RESpoNSETO E 

LOMAPRiETA 

~ 

I 

' I 

JANET A. McDoNNEll 
RESPONSE TO THE 

LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE 

by 

Janet A. McDonnell 

Office of History 

United States Army Corps of Engineers 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

1993 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISBN 0-16-041730-9 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

McDonnell, Janet A., 1952-

Response to the Lorna Prieta earthquake/ Janet A. McDonnell. 

p. em. 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

1. Emergency management-California-San Francisco Bay Region. 

2. Emergency management-California-Lorna Prieta. 3. Disaster relief 

-California-San Francisco Bay Region. 4. Disaster relief-CaliforniaLorna Prieta. 5. Earthquakes-California-San Francisco Bay Region. 

6. Earthquakes-California-Lorna Prieta. 7. United States. Army. Corps 

of Engineers. I. Title. 

HV551.4.C2M35 1993 

363.3'495'097956-dc20 92-25138 

CIP 

EP 870-1-44 
Foreword 

The circumstances surrounding the Lorna Prieta earthquake in California in the fall of 1989 were unique. Yet the 

threat of further earthquakes is constant. There are valuable 

lessons to be learned from the Lorna Prieta disaster that have 

much broader application and underscore the importance of 

the Corps' readiness mission. 

Historian Janet McDonnell has sifted through hundreds 

of documents and conducted scores of interviews to tell the 

story of the Corps' response and the specific missions it performed for FEMA and other agencies. Her analysis has led 

to several important conclusions. One is that the Corps is a 

versatile organization that has tremendous capabilities and 

can take on missions quickly and execute them extremely 

well. Dr. McDonnell has also raised several questions that 

the Corps must resolve for the future. 

Our intent in publishing this manuscript is to give the 

Corps' leadership and team members who have been or 

might be involved in emergency planning and operations the 

benefit of Dr. McDonnell's analysis and conclusions. 

WILLIAM D. BROWN 

Colonel, Corps of Engineers 

Chief of Staff 

111 
The Author 

Janet A. McDonnell is a senior historian with the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. She received her Ph.D. from 

Marquette University. Dr. McDonnell has published The 

Dispossession of the American Indian: Indian Land Policy, 

1887-1934 as well as several articles on Indian land policy. 

Her most recent publication is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. 

She is currently writing a history of the Corps' support 

of U.S. forces during the Gulf War and a history of the 

Army's role in the reconstruction of Kuwait. 

lV 
Introduction 

In September and October of 1989, the United States 

experienced two of the worst natural disasters in its history: 

Hurricane Hugo and the Lorna Prieta earthquake. The 

dramatic story of the earthquake response must be placed 

against the backdrop of Hurricane Hugo. Hugo, one of 

the most devastating and costly hurricanes to affect the 

United States, began pounding the Virgin Islands on 

17 September 1989 with winds exceeding 140 miles an hour. 

After cro~sing St. Croix and Puerto Rico, it ravaged the 

Carolinas. While the nation was still reeling from the storm 

on 17 October 1989, the Lorna Prieta earthquake struck 

northern California. 

The Lorna Prieta earthquake touched the lives of10 times 

the number of people affected in an "average" disaster to 

which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

responds, and federal outlay for the earthquake was 20 to 

30 times the norm. In addition, the earthquake occurred 

3,000 miles from the resources assembled to respond to 

Hurricane Hugo. 

Federal, state, and local agencies faced severe challenges 

as they struggled to provide essential services and supplies 

for the disaster victims in California. The state and local 

governments, which have primary responsibility for disaster 

response, were quickly overwhelmed; and the resources of 

many federal agencies were brought to bear. The Department 

of Defense and the Corps of Engineers responded quickly and 

aggressively. The Corps not only performed its traditional role 

of conducting damage surveys and administering contracts 

as it had after Hurricane Hugo, it also took on new missions 

such as inspecting private homes for damage and delivering 

rental assistance checks. 

The Corps' response to the Lorna Prieta earthquake revealed both strengths and weaknesses and provided valuable 

lessons for the future. This manuscript traces the Corps' early 

response and its efforts to set up an effective organizational 

v 
structure. It then describes and evaluates the specific missions that the Corps performed for FEMA and other agencies. 

The focus of this manuscript is on Corps operations rather 

than policy making and implementation at the headquarters 

level of the Department of the Army or within the Department of Defense. The manuscript does not deal with broader 

issues of the Department of Defense and the Department of 

the Army involvement and their organizational structuresuch as the roles of the Director of Military Support and the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, 

and Environment and the relationship of each to the Corps. 

Nor does this manuscript deal at length with the role and 

responsibilities of the disaster control officer who coordinated 

all Department of Defense support with FEMA officials on 

site. Further study of the earthquake response focusing on 

the larger policy issues and structure of the Department of 

the Army and the Department of Defense involvement awaits 

the work of another historian. 

JANET A. McDONNELL 

VI 
Acknowledgments 

Many individuals contributed to this Lorna Prieta history. 

Robert Fletcher, who was chief of the Readiness Branch at 

the Corps of Engineers headquarters at the time, initiated 

the project and consistently supported it. 

Edward Hecker, Don Masters, and other members of the 

South Pacific Division emergency management staff graciously shared their time and their records. Frank Rezac 

and Cindy Fergis from the division's public affairs office 

provided the photographs. 

William Baldwin of the Corps' Office of History read the 

manuscript and offered valuable insights. Kathy Richardson 

and Marilyn Hunter provided editorial expertise. 

I am most grateful, however, to Major General John Sobke 

and other individuals I interviewed for sharing their knowledge and insights so that we can learn from the Lorna Prieta 

expenence. 

Janet McDonnell 

.. Vll 
Contents 

Page 

Foreword .................................... Ill 

The Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1v 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vn 

Initial Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

Department of Defense Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 

Corps of Engineers Early Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 

Preliminary Damage Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 

Individual Assistance Mission ...... : . . . . . . . . . . . 27 

Public Assistance Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

Direct Federal Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 

Technical Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 

Work for Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 

Other Corps Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

People Interviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 

Illustrations 

Diagram of Lorna Prieta earthquake 

Damage in the Marina district ................. . 

Destroyed building in Marina district ........... . 

Map of major disaster area .................... . 

IX 

1 

2 

3 

5 
Page 

Collapsed section of the Bay Bridge 16 

Habitability inspection in Oakland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 

Damage inspection in Watsonville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 

Pacific Garden Mall in Santa Cruz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 

LTG Henry Hatch and Corps inspectors . . . . . . . . . . 45 

Berkeley Marina dredging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 

Collapsed two-tiered I-880 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 

Fracture in the Pajaro River levee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 

Damage to the San Lorenzo River levee . . . . . . . . . . 64 

X 
RESPONSE TO THE 

LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE 
Initial Response 

At 5:04 P.M. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on Tuesday, 

17 October 1989, while many San Franciscans gathered 

at Candlestick Park to watch the third game of the World 

Series, the San Francisco Bay area was shaken by an earthquake that registered 7.1 on the Richter scale. Its epicenter 

was roughly 10 miles east-northeast of Santa Cruz and 

60 miles southeast of San Francisco, near the 3,800-foot-high 

Lorna Prieta Mountain. (Lorna Prieta is a Spanish name for 

Dark Hill. 1) The earthquake was the most damaging in the 

United States in the past 80 years. It shot tremors as far 

south as Los Angeles and as far north as the California/ 

Oregon state line. Although the earthquake lasted only 

15 seconds, it killed 62 people, injured 2,435 others, and left 

thousands homeless. The estimated material loss reached 

$7 billion. Over 14,000 residents in seven counties were forced 

into shelters for the homeless.2 

Of the 62 deaths, 42 resulted from the collapse of the 

two-tiered Cypress Street structure of 1-880. Six deaths 

EARTHQUAKE 

ORIGIN 

The Loma Prieta earthquake began 11.5 miles underground 17 October 1989. 
2 Lorna Prieta Earthquake 

occurred in San Francisco when an uru·einforced masonry 

brick wall fell on the occupants of adjacent cars. Four deaths 

in the Marina district were caused by building collapse and 

fire, and four occw-red in Santa Cruz when several buildings 

in the Pacific Garden Mall collapsed. Six more deaths were 

related to the earthquake. Most of the structural damage 

was to unreinforced masonry commercial and residential 

buildings and to older wood frame homes and apartments. 

Two-tiered freeways were particularly vulnerable; sections of 

l-480 (the Embarcadero Freeway) and I-880 (Cypress Street) 

all sustained major damage. The most serious destruction in 

San Francisco occun·ed in the fashionable Marina district 

where homes were damaged by failed foundations or ensuing 

fire. Whole blocks would have to be torn down and rebuilt.3 

The most heavlly damaged section of San Francisco was the Marina district 

wh~re four people died. 

Hundreds of people in San Francisco slept outside that 

first night because they were either homeless or feared their 

homes would collapse. By first light on 18 October, weary 

work crews struggled to restore electricity, telephone service, 

and gas lines. Subway and trolley service resumed by midday. Nearby communities sent water and fuel to keep emergency generators going. 
Initial Response 3 

A destroyed building crushes a car in San Franci.sco's Marina district. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 

created in 1979 to consolidate the various federal emergency 

programs, is the lead federal agency in responding to disasters. Within an hour of the earthquake, Grant C. Peterson, 

FEMA's associate director for state and local programs who 

had been serving as acting director since June, had assembled 

a crisis management staff of 40 to 50 people and alerted the 

26 member agencies of the Plan for Federal Response to a 

Catastrophic Earthquake. 4 

Under the 1988 Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief 

and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 100-707), as 

amended, the federal government assists state and local 

governments in preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. 

After the President declares a disaster, FEMA supplements 

the efforts and resources of state and local governments and 

voluntary relief agencies. Emergency management has four 

phases: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. 

• In the preparedness phase, state and local governments 

develop emergency plans and conduct training and 

exercises. 

• In the response phase, local, state, federal, and voluntary relief agencies provide food, shelter, and emergency 
4 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

power. FEMA does not maintain a stockpile of material 

resources but can direct other federal agencies to provide staff, equipment, supplies, and other resources. 

• During the recovery phase, FEMA provides grants and 

loans to repair homes and public facilities. 

• Hazard mitigation involves finding methods to reduce 

risks to life and property in the future. 5 

Within hours of the earthquake, FEMA opened an 

emergency information and coordination center in Washington, DC. Late Tuesday night, FEMA officials convened 

a meeting of the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group 

at the center. Representatives from the departments of 

Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, 

Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; Environmental Protection Agency; General Services Administration; 

Federal Aviation Administration; National Communications 

Systems; and the American Red Cross met to discuss the 

situation and to identify requirements for federal assistance 

to supplement state and local efforts. John P. Elmore, chief 

of the Operations, Construction, and Readiness Division, 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE), 

represented the Corps. 

A representative from the governor of California's office 

also attended the meeting in Washington. The Catastrophic 

Disaster Response Group placed a conference call to state 

emergency officials in Sacramento, who indicated that the 

state was still assessing damage and had thus far been able 

to meet the requests for assistance from local governments. 

When queried by the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group, 

state officials recommended against activating the federal 

earthquake plan. These officials believed the state could 

handle the situation and thought that federal agencies would 

not need the authority provided in the plan.6 

Once the Plan for Federal Response to a Catastrophic 

Earthquake is activated, federal agencies have automatic 

authority to obligate funds from the Disaster Relief Fund in 

coordination with state counterpart agencies. Although the 

plan was not activated in its entirety and federal agencies 

were not given this authority to obligate funds, federal officials decided to organize federal agencies along the lines of 
Initial Response 5 

the 11 emergency support functions (ESFs) described in the 

plan. Under the plan, the Corps of Engineers is responsible 

for ESF # 3, construction management (now public works 

and engineering). 7 

In those first frantic hours, as the Catastrophic Disaster 

Response Group assembled, the White House quickly mobilized government resources. Stung by criticism of its Hurricane Hugo relief efforts, the White House was anxious to 

demonstrate its responsiveness and compassion. Following 

Hurricane Hugo, critics had charged FEMA with failing to 

put enough resources in place and taking weeks to set up 

disaster application centers in some counties and even longer 

to distribute emergency relief checks. President Bush, who 

had staunchly defended FEMA in the aftermath of Hurricane 

Hugo, visited FEMA headquarters the morning after the 

earthquake and directed Chief of Staff John Sununu to 

oversee the earthquake relief effort. He also dispatched 

Vice President Dan Quayle and Transportation Secretary 

San 

Francisco 

San 

Mateo 

The Loma Prieta earthquake created a seven-county major disaster area 

in California. Three northern counties were added later. 
6 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Samuel K. Skinner to the bay area and visited the area 

himself two days after the earthquake. 8 

Early on 18 October, at the request of Acting Governor 

Leo T. McCarthy, Bush declared a major disaster in California under the Stafford Act, making seven counties in the 

bay area eligible for federal disaster aid money. He authorized FEMA to provide individual assistance and public 

assistance in Alameda, Monterey, San Benito, San Mateo, 

Santa Clara, and Santa Cruz counties, and in San Francisco. 

By law, federal funds were to supplement state and local 

funds, not replace them. Under the Stafford Act, public assistance was limited to 75 percent of the total eligible costs. 

Tommie C. Hamner, director of FEMA Region IX headquarters in San Francisco, became the designated federal 

coordinating officer. Subsequently, federal authorities declared 

the counties of Contra Costa, Marin, and Solano and the cities 

of Isleton and Tracy part of the disaster area. 9 
Department of Defense Response 

The Department of Defense responded to the earthquake 

even before the disaster declaration. Defense Secretary 

Richard Cheney activated the Directorate of Military Support 

(DOMS), a group of officers in the Pentagon who coordinate 

the military's response to a civilian disaster. The Secretary 

of the Army-the Defense Department's executive agent for 

support to FEMA during a disaster-advised the director of 

military support, Major General James D. Smith, to activate 

a joint task force to coordinate, manage, and task all Department of Defense support to FEMA. Army officials initiated 

a DOMS crisis response cell in the Army Operations Center 

at 9:15P.M. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on 17 October. The 

DOMS crisis response cell alerted all nearby Army, Navy, 

and Air Force aviation (helicopter), engineer, and medical 

units to be ready to provide support. A full joint task force 

met for the first time at 7:00 A.M. the next morning. The 

Secretary of the Army directed the commanders of the major 

military commands to coordinate Department of Defense 

disaster assistance in their respective geographical areas of 

responsibility. The commander of the U.S. Army Forces 

Command (FORSCOM) was designated as the supported commander and all other Department of Defense commandersin-chief were designated supporting commanders.10 

General Smith sent an execution order to FORSCOM 

indicating that because the President had signed a disaster 

declaration, Department of Defense could use its resources 

on both public and private lands to perform work that the 

FEMA federal coordinating officer requested. He directed 

FORSCOM to plan for and conduct disaster support operations in the areas of responsibility. FORSCOM would appoint 

a Department of Defense military representative as a disaster 

control officer. As the single point of contact for the federal 

coordinating officer, this person would coordinate all FEMA 

mission assignments for military assistance. The FORSCOM 

commander designated Major General Todd P. Graham, 
8 Lorna Prieta Earthquake 

deputy commander of Sixth Army, as the disaster control 

officer for the earthquake.ll 

Sixth Army, headquartered in the Presidio overlooking 

San Francisco Bay, spearheaded the Army's response. The 

commanding general of Sixth Army is responsible for responding to federal disasters in 12 western states. As regional 

Department of Defense executive agent, Sixth Army's responsibilities included the urban search and rescue mission (ESF 

# 9) if required. When the tremors began, Colonel Albert E. 

Carlson, the deputy chief of staff for operations at Sixth Army, 

hurried down the stairs to the emergency operations center 

(EOC) in the basement of the headquarters building. The 

center, already fully staffed and operational because it was 

participating in a mobilization exercise, shifted its efforts from 

running the exercise to handling earthquake requests.12 

Within minutes, Sixth Army staff reestablished telephone 

communications and began calling in additional critical personnel. A Sixth Army liaison was already en route to the 

California Office of Emergency Services (OES) in Sacramento. 

Navy and Air Force liaisons were already present in the 

emergency operations center and other liaisons would arrive 

later. Carlson observed that if Sixth Army staff had not been 

in the midst of an exercise, it would not have been as proficient as it was. He acknowledged some glitches in the response that would have been more difficult to smooth out if 

the right people had not been there for the exercise. 

Carlson and his staff soon were joined by Tommie Hamner, 

who was locked out of his own headquarters building across 

the parade grounds at the Presidio. Sixth Army temporarily 

provided Hamner with a desk and phone so he could begin 

his operations.13 

Sixth Army geared up for its urban search and rescue 

mission. Its fire trucks were among the first on the scene in 

the Marina district. Sixth Army also sent military police to 

help civilian police direct traffic so they could get the fire 

trucks through. Nine military police from the Presidio immediately assisted with local traffic control, while other 

military police provided support to urban search and rescue. 

