### In the



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1314

K E I T H A. L E E, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

B RI AN F O S T E R

, Responden t-Appellee.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Eastern Distri ct o f Wi sconsi n. No. 1: 10 -cv-00 04 0 — Will ia m C. Griesb ach , Chief Judg e.
A RGU E D O C TOB E R 29, 2013

— D E C I D E D A P RI L 28, 2014

Before W OOD, Chief Judge, and K AN N E and H AMI L T O N , Circ uit Judges. K AN N E, Cir cui t Judge. Keith Lee fi led a petiti on for a wri t of habeas corpus in the Uni ted St ates Di stric t C o ur t for the Eastern Di stric t of Wi scons in. The di stric t court d e nied the petiti on, but certifi ed three i ssu es for appeal: (1) whether an incourt i denti fi cati on of Lee violated hi s rights to due process; (2) whether an ad e qu ate and independent state gr ound precluded consi derat i on of Lee’s clai m fo r ineffec tiv e assi stance of2 No. 13-1314

couns el; and (3) whether admi ssi on of an out-of-court statement at tr i al violated his S ix th Amendment right to confront wi tnesses. W

e affi rm. I. B A C K G R O U N D Lee w as tr i ed and convic ted of the fi rst-degr ee reckless homi cide of Joshua Mey ers along wi th tw o counts of armed
ro bbery

. The government presented evidenc e tha t he and Vi ctor Thomas tr av eled to Mey ers’s resi dence in Os hkosh, W isconsin to collect a drug debt. Four people w ere pre se nt when Thomas and Lee arr i v ed: Mey ers’s half-brot her Kr i stopher Johnston, Mey ers’s fri end Cei ly a P aez, P aez’s tw o-y ear -old daughter , and Meye r s. So on after their arr i v al, a fi ght brok e out, at whi ch poin t Lee pulled a gun and shot Mey ers in the abdomen. Mey ers di ed shortly after being sh ot. Lee and Thomas left th e apartment and dr ov e to Milw aukee where they met wi th Chris topher Johnson. Johnson drove L ee and Thomas to a gas station and then dropped L e e o ff a t
a street corner in M i lw aukee. Shor tly there after , Johnson and Thomas w ere pulled ov er by M ilw aukee poli ce and arr ested. Le e w a s apprehended in Chi cago approx i mately one month later

. Lee w as found gui lty following a fi v e-day jury t r ial. He appealed hi s convic tion, whi ch w as affi rmed by the Wi scons in Court of Appeals. Lee then fi led a postconvic tion motion wi th the Wi scons in ci rcui t court, whi ch w as deni ed. The Wi scons in Court of Appeals affi rmed and the Wi scons in Supreme Court d eni ed further rev i ew

. He then fi led a petiti on for a wr it o f habeas c orpus wi th the di stric t court, whi ch deni ed the petiti onNo. 13-1314 3
but certifi ed three i ssu es for appeal. W e wi ll address each in turn. II. D I S C U S S I O N The Antiterro ris m and Effec tiv e Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, permi ts habeas relief only i f the st a t e-court adjudicati on resulted in a deci si on that “w as contrar y to, or inv olv ed an unre a sonable appli cati on of, clearly establi shed Feder al law

, as de t ermin ed by the Supreme Court of the Uni ted St ates” or “resulted in a deci si on that w as based on an unreasonable deter minati on of the facts in li ght of the evidenc e p resented in t he St ate court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). W hen rev i ewing a petiti on for a wri t of habeas cor p us , “ w e rev i ew the di stric t court’s findings of fact for clear err or and i ts ruli ngs on i ssu es of law de novo .” Bintz v
. Bertrand, 403 F .3d 859, 865 (7th Ci r
. 2005) (quoting Denn y v
. Gudmanson , 252 F .3d 896, 900 (7th Ci r
. 2001)). As all t hree of Lee’s clai ms inv olv e i ssu es of law , our r eview of the di stric t court ’s ruling i s de novo

. A. Identification Procedure Lee fi rst chall e ng e s the in-c ourt i denti fi cati on by Chris topher Johnson. Elev en days before Lee’s tr i al, the poli ce showed Johnson a photo arr ay

