[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 181 (Thursday, September 18, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49034-49043]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24807]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-245, 50-336, and 50-423 and Docket No. 50-213]


Northeast Utilities, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, 
and 3 and Haddam Neck Plant; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision 
Under 10 CFR 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, has issued a Partial Director's Decision with regard to a 
Petition dated November 25, 1996, as amended on December 23, 1996, 
filed by Ms. Deborah Katz and Mr. Paul Gunter on behalf of the Citizens 
Awareness Network (CAN) and the Nuclear Information and Resource 
Service (NIRS), hereafter referred to as ``Petitioners.'' The Petition 
pertains to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and 
the Haddam Neck Plant.
    The Petitioners requested that the NRC: (1) Immediately suspend or 
revoke Northeast Utilities' (NU's or Licensee's) licenses to operate 
its nuclear facilities in Connecticut; (2) investigate possible 
Licensee material misrepresentations to the NRC; (3) continue the 
shutdown of the Licensee's facilities until the Department of Justice 
completes its investigation and the results are reviewed by the NRC; 
(4) continue the shutdown until the NRC evaluates and approves the 
Licensee's remedial actions; (5) continue listing the Licensee's 
facilities on the NRC's ``Watch List'' should any facility resume 
operation; (6) bar any predecommissioning or decommissioning activity 
at any of the Licensee's nuclear facilities in Connecticut until the 
Licensee and the NRC take certain identified steps to assure that such 
activities can be safely conducted; (7) initiate an investigation into 
how the NRC allowed the asserted illegal situation at the Licensee's 
nuclear facilities in Connecticut to exist and continue for more than a 
decade; and (8) immediately investigate of the need for enforcement 
action for alleged violation of 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B, with 
respect to nitrogen calculations.
    The bases for the assertions are Licensee and NRC inspection 
findings and Licensee documents referred to in the Petition and a VHS 
videotape, Exhibit A, which accompanied the Petition. The videotape 
records an August 29, 1996, Citizens Regulatory Commission televised 
interview of a former Millstone Station employee expressing his views 
on Licensee management. Areas identified in the Petition include 
inadequate surveillance testing, operation outside the design basis, 
inadequate radiological controls, failed corrective action processes, 
and degraded material condition. The Petition asserts that this 
information demonstrates that there are inadequate quality assurance 
programs at the Licensee's nuclear facilities in Connecticut, that the 
Licensee has made material false statements regarding its Millstone 
units, and that safe decommissioning of the Haddam Neck facility is not 
possible because of the deficiencies in the design and licensing bases 
of the facility.
    The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
partially granted the Petition. The reasons for this partial grant are 
explained in the ``Partial Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 
2.206'' (DD-97-21), the complete text of which follows this notice and 
is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, at the 
local public document rooms located at the Learning Resources Center, 
Three Rivers Community-Technical College, New London Turnpike, Norwich, 
Connecticut, and at the temporary local public document room located at 
the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, 
Waterford, Connecticut, for Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3; and at the 
Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut, for the 
Haddam Neck Plant.
    A copy of the Partial Director's Decision will be filed with the 
Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance 
with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided for 
by this regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of 
the Commission (for Requests 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8) 25 days after the date 
of issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a 
review of the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of September.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Partial Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206

[DD-97-21]

I. Introduction

    On November 25, 1996, as amended on December 23, 1996, Ms. Deborah 
Katz and Mr. Paul Gunter filed a Petition on behalf of the Citizens

[[Page 49035]]

Awareness Network (CAN) and the Nuclear Information and Resource 
Service (NIRS), hereafter, referred to as Petitioners. These two 
submittals will hereafter be referred to as the Petition. The Petition 
was filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the NRC 
Executive Director for Operations pursuant to Sec. 2.206 of Title 10 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206).
    The Petitioners requested that the NRC take the following actions: 
(1) Immediate suspension or revocation of Northeast Utilities' (NU's or 
Licensee's) licenses to operate its nuclear facilities in Connecticut; 
(2) investigation of possible NU material misrepresentations to the 
NRC; (3) continued shutdown of the NU facilities until the Department 
of Justice completes its investigation and the results are reviewed by 
the NRC; (4) continued shutdown until the NRC evaluates and approves NU 
remedial actions; (5) continued listing of the NU facilities on the 
NRC's Watch List should any facility resume operation; (6) prohibition 
of any predecommissioning or decommissioning activity at any NU nuclear 
facility in Connecticut until NU and the NRC take certain identified 
steps to assure that such activities can be safely conducted; (7) 
initiation of an investigation into how the NRC allowed the asserted 
illegal situation at NU's nuclear facilities in Connecticut to exist 
and continue for more than a decade; and (8) an immediate investigation 
of the need for enforcement action for alleged violation of 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix B.<SUP>1</SUP>
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    \1\ Petitioners requested copies of the Licensee's calculations 
performed in response to the event at the Haddam Neck Plant that 
resulted in the introduction of a nitrogen bubble into the reactor 
vessel. The calculations requested were discussed during a 
predecisional enforcement conference held on December 4, 1996. The 
calculations were provided to the Petitioners on July 21, 1997.
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    The bases for the Petitioners' assertions are NU and NRC inspection 
findings and NU documents referred to in the Petition and a VHS 
videotape, Exhibit A, which accompanied the Petition. No new 
information regarding Licensee activities was provided by the 
Petitioners except for the alleged violation referred to in Request 8. 
The Petitioners assert, in Request 8, that NU relied partly on draft 
calculations in its presentation at a public predecisional enforcement 
conference with the NRC staff, which included a discussion of an event 
at the Haddam Neck Plant. The Petitioners further assert that the 
calculations had not been reviewed and approved in accordance with the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B.
    The areas of concern identified in the Petition include inadequate 
surveillance testing, operation outside the design as specified in the 
updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), inadequate radiological 
controls, failed corrective action processes, and the degraded material 
condition of the plants. The Petitioners also assert that this 
information demonstrates that there are inadequate quality assurance 
programs at NU's nuclear facilities in Connecticut, that NU has made 
material false statements regarding its Millstone units, and that safe 
decommissioning of the Haddam Neck Plant is not possible given the 
defective nature of the design and licensing bases for the facility. 
The videotape records an August 29, 1996, Citizens Regulatory 
Commission televised interview of a former Millstone Station employee 
expressing his views on NU management. The tape has been transcribed 
and placed on the dockets of the facilities cited. The videotape 
interview included the former employee's views relating to NU's poor 
management in allowing degradation of the material condition of the 
plant; poor radwaste practices resulting in potential radiation 
exposure to employees; and harassment, intimidation, and subsequent 
illegal termination of employees raising safety concerns.
    On January 23, 1997, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the Petition 
and informed the Petitioners that the Petition had been assigned to the 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to prepare a response and that 
action would be taken within a reasonable time regarding the specific 
concerns raised in the Petition. The Petitioners were also informed 
that the requests for immediate action were denied. The Petitioners 
were further informed that copies of the Petition and videotape were 
sent to the NRC's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in response to 
Petitioners' Request 7 and parts of Requests 5, 6, and 8.

