The Honor able Judit h M. Ba rzilay , J udg e of the United States Court of I nternational Trade , * sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0232n.06 F iled: May 5, 2008 Nos. 07-1302, 07-1498 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DEGUSSA ADMIXTURES, I NC., Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. DOUGLAS BURNETT and SI KA CORP., De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : BATCHEL DER and SUTTON, Circ uit J udg es; and B ARZ I L AY, Judge. * SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. After Degussa Admix tures voluntarily dismiss ed with pre

judice its state -l aw ac tio n ag a ins t Dou g la s Burn e tt an d Sika Cor po ratio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d B ur ne tt and Sika’s mot ion for attorney ’s fe es. B eca use the district cour

t neither plainly

err ed in deter

mining that Mic hig a n la

w g ov e rn s th e mot ion

no r a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

g ra nti ngthe mot ion , w e a ff

ir m.
I.
I n 1986, Bur

nett started wor

king f or De g ussa, a manuf

actur er of admix tures fo r conc rete , and eventua lly beca

me a salesman for t he company responsible for wester n Michig an. During his tenureNos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 2 - w i t h D e g u s s a , B u r

n e t ts i g n e d

a c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y

a g r e e m e n tb u tn o ta

n o n c o mp e t e a g r e e m e n t
. In Aug ust 2005, Bur

nett left Deg ussa and landed a job as a salesman covering all of Michig an for Sika Corporation, one of

Degussa’s compe titors.
I n his first couple months with Si ka, B urnett per suaded se vera l former customers to switch to S ika pr od uc ts. Co nv in ced

that B ur

ne tt c ou ld n ot “ tur

n o ve r t

ho se c us tom e rs so quickly
. . . without r elying on [confidential] i nformation” he had ac quired at his former e mploy er, JA 58 7, De g us sa

fi le d a c omp la int

a g a ins t B ur

ne tt a nd Sik a in fede ra l c ourt

on div e rs ity g ro un ds
. I n particula

r, De g ussa alleg ed that B urnett bre ache d his confidentia lity ag ree ment with Deg ussa, that Sik a ind uc e d th a t br e a c h a

nd that B ur ne tt a nd Sik a vio la te d th e Mi chi gan Un if or m T ra de Se c re ts Act, Mi ch. C omp. L aws § 445.1901 et seq. Degussa soug ht a tempora ry restra ining or der, da

mag es and injunctive re lief.
The dist rict court denied Deg ussa’s mot ion for a temporar y restra ining order, r easoningthat De g us sa “ fa ile d to a lle g e wi th a

ny sp e c if ic ity the c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a tio n th a t B ur ne tt p os se sse s” and that “g ener alized alleg ations of impropriety do not demonstrate that, a bsent an injunct i o n, [De g us sa ] wil l su ff

e r i rr e pa ra ble ha rm .” JA 12 9– 30 . A ft e r c on sid e ra ble dis c ov e ry , D e g us sa wi th dr e w i t s r e qu e s t f

o r a p r e l i m i n ar

y i n j u n c t i o n an d m a d e a “ b u s i n e s s d e c i s i o n ” t o d i smi ss i ts complaint without prejudice. JA 297. Burne tt and Sika responded by filing a motion for c osts and attorney ’s fe es. The c ourt g rante d Degussa’s motion continge nt on the company paying Bur

nett and Sika their costs and fe es. Degussa t hen withdrew its previous mot ion to dism iss and filed a motion to dis mis s it s c omp la int with pr e jud ic e , c on te nd ingthat su c h a dis mis sa l “ wi ll p ro te c t D e fe nd a ntsNos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 3 - a g a ins t a ne w a c tio n b a se d u

po n th e dis mis se d c la ims and that it the re fo re wo uld no t be a pp ro pr ia te to further awa rd De fenda

nts fees or costs.” J A 374. Bur nett and Sika ag ain soug ht fee s. The district court g rante d Degussa’s motion to dism iss the complaint with prejudice, denied Bur nett and Sika’s mot ion fo r c os ts and fe e s un de r F e de ra l Rul e s of Civ il Pr oc e dure 11 and 41 (a ) a nd g ra nte d B ur ne tt
and Sik a ’s mot ion