, whi ch inclu ded pi ctures of both Vi ctor Thomas and Lee. Johnson w as not able to pi ck out Lee’s photo from the lineup,—though he w as able to i denti fy Thomas—b ut told detectiv es that he could i denti fy the man he gav e a ride i f he saw hi m in person. In ret urn for hi s testim ony against Lee, the detectiv es told Johnson that they w ould testif y on hi s behalf in hi s un relat ed tr i al.4 No. 13-1314
At tr i al, Johnson testifi ed to the ext ent that he knew Lee. He st ated that though he had seen Lee “a couple of t ime s
... I
nev er shook hands or none of that li ke that” and that he w ould be able to recog ni ze hi m i f he “saw hi m toda y .” Thereafter

, Johnson i denti fi ed Lee as the man in the courtr oom who, whi le riding wi th Thomas and hi mself, admi tte d “pop[ping]” a “guy” in Oshkosh on the night of January 10, 2006. On cross-examinati on, Johnson stated: Q. So y ou knew that y ou w ere go ing t o be able to say I ’ m going to look at the defense table and I’m going to po int to the AfricanAmeric an and that’s go ing to be the guy; is n’t thatcorr ect? A. Basi cally

, y eah. Lee arg ues that thi s statement proves that Johnson i denti

fi ed Lee solely on the basi s of hi s race. He alleges that thi s fact, coupled wi th Johnson’s inabi li ty to i dentify Lee in the photo
arr ay and the fav or able testim ony receiv ed from detecti v es at hi s own tr i al, consti tutes an i mpermi ssi ble i denti fi cati on procedure. W e hav e held that a “wi tness’s i denti fi cati on violate s a defendant’s right to due process when the i denti fi cati on procedure i s so i mpermi ssi bly suggesti v e a s t o giv e ris e to a
v ery sub stanti al li kelih ood of i rr eparable mi si denti fi cati on.” United States v
. Recen diz , 557 F .3d 511, 52 4 (7 t h C i r
. 2009) (internal quotat i o n marks omi tte d). Y et “the admi ssi on of evidenc e ra r e ly i mpli cates due process,” as courts typical ly rely on ot her means—su ch as the Sixth Amendment r i ghts to
couns el and confronta t io n—to safeguard the reliab i li ty ofNo. 13-1314 5
eviden ce

. United States v
. Sanders , 708 F .3d 976, 983 (7th Ci r
. 2013). Due process wi ll only prohibi t ev ide nce when i t “i s so ext reme l y unfai r that i ts admi ssi on violates fund amental concepti ons of justi ce.” Perry v

. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct . 716, 723 (2012) (quoti ng Dowling v
. United States , 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990))

. In deter min ing whether an i denti fi cati on procedure reaches thi s sub stanti al threshold, w e engage in a tw o-pro nged analy sis. First, w e deter mine whether the i denti fi cati on proced ur e w as suggesti v e and unnec essary

. Sanders , 708 F .3d at 984–85. Second, w e deter mine under t he tot ali ty of the ci rcums tances whether the p ro c e d u re wa s n one theles s reliab le. Id. Lee’s asserti on that Johnson w as aw are that Lee w ould be the Afric an-Ameri can at the defense table i s nei ther suggesti v e nor unnec essa ry

. W e hav e noted that “a defendant’s mere presence at t he defense table i s not enough to establi sh a violati on of due process.” Recen diz, 557 F .3d at 525; see also United Stat es v

. Bush , 749 F .2d 1227, 1232 (7th Ci r
. 1984). There is nothin g in the recor d to establi sh that Johnson’s i dent ific a
tion w as made solely on the basi s of Lee’s race or that Johnson

w as instructed to poin t to the Afric an-Ameri can man at the defense table. Rather

, Johnso n w as si mply testif yin g to hi s knowledge of the si tuation at hand: he ha d seen Lee, an Afric an-Ameri can, on sev eral occasi ons and w as aw are that he

w as testif

yin g at Lee’s tr i al. Whi le the questi on i tself may seem fai rly su spect, i t does not i tself establi sh any w ro ngdoing that mi ght i mpli cate due process. Sim i larl y , Jo hnson repeat edly admi tte d that he w a s un able to pi ck out Lee’s pi cture in the photo arr ay

, but could i denti fy L e e if he saw hi m in person. The fact that Johnson w as not able to select Le e ’ s p ho to may6 No. 13-1314
tend to di scredi t Johnson’s testim ony , but t hi s i s not our concern, fo r e x a mining the accu racy of the i denti fi cati on falls wi thi n “the exclusi v e prov ince o f the jury .” Recen diz , 557 F .3d at 524. Johnson’s testim ony too k place in front of th e j ur y , “whi ch observ ed and presum ably w ei ghed any arg uably suggesti v e ci rc um stances .” Id

