Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 179 / Tuesday, September 16, 1997 / Notices 48677

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–382]

Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of

Withdrawal of Application for

Amendment to Facility Operating

License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) has

granted the request of Entergy

Operations, Inc. (the licensee) to

withdraw its October 16, 1996,

application for proposed amendment to

Facility Operating License No. NPF–38

for the Waterford Steam Electric Station,

Unit 3, located in St. Charles Parish,

Louisiana.

The proposed amendment would

have revised the facility technical

specifications (TSs) pertaining TSs 3.2.1

and 3.2.4 and their surveillance

requirements.

The Commission had previously

issued a Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment published in

the Federal Register on April 9, 1997

(62 FR 17232). However, by letter dated

August 26, 1997, the licensee withdrew

the proposed change.

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated October 16, 1996, and

the licensee’s letter dated August 26,

1997, which withdrew the application

for license amendment. The above

documents are available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

and at the local public document room

located at the University of New Orleans

Library, Louisiana Collection, Lakefront,

New Orleans, LA 70122.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day

of September, 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Chandu P. Patel,

Project Manager, Project Directorate, Division

of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–24561 Filed 9–15–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8010–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323]

Pacific Gas and Electric Company;

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of

Amendments to Facility Operating

Licenses, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–

80 and DPR–82 issued to Pacific Gas

and Electric Company (the licensee) for

operation of the Diablo Canyon Power

Plant, Units 1 and 2, located in San Luis

Obispo County, California.

The proposed amendments would

approve a modification to the Diablo

Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Units 1 and

2 auxiliary saltwater (ASW) system to

bypass approximately 800 feet of Unit 1

and 200 feet of Unit 2 Class 1 ASW

pipe, a portion of which is buried below

sea level in the tidal zone outside the

intake structure. Upgraded flow meter

and temperature instrumentation will be

included. The project includes

approximately 450 feet (both Units) of

new pipe inside the intake structure,

and 1,400 feet of new buried pipe

between the intake and selected tie-in

points in the existing pipe. This

modification was completed on Unit 1

during the refueling outage completed

this year.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendments, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) Involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve

a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated.

The auxiliary saltwater (ASW) system is

not identified as the cause, or involved in the

initiating event of, any Final Safety Analysis

Report (FSAR) analyzed accidents. Thus,

activities addressed herein will not increase

the probability of occurrence of any FSAR

evaluated accident.

During the construction of the ASW bypass

piping, the integrity and performance of the

ultimate heat sink will not be affected, nor

will the ability of any safety-related system,

structure, or component (SSC) to perform

their function be compromised. Approved,

written procedures are used during

construction to assure the functioning of

these SSCs (e.g., heavy load procedures,

security procedures, tie-in procedures). The

system unavailability due to construction is

managed in accordance with Technical

Specification (TS) limiting conditions for

operation (LCO).

The ASW system is a moderate energy

system. Since the bypass modification does

not significantly change the operating

parameters of the system, there is no change

in the Medium Energy Line Break (MELB)

analysis methodology for this system, and no

increase in the probability of occurrence of

a pipe crack. The ASW pipes are required to

mitigate consequences of FSAR analyzed

accidents.

The initial work for the ASW bypass

project involved installation of Design Class

I removable spool pieces in the existing ASW

piping. The spool pieces removed were

modified and reinserted into the existing

ASW piping. The modifications to the spool

pieces did not affect their flow characteristics

or structural integrity. Therefore, the

removable spool pieces did not cause ASW

operating parameters to exceed their design

basis, did not change any system interfaces,

had no impact on ASW system capability to

perform its function, and did not change the

system’s operation.

The work for this project was performed in

a series of steps. For each step, the added

work scope was incorporated in a design

change package revision and a revised safety

evaluation was performed.

The tie-in of the piping to the ASW system

is done during separate system clearances

during a refueling outage for each train; one

train will remain in service during the outage

at all times. The cross-tie between the two

Units will be available during the work.

When all the work associated with the

ASW bypass project is completed, including

pipe and pipe support installation, structural

modifications, and external protective

features, the ASW system will perform its

safety function as described in the FSAR. The

flow in ASW pipes will not be significantly

affected by this work. Per Mechanical

Calculation M–988, the increase in head loss

for bypass piping is not significant; the

design basis flow is maintained with a

margin and there is no significant effect on

the Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat

removal capacity.

The newly installed piping has been

designed to withstand the appropriate design

basis seismic loading and to withstand the

effects of external events including flooding,

tsunami, and tornadoes. The newly installed

piping and associated support components

have been evaluated, and where appropriate,

designed to withstand system interactions

including pipe breaks, internal flooding,

seismic interaction, internally generated

missiles, and fires.

Since the ASW system design bases

parameters are maintained and the newly

configured piping has been evaluated and

designed to meet established licensing basis

considerations, the consequences of an

accident previously evaluated in the FSAR

are not increased.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not

involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.