II. Discussion

    The NRC staff has reviewed the Petition and, with the exception of 
Request 8, has not identified any new information regarding either the 
Millstone or the Haddam Neck facilities. Both of the facilities have 
been the subject of close NRC scrutiny for several years.

Millstone Facility

    With regard to the Millstone units, the NRC staff has been 
concerned for the last several years about the number and duration of 
violations at the Millstone site in the broad programmatic areas of 
design and licensing bases, testing, and radiological controls. 
Programmatic concerns in these areas, along with concerns in other 
areas, were major contributors to the decline in performance at the 
Millstone site. In the most recent systematic assessment of licensee 
performance (SALP) report of August 26, 1994, the NRC staff stated in 
the cover letter that it had noted several performance weaknesses, 
common to all three Millstone units. Among these were continuing 
problems with procedure quality and implementation, the informality in 
several maintenance and engineering programs (contributing to instances 
of poor performance), and the failure to resolve several longstanding 
problems at the site. In addition to these programmatic problems, the 
Licensee has had significant problems in dealing with employee concerns 
involving safety issues at the site.
    On November 4, 1995, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 1 for a 
scheduled refueling outage. The NRC sent a letter to the Licensee on 
December 13, 1995, requiring the Licensee, before restarting Millstone 
Unit 1, to inform the NRC, pursuant to section 182a of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and 10 CFR 50.54(f), of the 
actions taken to ensure that in the future the Licensee would operate 
that facility according to the terms and conditions of the unit's 
operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the unit's FSAR.
    In January 1996, the NRC designated the three Millstone units as 
Category 2 on the NRC's Watch List. Plants on the Watch List in this 
category have weaknesses that warrant increased NRC attention until the 
licensees demonstrate improved performance for an extended period of 
time.
    On February 20, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 2 when 
it declared both trains of the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) 
system inoperable because of a design issue. There was a potential that 
the HPSI throttle valves could become plugged with debris when taking 
suction from the sump during recirculation mode.
    On March 30, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 3 after 
finding that containment isolation valves for the auxiliary feedwater 
turbine-driven pump were inoperable because the valves did not meet NRC 
requirements. In response to a Licensee root cause analysis of 
inaccuracies in the Millstone Unit 1 FSAR, identifying the potential 
for similar configuration control problems at Millstone Units 2 and 3 
and the existing design configuration issues identified at these units, 
the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters to the Licensee on March 7 and 
April 4, 1996. These

[[Page 49036]]

letters required that the Licensee inform the NRC of the corrective 
actions taken regarding design configuration issues at Millstone Units 
2 and 3 before the restart of each unit.
    In June 1996, the NRC designated the three units at Millstone as 
Category 3 on the NRC's Watch List. Plants in this category have 
significant weaknesses that warrant maintaining them in a shutdown 
condition until the Licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that it has 
both established and implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure 
substantial improvement. This category also requires Commission 
approval before operations can be resumed.
    On August 14, 1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order directing 
the Licensee to contract with a third party to implement an Independent 
Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) to confirm the adequacy 
of its efforts to reestablish the design basis and configuration 
controls for each of the three Millstone units. The ICAVP is intended 
to provide additional assurance, before a unit restart, that the 
Licensee has identified and corrected existing problems in the design 
and configuration control processes for that unit.
    On April 16, 1997, the NRC issued another 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, 
which superseded the previously mentioned 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters and 
consolidated its requests for information and periodic updates. The 
information requested included: (1) The identification of significant 
items needed to be accomplished before restart; (2) identification of 
items to be deferred until after restart; (3) NU's process and 
rationale for deferring items; and (4) a description of the actions 
taken by NU to ensure that future operation will be conducted in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the operating licenses, the 
Commission's regulations, and the FSARs. The Licensee provided the 
initial information requested by letter dated May 29, 1997. Additional 
information and updates will be provided in accordance with the time 
intervals specified in the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter.
    During eight NRC inspections conducted between October 1995 and 
August 1996, more than 60 apparent violations of NRC requirements were 
identified at the Millstone site. These apparent violations were 
discussed at a public predecisional enforcement conference held at the 
Millstone site on December 5, 1996. During the meeting, the Licensee 
stated that management failed to provide clear direction and oversight, 
performance standards were low, management expectations were weak, and 
station priorities were inappropriate. The NRC staff is nearing 
completion of its evaluation of potential enforcement action to address 
these apparent violations and their overall impact on the safe 
operation of the Millstone units.
    Additionally, the Licensee has had a chronic problem of not dealing 
effectively with employee concerns at the Millstone site. On December 
12, 1995, the NRC established a review group to conduct an independent 
evaluation of the history of the Licensee's handling of employee 
concerns related to licensed activities at the Millstone facility. The 
review group determined that, in general, an unhealthy work 
environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and did not 
welcome or promote questioning attitudes, has existed at the Millstone 
facility for the last several years. To address this problem, the NRC 
issued an Order on October 24, 1996, that directed NU to devise and 
implement a comprehensive plan for handling safety concerns raised by 
Millstone employees and to ensure an environment free from retaliation 
or discrimination. In addition, the Order required NU to have an 
independent third party oversee its employee concerns program. The 
third party is responsible for providing periodic reports to NU and the 
NRC detailing its findings and recommendations. The third-party 
findings and the NU responses to them will be assessed by the NRC staff 
for any restart issues.
    The NRC regards compliance with regulations, license conditions, 
and Technical Specifications (TSs) as mandatory. However, the NRC also 
recognizes that plants will not operate trouble-free.<SUP>2</SUP> This 
is clearly articulated in Criterion XVI, Appendix B, Part 50, ``Quality 
Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power plants and Fuel Reprocessing 
plants.'' Criterion XVI states that ``measures shall be established to 
assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, 
malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and 
equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.''
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    \2\ The NRC's approach to protecting public health and safety 
includes the philosophy of defense-in-depth, which supports the 
identification and correction of degraded or nonconforming 
conditions discussed above. Briefly stated, this philosophy (1) 
requires the application of conservative codes and standards, to 
establish substantial safety margins in the design of nuclear 
plants; (2) requires high quality in the design, construction, and 
operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of 
malfunctions, and promotes the use of automatic safety system 
actuation features; (3) recognizes that equipment can fail and 
operators can make mistakes and therefore requires redundancy in 
safety systems and components to reduce the chances that 
malfunctions or mistakes will lead to accidents that release fission 
products from the fuel; and (4) recognizes that, in spite of these 
precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen and therefore 
requires containment structures and safety features to prevent the 
release of fission products. In the unlikely event of an offsite 
fission product release, emergency plans are in place to provide 
reasonable assurance that protective actions can and will be taken 
to protect the population around nuclear power plants. These 
emergency plans are coordinated with local and State officials and 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
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    The appropriate response to an identified deficiency can and should 
vary, depending on the safety significance of the deficiency. For 
example, for rapidly developing situations, when prompt action is 
required to assure plants are not in an unsafe condition, automatic 
safety systems are in place to shut down the reactor. In other, less 
time-critical situations, TSs relating to structures, systems, and 
components (SSCs) vital to the safe operation of a nuclear plant 
require that specific actions be taken within a predetermined time 
period when the SSC is determined to be inoperable. The time period is 
dependent on the safety significance of the SSC. NRC Generic Letter 91-
18, ``Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual 
Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on 
Operability,'' provides guidance for licensees to determine what 
actions are required and when they need to be taken for identified 
degraded or nonconforming conditions.
    The conduct of NRC regulatory oversight at the Millstone site is 
based on the recognition that it is the Licensee's primary 
responsibility to demonstrate that corrective actions have been 
effectively implemented. Thus, the Licensee must determine that a unit 
is in conformance with applicable NRC regulations, its license 
conditions, and its FSAR and that applicable licensing commitments have 
been met before the NRC staff can recommend that the Commission approve 
the restart of any unit. The Licensee's conformance with NRC 
regulations, license conditions, and licensing commitments is 
fundamental to NRC's confidence in the safety of licensed activities. 
In short, the Licensee has the primary responsibility for the safe 
operation of its facilities.
    In a June 20, 1996, letter to the NRC, the Licensee described its 
Configuration Management Plan (CMP), which is its principal program to 
provide reasonable assurance that weaknesses at the Millstone units 
have been effectively corrected. The CMP includes efforts to understand 
and correct the licensing

