The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Mexican War

DESPERATE STAND

The BATTLE of BUENA VISTA
Introduction

The Mexican War (1846–1848) was the U.S. Army’s first experience 

waging an extended conflict in a foreign land. This brief war is often 

overlooked by casual students of history since it occurred so close to the 

American Civil War and is overshadowed by the latter’s sheer size and 

scope. Yet, the Mexican War was instrumental in shaping the geographical 

boundaries of the United States. At the conclusion of this conflict, the 

U.S. had added some one million square miles of territory, including what 

today are the states of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California, as 

well as portions of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada. This newly 

acquired land also became a battleground between advocates for the 

expansion of slavery and those who fought to prevent its spread. These 

sectional and political differences ripped the fabric of the union of states 

and eventually contributed to the start of the American Civil War, just thirteen years later. In addition, the Mexican War was a proving ground for a 

generation of U.S. Army leaders who as junior officers in Mexico learned 

the trade of war and later applied those lessons to the Civil War.

The Mexican War lasted some twenty-six months from its first 

engagement through the withdrawal of American troops. Fighting took 

place over thousands of miles, from northern Mexico to Mexico City, and 

across New Mexico and California. During the conflict, the U.S. Army 

won a series of decisive conventional battles, all of which highlighted 

the value of U.S. Military Academy graduates who time and again paved 

the way for American victories. The Mexican War still has much to teach 

us about projecting force, conducting operations in hostile territory with 

a small force that is dwarfed by the local population, urban combat, the 

difficulties of occupation, and the courage and perseverance of individual 

soldiers. The following essay is one of eight planned in this series to 

provide an accessible and readable account of the U.S. Army’s role and 

achievements in the conflict.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military 

History by Stephen A. Carney. I hope that this absorbing account, with 

its list of further readings, will stimulate further study and reflection. 

A complete list of the Center of Military History’s available works is 

included on the Center’s online catalog: http://www.history.army.mil/

catalog/index.html.

JEFFREY J. CLARKE

Chief of Military History


Portions of the U.S. Army (nearly half of the Regular Army) under 

the command of Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor achieved an unbroken series 

of battlefield victories during the first nine months of the war with 

Mexico. From 8 May to 23 September 1846, Taylor defeated Mexican 

forces at Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterrey. These victories 

vindicated the oft-scorned U.S. Regular Army and demonstrated the 

competence of the graduates of the U.S. Military Academy. In the 

months following these victories, Taylor became a popular hero, and 

newspapers speculated that he would win the Whig Party nomination for 

president in 1848. This prominence infuriated President James K. Polk, 

a Democrat, who was angry with Taylor both for making his presidential 

ambition known publicly and for granting overly generous cease-fire 

terms to the Mexican Army after the battle for Monterrey.

Meanwhile, on the basis of promises from former Mexican 

strongman Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna that he would settle the 

Texas border issue and sell California to the United States, Polk had 

allowed him to return from exile in Cuba through the U.S. naval 

blockade in July 1846 to resume power. Polk hoped this would hasten 

the end of the war. Instead, Santa Anna seized control and hurriedly 

assembled a large force with the intention of driving the American 

Army out of northern Mexico. His attack struck Taylor’s force at a 

place the Americans called Buena Vista. 

Strategic Setting

In early October 1846, after the Americans’ capture of Monterrey 

in September, Santa Anna moved some 220 miles from Mexico City 

to San Luis Potosi, 250 miles south of Monterrey. Resisting demands 

from threatened Mexican cities that he immediately confront the 

invading forces, he instead concentrated most of his forces at this location in the northern part of the country. From this core, he immediately 

began rebuilding the Army of the North into a massive force that might 

be capable of driving the Americans out of Mexico. 

The problems Santa Anna faced in accomplishing this task seemed 

insurmountable, but his enthusiasm and personal charisma won 

Desperate Stand

The Battle of Buena Vista


acceptance—if not agreement—

for his decision, even from bitter 

opponents of concentration. 

