

returned. 

Despite pre-summit statements by the administration that North Korea was moving toward accepting 

the UN-required concept of complete verifiable irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs, 

there was no evidence of that in the communique. When asked during a press conference why he 

didn't get Kim to agree to CVID, Trump replied, "Cause there's no time." 

The Trump-Kim joint statement also did not include any reference to missiles, nuclear/missile test 

moratorium, biological and chemical weapons, verification, or human rights -- all topics that the 

Trump Administration stated would be discussed during the summit. By contrast, the 2000 President 

3 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Clinton-Marshal Jo communique included a pledge by North Korea to "not launch long-range 

missiles of any kind while talks on the missile issue continue." 

Disparities Over Definitions 

Resolving the difference between the U.S. and North Korea definitions of such seemingly straightforward terms as "denuclearization" and "Korean Peninsula" is critical. Pyongyang defines 

"denuclearization" as global arms control and, as a self-professed member of the nuclear club, the 

regime will eliminate its nuclear arsenal when the other members do so. 

In May, a senior North Korean ofticial publicly rejected U.S. demands that the dictatorship rapidly, 

verifiably and irreversibly abandon its nuclear arsenal before getting any rewards. Instead, Vice 

Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan repeated long-standing demands for U.S. security and economic 

concessions in return for any constraint on Pyongyang's nuclear programs, and he affirmed that 

North Korea would not engage in unilateral disarmament. 

Kim's statement was a reiteration of well-established regime positions that were well-known to 

Korea watchers but which surprised the White House which interpreted it as a broken promise The 

realization of how far apart the two sides remained led the administration to lower expectations for 

the summit. 

Another ditl'erence of view is that the U.S. interprets "Korean Peninsula" as the landmass 

encompassing North and South Korea. Therefore, denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula only pertains 

to the North Korean nuclear arsenal. However, Pyongyang defines the term to include anything that 

influences or impacts the peninsula which would include the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee 

("nuclear umbrella") and any nuclear-capable system such as submarines, aircraft carriers, dual 

capable aircraft, and strategic bombers in Guam. 

Because the U.S. and North Korea have such different interpretations and given the failure of eight 

previous diplomatic agreements with Pyongyang, it shows the necessity of having clearly delineated 

text and rigorous verification protocols. Both of those components were included in anns control 

treaties with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact but in none of the agreements with Pyongyang. 

Canceling U.S.-South Korea Military Exercises 

After concluding the summit with Kim Jong-un, President Trump held a press conference in which 

he unilaterally declared that he would cancel the "provocative" U.S.- South Korea "war games"--

terms that Washington had always rejected when used by North Korea. This was a major unilateral 

concession to Pyongyang for which the United States received nothing in return. 

Trump described the routine training exercises as "inappropriate" while negotiating with North 

Korea, but focused more on their cost. He commented that the exercises are "tremendously 

expensive ... South Korea contributes but not l 00 percent.. .We save money -- a lot" by canceling 

them. 

4 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

During subsequent interviews. Trump affirmed that "T hated them from the day T came in. T said, 

why aren't we being reimbursed" We pay for it. We pay millions and millions of dollars for 

planes .. .lt costs us a lot of money. I saved lot of money." 

For years, the U.S. had correctly rejected North Korea's "freeze for freeze" proposal in which 

Pyongyang would suspend its prohibited nuclear and missile tests in return for Washington and 

Seoul suspending allied conventional military exercises. In September 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the 

UN Nikki Haley dismissed the freeze for freeze proposal as "insulting [since] "When a rogue regime 

has a nuclear weapon and an [intercontinental ballistic missile] pointed at you, you do not take steps 

to lower your guard. "

1 

As I wrote in 2015, "canceling the combined exercises would have degraded U.S. and South Korean 

deterrence and defense capabilities necessitated by North Korea's previous invasions-terror 

attacks; its forward-deployed, offensively positioned military forces; and repeated threats of attacks, 

including nuclear strikes on the United States and its allies." 2 

Last week, my Heritage colleague U.S. Army Lieutenant General Thomas Spoehr (ret.) concluded 

that "canceling military exercises before North Korean has taken any concrete steps to demonstrate 

its intentions would be troubling ... These exercises are necessary to ensure the interoperability and 

integration of operations [and] ensure readiness and preparedness."' 

Spoehr assessed that "suspending these large joint exercises for an extended period of time, 

particularly for more than six months, could erode the readiness of U.S. and South Korean forces to 

successfully work together to defend South Korea. [If the president's pledge] "encompasses lowerlevel exercises, the negative impact on readiness will be more immediate and severe ... Because 

ceasing these exercises would erode the U.S. and South Korea's ability to defend the peninsula." 

Analysts at the Heritage Foundation have consistently recommended that the U.S. not accede to 

North Korean demands to cancel these exercises unless the north shows more tangible signs of 

seriousness in seeking peace and stability. Spoehr concludes that "the financial cost of these 

exercises is simply the price the U.S. must pay to defend its global national interests. The South 

Koreans pay their share of the exercise costs." 

Alliances are the cost-effectil•e option. A key component to mitigating risk in northeast Asia is 

through maintaining strong alliances and robust forward-deployed U.S. forces in the region. The 

Heritage Foundation's annual Index of Military Strength4 highlights the importance of alliances to 

U.S. security. 

An essay in the 2017 index explains: 

1 Paul D. Shinkman," China's 1

Free7.e for Freeze1 Plan for North Korea Gets Chilly Reception in U.S .. " U.S. News and 

World Report. September 5, 2()17, https://v .. '\Y\v.nsne\vs.com/ne\vs/world/articles/2017-09-05/us-rejects-chinas-freezefor-freeLe-plan-for-north-korea. 

2 Bmce Klingncr. " Respond Cautiously to North Korean Engagement Offers." The Heritage Foundation April 20. 2015. 

https://w\Y\v.heritage.orgldefense/reporUrespond-cautiously-north-korean-engagement-offers. 

3 Thomas Spoehr. "Suspending Military Exercises in South Korea Canies Risks." The Herit<Jge Foundation. June 12. 

2() 18, ltttps:/ /vnvw .lteritage.org/asia/comtnetltary /sttspendi ng -military -exercises-soul lt-korea-canies-risks. 

-1 "Index ofU.S. Military Strength, The Heritage Foundation, https://w\V\\·.heritage.org/military-strength. 

5 
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The costs of alliances, including the sometimes disproportionate cost of alliance 

leadership, must not be weighed against cash savings but rather against the cost of 

possible conflict in blood as well as treasure without them. 

Preserving peace and sustaining the global political and economic system's current 

US. orientation can be achieved most cost-effectively with allied support. The 

alternatives would call for either the maintenance of a huge U.S. military presence 

overseas far in excess of what is being maintained now or the holding of substantial 

forces in readiness at home in case the need arose to fight their way back into Europe 

or Asia to confront trouble in support of what is called "offshore balancing." 5 

Trump's decision was a mistake which risks degrading allied military deterrence and defense 

capabilities. He accepted the bad half of North Korea's bad freeze-for-freeze proposal without the 

regime codifying its nuclear and missile test moratorium in the Singapore Communique. Nor did 

Pyongyang reciprocate with a freeze of its own large-scale annual Winter Training Cycle and 

Summer Training Cycle conventional exercises. 

It is unclear whether Trump will only cancel show-of-force activities such as tlyovers ofB-2 

strategic bombers and large field training exercises Key Resolve and Ulchi Freedom Guardian or 

whether he will also ban unit field training exercises and command post exercises. 

Even if restricted to large-scale exercises, the announcement could be a slippery slope in which 

Pyongyang demands curtailing additional allied military activity. North Korea has repeatedly 

criticized or taken action against an opponent which violated the regime's interpretation of a vague 

agreement. This year, North Korea canceled an inter-Korean meeting and criticized the allied 

military exercises that Kim Jong-un previously promised he wouldn't criticize because they 

"violated" the Panmunjom Declaration. 

Trump's decision could also raise questions as to the continued utility of US Forces Korea on the 

peninsula if it cannot train there. Trump's unilateral decision, made without consultation with South 

Korea or Japan, will generate concerns of U.S. resolve and commitment to defend them. 

Japan Defense Minister Onodera told Secretary of Defense Mattis that Tokyo regretted not being 

infonned beforehand of the decision, and that there are fears that the suspension of military exercises 

will weaken deterrence in the region. Onodera said, "US-South Korean military exercises are a 

critical pillar for regional peace and stability." 6 

Recommendations 

The United States may have the opportunity to finally cut the Gordian Knot of intertwined issues of 

eliminating the North Korean nuclear threat to the US. and its allies, ending the Korean War with a 

permanent peace treaty, addressing the regime's atrocious human rights record, and establishing 

diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Perhaps this time is different But there is a long track record 

of previous failed diplomatic e!Jorts with Pyongyang which were all greeted in their time as 

breakthroughs. 

5 Martin Murphy, 11The Importance of Alliances for U.S. Security. The Heritage Foundation. 

https:/ /inde:x. heritage.org/mil itary /201 7 /essays/importance -alliances-u-s-security /#fnl 0-:17X 1. 

"NHK News, Jtme 16. 2018. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/ne;;s/html/20180616/kl0011~80201000.html (Japanese text). 

6 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

As the U.S. and its allies work toward such an agreement, President Trump and U.S. diplomats 

should focus on several key tasks: 

CVID. North Korea should unequivocally, explicitly, and publicly accept the UN-required 

abandonment of the regime's nuclear, missile, and BCW weapons programs in a "complete, 

verifiable, and irreversible manner." [UN resolution cite]. It should be implemented in an 

expeditious manner 

Return to previous agreements. Pyongyang should the affirm its recommitment to previous 

international denuclearization accords, the armistice ending the Korean War, the interKorean Basic Agreement, and return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA Safeguards 

agreement, and join the Missile Technology Control Regime. 

Require detailed, carefully crafted text. Past negotiations with North Korea were flawed 

because the allies, overeager to achieve an agreement, acquiesced to short, vague agreements 

which paid insufficient attention to details. Unlike extensively detailed arms control treaties 

with the Soviet Union which clearly identified definitions and provisions, all agreements 

with North Korea were terse and poorly crafted. 

Create a Road Map. Once both sides agree on what will be constrained and eliminated, there 

must be settlement on linkages and sequencing of responsibilities, as well as the timelines 

under which they will be carried out There should be agreement on concise timelines for 

expedited rather than protracted implementation. 

Get it in writing. There has been a long history of Americans being surprised that North 

Korea had a different interpretation of the provisions and requirements of agreements. U.S. 

negotiator claims of oral agreements with North Korean counterparts enabled the regime to 

pocket concessions without reciprocating. Oral agreements with North Korea are not worth 

the paper they are written on. Unfortunately, we are already seeing signs of this in postsummit statements by President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo. 

• Distrust but verify. North Korean cheating on previous agreements makes it even more 

important to have a far more robust and intrusive verit1cation regime than in the past 

Parameters should be commensurate with the verification protocols of the START, INF, and 

CFE Treaties with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact 

o Provisions must include data declaration of North Korea's nuclear, chemical, 

biological and missile production, fabrication, test and storage facilities and the 

stockpile of fissile material and weapons of mass destruction arsenals; dismantlement 

of those facilities and destruction of the regime's WMD arsenals; on-site inspections 

of declared facilities; and short-notice challenge inspections of non-declared 

facilities. Given President Trump's criticism of the JCPOA, an NK deal must provide 

complete and total access to all North Korean military sites. 

• Maintain Pressure Until Significant Progress Is Achieved President Trump should not 

relax sanctions in return for North Korean pledges or minimalist implementation. Trump 

should make clear the ditTerences between negotiable trade sanctions, such as U.N. measures 

that limit North Korean import of oil and export of coal (which can be relaxed in return for 

progress on denuclearization), from non-negotiable U.S. targeted financial measures, which 

are law enforcement measures defending the U.S. tinancial system. 

o The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, Sections 401 and 402 allow 

the U.S. to suspend sanctions for up to one year or remove sanctions only if North 

Korea has made progress on several stipulated issues. [North Korea Sanctions and 

Policy Enhancement Act of2016, HR. 757, !14th Cong., 2nd Sess, 2016. 

7 
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Peace treaty contingent on reducing conventional.force threat A peace treaty should be an 

endpoint of arms control negotiations rather than the opening gambit to improve relations 

with North Korea. Signing a peace treaty prematurely can dangerously degrade allied 

deterrence and defense capabilities since it would end the basis for the United Nations 

Command and could create momentum in both South Korea and the US for "the war is 

finally over, bring the boys home.'' 

o The US. and South Korea should not sign a peace treaty until the North Korean 

nuclear threat is eliminated and the conventional threat reduced. North Korea has 

extensive conventional, mechanized, armor, and artillery corps deployed near the 

demilitarized zone, posing a threat to the south. 

o These forces should be capped and then weaned away from the forward area using 

measures similar to those in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the 

accompanying Vienna Document of Confidence and Security Building Measures. 