[[Page 49037]]

and design bases issues that led the NRC to issue the 10 CFR 50.54(f) 
letters and Order actions to prevent recurrence of those issues. The 
Licensee stated that the objective of the CMP was to document and meet 
the licensing and design bases requirements of each unit and to ensure 
that adequate programs and processes are in place to maintain control 
of these requirements.
    The Licensee's CMP must either correct each FSAR deficiency or 
evaluate it to ensure that the change to the facility does not involve 
any unreviewed safety question or change to the facility TSs. NU has 
documented a large number of deficiencies, which vary in scope and 
safety significance for each unit. These lists contain significant 
deficiencies that must be corrected before restart and others that the 
Licensee is planning to correct after the restart. In its continuing 
reviews of the deficiency lists, the NRC staff will determine whether 
the Licensee has appropriately scheduled safety-significant items for 
completion before restart and whether those items that the Licensee 
will defer until after restart are appropriate for each unit. The 
results of these efforts will be documented in NRC inspection reports.
    The NRC's regulatory oversight of the Licensee's corrective actions 
requires extensive planning and program integration. To focus more 
regulatory attention on all of the restart issues related to the 
Millstone units, the NRC has established a Special Projects Office 
(SPO) within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to oversee these 
activities. The SPO has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted 
oversight program to verify the adequacy of NU's corrective actions, 
programs, and processes. The breadth and significance of the problems 
identified at the Millstone site require this program. The SPO has 
developed a Restart Assessment Plan (Assessment Plan) for each of the 
Millstone units, which includes: (1) the appropriate aspects of NRC 
Inspection Manual, Manual Chapter (MC) 0350, ``Staff Guidelines For 
Restart Approval''; (2) oversight of NU's ICAVP; and (3) oversight of 
NU's corrective actions relating to employee concerns involving safety 
issues. The activities associated with the Assessment Plan are in 
addition to the normal inspection and licensing activities being 
carried out at the Millstone site.
    MC 0350 establishes the guidelines for approving the restart of a 
nuclear power plant after a shutdown resulting from a significant 
event, a complex hardware problem, or serious management deficiencies. 
The primary objective of the guidelines in MC 0350 is to ensure that 
NRC's restart review efforts are appropriate for the individual 
circumstances, are reviewed and approved by the appropriate NRC 
management levels, and provide objective measures of restart readiness.
    The Assessment Plan for each unit includes those issues listed in 
MC 0350 that the NRC staff has identified as relevant to the shutdown 
of the unit. Each Assessment Plan also includes additional issues 
determined to be applicable to the specific situation. The Assessment 
Plans include all actions the NRC expects NU to take before the NRC 
staff recommends to the Commission that a unit be permitted to restart. 
Accordingly, the staff will use the Assessment Plan for each Millstone 
unit to track and monitor all significant actions necessary to support 
a decision on restart approval of the unit.
    The Assessment Plan for each Millstone unit includes the 
requirement to review the NU Operational Readiness Plan, the deficiency 
lists associated with the Assessment Plan, including restart and 
deferred items, the corrective action program, work planning and 
controls, the procedure upgrade program, the nuclear oversight function 
(quality assurance), outstanding enforcement items, and a Significant 
Issues List (SIL), which includes issues identified by both NU and the 
NRC as issues requiring resolution before restart. NRC MC 93802, 
``Operational Safety Team Inspection'' (OSTI), provides the framework 
for a team inspection to be performed during the later stages of the 
restart process. The inspection will be structured to focus on the 
pertinent issues at each of the Millstone units.
    Within the SPO, a Millstone Restart Assessment Panel (RAP) has been 
formed in accordance with MC 0350. The RAP meets to assess the 
Licensee's performance and its progress in completing the designated 
restart activities. The RAP is composed of the Director, SPO 
(chairman); the Deputy Directors of Licensing, Inspections, and 
Independent Corrective Action Verification Program Oversight; the 
Project Managers for the three Millstone units; the Inspection Branch 
Chief; the Senior Resident Inspectors for the three Millstone units; 
and the appointed Division of Reactor Safety representative. The RAP 
holds periodic meetings with the Licensee to discuss the Licensee's 
corrective actions and schedules of each Millstone unit. These meetings 
are noticed and are open to the public. An additional meeting with the 
public is usually held that same day in the evening to summarize the 
meeting with the Licensee, provide an update on NRC activities, and 
address comments from the public.
    The purpose of the ICAVP, as stated in the Confirmatory Order, is 
to confirm that the plant's physical and functional characteristics are 
in conformance with its licensing and design bases. The ICAVP audit 
required by the NRC is expected to provide independent verification, 
beyond NU's quality assurance and management oversight, that the 
Licensee has identified and satisfactorily resolved existing 
nonconformances with the design and licensing bases; documented and 
utilized the licensing and design bases to resolve nonconformances; and 
established programs, processes, and procedures for effective 
configuration management in the future. NU has started programs to 
identify and understand the root causes of the licensing and design 
bases issues that led to NRC issuance of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters to 
NU and to implement corrective actions that will ensure that NU 
maintains the design configuration and that each unit is in conformance 
with its licensing basis. NU has indicated that the scope of its 
corrective programs will include those systems that it has categorized 
as either Group 1 (safety-related and risk-significant) or Group 2 
(safety-related or risk-significant). The ICAVP audit must provide 
insights into the effectiveness of NU's programs so that the results 
can be reasonably extrapolated to the structures, systems, and 
components that were not reviewed in the audit.
    As a practical matter, the NRC cannot do a 100-percent verification 
of the Licensee's corrective actions, processes, and programs for each 
Millstone unit. However, a comprehensive and multifaceted oversight 
process has been developed by the NRC staff to provide a high level of 
confidence that the Licensee has implemented required corrective 
actions and that all of the issues on the SILs have been resolved. The 
independent third-party evaluations required by the NRC will be used to 
enhance NRC confidence that the Licensee's corrective action programs 
have been effectively implemented at each unit.
    NRC activities (including oversight of the ICAVP) to ensure that 
effective corrective actions are being taken by the Licensee will 
provide additional assurance that the Licensee's corrective action 
programs have been effectively implemented. These activities will 
include in-process reviews of the ICAVP contractor's activities, 
reviews of the ICAVP results, and additional independent reviews of 
compliance with the design and licensing bases of

