1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-19-00171-CR

NO. 09-19-00172-CR

________________

JE’QUAYLIN TAYLOR, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. 17-26500, 17-26502

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Je’Quaylin Taylor appeals the trial court’s revocation of his deferred 

adjudication.

1 In four issues on appeal, Taylor argues the trial court erred by not 

considering the entire range of punishment for his offense and by admitting hearsay

testimony in violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of 

1 Appellant is also known as Jequaylin Taylor, Jequaylin Prince Taylor, and 

Jequaylin Lee Andrew Prince.
2

the United States Constitution and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV. For 

the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Background

On January 4, 2017, a Jefferson County Grand Jury indicted Taylor for two 

separate incidents of Aggravated Robbery, both first-degree felonies. See Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2), (b). On July 23, 2018, Taylor pled guilty to both counts. 

Taylor entered into a plea agreement with the State that capped his punishment at 15 

years of incarceration on both cases and provided that Taylor would be granted 

deferred adjudication on both charges. The trial court approved the agreement, 

deferred adjudication in both cases, and ordered that Taylor be placed on 10 years 

of community supervision. One condition of his community supervision required

Taylor to “enter and successfully complete the cognitive and substance abuse 

programs of the Intermediate Sanctions Facility (ISF)[.]”

On January 9, 2019, the State filed a Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated 

Probation in both cases. In March 2019, the trial court held a hearing regarding the 

State’s Motion to Adjudicate. At the hearing, the trial court asked Taylor whether 

the allegation in the State’s motion that he violated his probation by “failing to 

comply with the program guidelines and rules of the Intermediate Sanction Facility” 

was true or not true. Taylor pled “not true” for Count 1 in both cases. At this hearing,
3

the trial court reminded Taylor of the punishment range for his crimes, stating, “I 

just want to make sure you understand that I can revoke your probation and I can 

sentence you anywhere in the range of punishment for those offenses, which is 

between five years and up to 99 years or life.” The trial court then reset the case for 

an evidentiary hearing.

In May 2019, the trial court held the evidentiary hearing regarding the State’s 

motion to revoke unadjudicated probation. During the hearing, a single witness 

testified for the State regarding its allegations. At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial 

court adjudicated Taylor guilty of both Aggravated Robbery charges, made an 

affirmative deadly weapon finding, and sentenced him to 40 years of incarceration 

in the Texas Department of Corrections. Taylor timely appealed.

Issue One

In his first issue, Taylor argues that the trial court erred when it did not 

consider the entire range of punishment for his offenses. Specifically, Taylor argues 

that he was not afforded a “neutral and detached” judge because the trial court 

“refuse[d] to consider the evidence and impose[d] a predetermined punishment.” 

Taylor’s brief directs this Court’s attention to the trial court’s July 2018 comments 

when it initially deferred adjudication.

THE COURT: I’m going to do something here that I really didn’t think 

I was going to do until about right now, and that is I am going to give 

you an opportunity. You may not like it, because it’s probably going to 

be more difficult -- what I’m going to do today is probably more 
4

difficult than me just giving you some time and you go do it. I agree 

with [the defense attorney]. I think sending you to prison could 

potentially make things worse. Now, there may be a time when there’s 

no choice that I have, and there are cases where I feel like there’s no 

choice but to send somebody to prison, whether it makes them better or 

worse or whatever. But because of your age, because you have those 

people right there, that’s why I’m doing this, is because you have 

somewhere to go.

And, so, what I’m going to do -- in Cause No. 26500, I’m going to find 

that you entered your plea of guilty freely and voluntarily. I’m going to 

find sufficient evidence to find you guilty. However, at this time, I’m 

going to defer all proceedings and place you on probation for a period 

of ten years. I’m going to go through what all the requirements of that 

are in a minute.