Reducing the potential for either side to conduct a sudden-start invasion while 

increasing transparency on military forces can lower tensions by reducing the 

potential for miscalculation leading to a military clash. 

Economic assiMance ,,hauld be predicated on CVTD progress. Provision of aid and 

assistance should be implemented in a manner to encourage economic reform, marketization, 

and the opening up of North Korea to the outside world rather than providing direct financial 

benefits to the regime. 

o Should be consistent with US. laws and lending requirements oflnternational 

Financial Institutions. Executive Order 13722 bans "new investment in North Korea 

[and] any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a US person ... where the 

transaction ... would be prohibited ... if performed by a United States person or within 

the United States." 

o There should be direct payments of wages to workers rather than the procedures in 

the Kaesongjoint-economic experiment whereby wages were paid to the regime 

which siphoned o!Ithe money and provided trading scrib to workers to be redeemed 

in factory stores. 

No normalization of diplonuttic relations without progress on human rights. Pyongyang's 

human rights violations have been so widespread, systemic, and egregious that the UN 

Commission of Inquiry determined they legally constituted "crimes against humanity." Some 

of the US. sanctions imposed on North Korea, including directly against Kim Jong-un, are 

due to human rights violations. Suspension or removal of US. sanctions are, in part, 

predicated on North Korea improving internal human rights conditions. 7 

Conclusion 

The U.S. and its allies must keep their shield up and its sword sharp until the threat necessitating 

their need is removed or reduced. President John F. Kennedy declared, "The costs of freedom is 

always high-- but Americans have always paid it" America, and its mothers and fathers of those 

brave men and women in the U.S. military do not take that commitment lightly but we are willing to 

make it 

The parents of 28,500 American warriors have pledged their most precious treasure- their children 

-to defend our allies in the region. Many more would come if there were a crisis. There can be no 

'North Korea Sanctions and Polley Enhancement Act. Sections 401 and -1-02, https://w\\'W.congress.gov/congressionalreportl 11-1-th-congress/house-report/3 92/1 ?oven·iew=closed. 

8 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

stronger signal of American commitment. We share common values and common cause with our 

South Korean ally. Yesterday ... today ... and tomorrow .... katchi kapshida ("we go together"). 

9 
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10 
23

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for that. 

Dr. Green. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GREEN, PH.D., SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT FOR ASIA, JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. GREEN. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me back this 

time to talk about the outcomes of the June 12th summit. 

I hope I can add some clarity on what was achieved, what we 

failed to achieve, and what we may have unleashed in terms of 

broader geopolitics in Asia with this summit. In each of these areas 

I think there is an oversight role for Congress, which I will touch 

on in my remarks. 

As several of the members of the committee have noted, Kim 

Jong-un has certainly achieved two of his objectives—first, he is 

now able to claim de facto U.S. recognition of this nuclear weapons 

status. 

When I was in the White House under President Bush, the 

North Koreans wanted a summit with George W. Bush. They tried 

to get one with Bill Clinton. They tried to get one with Barack 

Obama. 

Those Presidents said no because they thought the North Koreans were doing this to try to claim de facto status for their nuclear 

weapons. 

Kim has checked that box. We can debate about whether it’s 

worth it, but that’s one accomplishment. 

Second, as has been mentioned, Kim has successfully blunted 

sanctions. Not necessarily U.S. sanctions but China’s imposition of 

sanctions. China counts for 90 percent of North Korean trade. 

What did the United States achieve? North Korea has stopped 

testing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Kim probably knows 

that if he resumes testing the President will put back together the 

maximum pressure of international coalition of sanctions, if not 

military options. 

But we should also acknowledge that North Korea had violated 

every freeze in the past and could do so again at any time, and as 

others have mentioned on the committee, a freeze in testing is not 

a freeze in production and development of weapons and fissile material. 

The language, as my colleague pointed out, in the June 12th 

summit falls far short of previous agreements. Kim’s firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean 

Peninsula is a line I heard and saw in documents in many negotiations with the North. 

When they say this, they mean we’ll denuclearize when you 

denuclearize, meaning when you stop protecting Japan and Korea 

stop sanctions. 

The North Koreans look at the nonproliferation treaty of 1968 

with the U.S. and other nuclear power’s promise to get rid of nuclear weapons and I think Pyongyang realizes that’s what you say 

to get membership in the nuclear weapons club. 

24

So like Mr. Klingner, I don’t put much value on that particular 

statement. It’s possible Secretary Pompeo will be able to produce 

more details than we’ve seen. I certainly hope so. 

The pattern in the past has been for North Korea to prevaricate 

and not implement after the ink dries, and I think Congress can 

help Secretary Pompeo get more leverage in that difficult process. 

We’ll know it’s different this time or potentially different if Secretary Pompeo can get the North Koreans to produce a statement 

on North Korea’s full weapons and missile inventory and a 

verification plan. 

We were supposed to get this in the Six-Party Talks I joined. 

They were supposed to be part of the agreed framework. Doesn’t 

mean that they would go down that path but it’s the first necessary 

step. 

Absent real steps toward denuclearization of that kind, Congress 

would be right to insist on fuller implementation of sanctions including secondary sanctions against Chinese or Russian firms, and 

I would argue to do so before the September U.N. General Assembly when Kim Jong-un is expected to be addressing the international community. 

Also, U.S. unilateral sanctions, while they’re still on, are not a 

passive instrument. It takes active implementation. Is the administration going to do maritime interdiction operations when we catch 

the North Koreans transporting dangerous materials? Will they be 

imposing sanctions when they catch new banks? 

I think Congress has an important role in pushing the administration not only to maintain sanctions but to actively implement 

them. 

A second area requiring greater congressional oversight is management of our alliances. All of us who work in Asia were confused 

or disturbed by the President’s abrupt cancellation of U.S. joint 

military exercises. 

This was not a unilateral decision, if you were in Japan or Korea 

or Australia. This was a bilateral decision between North Korea 

and the U.S., proposed by China and Russia, with no consultation 

with our closest allies, compounded by the President’s statement 

that someday he’d like to get out of Korea altogether. 

I think most veterans of North Korea diplomacy, Republican or 

Democrats, would say they hope the President succeeds. We should 

give Secretary Pompeo the leverage he needs. But it probably won’t 

work. 

What we do know for sure is we are going to need our alliances. 

We’ll especially need them if North Korea continues developing 

dangerous weapons. 

We are also going to need our alliances because we are playing 

two games of chess in Asia right now. We are not just playing this 

game of chess with North Korea. We are playing a much more consequential long-term game with China about who’s going to dominate the rules and security in this region. 

On that chessboard, we make a mistake sending signals of lack 

of resolve or potential retreat on our alliances. I think the administration would be appreciative, perhaps, of Congress asking how 

this negotiation is going to advance the strategy that the PresiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:02 Jul 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\062018\30497 SHIRL
25

dent’s own national security strategy and the national defense 

strategy articulate that we are in a competitive game with China. 

How will our diplomacy with North Korea—how will our coordination with our allies help us in that other chess game, which is 

no less important to our security than what the President is trying 

to do with North Korea? 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

26


30497b-1.eps

Statement Before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

A Testimony by: 

Dr. Michael Green 

Senior Vice President for Center for Strategic and 

International Studies 

Director of Asian Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of 

Service 

::Prwn,Ptn\Mn University 

June 20, 2018 

2172 House Office Building 
27


30497b-2.eps

Green: Written Testimony, HFAC A&P Subcommittee 06/20/2018 2 

Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Shennan, Tam pleased to speak before this committee on the 

outcomes of President Trump's June 12 Summit in Singapore with North Korean leader Kim 

Jong-un. I hope to add some clarity about what we have accomplished, failed to accomplish, and 

potentially unleashed in terms of the larger geopolitics of East Asia. There is an important 

oversight role for Congress in each of these areas which I will highlight in my remarks 

Kim Jong-un appears to have achieved two of his objectives with this summit. First, the summit 

allows him to claim de Ji7clo U.S. recognition of his nuclear weapons status. The North sought 

summits with Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush for this reason. Both Presidents 

understood the real purpose and refused, but now Pyongyang has checked that box. Second, Kim 

has succeeded in blunting and diluting the US. campaign of"maximum pressure"-at least in 

terms of China, which accounts for 90% of North Korean trade and has visibly backed away 

from full implementation of sanctions since the summit was announced. 

What did the United States achieve? North Korea has stopped testing ballistic missiles and 

nuclear weapons. Kim Jong-un appears to be enjoying the international acclaim he is receiving 

He probably realizes that a resumption of testing would allow the United States to reassemble the 

international coalition needed to return to maximum pressure. However, we must acknowledge 

that North Korea has violated testing freezes in the past and could do so again at any time. 

Moreover, a freeze in testing does not constitute a freeze in the regime's ongoing nuclear 

weapons development programs. 

Kim Jong-un may be a new and different leader, but there is nothing in the June 12 Singapore 

Joint Statement that would constitute a new commitment by the North to denuclearization. In 

fact, the language in the June 12 Joint Statement falls far short of previous agreements. Kim's 

''firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" is a 

rehash of earlier North Korean language that Pyongyang has always conditioned on the United 

States first ending its security commitments to Japan and South Korea. This unhelpful language 

contrasts with the specifics of prior diplomatic agreements with North Korea: 

in the 1992 North-South Denuclearization accord the North committed to "not test, 

manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons;" 

in the 1994 Agreed Framework the North pledged to allow full International Atomic 

Energy Agency safeguards and inspections; 

and in the 2005 Six Party Joint Statement the North committed to ''to abandoning all 

nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date" to the 

NPT and to IAEA safeb'llards. 

It is possible that Secretary of State Pompeo will produce more detailed plans in the weeks and 

months ahead, but the general pattern to date has been for North Korea to prevaricate and stall 

after the ink has dried on agreements- not to add more details for implementation. As we know, 

the North began cheating on the 1992, 1994 and 2005 agreements almost immediately by 

restarting reactors, embarking on clandestine uranium enrichment paths to nuclear weapons, or 

testing nuclear weapons 
28


30497b-3.eps

Green: Written Testimony, HFAC A&P Subcommittee 06/20/2018 

We will know this time is different if Secretary Pompeo's team can compel their counterparts to 

produce a statement on the North's full weapons and missile inventory and to agree on 

verification protocols for inspections. This would not necessarily mean that the North intends to 

follow through, but it would represent a concrete step towards verifiable denuclearization that 

Pyongyang was supposed to have delivered in previous agreements. Alternatively, the North may 

turn over weapons or allow inspectors into a critical facility -but it would have to be 

considerably more than what we saw last month when the North invited friendly journalists to 

witness the pretend demolition of a collapsing test site. Absent real steps towards 

denuclearization, Congress would be right to insist on fuller implementation of sanctions, 

including secondary sanctions against Chinese or Russian firms, and to do so before Kim Jongun embarks on his expected visit to address the UN General Assembly in September 

A second area requiring greater Congressional oversight is management of our alliances. The 

President's abrupt cancellation of U.S. joint military exercises with South Korea was a 

bombshell to our allies. It would be a mistake to call this a ·'unilateral" decision. It was, in fact, a 

hi lateral decision reached with North Korea at the suggestion of China and Russia over the 

heads of our closest allies in the region. The shock to our alliances was compounded by the 

President's statement that he would like eventually to pull all U.S. troops out of South Korea. 

If you ask veterans of North Korea diplomacy from either party, the overwhelming majority 

would predict that Kim Jong-un is not going to denuclearize. This does not mean that we should 

abandon our current diplomatic path, but it does mean that we should be reinforcing our alliances 

to contain and deter a significantly more dangerous North Korea. Signaling a desire to retreat 

from the peninsula only encourages the North to think that its nuclear weapons can break our 

will and intimidate our allies 

A dismissive attitude towards our alliances also emboldens China. The President's 2018 National 

Security Strategy rightly identified great power competition with China and Russia as the central 

challenge to our security and our alliances as essential to meeting that challenge. As the U.S. 

