UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

FOLARIN HENRY ALABI, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 21-9514 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Folarin Henry Alabi, a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitions for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision that affirmed the immigration judge’s (IJ) 

discretionary denial of his request for a waiver of the joint-filing requirement to remove 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 13, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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the conditions of his status as a permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A). We 

dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Alabi entered the United States with a student visa in February 2008. He 

married Kimberly Straughter, a U.S. citizen, in March 2009. On August 6, 2010, 

Mr. Alabi adjusted his status to that of a conditional permanent resident for a two-year 

period under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1). In June 2012, Mr. Alabi and Ms. Straughter filed 

with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a joint petition to 

remove the conditions of his residence under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1). 

Ms. Straughter, however, failed to appear for her scheduled interview with USCIS 

in May 2013; instead, several weeks later, she sent a letter withdrawing her support for 

the petition. Specifically, Ms. Straughter represented that she and Mr. Alabi “had not 

been living as husband and wife since October 2010,” and she “filed for divorce [in] 

August 2011.” Admin. R. at 1065 (capitalization altered). She further stated that 

Mr. Alabi “married [her] for imm[i]gration only and he refuse[d] to divorce [her] because 

of it.” Id. (capitalization altered). She believed “he also may have signed [her] name on 

the final paperwork.” Id. (capitalization altered). The record reflects that their divorce 

was finalized in July 2013. On October 7, 2013, USCIS issued Mr. Alabi a “Notice of 

Termination of Conditional Residence” on the grounds that he no longer had a properly 

filed joint petition as required under 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(6). Admin. R. at 1091. 

Additional problems for Mr. Alabi arose in November 2015, when he was charged 

in a two-count federal indictment with conspiracy to commit marriage fraud and aiding 

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and abetting marriage fraud. Shortly thereafter, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

commenced removal proceedings against Mr. Alabi, who in turn filed a new petition with 

USCIS under § 1186a(c)(4) requesting a waiver of the joint-filing requirement on the 

grounds of “extreme hardship” and “good faith.”1

 

In April 2017, while his application for a waiver was pending, Mr. Alabi was 

convicted by a jury on both counts in the indictment and sentenced to eighteen months’ 

imprisonment. Following the jury’s verdict, the United States Attorney’s Office issued a 

press release describing Mr. Alabi as “the leader of the conspiracy.” Admin. R. at 1063. 

In August, USCIS denied the waiver because Mr. Alabi failed to establish a “good faith” 

marriage. 

Mr. Alabi sought review of USCIS’s decision in the removal proceedings. See

8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) (“[T]he alien may seek review of such decision in removal 

proceedings.”). To that end, in November 2018, he testified before the IJ about the 

circumstances of his marriage. Briefly summarized, Mr. Alabi denied marrying 

Ms. Straughter for immigration purposes. He also denied forging Mr. Straughter’s 

signature on the joint petition or having any knowledge that she had filed for divorce. He 

further insisted his convictions related to marriage fraud were based on “false 

accusation[s].” Admin. R. at 969. 

1

 There are four bases for waiver of the joint-filing requirement, including 

“extreme hardship” under § 1186a(c)(4)(A), which requires the applicant to show his 

or her removal would result in “extreme hardship,” and “good faith” under 

§ 1186a(c)(4)(B), which requires the applicant to show he or she entered into the 

marriage in “good faith.” 

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 At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ found Mr. Alabi failed to prove his 

entitlement to a “good faith” waiver, citing: (1) his forgery of Ms. Straughter’s signature 

on the joint petition; (2) his convictions related to marriage fraud and his role as 

ringleader; and (3) numerous contradictions between his testimony and the documentary 

evidence. 

 Mr. Alabi appealed to the BIA, arguing, among other things, the IJ erred by 

requiring him to show a “good faith” marriage before considering an “extreme hardship” 

waiver. In May 2019, the BIA issued its first decision, which affirmed the IJ’s finding of 

no “good faith” marriage but agreed with Mr. Alabi that the IJ should have also evaluated 

the “extreme hardship” waiver. 