Cause No. 26502, I’m also going to find that you entered your plea of 

guilty freely and voluntarily, find sufficient evidence to find you guilty, 

and in that case, I’m going to defer all proceedings for a period of ten 

years and place you on probation. The conditions of both of these 

probations are that you will start off your probation by entering and 

successfully completing both phases of I.S.F., the drug treatment phase, 

as well as the cognitive thinking phase. So, I realize you’ve been locked 

up, but sitting in jail waiting on this doesn’t help me feel better about 

sending you to them. So, you’re going to go through both phases. I can 

tell you right now that if you act the way you’ve been acting in jail 

when you’re at I.S.F. and I get one report that you have been

disrespectful to anyone, then that will be a violation of your probation, 

and you’ll never get out to even try the real probation. Do you 

understand what I'm saying?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Once you successfully complete that, because I believe 

that you can -- I believe that you need to listen to what they tell you 

when they visit you, not what anybody else tells you -- then you will be

ordered to live with your parents. You will have a restriction to be living 

in their house at all times. You’re not allowed to spend the night 

anywhere other than their house. You will be ordered to wear a GPS

monitoring device, and you will also be ordered to wear a drug patch at 
5

least for some time until we see how aftercare’s going after I.S.F. so 

that I know what you’re doing, where you are. Other than a job or

school, you will be ordered to house arrest. So, you can go [to] school. 

I hope you do. You’re going to have every opportunity in these cases 

because you don’t have a felony conviction on your record. This is your 

day. This is it. You either take this day and run with it, or you come 

back in this court -- and the reason I gave you a deferred probation is 

partly for you -- but it’s more for me; okay -- to keep those convictions 

off your record, which is great for you. If you successfully complete 

these probations, then the cases are dismissed at the end and you’ll 

never have a felony conviction on your record. So, when I say this is 

your day, I mean it. Like, this is a huge day for you.

Other side to that, though, is I’m -- I did a deferred for me. Because if 

you violate any condition, then I have the whole range of punishment,

and that’s up to 99 years or life in prison. What you did in that store 

deserves prison time. So, this opportunity is for you to take, but if you 

don’t take it and run with it and do everything right from the beginning, 

then you’re going to be back in here and you could be looking at a lot 

more time in prison than what you could have gotten today. No 15-year 

cap. That’s all gone. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am.

Taylor contends that the trial court’s comment that if he violates his probation, he 

will “never get out to even try the real probation[,]” equate to the trial court 

predetermining his sentence before hearing the evidence.

To preserve error for appellate review, a party must present a timely objection 

to the trial court, state the specific grounds for the objection, and obtain a ruling. 

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). But as the Court of Criminal Appeals determined, Rule 33.1 
6

is not absolute. See Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In 

Grado, the Court of Criminal Appeals provided the following guidance in 

determining if waiver applies to the appellant’s complaint. 

The general requirement that a contemporaneous objection must be 

made to preserve error for appeal is firmly established in Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 33.1. But the rule is not absolute. In Marin, we 

held that the general preservation requirement’s application turns on the 

nature of the right allegedly infringed. We separated defendants' rights 

into three categories:

• The first category of rights are those that are “widely considered 

so fundamental to the proper functioning of our adjudicatory 

process . . . that they cannot be forfeited . . . by inaction alone.” 

These are considered “absolute rights.”

• The second category of rights is comprised of rights that are 

“not forfeitable”—they cannot be surrendered by mere inaction, 

but are “waivable” if the waiver is affirmatively, plainly, freely, 

and intelligently made. The trial judge has an independent duty 

to implement these rights absent any request unless there is an 

effective express waiver.

• Finally, the third category of rights are “forfeitable” and must 

be requested by the litigant. Many rights of the criminal 

defendant, including some constitutional rights, are in this 

category and can be forfeited by inaction.

Rule 33.1’s preservation requirements do not apply to rights falling 

within the first two categories. Barring these two narrow exceptions, all 

errors—even constitutional errors—may be forfeited on appeal if an 

appellant failed to object at trial.

Id. at 738–39 (citations and footnotes omitted). Grado specifically decided that the 

right for the trial court to consider the appropriate punishment range falls into the 

second category and are forfeitable only by an “effective waiver[.]” Id. at 743. 
7

Accordingly, although Taylor failed to object at trial regarding the trial court’s

failure to consider the entire punishment range, absent an express waiver, he did not 

waive his objection for review on appeal. See id. 

Our review of the record reveals that Taylor’s complaints lack merit. In the 

absence of a clear showing to the contrary, we presume that the trial court was 

neutral and detached when it assessed the defendant’s punishment and that it

considered the full range of punishment. See Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 645

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Jaenicke v. State, 109 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). Bias is not shown when the trial court makes 

no comments indicating that the court considered less than the full punishment 

range. See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645; see also Banister v. State, 551 S.W.3d 768, 

770 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (no bias by the trial court that “ordered 

a PSI, heard testimony from witnesses, and considered argument of counsel prior to 

sentencing [the appellant]”). 