Pacific Commander testified in Congress in April, China has a ·'clear intent to erode U.S. 

alliances and partnerships in the region.·· Tn recent years Beijing has pressured South Korea to 

sign a declaration opposing U.S. alliances in Asia -unsuccessfully --and has boycotted billions of 

dollars in South Korean products in an effort to stop U.S. missile defense deployments to the 

peninsula. Congress would be right to ask the administration how the June 12 summit will 

impact our ability to meet the challenges posed by China, which is no less important than the 

North Korea nuclear negotiations themselves. Indeed, the credibility of our alliances is one of the 

greatest sources of leverage we have to push both China and North Korea to do the right thing on 

the Korean peninsula. 

Thank you 
29

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your comments. 

Mr. Denmark. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ABRAHAM DENMARK, DIRECTOR, ASIA 

PROGRAM, THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS 

Mr. DENMARK. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, 

members of the committee, it’s an honor to be invited to give testimony today to review last week’s remarkable summit between 

President Trump and Kim Jong-un. 

Before I begin, I would just like to emphasize that the views expressed in this testimony are mine alone and not those of the Wilson Center or the U.S. Government. 

I am a strong supporter of diplomacy with North Korea. I work 

this challenge every day during my most recent appointment at the 

Department of Defense and I am deeply familiar with the risk associated with the military conflict with North Korea. 

Still, we should remember that diplomacy is a tactic, not a strategy and certainly not an objective. While the diplomatic process 

that has begun—that has begun may yield results eventually, the 

unfortunate fact is that the United States got a bad deal in Singapore. 

First, I would like to summarize what happened. The most geopolitically significant outcome of the summit was to set the U.S.-

DPRK relationship——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Could we ask Mr. 

Denmark to pull that mic closer to him? It’s a little hard to hear 

you. 

Mr. DENMARK. I apologize, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. YOHO. Not a problem. Thank you. 

Mr. DENMARK. The most geopolitically significant outcome of the 

summit was to set the U.S.-DPRK relationship onto a diplomatic 

track. 

Additionally, the President suspended major U.S.-ROK joint military exercises. This gave away a major piece of leverage while over 

time weakening the capabilities of our forces stationed in Korea for 

no appreciable gain. 

I should add that I disagree with the President’s characterization 

of these exercises as provocative. These exercises are stabilizing 

and defensive, and they are essential for deterrence, reassurance, 

and readiness. 

This is not to say that military exercises are sacrosanct. Adjusting exercises should be part of a negotiation. 

In any case, suspending exercises does not require the President 

denigrating their utility. There is also a lot that didn’t happen in 

Singapore. Most importantly, North Korea made no new commitments toward denuclearization. 

North Korea remains free to manufacture more nuclear weapons, 

ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction. There is 

no deadline for them to eliminate their illegal capabilities or even 

to freeze their continued production. 

30

Further, as you can see in the chart I appended to my testimony, 

North Korea’s denuclearization commitment made last week was 

the least specific commitment it has ever made. 

Moreover, the joint statement from Singapore made no mention 

of verification. Considering North Korea’s repeated history of violating past agreements, there is little reason to trust them this 

time. 

I would point to four significant implications of the Singapore 

summit. One, despite the President’s claims, North Korea remains 

a significant threat to the United States and our allies in East 

Asia. 

North Korea has the same ability today to attack our allies and 

possibly the United States as it had before the President met Kim. 

Two, the summit was a tremendous propaganda victory for Kim 

Jong-un. This is why previous Presidents have refused to meet 

with North Korean leaders. Doing so in itself is a major concession 

and conveys tremendous legitimacy to the North Koreans. 

Three, the summit injected a new turbulence into U.S. alliances 

with Japan and the ROK. The President’s effusive praise of Kim 

Jong-un and his willingness to meet with Kim and make significant concessions despite making so little progress on 

denuclearization inflamed allied concerns about U.S. reliability. 

And four, China got everything it wanted. China has long sought 

for the United States to be committed to a diplomatic process and 

to suspend its military exercises in Korea. 

To conclude, I would like to offer four points on next steps. On 

the first, time is not on our side. North Korea can continue to mass 

produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles as Kim Jong-un actually called for in his New Year’s speech in January. 

There is a danger that the U.S. has entered into an open-ended 

diplomatic process which would give North Korea a distinct advantage. 

One way for the United States to address time pressures in this 

negotiation would be to achieve a complete freeze on North Korea’s 

nuclear and ballistic programs as an early step in this process. 

Second, to supplement the President’s trust of Kim Jong-un, the 

U.S. should insist on strict inspection and verification regimes to 

accompany any concession North Korea may make toward 

denuclearization. 

Third, the United States should prepare for increased friction 

with China over maintaining pressure on North Korea. I expect 

China will soften its enforcement of sanctions on North Korea and 

the United States should expect to be prepared to hold China accountable, even to the point of enacting secondary sanctions on 

China’s entities that continue to do business with North Korea. 

And fourth, considering the continued threat posed by North 

Korea, the United States should ensure that its military forces and 

alliances in the region remain ready and robust. 

Any strategy toward North Korea is far stronger if the full 

weight of the United States and our allies can be brought to bear. 

Further, the people of the U.S. military deserve the resources 

needed to do their job effectively and the ability to exercise as 

needed. 

31

Readiness saves lives and ensures that our military remains the 

most awesome feared fighting force in the history of the world. 

Going forward, we must remain clear-eyed about how we are 

dealing with. The threat from North Korea remains real and Kim 

is not to be trusted. 

A credible high-quality deal will be very difficult to achieve and 

even more difficult to implement and verify. After the pageantry of 

Singapore, the difficult work of diplomacy and denuclearization 

still lies ahead. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Denmark follows:]

32


30497c-1.eps

il 

Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Hearing on "The Trump-Kim Summit: Outcomes and Oversight" 

Abraham M. Denmark 

Asia Program Director 

Senior Fellow at the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States 

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 

June 20, 2018 

Rayburn House Office Building Room 2172 
33


30497c-2.eps

Denmark: Testimony Before the HFAC A&P Subcommittee I june 2018 

Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, members of the Committee, my distinguished 

fellow panelists: it is an honor to be invited to give testimony today to review last week's 

remarkable summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. 

Given what happened in Singapore- and what didn't happen- this hearing provides an 

opportunity for a valuable public discussion about a topic of critical importance. 

My name is Abraham M. Denmark, and I am Director of the Asia Program atthe Woodrow 

Wilson International Center for Scholars, where I also hold an appointment as a Senior 

Fellow in the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. The views I express in my 

testimony are mine alone, and not those of the Wilson Center or of the U.S. government. 

At the outset, I want to be clear that I am a strong supporter of diplomacy with North 

Korea. I worked the North Korea challenge every day in my time at the Department of 

Defense, and I am deeply familiar with the costs and risks that would be involved in a 

military conflict with North Korea. While I oppose taking military options off the table, I 

firmly believe that realistic diplomacy- complemented by sustained pressure as well as the 

resolve to demand reciprocal concessions from North Korea- is preferable to the risks of a 

potentially catastrophic conflict. As President Kennedy said, "let us never negotiate out of 

fear. But let us never fear to negotiate." 

Still, while I believe in diplomacy, we should remember it is a tactic- not a strategy, and 

certainly not an objective. While entering into a diplomatic process with Pyongyang is a 

positive development, North Korea has so far received several significant concessions 

without giving much in return. In several ways the United States emerged from the 

Singapore summit at a greater disadvantage than when it began. While the diplomatic 

process that has begun may yield results eventually, the unfortunate fact is that the 

United States got a bad deal in Singapore. 

What Happened in Singapore 

Regardless of its outcome, a meeting between the President of the United States and the 

North Korean leader was undeniably historic. After over 70 years of hostility and multiple 

instances of extreme tension, the meeting of the two leaders offered a moment of hope 

despite all the skepticism, doubt, and distrust that infuses U.S.·DPRK relations. Despite the 

significant disappointment of the summit overall, it did have some tangible results. 

• The most geopolitically significant outcome of the summit was to officially set 

the U.S.·DPRK relationship onto a diplomatic track. While it is unclear if this 

process will generate any tangible results, this is far better than the tension and "fire 
34


30497c-3.eps

Denmark: Testimony Before the HFAC A&P Subcommittee I june 2018 

and fury" rhetoric from previous months. 

• Though often overlooked, it is important to recognize that North Korea committed 

to recovering American POW /MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of 

those remains already identified. While this is a positive gesture from Pyongyang, 

we should recall that they have in the past demanded payment for the return of our 

people's remains. 

• Unilaterally suspending major U.S.-ROK joint military exercises gave away a 

major piece of American leverage while over time weakening the capabilities 

of our forces stationed in Korea, for no appreciable gain. North Korea is still free 

to conduct its major exercises, and its pledge to halt nuclear and missile tests was 

not included in the Singapore summit joint statement- meaning the president's 

concession appears entirely unilateral. Cancelling these exercises has been a longheld goal for North Korea and China, and the president adopted their argument 

when he called the exercises "provocative".1 1 disagree with the president's 

characterization. These joint military exercises are stabilizing and defensive, and 

they are essential for deterrence, reassurance, and readiness. They ensure that that 

U.S. and ROK forces are ready to "fight tonight" to defend against any potential 

aggression on the peninsula. The President often touts the power of the U.S. military 

-in the past, he has warned that U.S. military options are "fully locked and loaded" 

in Korea.2 But the reality is that the only reason these forces are so ready to go is 

because they exercise regularly. 

This is not to say that military exercises are sacrosanct and should not be adjusted 

under any circumstance. Adjusting exercises should be part of a negotiation with 

North Korea - not a unilateral concession for which we get nothing in return. In any 

case, it does not require the president denigrating the utility of our exercises. Doing 

so suggests that exercises are primarily bargaining chips - not actions that are 

necessary to maintain military readiness- and will have global implications for 

exercises held all around the world. 

What Didn't Happen in Singapore 

'"Trump: military solutions 'locked and loaded' against North Korea threat," Reuters, August 11, 2017, 

https:/ jwww.reuters.comjarticlejus-northkorea-missiles-trump-idUSKBN1AR15M. 
35


30497c-4.eps

Denmark: Testimony Before the HFAC A&P Subcommittee I june 2018 

North Korea has made no new commitments to denuclearization, and in fact 

has backed away from its previous commitments. In Singapore, Kim was able to 

simply reiterate the commitment made at Panmunjom in April, that "South and 

North Korea confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete 

denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula."3 North Korea remains free to 

manufacture more nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass 

destruction - even though it has unilaterally frozen testing of its nuclear weapons 

and certain ballistic missiles. There is no deadline for them to eliminate their illegal 

capabilities, or even freeze their continued production. 

4 

Further, as you can see in the chart I appended to my testimony, North Korea's 

denuclearization commitment made last week was the least specific commitment it 

has ever made. For example, in 2005 as a result of the 6-Party Talks process, North 

agreed to "verifiable" denuclearization and to "abandoning all its nuclear weapons 

and nuclear programs and returning, a tan early date" to the NPT.4 The reality is that 

the commitment Kim made last week is a significant downgrade from any of its 

previous commitments. 

• The joint statement from Singapore did not mention human rights, other 

weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles or verification, meaning the 

president could only point to his personal trust in Kim Jong Un. Considering 

North Korea's repeated history of violating past agreements, there is little reason to 

trust them this time. Moreover, Kim rules a regime that commits systematic, 

widespread and gross human rights violations against his own people, and is 

believed to have directed acts of aggression against our ROK ally and the rapid 

acceleration of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile testing program upon 

taking power. Yet in the Singapore joint statement and in the president's comments 

since then, there has been no mention of verification or enforcement. Instead, the 

president has repeatedly described the trust he holds for Kim jong Un. Time will tell 

if this trust is well placed, but I am skeptical about entrusting the future security of 

my country or our allies in the goodwill of Kim jongUn. 

• Despite their pledge to completely denuclearize the Korean peninsula, 

Washington and Pyongyang have yet to agree on a common definition of 

denuclearization. Without a common understanding of what is to be achieved, it is 

"Panmunjeom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, April27, 2018. 

"

1 joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005, llt\ll:S..LL£001- 2 OWJ5tn~v /r /pa/prs/ps 12 005/=i3490.htn).. 
36


30497c-5.eps

Denmark: Testimony Before the HFAC A&P Subcommittee I june 2018 

more likely that negotiations will end in disappointment and recrimination. 

Pyongyang may believe that the "complete denuclearization of the Korean 

peninsula" entails the United States withdrawing its extended deterrent 

commitment to the ROK, or even to end the U.S.-ROKAIIiance. Indeed, Secretary 

Pompeo's statement that "complete" includes verification strongly suggests that 

establishing a common understanding of the terms being used will be an essential 

step in the diplomatic process. 