[[Page 49038]]

selected systems. The State of Connecticut's Nuclear Energy Advisory 
Council has provided input to the NRC staff for selecting the systems 
which will be reviewed by the ICAVP contractor and has been invited to 
observe the NRC staff's ICAVP inspections.
    When the restart review process has identified, corrected, and 
reviewed relevant issues regarding each Millstone unit, a restart 
authorization process will be initiated for that unit. Upon receipt of 
a staff recommendation and a briefing on any ongoing investigations, 
the Commission will meet to assess the recommendation and vote on 
whether to allow the restart of the unit. The same process will be 
followed for the remaining units.

Haddam Neck Facility

    With regard to the Haddam Neck Plant, the Licensee shut down the 
plant on July 22, 1996, as required by the facility's TSs, because of 
concerns that the containment air recirculation fans service water 
piping may exceed design loads during certain accident scenarios. The 
Licensee determined that these concerns and other hardware and 
programmatic problems identified before and during the forced outage 
should be resolved before restarting the plant. Thus, the Licensee 
decided to begin Refueling Outage 19 on August 17, 1996. On October 9, 
1996, the owners of the Haddam Neck Plant stated that a permanent 
shutdown of the plant was being considered by the Board of Trustees 
based on an economic analysis of operations, expenses, and the cost of 
replacement power. Subsequently, all fuel assemblies were removed from 
the reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool.
    From November 21, 1995, to November 22, 1996, the NRC conducted 
numerous inspections at the Haddam Neck Plant to review several facets 
of plant performance. These inspections included a Special Team 
inspection by NRC headquarters staff focused on engineering 
performance; a special Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection of a 
reactor vessel nitrogen intrusion event in late August and early 
September 1996 that lowered the reactor vessel water level; a special 
radiation protection inspection of a significant contamination event in 
November 1996; an emergency preparedness inspection to observe the 
Licensee's response during an emergency exercise held in August 1996; 
and several resident inspections. Numerous violations, as well as 
several significant regulatory concerns, were identified during these 
inspections. Most of the violations were discussed at a transcribed 
public predecisional enforcement conference at the Millstone training 
building in Waterford, Connecticut, on December 4, 1996. The December 4 
conference was open to the public and focused on the broader 
programmatic deficiencies underlying the violations that contributed to 
the problems at Haddam Neck. A Notice of Violation and Proposed 
Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $650,000 was issued on 
May 12, 1997, and subsequently paid by the Licensee.
    The restart process described for the three Millstone units is not 
applicable to the Haddam Neck Plant. By letter dated December 5, 1996, 
the Licensee certified to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) 
and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that it had decided to permanently cease 
operations at the Haddam Neck Plant and had permanently removed the 
fuel from the reactor. The Licensee further noted that a Post-Shutdown 
Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) and a site-specific 
decommissioning cost estimate would be submitted in accordance with 10 
CFR 50.82, ``Termination of License.''
    It is important to note that the NRC continues to identify problems 
at both the Millstone site and the Haddam Neck Plant, as documented in 
inspection reports issued after this Petition was filed. These findings 
indicate that the corrective actions required to restart the Millstone 
units have not yet been fully implemented. The NRC staff will not 
recommend that the Commission allow the restart of a Millstone unit 
until the Commission has determined, in accordance with the Assessment 
Plan, that the necessary corrective actions have been effectively 
implemented for the unit.
    As for Haddam Neck, a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued 
to the Licensee on March 4, 1997, concerning radiological-control 
problems at the Haddam Neck Plant. This CAL is an example of the type 
of action that the NRC takes to assure that the limited activities at 
the site will be conducted in a safe manner and in accordance with 
regulatory requirements. The CAL prohibits the Licensee from performing 
any radiological work except that required to maintain the plant in a 
safe configuration until the corrective actions identified in the CAL 
have been implemented.