The generalissimo ordered each 

Mexican state to recruit a quota 

of troops from among men aged 

sixteen to fifty years. Because no 

national mechanism existed to 

enforce conscription, he approved 

various coercive measures to 

pressure states to comply. He 

also recruited jailed criminals, 

bandits, and any other available 

able-bodied men. In the end, he 

increased the Army of the North

to some 25,000 men, concentrated around San Luis Potosi. He 

accomplished this remarkable feat 

by late December, in less than 

four months. It was the largest 

force Mexico would field during the entire war, but the reconstituted 

Army of the North was largely untrained and untested, with few 

veteran units left from the early months of the war. 

Santa Anna also faced financial problems. He needed many more 

troops and had to purchase supplies and arms, all of which required 

substantial funding. He drew on his personal fortune and coerced 

money from state governments, the federal coffers, and the cash-rich 

Catholic church. He threatened and cajoled Catholic archbishops to 

provide loans, grants, and even church property to pay for the cause. 

On the other side, President Polk and Secretary of War William 

L. Marcy had both fumed at Taylor’s seemingly generous terms of 

surrender at Monterrey when they received his report on 11 October. 

[See CMH publication Gateway South: The Campaign for Monterrey.] 

The fact that Taylor allowed the Mexican Army to vacate the city with 

its firearms was bad enough, but they could not forgive his granting 

an eight-week armistice. The president pushed ahead with his plan 

to discredit Taylor, questioning the general’s loyalty and vigor in 

continuing the war. Finally, Marcy ordered Taylor to terminate the 

armistice, an order the general received on 2 November. 

President Polk also decided to give sixty-year-old Maj. Gen. 

Winfield Scott, general-in-chief of the U.S Army, a field command. 

Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna

(Library of Congress)


Scott was clearly not his first 

choice; in fact, the president 

disliked him personally. But 

Polk hoped to divide public 

support between these two politically ambitious Whig generals, 

thereby frustrating any hopes 

of a successful presidential bid 

by either in 1848. Polk wanted 

to promote a Democrat to take 

charge, but he could not find a 

suitable officer. Earlier, he had 

schemed with Senator Thomas 

Hart Benton of Missouri (an 

influential, egotistical, and politically ambitious Democrat) to give 

him command of U.S. forces in 

Mexico, but the mere suggestion 

caused a stir even among Polk’s 

staunchest supporters. Therefore, 

he had to settle on the highly professional and experienced Scott and 

be satisfied with appointing Democrats from civilian life to general 

officer billets. Scott met with Polk on 19 November and received 

orders to take command in the field immediately. 

In mid-November, when Santa Anna received the message from 

Taylor that the armistice had been terminated, he responded by 

hurriedly completing the defenses around San Luis Potosi. He was 

certain that the Americans would attack that strategically important 

city. He dispatched cavalry units northward to destroy all water tanks 

and wells along likely American lines of advance. Santa Anna also 

sent strong detachments to watch for signs that Taylor was beginning 

to move south. 

But Taylor believed that to force Mexico to accept a peace treaty 

the Polk administration would have to invade the coastal harbor of 

Vera Cruz and then move on to Mexico City. He believed that Santa 

Anna would never cede Mexico’s northern territories (especially 

modern New Mexico, Arizona, and California) unless the United States 

attacked what Taylor saw as the center of gravity: central Mexico and 

its capital, Mexico City. Taylor argued that it was impractical to attack 

Mexico City from Monterrey: Nearly 650 miles of mostly inhospitable 

land would stretch American supply lines too thin. He further pointed 

Thomas Hart Benton

(Library of Congress)
6 Dec 1846

San Pascual

22–23 Feb 18

Buena Vist

K E A R N Y

1 8 4 6

WO 

Gila R

Colorado R

Rio Grand

P A C I F I C

O C E A N

Boundary Claimed by Texas

M

E

X I C

Los Angeles

San Diego

El Paso del Norte

Fronteras

Tucson

Santa Fe

Taos

Albuquerque

Chihuahua

Parras

S

Mazatlan

Miles

0 400

1846–1847

MEXICAN WAR

Engagement, Date Indicated

U.S. Advance, Date Indicated

Disputed Territory
out that his force did not have 

the manpower to launch such an 

operation. President Polk and 

Secretary Marcy agreed with this 

assessment and directed Scott’s 

field command to undertake the 

campaign against Mexico City. 