Here, the record does not support Taylor’s claim that the trial court failed to 

consider the full range of punishment. None of the trial court’s comments reflect 

bias, partiality, or a refusal to consider evidence relevant to punishment or to the full 

range of punishment. See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645. When the trial court made the 

statement of which Taylor complains, it was referring to the ISF program 

specifically and explained that if Taylor failed to comply with the program rules, his 
8

probation would be subject to revocation before he was ever released to live in his 

parents’ home. The revocation hearing’s record reflects that the trial judge heard 

arguments from both the prosecutor and defense counsel before deciding to revoke

Taylor’s community supervision and assess punishment. Notably, the trial court told 

Taylor that if he violated the conditions of his probation, he would be subject to the 

“the whole range of punishment[.]” Compare Banister, 551 S.W.3d at 770, with Ex 

parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449, 456–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining that a 

trial court violated the appellant’s due process rights by a “promise to impose the 

maximum punishment if a prospective probationer fails to abide by the terms of 

probation and then carrying through on that promise[,]” without any evidence in the 

record that contradicts that promise). Because the record does not show that the trial 

court arbitrarily refused to consider the entire range of punishment in assessing 

Taylor’s sentence, we overrule issue one.

Issue Two

In his second issue, Taylor argues the trial court erred when it allowed

inadmissible hearsay testimony from the State. Specifically, Taylor contends the trial 

court erroneously permitted “textbook hearsay” when the prosecution’s only witness 

was allowed to testify “solely based on out-of-court statements provided to him.”

We review a trial court's order revoking probation for abuse of discretion. 

Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). At a revocation 
9

hearing, the State has the burden to establish the alleged violations by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1993). Proof of a violation of a single condition of community supervision is 

sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to revoke. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 

924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Because community supervision 

revocation hearings are judicial proceedings, they are governed by the Texas Rules 

of Evidence. Ex parte Doan, 369 S.W.3d 205, 210, 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 

Accordingly, we address Taylor’s evidentiary issue in the same manner as other 

judicial proceedings. See id. at 212. We review the trial court’s decision to admit or 

exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2002). 

Assuming without deciding that Taylor properly preserved the issue and that 

the trial court erred by admitting the testimony from the witness based on out-ofcourt statements, we consider the issue of harm. “Error in the admission of evidence 

is non-constitutional error subject to a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b)[.]” Jabari 

v. State, 273 S.W.3d 745, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing 

Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1998)). Rule 44.2(b) requires that we disregard the alleged error unless it affected 

Taylor’s substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Hernandez v. State, 176 

S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex. Crim App. 2005). A substantial right is affected when the 
10

alleged error had a substantial, injurious effect or influence on the outcome. See King 

v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

At trial, the State’s sole witness, Steven Pluth, testified about Taylor’s 

participation in the MTC East Texas Treatment Facility. Pluth stated that he is a 

licensed chemical dependency counselor and that he supervises and trains about 35 

people at the facility. Pluth described his facility and Taylor’s initial orientation into 

the facility. Although not admitted into the record, the transcript shows that when 

questioned about Taylor’s infractions at the facility, he referenced a document, 

referred to by the State as “paperwork[.]” The defense objected to this as hearsay,

and the trial court sustained the objection. The State then asked Pluth for any 

infractions by Taylor of which he had personal knowledge. Pluth stated that Taylor 

violated “major Rule No. 1, . . . no disrespect to staff.” The defense objected again, 

which the trial court overruled. Pluth explained that he was reading from a 

“chronological summary” he prepared listing all of Taylor’s disciplinary actions that 

he considered in deciding whether to give Taylor a thirty-day extension or a program 

removal. At each point, the trial court overruled the defense’s continued objections. 

The defense eventually asked for and was granted a running objection regarding 

Pluth’s testimony from the document.

Regardless of whether Taylor’s testimony from the document was hearsay, 

there was no harm shown by the testimony. After overruling the defense’s objection, 
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the trial court noted that all of the violations were “lined out” in the presentence

investigation report presented to the trial court. Taylor did not object to the trial 

court’s consideration of the presentencing report. The Court of Criminal Appeals has 

made clear that a trial court can consider the presentencing report when assessing 

punishment, including hearsay in a PSI, because the Rules of Evidence do not apply 

to PSI’s contents. See Fryer v. State, 68 S.W.3d 628, 631–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002). This rendered harmless the complained-of testimony from Pluth while 

referencing the document. See Mayes v State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1991) (stating that any objectionable testimony was harmless because “substantially 

the same evidence” was admitted elsewhere without objection); see also Merritt v. 

