1 It is noted that the original complaint named various individual Pennsylvania state

correctional officials as Defendants. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDWARD C. KELLEY, :

Plaintiff :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-04-1851

:

: (Judge Jones) 

SCI -FRACKVILLE :

ADMINISTRATORS, ET AL., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

February 13, 2006

Background

Edward C. Kelley (“Plaintiff” or “Kelley”), an inmate presently confined at

the State Correctional Institution, in Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Frackville”),

initiated this pro se civil rights action. Following service of the original

complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting leave to submit an amended

complaint. By Order dated April 4, 2005, Kelley’s motion was granted and

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the original complaint was denied as moot. 

On April 11, 2005, Kelley filed an amended complaint. Named as

Defendants therein are: SCI-Frackville, “Administrators and Staff” at his prior

place of confinement, the State Correctional Institution, in Waymart, Pennsylvania

(“SCI-Waymart”), and the Central Office Executive Staff.1

 (Rec. Doc. 22, at 1). 

Kelley’s amended complaint generally alleges that he was denied adequate

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 The original complaint sought injunctive relief and compensatory damages.

3

 In one submission, Plaintiff indicates that he wishes to appeal the dismissal of his action

(doc. 26), other filings request that SCI-Frackville and the DOC be abolished, (doc. 34) that Kelley

be deemed a citizen of no nation, (doc. 30) and that he should be considered a member of “Al-

(continued...)

2

medical treatment at both prisons. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that due to the

failure of prison officials to provide him adequate mental health treatment, he is

not eating or taking care of himself and has become suicidal. He next claims that

SCI-Frackville staff have interfered with his right of access to the courts by

destroying his legal papers and denying him access to writing paper. His amended

complaint does not set forth what type of relief is being sought.2

Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion seeking dismissal

of the amended complaint. (Rec. Doc. 23). The motion is ripe for consideration.

Discussion

Defendants seek dismissal of the amended complaint on the grounds that:

(1) Kelley’s claims, to the extent that he seeks monetary damages, are barred by

the Eleventh Amendment and (2) the amended complaint, to the extent that it may

seek injunctive relief, is inadequate because none of the named Defendants are

persons for purposes of § 1983. 

Since the submission of Defendants’ supporting brief, Plaintiff has made

various filings, including a motion for partial summary judgment, indicating that

he is opposed to the proposed dismissal of his amended complaint. However,

none of Kelley’s filings address Defendants’ pending arguments for dismissal.3

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(...continued)

Qiada” (doc. 60).

3

A court, in rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, must accept the

veracity of the plaintiff's allegations. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1990). In Nami v. Fauver,

82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit added

that when considering a motion to dismiss based on a failure to state a claim

argument, a court should "not inquire whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail,

only whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support their claims." "[A]

complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

"The test in reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is

whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, plaintiff may be entitled

to relief." Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation

omitted). Additionally, a court must "accept as true the factual allegations in the

complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them." Markowitz

v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990); Independent Enters., Inc.

v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1168 (3d Cir. 1997). Finally,

it is additionally well-settled that pro se complaints should be liberally construed. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This Court will now discuss

Defendants’ motion in light of the standards set forth above and Rule 12(b)(6) of

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A. Eleventh Amendment

Defendants argue that the claims against them should be dismissed on the

grounds that they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The

United States Supreme Court has ruled that a § 1983 action brought against a

"State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment unless

[the State] has consented to the filing of such a suit." Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.

781, 782 (1978). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has similarly

concluded that the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole could not be sued

because "it is not a 'person' within the meaning of Section 1983." Thompson v.

Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 232 (3d Cir. 1977).

 In Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), the Supreme

Court reiterated its position that state agencies are not "persons" subject to liability

in § 1983 actions brought in federal court. The Court noted that a § 1983 suit

against a state official's office was "no different from a suit against the State

itself." Id. at 71. "Will establishes that the State and arms of the State, which

have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit

under § 1983 in either federal or state court." Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365

(1990). 

Similarly, a prison or correctional facility is not a person within the

meaning of § 1983. See Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.

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1973)(prison medical department is an agency of the state and therefore not a

proper defendant for purposes of § 1983); Philogene v. Adams County Prison,

Civ. No. 97-0043, slip op. at p. 4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1997) (Rambo, C.J.); Sponsler

v. Berks County Prison, Civ. A. 95-1136, 1995 WL 92370, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb.

28, 1995).