. at 526; see also Johnson v
. McCaughtry, 92 F .3d 585, 597 (7th Ci r
. 1996) (though an in-c ourt i dentifi c a ti on m a y n ot b e “ especi ally convin cing,” that does not render i t in admi ssi

ble; the u ltim ate ac curacy of the id entifi cation i s to be deter mined by the jury as the tr i er of fact). Our ro le i s only to deter min e whether an i denti fi cati on i s “so i mpermi ssi

bly suggesti v e as to give r ise to a v ery sub stanti al li kelih ood of i rr eparable mi si denti fi cati on.” Simm ons v
. United States , 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). Nei ther the in-c ourt i denti fi cation nor the phot o ar ray meet this threshold. Ev en i f w e found Johnson’s id entifi cati on procedure to be
unnec essari ly suggesti v e, how ev er , i t w as nonetheless reliab le under the ci rcums tances. The Supreme Court set fort h sev eral factors for courts to use to deter mine whether an undu ly suggesti v e i denti fi cati on procedure w as still to be consi dered reliab le under the ci rcums tances: (1) the o p p or tuni ty of the wi tness to observ e the cri minal at the tim e of the cri me (or prior to the i denti fi cati on); (2) the wi tness’s degr ee of atte nti on; (3) the accu racy of the wi tness’s prior d e scri ption of the cri minal; (4) the lev el of certainty demonstrate d by the wi tness at the tim e o f the i denti fi cati on; and (5) the length of tim e betw een the cri me and the i denti fi cati on. Neil v
. Biggers , 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972). Applyin g the factors to Johnson’s testim ony , w e find i t w as suffi ci ently reliab le to be admi tte d at tr i al. First, JohnsonNo. 13-1314 7

t e st ifi ed that he w as in the car wi th Vi ctor Thomas and L e e after the shooting and drove th e t w o men aro und before dropping Lee off on a Milw aukee street corner

. He also stated that at one poin t, he and Lee w ere alone in the v ehi cle and had a bri ef di scu ssi on. Second, Johnson di d admi t thathe w as not payin g particu lar att ention to Lee or the backseat where Lee

w as lo cated. As t o the thi rd factor , Johnson did not prov i de a prior descri ption of Lee, but di d testif y that he had se e n L e e driving aro und on sev eral occasi ons. A nd whi le he could not pi ck hi m out i n the photo lineup, he repeat edly s tate d that he

w ould be able to i denti fy Lee i f he saw hi m in person. Four th, Johnson confi rmed tha t he w as “sure” that the man who w as in the car wi th hi m and Vi ctor Thomas the ni ght o f the s hoot

ing w as in fact Keith Lee. Fin ally , ov er nine months had pass ed betw een the shoot ing and the i n-c ourti denti fi cati on. Consi dering all of the factors, w e do not find thi s testim ony to be unreli able. Although Johnson’s lack of atte nti on to Lee on the ni ght of the shootin g a nd t he ext ended duration of tim e betw een their ini tial encounter and the i denti fi cati on rais e some concern, the testim ony w as nonetheless consti tutionally reliab l e when consi dered wi th the other Biggers factors. Cert ainly Johnson’s testim ony w as not receiv ed wi thout some flaws, as i s most evidenc e that i s proper ly exami ned, but these are is suesfor t he jury to decide in w ei ghi ng any questi onable di screpanc i es. Manson v
. Brathw aite, 4 3 2 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (“[E] videnc e wi th some element of untrustw or thiness i s cus tomar y gr i st for the jury mi ll. Juries a r e not so sus cepti ble that they cannot measu re intelli gently the w ei ght of i denti fi cation testim ony that has some quest i onable feature.”) Accordingly , w e find no err or