fo r f e e s ( tot a lin g ro ug hly

$1 14 ,0 00 ) u

nd e r t he Mic hig an U nif

or m T ra de Se c re ts Act. De g ussa cha lleng es the attorney ’s fe e aw ard.
II.
A.
This case initially

prese nts a choice of law qu es t i o n : Does fe dera l or state law g overn? Degussa contends that the fee provision in the Michiga n Uniform Trade Secre ts A ct amounts to a proce dural, not a substan t i v e, ru l e u n der Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and thu s d oe s n ot a

pp ly . T he di st ri ct c ourt

he ld t hat D e g us sa

wa ive d th is a

rgume nt b y

fa ili ngto r a ise it i n a tim e ly mann e r a

nd tha t, in the a lte rn a tiv e , th e argume nt w a s w ith ou t me ri t. D e g us sa challeng es only

the latter de termination in its primary ap p ellate br ief a nd asks us to review

that deter mination for plain er

ror. L eavingto the side whether even a plain err or would excuse Degussa’s waiver , cf. United States v. Rogan , 517 F.3d 449, 454 ( 7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is no g ener al doctrine of pla in- e rr or

re vie w i n c ivi l c a se s. ” ), De g us sa ha s n ot s ho wn th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to apply Michig an law w as “obvious[ly ] or clear [l y ]” wrong , s e e United States v . Vonner , 516 F.3d 382,Nos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 4 - 38 6 (6t h Cir . 2 00 8) (e n b anc ) ( ho ldi ng , in the c ri min a l c on te xt, th a t pl a in e rr or re qu ir e s, a t a minimum , a showing of er ror that “ was obvious or c lear ”) ( internal quotation marks omitted).
Whil e De g ussa ca

ptures the Er ie dichotomy corr ectly —it indeed re quires a fe d er al cour t sitti ng in diversity to apply state subs tantive l aw and fede ral proc edura l law, see Erie R.R. , 3 04 U. S. at 78

—the dis tr ic t court did no t cle arl y e rr in inv ok ing the Ac t her e . “[I ]n an o rd ina ry div e rs ity c a se wh e re the state law doe s not run co un te r to a va lid fe de ra l sta tut e or ru le of c ourt , a nd us ua lly it w ill not, state law deny ing the rig ht to attorney ’s fe es or g iving a rig ht thereto, whic h ref

lects a substantial policy of the state, should be followed.” Alyesk a Pipeline Serv. Co. v. W

ilderness Soc’y , 4 21 U. S. 24 0, 25 9 n.3 1 (19 75 ) (i nte rn a l quot a tio n mar ks omi tte d an d alt e ra

tio n in or ig ina l) . F e de ra l c ourt s sitti ng in diversity

thus customarily

will apply

state “f ee- shifting r

ules that em b o dy

a substantive policy , such as a

statute which permits a preva iling par ty in cer tain classes of

litigation to rec over fee s.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc

. , 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991). Michig an follows the “ Americ an rule ,” mea ning that “attor n ey

fee s g ener ally

are not
rec overa ble from the losing party

as costs in the absence of an ex ception set forth in a st atute or court rule e x pressly

authorizing such a

n awa rd.” McAule

y v. G en. Motors Corp. , 578 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Mich. 1998). The Michig an Unifor m Trade Secre ts Act provides a n exception: “I f a c laim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or willful and malicious misappropriation ex ists, the court may awa rd re asonable attorney ’s fee s to the preva iling par

ty .” Mich. Comp. L aws § 445.1905.Nos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 5 - This provision amounts to a substantive rule under Erie, re qu ir ing fe de ra l c ourt s to a pp ly it in a diversity case . As a state la w that “pe rmits a preva iling par ty in [ a] certa in class[] of litigation to r ecove r fee s,” the attorney -fe e provision “ embod[ies] a substantive policy ” o f t h e S tate, Cha mb e rs , 501 U.S. at 52—a policy that deter s frivolous trade -sec ret a ctions that threate n “fr ee a nd open compe tition i n the manu f a c tur e and sa le of unpatented g oods” or that discour ag e “w orker s from p u rs u i ng their livelihoods when they leave their cur