The Presidio furnished bedding and light sets to the city of 

San Francisco. Sixth Army compiled lists of available disaster 

assistance equipment from all military services and later 
Department of Defense Response 9 

deployed three people to FEMA's disaster field office as logistical liaisons. It provided six helicopters and two fixed-wing 

aircraft to provide airlift assistance, which included special 

missions for the Corps of Engineers. By 30 October, over 800 

active duty Army soldiers had participated in disaster relief 

operations. 14 

Other services, particularly the Navy and Marines, also 

played key roles in the response effort. Navy ships in San 

Francisco Bay helped fight fires in the city and supplied 

heavy equipment to aid in rescue efforts on collapsed freeways in Oakland. The USS Lang, moored in San Francisco 

Harbor, provided steam services for power generation to the 

city utility company. The USS Gray, also in the harbor, provided electrical services to Pacific Gas and Electric to support damage control in the Marina district. The USS Kansas 

City and USS Flint were also in San Francisco Bay with 

helicopter detachments on standby. The USS Texas provided 

communications coordination for the bay area. 

Personnel from the Treasure Island Naval Station helped 

evacuate people from the Oakland Bay Bridge and provided 

emergency food and shelter for people trapped on the bridge. 

Alameda Naval Air Station provided construction battalion 

personnel and equipment to support rescue operations on 

the collapsed section of I-880.15 On 20 October, the Pelilieu 

traveled to San Francisco Bay to assist in the recovery. 

The Marine Air Group 42, stationed at the Alameda Naval 

Air Station, provided air lift for personnel and equipment. 

By 23 October, the Navy had committed 15 ships to the 

earthquake recovery operations. In addition, 18 aircraft and 

35 ships provided assistance. Sailors and marines from the 

Pelilieu, Fort Fisher, and Schenectady performed various tasks 

ranging from making lunches for relief workers to transporting fresh water into Santa Cruz. The Navy provided large 

tents with generators and lighting for use by rescue workers 

on I-880. Volunteers from the Gompers helped the Red Cross 

evaluate structural damage to buildings in Oakland. 

Beginning on 25 October, 25 marines from the Pelilieu 

assisted with traffic control during rush hour at the Port 

of San Francisco. The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit furnished 121 marines to help remove downed trees and clear 
10 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

roads near Soquel Valley, California. Marine personnel established a backup communications net for FEMA at its disaster 

field office, and four marines were detailed to the Presidio 

to provide administrative support for FEMA.16 

The Air Force responded along with the other services. 

California's Office of Emergency Services established a medical staging area at Travis Air Force Base and a disaster support area at Mather Air Force Base. The Air Force provided 

aerial reconnaissance support from Beale Air Force Base.17 

Roughly 900 displaced persons were sheltered in Department of Defense facilities: 300 aboard the Pelilieu and 600 

more at the Presidio in the Golden Gate Reserve Center and 

in renovated barracks. On 27 October, the displaced men 

aboard the Pelilieu were transferred to an onshore Red Cross 

center. On 30 November, the last 103 people sheltered at the 

Presidio were relocated to other Red Cross shelters off the 

installation.18 

The California National Guard also contributed greatly 

to the response. Within an hour of the earthquake, the California Air National Guard's 129th Air Rescue and Recovery 

Group, based at the Moffett Field Naval Air Station near 

San Jose, had its first HC-130 Hercules transport conducting a damage assessment over the San Francisco Bay area. 

By 6:00P.M. every National Guard unit in California had 

been put on alert for possible state active duty. 

The California Army National Guard operated a helicopter detachment from the Alameda Naval Air Station. On 

18 October, DOMS reported 1,050 California guardsmen were 

on state active duty performing earthquake recovery operations. Their missions included medical evacuation, aerial 

observation and damage surveys, air transportation, and 

engineer support. Their equipment included 4 C-130 cargo 

aircraft and 12 helicopters.19 

The California National Guard formed two task forces in 

expectation of receiving missions from the California Office 

of Emergency Services. The Guard assisted primarily in the 

areas of aviation support to law enforcement and damage 

assessment operations. By 23 October, only 119 soldiers remained on state active duty with the California National 

Guard.20 
Corps of Engineers Early Response 

Along with the other Department of Defense agencies, the 

Corps of Engineers responded quickly to the earthquake. In 

the first 24 hours, the Corps struggled to establish command, 

control and communications; reestablish a base of operations; 

account for its personnel; respond to early missions; and 

assess damage. For division and district officials, balancing 

the need to reconstruct their own organizations (such as 

finding new offices, accounting for personnel) with the need 

to conduct earthquake response operations was no easy task. 

This was not the first time that the Army engineers 

had responded to a major earthquake in San Francisco. Immediately after the devastating San Francisco earthquake 

in 1906, Army engineers patrolled the city streets to provide 

security and aided in fire fighting. They also inspected buildings for structural damage and dynamited buildings to create 

fire blocks. In the aftermath of the earthquake, engineers at 

Fort Mason fed and housed 20,000 refugees who poured into 

the post. Working with local authorities and other agencies, 

they restored utility and transportation services, demolished 

weakened and structurally unsafe buildings, and designed 

and constructed camps to house the homeless. 21 

When the Lorna Prieta earthquake hit, San Francisco 

District Engineer Colonel Galen Yanagihara and a small 

cadre of his staff were still at work. His deputy, Lieutenant 

Colonel William T. Coffey, was standing underneath the 

Embarcadero Freeway waiting for his car pool. After Coffey 

and another car pool member, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick 

Ferrin, the South Pacific Division chief of staff, reached the 

Marina district and began to sense the extent of the damage, 

they made plans to return to the city later in the evening.22 

A few blocks away at the South Pacific Division headquarters, Rich Young, an experienced Corps emergency management specialist, felt the building shake. He immediately 

tried to establish communications with the Sacramento 

District and Corps headquarters in Washington. Within 
12 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

minutes he established contact with Sacramento using 

a telephone patch off a VHF radio. Young also contacted 

Helga Grahl, an emergency management specialist at the 

San Francisco District, and then walked to the district headquarters at 211 Main. As Young approached the darkened 

district building, he found Yanagihara and Grahl in front 

operating out of Yanagihara's car. Young and Grahl carefully 

climbed up and down the steps of the building to retrieve 

portable radios and other supplies. 23 

Meanwhile, the chief of the South Pacific Division's Emergency Management Branch, Edward Hecker, tried to communicate with his office from his home in Concord north of 

the city. Although he could not get through, he contacted 

the emergency management representatives at Corps headquarters in Washington and monitored conversations in 

San Francisco on his VHF radio. 24 

From miles away at the Sacramento District, Pat Kuzmiak, an emergency management specialist, attempted to 

reach the South Pacific Division but was unsuccessful. The 

Sacramento District activated its crisis management team 

and tried to establish contact with headquarters, other Corps 

districts, and state and federal agencies. 

Some confusion existed initially about who was in charge 

of the Corps' activities because the South Pacific Division 

commander, Brigadier General (later Major General) John 

Sobke, was out of the bay area and could not be reached by 

phone. Corps plans traditionally focus on catastrophic rather 

than near-catastrophic scenarios. In a catastrophic event, 

planners assumed the San Francisco District and the South 

Pacific Division would be out of operation for some time. 

Under the current catastrophic earthquake plan, command 

and control automatically shifted to the Sacramento District 

so the San Francisco District and the division could focus on 

reconstructing themselves. With both the division and the 

San Francisco District emergency operations centers out of 

operation in the first few hours, the Sacramento District 

officials decided to assume their support role as outlined in 

the federal response plan. This included sending the initial 

situation reports to HQUSACE. The district continued this 

function until the South Pacific Division officials reestablished a command center at the Presidio. 25 
Corps of Engineers Early Response 13 

Because of poor communications between the division, 

HQUSACE, and the San Francisco District, the Sacramento 

District assumed some command and control functions. The 

district quickly activated its emergency operations center. 

Within 15 minutes it had made contact with HQUSACE 

and within the San Francisco area. In the next hour, the 

Sacramento District operations center had verified contact 

with FEMA, the Bureau of Reclamation, Sixth Army, HQUSACE, other Corps districts, and California's Office of 

Emergency Services and Department of Water Resources. 

The Sacramento District's first situation report went to 

HQUSACE at 5:00A.M. PDT the next morning.26 

General Sobke was hosting an installations conference 

in Las Vegas, Nevada, along with most of the senior staff from 

his districts and the division, including the South Pacific 

Division Deputy Commander Colonel Dennis K. Culp, Sacramento District Commander Colonel Jack A. LeCuyer, and 

the division's Chief of Construction-Operations, Dave Fulton. 

When Sobke received word of the earthquake, he prepared 

to return to the bay area with his staff as quickly as possible, chartering a Lear jet for the return trip. The airplane 

ticket was a piece of paper signed "Contracting Officer" on 

which LeCuyer had written words to this effect: "I promise 

to pay you for this airplane. Send a bill:' By 7:00P.M. they 

were on their way. 27 

General Sobke and the others planned to have a helicopter meet them at the Monterey airport to take them to 

the Presidio's Crissey Field. There was no helicopter when 

they arrived, but people from Fort Ord picked them up and 

transported them to the 7th Infantry Division headquarters 

where they arranged for a Blackhawk helicopter to take them 

to Crissey Field. General Sobke called the Chief of Engineers, 

Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch, about 9:00 P.M. from the 

Monterey airport to report that he was on his way back to 

the bay area. 

During the flight, General Sobke and his staff planned 

an immediate response. They decided to have Corps personnel check all the dams and levees, coordinate with Sixth 

Army to see if engineers were needed to support the urban 

search and rescue mission, establish operations centers to 
14 Lorna Prieta Earthquake 

respond to FEMA requests, and seek increased authority for 

emergency contracts.28 

While General Sobke and his staff were en route, Colonels 

Ferrin and Coffey decided to join Colonel Yanagihara in 

establishing a base of operations at the Sixth Army emergency operations center, arriving there between 7:00 and 

7:30P.M. By 10:00 P.M. the division's emergency operations 

center was reestablished within the Sixth Army EOC at the 

Presidio. Ferrin, Coffey, and others were hard at work when 

General Sobke, Colonel Culp, and Dave Fulton arrived at the 

Presidio around 11:00 P.M. Upon his arrival, General Sobke 

took charge of the response activities. He and his senior staff 

received a briefing on the current situation and then discussed plans and strategies. Sobke directed Edward Hecker 

to visit FEMA Region IX headquarters to determine the 

kinds of missions the Corps could expect. 29 

Having the Corps collocated at the Presidio improved 

communications and allowed for rapid coordination. Sixth 

Army officials were generally pleased with the set up. Yet the 

facilities quickly became cramped, and the shortag~ of phones 

and space restricted operations. Division personnel needed 

their own space, as well as their data processing systems, map 

displays, and communications. They continued to operate out 

of the Presidio until about noon on 19 October, when power 

was restored to the division headquarters building. 30 

San Francisco District personnel also operated out of 

the emergency operations center at the Presidio for two days 

after the earthquake. Damage to their headquarters building 

was minimal, but file drawers were overturned, pictures were 

down, and books were strewn on the floor. In addition, the 

air quality was poor. Coffey, Yanagihara, and others realized, 

however, that the district and division could not function 

well out of the same location because their perspectives and 

concerns differed. District officials had difficulty exercising 

independent command and control in the cramped Sixth 

Army operations center. It was a challenge, Colonel Coffey 

observed, to meet the needs of the division commander and 

still function as a unit commander with concern for the 

status of his staff and building. Moving the district headquarters to a new location would allow it to reestablish itself 
Corps of Engineers Early Response 15 

over the next four or five days and to do the things that only 

it, not the division, could do, such as emergency surveys and 

dredging contracts. 31 

District officials recommended to General Sobke that 

the San Francisco District reestablish itself at the Corps' 

resident office in the base yard at Sausalito. They chose the 

base yard because it was undamaged and offered special 

capabilities such as an emergency operations van. Moreover, 

it was the closest Corps-owned property and contained an 

easily recognizable landmark, the Bay Model. Officials reconstituted the San Francisco District at the district base yard 

in Sausalito at noon on 19 October. 32 

During the first 24 hours after the earthquake, besides 

establishing command and control and a base of operations, 

Corps personnel began assessing damage. The California 

Office of Emergency Services called the Sacramento District 

emergency operations center at 6:45 P.M. on 17 October to 

ask the Corps to provide engineers to inspect dams within 

the bay area. In response, the district sent two Corps representatives who met with their state counterparts early the 

next morning. The team completed its survey of 40 dams near 

the epicenter that same day. It concluded that all federal dams 

inspected within 50 miles of the epicenter were structurally 

sound. Three nonfederal dams near the epicenter (Newell 

Creek, Lexington, and Lake Eisman) had major cracks; but 

because of the low water level of the three reservoirs, they 

posed no significant threat to public safety. The Corps also 

coordinated a joint Corps/state inspection of the flood control 

systems in the Sacramento and San Joaquin river deltas.33 

On the morning of 18 October, as the Sacramento District team began its survey, General Sobke; Brigadier General George Baxter, Commander, Sixth Army; and Tommie 

Hamner surveyed damage to the bay area by helicopter. 

With no power and with phone lines jammed, getting accurate information about the nature and extent of the damage 

proved difficult. From the air, Sobke and Baxter were too far 

away to get a clear sense of the earthquake's effects, but 

they could see damage to the Bay Bridge, the Marina, and 

the Cypress Street section of I-880. When Sobke returned 

from his survey that morning, he reported to Brigadier General (later Major General) Patrick Kelly, Director of Civil 

Works, HQUSACE, by phone.34 
16 Lorna Prieta Earthquake 

A collapsed section of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bndge 

Meanwhile, Corps officials in Washington followed the 

events in California closely. General Hatch had tried to contact the South Pacific Division within minutes of the earthquake but only succeeded in reaching a frightened telephone 

operator at the Presidio. HQUSACE activated its emergency 

operations center around 9:30 P.M. Eastern Standard Time 

(EST). Predesignated crisis management team members 

reported to the operations center to support the response 

operations. Through the crisis management team, headquarters would arrange for personnel, supplies, and laboratory support for the South Pacific Division. Lieutenant 

Colonel James Jeffrey Robertson represented the Corps on 

the DOMS team in the Pentagon. 

After division and San Francisco District personnel were 

established at the Presidio, headquarters officials directed 

them to call in every half hour with a situation report to 

the HQUSACE emergency operations center to determine 

the USACE technical expertise they needed quickly, to find 

out what types of assistance would be requested of the Corps, 

to videotape the earthquake damage by helicopter if possible, and to check with the Sacramento District on any requests for inspections of non-Corps dams and levees in the 

bay area.35 
Corps of Engineers Early Response 17 

At 12:25 A.M. on 18 October, Corps headquarters tasked 

the Engineering and Housing Support Center (EHSC) at 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to report on the status of prime power 

assets available for deployment to California. EHSC had 

three 14-person prime power teams at Fort Belvoir and a 

forward team of 5 people. It had seven 750 kilowatt heavyweight generators and one light-weight generator at Toole, 

Utah, that could be used. The center also had a 4.5 megawatt power plant at Travis Air Force Base that would require heavy lift and transportation but could be in operation 

48 hours after it was on the ground. Although EHSC prepared itself for a major mission in California, that mission 

never materialized. 36 

Finally, in those early hours, Corps headquarters worked 

to get the South Pacific Division the delegation of contracting authority that it required. General Sobke 'requested a 

redelegation of authority from HQUSACE. On 18 October, 

the Commander, USACE, authorized General Sobke to delegate to his district engineers authority to execute indefinite 

contract agreements (letter contracts) that did not exceed 

$10 million for San Francisco earthquake response only. 

Authority was granted to increase the maximum value of 

each architect-engineer indefinite delivery type (IDT) contract to $1 million and each delivery order up to $250,000. 

The authority was valid as long as earthquake disaster procedures remained in effect, unless the division commander 

rescinded it. Later that day, at Sobke's request, headquarters 

granted authority to the division and its districts to execute 

indefinite contract agreements of up to $20 million.37 
Organizational Structure 

Federal agencies initially were handicapped in coordinating their efforts because the federal response plan was 

not activated. With telephone systems overloaded, emergency 

personnel had to rely on cellular phones. FEMA had difficulty coordinating all the agencies with emergency support 

functions and gaining reliable damage information until it 

established a disaster field office under the direction of the 

federal coordinating officer (FCO) in Mountain View, California, on 23 October, the Monday following the earthquake. 

The Plan for Federal Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake 

outlined 11 emergency support functions. The federal coordinating officer dispensed with the emergency support function 

designations after the first week of the. disaster field office 

operations. Clearly, this was primarily a recovery operation 

that did not require the full participation of all federal agencies identified in the federal response plan. 38 

Decisions on how to organize the Corps' response were 

not based on any previous plan because the earthquake was 

not as catastrophic as the plans had envisioned. General 

Sobke made his decisions on an ad hoc basis using the recommendations of his staff. He quickly divided responsibilities 

roughly down the center of San Francisco Bay because damage to the Bay Bridge effectively isolated the Corps in an 

east/west direction. The Sacramento District would do preliminary damage assessment in the eastern half, primarily 

in the Oakland area, and the San Francisco District in 

the western half. The general also placed the Sacramento 

District's Monterey office under the San Francisco District. 39 

The loose structure generally worked well.40 Corps officials 

modified their organizational structure as their missions 

became clearer and as FEMA refined its own organizational 

structure. 

On Saturday, 21 October, after getting word that FEMA 

planned to establish a disaster field office, Edward Hecker 

drafted a structure for Corps operations at that office, which 
20 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Dave Fulton briefed to General Sobke the next morning. 