Implications 

• Despite the president's claims, North Korea remains a significant threat to the 

United States and our allies in East Asia. While the President's summit with Kim 

may have generated some goodwill and even built personal trust between the two 

leaders, North Korea has not given up a single warhead or ballistic missile. Its WMD 

production facilities are free to continue to manufacture their illegal arms, and not a 

single long-range artillery tube has been withdrawn from threatening the Seoul 

metropolitan area. North Korea has the same ability today to strike our allies, and 

possibly the United States, with nuclear weapons as it had before the President met 

Kim in Singapore. 

The summit was a tremendous propaganda victory for Kim Jong Un. This is 

why previous presidents have refused to meet with North Korean leaders- doing so 

in itself is a major concession and conveys tremendous legitimacy to the North 

Koreans. Images of Kim's meeting with the President of the United States will likely 

be used for years to show his people that he is respected and admired around the 

world and is considered an equal to the world's most powerful leaders. He can show 

the North Korean flag sitting next to the American flag and tell his people that his 

leadership has made the DPRK respected as an equal to the United States and 

recognized as a de facto nuclear power. And he can show the President saluting a 

North Korean General and tell his people that even the American President respects 

the Korean People's Army. 

• The Singapore summit injected new turbulence into U.S. alliances with Japan 

and the ROK. The President's effusive praise of Kim ]ong Un, and his willingness to 

meet with Kim and make significant concessions- despite making so little progress 

on denuclearization- inflamed allied concerns about the reliability of the United 

States. Tokyo has been more open about expressing their concerns, though it has 

been sure to praise the Trump administration for raising the issue of] apanese 
37


30497c-6.eps

Denmark: Testimony Before the HFAC A&P Subcommittee I june 2018 6 

abductees with Kims and its pledge to sustain economic sanctions until concrete 

steps toward denuclearization have been taken. In Seoul, the Moon administration 

has been officially supportive of the summit's outcomes and endorsed the 

president's decision to suspend military exercises.6 Yet both Seoul and Tokyo are 

concerned about the suspension of exercises without corresponding North Korean 

concessions and without prior consultation. Such actions can, over time, damage the 

confidence of our allies in American reliability. Moreover, giving away significant 

mechanisms of alliance cooperation without coordination inflames fears that the 

United States will make another deal with North Korea that undermines their 

interests. 

• China got everything it wanted. China has long sought for the United States to be 

committed to a diplomatic process and to suspend its military exercises in Korea. 

Beijing increasingly views issues on the Korean peninsula through the lens of 

geopolitical competition with the United States and seeks to diminish American 

power and influence in Korea. Further, China has long sought to cancel major U.S.-

ROK joint military exercises and inject turbulence into the Alliance -both of which 

President Trump fulfilled unilaterally. 

Going forward, the Trump administration may have an opportunity to point to its 

tacit adoption of China's preferred strategy in order to sustain Beijing's continued 

enforcement of sanctions. This may be important, as China had already begun to 

soften its enforcement of sanctions weeks before the summit. 

Next Steps 

While it is too soon to know whether the diplomatic process that has been put in place will 

ultimately be successful, the United States has an opportunity to add specifics to the broad 

principles agreed to in Singapore. When looking forward to future engagements with North 

Korea, I want to make four concluding points. 

Time is not on our side. As Mike Pompeo stated as CIA Director in january of this 

year, North Korea was just "a handful of months away" from having the ability to 
38


30497c-7.eps

Denmark: Testimony Before the HFAC A&P Subcommittee I june 2018 

strike the United States with nuclear weapons 7 - something the president and 

several of his predecessors have stated would be intolerable. Yet as Secretary of 

State following the Singapore summit, Pompeo stated that he expects there to be 

significant progress toward denuclearization by the end of 2020. 

While North Korea has frozen its nuclear and ballistic missile testing, its ability to 

continue to mass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles- which Kim 

called for during his New Year's speech in January of this year- remains 

unrestrained. There is a danger that the United States has entered into an openended diplomatic process which would North Korea at a distinct advantage. While 

Secretary of State Pompeo's statement that he hopes to achieve North Korea's 

denuclearization by the end of 2020s suggests that he is aware of these time 

pressures, the fact that North Korea has not agreed to such a time line suggests that 

this remains an unresolved issue. 

As negotiations commence, North Korea will be able to continue to mass produce 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles unless we achieve a complete freeze of those 

programs. One way for the United States to address time pressures on this 

negotiation would be to achieve a complete freeze of North Korea's nuclear 

and ballistic missile programs as an early step in a diplomatic process. 

• Another critical step in the denuclearization process will be to receive a full 

declaration from North Korea of its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, and 

the biological program it is suspected of possessing. Without such a declaration, it 

will be impossible to achieve denuclearization to any degree of confidence. 

To supplement the president's trust of Kim jong Un trust, the United States could 

insist on strict inspection and verification regimes to accompany any concession 

North Korea may make toward denuclearization. Without verification, any North 

Korean concession should be viewed with deep skepticism. 

While I take the president at his word that human rights issues were discussed in 

Singapore, it is clear that these issues took a back seat. While I support the 

7 john Haltiwanger, "North Korea 'Handful of Months' From Being Able to Hit U.S. With Nuclear Weapon, CIA 

Director Warns," Newsweek January 22, 2018, lW».dl:t\!:lYJ-Y:~.!lQ.::tL~\Y~J-.J::.&.Qtll .. LrriL.tl.h::-lmn-;a.Jl{!mlt:!-i.!:Jiilllith?_: 

bcing·-:J_ble- hit~ us-nuclear.-wcapon-cia-ditector-\Varns-'786 7 06. 

7 
39


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Denmark: Testimony Before the HFAC A&P Subcommittee I june 2018 

administration's focus on denuclearization as its top priority with North Korea, a 

failure to keep international attention on these issues could result in a bad deal for 

the North Korean people. I find it difficult to imagine North Korea being accepted 

into the international community if it leaves its serious human rights issues 

unaddressed- even if North Korea were to genuinely denuclearize. 

• The United States should prepare for increased friction with China over 

maintaining pressure on North Korea. I expect China will soften its enforcement 

of economic sanctions on North Korea, both to thwart U.S. efforts to maintain 

pressure on Pyongyang and to build a stronger bilateral relationship with Kim. The 

United States should be prepared to hold China accountable for its continued 

support of North Korea, even to the point of enacting secondary sanctions on 

Chinese entities that continue to do business with North Korea. 

8 

• Considering the continuing threat posed by North Korea, the United States 

should ensure that its military forces and alliances in the region remain ready 

and robust. This may entail tailoring what exercises remain so as to maintain 

necessary levels of force readiness and conducting genuine coordination efforts 

with our allies before a decision is made. Any strategy toward North Korea- be it 

diplomatic of military- is far stronger if allies are consulted and if the full weight of 

the United States and our allies can be brought to bear on a particular issue. Our 

allies are the foundation of American power in the Asia-Pacific and make significant 

contributions to the stability and prosperity of the region and to U.S. interests 

around the world. They deserve to be respected and consulted. 

Further, the people of the U.S. military make incredible sacrifices to defend the 

security and freedom of their fellow countrymen and our allies. During my time in 

the Department of Defense, I witnessed the incredible capabilities of the U.S. 

military and those of our allies. They deserve the resources needed to do their job 

effectively, and the ability to exercise as needed. Readiness saves lives, and ensures 

that our military remains the most awesome, feared fighting force in the history of 

the world. While negotiations with North Korea are certainly important as well, they 

do not have to come at the expense of the readiness of our forces or the security of 

our allies. 

Going forward, we must remain clear-eyed about who we are dealing with. The threat from 

North Korea remains real, and Kim is notto be trusted. A credible, high-quality deal will be 

difficult to achieve, and even more difficult to implement and verify. After the pageantry of 

Singapore, the difficult work of diplomacy and denuclearization still lies ahead. 

30497e.eps

Descri tion 

NPT Signing 

South-North Joint 

Declaration 

Joint Statement of the 

DPRK and the U.S. 

Agreed Framework 

U.S.-DPRK joint 

Communi ue 

Withdrav\-·al of the NPT 

Fourth Round of the 

Six-Party Talks Joint 

Statement 

Joint Statement 

Follo'vving Six-Party 

Talks 

Six-Party Talks, Second 

Phase for the 

Implementation of the 

2005 Joint Statement 

Second Inter-Korean Summit 

Leap Day Agreement 

Panmunjom Declaration 

Singapore Summit 

Joint Statement 

Date 

Dec 12, 1985 

jan 20, 1992 june 11, 1993 

Oct 21, 1994 

Oct 12, 2000 

jan 10, 2003 

Sept ·19, 2005 

I feh 13, 2007 

Oct 3, 2007 Oct 1, 2007 

Feb. 29,2012 

April27, 2018 

June 12,2018 

North Korean Denuclearization Commitments (1985-2018) 

Commitment 

North Korea acceded to the very detailed nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but makes its membe

contingent on the U.S. withdrawing nuclear weapons from the ROK 

Agreed to not "test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons" or "p

nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." North Korea also agreed to inspections for vei

Both sides endorsed the 1992 South-North Joint Declaration and agreed to the ptinciples of "assurance

the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons;" and "peace and security in a nuclear-free Korea

Peninsula, including impartial application of full-scope safeguards." 

North Korea committed to "freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventu

dismantle these reactors and related facilities" agreed that the IAEA "will be allowed to monitor this fre

the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose." North Korea also agreed to allm,v 8

spent nuclear reactor fuel elements to he removed to a third country. North Korea also agreed to remai

NPT and allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty. 

Endorsed the Agreed framework and strongly affirmed its role in achieving a nuclear weapons-free Ko

Peninsula. 

"Though we pull out of the NPT, we have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear acti

this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity" 

Reaffirmed that the goal oft he Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsul

peaceful manner. Committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and ret

at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. 

North Korea agreed to shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yonghyon nuc

facility, including the reprocessing facility, and invite hack IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary mon

and veiifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK. North Korea also committed to discussing a li

nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rod

would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement. 

North Korea agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment under the Septemb

Joint Statement and the February 13 agreement. It also committed to disabling the 5-megawatt Experim

Reactor, the Reprocessing Plant, and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility atYongbyon hy 31 Dece

2007. Pyongyang also agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs, 

reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, or know-ho\ov. 

The South and the North have agreed to wurk together to implement smoothly the September 19,2005 

Statement and the Februa1y 13, 2007 Agreement achieved at the Six-Party Talks. 

North Korea announced it would suspend nuclear weapons tests and uranium enrichment, halt test lau

of long-range missiles, and allm'\' international inspectors to monitor activities at its main nuclear comp

"South and North Korea confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denudeatization, a 

free Korean Peninsula" 

"Reaffirming the April 27, 20"1 8 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." 

Denmark Testimony Hefore the HFAC A&P Subcommittee I june 201 H Appended D
41

Mr. YOHO. Thanks, everyone, for your testimony. I look forward 

to getting into the questions. 

You know, you brought up—Mr. Denmark, you brought up a very 

good point. It’s a tremendous propaganda win for Mr. Kim and I 

think most of the world sees that and I think a lot of people here 

feel that, too. 

But it’s also a tremendous opportunity. I was born in 1955. That 

conflict has been going on ever since then. You know, we are operating under an armistice for all those years. 

It’s time to bring finality to something, and when we get to that 

point then you have certainty, and when you have certainty you 

can develop trade and all those things in the economy. 

And until we get to that point, we are not going to have that 

kind of stability on that peninsula, as I think we all agree. 

What I see with what President Trump has done is he’s changed 

the dynamics of negotiation, and, you know, whether it’s good or 

bad, the future will tell us. 

But what I see he has given the ball or a pass to Mr. Kim, and 

it’s an opportunity. What he does with it will determine the next 

steps. 

You know, some people look at it as a rope—if he does bad that 

he’ll hang himself with it. Others will see, you know what, this is 

a chance that they can change the dynamics on North Korea—of 

North Korea and develop an economic engine, and I can only think, 

because we were talking about when he was in Singapore. 

Here you have a young leader of a country that doesn’t have 

much outside exposure. Thirty-four years old—goes and sees Xi 

Jinping in China, sees their economic engine there. Goes to Singapore, sees the economic engine. 

The things that he sees, he has to go home thinking why can’t 

this be my country. Now he’s got to deal with how do I bring this 

in there. Hopefully, that’s what he’s seeing, and I think with the 

President allowing him—and I don’t want to use the word legitimacy—but allowing him to move into the negotiations, I think this 

is, as we’ve said multiple times, historic. 