Pursuant to the above discussion, SCI-Waymart, SCI-Frackville, Central

Office Executive Staff, SCI-Frackville Administrators, SCI-Frackville Staff and

the SCI-Frackville Medical Department, as agencies or arms of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, are not persons and may not be sued under §

1983. See Thompkins v. Doe, No. 99-3941, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. March 16, 2000)

(a state prison and a department within the prison are not persons and may not be

sued under § 1983). Entry of dismissal in favor of those Defendants is

appropriate.

B. Personal Involvement

A plaintiff, in order to state an actionable civil rights claim, must plead two

essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under color of law, and (2) that said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a

right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995);

Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1990); Frazier v.

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1986)(a civil

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 John Doe defendants may be allowed "to stand in for the alleged real parties until

discovery permits the intended defendants to be installed." Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F. Supp.

873, 878 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (citations omitted). However, since the original complaint provided the

names of numerous correctional officials who were listed as the original Defendants, it does not

appear that the names of the administrators and staff named as Defendants in the amended complaint

were unknown to Kelley.

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rights complaint should allege the conduct violating the plaintiff's rights, the time

and the place of that conduct, and the identity of the responsible officials).

Civil rights claims brought cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat

superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, each

named defendant must be shown, via the complaint's allegations, to have been

personally involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim. See

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials,

546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976). As explained in Rode:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . [P]ersonal involvement

can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of

actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of

participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however,

must be made with appropriate particularity. 

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

The named Defendants include the SCI-Waymart Administrators and Staff

and the Camp Hill Central Office (presumably the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections) Executive Staff.4

 A review of the complaint establishes that there

are no allegations of constitutional misconduct directly asserted against any

specific individuals. Moreover, Kelley does not provide the name of any prison or

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DOC official anywhere in his amended complaint. Based on a review of the

amended complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting to establish liability

against some correctional staff solely based upon their supervisory roles. 

Due to the failure of the Plaintiff to name any actual persons as Defendants,

his amended complaint fails to satisfy the basic notice pleading requirements of §

1983 and is subject to dismissal. It is additionally noted that the amended

complaint is also flawed in that it fails to indicate what type of relief Kelley is

seeking. 

C. Access to the Courts

It is well-settled that prison inmates have a constitutional right of

meaningful access to law libraries, legal materials or legal services. Bounds v.

Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-25 (1977). Failure to provide inmates with legal

research material or trained legal assistance can constitute a constitutional

violation. Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1507 (9th Cir. 1991). A recent

opinion by the United States Supreme Court, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-

54 (1996), clarified that an inmate plaintiff, in order to set forth a viable claim

under Bounds, must demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim had been

frustrated or was being impeded. A plaintiff must also allege an actual injury to

his litigation efforts.

A review of the amended complaint reveals that Plaintiff has not satisfied

his burden under Lewis of demonstrating that he suffered an actual injury to a

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non-frivolous litigation effort. Therefore, his denial of access to the courts claim,

even if asserted against a properly named defendant, could not proceed. 

D. Mental Health Treatment

It is also noted that in addressing Plaintiff’s request for preliminary

injunctive relief, this Court’s January 27, 2006 Order noted that an unopposed

document submitted by Defendants established that Kelley has a Personality

Disorder and a history of manipulative suicide gestures and refusals to eat,

shower, and take medication. (Rec. Doc. 62 at 3).

Furthermore, the Order added that Plaintiff undergoes regular psychiatric

and psychological exams, is kept under close observation, and was being

considered for commitment to a mental health facility. Those factors clearly

undermine Plaintiff’s vague claim of deliberate indifference to his mental health

problems.

Conclusion

Pro se parties are accorded substantial deference and liberality in federal

court. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5

(1980). They are not, however, free to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. An amended complaint must be complete in all respects. It must be a

new pleading which stands by itself without reference to the complaint previously

filed. Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). 

Generally speaking, the purpose of an amended complaint is to cure

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deficiencies which exist in the original complaint. However, in the present case,

Kelley has submitted an amended complaint which is clearly inadequate, cannot

stand by itself, and is vastly inferior to his original complaint. Defendants’ motion

to dismiss the amended complaint will be granted. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. 23) is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE the case.

3. Based on the Court’s decision, all other pending motions are

dismissed.

4. Any appeal from this order will be deemed frivolous, without

probable cause, and not taken in good faith.

s/ John E. Jones III

JOHN E. JONES III

United States District Judge

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