This split American combat operations into two spheres—what 

we would now call two separate 

theaters of operation. 

In keeping with his role of 

directing the northern theater of 

operations, Taylor chose a closer 

objective, the town of Saltillo, 

fifty miles west of Monterrey. 

Saltillo had considerable strategic 

importance because major northsouth and east-west thoroughfares 

ran through it. The town guarded 

the southern approaches to 

Monterrey, Taylor’s main headquarters. Saltillo also commanded 

the road to the agriculturally 

rich region around Parras, some 

seventy-five miles farther west.

Taylor and a force of 1,000, 

composed mostly of regular artillery companies and dragoons, left 

their camp outside Monterrey at 

Walnut Springs on 12 November 

1846 to take Saltillo. After 

moving off the plain in front of 

Monterrey, the column rapidly 

ascended into the Sierra Madre 

foothills. This rugged country 

was quite different from the flat 

and oppressively hot and humid 

region around the Rio Grande 

corridor. Along the way, the 

Americans supplemented their 

8 May 1846

Palo Alto

9 May 1846

Resaca de la Palma

21–23 Sep 1846

Monterrey

847

ta

S A N

TA

A N

N A

1 8 4 6

WO O L 1 8 4 6

TAY L O R 1 8 4 6

S C O T T 1 8 4 7

23 Sep

Red River

de

Neuces R

Boundary of Adams-Onis Treaty 1819

Boundary Claimed by

Mexico After 1836

Point Isabel

Lobos I.

L O U I S I A N A

A R K A N S A S

T E X A S

O

U N O R G A N I Z E D

T E R R I T O R Y

Fort Brown

San Jacinto

Houston

San Antonio

Austin

Victoria

Tampico San Luis Potosi

Matamoros

Camargo

altillo

Corpus Christi

Goliad

Mexico City

Puebla

Jalapa Verz Cruz


foodstuffs with fresh grains and 

fruit from numerous apple and 

cherry orchards. Taylor quickly 

entered Saltillo and took the 

town without firing a shot. The 

Mexican Army that had surrendered at Monterrey had long since 

abandoned the town and moved 

south to San Luis Potosi. 

Taylor directed Brig. Gen. 

John E. Wool to abandon his 

originally planned expedition 

in mid-November. Secretary 

Marcy had ordered Wool—with 

some 3,400 men organized into 

the Division of the Center—to 

march from San Antonio, Texas, 

to Chihuahua, in north-central 

Mexico. Wool’s command left the 

United States on 23 September 

1846 on what proved to be a five-month expedition. The division 

consisted of a small core of Regular Army companies (from the 1st 

and 2d Dragoons, the 4th Artillery, and the 6th Infantry) as well as 

three regiments of volunteers. 

Wool, an excellent tactician and leader, was a strict disciplinarian 

and a veteran of the War of 1812 and numerous Indian conflicts. On 

the march south through Mexico, he instituted harsh measures to keep 

his men under control. Unpopular though these measures were, they 

succeeded in maintaining discipline. 

Taylor redirected Wool’s division to Monclova, 120 miles north of 

Saltillo. From that position, Wool could protect rich agricultural lands 

that extended through the area, occupy an alternative route to San Luis 

Potosi, and be in position to move on either Durango or Zacatecas, 

both located several hundred miles to the southwest. In addition, the 

force could provide support if Taylor’s army were attacked. Wool 

occupied Monclova without incident on 29 October and stayed in that 

town for most of November. In early December, Wool marched to 

Parras, some seventy-five miles west of Saltillo, to close the distance 

between Taylor’s force and his own. 

Taylor also sent a detachment of Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson’s 

division to support the Navy’s occupation of the Gulf Coast town 

Winfield Scott

(Library of Congress)


of Tampico in early November. 

Patterson, a native of Ireland 

and one of the president’s 

civilian appointees, had served 

as a Regular Army captain 

during the War of 1812. After 

the war, he retired and became 

a wealthy businessman and 

influential Democrat. After Vera 

Cruz, Tampico was the most 

important port on the Gulf of 

Mexico. There had been calls 

in that region to break away 

from Mexico City and create 

an independent state. The Polk 

administration hoped that an 

American presence would further 

encourage the separatist agenda. 