State, 529 S.W.3d 549, 556 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). For 

these reasons, we conclude that Taylor’s substantial rights were unaffected by the 

trial court’s consideration of Pluth’s testimony as the presentencing report contained 

the same information, which the trial court is authorized to consider in assessing 

punishment. See Fryer, 68 S.W.3d at 631–32. We overrule Taylor’s second issue on 

appeal. 

Issue three

Taylor argues in his third issue that the trial court violated his rights to 

confrontation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. 

Const. amend. XIV. Specifically, Taylor asserts that his “due process rights to 
12

confrontation” were violated when Pluth was allowed to testify from the complained 

of document. He argues that Pluth had no personal knowledge of the evidence 

presented.

We must first address whether Taylor’s complaints were properly preserved 

for appellate review. Preservation of error is systemic and must be reviewed by a 

court of appeals, even when the issue is not raised by the parties. Bekendam v. State, 

441 S.W.3d 295, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). To preserve a complaint for appeal, a 

party must make a timely, specific objection to the alleged error and obtain a ruling. 

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 463–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009). A party must “‘let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is 

entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time 

when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it.’” Pena, 285 

S.W.3d at 464 (quoting Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1992)). Moreover, whether a party’s complaint is preserved is contingent upon 

whether the complaint on appeal comports with the complaint made at trial. Id.

Potential constitutional violations are not immune from waiver if the party does not 

object at trial. Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. Crim App. 1990).

Our review of the record shows that although Taylor initially objected to 

Pluth’s testimony as hearsay, he clarified his objection and stated that he was 

objecting to the testimony as hearsay and as “a confrontation clause” objection.
13

When the trial court overruled his objection, defense counsel then asked for a 

running objection stating that “I suppose, your Honor, more specifically, the 

objection I’m making is, yes, the Court has it and the parties have all been furnished 

this but it’s still hearsay. It’s a confrontation issue, it’s a 6th Amendment issue.” 

Taylor again clarified his objection as a Confrontation Clause issue under the Sixth 

Amendment. The record does not show that he made a Due Process argument under 

the Fourteenth Amendment when he objected to Pluth’s testimony or the document 

Pluth used during his testimony.

It is well established that, in order to preserve an issue for appeal, a 

timely objection must be made that states the specific ground [for the]

objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context. A 

general or imprecise objection may be sufficient to preserve error for 

appeal, but only if the legal basis for the objection is obvious to the 

court and to opposing counsel. When the objection is not specific and 

the legal basis is not obvious, it does not serve the purpose of the 

contemporaneous-objection rule for an appellate court to reach the 

merits of a forfeitable issue that is essentially raised for the first time 

on appeal.

Buchanan v. State, 207 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (internal citations 

omitted); see also Schultze v. State, 177 S.W.3d 26, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (noting that “an objection stating one legal basis may not be 

used to support a different legal theory on appeal”). 

Ultimately, Taylor’s objections at trial were different from the constitutional 

challenge before us today, and he has failed to preserve his constitutional challenge 

of a due process violation for review. See Rogers v. State, 640 S.W.2d 248, 265 (Tex. 
14

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (op. on State’s first motion for reh’g) (holding that 

when appellant failed to voice his due process objection he waived his complaint in 

the revocation hearing); see also Shah v. State, 403 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (holding that failing to object waives the 

appellant’s due process argument); see also Tex. R. App. 33.1. Therefore, we 

overrule Taylor’s third issue.

Issue Four

In his final issue, Taylor argues that the trial court violated his Sixth 

Amendment right under the Confrontation Clause when it allowed Pluth to testify to 

testimonial hearsay from a document not admitted in evidence. See U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. Before reaching the merits of Taylor’s argument, we must decide 

whether the Confrontation Clause is applicable to a revocation of community 

supervision hearing.