Where it goes from here will be based on the next steps, and it’s 

going to be a step by step process, and I think you have all brought 

up a very good point that we have to make sure that the sanctions 

stay ratcheted up and so I think along those lines, as we start negotiation, what I see as one of the most important things is the 

definitions—definitions of denuclearization—what does that mean 

to the North and what does that mean to the peninsula and the 

rest of the world. 

Verification—and I want to ask the question, who should do the 

verification? Should we rely on the IAEA that I, personally, don’t 

have a lot of confidence in, or should it be a coalition of the partner 

countries—South Korea, North Korea, us, and maybe for balancing, 

allow somebody from China or Russia there? 

I would like to have your opinion on that and then we’ll ask you 

a few more questions. Bruce? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Verification is an issue dear to my heart. I was 

a chief of the arms control staff at CIA and I served on one of the 

negotiating delegations overseas. 

42

So it’s really a two-part thing. One is the measures that you have 

in the treaty, in which everyone knows exactly what their responsibilities are and you provide the details of how that is done. 

And then that’s used in conjunction with your national technical 

means so that you can verify that. But you do need on-site inspection. 

So with the inspectors, whether it’s IAEA or a coalition or whether we call it other things, I think what you will need to do is have 

on any teams at least one American and one Chinese representative, because the Americans are going to want to have eyes on 

where we see if something is a violation or not, and if we call it 

a violation China would likely disagree. So you probably need them 

there on the same team. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Now, things—when you get to actual fissile material and actual nuclear weapons, you would probably want to restrain that to the five members of the P-5 who have nuclear weapons. 

So if you’re getting into that level of radioactive and nuclear 

weapons, I think you keep it to a very select few countries. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Mr. KLINGNER. But the U.S. wouldn’t have enough inspectors to 

man all of the inspections. So you would need other countries. But 

I think we’d have to have U.S. representation on every team. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. 

Let me go down to Dr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. We, in the Six-Party Talks, did considerable work on 

this with other nuclear weapon states, principally Britain and 

France, but also Russia, which was helpful at the time, and to a 

lesser extent, China, which has very limited experience in arms 

control. 

The work has been done on what this should look like and the 

State Department and the CIA and others would have it. 

As Bruce points out, the IAEA has a role in safeguards in places 

like Yongbyon, but nuclear weapons they don’t do, so that would 

require some accommodation of the permanent five and most likely 

U.S. and Russia, Britain, and France would be at the core of it. 

As Bruce points out, China has a major equity, and although 

they have less experience, should probably be there. 

Stanford University did a study that suggested even under a permissive environment, in the very unlikely event that Kim Jong-un 

really wants to denuclearize, this is a 10- to 15-year process. 

And even then, the scientists and engineers have all that information in their heads and what do you do with them? So the reality is there is no end date for CVID. It’s a constant ongoing process. 

The other problem is precisely because it has to be in iterations 

that North Koreans and China will use that to try to get rewards 

for small increments and to hold up progress. 

So one of the tough challenges for the Secretary of State is 

what’s an early harvest that shows us seriousness. I think a declaration is one of them. Getting out fissile material weapons might 

be next. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. Mr. Denmark—20 seconds. 

43

Mr. DENMARK. I don’t have much. I thought the answers were 

very good. I agree that the IAEA has an important role to play. 

But there is a difference between inspection, verification, and actually pulling the weapons out—that the P-5 is going to have an 

important role to play. 

The different countries have various levels of capability. I am especially concerned about China’s ability to actually handle those responsibly. 

But overall, I think it’s important to make sure that any 

verification regime is robust. As Dr. Green said, this is going to require very intense—very intrusive inspections. That’s difficult for 

any country to really accept and for a country as self-isolated as 

North Korea it’s very difficult to see. 

But it’s going to be an extremely long process. There is really no 

such thing a quick denuclearization. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. Thank you. 

I will next turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. One bit of disagreement with Dr. 

Green. It may take 10, 15 years to root out every piece of the North 

Korea nuclear program. 

But if they stop the centrifuges, dismantle them, ship fissile material, that is something Iran did in 90 days and could have done 

quicker, and that would make us all sleep a little better. 

I do have a comment or two about Mr. Rohrabacher’s opening 

statement. First is I believe it’s President Eisenhower who is the 

President who did the most to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula. 

And second, I want President Trump to succeed and, beyond 

that, I have defined success with a lower, more achievable standard 

not only that any Democrat in the room but any Republican in the 

room, although we haven’t heard from the gentlelady from Hawaii 

yet, but in a much more achievable lower standard for success than 

anyone else I know actively involved in foreign policy. 

But as Mr. Green points out, just doing a meeting that’s not an 

achievement. That’s a concession. The last four or five Presidents 

were all begged by North Korea to do this meeting. They all decided it was a concession they were unwilling to make. 

I want to focus a bit, because we have a Japan expert with us 

here—Dr. Green. It is very anomalous that you have in Japan the 

third largest economy in the world who, as of now, is doing nothing 

with its own military forces or preparing to do nothing with its 

military forces to defend its own back yard. 

Now, the Japanese constitution talks about this or that, but the 

U.N.—the mission to defend North Korea is a United Nations mission, and many countries believe that meeting their U.N. obligations is something they’re legally able to do. 

What do we do to have the Japanese military be willing and prepared to be part of the effort to defend South Korea? 

I realize that not all the problems are in Tokyo. 

Mr. GREEN. No, they’re enough. First of all, I think you put that 

very well. 

44

North Korea could, in a month, in a week, ship out centrifuges, 

fissile material, nuclear weapons, and in a month or 2 ship out all 

of it. 

The full CVID is what’s going to take 10 or 15 years. So I 

think—I agree with you actually. I think that’s an important point 

for the record. 

Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan has revised the interpretation 

of the constitution to allow for the first time in the post-war period 

Japanese forces to plan jointly with the U.S. to move and operate 

together, and that’s a significant move. 

He’s moved—he’s increased the defense budget a little bit. Japan 

should spend more. He’s moving—he said he’s going to buy new 

weapons systems that Japan had never had. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But how do we get those joint trilateral exercises? 

Mr. GREEN. So that is a problem. The Japanese defense forces 

are keen to exercise with Korea. The Korean defense forces are 

keen to exercise with Japan because they recognize what you said. 

If we are not working together it’s dangerous for all of us. 

It’s the political level that’s the problem. Right now the——

Mr. SHERMAN. Is it politically dangerous for a South Korean 

President to say hey, we are going to have joint trilateral exercises? 

Would that have been dangerous before Singapore? Is it dangerous 

after Singapore—politically dangerous? 

Mr. GREEN. I don’t think it is. It’s not easy, but I don’t think it’s 

difficult and, frankly, if we pushed——

Mr. SHERMAN. And how difficult would it be for Abe to——

Mr. GREEN. Abe would do it. The problem is that the South Korean side, as Bruce and Abe know well, the South Korean side is 

not satisfied with the agreement that Prime Minister Abe made 

with the previous President about historical issues like the comfort 

women, and that’s a political and social and other problem. 

But in terms of the militaries—Japanese and Korean realize they 

have to work together jointly and, you know, in my view, the administration should be pushing harder on this. 

The exercises we do with the South Koreans are suspended. The 

South Korean military is going to go ahead with another exercise 

to defend the small island of Dokdo against the Japanese. That’s 

the wrong enemy. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What? 

Mr. GREEN. The wrong enemy, yes. 

So I am glad you flagged it in your opening comments. I think 

it should be a priority. I think that the—that the Japanese and Korean military experts, diplomats, should think about the North Korean problem, recognize it. It’s the politicians who have to be 

pushed to increase the collaboration between the two. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. YOHO. Next we’ll go to Dana Rohrabacher from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A couple of thoughts. I am sorry I would disagree with my colleague and the witness as well. You both seem 

to be underestimating the antagonism of the Korean people to the 

Japanese. 

And I am sorry, it’s not a good thing. I don’t like it. But it better 

be a factor in how we create a more peaceful situation in that part 

of the world. 

45

The Koreans have never forgiven the Japanese for the Second 

World War, and but that does not mean we should not—we should 

not be moving forward with a plan that would increase Japan’s at 

least capacity in that region but not necessarily having military 

maneuvers aimed at something going on in Korea. I think that 

would be counterproductive. 

With that said, let me also note when I said that this whole 

thing is a, you know, deja vu all over again. Let us note that of 

my colleagues who are saying we didn’t accomplish anything and 

my witnesses suggest it wasn’t accomplished, that Reagan, when 

he was negotiating, when he went to Reykjavik and elsewhere, this 

was predicated how we ended up turning what was a slamming of 

the door—Reykjavik—to another situation was Ronald Reagan proposed the zero option, and he was—by the way, most people forget 

that. 

And, again, castigated by the liberal Democrat opponents of Ronald Reagan as being a fraud and you’re never going to get them to 

agree to that. 

We want the nuclear freeze, which would have frozen the Soviets 

into a—into a superior position with nuclear weapons and Reagan 

said no, we are going to go for the zero option and he was called—

they said he’s being disingenuous. The Democratic attacks on 

Trump are almost exactly the same, and the fact is that in the end 

the Soviets agreed to the zero option, and in the end we eliminated 

a whole schedule of nuclear weapons in Europe because yes, the 

President did not demand immediately to have something to show 

for every meeting that he was in and had a long strategy that 

worked. 

I believe that’s what’s going on right now, and our President has 

opened the door. He’s opened the door, and I agree with Mr. 

Kinzinger, I should say—not Kissinger—who pointed out military—

maintaining a strong military possibility and that’s why I was talking about Japan and helping them build forces there, was an important component about bringing together the end of the Cold War 

and would be important to hear as well. 

In the Cold War, while Ronald Reagan had his hand out, he also 

was supporting mujahadeen guerillas in Afghanistan, the contras 

in Nicaragua, various elements in eastern Europe who we were 

supporting under cover like Walesa and others. And so my colleague is exactly right, it needs to be a two-fisted thing. 

But I have no reason—I do not believe there is any reason for 

us to suspect that this President—we keep treating him as if he 

doesn’t know what he’s doing. He understands the basics, and 

there’s a fellow who wrote a book in my district called ‘‘No Profit 

Without Risk.’’ His name is Bob Mayer. Bob Mayer is a very successful businessman. 

Our President is very successful businessman. He realizes there 

will be not progress without some risk, and what you—and what—

but you should not castigate this President and undermine his position as being taking—as possibly having a rational approach 

rather than just dismissing him as oh, this is just so risky—we 

shouldn’t be doing this. 

46

I think he’s putting us in a position, like Reagan did when he 

said the zero option, not nuclear freeze, to actually put us in a position to end the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. 

And the goal isn’t just taking nuclear weapons out of the hands 

of North Korea. The goal is to unify Korea in the end under a 

somewhat democratic country. 

And one last note, and I want your comments on this—sorry I 

am taking up all this time—but the fact is that this Kim is different than his father and his father’s father. 

And when you say that, as my colleague just said, but he went 

to Singapore, maybe he saw the potential of the West—this man, 

this young leader Kim, he was educated in Switzerland at an elite 

and prestigious school. 

He knows so much more than what his father and his father’s 

father knew that perhaps these things that we are talking about 

make sense that you’re dealing with a rational person rather than 

a rabid Marxist dog like his dad and his grandfather. 

So I am sorry. I’ve used up my time. Could they have a minute 

to comment on—feel free to disagree. 

Mr. YOHO. Real briefly, if you can comment. 

Mr. KLINGNER. I think in many ways Kim Jong-un is different 

from his predecessors but in many ways he is similar. It perhaps 

is a more effective implementation of a three generation game plan 

by the North Koreans. 

North Korea has had a two-page play book of alternating threats, 

attacks with charm offensives, although with North Korea it tends 

to be more offensive than charming. 

With Kim Jong-un, he, for 6 years, only did the first page of his 

father’s play book and he did it on steroids with an accelerated test 

schedule. 

And since January he switched to the second page and also done 

that sort of on steroids, where he’s now had the revolving door of 

summits. 

So the whiplash effect is strong in going from one extreme to the 

other. But I think it’s still trying to implement the objectives of his 

father and his grandfather of being accepted as a nuclear state, of 

reducing the pressure and isolation on North Korea, getting economic benefits but on North Korean terms. 

They want to get the economic benefits but they don’t want to 

open their country to what they see as the contagion of outside influence. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Thank you. 

We are going to go on, just out of respect for the other members. 

Mr. Connolly from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank you 

for putting together an intellectually honest panel. I’ve gone to way 

too many committee hearings on this committee over the years 

where we have a skewed panel. Even the title of the hearing predetermines the outcome of the hearing. 

Mr. YOHO. We try to be fair and balanced. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, you have been more than that. 

No, seriously, I really thank you because I think we are having 

an intellectually honest conversation about something that’s terribly important. 