.8 No. 13-1314 B. Ineffec tive Assistance of Coun sel Lee also conten d s that he i s entitled to an evidenti ary hearin g on hisclai m of ineffec tiv e assi stance of coun sel. Lee’s
couns el appealed hi s convic tio n, wh i ch w as affi rmed by the Wi scons in courts, but di d not rais e a clai m of ine ffec tiv e assi stance of tr i al couns el. Thereafter , Lee fi led hi s postconvi- 1 cti on motion for in effecti v e assi stance of both trial and app ellate couns el. Lee arg ued that hi s tr i al couns el’ s inve sti gation into hi s alibi w as defi ci ent and that hi s atto rney fail e d to explain why he could not present both the alibi and credibi li ty arg uments at tr i al. He also asserts that hi s appellate couns el

w as ineffec tiv e i n fai ling to rais e the effecti v eness clai m in hi s di rect appeal and should hav e di scerned s u ch an obvious clai m from the r ecord. The Wi scons in Court of Appeals deni ed Lee’s motion for postconvi c ti on re l i e f. It found that the allegations reg ardin g hi s postconvic tion couns el’ s perfor manc e w ere conclu sory and legally insu ffi ci ent under the rule set forth in State v
. Allen , 682 N.W .2d 433 (Wi s. 2004). The court als o held that Lee’s motion

w as barred by the Supreme Court of Wi scons in’s ruli ng in State
v
. Escalona-Nara njo , whi ch holds that all i ssu es not ra ised in a prev i ous postconvic tion motion or appeal are foreclosed from being brought up in a sub seque nt postconvic tion motion unles s the petiti oner can demonstrate “ su ffic i ent reason” for the delay

. 517 N.W

.2d 154, 162 (Wi s. 1994).

Lee’s appell ate counsel chall enged the (1 ) i n-co urt i denti fi catio n of Lee b y 1 Chri stopher Jo hnson and (2 ) whether Jo hnson’s testimo ny ab out a
c onversation tha t occ urred b etween Thomas and Lee consti tuted in a dm is s ib l e hearsay.No. 13-1314 9
The di stric t court affi rmed the deci si on, finding that, whi le the motion w as not barred on Escalona-Nara njo gr ounds, i t w as nonetheless pr ocedurally defaulted becaus e he di d not allege suffi ci ent facts to entitle hi m to r eli ef. A clai m wil l be pr ocedurally defaulted—a nd barred from federal review —i f the last state court that rendered judgment “‘clearly and expr essly’ states that i ts judgment rests on a state procedural bar .” Harris v
. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 2 6 3 (1 9 8 9) (quoti ng Caldwell v
. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1 9 8 5 )). Accordi ngly

, we wi ll no t enter tain questi ons of federal law in a habeas petiti on when the state procedural gr ound r e l ied upon in the state court “i s independent of the federal questi on and adequate to supp or t the judgment.” Coleman v
. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). An independent state gr ound wi ll be found “when the court actually relied on the procedural bar as an independent basi s for i ts di sposi tion of the case.” Thompkins
v
. Pfister, 698 F .3d 976, 9 8 6 (7 t h Ci r
. 2012) (ci tin g Kaczmarek v
. Rednour, 627 F .3d 586, 592 (7th Ci r
. 2010)). A s tate law gr ound i s adequat e “ when i t i s a fi rmly establi shed and reg ularly follow ed state pr acti ce at the time i t is appli ed.” Id. The Wi scons in Court of Appeals relied on the Wi scons in Supreme Court ’s rule set fort h in State v
. Allen— whi ch governs when a petiti oner asserts tha t he i s entitled to an evidenti ary hearin g—a s it s basi s for denyi ng Lee’s motion. The court stated, “A W I S

. S T

A T

. § 974.06 motion mus t offer more than conclu sory allegations to be legally suffi ci ent. See Al l e n , 274 Wi s. 2d 568, ¶12. W

e agr ee wi th the ci rcui t court that L e e’s allegations of postconvic tion couns el’s ineffec tiv eness w ere conclu so r y

... . The motion w as not suffi ci ent under Allen .”10 No. 13-1314
Thi s rule clearly serv ed as an independent basi s for the court’s deni al of Lee’s motion. Lee arg ues that the appli cati on of Allen by t he Wi scons in Court of Appeals cannot be found to be an adequate gr ound for d e ny ing relief. The rule requires a petiti oner to prov i de suffi ci ent material fact s, “ e .g. , who, what, where, when, why , and how-that, i f tr ue, w ould entitle hi m to the relief he seeks.” Al len , 682 N.W