III. NRC Response to Requested Actions

    In summary, the Licensee's implementation of its Configuration 
Management Plan (CMP) for each Millstone unit, response to the elements 
in the NRC staff's Restart Assessment Plan (Assessment Plan) for each 
Millstone unit, implementation of actions to improve programs to 
address employee concerns at the Millstone site, and the implementation 
of the decommissioning process specified in 10 CFR 50.82 for the Haddam 
Neck Plant, as discussed above, are the bases for the NRC staff's 
responses discussed in this Partial Director's Decision to the specific 
actions that the Petitioners requested be taken against NU. The 
Petitioners' requested actions and the NRC staff's responses are 
discussed below.<SUP>3</SUP>
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    \3\ In this Partial Director's Decision, Petitioners' Requests 
have been identified as Requests 1 through 8. These requests 
correspond to Requests A.1 through 5, B and C in the initial 
Petition, and Request II.A in the amendment to the Petition.
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    1. Petitioners request that the NRC immediately suspend or revoke 
NU's license to operate Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck) and the 
Millstone Nuclear reactors due to chronic, negligent management of the 
reactors which, for over a decade, has endangered and continues to 
endanger occupational and public health and safety and the environment 
due to resultant and cumulative major safety problems and violation of 
NRC regulations.
    The Petitioners base their request to suspend or revoke the 
operating licenses of Haddam Neck and the three Millstone units on NU 
reports and NRC inspection findings referred to in the Petition and on 
a videotape in which a former Millstone Station employee expresses his 
views on NU management and plant conditions. As previously noted, based 
on the NRC staff review of these materials, the Petitioners have 
identified no new information.
    With regard to the Millstone units, the units are currently in an 
extended shutdown and significant management changes at NU have been 
made in the past year. The NRC's focus is on evaluating improved 
performance, hardware and programmatic upgrades, and corrective 
actions. Specifically, NRC review and inspection emphasis will be 
directed toward the results of NU's actions to correct identified 
weaknesses in areas such as design controls, radiological controls, 
quality assurance, work control practices, corrective action processes, 
and the handling of employee concerns.
    The previous discussion provides an overview of the Assessment 
Plans that the SPO has developed for assessing the adequacy of NU's 
corrective actions being taken prior to Commission approval of restart 
for any of the Millstone units. The NRC staff will have to reach a 
determination that the

[[Page 49039]]

corrective actions taken by NU provide reasonable assurance that future 
operation will be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions 
of the operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the design 
basis, as documented in the FSAR, of each unit before recommending that 
the Commission approve the restart of any one of the units. Upon 
receipt of an NRC staff recommendation and a briefing on ongoing 
investigations, the Commission will hold a meeting to assess the 
recommendation and then vote on whether to approve the restart of each 
unit.
    The restart process discussed for the Millstone units does not 
apply to Haddam Neck. The Licensee has certified to the NRC that 
operations at the facility have permanently ceased and that fuel has 
been permanently removed from the reactor.
    The Petitioners' request to take immediate action was denied in the 
letter of January 23, 1997, which acknowledged receipt of the Petition. 
The request to suspend or revoke the licenses for the three Millstone 
units is denied based on the NRC staff's conclusion that such action is 
not warranted by the facts. Programmatic and review efforts are in 
place. If these efforts are successful, the NRC would allow the 
Millstone units to resume operation. The request to suspend or revoke 
the license to operate the Haddam Neck Plant is moot since the Licensee 
has certified to the NRC that the plant has permanently ceased 
operation and the fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.
    2. The Petitioners request that the NRC investigate the possibility 
that NU made material misrepresentations to the NRC concerning 
engineering calculations and other information or actions relied upon 
to assure the adequacy of safety systems at the Haddam Neck and 
Millstone reactors. The Petitioners said NU made possible material 
misstatements either through lack of rigor and thoroughness or by 
providing intentionally misleading information.
    The NRC has ongoing investigations related to alleged wrongdoing by 
NU personnel. The investigative results will be reviewed for possible 
enforcement action. Depending on the results of the ongoing evaluations 
of inspections and investigations, both NU as an organization and NU 
employees found to have engaged in deliberate misconduct will be 
subject to appropriate enforcement action. Consistent with the General 
Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions (NUREG-
1600), some enforcement action is normally taken against a licensee for 
violations caused by significant acts of wrongdoing by its employees. 
Such action could include a civil penalty or an order. In deciding 
whether to also take action directly against the responsible employees, 
the NRC considers a number of factors such as the employee's level in 
the organization, the employee's training and experience, the degree of 
supervision, the employee's attitude, and the degree of management 
responsibility or culpability. A decision to take action directly 
against an individual is significant and normally will be taken only 
when the NRC is satisfied that the individual has engaged in deliberate 
misconduct. The action taken could include prohibiting the individual 
from involvement in licensed activities for a period of years.
    As the NRC is currently evaluating alleged wrongdoing by NU 
personnel, the Petitioners' request is granted.
    3. Petitioners request that the NRC revoke NU's operating licenses 
for the Haddam Neck and the Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 reactors if an 
investigation determines that NU deliberately provided insufficient 
and/or false or misleading information to the NRC. If the NRC chooses 
not to revoke NU's licenses, the Petitioners specifically request that 
the reactors remain off-line until a United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ) independent investigation is complete and the NRC reviews 
the conclusions and recommendations contained therein for potential 
consequences to the Licensee and its agents under NRC regulations. The 
Petitioners note in a footnote that a DOJ report will likely produce 
information essential to the NRC's evaluation of NU's management 
problems. The Petitioners further stated that such information should 
influence any NRC decision concerning NU's future operation of nuclear 
reactors in Connecticut.
    Since the NRC investigations are ongoing, the NRC cannot respond to 
the first portion of the request to revoke the licenses of the three 
Millstone units at this time.
    The response to the Petitioners' Request 1 applies to the part of 
Request 3 asking that the reactors remain off line until the 
investigations are complete. As noted, the Commission will consider the 
status of all ongoing investigations, including any referrals to DOJ, 
in its deliberations before voting on the restart of any of the 
Millstone units.
    The part of the request relating to revoking the licenses of the 
three Millstone units is deferred until all investigations are 
complete. The request that the reactors remain off line until the 
investigations are complete is denied.
    This request does not apply to the Haddam Neck Plant, which has 
already permanently ceased operation.
    4. The Petitioners request that, if NRC chooses not to revoke NU's 
licenses to operate the Haddam Neck Plant and the Millstone Units 1, 2, 
and 3 reactors and allows the reactors to return to operation, the 
reactors remain on the NRC's Watch List to oversee reactor operations 
until NU management demonstrates to the NRC that:
    a. NU is able to fulfill NRC regulatory requirements;
    b. NU has met all prior commitments concerning the repair, 
modification, maintenance, and documentation of the nuclear power 
stations;
    c. NU has retrained all staff in the application and interpretation 
of NRC's regulations; and
    d. NU has removed from any positions of responsibility for 
operation and/or management of the reactors all persons whom DOJ, NRC, 
or other government investigators and/or civil or criminal prosecutions 
find to have made material misrepresentations to the NRC during the 
past decade of mismanagement.
    Due to the significance and programmatic nature of the concerns 
evolving from the various NRC reviews and inspections at the Millstone 
Station and the fact that each unit is shut down pending resolution of 
these issues, the Commission put the Millstone units in Category 3 of 
the Watch List. Accordingly, restart of any of the units is subject to 
Commission approval. SIL issues, which require resolution for safe 
operation, will have been addressed and a process will be in place to 
resolve any deferred items. If the Commission approves restart of any 
unit, that unit will be placed in Category 2 of the Watch List, where 
it will remain until the Licensee has demonstrated that satisfactory 
operational performance can be sustained at the unit.
    The restart process, as previously discussed, will assure that the 
management attributes identified by the Petitioners in Request 4.a, b, 
and c, will be adequately considered within the context of the SPO's 
Assessment Plans before the NRC staff recommends that the Commission 
allow the restart of any unit. Request 4.d will be considered in the 
restart process when the Commission is briefed regarding investigation 
efforts and recommendations.
    The request to retain the Millstone units on the NRC's Watch List, 
if the Commission approves restart, is granted.