More important, Tampico would 

make an outstanding base for the 

Navy’s Gulf Squadron and could be used to support an assault on 

Vera Cruz. Patterson’s men arrived on 23 November and provided 

security until more troops could occupy the port town. 

Once the Americans completed these moves, they settled into 

garrison duty, an extremely unpopular mission with the volunteers. 

They found the daily routine boring, resented the hierarchy of the 

chain of command, and felt that the inaction robbed them of the 

opportunity to win acclaim on the battlefield. As they had on the 

Rio Grande, depredations against the local populace became a major 

problem. Mexican citizens charged volunteers with theft, assault, rape, 

and other violent crimes. Volunteers often slipped away from camp 

to drink and gamble at local establishments, which made them easy 

targets for Mexican bandits and irregulars, who took every opportunity to attack isolated soldiers. These attacks led volunteers to justify 

various forms of retaliation, creating a cycle of violence that rapidly 

became a major cause of guerrilla activity that would plague American 

lines of communications in northern Mexico for the next year.

Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. (as of 30 June 1846) Stephen Watts Kearny 

enjoyed great initial success on his march toward California. Kearny 

led a column of about two thousand troops from Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, to San Diego, California, through the important commercial 

John E. Wool

(Library of Congress)
10

center of Santa Fe in what is today New Mexico. The force that 

departed Fort Leavenworth on 5 June 1846 included troopers from 

the 1st Dragoons, as well as several volunteer units: the 1st Missouri 

Mounted Volunteers, the St. Louis Volunteer Artillery, the Missouri 

Infantry Battalion, the Laclede Rangers, the 2d Missouri Volunteers, 

and the Mormon Battalion. The Mormon Battalion had been raised in 

Iowa after the Polk administration authorized church leader Brigham 

Young to recruit a battalion of volunteers to serve in California. 

Kearny captured Santa Fe on 17 August without firing a shot. Because 

of news that American settlers had taken control of California during 

the “Bear Flag Revolt,” Kearny did not expect any opposition and 

continued on to California with a contingent of only 100 dragoons. But 

as it turned out, he had to fight his way to the Pacific Coast, including 

a major engagement at San Pascual, where he lost eighteen men killed 

and thirteen wounded. In January 1847, the survivors launched a joint 

Army-Navy offensive in an effort to regain control of California after 

the Bear Flag rebels were themselves overthrown in September 1846. 

In Mexico, Santa Anna planned his next step while Taylor consolidated his forces. Santa Anna gained valuable intelligence by reading 

U.S. newspapers, which reported that an attack on Vera Cruz was 

probable. In early December, he also received information from intercepted message traffic that Taylor would lead an expedition to Victoria, 

150 miles southeast of Monterrey, and that Wool would continue his 

march to Chihuahua. These examples show that Santa Anna’s intelligence collection was impressive, if at times only partially correct. 

Beginning in early December, Taylor did march with Brig. Gen. David 

E. Twiggs’ division of volunteer regiments to Victoria, primarily to 

break the monotony of garrison duty. However, the Mexican general 

did not realize that Taylor had canceled Wool’s march to Chihuahua 

and had instead ordered the column to Monclova. 

On the basis of this faulty information, Santa Anna planned an 

attack on Taylor before Christmas 1846. He decided to march some 

13,000 troops (just less than half of his total force) north to hit the 

small American force at Saltillo, some 280 miles away. Brig. Gen. 

William J. Worth, whom Taylor had left in command at Saltillo while 

he marched with the volunteer regiments to Victoria, heard rumors 

from Mexican traders of the impending assault and hurriedly called 

for reinforcements. Taylor, already more than halfway to Victoria, 

hastened back to the main American position with General Twiggs’ 

entire complement of regulars, while Brig. Gen. John A. Quitman’s 

volunteers continued on to Victoria. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. William 
11

O. Butler, commander of the Monterrey garrison, called troops up 

from the Rio Grande corridor. The 55-year-old Butler had served with 

Andrew Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812 and 

was one of the most capable of the volunteer generals President Polk 

recruited from civilian life. 

