1 Michael J. Astrue has been appointed to serve as Commissioner of Social Security and is substituted as the appell ee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).

2 The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________
No. 05-4409

___________ Denise L. Miller, *

* Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western * District of Missouri. Michael J. Astrue, 1 Commissioner * of the Social Security Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED]

* Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: May 4, 2007 Filed: May 18, 2007

___________ Before COLLOTON, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________
PER CURIAM.

Denise L. Miller appeals the district court’s 2 order affirming the denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemen tal security income. In her October 2002 application, Miller alleged disability due to an Octobe r 2001 back injury. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that (1) Miller’s impairments-2- of fibromyalgia and lumbar-spine-fracture re siduals were severe, but did not meet or equal a listed impairment; (2 ) her alleged affective and anxiety disorders had no more than de minimis effect on her ability to wo rk and were non-severe; (3) her statements concerning her impairments and their impact on her ability to work were not entirely credible; (4) she had the residual functiona l capacity (RFC) to perform a wide range of sedentary work; (5) she c ould perform her past relevant work of order clerk; and (6) she also could perform the alternative jobs of photo finisher and wire patcher, which existed in significant numbers in th e local and national economy. After the Appeals Council denied review, the district court affirmed in an order and judgment entered on August 9, 2005.

As a threshold matter, we find thatalthough Miller’s D ecember 9, 2005 notice of appeal (NOA) was untimely, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), (5), her appeal is timely based on a pro se letter that she filed in th e district court on Oct ober 7, in which she asked for more time to file her appeal, st ating that “the 60 days are up Oct 8.” We believe that this filing sufficiently manifest ed Miller’s intent to appeal, and referred to the district court’s August 9 entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) (NOA content requirements); Becker v. Montgomery , 532 U.S. 757, 767 (2001) (“imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from whatjudgment, to which appellate court”);
Pierson v. Dormire , No. 06-2545, 2007 WL 984104, at *6 (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 2007) (reaffirming that letters a ddressed to judge within prescribed time which manifest intent to appeal are su fficient to constitute NOA); Isert v. Ford Motor Co. , 461 F.3d 756, 762-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases and discussing circumstances in which courts of appeals construed extension motion as NOA).

Turning to the merits, we reject M iller’s contention that the ALJ wrongly discredited the opinion of Dr. Yvonne Agiu s, a general practitioner who completed an RFC assessment which essentially asse ssed Miller as being unable to pursue gainful employment. The ALJ properly di scounted the RFC assessment after finding that it did not reference clinical findings or otherwise explain its basis, and that it was-3- inconsistent with Mille r’s reported activities. See Johnson v. Apfel , 240 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ may reject conclusi ons of any medical expert if they are inconsistent with record as a whole); Kelley v. Callahan , 133 F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir. 1998) (treating physician’s opinion is entitle d to substantial weight, but is not conclusive and must be supported by clinical or diagnostic data); Thomas v. Sullivan
, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991) (when trea ting physician’s statement consists of only conclusory statements, it is not entitled to greater weight than any other physician’s opinion).

We also conclude the AL J properly discounted Miller’s assertion that she was unable to work because of fibromyalgiaand back pain. The ALJ’s finding is supported by his consideration of Miller’s daily activities, the ALJ’s personal observations, an examining physician’s repor t of Miller’s “questionable effort” and lack of participation in his examination, th e lack of aggressive medical treatment, the inconsistency of Miller’s assertions with the objective medical evidence, and her sporadic work history. See Lowe v. Apfel , 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2000) (if adequately explained and supported, credib ility findings are for ALJ to make). We further find the hypothetical to the VE thatwas adopted by the ALJ, which was more restrictive than the consulting doctor’s RFC assessment, included all of the impairments that the ALJ found to be substantiated by the record. See Johnson , 240 F.3d at 1148 (ALJ may exclude alleged impairments he has properly rejected as untrue or unsubstantiated). Finally, we decline to consider the new evidence that Miller has submitted to this court, which does not appear to help her in any event. Cf. Jones v. Callahan , 122 F.3d 1148, 1154 (8th Cir. 1997) (d istrict court’s consideration of evidence outside record before Commissi oner is generally precluded; remand is warranted only upon showing that new evidence is material, i.e., non-cumulative, relevant, and probative of claimant’s cond ition for time period for which benefits were denied).

Accordingly, we affirm.

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