IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDWARD C. KELLEY, :

Plaintiff :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-04-1851

:

: (Judge Jones) 

SCI FRACKVILLE :

ADMINISTRATORS, ET AL, :

Defendants :

ORDER

May 13, 2005

Background

Edward C. Kelley (“Plaintiff” or “Kelley”), an inmate presently confined at

the State Correctional Institution, in Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Frackville”),

initiated this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After being

granted leave of court, Plaintiff submitted an amended complaint on April 11,

2005. (See Rec. Doc. 22).

Presently pending before the Court are two motions seeking preliminary

injunctive relief filed by Plaintiff. (See Rec. Docs. 9 & 10). In his first motion,

Kelley contends that he is being denied necessary medical treatment by SCIFrackville medical staff. He indicates that he will go blind if he is not provided

with contact lenses. His second motion, which was filed three days later, requests

that the Defendants be ordered to install a new ventilation system in the SCIFrackville Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”). Specifically, Kelley alleges that

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because smoke and fumes were coming through the ventilation system, one RHU

inmate had to be hospitalized for treatment of a breathing problem.

Discussion

Preliminary injunctive relief is extraordinary in nature, and is discretionary

with the trial judge. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 836 F. Supp. 309, 311

(E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College,

353 F. Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa. 1973)). In determining whether to grant a motion

seeking preliminary injunctive relief, courts in the Third Circuit consider the

following four factors: (1) the likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the

merits; (2) the extent to which the movant is being irreparably harmed by the

challenged conduct; (3) the extent to which the non-moving party will suffer

irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) whether granting

preliminary injunctive relief will be in the public interest. S & R Corp. v. Jiffy

Lube Int'l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Hoxworth v. Blinder,

Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1990)); Instant Air Freight v. C.F.

Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989); Premier Dental Prods. Co. v.

Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 852 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.

950 (1986). It is the moving party who bears the burden of demonstrating these

factors. See Dorfman v. Moorhous, No. Civ. A. 93-6120, 1993 WL 483166, at *1

(E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1993). 

Perhaps the most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary

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injunction is a demonstration that, if it is not granted, the applicant is likely to

suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered. 

Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 356 (3d Cir.

1980). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has defined irreparable injury as

"potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or equitable remedy

following a trial." Instant Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 801. A court may not grant

preliminary injunctive relief unless "[t]he preliminary injunction [is] the only way

of protecting the plaintiff from harm." Id.

The relevant inquiry is whether the party moving for the injunctive relief is

in danger of suffering the irreparable harm at the time the preliminary injunction is

to be issued. SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1264 (3d Cir.

1985). Speculative injury does not constitute a showing of irreparable harm. 

Continental, 614 F.2d at 359; see also Public Serv. Co. v. West Newbury, 835

F.2d 380, 383 (1st Cir. 1987). Nor does it appear that the temporary loss of

income, ultimately to be recovered, is enough to constitute irreparable harm. "The

possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available

at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim

of irreparable harm." Instant Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 801 (quoting Sampson v.

Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1964)).

It is noted that Plaintiff’s recently filed amended complaint does not assert a

specific claim relating to his failure to be provided with contact lenses and the

amended complaint is devoid of allegations pertaining to the allegedly unsafe

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ventilation system in the RHU. (See Rec. Doc. 22). Rather, Plaintiff’s amended

complaint contends only that he is not being provided with adequate mental health

and medical treatment and that prison officials are violating his right of access to

the courts.

Based on an application of the above standards to the Plaintiff’s requests for

preliminary injunctive relief, this Court is not satisfied that Kelley has satisfied his

burden of showing that he will prevail on the merits. Second, since the Plaintiff’s

recently filed amended complaint asserts no discernible claim relating to either the

purported deprivation of contact lenses or the RHU’s ventilation system, it is

unclear as to whether: (1) Kelley is in danger of suffering irreparable injury or (2)

the alleged contact lens and adequate ventilation problems still exist. 

Furthermore, based on his failure to include said claims in his amended

complaint, it equally unclear as to whether Plaintiff still wishes to proceed with

those assertions. Accordingly, the pending requests for preliminary injunctive

relief will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff, if he so chooses, may reassert

his requests in a new motion. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff's Motions for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (docs. 9 &

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10) are dismissed without prejudice.

2. If the Plaintiff still wishes to pursue his requests for preliminary

injunctive relief, he may reassert his claims through the

submission of a new motion which must be served on the

Defendants.

3. The Plaintiff is reminded that he must submit a brief in support of

any motions which he files with the Court. See M.D. Pa. Local

Rule 7.5. 

s/ John E. Jones III

JOHN E. JONES III

United States District Judge

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