rent positions,” PepsiCo, Inc. v . Redmond , 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 ( 7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]rade sec ret law does not pr ovide a re serve clause for solicitous employ ers.” ).
Nor ha s Degussa pointed to any fede ral statute or

rule that c onflicts wi th the policies underlying the Act’s attorney -fe e provision. As the Nint h Circuit rec ently conclude d in addre ssing
an id e nti cal pro vis ion

of Ca lif or nia law, the Ac t’ s atto rn e y -f e e pr ov isi on

is s ub sta nti ve be c a

us e it “applies only

in case s where a tra de sec ret misappropr iation claim was filed,” it “does not supplant or collide dire ctly

wit h an y Fe dera l Rule, and it embodies a substantive state policy ag ainst the frivolous filing of

trade secr et claims.” CRST Van Expe dited, Inc. v. W erner Enters., Inc. , 479 F.3d 10 99 , 1 11 1 ( 9th

Cir . 2 00 7) (c itatio n o mit te d) ; cf. 10 Charles Alan Wright et al., Fe dera l Practice and Procedur e § 2669 (“In these circ umstances the fede ral court should pe rmit a n awa rd of a f ee on the t h eo ry t h at i ti s p a r t o f t h e s u

b s t an t i v e r i gh ti ni s s u e. A c o n t ra ry co n cl u s i o n. . . wo u l d

en co u ra ge [forum shopping].”).
F i rst Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. , 3 0 7 F
. 3 d 5 0 1 ( 6 th Cir. 2002), is consistent with this decision. I n that case , we c oncluded that a n Ohio provision allowingNos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 6 - for attorney ’s fees was “ proce dural in nature ,” so that Rule 11, ra ther than O hio law, g overne d “sanc tions for frivolous conduc t.” Id. at 52 9
. Ye t , unlike the provision in today ’s ca se, that provision was “a

g ener al statute that allows for the awa rd of attorney s fee s based upon the c onduct of the pa rties and the attorney s in filing and litig ating the cl ai m , ra t h er than for suc cess on the underlying me rits of the cla im.” Id. ; see also N ielson v. Bob Schm idt Homes, Inc

. , 590 N.E.2d 1291, 12 93 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 19 90 ) ( statin g that O hio ’s “ fr ivo lou s c on du c t st a tut e ” —th e statut e a t is su e in Fi rst Ba nk of M ar ie tta —“applies to a ll civil actions”).
I n c on tr a st, the Ac t is no t a “ g e ne ra l” sa

nc tio ns statut e that, l ike Rul e 11 and the Oh io s ta tut e at issue in Fi rst

Ba nk of M ar ie tta , applies to all civil actions and that is intended to police conduct in l iti g a tio n; i t is a

sp eci fi c stat

ute that a pp lie s o nly

to t ra de -s e c re t c la ims and

that is int e nd e d to
encour ag e innovation, competition and job mobility in the marke tplace. A nd, unlike sanctions under the statute in Fi rst

Ba nk of M ar ie tta , an awa

rd of attorney ’s fee s under the Act hinge s larg ely on a party ’s succ ess on the under lying merits of t he claim; the court may awa rd fe es only

to the preva iling party
. Cf. Cha mb e rs , 501 U.S. at 53 (“Rule 11 sa nctions do not constitute the kind of fe e shifting at is s u e in Alyesk

a [because the y ] are not tied to the outcome of litigation.”) (interna l quotation
mark s o mit te d a

nd a lte ratio n in

or ig ina l) ; Gen. Ele c. Co. v. Latin Am. Im ports, S.A. , 127 F. App’ x 1 5 7 , 1 5 9