.2d at 436. Lee contends that the lev el o f speci fi ci ty in hi s postconvic tion motion—as an incarcera t e d defendant who w as purpor tedly repr esented by ineffec tiv e couns el a t both the tr i al and appellate lev els—sh ould be suffi ci ent to wi thstand rev i ew under t he Allen rule. Y et our rev i ew of the adequacy of a state gr ound i s li mi ted to whether i t i s a fi rmly establi shed and reg ularly follow ed state practic e at the tim e i t i s appli ed, not whether the rev i ew by t he state court w as prop er on the merits. And the Allen rule i s a wellro ote d p r o cedural requirement in Wi scons in and i s there fore adequate. See, e.g., State v
. Negrete, 819 N.W .2d 7 4 9 , 7 55 (Wi s. 2012) ; State v
. Balliette, 805 N.W .2d 334, 339 (Wi s. 2011); State v
. Love, 700 N.W

.2d 62, 68–69 (Wi s. 2005); S tat e v
. McDougle, 830 N.W .2d 243, 247–48 (Wi s. Ct. App. 2013). Consequently , w e find the state procedural r e q uirement relied upon by the Wi scons in Court of Appeals both independent and adequate. Lee’s ineffec tiv e assi stance c lai m i s procedurally defaulted. W e can excuse a procedural default i f a petiti oner i s able to show both caus e and prej ud ice or that fai lure to rev i ew the clai m wi ll result in a fund ame nt a l mi scarri age of justic e. Coleman , 501 U.S. at 750. Lee, how ev er , does not make an arg ument for ei ther and w e wi ll no t mak e i t for hi m her e. See Franklin v. Gilmore, 188 F .3d 877, 884–85 (7th Ci r . 1999).No. 13-1314 11 C. Hearsay Lee also contends that Johnson’s testim ony about a conv er
sati on betw een Thomas and Lee violated hi s ri ghts under the Confro ntation Clause of the Sixth Am e n d m e n t. Th e prosecutor
a sked Johnson about a conv ersation that occurred whil e driving to the gas station: Q: A fter y ou spoke wi th Vi ctor Th o ma s, d id you get back in the car and speak again wi th Keith Lee? A: No, I di dn’t speak to any body when I got back in the car . Vi ctor Thomas w as sp eaking. Q: Do you remember V i c to r e v e r te l l i ng Keith to say whathappened? A: He sort of asked him to confirm i t. Q: Di d Keith Lee say anyth ing t o you about what happened in Oshkosh? A: N o t e x a ct l y

. He just mumbled y eah, y eah, li ke that. (emphas i s added). Lee arg ues that the i talic i zed statement i s “non-testi moni al hearsay that lacks the indi ci a of reliab i li ty” and w as a d mit ted in violati on of hi s rights under the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment en su r e s that an accu sed maintai ns “the right

... to be confronted wi th wi tnesses again st hi m.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. But thi s right under the Confro ntation Clause i s li mi ted to evidenc e that i s “testim oni al.” Davis
v
. W ashington , 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006); United States v
. Ellis , 460 F .3d 920, 923 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (“Hearsay e v ide nce that i s12 No. 13-1314
nontestim oni al ‘i s not subje ct t o the Confro ntation Clause.’” (ci tin g Davis , 547 U.S. at 821)). Thus, becau se the testim ony by Thomas w as nontestim oni al (as Lee concedes in hi s bri ef ), the Confro ntation Clause does not apply and Lee’s Sixth Amendment clai m mu st fai l. III. C O N C L U S I O N For the for ego ing reasons, w e AFF IRM the deci si on of the di stric t court

.No. 13-1314 13
H AMI L T O N

, Circ uit Jud

ge, concu rr ing in part and concu rr ing in the judgment. I jo in all port i ons of Judge Kanne’s opini on fo r t he court except Part II-A, dealing wi th Chris topher Johnson’s in-c ourt i denti fi cati on of petiti oner Lee as t he p e r so n in hi s car on the ni ght o f the murder and ro bbery. Johnson admi tte d on crossexami nati on that he knew he would be asked to i denti fy the
man who was in hi s car that ni ght, and that he expected to look at the defense table and poin t to the only Afric an-Ameri can at that t able. As Judge Kanne poin ts out, “a defendant’s mere presence at the defense table i s not enough to establi sh a violati on of due process.” S li p op. at 5 (emphas i s added). Never theless, we have often recog ni zed the inherent s uggestiveness of in-c ourt i denti fic a t io ns where the defendant i s seated at the defense table. See, e.g., Johnson v. McCaughtry, 92 F.3d 585, 597 (7th Ci r. 1 9 9 6 ) (“mu ch less reliab le than fai r line-ups and photo a r ray s”); Rodriguez v. Peters , 63 F.3d 546, 556 (7th Ci r. 1995) (incourt procedure w as suggesti ve, but no due process violati on i f defendant’s location i s only suggesti ve ci rcums tance); United States ex rel. Hayw ood v. O’Le ary, 827 F.2d 52, 59 (7th Ci r. 1987) (tot ali ty of ci rcums tances kept in-c ourt i dent ific ation from being unreli able or vio l a tin g due process); United States v. Bush , 749 F.2d 1227, 1232 (7th Ci r. 1984) (recognizing suggesti veness but finding no due process violati on where defendant’s location was only suggesti ve ci rcums tance). Our colleagues in the Second Ci rcui t ha v e addressed the problem in gr eater depth. See, e.g., United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 941–42 (2d Ci r. 1984) (in-c ourt i denti fi cati on of defendant, t he only black person in the courtr oom, seated at the defense table, was14 No. 13-1314
i mproper ly suggesti ve, but e rr or w a s h a rm l e s s ) ; Un ite d States v. Brown , 699 F.2d 585, 593–94 (2d C i r. 1 9 8 3 ) (desc rib ing appropr i