Under the plan, the Corps ESF # 3 organization at the 

disaster field office would consist of three cells: a command 

and control cell staffed by the division; an individual assistance cell staffed by the Sacramento District; and a public 

assistance cell staffed by the San Francisco District. After 

Sobke approved the plan, division officials quickly drove to 

Mountain View.41 Before setting up operations at the disaster field office, Corps personnel met with FEMA officials, 

Bob Vickers, Bruce Baughman, and Bob Brussard, who 

directed FEMA's individual assistance and public assistance 

programs. They explained to FEMA the Corps' .capabilities 

and its plans for responding to possible missions. 

When Edward Hecker, Rich Young, and other Corps personnel arrived at the disaster field office, they found an empty 

facility with no phones, furniture, partitions, or tables. 

Based on the anticipated workload, they requested space for 

70 people: 30 from each district and 10 from the division. The 

South Pacific Division would draw personnel from Corps 

engineering, construction and operations, planning, human 

resources, information management, and real estate offices 

to staff the disaster field office, plus clerical and administrative personnei.42 

As the disaster field office began operations, General 

Sobke expanded on his initial concept of operations and laid 

out the organizational structure on 23 October in a fiveparagraph field order, Earthquake Operations Order # 2. 

The division's mission, he explained, was to-

• Implement ESF # 3 (construction management) of the 

federal earthquake contingency plan. 

• Support the Sixth Army commander in ESF # 9 (urban 

search and rescue). 

• Support FEMA in other assigned tasks. 

• Assist other federal agencies directly on a reimbursable 

basis under their authorities. 

• Provide authorized flood emergency services under 

Public Law 84-99 (Flood Control and Coastal Storm 

Emergencies). 

• Support defense installations. 
Organizational Structure 21 

The division would establish policy, coordinate Corps 

efforts, and accept missions; and its commander would continue to direct the operation. The division's crisis manager 

would serve as the link between the districts and other federal agencies and would assign the missions to the districts. 

The districts would provide preliminary damage assessments 

for the affected areas (San Francisco District for Santa Clara, 

Monterey, Santa Cruz, San Benito, San Mateo, and San Francisco counties and the city of San Francisco, and the Sacramento District for Alameda County). The San Francisco 

District would manage support to FEMA in conducting damage survey reports, while the Sacramento District would 

manage the individual assistance program.43 

Recognizing the importance of the response effort, Sobke 

placed his own deputy, Colonel Culp, at the disaster field 

office to establish procedures, clarify policy, and determine 

the scope of Corps missions there. Colonel Culp and his 

small staff functioned as a command and control element 

that coordinated the activities of San Francisco and Sacramento districts and oversaw the Corps' public assistance and 

individual assistance offices at the disaster field office. Culp's 

command and control cell screened FEMA taskings to determine which district was in a better position to respond, based 

on its staffing resources and expertise, and then forwarded 

the taskings to appropriate district personnel for action. The 

command and control cell also kept Corps headquarters, the 

division, and the district emergency operations centers informed of the status of operations in the field. 44 

In addition, the command and control cell functioned as 

the FEMA liaison, a staff element for FEMA's ESF #3. 

Colonel Culp or one of his staff attended daily briefings with 

FEMA officials and kept them informed of the status of the 

Corps activities. During these meetings, Bruce Baughman 

or Bob Brussard gave the Corps verbal instructions regarding new missions or changes in missions. Together, Corps and 

FEMA officials prepared a scope of work that became the 

Corps' formal mission statement.45 

The Corps' command cell at the disaster field office included Culp, Hecker, and Mike Grebinski, along with a small 

support staff. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Mason headed the 

individual assistance cell and Lieutenant Colonel Coffey 
22 Lorna Prieta Earthquake 

directed the public assistance cell. The lean three-cell structure at the disaster field office worked well, though Culp 

observed that he could have used a few more people, particularly one from resource management to set up cost-accounting 

procedures quickly.46 

Initially, all taskings flowed into the South Pacific Division's emergency operations center where officials screened 

them and assigned them to the districts. After the Corps 

established its command and control cell at the disaster field 

office, the cell gave taskings directly to the regional headquarters that Sacramento and San Francisco districts had 

established in Mountain View. After the regional office received a tasking, it set up its own procedures to execute 

the mission. Except for reporting, the regional office became 

a relatively independent operation under the auspices of 

the district commander. The Sacramento District's regional 

office in turn established seven area offices, while the San 

Francisco District's regional office established three. Only 

taskings outside the individual and public assistance missions were forwarded to the division headquarters.47 

Although many command and control responsibilities 

shifted from the division headquarters to the Corps' command 

and control cell at the disaster field office, some remained 

at the division's emergency operations center. General Sobke 

remained the final authority on accepting or declining missions. Dividing command and control responsibilities between 

the disaster field office Corps cell and the division headquarters occasionally presented problems. Corps people at the 

disaster field office often could respond more quickly than 

those at the division and better understood the urgency of 

the situation. They sometimes needed to make immediate 

decisions, and passing issues up to the division commander 

could be time consuming. 

Later, as the work became routine, division officials deactivated their emergency operations center, and Fulton replaced 

Culp in Mountain View. Officials also deactivated the district 

emergency operations centers, and district elements working 

on the earthquake response came directly under Fulton. 48 

With its organizational structure now firmly in place, the 

Corps could more effectively pursue its missions in support 
Organizational Structure 23 

of FEMA and other agencies. The largest and most significant Corps missions were preliminary damage assessment, 

individual assistance, public assistance, direct federal assistance, and technical assistance. The Corps also provided 

support to other agencies such as the California Department 

of Transportation (CALTRANS) and did work such as levee 

repair on its own authority. As the following sections illustrate, each mission presented unique challenges. 
Preliminary Damage Assessment 

The Corps' first major tasking from FEMA was to provide preliminary damage assessments for the seven-county 

disaster area. Officials in Washington needed reliable information to discuss with the President's staff whether or not 

to declare a disaster and what counties to include. Initially, 

the Corps received verbal taskings from FEMA followed by 

mission assignment letters (MALs). Corps officials actually 

wrote the mission assignment letters for FEMA because the 

agency lacked enough clerical help. The verbal tasking on 

18 October for preliminary damage assessment was later confirmed in Mission Assignment Letter # 1. FEMA requested 

that the Corps provide inspectors to perform preliminary 

damage assessments in conjunction with the state of California. Reimbursement for expenses related to this request 

was not to exceed $17,000. FEMA would not reimburse expenses over this limit unless the FEMA regional director 

amended the MAL.49 

On the afternoon of 18 October, General Sobke sent 

Colonel Yanagihara south to set up a field office in a motel 

in Monterey for preliminary damage assessment. Twelve 

preliminary damage assessment teams, under the Sacramento District's direction, headed to Monterey that same day. 

Each team was augmented by an engineer from the California Office of Emergency Services. Colonel Yanagihara 

briefed California Congressman Leon E. Panetta on their 

activities when the latter visited the operations center in 

Monterey. Initial inspections included roadways, bridges, 

and other public facilities, as well as general damage to 

commercial and residential areas. By 22 October, the teams 

had completed general damage assessments of Monterey, 

Santa Cruz, and San Benito counties. 50 
Individual Assistance Mission 

Another major FEMA mission for the Corps of Engineers was to conduct habitability inspections under FEMA's 

individual assistance program. After a natural disaster, 

individuals can apply to FEMA for housing assistance, and 

FEMA inspects the property to verify the extent of the 

damage. Under its temporary housing program, FEMA can 

provide the following: 

• A grant to make minimal repairs to restore habitability. 

• Rental assistance, for 1 to 3 months, but up to 

18 months. 

• A mobile home for up to 18 months if other housing 

is not available. 

If FEMA cannot satisfy the victims' temporary housing 

needs, it refers them to the Small Business Administration 

(SBA) or other programs. The SBA is authorized to lend up to 

$100,000 for real property damage and up to $20,000 for personal property. Two days after the earthquake, FEMA established a toll-free, 24-hour hotline and began taking applications for assistance. On 22 October, FEMA opened seven 

disaster application centers, one in each affected county.51 

On Friday, 20 October, FEMA asked the Corps of Engineers to provide 300 people to perform real and personal 

property inspections of individual residences in the seven 

counties and to provide all administrative, supervisory, and 

logistical support. FEMA traditionally hired contractors to 

conduct the inspections, but the response to Hurricane Hugo 

had strained the supply of available contractors. Anxious to 

put as many inspectors in the field as quickly as possible, 

FEMA turned to the Corps. The formal mission assignment 

letter, which came a few days later, specified that reimbursement was not to exceed $1 million. When Colonel Culp received FEMA's request Friday evening, he quickly called the 

Chief of Staff, HQUSACE, who indicated that General Hatch 
28 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

would have to decide to accept the mission. After discussing 

the matter with General Sobke, who favored accepting the 

mission, General Hatch gave his approval. 52 

Officials were already discussing the types of people they 

would need (such as engineers, engineer technicians, and construction representatives) and other essentials such as valid 

drivers licenses. They also discussed whether the Corps 

should contract out the inspections, use Corps personnel, or 

share the responsibility with contractors. Division officials 

favored using Corps personnel because they believed the contracting process would take too long and many Corps people 

wanted to be involved in the response effort. In addition, 

FEMA official Robert Brussard had indicated that the Corps 

should use its own inspectors rather than contractors. 

Brussard requested that the Corps bring in Gene Dretke, 

acting chief of Construction-Operations, Southwest Division, 

to run the habitability inspections and act as the FEMA 

liaison because FEMA officials had worked with Dretke 

in previous disasters and had confidence in him. Corps officials complied because the mission was new and Dretke 

had expertise that would be valuable in setting up the initial procedures. 53 

At 2:51A.M. on 21 October, the emergency operations 

center in HQUSACE sent a "warning order" to all districts 

and divisions stating that the South Pacific Division had 

received a tasking from FEMA to support structure damage assessments. The work required roughly 300 Corps 

employees, primarily construction inspectors and engineers 

(GS-9 through GS-12), who should arrive in Sacramento 

on Sunday, 22 October. All divisions in the continental 

United States and the Pacific Ocean Division were tasked 

to support this mission. Offers of help from throughout the 

Corps immediately began pouring into the South Pacific 

Division emergency operations center. 54 

The warning order was followed by a letter from General 

Hatch informing all division commanders that he needed 300 

Corps employees in California the next day to support the 

individual assistance mission. He asked commanders to send 

their "best" people because they would be dealing directly 

with the public. General Hatch also observed that the initial 

response to the warning order had been "terrific." Following 
Individual Assist~nce Mission 29 

the Hatch letter, the South Pacific Division sent out more 

specific instructions. The inspectors were to be GS-9, GS-11, 

or GS-12 engineer/engineer technicians and construction 

representatives/inspectors, were to have valid drivers licenses, 

and were to be authorized to have a rental car. They were 

to bring red jackets, hard hats, rain gear, and basic instruction materials. 55 

Meanwhile, early Saturday morning, LeCuyer met with 

his staff and directed them to make things as simple as 

possible for people arriving in California for temporary duty. 

District staff should meet the volunteers at the airport, 

arrange for hotel rooms, and secure needed equipment (such 

as cameras, wet-weather gear, rental cars, credit cards). 

Lieutenant Colonel Mason, who was in charge of the Corps' 

individual assistance mission, and other distdct officials 

struggled to set up a mechanism to receive, train, and mobilize these people in the field. Over the weekend, the Sacramento District arranged for 300 rental cars; hotel rooms 

throughout the seven counties; conference facilities; equipment; and the materials the individual inspectors might need 

such as phone credit cards, tape measures, red jackets, and 

The Corps of Engineers inspected hundreds of private homes Like this one 

in Oakland, Califi>rnia. 
30 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

hard hats. The arrangements were nearly complete by the 

time the first planeload of 50 inspectors arrived at 10:30 P.M. 

on Saturday. District personnel met them at the airport, 

bused them to a hotel, and transferred them to a processing 

center the next morning. By Sunday night, 320 people had 

registered. 56 

On 24 October, FEMA had 500 Corps and contract inspectors in the field with the first batch of 2,000 assistance 

applications. By 26 October, the registrations for individual 

assistance had increased to 21,389.57 

The Sacramento District established a regional headquarters in Santa Cruz near the disaster field office, which 

Colonel LeCuyer directed until Colonel Mason took command 

on 27 October. This office tracked personnel and workloads, 

answered questions, and solved problems throughout the 

Corps organization. 

FEMA planned for the Corps people to operate independently and complete inspections throughout the seven-county 

area rather than work with the 17 disaster application centers that FEMA had established. Based on that guidance, 

Corps officials decided to set up seven area offices, situated 

to provide the most flexibility in covering the seven-county 

area. Monday morning, while the inspectors were being 

trained, a few military officers from Corps districts went 

out as an advance party to set up the seven offices, ensure 

that the hotels were ready to receive the inspectors, and 

establish the necessary communications links. A military 

officer remained at each field office to oversee operations 

and logistical support. 

Mason and other officials determined the organizational 

structure for each area office and the kind of equipment 

needed such as phones and fax machines. Each area office 

required an administrative staff of four or five people. Officials 

located the offices. in areas where they believed the greatest 

damage had occurred: Oakland, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, 

Hollister, and Watsonville in the south. They also located one 

in Los Gatos on the San Jose side of the mountains and one 

in Redwood City to cover the area between San Francisco and 

San Jose. 

District officials divided the 300 inspectors into 10-person 

teams, each headed by someone from the Sacramento District, 
Individual Assistance Mission 31 

A Corps of Engineers team im•estigates the damage to a home in Watsonutile, California. 

which they could assign to the seven area offices as the 

workload evolved. For example, they f:trst placed only two 

teams in Oakland because-aside from the bridge collapsethe damage did not seem extensive. By early November, 

nine teams were in Oakland, each swamped with requests. 

Officials sent four teams each to Redwood City, Hollister, 

Los Gatos, and Santa Cruz because these towns were near 

the epicenter where most of the damage seemed to be. Lacking good information on the extent of damage, the Corps 

positioned the teams as best it could. 58 

After six hours of training by two FEMA inspectors, the 

first teams moved out on Monday night. Individual assistance 

applications dribbled into FEMA, so the inspectors did not 

have any work for the first few days. One Corps official later 

observed that FEMA might have called for the inspectors too 

quickly. Others, however, argued that it was better to have 

some inspectors sitting around temporarily waiting for work 

than risk not responding to those in need. On 30 October, 

Fulton reported that although the division was "well positioned" to execute its habitability inspection mission, it had 
32 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

not received its individual taskings as soon as expected 

because of the time FEMA needed to establish its disaster 

application centers and to process the initial requests for 

assistance. 59 

Corps officials at the disaster field office provided the 

area offices with general guidance but left the details of the 

operations up to them. Dretke and Mason occasionally visited 

the area offices to improve coordination. The procedures at 

the Marina Area Office, headed by Captain Charles Rimbach, 

typified those used at the other field offices. FEMA gave the 

applications-sometimes as many as 500 to 1,000-to Dretke 

who divided them among the field offices. A driver delivered 

large stacks of applications from the disaster field office 

(normally 25 to 50, but sometimes many more) to the Marina 

where the staff sorted them by ZIP code and distributed 

them among four inspection teams. The inspectors attempted 

to contact the applicants by phone or visited the site to set 

up an appointment (the applicants had to .be present when 

the inspection was made). Moreover, the inspectors needed 

the applicants' signatures because most applications were 

made over the phone. 60 

The individual assistance procedures provided for both 

quality assurance and quality control. Area office staff reviewed the applications that the inspectors brought back to 

ensure that they were complete and in proper form. Then 

the applications went to the disaster field office, where a 

small group of Corps personnel provided additional quality 

assurance. Quality ~ssurance personnel at the disaster field 

office had a better idea of what FEMA wanted and sent any 

questions back to the field. They organized the applications 

in neat packages so Dretke could return them to FEMA. 

The applications were returned to FEMA within 48 to 

72 hours.61 After Dretke returned the signed applications 

to FEMA, 40 to 50 FEMA staff members at the disaster field 

office reviewed them again. FEMA was pleased with the 

quality of the Corps' work. 

One of the most significant problems that the Corps faced 

with the individual assistance mission was anticipating the 

workload. FEMA was unable to give the Corps accurate 

projections of future workloads, and the flow of applications 

remained sporadic. The Marina office, for example, might 
Individual Assistance Mission 33 

receive 800 applications on one day and none the next. The 

Oakland office might get 800 to 1,000 applications in one 

day, creating a backlog, while the Watsonville office experienced a lull. Predicting the number of applications was 

impossible. 

Because of the fluctuating workload, Corps officials had 

difficulty allocating resources. Area offices at times were 

either overstaffed or understaffed. As the work evolved, the 

Corps found that it did not always have its people in the right 

places. When Corps officials initially deployed the inspectors, 

they did not know how many applications to expect or where 

the bulk of the work would be. The initial deployments were 

designed to cover the disaster area as well as possible and 

to place inspectors as close as possible to major damage so 

they would not waste time in travel. 62 

Ultimately, the bulk of the work developed in San Francisco and Oakland, both of which were short inspectors. 

Officials moved people from one location to another to compensate for changing workloads. By early November, they had 

closed offices at Hollister, Los Gatos, and Redwood City, 

and were planning to merge the Watsonville office with 

Santa Cruz. This would leave three offices: one on the east 

side of the bay (Oakland), one on the west side of the bay 

(San Francisco), and one to cover the southern area. The 

Corps could not move its people around as easily as the 

contractors who worked out of their homes. Finding hotel 

accommodations was sometimes challenging. No hotel rooms 

were available in Oakland, and Corps inspectors staying in 

Hollister and Watsonville were too far away to commute. 