At 1400 on 17 December, General Wool received an urgent plea 

for assistance from Worth. Less than two and a half hours later, his 

command struck out toward Saltillo with more than 350 wagons, 

400,000 musket cartridges, 400 rounds of artillery ammunition, fiftyfive days’ worth of provisions, and about 3,400 men. His men made 

the 100-mile forced march from Parras to Saltillo in less than four 

days. Wool’s maneuver was a textbook example of a supporting force 

rapidly moving to the decisive point to concentrate and lend aid. 

On his arrival at Saltillo, Wool (who outranked Worth) assumed 

command of the U.S. forces. He immediately began searching for the 

best defensive position to make a stand. On 23 December, he selected 

a pass through the Sierra Madre mountains twelve miles north of Agua 

Núeva; the pass was called La Angostura, which means “the narrows.” 

He began planning for operations, but the preparations proved unnecessary for the moment, as Santa Anna canceled his attack when he 

heard of Wool’s movement. After Taylor learned of Wool’s arrival in 

Saltillo, he resumed his march toward Victoria with Twiggs’ division 

and took that provincial capital on 5 January 1847.

Although the danger of an attack against Saltillo had temporarily 

passed, other developments made that position even more precarious. 

Scott, eager to take his field command, left Washington, D.C., for 

the theater of operations on 28 November 1846. He needed time to 

assemble troops to launch an assault against Vera Cruz before the 

wet spring months, when the yellow fever season would return to the 

low-lying coastal regions. En route to southern Texas, Scott wrote 

Taylor to reassure the popular general that he would not supersede 

his command. He offered no other details but suggested they meet 

to discuss future operations. When Scott arrived on the Rio Grande 

on 26 December, he found that Taylor was leading the expedition 

to Victoria and was not available. Scott had wanted to tell Taylor 

personally that he was requisitioning Worth’s regulars as well as the 

volunteers of Twiggs and Patterson for his Vera Cruz expedition. 

Instead, he sent copies of the orders to Taylor and to General Butler 

at Monterrey. That decision would leave Taylor with fewer than 

5,000 volunteer troops, a few regular artillery companies, and two 

squadrons of dragoons. 
12

When he received Scott’s letter on 14 January 1847, Taylor 

exploded. He was outraged that Scott had breached protocol by requisitioning the units instead of requesting them from Taylor. Although 

Scott had done this to save time, Taylor took it as a direct insult. He 

was infuriated that Scott had taken most of his regulars and nearly 

all of his veterans, leaving him with only a handful of green troops. 

Taylor considered Scott’s decision a personal affront and an effort to 

marginalize Taylor’s role in Mexico. Their relationship never recovered. Finally, Taylor had no intention of following Scott’s directive to 

abandon Saltillo, return to Monterrey, and avoid sending detachments 

south of that town. 

More important, on 13 January 1847, Mexican irregulars 

ambushed and killed Lt. John A. Richey, the courier carrying 

Scott’s orders to Butler. The communication methods available to 

commanders during the Mexican War relied primarily on mounted 

messengers. While Richey had a small guarding force—approximately ten men—couriers generally lacked an armed escort and 

were easy targets for guerrillas and highway robbers. (The War 

Department did use an early telegraph during the conflict, but only 

between the Office of the Quartermaster General in Washington, 

D.C., and a quartermaster depot in Philadelphia. Not until the 

American Civil War did army commanders have access to both strategic and field telegraphs.) 

With this crucial intelligence, Santa Anna reinstated his planned 

offensive against Saltillo, this time with his entire army of some 

25,000 men. His strategic plan was simple: He would sweep the 

Americans out of northern Mexico with the attack against the Army 

of Occupation at Saltillo and then swing southeast to Vera Cruz to 

repel Scott’s invasion force before it left the coastal yellow fever zone. 