[[Page 49040]]

Any unit permitted to restart will be placed in Category 2 of the Watch 
List, where it will remain until the Licensee has demonstrated that 
satisfactory performance can be sustained at the unit. Request 4.a, b, 
c, and d will be considered as set forth above.
    This request does not apply to the Haddam Neck Plant because the 
Haddam Neck Plant has permanently ceased operation. The NRC will 
continue its oversight of the defueled facility.
    5. Petitioners request that, as a minimum, the NRC keep Haddam Neck 
and the Millstone 1, 2, and 3 nuclear reactors off line until NU's 
chronic mismanagement has been analyzed, remedial management programs 
have been implemented, and the NRC has evaluated and approved the 
effectiveness of the Licensee's actions. As a minimum, NU should:
    a. Thoroughly analyze root causes for deficiencies in NU's FSARs, 
its documentation of licensing and design bases, its safety analysis, 
its engineering, its quality assurance, its as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA) programs, and other necessary or required 
documentation.
    b. Create a complete, accurate FSAR-mere ``reform'' is impossible 
when the basic document is inadequate and inaccurate;
    c. Reevaluate of any of its activities initiated under (or which NU 
should have initiated under) 10 CFR 50.59 in order to confirm the 
validity of such activities, particularly to determine the extent to 
which the FSAR does not match ``as built'' configurations. This 
reevaluation requires more than a paper audit; it requires checking 
actual physical plant against the existing documentation, component by 
component and system by system and creating correct documentation where 
it is lacking and/or inadequate;
    d. Institute and document an effective ALARA review of all 
operational and nonoperational activities that expose workers and/or 
the public to radiation;
    e. Thoroughly document the root causes of NU's chronic and systemic 
mismanagement including, documentation of the NRC Region I inspection 
program's staff and management failures over the past decade to detect 
and deal with this problem;
    f. Demonstrate, over a substantial period of time to the 
satisfaction of the NRC, NU's commitment to respect NRC regulatory 
requirements and consistently follow them;
    g. Retrain all personnel involved in day-to-day operations so that 
they are thoroughly conversant with NRC regulations; and
    h. Update and document Plant Design Change Requests (PDCRs) to 
include all changes to the reactor's design, and verification by the 
NRC staff of these design changes, with closeouts of PDCRs receiving 
the highest priority.
    As previously noted, NRC regulatory oversight programs at the 
Millstone Station are based on the recognition that the Licensee is 
primarily responsible for demonstrating that corrective actions have 
been effectively implemented. Before the NRC staff can recommend that 
the Commission approve the restart of a Millstone unit, the Licensee 
must determine that the unit conforms with applicable NRC regulations, 
license conditions, and the FSARs and that applicable licensing 
commitments have been met. The Licensee's conformance with NRC 
regulations, license conditions, and licensing commitments is 
fundamental to the NRC's confidence in the safety of licensed 
activities.
    The significant actions that the NRC is taking to monitor the 
Licensee's activities have been discussed in detail earlier in this 
Decision. Based on that discussion, the actions requested in Request 
5.a through h, with the exception of the part of 5.e relating to NRC 
staff performance, will be adequately addressed within the context of 
the SPO's Assessment Plan for each of the Millstone units.
    With regard to Request 5.e, the part of 5.e relating to the 
performance of the NRC staff is beyond the scope of the 2.206 process 
and will not be addressed in the Director's Decision relating to this 
Petition. This issue has been referred to the NRC's OIG for action as 
appropriate.
    The request to keep the Millstone units off line until the items 
identified in Request 5.a through h, with the exception of the part of 
Request 5.e relating to NRC's previous actions in dealing with the 
Licensee, is granted to the extent that the issues will be considered 
within the SPO's Assessment Plan for each of the units.
    This request does not apply to the Haddam Neck facility, which has 
permanently ceased operation.
    6. Petitioners request that, if NU decides to shut down any or all 
of the nuclear power reactors at issue herein with the intent to 
commence the decommissioning process, the NRC not permit any 
decommissioning or predecommissioning activity to take place until:
    a. All the documentation mentioned in earlier requests is available 
to the NRC and on site at the reactors;
    b. All personnel involved in the decommissioning process have been 
retrained (or trained) in the use and interpretation of the applicable 
NRC regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations;
    c. The NRC has appropriately evaluated and replaced personnel and 
has restructured the NRC Region I inspection program, its management, 
and the supervising NRC directorate to eliminate the regulatory anarchy 
that plagued the Connecticut nuclear reactors during the past 10 years; 
and
    d. The NRC makes certain that NU does not employ any persons in 
management or operations who made material misrepresentations to the 
NRC about the status of operations, repairs, modifications, or 
maintenance of NU's Connecticut reactors.
    On October 9, 1996, the owners of the Haddam Neck Plant stated that 
the Board of Trustees was considering a permanent shutdown of the 
plant, based on an economic analysis of operations, expenses, and the 
cost of replacement power. All fuel assemblies were removed from the 
reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool for temporary storage. By 
letter dated December 5, 1996, the Licensee certified to the NRC, 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that it 
had determined to permanently cease operations at the Haddam Neck Plant 
and that the fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor. The 
Licensee further noted that a Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities 
Report (PSDAR) and the site-specific decommissioning cost estimate 
would be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82, ``Termination of 
License.'' The PSDAR will be submitted to the NRC and a copy sent to 
the affected state(s) within 2 years after operations have permanently 
ceased. The report must include, among other things, a description of 
the planned decommissioning activities and a schedule for their 
implementation. No major decommissioning activities may be performed 
until 90 days after the NRC receives the PSDAR.
    The current activities at the site include the operation, 
monitoring, and maintenance of the spent fuel pool; radioactive waste 
management; radiological protection; and fire protection. These 
activities, including any activities relating to decommissioning, must 
be in compliance with the current license requirements, which apply 
when the reactor is defueled.
    The degree of regulatory oversight required during decommissioning 
of a nuclear power reactor is considerably less than during its 
operational phase. When the reactor is operating, the fuel

