ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Dennis F. Dykhuizen

Theodore T. Storer

Reanna L. Kuitse

Rothberg Logan & Warsco LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Laura L. Ezzell

Edward J. Chester

Chester Law Office

Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE

Indiana Trial Lawyers Association

Thomas A. Manges

Roby & Manges

Fort Wayne, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Parkview Hospital, Inc.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Thomas E. Frost by Shirley A. 

Riggs, his Guardian,

Appellees-Plaintiffs.

March 14, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1507-PL-959

Appeal from the Allen Circuit Court.

The Honorable Craig J. Bobay, 

Special Judge.

Cause No. 02C01-1405-PL-221

Friedlander, Senior Judge

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, we are presented with the issue of whether 

evidence of discounts provided to patients who either have private health 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A03-1507-PL-959 | March 14, 2016 Page 1 of 19
insurance or are covered by government healthcare reimbursement programs is 

relevant, admissible evidence regarding the determination of reasonable charges 

under the Indiana Hospital Lien Act, Indiana Code Annotated section 32-33-4-

1, et seq. (West, Westlaw current with P.L. 1-2016 and P.L. 2-2016 of the 2016 

Second Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly). We hold that it is and 

affirm. 

[2] On October 8, 2013, Frost was seriously injured in a collision involving a 

motorcycle he was operating and a pickup truck. Frost was transported by 

airbus to Parkview Hospital where he remained on an in-patient basis until 

November 12, 2013. Parkview did not obtain a signature on any written 

contract from Frost or his personal representative at the time of Frost’s inpatient stay there.

[3] On November 12, 2013, Frost’s condition had improved such that he was 

transferred to the skilled nursing facility at Parkview Randalia. The next day, 

Frost’s mother, Shirley Riggs, who had just recently been appointed as guardian 

over the person and estate of Frost, was approached by Parkview to sign an 

admission agreement, which she did sign. The agreement contained the 

following provision:

Agreement to Pay

The patient or person financially responsible for the patient, in 

consideration of the service to be rendered to the patient, is 

obligated to pay the account of the Hospital on all charges for 

services rendered.

Appellant’s App. p. 44.

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[4] Frost remained in skilled nursing until January 7, 2014, when he was 

transferred to in-patient rehabilitation before being discharged on January 28, 

2014.

[5] Parkview filed its hospital lien with the Allen County Recorder on February 12, 

2014, in the amount of $629,386.50. That amount included charges for Frost’s 

in-patient and skilled nursing care at Parkview. A copy of the lien was mailed 

to the law firm representing Frost in his personal injury action.

[6] Frost hired a person employed by an independent medical bill reviewing 

company to review the charges. After the discovery of several billing errors, 

Parkview filed a final amended hospital lien in the amount of $625,117.66.

[7] Frost did not have health insurance at the time he sustained his injuries. As the 

permissive user of the motorcycle, Frost had medical payment insurance 

coverage through State Farm for $5,000.00.

[8] On May 29, 2014, Frost filed a declaratory judgment action to enforce the 

patient’s remedy under the Indiana Hospital Lien Act, Indiana Code Annotated 

section 32-33-4-1, et seq. (West, Westlaw current with P.L. 1-2016 and P.L. 2-

2016 of the 2016 Second Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly). 

Under the Act, a patient may contest the lien or the reasonableness of the 

charges by filing a motion to quash or reduce the claim in the court where the 

lien was perfected. Ind. Code Ann. § 32-33-4-4(e) (West, Westlaw current with 

P.L. 1-2016 and P.L. 2-2016 of the 2016 Second Regular Session of the 119th

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General Assembly). Indiana Code Annotated section 32-33-4-4(e) provides as 

follows:

A person desiring to contest a lien or the reasonableness of the 

charges claimed by the hospital may do so by filing a motion to 

quash or reduce the claim in the circuit court in which the lien 

was perfected, making all other parties of interest respondents. 