47

My friend from California I think does not accurately recall history, even though he worked for Ronald Reagan. My recollection of 

the Reykjavik summit was that when Ronald Reagan said, why 

don’t we just get rid of all nuclear weapons, it was the neocons in 

his own administration who were shocked and distressed, not liberal Democrats. 

And secondly, I must remind my friend from California, I sat 

here for 8 long years and I don’t remember my friends on the other 

side of the aisle giving the very kind of consideration he now asks 

of this President to President Obama. And what’s sauce for the 

goose is sauce for the gander. 

So we Democrats reserve our right, the right you exercised for 

8 years, to criticise this President and we are going to do it carefully but with some zeal. 

Let me—let me summarize, if I may, what I’ve heard from all 

three of our witnesses. We have a history of violations by the 

North. Don’t get too excited about anything they sign on to. 

Added to the fact that this joint statement after the so-called 

summit actually lacked specificity. I think it was you, Mr. 

Klingner, who said—or maybe you, Dr. Green—it actually is less 

meat on the table in this statement than some of the previous ones. 

We still have a huge human rights problem. Again, I was listening to my friend from California. You would never guess—you 

know, he had his uncle executed in a horrifying way. You’d never 

guess he still presides over gulags of tens of thousands of North 

Koreans. You’d never guess that he had his step-brother assassinated—killed at a modern airport in Asia, but okay. 

You have the effect—I think, Dr. Green, you talked about the de 

facto lessening of sanctions with China. This kind of gives a little 

bit of a green light to China, maybe not others about certainly 

China, and that’s not a good thing, given the fact that most of their 

trade is with China. 

We have the recognition of their nuclear status de facto by having the summit by the United States. WE elevate his stature, 

which they’ve been seeking, as you pointed out, Dr. Green, for the 

previous three or four administrations. This is the first one to give 

it to him. 

And in return, we’ve gotten no commitment on denuclearization, 

no commitment on inspections, no commitment on metrics, and as 

I said in my statement, the problem President Trump has is by ripping up Iran, which was working and that had very specific 

metrics, one has to presume, since he decided that was inadequate, 

that with respect to North Korea or any nuclear threshold state, 

we are going to have higher metrics—we are going to have a higher 

standard they have to meet. And I don’t know how you do that, 

frankly, with North Korea. I think Iran complicates the problem. 

But I also think just this so-called summit—I don’t want to take 

anything away from shaking hand and having a photo op, but I 

think there’s danger in terms of the expectations that have been 

raised, in the concessions de facto that have been granted. 

I now welcome you to comment on that. 

Doctor—Mr. Klingner. 

48

Mr. KLINGNER. I’ve been working on North Korea for 25 years so 

I tend to be skeptical and cynical. But perhaps you are even more 

skeptical than I. 

No, I agree. I would say the summit as—it’s a first step. We can 

discuss, debate how successful it was, how good a first step it is. 

But as you know, my colleagues and I have tried to identify the 

things that we need to do to put the meat on the bones and——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, but I am not trying to be skeptical. I am trying to raise—I am trying to be realistic, and what I listed was actually feeding back what I heard from your testimony, which I 

thought was very helpful. 

You know, yes, be hopeful but let’s be realistic. Not like we don’t 

have a history here. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Right. No, exactly, and just to boil it down I 

would say is we need very detailed texts and then very good 

verification. 

You know, not only do they have a different definition of 

denuclearization, but when they define the Korean Peninsula, it’s 

anything that influences the peninsula, including our bombers in 

Guam and our submarines and our aircraft carriers. 

So we need to get the terms straight and we need to look at sort 

of the arms control treaties we had to be very, very specific—a very 

detailed contract with someone who has cheated us many times in 

the past. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If the chair would allow the other two witnesses 

to answer and then I yield back my time. 

Mr. YOHO. Go ahead. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. GREEN. So, Representative Connolly, I think you have accurately captured the core points we are all trying to make and that, 

I think, points to the important oversight role Congress should 

have in this and in any negotiation the negotiators help by a good 

cop-bad cop, and there’s a role that could be a bipartisan role for 

this committee and for the Congress, in my view. 

If I could very briefly pick up on Mr. Rohrabacher’s point about 

Ronald Reagan. You know, it was Richard Nixon, a conservative 

Republican, who changed relations with China. There is an argument that we should not dismiss, that any conservative Republican 

President can do this because of the curious politics of it all. 

However, I think there are two lessons from Reagan that would 

be important to remember. 

You know Ronald Reagan went to Reykjavik, having presented 

an absolutely unwavering commitment to human rights and democratic values, and a clear and unchanged, unrivalled, frankly, commitment to our allies. 

When the Soviets deployed SS-20s in Europe and NATO, he went 

right back, toe to toe, with tactical nuclear weapons. If we look for 

the opportunity for a Republican President to do something like 

this with North Korea, it is absolutely essential for President 

Trump to remember what Ronald Reagan did. 

And what we’ve heard so far has not been a Reagan-like commitment to democratic values, to human rights, and to our allies, 

which is an essential backstop precisely because North Korea is 

targeting the U.S.-Korea alliance as the center of gravity they don’t 

49

want to break and China is targeting our alliances as a whole, and 

that’s an important—the Reagan parallel could work. But I think 

those two caveats are absolutely essential to remember. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Denmark, real quick. 

Mr. DENMARK. Yes, sir. I agree that you summarized the points 

that we’ve been making a great deal, and I think—I agree that 

there’s a tremendous role that the Congress has in terms of oversight. 

The one point I would like to add and it feeds into some of the 

discussion that was had earlier but I didn’t have time to in my 

opening statement, one of the key aspects of any negotiation is to 

know what the other guy on the other side of the table wants—

what they’re trying to get out of this negotiation. 

And if you look at everything that Kim Jong-un has done—you 

said earlier that Kim Jong-un may be different from his father or 

his grandfather—since taking power, Kim Jong-un accelerated nuclear testing, accelerated ballistic missile testing. 

If you look at his New Year’s statement from January of this 

year, his version of the State of the Union Address, he embraced 

nuclear weapons, declared the whole program a success and said 

that he wanted to turn toward economic development, but as a nuclear power. 

I have yet to see any indication that Kim Jong-un is looking at 

disarmament or denuclearization. My sense is that he believes he 

wants to be entering into arms controls negotiations the way that 

we were doing in Reykjavik, not denuclearization negotiations, and 

if you have a good sense of right, I strongly recommend that you 

would read the New Year’s address. 

The translation is in English. It’s very clear. He’s looking to engage the world as a nuclear power, and until we have a good understanding of what he’s actually trying to get out of it, these negotiations are going to be difficult to even move a bit forward because 

we have different objections in mind. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Next we’ll go to Ambassador and Congresswoman Ann Wagner 

from Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The U.S. faces two threats in Northeast Asia—North Korea and 

China. My father served in the Korean War and the stalemate in 

the region persists to this day. 

America’s intervention in Korea in 1950 was a strategic success 

in preventing an important buffer region from becoming a zone of 

communist influence and strengthening the United States’ hand in 

the broader Cold War. Cold War is over, but today the North still 

serves as a buffer state for China. 

Rapprochement between the U.S. and North Korea could possibly 

threaten China’s influence over the Kim regime. 

Dr. Green, North Korea is useful to China because it distracts 

and challenges the U.S. and our South Korean alliance. 

At the same time, the Kim regime is vulnerable because of its 

strategic and economic dependency on China. China is North Korea’s real long-term threat, not the United States. 

Do you believe China has an interest, Dr. Green, in our negotiations failing? 

50

Mr. GREEN. You know, I think we don’t get to read about the 

Chinese debate because they don’t have an open vibrant political 

system like we do. 

But I think in Beijing they are as confounded by North Korea as 

we are, in many respects. I think you accurately captured their 

strategic view but there are huge debates within the leadership 

compound in Zhongnanhai, I am sure. 

I think from China’s perspective, the operative approach is not 

today—don’t let North Korea collapse today—don’t have unification 

today—kick this can down the road. 

In 10 years, in 20 years, in 30 years China will be more powerful. It will have more control over North and South Korea. China 

will be in a position to affect unification of a peninsula with no 

American alliance. 

So China has every incentive to lower tensions but also to just 

kick this can down the road, and that’s our problem, and part of 

the solution is our alliances, because China assumes it will be more 

powerful and have more influence over South Korea as time passes. 

But if we are faithful to our allies, if we are strong on trilateral 

defense cooperation with Japan and Korea, if we don’t say we want 

to get out of Korea, if we do all of those things, we signal to China 

that North Korea is making our alliances stronger—thank you very 

much, Beijing—so if you are worried about that, you need to put 

more pressure on your friends in Pyongyang—the game of alliances 

and U.S. and China is an essential part of how we get purchase 

on the——

Mrs. WAGNER. How can the U.S. best manage China’s interests 

as it negotiates with Kim? Because, frankly, kicking the can down 

the road is a negotiation failure at this point in time. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, in the sense that we won’t get a result. It’s a 

success for China and interests converge in North Korea because 

it just sort of prevents the U.S. from taking action. 

Look, we had the Six-Party Talks. They failed to get North Korea 

to denuclearize. I was involved in that at the time. One useful 

thing about it was it got China, Russia, Japan, Korea all around 

the table. They all have equities. Only China, North Korea, U.S., 

and South Korea would be in a peace negotiation to replace armistice. 

We will need a broader diplomatic framework that gets——

Mrs. WAGNER. I am running out of time. 

Mr. Klingner, is it possible to check the growth of Chinese power 

through our negotiations with Kim? Namely, what could we do to 

turn the North into a buffer zone for our own interests? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Well, I think the North Korean-Chinese relationship is strained. It’s more strained now than under the previous 

leaders in North Korea. 

You know, 5,000 years of history and 1,000 invasions or so have 

caused North Korea to have a very suspicious view of its neighbors. 

They see it as a shrimp amongst whales. 

Each of the leaders in North Korea has warned that China is a 

bigger threat to North Korea than the U.S. because of its intent to 

influence North Korea. 

51

So the North Korean nuclear program was a response to feeling 

that both the Soviet Union and China were not going to protect 

North Korea to the degree that they needed. 

So I think North Korea is playing all these countries, all these 

neighbors, off against each other. The thing with the alliances is 

that they are multi-purpose tool, so that they are not only deterring and defending against the North Korean threat but they’re 

also serving to protect not only U.S. and allied interests——

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. I hate to interrupt. 

But Mr. Denmark, we know Kim has been talking with Xi 

Jinping throughout this process. China has lost influence in North 

Korea’s top circles of power. But what role is Xi playing in our negotiations? Do you think China has the ability to influence Kim as 

he enters negotiations with the U.S., and how? 

Mr. DENMARK. I do believe that Xi Jinping has a multiplying effect. I think his primary message from all these meetings that he’s 

been having with Kim Jong-un is to show that China has a critical 

role to play and China will not be bypassed. 

The most important role that China will have in these negotiations will be in maintaining economic pressure. As the Trump administration has said, they want to make sure that North Korea 

remains under significant economic pressure until it makes significant steps toward denuclearization. 

The challenge, of course, is that the vast majority of international trade for North Korea goes through China, and China has, 

in the past, proven inconsistent, you can say, in its willingness to 

engage those sanctions and to enforce those sanctions. 

One of the challenges that we are going to have, going forward, 

is that many in China, as Dr. Green mentioned, many in China increasingly see dynamics on the Korean Peninsula through the lens 

of geopolitical competition with the United States. 

And if China sees progress in some area as being—sees increased 

sanctions, for example, as being an American interest, that may be 

one reason why China may be less willing to enforce some of those 

sanctions, because they see it potentially as helping the United 

States. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. 

My time has expired. I appreciate the chair’s indulgence. I yield 

back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Next we’ll go to Ms. Tulsi Gabbard from Hawaii. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the gentlemen 

for being here and sharing your insights. 

I think there’s been a lot of focus on the geopolitical considerations and impacts of these negotiations. But very little focus on 

the seriousness of the North Korea nuclear threat on the United 

States. 

As the chairman mentioned, I represent Hawaii. Being in the 

middle of the Pacific this is something that is an ever present concern for our residents and people who live in our State. 

The false missile alert that we had in January of this year 

brought things into light that many others really didn’t consider. 

So the seriousness of these talks and this diplomatic path failing, 

very high stakes, and why, I believe it’s important that these talks 

52

happened. Important first step, as everyone has said, clearly lacking in critical details, lacking in written plan of execution on exactly how this will be done. North Korea is still a threat that is 

posed to us. But we all hope for success and want to be supportive 

in that. 