Santa Anna dispatched a strong force of cavalry from his Army of the 

North: He sent some 3,500 cavalry, with perhaps as many as 3,000 

additional irregulars, under Brig. Gen. Jose Urrea to disrupt American 

lines of communications between Monterrey and Matamoros. From 

his position behind the Americans, Urrea could block their retreat 

from Saltillo and perhaps even compel their surrender. (In 1836, 

during the War for Texas Independence, Urrea had led a sizable 

cavalry force into Texas and captured some 300 Texans at Goliad; the 

Texans were subsequently executed by Urrea’s second-in-command 

on Santa Anna’s orders.) Santa Anna sent another cavalry force under 

Brig. Gen. Jose Vicente Minon to serve as a covering force in front 

of Taylor’s force at Saltillo. Minon, a native of Spain, had originally 
13

fought with the Spanish Army but later changed sides and fought with 

the Mexicans during the war for independence. After the Mexican 

War, he put down a number of peasant rebellions. Minon’s objectives 

were twofold: He would screen the main body of the Mexican Army 

on its march northward and, if necessary, prevent the Americans from 

withdrawing until Santa Anna arrived. With strong cavalry forces to 

screen his advance and cut the Americans off from the Rio Grande, 

Santa Anna planned to use his superior infantry numbers to destroy the 

American Army at Saltillo.

Operations

Santa Anna’s advance guard departed San Luis Potosi on 27 

January 1847 to clear a path northward. Over the next four days, the 

remaining six infantry and cavalry brigades—a force of some 21,500 

men—began their march toward Saltillo, 280 miles north across a 

stretch of dry, barren land. Santa Anna himself left the town on 2 

February with his personal escort, an elite, loyal unit known as the 

Regiment de Hussars. 

The Mexican Army’s weak logistics system created terrible 

hardships during its three-week trek toward Saltillo. Santa Anna’s 

November decision to order wells destroyed in order to delay Taylor’s 

move against San Luis Potosi now cost his force dearly, as his soldiers 

marched with barely enough water to survive. Cold weather gripped 

the region, and, because they lacked heavy coats and shoes, many 

of the troops were incapacitated by illness—the raw recruits from 

tropical regions of Mexico were especially unaccustomed to both 

the inclement weather and the hardships of army life. Finally, the 

Mexicans lacked sufficient wagons to carry rations for their large 

force, and the land was far too barren to fully support their movement. 

As a result, the men were half starved by the time they reached their 

destination. Conditions were so bad that Santa Anna ordered any man 

found more than one and one-half miles from camp to be shot as a 

deserter, even if he had fallen behind foraging for food or because he 

was too weak to keep up. 

Despite the appalling state of affairs, the Mexicans made remarkable progress. Without being detected by Taylor’s men, Santa Anna’s 

force began assembling in Encarnación, less than forty miles south of 

Saltillo, on 18 February. They had conducted a winter march of 240 

miles in about twenty-one days through a desert, averaging nearly 11 1⁄2 

miles a day on starvation rations.
14

Most Americans—including Taylor, who had been bombarded 

by constant rumors of attack since before Christmas—discounted 

the latest reports. Taylor did maintain regular patrols to the south 

but doubted they would find anything because of the difficulty the 

S A N

TA A N N A

WO O L

Bo u n d a r y C l a i m e d b y Te x a s

B o u n d a r y C l a i m e d b y

M e x i c o A f t e r 1 8 3 6

T E R R I T O R Y

U N D E R D I S P U T E

Monterrey

21–23 Sep 1846

Buena Vista

22–23 Feb 1847

Fort Texas

Nadadores

Monclova

Bejan

Nuevo Laredo

Salinas

Ramos

Cerralvo

Marin

Saltillo

Hedionada

Encarnación

Montemorelos

Linares

Mazapil

Agua Núeva

Victoria

Matehula

Corpus Christi

Camargo

Matamoros

Reynosa

Tampico

San Luis Potosi

Miles

806040200 100

NORTHERN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

June 1846–February 1847

Engagement, Date Indicated

Taylor's Movement

Quitman's Movement

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 1000 2000 3000 and Above
15

Mexican Army would have in crossing the dry plain between San 

Luis Potosi and Agua Núeva, a town approximately seventeen miles 

south of Saltillo. One of his patrols had actually made contact with 

General Minon’s cavalry screen on 16 February, a few miles north 

of Encarnación. The American scouts failed to realize that they had 

located the leading edge of Santa Anna’s army and instead reported 

that they had seen a few mounted irregulars. 