[[Page 49041]]

in the reactor core undergoes a controlled nuclear fission reaction 
that generates a high neutron flux and large amounts of heat. Safe 
control of the nuclear reaction involves the use and operation of many 
complex systems, adherence to operational limits, testing of components 
and systems to assure their operability, specified procedure adherence, 
and operator actions. Once the fuel has been permanently removed and 
temporarily stored in the spent fuel pool, the fuel is still highly 
radioactive and generates heat caused by radioactive decay. However, no 
neutron flux is generated and the fuel slowly cools as its energetic 
decay products diminish. Since the spent fuel is stored in a 
configuration that precludes the nuclear fission, no generation of new 
radioactivity can occur. However, the same areas of the facility 
contain radioactive contamination and those areas must still be 
controlled to minimize radiation exposure to personnel and to control 
the spread of radioactive material.
    The NRC staff continues to be concerned about the failures of the 
Haddam Neck radiological controls program (which recently resulted in 
the unplanned exposure of two individuals), long-standing discrepancies 
in the calibration of several radiation monitors that are used to 
monitor and control radiological effluent releases, and the inadequate 
control of radioactive material that resulted in the undetected release 
of contaminated equipment to a nonlicensed vendor.
    In response, the NRC has taken comprehensive and significant 
actions to resolve concerns in the area of radiological controls, 
including the issuance of a CAL on March 4, 1997, confirming the 
Licensee's commitment to respond to the findings in Inspection Reports 
50-213/96-12, dated December 19, 1996, and 50-213/97-02, dated March 
21, 1997. The CAL restricts the Licensee from performing any 
radiological work except that required to maintain the plant in a safe 
configuration. The CAL identifies four significant activities required 
of the Licensee to bring its management and implementation of radiation 
control programs up to a standard acceptable to the NRC. The activities 
are to (1) identify, in writing, specific compensatory measures that 
the Licensee will establish to assure sufficient management control and 
oversight of ongoing or planned activities that require radiological 
controls; (2) engage the services of an independent assessor to assess 
the quality and performance of the Licensee's radiological control 
programs and their implementation; (3) by May 30, 1997, based on the 
results of that independent assessment, (a) identify problems, 
determine root causes, and develop broad-based and specific corrective 
actions; (b) identify performance measures that may be used to 
determine the effectiveness of radiological control programs; and (c) 
submit a plan and schedule to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region I, 
for implementing improvements in the radiological control programs; and 
(4) before eliminating any interim compensatory measures, meet with the 
Region I Administrator to describe program implementation and 
performance improvements achieved or planned.
    In summary, the NRC is following the decommissioning process as 
specified in 10 CFR 50.82, which requires that no major activities may 
be performed until 90 days after the NRC receives the PSDAR. The 
Licensee must comply with all the applicable operating license 
requirements in effect for the defueled reactor relating to activities 
currently being performed at the Haddam Neck Plant. Further, the NRC 
will take appropriate actions for any defueled reactor to assure 
compliance with its license and license conditions, such as the actions 
described above for the failure of adequate radiological controls at 
Haddam Neck. The Haddam Neck Plant is the only reactor that the 
Licensee has determined to permanently shut down and decommission.
    The request to forbid decommissioning activities or 
predecommissioning activity at any NU nuclear power reactor until all 
the requested actions identified in the Petition, including items a, b 
and d, of Request 6, have been completed is denied for the reasons 
stated above. The NRC staff has determined that the NRC requirements 
that govern decommissioning and the activities being undertaken by the 
Licensee in response to the CAL are sufficient to assure that the 
activities at the Haddam Neck facility are being conducted in a safe 
manner. Request 6.c, relating to the performance of the NRC staff, is 
beyond the scope of the 2.206 process and will not be addressed in the 
Director's Decision relating to this Petition. This issue has been 
referred to the NRC's OIG.
    7. The Petitioners request that the NRC commence an investigation 
into how it allowed the illegal situation at NU's Connecticut reactors 
to exist and to continue over a decade. Particularly, Petitioners 
request that the Commission order its staff (directors of the 
responsible directorates, managers, and Region I management and staff) 
to answer the following questions, and hold these persons accountable 
for their answers and actions regarding the past 10 years at NU's 
Connecticut nuclear power reactors:
    a. What documents did Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and 
NRC Project Directors and Project Managers review during 10 years of 
NU's out-of-compliance operation?
    b. If NU provided documents that somehow deceived the Region I 
inspector, how does the information in these documents relate to the 
everyday workings and activities conducted during the otherwise 
undocumented decade of operations at the Millstone and Haddam Neck 
plants?
    c. How did Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and NRC Project 
Directorates and Managers find that NU was conducting operations in a 
way that keeps worker and public exposures to radiation ALARA when NU 
was not adequately documenting either its licensing basis or the basis 
of reactor operations?
    d. Knowing, as Region I inspectors must have known, of excessive 
worker exposures (for example, due to a long standing problem with 
leaking pipes as documented by an NU worker in the video tape provided 
with this Petition Exhibit A), how did the Region I inspectors certify 
that operations at the Millstone and Haddam Neck plants were being 
conducted ALARA? How did the supervisors, and those in the NRC Project 
Directorate, make the same certifications?
    e. During the undocumented decade, how did Region I inspectors, 
their supervisors, and NRC Project Directors and Managers manage to 
track NU's activities at the Millstone and Haddam Neck plants under 10 
CFR 50.59?
    f. To what extent have NRC Region I inspectors, their supervisors, 
and NRC Project Directors and Managers allowed the same type of 
problems to develop at other nuclear power reactors in New England 
(i.e., Maine Yankee, Pilgrim, Seabrook, Vermont Yankee, and Yankee 
Rowe)?
    g. Is there any connection between licensees employing Yankee 
Atomic Electric Company's consulting and engineering services and the 
serious problems with documentation and lack of compliance with the 
licensing and design bases nuclear power stations in New England or in 
other parts of the country?
    This request is beyond the scope of the 2.206 process. It concerns 
the performance of the NRC staff and will not be addressed in the 
Director's