[9] Frost’s petition alleged in part that Parkview’s charges were unreasonable 

because they were greater than the amounts Parkview accepts as payment in 

full from other patients. Frost served a written discovery request on Parkview 

requesting information about discounts provided to patients who either had 

private health insurance or who are covered by government healthcare 

reimbursement programs. Frost was dissatisfied with Parkview’s response and 

sought an order to compel discovery. Parkview requested and received a stay of 

discovery. Parkview then filed its motion for partial summary judgment 

seeking an order that its chargemaster1

rates were reasonable as a matter of law. 

After a hearing on Parkview’s motion, the trial court entered its order denying 

the motion, concluding that evidence of discounts provided to patients who 

either have private health insurance or are covered by government healthcare 

1 “A chargemaster is an extensive price list created and maintained by hospitals and other providers. A 

hospital’s chargemaster lists a price for each good and service provided by the hospital (20,000 or more 

separate items may be included). Hospitals update, that is increase, these list prices frequently.” George A. 

Nation III, Determining the Fair and Reasonable Value of Medical Services: The Affordable Care Act, 

Government Insurers, Private Insurers and Uninsured Patients, 65 Baylor L. Rev. 425, 427-28 (2013).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A03-1507-PL-959 | March 14, 2016 Page 4 of 19

 
reimbursement programs is relevant to the determination of reasonable charges 

under the Act and are admissible. This interlocutory appeal ensued.

[10] In an Indiana summary judgment proceeding, “the party seeking summary 

judgment must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a 

determinative issue, and only then is the non-movant required to come forward 

with contrary evidence.” Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 

N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994). T.R. 56(C) provides in pertinent part:

At the time of filing [a] motion [for summary judgment] or 

response, a party shall designate to the court all parts of 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, 

matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it 

relies for purposes of the motion. A party opposing the motion 

shall also designate to the court each material issue of fact which 

that party asserts precludes entry of summary judgment and the 

evidence relevant thereto. The judgment sought shall be 

rendered forthwith if the designated evidentiary matter shows 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

[11] Summary judgment should not be entered where material facts conflict or 

where conflicting inferences are possible. Miller v. Monsanto Co., 626 N.E.2d 

538 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). When we review the grant or denial of a motion for 

summary judgment our standard of review is the same as that used by the trial 

court. J.C. Spence & Assocs., Inc. v. Geary, 712 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 

We must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and 

whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In 

resolving those inquiries, we consider only the evidence that has been 

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specifically designated to the trial court. Id. The party appealing the trial 

court’s ruling has the burden of persuading this court that the trial court’s 

decision was erroneous. Id. A summary judgment determination shall be made 

from any theory or basis found in the designated materials. Id. “We give 

careful scrutiny to the pleadings and designated materials, construing them in a 

light most favorable to the non-movant.” Id. at 1102 (quoting Diversified Fin. 

Sys., Inc. v. Miner, 713 N.E.2d 293, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). The fact that the 

parties make cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard 

of review. Wank v. Saint Francis College, 740 N.E.2d 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), 

trans. denied.

[12] Parkview claims that Frost may not challenge the reasonableness of the fee 

because the contract guaranteeing “to pay the account of the Hospital on all 

charges for services rendered” referred to its chargemaster rates. See Allen v. 

Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. 2012) (“In the context of a 

contract for the provision of and payment for medical services, a hospital’s 

chargemaster rates serve as the basis for its pricing.”).

[13] Frost is not challenging that a debt is due Parkview. Likewise, Frost is not 

asking a court to impute a reasonable price into the contract where no price is 

stated, or asking a court to completely disregard Parkview’s rates. Instead, he 

argues that under the Act, he may challenge the reasonableness of the charges 

claimed, and is entitled to discovery from Parkview in order to do so, relying on 

language from Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2009) regarding the 

evidentiary use of discounted medical expenses paid. 

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[14] The Act does not define a reasonable charge, which makes sense because that is 

the disputed issue. There are several cases addressing challenges involving the 

reasonable value of medical services, but not exactly in the context presented in 

this appeal. 

[15] In Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2009), an action where liability was 

admitted and the sole issue for trial was damages, the Supreme Court was 

presented with the question whether the discounted amount of medical 

expenses actually paid by the plaintiff in a personal injury case was admissible 

and relevant to a determination of damages to an injured party. The plaintiff, 

who was insured, paid a discounted amount in satisfaction of his medical 

expenses after negotiations conducted by his health insurance provider. Id. At 

trial, without objection, the plaintiff introduced redacted medical bills showing 

the amounts medical service providers originally billed him. Id. 

