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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RACHELLE DUVALL, as Personal : No. 4:CV 05-1786

Representative of the ESTATE OF :

MARK DUVALL, deceased; and :

RACHELLE DUVALL, as Personal : Judge Jones

Representative of the ESTATE OF :

TAMMY DUVALL, deceased, :

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. :

:

AVCO CORPORATION, et al., :

: 

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

January 30, 2006

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

Pending before the Court is a Motion for More Definite Statement (“the

Motion”) or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss for Failure to State Claims upon Which

Relief May be Granted (“the Alternative Motion”)(doc.25) filed by Defendants,

AVCO Corporation, on behalf of its Lycoming Engines Division (“AVCO”) and

Textron Inc. (collectively “the Defendants”).

Diversity jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332.

For the following reasons, the Motion and the Alternative Motion are denied.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This products liability, negligence and wrongful death action arises out of an

aircraft accident near Chickaloon, Alaska, on September 2, 2003, which killed the

pilot, Glyn. A. Bindon and his two passengers, Mark K. DuVall and Tammy S.

DuVall. Rachell DuVall (“DuVall” or “Plaintiff”), the personal representative of the

passengers’ estates, commenced this action by filing a complaint (doc. 1) with this

Court on September 1, 2005. The named Defendants in this action include Cessna,

the manufacturer of the aircraft, AVCO, whose Lycoming Engines Division is the

manufacturer of the engine, Precision, the manufacturer of the fuel servo, and Crane

Co. d/b/a Lear Romec, the manufacturer of the fuel pump. The Plaintiff claims that

the accident was caused by the malfunction of the aircraft’s engine and fuel servo. 

Slightly before 8 a.m. on September 2, 2003, Mark and Tammy DuVall

joined Glyn Bindon on a flight departing from Homer, Alaska, aboard Mr.

Bindon’s Cessna T206 aircraft. The National Weather Service weather observer in

the area reported limited visibility in the area and that Sheep Mountain Pass, a route

Mr. Bindon intended to utilize, was closed. However, Mr. Bindon did not have

this information during flight because he did not request any weather updates. At

approximately 10 a.m., the aircraft piloted by Mr. Bindon crashed into the side of a

mountain. Mr. Bindon and both of the DuValls were killed in the accident. 

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The instant Motions (doc. 25) were filed on November 7, 2005. To date the

Motions have been fully briefed and are therefore ripe for review. We will dispose

of the Motion for More Definite Statement first and then move to an analysis of the

Alternative Motion to Dismiss.

A. MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT:

Standard of review:

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), a party may make a motion for a more

definite statement if a pleading is “so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” Further, “the motion shall

point out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires “notice pleading” of the parties in diversity

cases pending in federal courts. The “notice pleading” standard requires a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Motions for more definite statements arise in “the rare cases where because

of the vagueness and ambiguity of the pleading the answering party will not be able

to frame a responsive pleading.” Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publ’ns Inc., 370

F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967). “Motions for more definite statement are generally

disfavored, and should [be granted only] if a pleading is unintelligible, making it

virtually impossible for the opposing party to craft a responsive pleading.” 

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Synagro-WWT v. Rush Tp., Penn., 204 F. Supp. 827, 849-850 (M.D. Pa. 2002).

Discussion:

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s allegation that the engine and the

fuel servo malfunctioned, resulting in the aircraft crash, is “barebones” and “does

not provide adequate notice” to the Defendants. Defendants argue that the Plaintiff

does not allege how or why the malfunction occurred or how the engine was

defective, therefore the Defendants cannot adequately respond to the complaint.

Plaintiff’s complaint plead the particular aircraft and the crash giving rise to

this cause of action, states the type of fuel servo and engine installed on the subject

aircraft, and alleges that the cause of the crash is due to a faulty/defective fuel

metering system on the Cessna T206 aircraft’s TIO-540 engine that was designed

and manufactured by the Defendants. The claims alleged against the Defendants

are clearly founded in wrongful death, negligence and products liability and are set

forth in a cogent manner. 