In previous disasters such as tornadoes and hurricanes, 

damage was more concentrated. The earthquake was a 

unique situation for the Corps and FEMA, because the work 

force in the field had to react to the ebb and flow of applications over a wide geographic area. Contractors used local 

hires, and if the workload dropped, they could lay these 

people off for a few days and bring them back as needed. 

This option was not available to the Corps nor could Corps 

inspectors work out of their homes. 63 

The productivity of Corps and contractor inspectors also 

differed. FEMA measured productivity by applications that 

each inspector completed in a day. Contractors handled an 
34 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

average of 10 to 12 applications per day, and sometimes as 

many as 25 to 30. Corps inspectors, who tended to spend more 

time with each applicant, averaged only 2 to 3 applications 

per day. Mason countered, howeve:c, that productivity can be 

measured in many ways. Contractors had strong incentive 

to process applications as quickly as possible because they 

were paid per application. Corps inspectors had come to 

California voluntarily to provide assistance and spent more 

time with applicants listening to their concerns and reassuring them.64 

Mason also contended that Corps inspectors made more 

of an effort to contact applicants. FEMA required inspectors 

to make three serious attempts at contact (by phone call or 

visit) within 48 hours. Corps inspectors put extra effort into 

contacting applicants, sometimes scouring homeless shelters 

and delaying inspections to accommodate the applicants. 

Although Mason understood FEMA's concerns about productivity, he concluded, "We think they [the inspectors] are doing 

a good job in the field and we think that the public is very 

receptive to what the Corps was doing and appreciative:' 

Mason gave the Corps inspectors high marks in "customer 

care;' but not in productivity.65 The Corps had to consider 

and respond to two customers-the applicant and FEMAand the needs of each were not always the same. 

At a heated meeting on the morning of 8 November, 

FEMA officials informed Corps representatives that their 

production rate was unacceptable, and Corps officials acted 

quickly to resolve the problem. Dretke directed his inspectors to increase their productivity. Culp agreed with FEMA's 

criticism of the Corps for not emphasizing production enough 

and conceded that the Corps got into the "production mode" 

about 24 hours late. Initially, Corps officials told the inspectors that their primary goal was to take care of the needs 

of the applicant, but that took more time. After the directive 

to increase productivity, the inspectors made fewer attempts 

to contact individual applicants and spent less time with 

them. Although Corps productivity was low compared to that 

of the contractors, FEMA was very pleased with the quality 

of the inspections. It normally took experience in three disasters for an inspector to do the quality work that Corps 

inspectors were doing for the first time. 66 
Individual Assistance Mission 35 

Besides productivity, finding people with the right expertise posed a problem. The Corps had only 48 hours to put 

300 people with specific skills at certain grade levels in the 

field. For example, when work began, officials found that they 

lacked data processing skills in the field. The field offices also 

needed more clerical and administrative personnel as well 

as finance and accounting and resource management specialists to deal with time-keeping and accountability questions. 

Critics complained that Corps inspectors were over qualified. At it turned out, the mission required more construction inspection skills than engineering skills, but with only 

a short time to mobilize for a new mission, Corps officials 

could not determine exactly what skills were required. Professional engineers at GS-13 through GS-15 were at times 

performing GS-9 through GS-11 work. However, given the 

uncertainty, Culp responded, having these professional engineers available in the area to perform other functions was 

an advantage. For example, officials diverted one habitability 

inspector who was a geotechnical expert to the hazard mitigation team.67 

Inadequate training and changing guidance presented 

additional problems. Inspectors had received a few hours 

of FEMA training, but those without previous disaster experience had no frame of reference. FEMA representatives provided no pamphlet highlighting the critical elements. Instead, 

the inspectors received a sample report that was explained 

in detail. Each application, however, was unique and the 

pertinent information did not always fit neatly in the spaces 

provided. Moreover, FEMA guidance on how to fill out the 

application and the information that inspectors were to provide changed continually. The Marina office, for example, 

received eight "volumes" of changing guidance from the 

disaster field office and personnel became discouraged. Getting information to the inspectors was complicated by their 

varied work schedules, and sometimes they had to go back 

to the applicant for additional information. 68 

At times, language posed a problem. The bulk of the 

damage assessments in Hollister was for Hispanic residents, 

and only two inspectors at the office spoke Spanish. Corps 

inspectors translated the standard letter for applicants into 
36 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Spanish and Chinese and used Spanish-speaking inspectors 

in certain areas. 69 

As part of the individual assistance mission, Corps inspectors also delivered rental assistance checks. (Never before 

had anyone hand-delivered checks after a natural disaster.) 

Some applications came to Corps inspectors from FEMA 

with pre-approved rental assistance checks (for three months' 

rent) attached. If the inspector verified that the applicant was 

the owner and concluded that the house was uninhabitable, 

he was authorized to hand the applicant the rental assistance 

check as soon as he finished his inspection. 

Although this was the fastest method of getting financial assistance to homeless earthquake victims, problems 

developed. Some ineligible people received checks. More 

important, inspectors who hand-carried the checks risked 

being robbed. Nevertheless, Corps inspectors continued to 

deliver the checks. Officials modified the procedures somewhat to ensure that inspectors traveled in groups when 

delivering the checks. 70 

Confusion and fraud also hampered the individual assistance progran1. Some addresses on applications turned out 

to be empty lots, school yards, and city parks. One hotel had 

80 rooms, but 150 people claimed to be living there. Over 

3,000 of the first 10,000 applications were duplicates because 

some people who originally registered by telephone registered 

again in person or by phone. FEMA later implemented an 

address check to identify duplicate registrations. Roughly a 

third of the applications for aid came from multiple residents 

at the same address, which resulted in duplicate inspections 

of the property and duplicate payments. 71 

The individual assistance mission ended a month after 

it had begun. Within 30 days, Corps members completed 

19,469 habitability inspections and delivered, or attempted 

to deliver, 1,054 assistance checks with a value of almost 

$3 million. Every division in the Corps supplied inspectors for 

the individual assistance mission except the South Atlantic 

Division, which was still involved in Hurricane Hugo recovery 

operations. Over 330 Corps inspectors participated in the 

program.72 
Individual Assistance Mission 37 

Corps costs for personnel, transportation (including air 

fares and rental cars), lodging, equipment, and supplies 

amounted to roughly $4.5 million. The first group of inspectors left in late October. By mid-November, fewer than 100 

were still working in the field headquarters, Oakland, and 

San Francisco. By 22 November 1989, the day before Thanksgiving, the last Corps individual assistance inspectors left for 

their home districts. 73 
Public Assistance Mission 

While the Sacramento District grappled with the individual assistance mission, the San Francisco District took 

charge of the public assistance effort for FEMA. FEMA's 

public assistance program provides federal grant assistance 

for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged 

publicly owned facilities and certain private nonprofit facilities. Grants are provided on a 75/25 percent federal/nonfederal 

cost sharing basis. Eligible applicants include the state and 

any county, city, village, town, or other political subdivision 

of the state, as well as private nonprofit organizations or institutions that own and operate certain educational, utility, 

emergency, or medical facilities or that provide essential 

government service. 

Work that is eligible for federal grant assistance is classified as either emergency or permanent. 

• Emergency work must be performed immediately to 

save lives, ensure public health and safety, and protect 

property. 

• Permanent work includes repair or restoration of public 

roads and streets, water control facilities (such as dams 

and levees) owned or maintained by an eligible applicant, public office buildings, utility distribution systems 

(such as sewage treatment plants), public parks, and 

recreational facilities. Damaged facilities are restored 

to their predisaster condition and design, subject to 

applicable codes, standards, and specifications.74 

In Mission Assignment Letter # 2, FEMA requested that 

the Corps provide inspectors to assess damage and conduct 

initial inspections. The inspectors would prepare damage 

survey reports (DSRs) according to FEMA regulations and 

deliver those reports directly to the disaster field office for 

FEMA review and distribution to the state of California. 

When the governor's authorized representative notified 

FEMA and the Corps that work covered by the damage 
40 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

survey report was completed, Corps inspectors would make 

additional surveys as necessary to confirm that the work in 

the original project application had been completed. They 

worked with state counterpart agencies to ensure that each 

FEMA-approved site where damage exceeded $25,000 was inspected by a federal and/or state official and that the completed work complied with the approved scope of work and 

the FEMA engineering analysis. The inspections, conducted 

jointly with the appropriate state counterpart inspectors, were 

to begin within 7 days of Corps notification and were to be 

completed within 30 days. 

The mission assignment letter specified that reimbursement be limited to $600,000 unless the FEMA regional director approved additional expenses by amending the original 

mission assignment letter. To obtain additional obligating 

authority, the Corps had to submit a request for additional 

funding based on projected need and an estimate of the revised total cost of the project. In mid-November, FEMA increased funding for the public assistance/damage survey 

report mission from $600,000 to $3 million and later to 

$3.5 million.75 

In previous response efforts, FEMA had directed the public 

assistance program itself, using Corps personnel to do the 

inspections. FEMA followed the same approach after the 

earthquake. But on 25 October, Bruce Baughman, who had 

been sent from FEMA headquarters in Washington to head 

the public assistance program, asked the Corps to manage 

the entire operation to include training, equipping, and deploying inspectors. FEMA retained ultimate responsibility 

and signatory authority. 

Baughman decided to put the Corps in charge of the 

entire public assistance mission in part because of the many 

inspectors requiring supervision. He also understood that 

the Corps preferred to be given the freedom to decide how 

to accomplish a mission and to set its own standards. Culp 

and other Corps officials were predisposed to take on the 

entire mission. They felt they could respond more effectively 

and exert better control if given a standard and allowed 

to organize as they saw fit to accomplish a mission. And, 

with its resources already strained by Hurricane Hugo, 
Public Assistance Mission 41 

FEMA did not have the staff to manage the public assistance 

program.76 

Corps officials established a goal of a 2 percent error rate 

and offered to have Corps personnel do the quality assurance 

to achieve this rate. FEMA officials rejected the offer, indicating that they would do the final check. Corps officials 

decided to establish their own quality assurance section even 

though FEMA would perform another review. 77 

During that first weekend, Coffey and other Sacramento 

District staff developed a plan for tackling the public 

assistance/damage survey mission. On Sunday night, 

22 October, they explained their plan to General Sobke and 

received his approval. At that point, Colonel Coffey and 

Helga Grahl quickly drove to Santa Clara to establish a base 

for damage survey reports. Baughman approved the structure that the Corps created to accomplish the mission. 78 

Meanwhile, Edward Hecker met with Bruce Baughman, 

Roy Gorup, and Daryl Waite, the FEMA public assistance 

staff. FEMA tasked USACE with providing an additional 

25 DSR inspectors, bringing the total to 60. Training for the 

first phase (35 inspectors) would take place on Wednesday, 

25 October, and for the second phase (25 inspectors) on Thursday, 26 October. FEMA also tasked the Corps with providing 

two to four specialized DSR inspectors for the Port of Oakland 

Marine Terminal and Metropolitan Oakland International 

Airport, with expertise in evaluating damage to the port's 

heavy cranes as well as in doing the damage survey report 

for the runway. 79 

FEMA began doing damage survey reports on 22 October 

and conducted the first public assistance applicant briefings 

the next day. Public assistance procedures were well defined. 

As soon as some preliminary damage assessments were complete, FEMA held public forums for city and county officials 

to explain procedures for requesting and obtaining public 

assistance. All public and private organizations within that 

geographic or political jurisdiction could attend. FEMA officials distributed a two-inch thick packet of forms, which 

included a one-page form called a "notice of intent" on which 

applicants indicated the type of damage that their property 

had sustained. FEMA explained how to fill out the forms and 

the attendees returned them at the end of the meeting. 
42 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

After the meeting, FEMA entered the information into 

a computer database at the disaster field office as a notice 

of intent and assigned an identification number that corresponded to the agency submitting the notice. Then FEMA 

passed the notices on to the Corps for coordination. A team 

composed of one federal representative (Corps or contractor) 

and one state representative, notice of intent in hand, then 

visited the agency applicant and started to assess the scope 

of the damage and write the damage survey report. This 

appointment was critical because at that point the Corps 

started compiling the report, which contained both engineering estimates and documentation provided by the applicant. 

Corps officials could not determine from the original 

notice of intent how many damage survey reports would be 

required or the scope of the work or the number of inspectors required. The notice indicated the type of discipline 

needed (such as structural engineering, plumbing) but beyond 

that provided little information. For example, if the applicant 

checked off "roads" on the form, it could indicate damage 

to 18 miles of roads or 40 miles. The report provided the 

scope of work and the cost estimate that became the basis 

for grant funding.BO 

The Corps established three sites (San Francisco, Mountain View, and Santa Cruz), each with a station chief who 

was responsible for managing the DSR missions within a 

particular geographic area. This was a command and control 

cell in charge of all the individual inspection teams. The 

station chiefs, in turn, reported to the damage survey report 

chief, Lieutenant Colonel Coffey. 

The 128 teams produced over 6,000 damage survey 

reports with a value exceeding $25 million. A quality 

assurance/quality control team reviewed each report. Corps 

involvement in this process continued until spring 1990.81 

As Corps personnel executed the damage survey reports, 

they sent them to a FEMA public assistance officer for approval. No two reports were alike, and quality became a 

problem. The Corps had to verify its initial guidance on 

filling out the damage survey report with the FEMA reviewers to ensure that they agreed. The Corps' internal 

review process apparently worked well, for FEMA accepted 
Public Assistance Mission 43 

A Corps of Engineers inspector surveys wreckage at the Pacific Garden Mall 

in Santa Cruz, California. 

95 to 96 percent of the damage survey reports the first time 

they were submitted. 82 

Not all inspectors were adequately trained. A June 1988 

memorandum of agreement between the Corps and FEMA 

specified that each engineer division create a cadre of personnel who could write damage survey reports, but in return, 

FEMA would help provide training. Although each Corps 

division was linked with a FEMA region for training, not 

all FEMA regions provided that training. Sometimes if an 

engineer division spanned more than one FEMA region, no 

one took responsibility for b·aining. 83 

FEMA later waived the requirement that inspectors be 

trained before they arrived and indicated that inspectors had 

to be trained only before they went into the field. The Corps 

in conjunction with FEMA conducted a four-hour training 

session for DSR inspectors. But the training was inadequate, 

in part because FEMA had no instruction manuals available 

for inspectors. In November 1988, some federal statutes had 

changed, and FEMA was in the process of printing new 

manuals reflecting these changes. FEMA has no uniform 

standards or guidelines for training across the country. 84 
44 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Without adequate training and guidance, Corps inspectors 

had difficulty estimating costs. Corps officials charged that 

FEMA standards for estimating costs were inconsistent and 

did not reflect the local market. For example, repairing a 

brick wall in Santa Cruz was cheaper than repairing one 

in San Francisco, but FEMA standards did not reflect this. 

The limits that FEMA placed on repair costs also created 

problems. Although the amount of acceptable costs was an 

issue that FEMA and the applicant had to resolve, the DSR 

teams were at times caught in the middle. FEMA apparently 

had regulations that outlined what it would reimburse, but 

it had not yet put out guidance that defined and clarified 

its criteria.85 

Corps officials complained that FEMA's guidance changed 

continually. Without site-specific or consistent standards, 

Lieutenant Colonel Coffey observed, there was no agreement 

on proper costs. What was acceptable kept changing, and 

FEMA officials at the three different stations were not in 

accord. They returned rejected. estimates to frustrated inspectors who then had to go back to the agency applicant. As a 

result, their credibility suffered. 

Baughman, however, denied that the cost amounts listed 

on the disaster survey reports were ever changed at the disaster field office during his tenure and disputed the idea that 

discrepancies occurred in authorized prices. He claimed that 

FEMA used a standard unit price list, developed with state 

concurrence. If a local jurisdiction proved that its costs were 

greater than the standard costs, the costs were altered.86 

During the first two weeks, managing the personnel 

coming in from other districts and divisions posed a problem. 

Planning was hampered by lack of any advance notice of how 

many people would be :reporting and the absence of any uniform, mandatory period of service. The Sacramento District 

staff successfully processed and deployed 300 inspectors, but 

the processing took place outside the disaster area so hotel 

rooms were available. Providing for the DSR inspectors inside 

the disaster area was more difficult. 87 

Public assistance/disaster survey work was more detailed 

and required more training than did habitability inspections, 

so it was difficult to move inspectors back and forth between 

programs. In only a few instances could Corps officials divert 
Public Assistance Mission 45 

personnel from individual assistance to public assistance 

work. Only 45 to 50 of the 300 individual assistance inspectors were qualified and trained to do damage survey reports. 

Once the inspectors were in the field, it was not feasible to 

switch them from one program to another. After giving the 

individual assistance and public assistance missions to separate districts, the Corps was unable to transfer resow·ces 

between the two missions because each district wanted to 

retain control of its resources. 88 

Chief of Engineers LTG Henry Hatch talks with Corps inspectors in Watsonville, California. 