I have a few questions. I am, first of all wondering what your 

thoughts are on should a nuclear agreement come out of these 

talks, what role approval by the House and Senate has, whether 

this should require ratification by the Senate or take a similar 

route as the previous Iran nuclear deal in allowing for congressional disapproval? 

If we are talking about permanent denuclearization being most 

successful, what role do you see Congress playing in that? 

Mr. KLINGNER. I believe that achieving many issues with North 

Korea, not only denuclearization but a potential peace treaty and 

normalization relations, are of such critical importance to the 

United States that it should be a matter for more than just the executive branch. 

I think the legislative branch should be involved. So whether 

that’s a formal treaty or interaction with the executive branch, I 

think it is of such importance, particularly a peace treaty and 

denuclearization. 

Ms. GABBARD. So you don’t see any major difference between 

ratification of the treaty by the Senate versus some other mechanism of approval or disapproval? 

Mr. KLINGNER. I don’t know enough about the mechanics of it—

a Senate ratification versus other means. 

Mr. GREEN. The President had waiver authority in the 18 or so 

pieces of legislation that Trading With the Enemy Act and so 

forth—terrorism—these sanctions give the President a Presidential 

waiver. So legally he can lift sanctions in the process of rewarding 

North Korea for steps toward denuclearization. But the President 

has talked about a peace regime—a peace declaration—a peace 

treaty that would have to be ratified by the Senate. 

If the United States negotiates a normalization that has to be 

ratified, and if there is to be aid for North Korea, it would come 

through the Asia Development Bank, the World Bank, maybe China’s Belt and Road. But Congress would have authorities and control of the budget. 

So bottom line is if this does move forward there’s going to be 

a major congressional role even if the President has national security waiver authority on sanctions, and one way to construct this 

would be, like, the Helsinki process in the Cold War with the Soviet Union to have a broad framework where there are baskets, 

such as economic development, human rights, conventional weapons, and confidence building nuclear weapons and with the aim of 

ultimately moving toward peace treaty ratification denuclearization 

and begin building that process with Congress through hearings 

and so forth to anticipate what Congress would expect. 

I think maybe not in the next month or 2 but early on in the 

process that framework should be set up. 

Ms. GABBARD. Dr. Green, you mentioned earlier, I think, about 

how CVID is an ongoing process. It’s not something that really has 

a hard finish. 

53

A lot has been—I think you all talked about the different types 

of verification measures that would be needed. Can you talk about 

the irreversible part of that acronym and how that can be executed, 

especially given your history in this? 

Mr. GREEN. Well, we never got irreversible, ever, not in the SixParty Talks. 

Ms. GABBARD. Is it possible? 

Mr. GREEN. If the North Koreans turn over fissile material, nuclear weapons, that’s irreversible in the sense that they can’t use 

those anymore. 

But that doesn’t stop them from continuing to spin centrifuges to 

make more uranium-based weapons if we don’t know where all the 

facilities are. 

So the only way to get irreversible really, aside from bits and 

pieces, is full inspections, and the North Koreans have not even let 

us look in the keyhole in the negotiations to date. The first step 

will be a declaration. 

Ms. GABBARD. How do you deal with the nuclear scientists that 

they have? 

Mr. GREEN. Well, you know, Senators Nunn and Lugar have legislation to do this with the Soviets that was—appears to have been 

pretty effective and I saw they both spoke recently and met with 

the President, I understand. 

So that might be a model—the Nunn-Lugar legislation to employ 

scientists and engineers, and it’s also one we suggested to the 

North Koreans in the Six-Party Talks as a way to help compensate 

them, basically, by hiring scientists and engineers for other 

projects. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Next we’ll go to Ms. Dina Titus from Nevada. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all of 

you for testimony. It’s been most interesting. 

I share in your skepticism about this so-called agreement and 

some of the vagueness of the terms—what’s the time and what’s 

the possible verification—what does denuclearization really mean. 

Also, President Trump has been getting a lot of credit for putting 

us in a better position with Korea—than we’ve been in for a while. 

But let us not forget that it was some of his saber rattling and 

his belligerent rhetoric that got us to the kind of a crisis situation—the fire and fury, as you recall. So I don’t think we should 

give the arsonist too much credit for putting out the fire. 

You were talking earlier about, you know, some of the tactics of 

diplomacy and I think language is a very big part of that and the 

language that you use. 

Our President is not a master of the English language, much less 

any other one, and he doesn’t stick to the script or read the teleprompter or take notes or believe in preparing. 

One of the uses of language I thought that might hinder this diplomatic effort is when he used the same language as North Korea 

and China used about the joint military exercises and called them 

provocative. That’s what they have been saying they are. 

54

We have had other reasons for why those exercises took place but 

now just kind of on the spur of the moment he canceled them because they are provocative. 

I wonder if, moving forward in these diplomatic relations, we 

aren’t making a mistake using the same language that our adversaries use as opposed to making our own case. 

Mr. Denmark, would you comment on that? 

Mr. DENMARK. As I said earlier, ma’am, my sense is that these 

exercises are not provocative. They’re defensive. They’re stabilizing. 

They’re legal, which is why I’ve always opposed the so-called freeze 

for freeze proposal that the Chinese made, and I am trying to 

equate some degree of equality between these two. 

But I think, if you take a step back, referring to these exercises 

as provocative really has broader implications than just on the Korean Peninsula. It suggests that these exercises are done to provoke not just North Korea but potentially the exercises that we 

have all around the world can now be pointed to by our adversaries 

as provocative. 

And so I think it has global implications in that way. But at the 

same time, my sense is that it raises the bar for if the President 

decides he wants to reinstate these exercises, wants to do any of 

these major exercises again in Korea, then it allows North Korea, 

it allows China to say, you said that these are provocative—you’re 

only doing these to provoke us—it’s not about readiness—it’s not 

about deterrence—you said it’s about provocation and this is exactly what you’re trying to do. 

So I think by using that language, I agree that languages is absolutely important in diplomacy. My concern is that by using this 

language it helps feed into the arguments that China and North 

Korea have been making for a long time. 

Ms. TITUS. I agree. 

You know, we’ve heard a lot about China and North Korea and 

Japan. There are other players in the area that are going to be affected by this that I think we need to take into account, too. You 

saw Mongolia wanted to host the summit, Singapore, you know, 

India. We need to look at other allies there as we move forward on 

this. 

Also, I would ask you, I am inclined to think that North Korea 

is not going to give up their nuclear weapons because that’s what 

got them to the table. That’s what got the U.S. there, and now they 

want to play on that stage. 

At what point in these negotiations, going forward, do we shift 

our focus from denuclearization to nuclear control or arms control? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Well, going along with the theme of words matter, North Korea defines denuclearization as global arms control, 

and as my colleagues have said it is as a self-professed member of 

the nuclear club, North Korea will say, we’ll go to zero when you 

go to zero. 

So we need to move away from defining or allowing North Korea 

to define the denuclearization, which is a U.N. requirement, in 

North Korean terms of arms control. 

So we need to keep focusing on what is required under numerous 

U.N. resolutions. 

55

Mr. GREEN. I would not bet a lot of money that this is going to 

lead to CVID. If it goes well, then maybe in a year or 2 this committee will be debating the deal we have, and the deal we have is 

probably going to be if it’s—best case scenario, in my view, North 

Korea freezes the Yongbyon plutonium facility or North Korea 

agrees to turn over certain facilities. 

It’s a piece of the program, and then the debate will be how 

much do we lift sanctions—do we normalize relations—do we give 

them economic aid. 

And people can have a reasonable debate about that if we are 

lucky enough to get that far. My own bias would be reward them 

incrementally with humanitarian aid and other things but do not 

normalize or do other things that undermine the credibility of our 

commitment to allies. 

WE should be always remembering, as I said, that there are two 

chess games going on. One is with North Korea but the other one 

is with China, and our critical advantage in both, but especially the 

one with China, is our alliances. 

So let’s not jeopardize our alliances for a partial deal. Let’s pay 

something if we have to, but make sure that our alliances and our 

military readiness and deterrence are intact and, in fact, are getting stronger. 

Mr. DENMARK. I believe that the United States should not drop 

its commitment to denuclearization. That said, I do think that positive progress is positive progress, and if we are able to make a partial deal that improves stability, that reduces the risk of war, that 

would be work to some degree of concessions, although I agree with 

Dr. Green that it is not worth giving everything for a partial deal. 

My sense, as I’ve said before, is that North Korea thinks they’re 

in the mode of arms control negotiations, not denuclearization negotiations. 

And my fear for accepting a partial goal would that be the North 

Koreans would say okay, we got what we wanted—we are going to 

stop here. 

So I think it’s always important to maintain—keep things back 

that they need—that they want in order to continue to have pressure to move forward on negotiations. But, again, positive progress 

is positive progress. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOHO. Next, if you guys can tolerate it, we’ll go back. Not 

that it’s bad, but a second round of questions and I am going to 

let the ranking member start because he’s got to get to another 

meeting. 

Mr. SHERMAN. First, as to—and I will pick up on the gentlelady 

from Hawaii’s point—from a North Korean perspective, for them to 

settle for an agreement that is just with the executive branch 

would show that they’re not paying attention. 

Gaddafi gave up his incipient nuclear program in return for an 

agreement with the executive branch. We all know that Kim Jongun does not want to follow the Libya model. And Iran reached an 

agreement with only the executive branch and then the next head 

of the executive branch abrogated it. 

56

That may not be as important to Iran because they want a relationship with Europe more than they want a relationship with the 

United States. But in North Korea’s circumstance, it would deprive 

them of very much of what they’re negotiating for. 

I would also point out that if we release half the sanctions and 

we get half of what we need in terms of arms limitations rollbacks, 

that’s a much worse deal for us because if you give up half the 

sanctions that’s like you did have your foot on his neck and now 

you lift it most of the way. 

Well, that’s bad for his people, because they won’t enjoy prosperity. But it gives him enough economic clout to survive and to 

make sure that the finest in European luxuries are bestowed upon 

the top 3,000 or 4,000 families in the countries. 

So he doesn’t need all these sanctions released. He only needs 

half of them released to assure everything he cares about. 

I want to ask—and I don’t know which of you is in addition to 

being a foreign policy expert a strategic arms expert—but let’s talk 

first about testing—what do they need to test. 

Have they reached the point where they’ve tested a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb or do they need to do more testing to feel 

that they are capable of creating that? 

Who has an answer? Mr. Denmark. 

Mr. DENMARK. So I can give my sense. I think Bruce has some 

thoughts as well. 

We’ve seen them conduct tests. We don’t get perfect sense of 

what it is. What we saw is a large device. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. 

Mr. DENMARK. When it comes to testing I think the key thought 

is that we should not apply our standards of testing to North 

Korea. We have very high standards of testing for the reliability of 

our missiles, of everything. 

For North Korea, they just need to have the plausible capability. 

They don’t need to test it——

Mr. SHERMAN. So have they reached that plausible capability 

with regard to thermonuclear weapons, even if they agree not to 

test nuclear weapons in the future? 

Mr. DENMARK. My judgment is that they’re probably confident 

enough in order to be able to do it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does any—do either of our other panellists disagree? 

Mr. GREEN. I agree the one technical hurdle they appear not to 

have crossed is the ability for their weapon to reenter the atmosphere without burning up. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. That’s the delivery system. 

Mr. GREEN. But I think they——

Mr. SHERMAN. Now, on delivery systems, keep in mind they can 

have a submarine in a small boat deliver one—not to Chicago but 

to Los Angeles or Honolulu. I guess Las Vegas is safe from that. 

Mr. GREEN. So they’ve achieved an acceptable level of ICBM capability. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So they clearly have proven missile capacity with 

regard to Tokyo and Seoul but they’d need a reentry vehicle to hit 

an inland city in the United States and they haven’t proven that. 

57

Could they—if they were allowed to have a peaceful space program, would that give them all of the excuse necessary to do the 

testing to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles and reentry 

systems? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes. In agreement. They have tested a thermonuclear device, that the size of the seismic event was such that it 

could only have been through a thermonuclear. 

Most assessments are that they have—the missile delivery systems for nuclear weapons against South Korea and Japan. They 

have demonstrated the ICBM that can reach all the way down to 

Florida and beyond. 

The question is since they haven’t demonstrated but that doesn’t 

mean they don’t have a reentry vehicle that would——

Mr. SHERMAN. And they haven’t tested to be sure that they have 

the reentry vehicle, but you can smuggle a nuclear weapon. 

Now, they’re producing a certain number of new nuclear weapons, atomic and thermonuclear, every year. 

At what point will they feel they have the minimum they need 

to defend themselves and will they feel free to sell a nuclear weapon to anybody who’s got a billion or two? 