– 6 0 (6 t h C i r. Fe b
. 8 , 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Fi rst Ba nk of M ar ie tta for the pr oposition t hat “whe n the iss ue of wh e the r to awa

rd a tto rn e y s’ fe e s d e pe nd s o n th e un de rl y ingsu bs tanti ve c la im, the iss ue is
su bs ta nti ve i n n a tu r e ” )
. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt t h u s d i d n o t c l e ar l y e r r i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e A c tis substantive for Erie purposes. See W eiss v. St. Paul Fire &Marine Ins. Co. , 28 3 F .3 d 79 0, 79 8 ( 6thNos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 7 - Cir. 2 00 2) (r e ve rs inga

“ dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt a wa rd inga tto rn e y ’s fe e s” be c a us e the “ c ourt , sitti ng in diversity , was bound to apply the s ubstantive law of Ohio” and beca use “Ohio law does not permit a court to awa

rd attorney ’s fees [ in a par ticular ty pe of a ction] ex cept with explicit st atutory authorization and to the preva iling par ty ”).
B.
The ne x t question is whether the district court cor rec tly applied the Ac t in impos ing f ees on De g us sa fo r b a d f a ithin b ri ng ingthi s tr a de -s e c re ts c la im. We r e vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on

to
awa rd attorney ’s fe es for

abuse of discretion, while a

pply ing c lear -er

ror r eview to a

ny fac tual finding s underlying that decision. See Bergman v. United States , 844 F.2d 353, 357 ( 6th Cir. 1988);

se e als o G e ie r v . S

un dq uis t , 372 F.3d 784, 789–90 (6th Cir. 2004). The cle arly err oneous standar d applies to a “ finding [of] bad fa ith.” Bergman , 844 F.2d at 357.
Th e Ac t impo se s two re qu ir e me nts on a pa rt y se e kin g a tto rn e y ’s fe e s: ( 1) that th e pa rt y is the “pr evailing party”; and (2) that the opposing party ’s “c laim of misappropriation is made in ba d fa ith .” Mic h. Com

p. L aws § 4 45 .1 90 5. Al l a g re e that B ur ne tt a nd Sik a we re pr e va ili ngpa

rt ie s. So the issue is whether the court err ed in finding bad faith. Although no Michig an cour t has define d “bad f aith” under

the Act, other

courts construingidentical provisions fro m other States have conclude d, as the district cour t did he re , t h at bad fa ith “require s objective spec iousness of the plaintiff’s cla im . . . and . . . subje ct i v e bad faith in bring ing or maintaining the claim.” Gemini Aluminum Corp. v

. Cal. Custom Shapes, Inc

. , 116 Ca l. Rptr . 2d 358 , 3 68 (C a l. C t. A pp . 2 00 2) ; seeNos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 8 - also Berry v. H

aw. Express Serv ., Inc. , No. 03-00385, 2007 WL 689474, at *13–15 (D. Haw. Mar
. 2, 2007) (a

pply ing the same test under Hawa ii law and noting th at o t h er j u ri sdictions that have addre ssed the issue also have applied the same test).
We see no re ason not t o ap p ly this conventional test here . The Michig an cour ts have indicated that they

will se ek g uidance from their sister state cour ts in construing the Act, and the parties at all events both subscribe to this formulation of the bad fa ith test. Se e Nie mi v . A m. Ax le Mf g . & Holding, Inc. , N o . 2 6 9 1 5 5 , 2 0 0 7 WL 2 9 3 8 3 , a t * 2 n . 1 ( M ic h
. Ct
. A p p . Ja n . 4 , 2 0 07) (“Sec tion 9 of the Michig an Unifor m Trade Secre ts Act requir es that the a ct b e ap p l i ed and construed to e ffe ctuate its g ener al purpose to make uniform the law with r espec t to the subject of th[ e] act amon g s t at es en ac t ing it. Thus, it is appropriate to seek guidance from the de cisions of other jurisdictions.”) ( internal quotation marks a nd citations omitt ed and a lteration in orig inal).
Th e dis tr ic t cour t di d no t c omm it c le ar e rr or in f ind ingba d f

a ithor oth e rw ise a

bu se its discretion in imposing fe es on De g ussa. I n filing this action, Deg ussa ac knowledg ed that it had no direc t evidence that Bur