Coffey recommended that in the futw-e the Corps provide 

a civilian personnel officer located outside the disaster area 

to manage and assign its personnel. Inside the disaster 

area, officials were too busy setting up an organization, conducting training, and providing logistics support. For future 

disaster responses, Coffey also proposed that the Corps deploy 

a management structure, organized in teams, each with 

a head and an administrative assistant. For example, the 

Santa Cruz office had three people from the Corps' Missouri 

River Division who operated as a unit. Coffey plugged them 
46 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

as a management cell to supervise 26 teams. He recommended that the Corps prepackage management structures 

for disaster field offices composed of emergency operating 

personnel from the districts.89 
Direct Federal Assistance 

FEMA's third formal tasking to the Corps was direct 

federal assistance. FEMA asked the Corps to provide liaison 

and technical support to include material, equipment, and 

personnel as requested. Under Mission Assignment Letter 

# 3, reimbursement was not to exceed $1 million without 

Hamner's authorization. FEMA later increased this amount 

to $5 million and amended the mission assignment letter by 

adding "construction, dredging;' to "material, equipment, 

and personnel:' Corps work under the MAL was cost shared 

at a 75/25 ratio of federal/state contributions.90 

Under MAL #3, the Corps provided ferry service and 

dredging support. With the Bay Bridge closed, commuters 

in the bay area needed alternative means of transportation. 

Expanding ferry service between the East Bay harbor and 

San Francisco was the best method for meeting the immediate transportation need. Hence, FEMA tasked the Corps 

to assist in establishing ferry service. The South Pacific 

Division in turn tasked the San Francisco District to inspect the dock at Berkeley Yacht Harbor, to either repair 

it or construct a new floating dock, and to dredge the channel to accommodate ferries. The division also directed the 

San Francisco District to survey Golden Gate Fields at 

Albany and to verify the need for a floating dock at Bay Farm 

Island in San Leandro Bay. Two days later, the South Pacific 

Division changed the tasking with FEMA's consent. The 

San Francisco District would dredge the slip at the Marriott 

Hotel dock in Berkeley Yacht Harbor and pursue the assigned 

work at Bay Farm Island, but cancel all work at Golden Gate 

Fields. On 2 November, the South Pacific Division directed 

the San Francisco District to provide a floating dock, 40 feet 

by 80 feet, at Todd Shipyard in Alameda to promote transbay ferry service. On 31 October, Corps personnel inspected 

seven ferry boat sites as requested by the California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS).91 
48 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

The channel depths at Berkeley Marina had to be 

deepened so ferries could safely enter and leave the harbor. 

CALTRANS, through FEMA, immediately requested that the 

Corps execute and administer the dredging contract. Corps 

officials promptly obtained the required approvals from environmental agencies, such as the Environmental Protection 

Agency, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the State 

Department of Fish and Game. 

A Corps contractor dredges the Berkeley Manna to expand ferry seruice 

Once the approvals were received, the Corps implemented 

emergency contract procedures to ensure that dredging was 

completed as quickly as possible. It secured two contracts, 

one with Manson Dredging and the other with the Dutra 

Dredging Company. Work under the Manson Dredging contract, which deepened the channel to 6 feet below mean low 

low water (MLLW), began 21 October and ended 27 October, 

for a total cost of $150,000. The Dutra Dredging Company 

contract completed the project to 9 feet below MLLW at a cost 

of $60,268. This contract was awarded on 3 November and 

completed 15 November, six days later than anticipated 

because of a labor union strike. The combined dredging contract costs totaled $210,268.92 
Direct Federal Assistance 49 

Under the direct federal assistance mission, FEMA also 

tasked the Corps to provide a heating system for 19 housing units at Buena Vista Farm labor camp in Watsonville, 

California. 93 
Technical Assistance 

In Mission Assignment Letter # 5, FEMA asked the Corps 

to provide technical assistance to state and local interests as 

requested. FEMA specified that reimbursement for technical 

assistance expenses not exceed $100,000 unless approved by 

the FEMA regional director, but it later increased the amount 

to $1,750,000. At FEMA's direction, on 23 and 24 October, 

Sacramento and San Francisco district mechanical and structural engineers inspected four state and county bridges (Fruitvale Avenue Railroad Bridge, Miller Sweeney Bridge, High 

Street Bridge, and Park Street Bridge) in Alameda County 

to determine the extent of damage. FEMA indicated that the 

Alameda bridge inspections were a technical assistance mission paid for entirely with federal funds. 94 

The Sacramento District provided engineers to inspect the 

structural integrity of piers for safety and for ferry use at 

the following sites: Todd Shipyard at Jack London Square 

in Alameda, the container pier at the south end of Richmond 

Inner Harbor, Vallejo Pier, Berkeley Marina (part of the 

original mission assignment), San Leandro Marina, and 

Emeryville Marina. The San Francisco District also provided 

two structural engineers to inspect buildings owned by the 

Santa Cruz Department of Parks and Recreation.95 

A large part of the Corps' technical assistance effort 

involved geotechnical support. The earthquake triggered 

thousands of landslides in the north central portion of California's coastal ranges from the San Francisco Bay area to 

the Big Sur coastline. Most of the landslides occurred near 

the earthquake's epicenter in the Santa Cruz Mountains. 

The steep mountains, which receive up to 60 inches of rain 

per year, historically produce slides during heavy seasonal 

rains and earthquakes. 

The landslides were predominantly shallow (10 feet or 

less) rock falls, rock slides, and soil slides. Typically, these 

slides pushed quickly down steep slopes, depositing boulders 

and finer grained material. Slides killed two people during 
52 Lama Prieta Earthquake 

or immediately after the earthquake. Large blocks of soil also 

broke away and some of these block slides showed evidence 

of continued or renewed movement as the result of rainfall 

in the mountains 10 days after the earthquake.96 

County officials and residents worried that aftershocks 

and winter storms could lead to more landslides, further 

destruction of property, and loss of life. Santa Cruz County 

officials appealed to state and federal agencies and to their 

congressional representatives for assistance in evaluating this 

possible geologic hazard in the area. 

In the first days after the earthquake, an on-site Waterways Experiment Station (WES) team consisting of personnel 

from the Geotechnical Laboratory and Structures Laboratory evaluated the earthquake's effects. During the week of 

30 October, personnel from the two laboratories supported 

the FEMA disaster mitigation team at the disaster field 

office. On 13 November, a Geotechnical Laboratory geologist 

assisted FEMA and the South Pacific Division in mapping 

and planning mitigation action for a major landslide in the 

Santa Cruz Mountains.97 

At a public meeting hosted by California Congressman 

Leon E. Panetta on 28 October 1989, officials offered federal 

technical assistance for evaluating the geologic hazards posed 

by the slides in Santa Cruz County. Representatives of the 

Corps of Engineers, the California Division of Mines and 

Geology, and the county met on 3 November to identify the 

scope of the technical assistance required. Participants identifled technical support for ongoing investigations of massive 

slides in the Santa Cruz Mountains as the most critical need. 

A few days later, on 8 November, representatives ofFEMA, 

the U.S. Geological Survey, the Corps, the California State 

Office of Emergency Services, and Santa Cruz County met 

to discuss the county's request for assistance. Soon after, the 

county formally requested, through the Office of Emergency 

Services, that FEMA provide technical assistance for the 

geologic hazards analysis study. 98 FEMA then directed the 

Corps to provide technical assistance at a cost of $1,350,000 

to Santa Cruz County to investigate geologic hazards resulting from the earthquake. FEMA specified the need for geotechnical advice and resource support to Santa Cruz County 

in the following areas: survey and mapping of areawide 
Technical Assistance 53 

hazards, foundation investigation and instrumentation, and 

preliminary slope stability modeling and geologic hazards 

analysis to determine public-safety hazards and emergency 

measures required. 

An interagency technical advisory group (TAG) was established to perform the investigation, which included representatives of Santa Cruz County, the U.S. Geological Survey, the California Division of Mines and Geology, and the 

San Francisco District. The district provided a project manager to oversee scheduling and funding, to administer Corps 

engineering services contracts, and to coordinate participation from other Corps elements such as the South Pacific 

Division and the Waterways Experiment Station.99 

At the request of the county, FEMA funded the studies 

and reviewed the overall objective and scope. The Corps provided technical and contractual support and served as project 

manager. The technical advisory group made up of representatives of the county, the U.S. Geological Survey, and 

the Corps met regularly to advise the county and the project 

manager on the scope of the mission, various technical concerns, and data analysis and interpretation. 

The analysis would be conducted in three phases, the 

first of which involved identifying and surveying the slides. 

The second phase involved geologic characterization and 

installation of monitoring instruments, and the third phase 

was for data reduction and analysis. Phase one mapping 

began soon after the earthquake and was 95 percent complete by 22 November 1989. Surveys of the slides began on 

15 November, and 10 of the 12 surveys were completed by 

22 November. The last two were completed by 7 December. 

On 6 December, a contract was awarded to William Cotton 

and Associates to perform the geologic characterization of 

and install the instrumentation (phase two) in the first 

two landslides selected for the detailed study (Villa del Monte 

complex and Schultheis Road landslide). Work on the geologic characterization of the most critical of the slides began 

8 December, and the drilling and instrumentation work was 

scheduled to begin 10 days later.lOO 
Work for Others 

Besides responding to FEMA missions, the Corps provided 

assistance to other federal and state agencies as requested. 

The Corps, for example, responded to a request from CALTRANS for a "forensic" engineering study of the collapsed 

I- 880 section in Oakland, California. The two-tiered elevated structure, the Cypress Street Viaduct, fed traffic from 

Oakland onto the Bay Bridge. During the earthquake, the 

upper deck fell onto the lower deck, crushing motorists. 

Widespread interest focused on discovering exactly why the 

structure failed. 

A collapsed section of the two-tiered 1-880 in Oakland, California. 

On 18 October, after visiting the collapsed Cypress Street 

Viaduct, Colonel LeCuyer contacted Robert K. Best, the 

director of CALTRANS, to offer help in the cleanup and 

removal of the structure. At the request of CALTRANS, on 

19 October, Sacramento District officials provided a general 
56 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

plan for the work. A forensic engineering study was to be 

included, presumably to be conducted by or at the direction 

of CALTRANS. Best favored the forensic study because 

it would: 

• Establish the facts concerning the standards by which 

the bridge was designed, constructed, and retrofitted. 

• Document the damage and establish how the structure 

failed. 

• Determine the performance of existing seismic restrainers. 

• Determine the condition and performance of the footings and piles. 

• Provide new knowledge concerning details and materials for use in future seismic retrofit projects.lOl 

CALTRANS officials asked the Sacramento District to 

contract with an expert engineering firm to conduct a detailed 

study. The Corps had to move quickly before the entire viaduct was demolished.102 On 26 October, Best asked General 

Sobke to proceed with the selection of the consultant engineers for the forensic engineering study. Sobke realized that 

such a study could put the Corps in the position of criticizing 

CALTRANS and the engineers who had constructed the 

freeway, and he knew that others were already making assessments. When General Hatch visited the area on 26 October, 

Sobke asked him for guidance. 

General Hatch informed General Sobke that the forensic 

study mission was not appropriate for the Corps of Engineers. 

The Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration had the principal oversight and funding authority 

to conduct the proposed forensic analysis and the Corps would 

defer to it. Moreover, a congressional committee had asked 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology to study 

the I-880 collapse. Additional studies were under way at the 

state level, including Governor Dukemejian's Blue Ribbon 

Commission, and Corps officials wanted to avoid any duplication of effort. The issue of the I-880 collapse was controversial and sensitive, and General Hatch did not want the 

Corps to put itself in the position of criticizing the work of 

other engineers.103 
Work for Others 57 

Although the Corps declined the forensic study mission, 

the Sacramento District sent four people to the site to create 

a record of the failed structure for future reference. Between 

20 and 23 October, they took hundreds of photographs and 

recorded hours of videotape of the structure, which they later 

turned over to the state. The district also developed a contingency plan for demolishing the failed sections and contacted 

other districts to identify personnel and companies with 

heavy-lift experience and equipment. District officials pulled 

the team off the site with 7 5 percent of their documentation 

effort complete, and the structure was demolished soon after. 

The technical information that the district compiled proved 

to be a very valuable resource for post-earthquake response 

studies.104 

Besides the request for a forensic study, on 20 October, 

CALTRANS asked the Corps to help clean up the Cypress 

Street Viaduct. CALTRANS could handle the removal of 

debris, but it needed the Corps' help in obtaining a disposal 

site for the estimated 60,000 cubic yards (120,000 tons) of 

heavily reinforced concrete to be removed from the collapsed 

structure.105 

On 25 October, the Sacramento District and the South 

Pacific Division representatives met with CALTRANS and 

others to discuss potential ocean disposal sites. Corps personnel explained that because the 1-880 rubble was not 

dredge or fill material, the Corps had no permit authority 

for disposal beyond the three-mile limit. The Corps tried to 

locate a site acceptable to the federal agencies involved in 

the approval process. After evaluating various alternatives, 

they identified a deep-water site roughly 30 nautical miles 

west of the Golden Gate Bridge as the most feasible. 

Corps officials also explained that to expedite the disposal 

of rubble, CALTRANS needed to obtain an exception to the 

Ocean Dumping Act. The basis was to allow the placement of 

materials at this site to enhance the development of fisheries 

resources. Under the applicable regulations, the National 

Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the 

U.S. Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency, and 

the Corps of Engineers had to concur before the site was 

used.106 The Environmental Protection Agency gave the site 
58 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

preliminary approval as a "fisheries resources site" and obtained the necessary concurrence from the U.S. Coast Guard 

and the Corps. However, NOAA's approval was stalled because 

of objections from commercial fishing interests. 

Another potential site, about six miles out and known 

as the "BART site;' was also proposed, but with a caveat 

that time-consuming coordination with numerous agencies 

was required. An upland disposal alternative, which the 

port and CALTRANS had been discussing, was mentioned. 

The Corps representatives cautioned that portions of the 

Oakland airport could not be used due to wetlands classification. On 30 October, Colonel LaCuyer provided CALTRANS 

with a report identifying various aquatic and upland disposal sites. 107 

Besides work for CALTRANS, the Corps also provided 

support to the Port of Oakland. The Oakland airport, owned 

and operated by the Port of Oakland, suffered $30 million 

in damage. It had to be repaired immediately to handle the 

increasing demands resulting from the earthquake. The major 

damage was to its 10,000-foot air-carrier runway and parallel 

taxiway. Massive cracks in both had taken a third of the 

taxiway and runway out of service. In addition, the dike along 

the eastern side of the runway that held back the bay waters 

had been damaged significantly. 

The failure of the Bay Bridge and the I -880 section had 

greatly increased the demands on the Oakland airport. 

Several air carriers announced plans to increase the number 

of flights into Oakland because of limited access to the 

San Francisco airport. The Oakland airport was also one of 

the nation's largest aircraft maintenance facilities. Military 

Air Command flights between the United States and Korea, 

Japan, and the Philippines could not operate from Oakland 

without the repairs. lOS 

The Port of Oakland's maritime facilities also suffered 

$75 million in damage; $50 million of this was to the port's 

Seventh Street Marine Terminals, constructed in the 1960s. 

Because the 75-acre Seventh Street Public Container Terminal was inoperable, the port was losing an important source 

of revenue. The other $25 million in damages occurred 

throughout the port area and included subsidence damage 

to utilities, wharves, and other harbor structures. 
Work for Others 59 

The port facilities were particularly critical in the wake of 

the earthquake. After the closing of the Bay Bridge, the major 

transportation link between East Bay and San Francisco, a 

passenger ferry system had been established at the port. The 

port was a major export facility for California Central Valley 

agricultural products as well as cargoes from the inland areas 

of the United States destined for the Pacific Basin. It was 

also important for national defense. Portions of the port's 

Outer Harbor Terminal were located on waterfront property 

leased from the U.S. Army. The port's rent payments were 

used for rehabilitating the Army's wharf facilities. Federal 

legislation authorized such leasing arrangements to assure 

that the U.S. military services could maintain adequate shipping facilities at minimal cost to taxpayers.l09 

At the request of the Port of Oakland, the Sacramento 

District inspected the port and Oakland airport and prepared 

preliminary damage assessments. The district was tasked 

with doing the preliminary damage assessment only, and by 

24 October, it had 20 inspectors at work. The San Francisco 

District would perform a disaster survey report with assistance from the Sacramento District if necessary. Port of Oakland authorities estimated the damage to be $108 million, 

including damage to the Oakland airport. The Federal Aviation Administration delivered $8 million of $17 million in 

emergency funding for the airport on 27 October.110 

Occasionally, work for others took the form of technical 

assistance. The U.S. Department of Education, for example, 

asked the Corps to survey damage to school districts in the 

declared counties. The Corps also wrote disaster survey 

reports for San Francisco International Airport for the Federal 

Aviation Administration. The Los Angeles District structural 

engineers helped the General Services Administration inspect 

federal facilities in San Francisco. Engineers were also assigned to the Presidio and Oakland Army Base to help with 

damage assessments. The Small Business Administration 

tasked the Corps to provide eight people to verify damages 

beginning 4 January 1990.111 
Other Corps Activities 

Besides work for FEMA and other agencies, the Corps 

repaired levees on the San Lorenzo and Pajaro rivers. The 

San Lorenzo River carries runoff from the Santa Cruz Mountains through the city of Santa Cruz into the Pacific Ocean. 