Mr. Green. Dr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. In March 2003, I was in negotiations in Beijing with 

the North Koreans where they told us that if we didn’t end our hostile policy and give them what they wanted, they would transfer 

their nuclear capability. 

And then you will recall——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, they did transfer the capability to Syria or 

Syria/Iran that Israel destroyed in 2007. 

Mr. GREEN. That’s right. They followed up on that threat. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And they could go forward and—when will they 

have enough weapons so that they feel that they can transfer 

fissile material? 

Mr. GREEN. They have enough weapons probably so that they 

can afford to transfer weapons or fissile material without significantly reducing their own military capability. 

The question is will they be deterred. I think the answer is yes. 

It’s an excellent question because I think the North Koreans will 

put more pressure on us by threatening transfer, and we need to 

have very clear red lines and interdiction capabilities, which is one 

more reason why sanctions have to be vigorously enforced. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So far the Chinese have not agreed that they 

would prohibit nonstop flights between Tehran and Pyongyang. If 

those flights stopped in Beijing for fuel, then they would only carry 

the materials that China agreed to allow. 

But if they go nonstop they’ll have whatever they have on them. 

I believe I’ve gone into overtime. I will yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. I appreciate the second round. 

Let me ask you, in your opinion how much cooperation do you 

feel China has earnestly afforded to this process as far as sanction 

compliance? 

Any thoughts? 

Mr. KLINGNER. I think it has been better than in the past but 

it’s not as much as the U.S. would like. A lot of it, especially from 

58

the outside of government, it’s hard to get information on how 

strictly they have implemented sanctions. 

I think, since the January 2016 nuclear test, China has allowed 

better U.N. resolutions than in the past. I think they have stepped 

up their sanctions enforcement, as they periodically did in the past. 

It seems that this sanctions enforcement is, I think, stronger and 

longer than previous ones. But we also, at the same time, get conflicting reports about economic activity going on near the North Korean border as we even get reports about economic activity being 

restricted. So I——

Mr. YOHO. Does anybody else have a different opinion? 

Mr. GREEN. Just a bit more detail. I understand from international relief organizations that when they try to transfer medicines or other things across the Chinese-North Korean border 

they’re being stopped if there’s any metal of any kind. 

So the Chinese were implementing pretty strictly up until recently. But since the summit was announced, we have Japanese 

photographs of Chinese ships helping transfer oil and so on and so 

forth, and the pattern for China has been they will put economic 

pressure on North Korea to get North Korea to the table, and as 

soon as there’s a process the Chinese back way off and we can see 

that coming with a Xi-Kim dialogue going on right now. That’s 

what we have to watch out for. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, and that was one of my questions I wanted to 

ask you. Do you have any factual information that China relaxed 

the sanctions after the Kim-Xi meetings? 

Mr. Denmark, you were going to say something too? 

Mr. DENMARK. There’s indications that they have dialled it back. 

I would add to what Dr. Green said, that North Korea—excuse me, 

China does reduce economic sanctions enforcement after a meeting. 

They also put pressure on North Korea when they feel it helps 

keep the United States on the diplomatic path. So I actually think 

the Trump administration deserves a great deal of credit for getting the Chinese to enforce sanctions more than they had done before. 

That said, China—my sense is that China is already starting to 

soften its enforcement. My expectation is that they’ll continue to 

soften and my concern, of course, is that the era of maximum pressure is over and we are in different period now than we were before. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes, and I have nightmares of snap back with the 

JCPOA—immediate snap back, which we knew was never going to 

happen. 

But I think this will be different. The thing that—I guess I am 

concerned about is North Korean vessels—since the summit we are 

seeing North Korean vessels transport coal and other minerals 

have been spotted at Chinese harbors. 

Chinese officials have stated that China will continue enforcing 

sanctions but have also suggested lifting U.N. sanctions on North 

Korea following the summit. 

I think this is a huge mistake. This is something that we are 

going to express our concerns here from this committee and the full 

committee. 

59

This is something that has brought us to the table to start the 

negotiations and we cannot back off and I think the President and 

Secretary Pompeo have articulated that very well and we want to 

make sure those tools stay in the arsenal as we talked about before 

this hearing. 

There is the saying—it’s Korean—that says a job begun is a job 

half done. The summit happened. We can’t go further if we didn’t 

start. 

So let’s just hope we have wise leaders, that we have the backbone, I think, or the political willingness to hold people accountable, because this is a historic moment—that if we can bring peace 

to that peninsula, finally, after the end of the Korean conflict, it’ll 

be a historic moment that the world will be better off for that. 

And so let’s just hope with the recommendations that you all 

have afforded us and we appreciate that, that we move in that direction. 

With that, this hearing is concluded, and I appreciate your patience and everybody in the audience being here. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

W ASHTNGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Ted Yoho (R-FL), Chairman 

June 13, 2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

A±Iairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in Room 2172 of the Rayburn 

House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

http:/1\"vww.Foreit.mAffilirs.house.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, June 20,2018 

2:00p.m. 

The Trump-Kim Summit Outcomes and Oversight 

Mr. Bruce Klingner 

Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia 

Asian Studies Center 

The Heritage Foundation 

Michael J. Green, Ph.D. 

Senior Vice President for Asia 

Japan Chair 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Mr. Abraham Denmark 

Director 

Asia Program 

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 

By Direction of the Chairman 
63

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ________ A_s,_·a_m_ul_t_lw_· P_a_:cifi:...1_' _______ HEARING 

Day Wedue.w!rty Date ___ J~a~lt_e_2_0~,_2_0_1_8 __ Room. ___ ~2~1~7~2~---

Sforting Time ---'"2._,:0"0'-'p"''"""--Ending Time 3:40pm 

Re~esses L_to __ ) (_to __ )( __ tu __ ) (_to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to __ ) 

P1·esiding Mcmbcr(s) 

Clwinmm J'Q/tv 

Checl< all oflliefol/owint: tlwt app(v: 

Open Session IZl 

Executi\'c ~sed) Session 0 Televised D 

'1'1TLE OF HEARING: 

J<:lectronicnlly Recoi'Ciw_(tnped) 0 

Stenographic Record U 

11re 1)·ttmp-J(im Summit: Ott/comes and Oversiglil 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rep. Rohmbaclter, Rep. Kinzi11ger, Rep. Pen:1•. Rep. Wagner, Rep. Chabot 

Rep. Sltermtm, Rep. Bem, Rep. Comtolfy, Rep. G"bbnl'd, Rep. Tit11s 

NON-SUDCOMI\IITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an • iftlley are no/members of(tt/1 commillee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attaclml? Yes IZJ Nu D 

(If "no", please list below uml inc/ udt! iille, agency, depurlment, or orguni;wtion.) 

STATEMENTS I<OR 'l'IIIC RECORIJ: (List any statements submilledfor the record.) 

Lei/er sltlmtilledfor 1/ze record- Shemurn 

TIMESCHEDULEDTORECONVENE____ 

01' 

~ d TIME ADJOURNED __ 3_:4_0.cp_n_t_ MJ!V1 

su bc~l1ll1itteQat'fAsso1lltte-
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App~ndix R to thi~ leiter cQnlaim; a list ofNmth Korean banks that are designated by the 

U.S. Treasury Depa1111lent, and that may seek to access our financial system through 

dcccpiivc financial practices. Please describe your plan to hire !he staff described in section 

102(b) of the NKSPEA to enforce our Jaws against those who help North Korean banks 

access !he limmeial "ys!cm. 

Appendix C contains a list of North Korean banks that aru not designated by either the 

tlnited Nations orthe Treasury Depa1·tmenl, btll whieh !he Panel's repml implicated in 

violations oft:.N. s\mctions.1 Please notify us whether you plan to designate tJ1ese b~nks 

linder section 104 ofthe NKSl'EA or seek a waiver under .section 208. 

Appendix D contains a list of Chinese banks that may have provided North Korean banks 

with e~m:s~ondenl banki:1g services since such servi~es were prohibited uuder U.N. 

resolullot.JS. Please de8cnbe your ef[orts to fu.lly enforce the Tre~sory Department 

regulation at 31 C.F.R. § 1010.659 and to ensure strict compliance with their K11ow, YourCusto.mer, i>uspicious Activity reporting, and Anti"Money Laundering compliance 

obligations with respect to these and othcl' North Korcru1 entities ru1d nationals. 

Finally, please provide a list of foreign and domestic financial il1slitulim1s that maintain 

direct or indirect con·cspondent relationships with ~01th Korean banks in violation of U.N. 

resolutions4 and UB. law/ and nfall member states that have failed to expel these banks' 

representatives rvith regard to each of the banks in these appendices, 

We thank you for yom attention to these issues ru1d look furword to your reply. 

Sincerely, 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

2 North Korean banks may not operate foreign branches or joint ventures. UNSCK 2::no, para. 33, 3 See id.; United States v. All Ftmds in theAccm,mts ofBlueS~a Busines:'!: Fund<>, Ltd, -ef al., No. J6-1Y54 

(DXJ., Verified Complaint for Civil Forfeiture, flleu Sept. 26,2016, 

hllpdlwww.ju:;Licc.guv/upa/lik/89705 1/duwnluml). 

'UNSCR 2270, para. 3J. 

'Seo 31 C.F.K. § 1010.569 (2016), 
66


30497f-3.eps

AppenilixA6 

North Korean Banks That Have Been Designated by the United Nations and by the U.S. 

Name 

Bamk ofEasl Land 

Treasury Department 

Also KJlO\Yn AsfFt~quently Known As 

AKA: DongQang Dank, Tong bang Danl;:, Uitedang 

Bank 

Daedong Credit llanlc AKA: DCll Finance I .td.; FKA: Perigrine-Daesong 

Development Bank 

Korea Kwangson llaol<ing Corp FKA: Korea Kwangson Jiinance Company 

Amroggang Development Dank 

: K. ore a Daesong Rank 

Foreign Trade Bunll of the 

O.P.K. ofKorea7 

n/a 

AKA; Daesong Rank, Tae!"ong Rank, Cho:::en 

Taef;ong lJnhaeng 

AKA: Mooyukbattk, Korea Trade Bank 

AppendixB 

Designated 

underV,O 

113551 

· i9Anr20ll 

1:1JH2 

27 hm2Q13 

133~2 

ll J\·t" 2DM 

13382 

23 O.;t2U0!1 

11551 

!8Ncw2DFI 

13382 

JIM~l'2_t\U 

North Korean Banks That are Designated by the U.S. Treasury Department, and Tbat May 

Seck to Access our Financial System Through Deceptive Financial Practices 

,---------------------------------------------

[Name 

Koryo Credit Development 

!Jank 

North Rast.Asia Bank 

Koryo Bani< 

r\.umgang Bank 

Tanchon Commercial !lank 

Rason International 

Commerci~lBank 

Korea United Dcvt:lo:pmcnt 

Bani< 

• AKA/FKA 

fKA: Koryo Global Trust !lank, Koryo-Global Credit 

llank 

n/a 

FKA: Myohyangsan Bank, Myongb.yangsan Bank 

6 U.N. member ~ate::: are ohtigated to freeze the as.sets of these hanks, expel their repres~ntatives, clD&e thetr 

offices, and deny thcrn any financial services. UNSC:R 1718 (200ti), para. S(d); UNSCR 2094, pants. 8 & 11; 

UNSCR 2270, paras. 15 &32; & UNSCR, 2321, para. 3. 

'United States v. Sl,07l.251.44 of l'unds Associated with Mingzheng International, No. l7"0ll66 (DJl.C., 

Verified Complaint for Civil Forfeiture filed June 14, 2017). 
67


30497f-4.eps

North Korean Banks That are 

n/a 

~nra 
68

Æ


30497f-5.eps

Appcllllix D · 

Chinese Banks That J'vlay Have Pmvidcd North Korean Barllcs with Indirect Correspondent 

Banking Services Sinc.e Such Services Were Prohibited Under U.N .. Resolutions, Identified 

in United States v. All Funds in the Accounts of Blue Sea Business }'unds, Ltd., eta!., No. 

I 6-1954 (D.N.l, Verified Complaintfor Civil Folfciturc, filed Sept. 26, 2016) 

• Agricultural Rank of China • China Merchants Bank 

• .Bank of Communications Co. of China • China MJnshell!l, Banking Corporation 

• Bank of Dalian • Guangdong Development Rank 

• Bank of Dandm1g • I-lua Xia Bm1k 

• Bank of Jinzhou • 1 ndus!JiaJ & Commetcial Barile of China 

• China Con~lruution Bank • Shanghai l'udong Development Bank