On remand, the parties disagreed whether the IJ had jurisdiction to adjudicate the 

“extreme hardship” waiver because USCIS had not yet ruled on the issue. The parties 

further disagreed on the relevant time period in which to assess “extreme hardship.” For 

its part, the government argued the relevant period was from August 6, 2010, to August 

6, 2012, under § 1186a(c)(4), which provides “[i]n determining extreme hardship, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security shall consider circumstances occurring only during the 

period that the [noncitizen] was admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.” 

According to the government, circumstances occurring outside the relevant two-year 

period when Mr. Alabi was admitted for conditional residency, such as hardship to 

Mr. Alabi’s son Daniel, who was born in June 2013, could not be considered. Mr. Alabi, 

on the other hand, argued the relevant period ran from August 6, 2010, to October 7, 

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2013, when USCIS issued its notice terminating his conditional residency, and therefore 

included hardship to Daniel. 

Mr. Alabi testified he plans to take Daniel (and another son born in 2016) with 

him to Nigeria if he is removed. Daniel is autistic and has speech and developmental 

problems that require him to attend a special school. He cannot dress himself and needs 

constant care, including help going to the bathroom. According to Mr. Alabi, Daniel 

would endure extreme hardship in Nigeria because there are no suitable schools and 

limited medical care. The documentary evidence included, among other things, Daniel’s 

medical records (including information about his ongoing therapy) and articles discussing 

challenges for children with disabilities in Nigeria. Mr. Alabi added he would face his 

own extreme hardship for several reasons, including: (1) the lack of any assets in 

Nigeria; (2) difficulty finding employment; and (3) possible danger from the terrorist 

organization Boko Haram. 

The IJ determined he had jurisdiction and ruled the relevant time period was 

August 6, 2010, to August 6, 2012, which excluded any hardship to Daniel. The IJ 

assumed Mr. Alabi was credible but found no “extreme hardship.” In the alternative, the 

IJ denied a waiver on discretionary grounds. 

Mr. Alabi appealed to the BIA raising two arguments: (1) the IJ lacked 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the “extreme hardship” waiver because USCIS had not yet ruled 

on the issue and (2) the IJ erred in limiting the relevant time period for assessing hardship 

from August 6, 2010, to August 6, 2012. The BIA issued a second decision in which it 

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agreed the IJ lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the “extreme hardship” waiver and ordered 

the proceedings be continued pending a decision from USCIS. 

USCIS eventually decided the case and ruled the relevant time period for 

evaluating hardship ended on August 6, 2012, and as a result, Mr. Alabi failed to 

establish “extreme hardship.” In the alternative, it considered hardship to Daniel and 

denied a waiver in the exercise of its discretion. Mr. Alabi sought review with the IJ.2

In a written decision, the IJ reaffirmed his ruling that the relevant time period for 

assessing hardship ended on August 6, 2012, and Mr. Alabi failed to establish “extreme 

hardship” based on circumstances occurring this period. In the alternative, the IJ found 

that “even if [Mr. Alabi] had established the necessary level of extreme hardship for 

the . . . waiver under [§ 1186a(c)(4)(A)] . . . and even if hardship to his two children may 

be factored, the [c]ourt nonetheless denies his . . . extreme hardship waiver as a matter of 

discretion.” Admin. R. at 138. In reaching this determination, the IJ accepted as credible 

Mr. Alabi’s testimony concerning Daniel’s medical condition and special needs but found 

“[t]he additional presumed hardships to his two children, one of whom has a 

developmental disability and is on the autism spectrum, would still be insufficient for 

th[e] [c]ourt to find that the balance of the equities would tip in his favor.” Id. at 137. In 

particular, the IJ cited Mr. Alabi’s: (1) “severe, serious, and recent” convictions for 

conspiracy to commit marriage fraud and aiding and abetting marriage fraud; (2) role as 

ringleader of the conspiracy; (3) sham marriage; (4) forgery of Ms. Straughter’s signature 

2

 On review to the IJ, Mr. Alabi abandoned his request for a “good faith” 

waiver. 