In 1955, the Corps had improved a floodway channel and constructed levees along the banks of the San Lorenzo River to 

manage periodic floods. The earthquake severely damaged 

the levees and floodway, and with the rainy season fast 

approaching, Santa Cruz faced the threat of a major flood.112 

On 19 October, a San Francisco District inspection team 

observed significant cracking, sloughing, and lowering of levee 

crests along several reaches of both projects, and damage to 

project gravity and pump station drainage structures that 

could fail completely with normal winter' flow conditions. 

Corps inspectors found several cracks, about 1,200 to 1,500 

feet long and 2 feet deep, in the levee on the San Lorenzo 

River. They completed their inspection on 21 October.113 

Because of the urgent need for repair before the winter 

rains, General Sobke sought an exception to the requirement 

that the California governor specifically request assistance. 

He asked HQUSACE to give him the authority to approve 

the two projects. Sobke estimated that the Pajaro River would 

require 4,200 feet of levee construction at a cost of$1 million 

and the San Lorenzo River would require 4,200 feet of levee 

construction at a cost of $2 million.114 

Public Law 84-99, Flood Control and Coastal Storm Emergencies, authorized the Corps of Engineers to repair only 

those federal and nonfederal flood control projects that had 

been damaged by floods, hurricanes, or coastal storms. If an 

"imminent danger" of flooding existed, the Corps could act 

to alleviate the threat to public health and safety. But this 

authority would be considered only after a request from the 

state governor confronted with the threat of flooding. The 

South Pacific Division requested authority under P.L. 84-99 

to repair the levees. 
62 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

A Corps inspector measures a fracture in the Pajaro River levee 
Other Corps Activities 63 

The fact that the Corps had constructed the levees initially made it easier to justify its involvement. Mter being 

built, both projects had been turned over to local residents 

for operation and maintenance. Corps officials reasoned that 

the Corps design had failed because the damaged levees no 

longer provided adequate flood protection for Santa Cruz and 

Watsonville. In addition, late October marked the beginning 

of the flood season.115 

Within hours, HQUSACE approved the South Pacific 

Division's request. In his letter authorizing the South Pacific 

Division to proceed with repair of the levees, John Elmore 

increased the South Pacific Division commander's authority 

for approving flood control projects damaged by earthquake 

from $500,000 to $3 million.116 

The division quickly established a resident office staffed 

by personnel from San Francisco and other districts. Within 

two weeks, Corps personnel prepared plans, specifications, 

and bidding packages. On 28 October, the Corps awarded 

Granite Construction a $1.44 million contract for work on 

the San Lorenzo River project; on 31 October, the Corps 

awarded the company a $1.35 million contract for the Pajaro 

River project. The projects consisted of 20.5 miles of earthen 

levee along the Pajaro River and 42 miles of earthen levee 

on the tributary Corralitos Creek. The Corps estimated that 

9,530 feet of levee on the Pajaro River and 4,530 feet of levee 

on the San Lorenzo River required repair.117 

By November, it became clear that the estimated $3 million cost of repairs to the San Lorenzo levees would be 

exceeded. The cost estimates at that time were $1.75 million 

for the San Lorenzo repairs and $1.84 million for the Pajaro 

repairs. As the work progressed, crews discovered additional 

damage that added to the cost. Furthermore, large overruns had occurred in the import fill requirements at both 

projects because the material was shrinking 20 to 30 percent. 

Colonel Yanagihara requested $3.58 million to complete the 

repairs.118 Elmore increased the commander's delegated 

authority from $3 million to $3.6 million.119 

By 15 December, contractors had rebuilt 5,200 feet of levee 

at 8 locations along the San Lorenzo River; by 11 December, 

they had repaired 12,000 feet of levee at 49 locations along 

the Pajaro River.12o 
64 Lorna Prieta Earthquake 

Chief of Engineers LTG Henry Hatch and Corps inspectors examine the 

San Lorenzo River leuee damage 

Another significant activity was the Corps' first-time 

involvement on a hazard mitigation team (HMT). Hazard 

mitigation, a process to reduce or eliminate threats to life 

and property, grew out of Sections 409 (Hazard Mitigation 

Planning) and 404 (Ha.zm·d Mitigation Grant Program) of the 

Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-288; 42 U.S.C. 

5121-5202). On 25 October, Tommie Hamner invited the 

Corps to participate in a hazard mitigation team that FEMA 

had created to develop strategies and recommend measures 

to reduce or eliminate future earthquake damage in California.121 The team met from 31 October to 2 November at 

the disaster field office in Sunnyvale. Attendees included 

representatives from federal agencies on FEMA Region IX's 

Regional Interagency Steering Committee (R.!SC) and from 

the principal agencies of the National Earthquake Hazards 

Reduction Program (NEiffiP), with the exception of the National Science Foundation. 

The Corps had nine representatives on the hazard mitigation team: Robert Edmisten and Paul Komoroske, emergency 

management specialists from the South Pacific Division and 
Other Corps Activities 65 

the Seattle District respectively; Dr. Gus Franklin, a geotechnical expert from WES; Dr. Robert Hall, a structural 

specialist from WES; David Sills and Jack Hurdle, emergency 

managers from the Lower Mississippi Valley Division and 

the Memphis District; Dr. Surya Bhamidipaty, a hydraulics 

specialist from the South Pacific Division; Chuck Perry, a 

geotechnical specialist from the Seattle District; and Greg 

Hempen, a geophysicist from the St. Louis District.122 

In its final report, the team made roughly 60 recommendations in such areas as hazard identification and monitoring, repair, and construction. It also addressed the need 

to identify and pre-position federal, state, and local resources 

to mobilize immediately for a disaster. The report observed 

that current federal law prevented major federal participants, such as the Department of Defense, from mobilizing 

immediately.123 
Conclusion 

In the first days after the earthquake, the decision not 

to implement the Plan for Federal Response to a Catastrophic 

Earthquake caused confusion among the agencies involved 

and hampered the response. Agencies found themselves without an adequate plan to cover a less-than-catastrophic event. 

If implemented, the federal response plan would have forced 

FEMA, the California Office of Emergency Services, and 

other agencies to colle1>cate. Instead FEMA needed several 

days to bring the various state and federal agencies together 

at the disaster field office. Meanwhile, Sixth Army staff had 

difficulty locating and contacting the offices with which they 

needed to work. Current plans did not provide well for the 

immediate response phase. Rather, FEMA's authority was 

primarily geared to a well-organized recovery process that 

involved receiving applications, sending out inspectors, evaluating inspection reports, and reimbursing local claimants. 

Without activating the federal response plan, FEMA had 

difficulty mobilizing federal resources.124 

The General Accounting Office (GAO) confirmed this 

problem when it conducted an audit between October 1989 

and September 1990. GAO concluded that, as with Hurricane 

Hugo, the Lorna Prieta response was hampered by staffing 

and coordination problems between agencies at all levels. 

Assistance was delayed in some cases because FEMA was 

not authorized to assume the state's role as immediate 

responder. According to GAO, legislation might be needed 

giving FEMA· such authority. 125 

While GAO conducted its investigation, the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) tasked FEMA to evaluate 

its responses to Hurri<eane Hugo and the Lorna Prieta earthquake and to identify weaknesses, strengths, and lessons 

learned. FEMA formed a task force to obtain comments and 

prepare a report for OMB. On 25 January 1990, FEMA held 

a meeting in Sunnyvale, California, that included representatives of the Corps of Engineers and the other federal and state 
68 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

agencies that had participated in the response. One major 

theme was the need t<:> execute the federal plan for nearcatastrophic events.126 

The consensus was that besides flaws in the current 

plans, the cost-sharing requirements hampered recovery. 

Because of cost sharing, state officials were reluctant to ask 

federal agencies for assistance. For example, with the public 

assistance program, FEMA paid 7 5 percent of the damage 

costs; individual cities, towns, and municipalities paid the 

remaining 25 percent. The state reimbursed the localities for 

75 percent of their 25 percent, so they ultimately paid only 

6 percent. FEMA had to get the state to agree to share the 

costs before it could task the Corps or other agencies to do 

work. One Corps official complained that initially the state 

often had slowed the response. The Corps would have responded faster, he observed, if it had not had to wait for 

state coordination.127 

Frustrated Sixth Army and Corps officials pointed out 

that they had tremendous capabilities for providing relief, 

but any actions had to be requested by the state and approved by FEMA. One Sixth Army official observed that they 

received few requests for help in a disaster because city and 

state governments were reluctant to pay when they could perform the mission themselves or use the National Guard. 

Negotiations on cost sharing are appropriate in the recovery 

phase, argued one Cor:@s official, but not in the initial response phase where the focus is on eliminating human suffering. The response phase, he added, should not be hampered 

in any way by administrative procedures or policies.128 

The Lorna Prieta response highlighted the need for federal 

and state agencies not only to have adequate plans, but 

also to test those plans on a regular basis. In July 1989, the 

South Pacific Division, anxious to establish itself as the 

Corps' earthquake center of expertise, had sponsored a Tactical Command Readiness Exercise in Sacramento. Along 

with representatives of 25 federal, state, and local agencies 

(including FEMA and the California Office of Emergency 

Services), the division conducted this exercise to sharpen 

earthquake response expertise. Sobke observed that the division's "overall preparat:iion went a long way toward helping 

us respond to this event?'129 
Conclusion 69 

In August 1989, FEMA had conducted a "Response '89" 

exercise to test its catastrophic earthquake plan. Federal 

and state officials ob$erved that this exercise improved the 

Lorna Prieta response. Sixth Army and Corps district and 

division officials specifically benefitted from the exercise. The 

collapse of the Bay Btridge and elevated roadways, the fires 

and drop in water pressure, and the interruption of services 

had all been addressed in simulation. The August exercise, 

however, also revealed problems. Unfortunately, the report 

identifying these problems was not released until after the 

Lorna Prieta earthquake.130 

Besides the need to develop and exercise adequate plans, 

Lorna Prieta dramatized the need for flexibility. The Corps 

of Engineers responded quickly and effectively in part because 

of the flexibility of its organization. The Corps is structured 

so that if a district ot division is temporarily unable to respond, personnel from another district or division can move 

in rapidly and establish command and control to achieve what 

General Sobke called the "same professional results:'131 

Sacramento District officials immediately assumed communications and reporting functions. The South Pacific Division 

and the San Francisco District officials were able to resume 

operations at the Presidio without delay or confusion. Moreover, General Sobke and his staff created an innovative, effective three-cell organi~ation at the disaster field office that 

made the Corps more responsive to FEMA's requests. They 

created a structure for individual assistance and public assistance missions that could quickly absorb Corps personnel 

from across the country. 

Hundreds of Corps employees from throughout the field 

responded when the call went out for assistance, giving new 

meaning to the motto, "The Corps Cares:' The Corps' response was even morte impressive given the fact that some 

of its personnel were still dealing with Hurricane Hugo. 

At a 2 November 1989 ceremony on the parade grounds 

at the Presidio, the commanding general of Sixth Army, 

Lieutenant General l3axter; General Sobke; and San Francisco mayor, Art Agnos, recognized 11 Corps personnel for 

their contributions. '!1he Santa Cruz director of public works, 

Larry L. Erwin, expressed gratitude for the Corps' prompt 

action in addressing the damage to the city's flood control 
70 Lorna Prieta Earthquake 

project: "The fact that the Corps had a survey team in our 

city one day after the Odtober 17, 1989, earthquake is truly 

amazing:'132 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) Robert W. 

Page congratulated the Corps for its "outstanding efforts" 

during Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake: "The 

Army Corps of Engineers distinguished itself as a unique 

national asset ready to serve the nation in a variety of ways:' 

On 6 December, General Hatch presented Meritorious Service Medals to four Sacramento District military officers and 

Commander's Awards for Civilian Service to 14 Sacramento 

District employees, callirtJ.g the response "absolutely magnificent." A few weeks lat~r, he commended Corps members 

for responding to the challenges of Hurricane Hugo and the 

Lorna Prieta earthquake. "I know of no other organization, 

in government or out;' he concluded, "that could have done 

what we did."133 

The earthquake experience gave the Corps the opportunity to demonstrate its capabiliti~s and perform new missions, and the Corps performed well. Yet the earthquake 

also raised important questions that the Corps must resolve 

for the future. 

• If FEMA offers the Corps the individual assistance 

mission again, should the Corps accept it? 

• Should the Corps put itself in the position of delivering assistance cheeks? 

• How can the Corps expedite its authority, approval, and 

funding processes? 

• Should the Corps develop and maintain a database that 

lists the names of Corps personnel who could be called 

on in future disasters based on their areas of expertise? 

• Should it train a cadre of Corps personnel to respond 

to emergencies? 

• Should the Corps pt.rrchase emergency equipment and 

store it until needed? 

• On a more philosophical level, who is the Corps' 

customer: the tasking agency (such as FEMA) or the 

disaster victim? 
Conclusion 71 

• What criteria $hould the Corps use to measure its 

success when it responds to an earthquake or other 

domestic emergency? 

A tendency exists to cut back on training, exercises, personnel, and other resources for emergency operations, particularly in times of tight budgets when other needs seem more 

pressing. The South Pacific Division had resisted that attitude 

because of its location in a geologically fragile part of the 

world. But General Sobke cautioned, other divisions also need 

to be prepared.134 

Though costly and destructive, the Lorna Prieta earthquake was not the laJ:1ge earthquake that had been predicted 

in California. The damage was confined to certain well defined areas, and most power and communications systems 

were restored quickly. If the damage had been widespread, 

the Corps districts and the division would have had greater 

difficulty providing for their own personnel and for the hundreds of inspectors who converged on the bay area. Corps 

officials easily reestablished themselves at the Presidio, but 

what if that facility had been unavailable? In a more catastrophic event, district and division commanders would have 

been more challeng~d in balancing the need to reconstitute their commands with the need to respond to requests 

for assistance: 

Serious earthquake threats exist throughout the nation. 

According to FEMA, 44 states have seismic risk areas and 

13 heavily populated areas are in high-risk locations. Earthquake threats exist not only in California and Alaska but 

also along the New Madrid Fault that encompasses seven 

states in the midsecttion of the country. Severe earthquakes 

struck there in 1811 and 1812. The Corps of Engineers must 

be prepared to respond as aggressively and effectively in the 

future as it did in California. 
Notes 

Initial Response 

1San Francisco Chronicle, 26 October 1989, section B, 

p. 6. 

2Alexander G. Tarics, "Earthquakes and Our National 

Defense;' The Military Engineer, March/April 1990, vol. 83, 

no. 534, p. 31; Sacramento District, Public Affairs Report. 

au.S. Army Corps <1>f Engineers South Pacific Division, 

After Action Report-Corps of Engineers Response to the 

Loma Prieta Earthqu(J)ke, December 1990, p. 6. (Hereafter 

cited as SPD After Ac~ion Report.) 

4The New York Times, 19 October 1989, section B, p. 15. 

5General Accounting Office, "Disaster Assistance: Federal, State, and Local Responses to Natural Disasters Need 

Improvement;' March 1991, p. 4. (Hereafter cited as GAO 

Report.) 

6The New York Times, 19 October 1989, section B, 

p. 16; FEMA Situation Report (SITREP), 19 October 1989, 

6:00 A.M.; interview with Edward Hecker, SPD, San Francisco, CA, 25 January 11

990. All interviews cited herein were 

conducted by the author. 

7Memorandum, R. Gregg Chappell, Deputy Chair, Catastrophic Disaster Group, 19 October 1989, HQUSACE EOC 

#401. 

BSan Francisco Chronicle, 26 October 1989, section B, 

p. 5; The New York Times, 19 October 1989, section B, p. 16. 

9FEMA SITREP, 1~ October 1989, 6:00 A.M.; memoran- ' . dum, Deborah Hart, Chief, Program Coordination, Disaster 

Assistance Programs (FEMA) to Department of Agriculture, 

Corps of Engineers, an<ll others, 18 October 1989, HQUSACE 

EOC #50; FEMA SITREP, 27 October 1989. 

Department of Def~nse Response 

lOMessage 180715Z; Director of Military Support to Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, J-3, 18 October 1989, HQUSACE EOC #58; 
74 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

DOMS Information Memorandum #1, 19 October 1989, SPD 

EOC #2. 

11 DOMS Informati<J>n Memorandum # 1. 

12Interview with MG Todd P. Graham, Deputy Commander, Sixth Army, Presidio, San Francisco, CA, 25 January 

1990, pp. 1-2; interview with COL Albert E. Carlson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Sixth Army, Presidio, 

26 January 1990, p. 2; Carlson, Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, 18 October 1989. 

13Carlson interview, pp. 2-5. 

14DOMS Information Memorandum #6, 25 October 1989, 

SPD EOC # 276; DOMS Information Memorandum # 7, 

26 October 1989, SPD EOC #300; Carlson interview, pp. 9-10, 

39; DOMS Information Memorandum #9, 30 October 1989, 

SPD EOC #351. 

15DOMS Information Memorandum # 1. 

16DOMS Information Memorandum # 2, 20 October 1989 

SPD EOC #132; DOMS Information Memorandum #4, "' 

23 October 1989; DOMS Information Memorandum # 5, 

24 October 1989, SPD !EOC #268; and DOMS Information 

Memorandum # 6. 

17DOMS Information Memorandum # 4; DOMS Information Memorandum # 8, 27 October 1989, SPD EOC # 323. 