nett had used, or was threatening to use, i ts alleg ed tra de sec rets. See JA 515 (De g ussa’s counse l “conc ed[ing]” that Degussa “did not catc h [Burnett] red- handed” ); J A 610 (D e g us sa ’s vic e pr e sid e nt d isc la imi ngany a lle g a tio n th a t B ur

ne tt “ thr e a te ne d to dis c los e information”) ; J A 727 (De g ussa’s sale s manag er sa y ing that he had “ no evidenc e” that Burne tt had disclosed conf

idential information to “anyone at Sika”)
.Nos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 9 - Degussa instead re lied larg ely on the t heory of “inevitable disclosure”—that Bur nett’s new employ ment inevitably

would lead him to rely on or di sclose Deg ussa’s trade sec rets. See J A 607 (De g ussa’s attorne y

stating that “[i] t ain’t no secr et t hat our case is, in larg e mea sure, built upon the I ne vit a ble Di sc los ur e Do c tr ine ” ); see also J A 515 (same ). Michig an, howe ver, has not endorsed that theory

and, makingmatt ers wor se, has a dded that, “[e]ven assuming that the conc ept of ‘threatened misappropr iation’ of trade secrets encompasses a conce pt of inevitable disclosure , that
c on c e pt m

us t no t c omp ro mis e the ri g ht of e mpl oy e e s to c ha ng e job s. Ac c or din g ly , . . . fo r a pa rt y to make a [cog nizable trade- secr ets claim], the party m u st establish more than the e x istence of g ener alized trade se cre ts and a c ompetitor’s employ ment of t he party ’s forme r employ ee w ho has knowledg e of tra de sec rets.” CMI Int’l, Inc . v. Inte rmet Int’l Corp. , 649 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Mich. Ct. Ap p. 20 02 ); s e e a ls o U n it e d R e n ta ls (

N. A m . ) , I n c . v. Keizer , 355 F.3d 399, 412–13 ( 6th Cir. 20 04 ) (s ame ); c

f. P e ps iCo , 5 4 F
. 3 d

a t 1 2 6 9 ( “ [T ]h e me r e f

a c t t h a t a p e r s o na s s u me d

a s imilar position at a competitor does not, without more, make it inevitable that he will use or disclose tr ade
secr et information . . . .”) (interna l quotation mar ks and alteration omitted). Eve n if we a ssumed that a Mic hig an c ourt

wo uld re c og nize the ine vit a

ble -d isc ov e ry

do c tr ine , D e g us sa

sti ll n e e de d to be able to establish “more tha n the exis tence of g ener alized tr ade secr ets and [Sika’s] employ ment of [Burne tt] who has knowle dg e of tra de sec rets.” CMI Int’l , 649 N.W.2d at 813. All that Degu ssa could say , howeve r, is that Bur nett had knowledg e of its alleg ed g e ne ra lize d tr a de se c re ts ( e.g. , its prices, marg ins, customers, mix tures and ma rketing strateg ies), that B ur ne tt p e rs ua de d s e ve ra l of his fo rm e r c us tom e rs a t D e g us sa to swit ch to S ik a

pr od uc tsNos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 10 - be c a us e of c os t sa vin g s and

that Sik a

pa id B ur

ne tt m or e tha

n h e made at Degus sa. Th e se alleg ations do not satisfy

even the Michig an courts’ conting ent ac knowledg ment of the inevitable

discovery doctrine. Also problematic a

re the se pre -complaint fa cts, which De g ussa had ever y rea son to know: Degussa had no sales represe ntative i n wester n Michig an for

over a month after B urnett depa rted; Bur nett’s re place ment at Degussa had no sales experience (and had not sec ured a ny new c ustomers
or ca lled on many of the lost customers during his first severa l weeks or

months with Deg ussa); the customers ha d been e x perie ncing “[q] uality problems with Deg ussa produc t,” J A 736; Degussa had been losing employ ees in its sales ra nks; Burne tt approa ched Sika for e mploy ment over c oncer

ns about job secur ity

and De g ussa’s new

compensation structure and was not making more than othe r Sika sales re prese ntatives; Bur nett’s boss at Degussa believe d Bur nett was a