[16] When the defendant sought to introduce evidence of the discounted amount 

actually paid, the plaintiff objected citing Indiana’s collateral source statute, 

Indiana Code Annotated section 34-44-1-2 (West, Westlaw current with P.L. 1-

2016 and P.L. 2-2016 of the 2016 Second Regular Session of the 119th General 

Assembly), which in pertinent part prohibits the introduction of evidence of 

insurance benefits in personal injury cases. Id. The trial court did not allow 

admission of the discounted amount finding that it flowed from insurance 

benefits and as such was barred by the collateral source statute. Id. 

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[17] On appeal, the Supreme Court held that where the reasonableness of the 

medical expenses is not an issue, medical bills can be introduced under Indiana 

Evidence Rule 413 as prima facie evidence of the reasonable amount of medical 

expenses for purposes of a damages determination. Id. 

[18] On the other hand, when there is a dispute as to the reasonable cost of medical 

expenses, the opponent may introduce contradictory evidence including expert 

testimony to challenge the reasonableness of the proffered medical bills. Id. 

The Supreme Court granted transfer, affirmed the judgment, and ordered 

remittitur, taking into consideration the discounted amount paid.

[19] Later, in Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. 2012), 

uninsured patients brought a class action against the hospital alleging breach of 

contract and seeking a declaration that the rates the hospital billed were 

unreasonable and unenforceable. The appeal arose from a motion to dismiss 

granted to the hospital by the trial court. Id.

[20] There the patients argued that the chargemaster rates imposed by the hospital 

were unreasonable such that they constituted a breach of contract. The contract 

provided as follows:

In consideration of services delivered by Clarian North Medical 

Center and/or the physicians, the undersigned guarantees 

payment of the account, and agrees to pay the same upon 

discharge if such account is not paid by a private or 

governmental insurance carrier . . . . If the amounts due Clarian 

North Medical Center for services rendered become delinquent 

and the debt is referred to an attorney for collection it is 

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understood and agreed that I shall be responsible for reasonable 

attorneys’ fees, court costs, and prejudgment interest.

Id. at 309.

[21] The patients argued that the contract did not specify a price for the medical 

services provided, or was silent on price, and as such a “reasonable price for the 

services” term should be imputed to the contract. Id.

[22] The Court agreed generally that where a contract is silent on price, a reasonable 

price should be imputed to a contract, but noted that an offer appearing to be 

indefinite may be given precision by usage of trade or by course of dealing 

between the parties. Id. In the context of contracts providing for health care 

services, the Court noted that precision concerning price is “close to 

impossible,” that a hospital’s chargemaster rates serve as the basis for its 

pricing, and they are unique because they are set by each hospital. Id. The 

Court noted the decision in Stanley, relied upon by the patients, and expressly 

declined to extend its holding about the evidentiary use of the reasonable value 

of medical expenses to actions alleging breach of contract. Id.

[23] Frost disagrees with the reasonableness of the charges claimed by the hospital, 

and directly challenges them by way of the Act, which explicitly allows for 

those challenges. Parkview sought to have its chargemaster rates deemed 

reasonable as a matter of law. The trial court’s denial of Parkview’s motion for 

partial summary judgment was premised on the language found in Stanley

regarding the evidentiary use of discounted amounts paid for medical expenses. 

Although Stanley was a personal injury action where damages were the issue, 

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there are enough similarities that we agree with the trial court’s reliance upon 

the reasoning in Stanley. 

[24] In Stanley, referring to a damages determination, but discussing the reasonable 

value of medical expenses, the Court stated as follows:

In sum, the proper measure of medical expenses in Indiana is the 

reasonable value of such expenses. This measure of damages 

cannot be read as permitting only full recovery of medical 

expenses billed to a plaintiff. Id. Nor can the proper measure of 

medical expenses be read as permitting only the recovery of the 

amount actually paid. Id. The focus is on the reasonable value, 

not the actual charge. This is especially true given the current 

state of health care pricing. . . . This value is not exclusively 

based on the actual amount paid or the amount originally billed, 

though these figures certainly may constitute evidence as to the 

reasonable value of medical services.