The “notice pleading” standard required by Rule 8(a) is a liberal one, and as

previously noted, a Rule 12(e) motion should only be granted where the complaint

is “unintelligible,” rendering a responsive pleading impossible. Our review of the

complaint (doc. 1) in this action reveals that it is hardly an “unintelligible”

document. Rather, the allegations in the complaint are both specific and pointed,

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and put the Defendants on notice that this action is a wrongful death, negligence

and products liability action relating to an alleged defect in the engine and fuel servo

of the subject aircraft. The complaint clearly meets the Rule 8(a) “notice pleading”

standard and therefore, the Motion for More Definite Statement pursuant to Rule

12(e) will be denied.

B. MOTION TO DISMISS:

Standard of review:

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), a

court must accept the veracity of a plaintiff's allegations. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir.

1990). In Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996), our Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit added that in considering a motion to dismiss based on a failure to

state a claim argument, a court should "not inquire whether the plaintiffs will

ultimately prevail, only whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support their

claims." Furthermore, "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a

claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957); see also District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d5 310 (3d Cir.

1986). 

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Discussion:

The Defendants move this Court to dismiss Counts IV, V and VI of the

complaint. (Rec. Doc. 1). Count IV is a negligence claim, Count V is a breach of

warranty claim and Count VI is a strict liability claim. With respect to Count V, the

Defendants argue that the Plaintiff failed to attach any warranty as an exhibit or

attempt to explain how or why a warranty was made. Defendants further argue that

Counts IV and VI must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege the minimum

elements for a negligence and a strict liability claim. Finally, Defendants allege that

the prayer for punitive damages in the damages provision of the complaint is

insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Defendants argue that Counts IV, V, and VI should be dismissed because

“the pleading fails to allege a breach of duties under federal law.” In support,

Defendants contend that under Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F. 3d 363

(3d Cir. 1999), Plaintiff must allege the breach of duties under federal law to survive

a motion to dismiss. Defendants thus appear to argue that because this case

involves an aircraft crash, that the Plaintiff must therefore plead the breach of a

federal duty of care because federal law preempts common law in the arena of

aviation safety. While we agree with the holding of Abdullah with regards to federal

preemption, it is clear to us that the standard of care announced by Abdullah court

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applies to the operation of an aircraft, not the manufacturing of aircraft parts: “No

person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger

the life or property of another.” Abdullah, 181 F. 3d at 372. Therefore contrary to

Defendants’ argument, the Plaintiff’s pleading is not insufficient because it does not

plead the breach of a federal duty of care.

The Defendants argue that Count V must be dismissed because it “purports

to state a claim for breach of express warranty yet fails to attach any such warranty

as an exhibit to the complaint or to even give a cursory description of how or when

any such warranty was made.” However, the Defendants do not cite and we

cannot find any precedent requiring the explicit language of an express warranty to

be attached to the complaint or a description of how or why the warranty was

made. The complaint (doc. 1) alleges that Defendants breached both express and

implied warranties that the “subject engine was reasonably fit for its intended and

foreseeable use and purpose.” (Rec. Doc. 1 at 14). Taking the Plaintiff’s

allegation as true, as we must at this juncture, we find Count V sufficient to survive

the Alternative Motion to Dismiss.

Next, Defendants argue that Count VI must be dismissed because it does not

allege the minimum elements of a strict liability claim under the laws of

Pennsylvania, Michigan or Alaska. Our reading of Count VI reveals that the

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Plaintiff pointedly alleges that “[t]he subject engine was manufactured with an

inherently defective condition since its fuel metering system was susceptible to uncommanded in-flight failure which Defendants knew would result in a crash . . .

Defendants failed to take remedial precautions [and] failed to warn . . . consumers. 

As a proximate result . . . the subject aircraft crashed causing Plaintiff’s decedents

to suffer severe injuries, death and damages.” We find that under any or all of the

potentially applicable states’ laws, the Plaintiff’s allegation in this regard is sufficient

to survive the Rule 12(b) standard. 

Finally, to the extent that it is uncertain at this point which state’s law will

ultimately apply to the action, we will not dismiss that portion of the Plaintiff’s

damages prayer requesting punitive damages. In the event that the applicable state

law, when determined, prohibits such damages, or if other facts in support of this

argument arise via discovery, Defendants are free to re-assert it at a later point in

this litigation.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Motion (doc. 25) is DENIED.

2. The Alternative Motion (doc. 25) is DENIED.

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s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Judge

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