“g ood admix ture salesman” who had “ integ rity ” and w as “honest,” J A 723; and Deg ussa lear ned “a fewday s befor e [Burnett] resig ned” that he “did not have a noncompe te” a g ree ment, J A 718. The picture that emer g es, as the district c ourt appre ciated, is not that De g ussa had a n objectively

supportable a

nd g ood-fa ith claim that Burne tt was using trade secr ets to g ain new
c us tom e rs and

wa s g e tti ngpa id e xtra

to d o s o. Ra the r, it s ug g e sts that D e g us sa ’s ow n pro du c tqu a lity , e mpl oy e e -r e te nti on and mark e tin g sh or

tc omi ng s le d it to fi le th is a c tio n in an atte mpt

to slow the bleedingfrom those self -inflicted wounds—to avoid losing additional marke t sha re a nd
sa le sp e op le to S ika

and to c on ve rt

B ur ne tt’ s c on fi de nti a lity

a g re e me nt i nto a

no nc omp e teNos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 11 - a g re e me nt. As De g us sa ’s vic e pr e sid e nt ( wh o a tta c he d an a ff ida vit to D e g us sa ’s c omp la int ) s a id in r e s p o n s e to a qu e s ti o n a b o u t w h a t le d th e c o mp an y to f il e th is s u it : “ [I ]t w a s th e fa ctors of a couple pe ople leaving

—leavingto go to Sika, the impact that we thoug ht that was g oing to have. And t hen, obvious ly , seeing that impact i n the s ales numbers.” J A 622. Filing a tra de-se cre t action to restra in leg itimate competition and job mobili ty , needle ss to say , is not proper . On t his recor d,
we se e no cle ar e rror

or other abuse of discretion in the district court’s de cision to awar d attorney ’s fee s to Burne tt and Sika.
I n resisting this conclusion, Deg ussa contends that the district court should have, c onsistent with the summary -judg ment standard, “g ive[n] Degussa the benef it of all rea sonable infe renc es that
ma y b e dr aw nf

r o m t h e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d
. ” Re p ly B r . a t 1 4
. Y e t qu e s ti o n s o f f a c t i nth e c o n te xt of dec iding whe ther t o awa rd attorne y ’s fe es (a s opposed to decidingwhether to gr ant summary judgme nt) are committed to the district court judg e, eve n when de cided b ef o re a t ri al. Com

pa re Bergman , 844 F.2d at 357, with Kraus v. Sobel Corrugated Containers, Inc. , 9 15 F .2 d 2 27 , 2 30 (6 th Cir . 1 99 0) . T he j ud ge, as the fa c tf ind e r i n th e atto rn e y -f

e e c on te xt, is no t r e qu ir e d to dr aw a ll inf e re nc e s in

fa vo r o f t he no n- mov ingpa

rt y bu t in ste a d is pe rm it te d to make fa c tua l f ind ing s in
acc ordanc e wi t h h i s o r her own view of

the evidenc e. That is just what the judg e did her e. And g iven our c onclusion that “t h e d i s trict court’ s acc ount of the evide nce is plausible in lig ht of the
r e c o r d v ie w e d in it s e n ti r e ty , [w e ] ma y n o t r e v e r s e it e v e n [i f w e a s s u me th a t w e ] w o u ld have weig hed the e vidence differ ently . Where ther e ar e t wo permissi ble views of the evidenc e, theNos. 07-1302, 07-1498

De gu ssa v . B ur

ne tt

- 12 - fac tfinder’ s choice betwee n them cannot be clea rly err oneous.” An de rso n v . Ci ty of B esse me r Ci ty , 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).
C.
Be cause Degussa’s appe al was not fr ivolous or filed for a n i m p ro p er purpose, we deny B ur ne tt a nd Sik a ’s mot ion

fo r atto rn e y ’s fe e s in c ur

re d o n a pp e a l.
III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.