906 N.E.2d at 856-58. 

[25] The Court cited Indiana Evidence Rule 413 as one method of proving the 

reasonable value of medical expenses. Id. The Rule provides as follows:

Statements of charges for medical, hospital or other health care 

expenses for diagnosis or treatment occasioned by an injury are 

admissible into evidence. Such statements are prima facie 

evidence that the charges are reasonable.

Evid. Rule 413.

[26] Quoting Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 277-78 (Ind. 2003), the 

Court said:

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The purpose of Rule 413 is to provide a simpler method of 

proving amount of medical expenses when there is no substantial 

issue that they are reasonable and were caused by the tort. If 

there is a dispute, of course the party opposing them may offer 

evidence to the contrary, including expert opinion. By permitting 

medical bills to serve as prima facie proof that the expenses are 

reasonable, the rule eliminates the need for testimony on that 

often uncontested issue. Finally, the fact that a statement was 

submitted is at least some evidence that the charge is normal for 

the treatment involved, and it was necessary to be performed. 

906 N.E.2d at 856.

[27] The Court distinguished between the introduction of medical bills to prove the 

amount of medical expenses when there is no substantial issue that the medical 

expenses are reasonable and when there is. 

Thus, medical bills can be introduced to prove the amount of 

medical expenses when there is no substantial issue that the 

medical expenses are reasonable. However, in cases where the 

reasonable value of medical services is disputed, the method 

outlined in Rule 413 is not the end of the story. See Cook, 796 

N.E.2d at 277. The opposing party may produce contradictory 

evidence to challenge the reasonableness of the proffered medical 

bills, including expert testimony. See id.

Id.

[28] In Stanley, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant should have been 

allowed to introduce evidence of the discounted amount that was paid on 

behalf of the plaintiff in satisfaction of his account, an issue relevant to the 

determination of damages, to contradict the plaintiff’s prima facie evidence. Id.

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[29] Here, Parkview sought to have the trial court determine as a matter of law that 

the chargemaster rates were reasonable. That issue was disputed by Frost, who 

sought to discover discounted amounts Parkview had accepted from other 

patients in an effort to challenge the lien amount. By frustrating Frost’s 

discovery efforts, Parkview prevented Frost from meeting Parkview’s prima 

facie evidence of reasonableness with contradictory evidence. The trial court 

correctly found that Frost should be allowed to discover that evidence and that 

such evidence was admissible under the Act. 

[30] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

[31] Judgment affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J. concurs.

Najam, J., dissents with separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A03-1507-PL-959 | March 14, 2016 Page 12 of 19
IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Parkview Hospital,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Thomas E. Frost, et al.,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1507-PL-959

Najam, Judge, dissenting.

[32] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Hospital Lien Act 

allows an uninsured hospital patient to renegotiate the terms of his contract 

with the hospital. 

[33] This case is controlled by our supreme court’s holding in Allen v. Clarian Health 

Partners, Inc. In Allen, uninsured patients executed contracts with the hospital 

under which they “guarantee[d] payment of the account[s].” 980 N.E.2d 306, 

308 (Ind. 2012). After providing the patients care, the hospital attempted to 

collect its chargemaster rates against the patients. The patients sued the 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A03-1507-PL-959 | March 14, 2016 Page 13 of 19
hospital for breach of contract on the ground that their contracts did not specify 

a price for services and, as such, the patients could introduce evidence in court 

to determine a reasonable price as a matter of law.

[34] Our supreme court rejected the plaintiffs’ complaint outright and held that they 

had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 309-10. In 

particular, the court held that the “price terms in these contracts, while 

imprecise, are not sufficiently indefinite to justify imposition of a ‘reasonable’ 

price standard.” Id. at 310. The court then explicitly held that the patients’ 

“agreement[s] to pay ‘the account’ . . . refer[] to [the hospital’s] chargemaster. 

As a result, we cannot impute a ‘reasonable’ price term into th[ese] contract[s].” 

Id. at 311.