In Ex parte Doan, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that a revocation 

hearing is a judicial proceeding governed by the same rules that govern other judicial 

proceedings, as opposed to an administrative hearing. 369 S.W.3d at 215. Doan did 

not decide whether the Confrontation Clause applies to revocation proceedings, and 

the Court of Criminal Appeals has not expressly stated in a post-Doan opinion 

whether the Confrontation Clause applies to revocation proceedings. As the Twelfth 

Court of Appeals explained, since Doan did not expressly address whether or not the 
15

Confrontation Clause applies in a probation revocation proceeding, several of our 

sister courts, in addressing this issue, have either decided that the Confrontation 

Clause did not apply or have assumed its application without expressly deciding it. 

See Sabella v. State, 578 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d)

(explaining the history of pre- and post-Doan analysis by the Court of Criminal 

Appeals and intermediate courts of appeals). 

We note that our own court has established precedent on this issue, explaining 

in Smart v. State, that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to revocation 

proceedings. 153 S.W.3d 118, 120–21 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. ref’d). 

Smart was decided before Doan but has not been expressly overruled by the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals. In Smart, this Court based its decision largely on its

review and analysis of United States Supreme Court cases and federal cases that held 

community supervision is not a stage of a criminal prosecution. See id.; see also 

Pickens v. State, No. 02-17-00050-CR, 2018 WL 3468359, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth July 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (analyzing 

Smart in a post Doan analysis and concluding Smart was largely based on our review 

of federal case law that a revocation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution). We 

noted in Smart that the United States Supreme Court held that the revocation process 

should be flexible to consider evidence not admissible in a criminal trial. Smart, 153

S.W.3d at 120–21 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). While the Texas 
16

Court of Criminal Appeals expressly stated in Doan that a revocation proceeding is 

a judicial proceeding with judicial processes, the Doan court did not expressly

equate the revocation of community supervision to a criminal prosecution. See

generally Doan, 369 S.W.3d 205. The Texarkana Court of Appeals declined to apply 

the Confrontation Clause to a revocation proceeding explaining that it did not find 

any case law expressly applying the Confrontation Clause to revocation proceedings. 

Sabella, 578 S.W.3d at 142. And while unpublished opinions offer no precedential 

value to the court, we find it persuasive that several of our sister courts have declined 

to apply the Confrontation Clause to revocation proceedings. See Hodges v. State, 

No. 04-19-00382-CR, 2020 WL 1930485, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 22, 

2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Corona v. State, No. 14-

17-00821-CR, 2019 WL 1768598, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 

2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Anthony v. State, No. 13-

17-0327-CR, 2019 WL 639492, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 15, 2019, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication); Pickins, 2018 WL 3468359, at *4; 

Roberts v. State, No. 05-16-00338-CR, 2017 WL 461354, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Jan. 24, 2017, pet. dism’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); 

Alvarez v. State, No. 11-13-00322-CR, 2015 WL 6121359, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Eastland Oct. 15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); but see 

Blackman v. State, Nos. 01-12-00525-CR, 01-12-00526-CR, 2014 WL 50804 at *2–
17

3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 7, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication) (noting that Smart along with other pre-Doan cases were disavowed 

by Doan for holding that a community supervision revocation hearing was merely 

an administrative hearing, but noting that Doan did not address whether the 

Confrontation Clause applies to community revocation proceedings). More recently 

after Smart, in an unpublished opinion, this Court stated the following about the 

Confrontation Clause and revocation proceedings:

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all 

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” A Crawford challenge 

under the Sixth Amendment “is not directly applicable in [a] revocation 

proceeding.” The Court of Criminal Appeals has held “that when a 

[presentencing investigation] is used in a non-capital case in which the 

defendant has elected to have the judge determine sentencing, 

Crawford does not apply.” In any event, the record does not reflect that 

the trial court, in assessing the sentences, considered the “proffer” as 

evidence in assessing the sentences.

Keller v. State, Nos. 09-11-00441-CR, 09-11-00442-CR, 09-11-00443-CR, 2012 

WL 2150348, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (citations and footnotes omitted).

Agreeing with the overwhelming weight of authority, therefore, we conclude 

that a community supervision revocation proceeding, while a judicial proceeding, is 

not a stage of a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause is 

inapplicable in those proceedings, and we decline to extend the application of the 
18

Confrontation Clause to community supervision revocation proceedings. We 

overrule Taylor’s final issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled all of Taylor’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgments

of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

 ________________________________

 CHARLES KREGER 

 Justice

 

Submitted on August 7, 2020

Opinion Delivered November 4, 2020

Do Not Publish 

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger, and Johnson, JJ.