18DOMS Information Memorandum #4; DOMS Information Memorandum #9; DOMS Information Memorandum 

# 16, 7 December 1989, HQUSACE EOC # 454. 

19 National Guard, February 1990, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 28-

29; DOMS Information Memorandum # 1. 

20DOMS Information Memorandum # 3, 21 October 1989, 

SPD EOC #160; DOM$ Information Memorandum #4. 

Corps of Engineers Early Response 

21 Leland R. Johnson, "Emergency Response: A History 

of the Army Engineer Disaster Relief Mission, 1794-1950;' 

chapter 4, pp. 13, 15, 19, 21, 24, 25, Research Collections of 

the Office of History, Fort Belvoir, VA, Box VIII, file 17 -A. 

22Interview with LTC William T. Coffey, Deputy Commander, San Francisco District (SPN), San Francisco, CA, 

23 January 1990, pp. 2-3. 
Notes 75 

23Ibid., p. 4; interview with Richard Young, SPD, San 

Francisco, CA, 7 November 1989; Engineer Update, vol. 13, 

no. 12, December 1989. 

24Hecker interview, pp. 3-4. 

25Ibid., pp. 5-6, 17; SPD After Action Report, p. 13; message, SPD Division Engineer to Sacramento, San Francisco, 

and Los Angeles District Engineers, 23 October 1989, HQUSACE EOC # 24 7; interview with COL Dennis K. Culp, 

Deputy Commander, SPD, San Francisco, CA, 18 April 1990, 

pp. 2, 3; Sacramento Dlistrict (SPK) SITREP # 3, 18 October 

1989; interview with BG(P) John Sobke, Commander, SPD, 

San Francisco, CA, 6 November 1989, p. 20; interview with 

Dave Fulton, Chief of Construction-Operations Division, 

SPD, 24 January 1990, p. 5. 

26SPK, Public Affairs Report, March 1990, pp. 3-4; SPK 

phone log, 17 and 18 October 1989. 

27Sobke interview, p. 1; SPK, Public Affairs Report, p. 5. 

28Sobke interview, pp. 1-3, 5. 

29Coffey interview, pp. 4-5; message, SPD Division Engineer to Sacramento, San Francisco, and Los Angeles District 

Engineers, 23 October 1989; Sobke interview, p. 4; SPD/SPN 

Staff Journal/Log, 17 October 1989; Hecker interview, p. 9; 

SPD After Action Report, p. 3. 

30Carlson interview, pp. 22-24; Hecker interview, p. 9; 

Graham interview, p. 12; Fulton interview, p. 4; Sobke interview, p. 6. 

31Coffey interview, pp. 8-9; Fulton interview, p. 4. 

32Coffey interview, pp. 6-7, 9-11; message, SPD-DE 

to SPK-DE, SPN-DE, and (Los Angeles District) SPL-DE, 

23 October 1989. 

33SPK SITREP # 1, 17 October 1989; # 3, 18 October 

1989; #5, 18 October 1989; Engineer Update, vol. 13, no. 11, 

November 1989, p. 1. 

34Sobke interview, p. 6; SPD/SPN Staff Journal/Log, 

18 October 1989; Sobke, Memorandum for Record, 18 October 

1989, SPD EOC #62. 

35Sobke interview, p. 5; SPD/SPN Staff Journal/Log, 

18 October 1989. 

36HQUSACE, Emergency Operations Center phone log, 

MAJ Webb, Engineering and Housing Support Center, to 

Captain Carpenter, 1$ October 1989. 
76 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

37Message, Commander, USACE, to SPD, 18 October 

1989, HQUSACE EOC' #52; message, Commander, USACE, 

to Commander, SPD, n,d., HQUSACE EOC #63; SPL Operations Log, 18 October 1989, 4:08 P.M. 

Organizational Structure 

38SPD After Action Report, p. 19. 

39Fulton interview, p. 7; Sobke interview, p. 7; SPK phone 

log, Sobke to COL LeCuyer, 18 October 1989, 9:30 A.M.; 

and 11:05 A.M.; message, SPD to SPK, SPN, and SPL, 

20 October 1989. 

40Coffey interview, p. 15. 

41 Hecker interview, p. 34; interview with Mike Grebinski, 

SPD, DFO, Sunnyvale,. CA, 7 November 1989, pp. 4-6. 

42Sobke interview, p. 12; Grebinski interview, pp. 4-7; 

SPD After Action Report, p. 19. 

43Message, SPD-DE to SPK-DE, SPN-DE and SPL-DE, 

23 October 1989. 

44Culp interview, pp. 4, 8; Fulton interview, p. 10. 

45Sobke interview, p. 11; Grebinski interview, p. 14; Culp 

interview, pp. 4-7. 

46Culp interview, pp. 8, 11. 

47Hecker interview, p. 43; Grebinski interview, pp. 10, 15. 

48Hecker interview, pp. 44-45, 4 7; Fulton interview, p. 11. 

Preliminary Damage Assessment 

49Robert L. Vickers, Regional Director, FEMA Region IX, 

to BG(P) John Sobke, 18 October 1989, HQUSACE EOC # 202. 

50Sobke interview, pp. 7, 32; "Bay Breeze;' SPD Special 

Earthquake '89 Issue, p. 6; Engineer Update, vol. 13, no. 11, 

November 1989, p. 1. 

Individual Assista:$ce Mission 

51FEMA SITREP, 22 October 1989. 

52Tommie Hamner to Sobke, 22 October 1989, Mission 

Assignment Letter (MAL) R-COE-SPD-4, SPD EOC # 253; 

Culp interview, pp. 17-18. 
Notes 77 

53Gary Campbell notes, 20 October 1990; interview with 

LTC Timothy P. Mason, Deputy Commander, SPK, DFO, 

Sunnyvale, CA, 8 November 1989; Culp interview, p. 10; 

Hecker interview, p. 36. 

54Message, HQUSACE Emergency Operations Center, 

20 October 1989, 9:51 P.M., SPD EOC # 89; Fulton interview, 

p. 18. 

55LTG Henry Hatch to all Division Commanders, 

21 October 1989, HQUSACE EOC # 186; SPD Emergency 

Operations, Memorandum for all USACE Divisions, 

21 October 1989, HQUSACE EOC #208. 

56SPK, Public Affairs Review, March 1990, p. 8; Mason 

interview, pp. 2-3. 

57 San Francisco Clhronicle, 26 October 1989, section B, 

p. 5; FEMA SITREP, 27 October 1989. 

58Mason interview, pp. 1-5. 

59SPK Public Affairs Review, p. 10; interview with Gene 

Dretke, DFO, Sunnyvale, CA, 8 November 1989, p. 5; Hecker 

interview, p. 37; Fulton interview, p. 22; interview with 

Bruce Baughman, FEMA, Washington, DC, 9 February 1990; 

SPD Emergency Openations, Memorandum for all USACE 

Divisions, 30 October 1989, SPD EOC # 352. 

60Dretke interview, p. 28; interview with CPT Charles A. 

Rimbach, Marina Area Office, San Francisco, CA, 7 November 

1989, pp. 3-5. 

61Rimbach interviaw, pp. 4-5; Dretke interview, pp. 7, 14. 

62Dretke interview, pp. 6-7; Rimbach interview, p. 10; 

Mason interview, pp. 6, 20; Culp interview, p. 14. 

63Mason interview, pp. 6, 11, 20; Dretke interview, 

pp. 6-7. 

64Dretke interview, p. 9; Mason interview, p. 17. 

65Mason interview, pp. 18-19, 22. 

66Dretke interview, pp. 9-10, 14; Mason interview, p. 23; 

Culp interview, pp. 15-16. 

67Mason interview, p. 9; Hecker interview, p. 39; Culp 

interview, p. 20. 

68Dretke interview, pp. 15-16; Rimbach interview, p. 19. 

69SPK Public Aff&,irs Review, p. 13; Dretke interview, 

p. 26. 

70Rimbach interview, pp. 4-5; Dretke interview, pp. 17-

18; Culp interview, p. 16; Fulton interview, p. 19. 
78 Lorna Prieta Earthquake 

7 1Crosscurrents (St. Paul District), vol. 12, no. 12, December 1989, p. 5; GAO Report, pp. 48-49. 

72SPD After Action Report, p. 29; Engineer Update, 

vol. 13, no. 11, November 1989. 

73SPK, Public Affairs Review, pp. 12, 21. 

Public Assistance Mission 

74"Public Assistan¢e Program;' n.d., SPD. 

75Tommie Hamner to Sobke, 15 January 1990, MAL 

R-COE-SPD-2 Supplement 2, SPD. 

76Coffey interview, pp. 23-24; Culp interview, p. 23. 

77Culp interview, ptp. 25-26. 

78Baughman interview. 

79Memorandum for Record, SPD Emergency Operations, 

22 October 1989, SPD EOC #228. 

80FEMA SITREP, 22 October 1989; Coffey interview, 

pp. 19-20; Baughman interview. 

81SPD After Action Report, p. 26. 

82Coffey interview, pp. 27 -29; Culp interview, p. 26. 

83Memorandum of Agreement between FEMA and 

Department of the Army, 28 June 1988; see also J. Robert 

Edmisten, Memorandum for Record, 13 September 1988; 

Baughman interview; Coffey interview, p. 36. 

84Culp interview, pp~ 21-22; Baughman interview; Coffey 

interview, p. 39. 

85Coffey interview, p. 32; Baughman interview. 

86Coffey interview, pp. 33-34; Baughman interview. 

87Coffey interview, pp. 46, 48, 55. 

88Culp interview, p. 20; Coffey interview, p. 49; Hecker 

interview, p. 41. 

89Coffey interview, pp. 49-52. 

Direct Federal Assistance 

90Vickers to Sobke, ll8 October 1989, MAL R-COE-SPD-3; 

Hamner to Sobke, 22 October 1989, MAL R-COE-SPD-3, 

SPD EOC #302; Hamner to Sobke, 2 November 1989, MAL 

R-COE-SPD-3 Amendment 1, SPD; Hecker, Memorandum 

for Record, Meeting wli.th FEMA Public Assistance Staff, 

22 October 1989, SPD EOC #228. 
Notes 79 

91 Message, SPD Emergency Operations to SPN Emergency Operations, 21 October 1989, SPD; message, SPD 

Emergency Operations to SPN Emergency Operations, 

23 October 1989, SPD; message, SPD Emergency Operations to SPN Emergency Operations, 2 November 1989; SPN 

SITREP # 23, 9 November 1989. 

92SPD After Action Report, pp. 26, 28. 

93Memorandum, SQbke to SPK, SPL, and SPN, 21 November 1989, HQUSACE EOC # 4 78; SPD After Action 

Report, p. 28. 

Technical Assistance 

94Message, SPD to SPK, 21 October 1989, SPD; Rick 

Britzman and Michael Rutherford, Memorandum for File, 

25 October 1989, SPD; Hecker, Memorandum for Record, 

22 October 1989. 

95Hamner to Sobke, 2 November 1989, MAL R-COESPD-5; Hamner to Sobke, 7 December 1989, MAL R-COESPD-5 Supplement 2; SPD After Action Report, p. 31. 

96"Geologic Hazard$ Investigation, County of Santa Cruz, 

California;' Disaster Field Office SITREP # 39 for Engineer 

Support Function #3, 11 December 1989, HQUSACE EOC 

#439. 

97HQUSACE, Daily Staff Journal. 

98"Geologic Hazards Investigation;' 11 December 1989. 

99SPD After Action Report, pp. 29-31; Tasker, FEMA to 

Corps of Engineers, SPD EOC # 426; LTC William T. Coffey 

to Fred Keeley, 5 Janlilary 1990 SPD. 

100"Geologic Hazards Investigation;' 11 December 1989. 

Work for Others 

101Robert K. Best to Sobke, 26 October 1989, SPD; 

Lewis A. Whitney, C!hief, Engineering Division, Memorandum for Record (MFR), 20 October 1989, SPD. 

102Best to Sobke, 2:6 October 1989; Whitney MFR. 

103Sobke interview, pp. 33-34; Sobke to Best, 31 October 

1989, SPD EOC # 371. 

104SPK, Public Affairs Review, March 1990, p. 7; SPD 

After Action Report, p. 33. 
80 Loma Prieta Earthquake 

105Hecker interview, pp. 20-21; James E. Roberts, Chief, 

Division of Structures, CALTRANS to SPK, 20 October 1989. 

l06Daniel J. Dykst:ta, Jr., Assistant Division Counsel, 

Memorandum for Record, 25 October 1989, SPD EOC #269. 

l07Sobke to Bruce E. Cannon, Division Administrator, 

Department of Transpo:ttation, Federal Highway Administration, California Division, 2 November 1989, SPD EOC #484. 

108"Earthquake Damage to Metropolitan Oakland International Airport;' 17 October 1989, SPD EOC # 143. 

109"Earthquake Damage to Port of Oakland's Marine 

Terminal Facilities;' 17 October 1989, SPD EOC # 143. 

llOMessage, SPD Emergency Operations to SPK District 

Engineer, 21 October 1989, SPD; SPD Emergency Operations 

to SPK and. SPN Emergency Operations, 23 October 1989, 

SPD EOC # 172; message, SPD Emergency Operations to 

SPK and SPN District Engineers, 30 October 1989, SPD 

EOC # 398; SPD SITREIP, 24 October 1989; FEMA SITREP, 

24 October 1989. 

lllHQUSACE SITREP #3, 4 January 1990, HQUSACE 

EOC #480. 

Other Corps Activities 

112 APWA (American Public Works Association) Reporter, 

February 1990. 

113SPN SITREP # 6, 20 October 1989, SPD EOC # 152. 

114Sobke, Memorandum for USACE Emergency Operations, 24 October 1989, SPD EOC. 

11533 U.S.C. 203; Heaker interview, pp. 22, 26-27; Fulton 

interview, p. 20. 

116John P. Elmore, Memorandum for SPD ConstructionOperations Division, 25 October 1989, SPD EOC #234. 

117 APWA Reporter, February 1990; SPD After Action 

Report, p. 34. 

118COL Galen H. Yi;lnagihara, Memorandum for Commander, SPD, t4 November 1989, SPD EOC. 

119Elmore, Memorandum for Commander, SPD, 16 November 1989, SPD EOG # 565; SPD, Memorandum for Commander, USACE (Emergency Operations), 16 November 1989, 

SPD EOC #565. 

120SPD After Action Report, p. 35. 
Notes 81 

121 Memorandum, Hamner to Region IX, Regional Interagency Steering Committee (RISC), Principal Agencies, 

National Earthquake Htazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), 

Region IX, Hazard Mitigation Team (HMT), 25 October 1989. 

122Attachment to Hamner memorandum, 25 October 

1989, "Overview, Post Disaster Mitigation Process"; Robert 

Edmisten and Paul K~moroske, Memorandum for Record, 

16 November 1989; Disaster Field Office, Corps, Executive 

Summary, 31 October 1989. 

123GAO Report, p. 62. 

Conclusion 

124Carlson interview, pp. 17-18; Hecker interview, pp. 27, 

33. 

125GAO Report, p. 5. 

126Grant C. Peterson, Associate Director, State and Local 

Programs and Support, FEMA, Memorandum for Catastrophic Disaster Response Group, n.d., HQUSACE EOC 

# 453; Hamner to Sobke, 27 December 1989, SPD; Hecker, 

Memorandum for Record, 26 January 1990, SPD EOC. 

127Hecker interview, p. 27. 

128Graham interview, p. 4; SPK, Public Affairs Review, 

March 1990, p. 7; Hedker interview, pp. 29-30. 

129Sobke interview, pp. 17-19. 

130GAO Report, pp. 22, 30; Carlson interview, p. 45; 

The New York Times, · 19 October 1989, section B, p. 15. 

131Sobke interview, p. 26. 

132SPK, Public Affairs Review, March 1990, p. 25; 

Larry L. Erwin to MG Patrick J. Kelly, 17 November 1989, 

HQUSACE EOC #482. 