[[Page 49042]]

Decision relating to this Petition. This request has been referred to 
the NRC's OIG.
    8. In the amendment to the Petition, the Petitioners request that 
the NRC take the following actions to enforce its regulations against 
NU. As part of the 2.206 process, the NRC should provide copies of 
Haddam Neck's nitrogen calculations to the Petitioners and conduct an 
independent review to see if the calculations meet the requirements of 
10 CFR part 50, appendix B. If appendix B requirements were violated, 
the Petitioners are concerned that the Licensee cannot safely 
decommission the Haddam Neck Plant. Accordingly, NU's operating 
licenses for its Connecticut reactors should be revoked, and NU should 
not be permitted to commence decommissioning until it has complied with 
the conditions outlined in the main body of the original Petition. 
Finally, the Commission should inquire into the NRC staff's failure to 
discern this situation and its continuing failure to enforce the terms 
and conditions of NU's license and NRC regulations.
    As noted above, the assertion by the Petitioners that the 
calculations performed by the Licensee violated NRC requirements is a 
new issue not previously considered by the NRC staff.
    The subject calculations were performed subsequent to an event at 
the Haddam Neck Plant that resulted in the formulation of a nitrogen 
bubble in the reactor vessel. The results of the calculations, which 
were one of several methods used to confirm the water level during the 
event, were discussed by the Licensee during a public predecisional 
enforcement conference held on December 4, 1996.
    By letter dated July 3, 1997, the Licensee provided information, 
including the requested calculations, relating to the different methods 
used for determining the reactor vessel water level resulting from the 
nitrogen intrusion event. This information has been placed in the NRC's 
Public Document Room and the Local Public Document Rooms. The 
Petitioners were provided a copy of the calculations as an enclosure to 
a Petition status letter dated July 21, 1997, since the calculations 
are relevant to the Petitioners' concern, are not proprietary, and are 
in the public domain.
    On September 5, 1996, while investigating the root cause of the 
undetected accumulation of nitrogen gas in the reactor vessel, the 
Licensee performed a special test (ST 11.7-197, ``Determination of 
Reactor Vessel Level'') to verify reactor vessel level. This test was 
necessary because the reactor vessel level indication system and the 
core exit thermocouples had been removed from service in accordance 
with the Licensee's refueling procedures. The reactor level measurement 
problem had been exacerbated by the nitrogen gas intrusion, which 
displaced water from the reactor vessel into the pressurizer, resulting 
in an unquantified decrease in reactor vessel inventory. During the 
course of the event, the shift manager had requested that the worst-
case (lowest) reactor vessel level achieved during the event be 
determined. As noted in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/96-80, ``NRC 
Augmented Inspection Team Review of the Undetected Introduction of 
Nitrogen Gas into the Reactor Vessel During Plant Shutdown,'' the plant 
staff completed a preliminary analysis on September 4, 1996. It was 
further noted that, at the end of the onsite inspection activities, the 
Licensee had yet to complete a final volumetric inventory balance 
calculation. In the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of 
Civil Penalties in the amount of $650,000 issued on May 12, 1997, the 
Licensee was cited for failure to take timely corrective actions 
following the nitrogen intrusion event, including the failure to timely 
establish the actual lowest reactor vessel level resulting from the 
event.
    Subsequently, the Licensee completed two calculations: (1) 
Calculation 96-MDE-1515-MY, ``Reactor Vessel Level Determination,'' 
prepared on October 2, 1996, independently reviewed on November 1, 
1996, and approved on November 5, 1996; and (2) Calculation 96-MDE-
1536-MY, ``Reactor Vessel Level Determination,'' prepared on October 4, 
1996, independently reviewed on November 22, 1996, and approved on 
December 1, 1996. These calculations were performed consistent with the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B.
    Also, during the December 4, 1996, predecisional enforcement 
conference, the Licensee presented the results of reactor vessel water 
level simulations, which were calculated using the RELAP5/MOD3 code. 
These simulation results were presented by the Licensee to corroborate, 
with a diverse methodology, the lowest reactor vessel water level 
determined by Calculations 96-MDE-1515-MY and 96-MDE-1536-MY. The 
results of the RELAP5/MOD3 reactor vessel water level simulations 
presented by the Licensee during the predecisional enforcement 
conference were only used to corroborate and provide additional insight 
into the reactor vessel water level that had been determined through 
Calculations 96-MDE-1515-MY and 96-MDE-1536-MY. These two calculations 
had been independently reviewed and performed consistent with the 
applicable provisions in the Licensee's 10 CFR part 50, Appendix B, 
``Quality Assurance Program,'' and are considered by the NRC staff to 
suffice to demonstrate the reactor vessel water level.
    Under these circumstances, the RELAP5/MOD3 simulations were not 
required to have been independently verified.
    Thus, the assertion by the Petitioners that the calculations 
discussed during the predecisional enforcement conference violated 10 
CFR part 50, appendix B, requirements is unfounded and no further 
actions by the NRC are required. The part of Request 8 relating to the 
performance of the NRC staff is beyond the scope of the 2.206 process 
and will not be addressed in the Director's Decision relating to this 
Petition. This part of Request 8 has been referred to the NRC's OIG.

IV. Conclusion

    The NRC staff has determined, for the reasons provided in the above 
discussion, that: Request 2 is granted for both the Millstone units and 
the Haddam Neck Plant; Requests 4 and 5 are partially granted for the 
Millstone units; Request 1 and parts of Requests 3, 4, 6, and 8 are 
denied for the three Millstone units; Requests 6 and 8 are partially 
denied for the Haddam Neck Plant; Request 3 is partially deferred for 
the three Millstone units; Requests 1, 3, 4, and parts of Request 5 are 
not applicable to Haddam Neck; and Request 7 and parts of Requests 5, 
6, and 8 are beyond the scope of the 2.206 process and are not 
addressed. The deferred parts of Request 3 will be addressed in a Final 
Director's Decision after any possible wrongdoing is fully considered 
by the NRC staff.
    As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Partial Decision 
will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's 
review. This Partial Decision will constitute the final action of the 
Commission (for Petitioners Requests 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8) 25 days after 
issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of 
the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of September.


[[Page 49043]]


    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia Jr.,
Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-24807 Filed 9-17-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P