[35] Likewise here, it is undisputed that Frost, an uninsured patient of Parkview’s, 

executed through his guardian a contract for medical services that obliged him 

“to pay the account.” Appellant’s App. at 44. Thus, under Allen, Frost agreed 

to pay Parkview’s chargemaster rates, no matter how reasonable those rates 

may or may not have been and regardless of how those rates were determined. 

Allen, 980 N.E.2d at 310-11. It is also undisputed here that that same amount is 

the amount of Parkview’s lien against Frost.

[36] The majority asserts that Allen is irrelevant here because “Frost is not 

challenging that a debt is due Parkview” and “Frost is not asking a court to 

impute a reasonable price into the contract where no price is stated . . . .” Slip 

op. at 6. I cannot agree. By challenging the reasonableness of Parkview’s 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A03-1507-PL-959 | March 14, 2016 Page 14 of 19
chargemaster rates—the basis for Parkview’s lien—Frost is challenging the 

amount of debt that, according to Allen, he has already agreed to pay, and he is

asking a court to impute a new, “reasonable” contract price in place of his 

agreement to pay Parkview’s chargemaster rates.

[37] The confusion here is understandable. Indiana Code Section 32-33-4-4(e) 

provides that “[a] person desiring to contest . . . the reasonableness of the 

charges claimed by a hospital [in its lien] may do so by filing a motion to quash 

or reduce the claim . . . .” In a vacuum, that language appears to permit 

patients against whom hospitals file liens to wholesale challenge the amount 

underlying the lien. But reading that language in that manner ignores our 

supreme court’s holding in Allen. 

[38] And, while Allen was not a hospital lien case, it is nonetheless binding here for a 

simple, pragmatic reason: if Allen does not apply, hospitals will simply stop 

seeking recovery of unpaid fees through hospital liens and instead seek recovery 

through breach of contract actions, where Allen is controlling. This end-run 

would obviate the Hospital Lien Act altogether. See, e.g., Cmty. Hosp. v. Carlisle, 

648 N.E.2d 363, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that, “[b]y allowing health 

care providers direct interests in funds collected by personal injury patients, the 

statute furthers the important policy of reducing the amount of litigation that 

would otherwise be necessary to secure repayment of the health care debts,” 

and that, “by expressly allowing attorneys to collect their fees before satisfaction 

of all other liens,” the statute enables “personal injury patients who are unable 

to pay for medical services” to hire a lawyer of their choice).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A03-1507-PL-959 | March 14, 2016 Page 15 of 19
[39] Moreover, Indiana Code Section 32-33-4-4(e) can be interpreted in a manner 

consistent with Allen. In particular, the Hospital Lien Act provides that the 

amount underlying a lien:

[b](5) must:

(A) first be reduced by the amount of any benefits to which the 

patient is entitled under the terms of any contract, health plan, 

or medical insurance; and

(B) reflect credits for all payments, contractual adjustments, 

write-offs, and any other benefit in favor of the patient;

after the hospital has made all reasonable efforts to pursue the 

insurance claims in cooperation with the patient.

(c) If a settlement or compromise that is subject to subsection (b)(1) is 

for an amount that would permit the patient to receive less than twenty 

percent (20%) of the full amount of the settlement or compromise if all 

the liens created under this chapter were paid in full, the liens must be 

reduced on a pro rata basis to the extent that will permit the patient to 

receive twenty percent (20%) of the full amount.

I.C. § 32-33-4-3. In other words, if a hospital files a lien that fails to properly 

account for the benefits in favor of the patient, or to account for the patient’s 

right to receive at least twenty percent of a settlement or compromise, or is 

similarly unreasonable, the patient can challenge the reasonableness of the 

amount of the lien pursuant to Indiana Code Section 32-33-4-4(e).2

 But what 

Indiana Code Section 32-33-4-4(e) does not authorize is a renegotiation of the 

original contract terms.

2

 In his brief, Frost asserts that the subparts of Indiana Code Section 32-33-4-3 are “prerequisites to filing a 

lien in the first place.” Appellee’s Br. at 11 (emphasis removed). Frost’s argument here is hard to follow; 

surely he does not suggest that Section 32-33-4-4(e) prohibits review of the hospital’s accounting.