133LTG Hatch, Memorandum for See Distribution, 

20 December 1989. 

134Sobke interview, p. 36. 
People Interviewed 

Bruce Baughman 

Colonel 

Albert E. Carlson 

Lieutenant Colonel 

William T. Coffey 

Colonel 

Dennis K. Culp 

Gene Dretke 

J. Robert Edmisten 

Dave Fulton 

Major General 

Todd P. Graham 

Mike Grebinski 

Edward Hecker 

Carl Kress 

Lieutenant Colonel 

Timothy P. Mason 

Captain 

Charles A. Rimbach 

Brigadier General(P) 

John Sobke 

Richard Young 

FEMA, Washington, DC, 9 February 

1990 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

Sixth Army, 26 January 1990 

Deputy Commander, San Francisco 

District, 23 January 1990 

Deputy Commander, South Pacific 

Division, 18 April 1990 

Disaster Field Office, Sunnyvale, CA, 

8 November 1989 

South Pacific Division, 7 November 

1989 

Chief of Construction-Operations 

Division, South Pacific Division, 

24 January 1990 

Deputy Commander, Sixth Army, 

25 January 1990 

Disaster Field Office, Sunnyvale, CA, 

7 November 1989 

Chief, Emergency Management 

Branch, South Pacific Division, 

25 January 1990 

South Pacific Division, 26 January 

1990 

Deputy Commander, Sacramento 

District, 8 November 1989 

Marina Area Office, San Francisco, 

CA, 7 November 1989 

Commander, South Pacific Division, 

6 November 1989 

South Pacific Division, 7 November 

1989 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 

APWA 

BART 

BG 

CALTRANS 

CDRG 

CIP 

CRC 

DAC 

DCO 

DFO 

DOD 

DOMS 

DSR 

EDT 

EHSC 

EOC 

EP 

EPA 

ESF 

EST 

FAA 

FCO 

FEMA 

FORSCOM 

GAO 

GSA 

American Public Works Association 

Bay Atea Rapid Transit 

Brigadier General 

California Department of Transportation 

Catastrophic Disaster Response Group 

Cataloging in Publication 

Crisis Response Cell 

Disaster Application Center 

Disaster Control Officer 

Disaster Field Office 

Department of Defense 

Direct<)rate of Military Support 

Damage Survey Report 

Eastern Daylight Time 

Engineering and Housing Support Center 

Emergency Operations Center 

Engineer Publication 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Emergency Support Function 

Eastern Standard Time 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Federal Coordinating Officer 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

U.S. Army Forces Command 

General Accounting Office 

General Services Administration 
84 

HMT 

HQUSACE 

IA 

IDT 

LTC 

MAL 

MFR 

MLLW 

NEHRP 

NOAA 

OES 

OMB 

PA 

PDA 

PDT 

RISC 

SAD 

SBA 

SITREP 

SPD 

SPK 

SPL 

SPN 

TAG 

USACE 

VHF 

WES 

Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Hazard Mitigation Team 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Individttal Assistance 

Indefinite Delivery Type 

Lieutenant Colonel 

Mission Assignment Letter 

Memorandum for Record 

Mean Low Low Water 

National Earthquake Hazards Reduction 

Progtam 

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

[California State] Office of Emergency Services 

Office of Management and Budget 

Public Assistance 

Prelimi:n:ary Damage Assessment 

Pacific Daylight Time 

Regional Interagency Steering Committee 

South Atlantic Division 

Small Business Administration 

Situation Report 

South Pacific Division 

Sacramehto District 

Los Angeles District 

San Francisco District 

Technical Advisory Group 

US Army Corps of Engineers 

Very High Frequency 

Waterwa~s Experiment Station 
Index 

A 

Administrative support: 9-

10, 35, 45-46 

Aerial reconnaissance: 10 

Agnos, Art: 69-70 

Air Rescue and Re¢overy 

Group, 129th: 10 

Airlift assistance: 9, 10 

Airports: 41, 58-59 

Alameda, CA: 4 7, 51 

Alameda County, CA: 6, 21, 

51 

Alameda Naval Air Station: 9, 10 

Albany, CA: 4 7 

American Red Cross: 4, 9, 

10 

B 

Baughman, Bruce: 20, 21, 

40, 41, 44 

Baxter, Lt. Gen. George: 15, 

69-70 

Bay Bridge: 9, 15, 19, 47, 

55, 58, 59, 69 

Bay Farm Island: 4 7 

Beale Air Force Base: 10 

Berkeley Marina: 4$, 51 

Berkeley Yacht Harbor: 4 7 

Best, Robert K.: 55-56 

Bhamidipaty, Surya: 64-65 

Bridges: 51 

Brussard, Bob: 20, 21, 28 

Buena Vista Farm, Watsonville, CA: 49 

Buildings, collapse of: 1-2, 

9 

Bureau of Reclamation: 13 

Bush, George: 5-6, 7, 25 

c 

California, governor of: 4, 

6, 39, 61 

California Air National 

Guard: 10 

California Army National 

Guard: 10 

California Department of 

Fish and Game: 48 

California Department of 

Transportation (CALTRANS): 23, 4 7-48, 55-

58 

California Department of 

Water Resources: 13 

California Division of 

Mines and Geology: 52-

53 

California National Guard: 

10 

California Office of Emergency Services: 8, 10, 13, 

15, 25, 52-53, 67' -68 

Carlson, Col. Albert E.: 8 

Catastrophic Disaster Response Group: 4, 5 

Cheney, Richard: 7 

Clerical personnel: 20, 25, 

35 

Coffey, Lt. Col. William T.: 

11, 14,21-22,41,42,44, 

45-46 

Commander's Awards for 

Civilian Service: 70 
86 

Communications coordihation: 9, 10, 14, 30, 69, 71 

Communications problems: 

11-13, 19 

Construction equipment: 9 

Construction management 

assistance: 20 

Contracting authority: 13-

14, 17, 63 

Contractors: 27, 28, 33-34, 

48, 63 

Contracts: 13, 14-15, 17, 

48, 53, 63 

Corps of Engineers: see U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers 

Corralitos Creek: 63 

Cost accounting: 22, 40 

Cost estimates: 42, 44, $1, 

63 

Cost sharing: 39, 4 7, 68 

Cranes, damage to: 41 

Culp, Col. Dennis K.: 13, 

14,21-22,27-28,34,35, 

40-41 

Cypress Street Viaduct 

(1-880): 1-2, 9, 15, 55-

57, 58 

D 

Damage assessment: 10, 

15, 16, 17, 19,21,22-~3, 

25,27,35-36,39-46,47, 

51, 53, 55-57' 59 

Damage survey reports: 21, 

39-46, 59 

Dams: 13, 15, 16, 39 

Deaths: 1-2 

Debris, disposal of: 57-$9 

Directorate of Military Support (DOMS): 7, 10, 16 

Disaster control officer: 7-8 

Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Disaster Relief Act of 1974: 

64 

Disaster Relief Fund: 4 

Docks: 47-48, 51 

Dredging: 14-15, 47-48 

Dretke, Gene: 28, 32, 34 

Dutra Dredging Company: 

48 

E 

East Bay harbor: 4 7, 59 

Edmisten, Robert: 64-65 

Elmore, John P.: 4, 63 

Emeryville Marina: 51 

Engineers: see U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers 

Engineering and Housing 

Support Center (EHSC): 

17 

Environ.mental Protection 

Agency: 4, 48, 57-58 

Erwin, Larry L.: 69-70 

F 

Federal Aviation Administration: 4, 59 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): 

3-6,7,9-10,13-14,19-

20,21,23,25,27-32,34, 

36,39-43,47-49,51,53, 

55, 61, 64, 67-71 

criSIS management 

staff: 3 

disaster application centers: 5, 27, 30, 31-32 

disaster field office: 9-

10,19,20,21-23,30, 

32,35,39,42-44,46, 

52, 64, 67, 69 
Index 

emergency information 

and coordination center: 4 

hazard mitigation 

team: 35, 64-65 

Region IX Interagency 

Steering Committee: 

64 

training provided by: 

31-32, 35, 42-44 

Federal Highway Administration: 56 

Ferrin, Lt. Col. Frederick: 

11, 14 

Ferry service: 47-48,$1,59 

Fire fighting: 8-9, 11 

Fires: 2, 8-9, 69 

Fisheries: 57-58 

Flood Control and C(J)astal 

Storm Emergencies: 20, 

61 

Flood control systems: 15, 

20, 61, 63, 69-70 

Food, emergency: 9 

FORSCOM: 7-8 

Fort Belvoir, VA: 17 

Fort Mason: 11 

Franklin, Gus: 64-6$ 

Fraud: 36 

Fruitvale Avenue Raiilroad 

Bridge: 51 

Fulton, Dave: 13, 14, 19-

20, 22, 31-32 

G 

General Accounting Office: 

67 

General Services Administration: 4, 59 

Geotechnical assistance: 

51-53 

87 

Golden Gate Fields: 4 7 

Golden Gate Reserve Center: 10 

Gorup, Roy: 41 

Graham, Maj. Gen. Todd P.: 

7-8 

Grahl, Helga: 12, 41 

Granite Construction: 63 

Grants, federal: 39-46 

Grebinski, Mike: 21-22 

H 

Habitability inspections: 

27, 28,31-32,36,44-45 

Hall, Robert: 64-65 

Hamner, Tommie C.: 6, 8, 

15, 47, 64 

Hatch, Lt. Gen. Henry J.: 

13, 16, 27-29, 56, 70 

Hazard mitigation: 4, 64-

65 

Hazard mitigation team: 

35, 52, 64-65 

Heating systems: 49 

Hecker, Edward: 12, 14, 19-

20, 21, 41 

Hempen, Greg: 64-65 

High Street Bridge: 51 

Highways 

Cypress Street Viaduct 

(I-880): 1-2, 9, 15, 

55-57, 58 

damage assessment: 

25, 55-57 

Embarcadero Freeway: 

2, 11 

1-480: 2 

Hollister, CA: 30, 31, 33, 

35-36 

Homeless, shelters for the: 

1, 2, 8-9, 10, 34, 36, 49 
88 

Housing assistance: 27, 36 

Hurdle, Jack: 64-65 

Hurricane Hugo: 5, 27, 86, 

40-41, 67-68, 69, 70 

I 

Individual assistance programs: 6, 20, 21-23, 2~7-

37, 44-45, 69, 70 

Injuries: 1-2 

K 

Kelly, Brig. Gen. Patrick: 15 

Komoroske, Paul: 64-66 

Kuzmiak, Pat: 12 

L 

Lake Eisman dam: 15 

Landslides: 51-53 

Language differences, problems posed by: 35-36 

Law enforcement, support 

to: 8-9, 10 

LeCuyer, Col. Jack A.: ]3, 

29-30, 55-56 

Lessons learned: 67-68 

Levees 

damage assessment: 13, 

16, 58 

repair of: 23, 39, 61, 63 

Lexington dam: 15 

Lighting equipment: 8-9 

Lorna Prieta Mountain: 1 

Los Angeles District: 59 

Los Gatos, CA: 30, 31, $3 

M 

McCarthy, Leo T.: 6 

Manson Dredging: 48 

Marina Area Office: 32-

33, 35 

Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Marina District: 2, 8-9, 11, 

15 

Marine Air Group 42: 9 

Marine Expeditionary Unit, 

15th: 9-10 

Marriott Hotel, dock slip 

dredged: 47 

Mason, Lt. Col. Timothy: 

21-22, 29-30, 32, 34 

Mather Air Force Base: 10 

Meritorious Service Medals: 70 

Military Air Command: 58 

Military police, use of: 8-9 

Miller Sweeney Bridge: 51 

Mission assignment letters: 

25, 39-40, 47, 51 

Missouri River Division: 

45-46 

Moffett Field Naval Air 

Station: 10 

Monterey, CA: 6, 13, 19, 

21, 25 

Mountain View, CA: 1, 19, 

20, 22, 42 

N 

National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program: 

64 

National Guard: 10, 68 

National Institute of Standards and Technology: 56 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA): 57-58 

Newell Creek dam: 15 

0 

Oakland, CA: 9, 19, 30, 31, 

33, 37, 55 
Index 

Oakland Army Base: 59 

Oakland International Airport: 41 

Ocean disposal sites: 57-59 

Ocean Dumping Act: 57-58 

Office of Management and 

Budget: 67-68 

Outer Harbor Terminal: 59 

p 

Pacific Gas and Electric: 9 

Page, Robert W.: 70 

Pajaro River: 61, 63 

Panetta, Leon E.: 25, 52 

Park Street Bridge: 51 

Perry, Chuck: 64-65 · 

Peterson, Grant C.: 3 

Plan for Federal Response 

· to a Catastrophic Earthquake: 3, 4-5, 19, 67 

Port of Oakland: 41, 68-59 

Power generators: 2, 9, 17 

Preparedness: 3, 68-69, 70, 

71 

Presidio: 8, 10, 14, 16, 59, 

69, 71 

Productivity: 33-34, 35 

Public assistance progtams: 

20, 21-23, 39-46, 68, 69 

Q 

Quality assurance: 32, 41, 

42 

Quality control: 32, 42-43 

Quayle, Dan: 5-6 

R 

Reclamation, Bureau of: 13 

Redwood City, CA: 30, 31, 

33 

89 

Reimbursement arrangements: 25, 27, 40, 47, 51 

Rental assistance checks: 

36, 70 

Rescue efforts: 9 

"Response '89" exercise: 69 

Richmond Inner Harbor: 51 

Richter scale: 1 

Rimbach, Capt. Charles: 32 

Robert T. Stafford Disaster 

Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act: 3-4, 6 

Robertson, Lt. Col. James 

Jeffrey: 16 

Runways: 41, 58, 59 

s 

Sacramento, CA: 4, 8, 28, 

68 

Sacramento District: 11-

12,13,15,16,19-20,21, 

22,25,29-31,39,41,44, 

51, 55-56, 57, 59, 69, 70 

Sacramento River: 15 

San Benito County, CA: 6, 

21, 25 

San Francisco, CA: 1-2, 6, 

8-9, 21, 30, 33, 42, 44, 

47-48, 59 

San Francisco County, CA: 

21 

San Franci~o District: 12, 

13,14-15,16,19-20,21, 

22,39,47,51,53,59,61, 

63, 69 

San Francisco earthquake 

of 1906: 11 

San Francisco Harbor: 9 

San Francisco International 

Airport: 59 

San Joaquin River: 15 
90 

San Leandro Bay: 4 7 

San Leandro Marina: 51 

San Lorenzo River: 61, 63 

San Mateo County, CA: 6, 

21 

Santa Clara, CA: 41 

Santa Clara County, CA: 6, 

21 

Santa Cruz, CA: 1, 2, 9~ 30, 

31, 33, 42, 44, 61, 63, 

69-70 

Santa Cruz County, CA: 6, 

21, 25, 52-53 

Santa Cruz Department of 

Parks and Recreation: 51 

Santa Cruz Mountains: 

51-53, 61 

Sausalito base yard: 15 

School districts: 59 

Seventh Street Marine Terminal: 58-59 

Shelters for the homeless: 

1, 2, 8-9, 10, 34, 36, 49 

Ships, Navy: 9 

Sills, David: 64-65 

Sixth Army: 7-8, 13, 14, 

15, 20, 67, 68, 69 

Skinner, Samuel K.: 5-6 

Small Business Administration: 27, 59 

Smith, Maj. Gen. James D.: 

7 

Sobke, Brig. Gen. John: 12, 

13-15,17,19-20,21,22, 

25,27-28,41,56,61,68, 

69, 71 

South Pacific Division: 11-

13,16,17,20-23,28-29, 

47,52,53,57,61,63,68, 

69, 71 

Earthquake Operations 

Order # 2: 20-21 

Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Emergency Management Branch: 12 

emergency operations 

center: 14, 22, 28 

organizational structure for response: 

19-23, 30, 41, 69 

Structural damage 

to bridges: 51 

to buildings: 2, 9, 28, 

51 

to highways: 2, 9, 15, 

25, 55-57 

to piers: 51 

Sununu, John: 5-6 

T 

Tactical Command Readiness Exercise: 68 

Technical assistance: 23, 

47, 51-53, 57, 59 

Todd Shipyard: 47, 51 

Traffic control: 9-10 

Training: 3, '31-32, 35, 40, 

41,43-45,68-69,70,71 

Transportation, means of: 

10, 11, 17, 47-48, 59 

Travis Air Force Base: 10, 

17 

Treasure Island Naval Station: 9 

u 

U.S. Air Force: 7, 8, 10 

U.S. Army: 7-11, 59 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

costs: 37, 52 

Headquarters (HQUSACE): 12-13, 15, 

16,27-28,41,61,63 
Index 

organization of response: 11-17 

personnel management: 

44-46 

staffing: 28-31, 32-33, 

35,40-41,44-4$,70 

see also: specific districts and divisions 

U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM): 7-8 

U.S. Coast Guard: 57-58 

U.S. Department of Defense: 

7-10, 11, 65 

U.S. Department of Education: 59 

U.S. Department of Ttansportation: 4, 56 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: 48 

U.S Geological Survey: 52-

53 

U.S. Marine Corps: 9 

U.S. Navy: 8, 9 

USS Flint: 9 

USS Fort Fisher: 9 

USS Gompers: 9 

USS Gray: 9 

USS Kansas City: 9 

USS Lang: 9 

USS Pelilieu: 9, 10 

USS Schenectady: 9 

USS Texas: 9 

91 

Urban search and rescue 

miSSIOn: 8-9, 13-14, 20 

v 

Vallejo Pier: 51 

Vickers, Bob: 20 

Videotaping: 16, 57 

w 

Waite, Dary 1: 41 

Water supplies: 9 

Waterways Experiment 

Station: 52, 53 

Watsonville, CA: 30, 33, 49, 

63 

White House: 5-6 

William Cotton and Associates: 53 

Workload, management of: 

20, 32-33, 42 

y 

Yanagihara, Col. Galen: 

11-12, 14, 25, 63 

Young, Rich: 11-12, 20 
ISBN 0~16-041730-9 

90000 

9 7801 0 417306 
For Further Reading on Corps Disaster Relief 

The Office of History haJs also published The U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers Response to the Exrxon Valdez Oil Spill, by Janet McDonnell. 

Copies are available from the publications depot. 

Additional copies of Response to the Lama ·Prieta Earthquake are 

also available. 

Corps of Engineers employees can order these books on ENG FORM 

4111. Others may request one free copy on official letterhead stationery. 

Contact: 

Army Corps of Engineers 

Publiqations Depot 

2803 $2nd Avenue 

Hyattsville, MD 20781 
EP870+44 

April1993 

US Army Corps 

of Engineers