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on the joint petition; and (5) other material misrepresentations in trying to gain 

immigration benefits. Id. 

Mr. Alabi appealed to the BIA. The BIA did not address the IJ’s ruling on the 

relevant time period or his hardship determination because it agreed with the IJ that “even 

assuming that the conditional residence period was extended and the extreme hardship 

standard was met, [Mr. Alabi] did not merit relief in the exercise of discretion in light of 

his criminal record.” Id. at 3. 

Citing Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (B.I.A. 1978), the BIA explained 

in order “[t]o determine whether [Mr. Alabi] merits . . . relief [as a matter of] discretion, 

we weigh the adverse factors evidencing his undesirability as a permanent resident 

against the social and humane considerations presented in his behalf and ask whether, on 

balance, [Mr. Alabi’s] continued presence in the United States would be in the best 

interests of this country.” Admin. R. at 4. The BIA ultimately determined that the IJ 

“correctly concluded that [Mr. Alabi’s] significant negative factors militate against a 

favorable exercise of discretion in this case” and dismissed the appeal. Id. This petition 

for review followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

In its decision, the BIA assumed Mr. Alabi was eligible for an “extreme hardship” 

waiver but did not merit the waiver in the exercise of discretion. This is precisely the 

type of discretionary decision the courts lack jurisdiction to review. See Iliev v. Holder, 

613 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review the decision to 

deny [an extreme hardship waiver] where eligibility for the waiver has been established 

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but the agency nevertheless has exercised its discretion to deny relief.” (brackets and 

internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (“[N]o court 

shall have jurisdiction to review . . . decision[s] or action[s] of the Attorney General or 

the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this 

subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 

Security.”). 

Specifically, “the question whether to remove the conditional basis of the 

permanent resident status of a[n] . . . alien who [is eligible for one of the four waivers 

described in § 1186a(c)(4)(A)-(D)], is among those decisions entrusted by Congress to 

the Attorney General’s discretion.” Iliev, 613 F.3d at 1022 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Further, § 1186a(c)(4) provides that “[t]he determination of what evidence is 

credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the 

Secretary of Homeland Security.” 

Notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar that prevents this court from reviewing the 

agency’s discretionary decisions, we are not “preclud[ed] [from] review[ing] . . . 

constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review,” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(D), which are “review[ed] . . . de novo.” Iliev, 613 F.3d at 1025. However, 

we reject Mr. Alabi’s attempt to raise a question of law by arguing an issue neither 

decided by the BIA nor necessary to the resolution of the case: whether the IJ erred in 

holding the relevant time period of conditional residence for which extreme hardship may 

be assessed ended on August 6, 2012. To be sure, in an appropriate case this could raise 

a question of law; however, it has no bearing on how Mr. Alabi’s case was ultimately 

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resolved and therefore need not be addressed. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 

(1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make 

findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”); 

Griffin v. Davies, 929 F.2d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1991) (“We will not undertake to decide 

issues that do not affect the outcome of a dispute.”). 

For his final argument, Mr. Alabi asserts the IJ’s exclusion of hardship to Daniel 

“affected the discretionary determination by foreclosing consideration of the hardship to 

[his] special needs U.S. citizen child.” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 23. This argument finds no 

support in the record. To the contrary, the IJ considered the testimony and documentary 

evidence concerning Daniel’s condition and special needs in balancing hardship against 

the factors weighing against a favorable exercise of discretion. We decline Mr. Alabi’s 

invitation to reweigh the evidence, which is not “within our jurisdictional ken,” Illiev, 

613 F.3d at 1024. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 The petition for review is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

 

Entered for the Court 

Jerome A. Holmes 

Circuit Judge 

 

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