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[40] I am not persuaded that, in light of Allen, the holding in Stanley v. Walker has 

any application to this matter. Stanley involved the evidence a tortfeasor could 

introduce to attempt to reduce the injured party’s claim of damages. 906 

N.E.2d 852, 858 (Ind. 2009). That simply is not this case. See Allen, 980 

N.E.2d at 311 (“We decline to extend Stanley to actions for breach of 

contract.”).

[41] Finally, I respectfully disagree with the Indiana Supreme Court’s premise and 

holding in Allen. See Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 955 N.E.2d 804, 809 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (Najam, J.), vacated. There was, simply, no factual basis in 

Allen for the assumption that chargemaster rates represented a rational—let 

alone a reasonable—value of medical services in the health care marketplace. 

See id. at 812 n.5 (“[the hospital] considers its chargemaster rates confidential 

and proprietary. Left unanswered by [the hospital] is how a patient and a 

provider can mutually agree to an ‘unambiguous’ and ‘express’ chargemaster 

fee schedule that is not available to the patient.”). As our supreme court has 

recognized in other contexts, “the relationship between [a hospital’s] charges 

and costs is tenuous at best.” Stanley, 906 N.E.2d at 857 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

[42] Health care is not an option but a necessity. Yet health care prices are an 

enigma:

Unlike everything else we buy, when we purchase a medical treatment, 

surgery[,] or diagnostic test, we buy blind. We do not know the cost of 

health procedures before we buy. When we do get the bill, we have no 

idea what the charges are based on and have no way to evaluate them.

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Tina Rosenberg, Revealing the Health Care Secret: The Price, N.Y. Times: 

Opinionator, July 31, 2013, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/

31/a-new-health-care-approach-dont-hide-the-price/. Indiana media have also 

recognized that “hospitals, doctors[,] and health insurers have been playing a 

game of hide-and-seek with the public on health care prices . . . .” J.K. Wall, 

Hospitals, Insurers Should End Hide-and-Seek with Prices, Indianapolis Bus. J., June 

14, 2013, http://www.ibj.com/blogs/12-the-dose/post/41959-hospitalsinsurers-should-end-hide-and-seek-with-prices. Indeed, few people on the 

planet understand how health care prices are determined. Id. 

[43] Thus, in its operation and effect, Allen places health care consumers, including 

emergency-room patients, at a permanent, take-it-or-leave-it disadvantage. 

Allen immunizes a hospital’s unilateral pricing scheme from an evaluation or 

comparison by individual consumers or the marketplace at the front-end and 

then leaves those same consumers without recourse from a trier of fact at the 

back-end. Given that there is no price transparency, to insinuate chargemaster 

rates into an agreement “to pay the account” cannot possibly represent a 

meeting of the minds between the contracting parties. Chargemaster rates are 

not per se reasonable when they are, first, confidential and, second, 

incomprehensible. In sum, there is no discernable or reliable correlation 

between chargemaster rates and the reasonable value of the health care services 

provided.

[44] Further, under the holding in Allen, the uninsured disproportionately bear the 

costs for health care. The Washington Post recently recognized that “hospitals 

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in the United States are charging uninsured consumers more than 10 times the 

actual cost of patient care . . . .” Lena H. Sun, 50 Hospitals Charge Uninsured 

More Than 10 Times Cost of Care, Study Finds, Wash. Post, June 8, 2015, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/why-somehospitals-can-get-away-with-price-gouging-patients-studyfinds/2015/06/08/b7f5118c-0aeb-11e5-9e39-0db921c47b93_story.html. As 

one academic authority has plainly stated, Allen is “oblivious to patients’ 

vulnerability and dependency.” Mark A. Hall, Toward Relationship-Centered 

Health Law, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 233, 248 (2015).

[45] I believe the majority’s statutory analysis would be correct, and I would concur, 

were it not for Allen, which is controlling authority. We are bound by Indiana 

Supreme Court precedent, but I encourage the Indiana Supreme Court to 

reconsider Allen given the opportunity. As such, I would reverse the trial 

court’s judgment for Frost and remand with instructions for the court to enter 

judgment for Parkview.

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