ate prot ectiv e measu res for in-c ourt i denti fi cati on where wi tness has not made prior identi fi cati on). Johnson’s tr oubling admi ssi on that he planned to poin t out the only Afric an-Ameri can at the defense table suggests there
was no independent basi s for hi s i denti fi cati on. The fact that he
was not able to i denti fy Lee from photo gr ap hs befo re tr i al strengt hens that suggesti on. The co mbin ation of (a) the inheren t suggesti veness of an in-c ourt i denti fi cati on of the defendant at the defense table, (b) Johnson’s inabi li ty to make
an earlier i denti fi cati on, and (c) hi s remark able admi ssi on that he planned to i de nt ify the Afric an-Ameri can at the defense table rais es a sub stanti al questi on about whether the i denti fi cation was suffi ci ently reliab le to be admi tte d, even though i ts flaws were full y a ired before the jury

. See gener ally Neil v. Biggers , 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972). Our cases have yet to address whether a nd when a wi tness ’s open admi ssi on that he i denti fi ed the defendant based
on hi s race and location in the courtr oom would indi cate “a
ve r y sub stanti al li kelih ood of i rr eparable mi si denti fi cati on” that mi ght violate due process. Johnson , 92 F.3d at 595, quoting Biggers , 409 U.S. at 198. In li ght o f the ci rcui t court cases ci ted above, among other s, I do not k now how I would dec i de that questi on i f thi s were a di rect appeal from a feder a l cr iminal tr i al. But that is not the questi on we mus t deci de. The ques tion befor e us i s li mi ted by t he hi ghly deferential standard of rev i ew we apply to the state court’s deci si on under the Antiterro ris m and Effec tive Death Penalty Act of 1996. TheNo. 13-1314 15
i ssu e i s not whether the admi ssi on of Johnson’s i denti fi cati on
v i olated the Uni ted St ates Constituti on. The i ssu e i s only whether the state court’s deci si on was “ c ontr a ry to, or invo lved
a n u n re asonable appli cati on of, clearly estab l i sh e d Fe d e ra l l a w , as deter mined by the Supreme Court of the Uni ted St ates.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)( 1). An unreasonable appli cati on of federal law i s di fferent from a merely incorre ct a p p li cati on of law, see Harrington v. Ric hter

, 131 S. Ct . 770, 785 (2011), ci tin g Williams
v. Taylor , 529 U.S

. 3 6 2 , 4 1 0 (2000), for § 2254(d)( 1) gives state courts consi d erable latitude in applyi ng federal law as deter

mined by the Supre me Court

. In th e d i stric t court, Chi ef Judge Gri esbach explain ed persuasi vely why the state court’s deci si on here would not justif y relief under § 2254(d)( 1). See Lee v. Baenen , No. 10-C-040, 2013 WL 364226, at *3 (E.D. Wi s. Jan. 30, 2 013). Petiti oner Lee has not rebutte d that analysi s wi th Supre me C ourtauthority. To the ext ent that Part II-A of my colleagues’ opin i on seems to apply a less deferential standard, one closer to a di rect appeal from a federal convic tion, i t says more than i s ne ce ss a r y

. On t he basi s of the di stric t court’s analysi s, though, I agr ee wi t h my colleagues that we mus t affi rm the deni al of habeas corpus relief b ased on the i n-c ourti denti fi cati on by Johnson.