As Santa Anna marched his army northward, Taylor moved his 

main body of approximately 4,650 men seventeen miles south of 

Saltillo to Agua Núeva, arriving on 5 February. The move helped break 

the monotony of garrison duty and, more important, would deprive 

Santa Anna of the area’s crucial water supply in case the Mexican 

leader actually was moving north in force. The Americans enjoyed 

making camp on the wide plain surrounding the town. It offered an 

abundance of water and a welcome change of scenery. The position, 

however, was not as good for defense as they first thought. Engineers 

conducting a reconnaissance of the area discovered bypasses through 

the hills both to the east and west. 

Although General Wool dispatched cavalry patrols on reconnaissance missions into the hills and to the south, Santa Anna’s luck in 

marching undetected with such a vast army did not run out until 20 

February, when Lt. Col. Charles A. May and a detachment of 400 men 

captured a Mexican soldier who was sending signals at a ranch south 

of Agua Núeva. The prisoner reported the approach of Santa Anna 

with a large force. 

At roughly the same time, a reconnaissance party of Texas 

Rangers, composed of volunteers under Capt. Ben McCulloch, discovered the main Mexican camp at Encarnación. On receiving this news, 

Taylor ordered Wool’s force at Agua Núeva to fall back to the strong 

defensive position at La Angostura. 

Col. Archibald Yell’s mounted Arkansas volunteers remained at 

Agua Núeva to screen the withdrawal of men and supplies. Yell and 

his men, often called the Arkansas Ransackers, were among the most 

undisciplined and violent volunteers serving in northern Mexico. 

Although popular with his soldiers, Yell had been arrested by General 

Wool in early December for disobeying orders. After midnight on 

the morning of 21 February, Yell’s pickets made contact with Santa 

Anna’s advancing force. His volunteers burned the remaining stores 

and pulled back to the new American position at La Angostura. 

General Wool had first considered defending La Angostura on 23 

December 1846, during the pre-Christmas attack scare, and had used 
16

the area as his headquarters in early February when Taylor moved his 

army to Agua Núeva. The pass lay slightly more than a mile south of 

hacienda de Buena Vista, for which the Americans later named the 

battle. In stark contrast with the broad plains around Agua Núeva, at 

La Angostura the strategically important Saltillo road descended into a 

2 1⁄2-mile-wide valley in the Sierra Madre mountains. Steep rock walls 

lined the road on either side, and steep gullies and ravines ran perpendicular to the road, which limited lateral mobility across the valley. 

The Saltillo road ran roughly north-south through the valley on its 

western edge. The road itself traversed three miles of the narrow pass 

of La Angostura and at one point contracted to a mere forty feet wide. 

South of this contraction, a small hill dominated the Saltillo–Agua 

Núeva road, while deep gullies with steep slopes made any flanking 

movement to the west impracticable. On the eastern side, fifty-foothigh bluffs led up to what was known as the plateau, a piece of high 

ground approximately a mile and a half wide. These bluffs prevented 

artillery, cavalry, or large infantry formations from exiting the valley 

except where the ravines cut the heights. 

Deep, steep-sided ravines ran perpendicular to the road and 

extended eastward to the foot of the Sierra Madres. Although small 

groups of infantrymen could climb the rugged sides of the cuts onto 

the plateau, it was much more difficult for larger infantry units trying 

to maintain their formation to do so. Cavalry and artillery could gain 

access to the plateau only at the head of one of the many ravines 

cutting through the terrain. 

The area was ideal for a defensive operation, which is exactly what 

Wool needed to maximize his limited manpower. If Wool could defend 

the Saltillo road, he would rob Santa Anna of the only high-speed 

avenue of approach through the valley. Since it would be very difficult 

for Santa Anna to move onto the plateau in numbers, Wool hoped to 

turn the battle into a regimental fight. After Scott requisitioned most 

of Taylor’s troops, the American presence in the north was little more 

than a skeleton force of 4,750 men and thirteen cannon at Buena Vista. 

With American forces in central Mexico drastically reduced, few reinforcements were available to Taylor. Outside the Saltillo–Buena Vista 

force, there was only the garrison force in Monterrey, fifty-five miles 

away. 

Taylor’s force at Buena Vista consisted primarily of volunteer 

infantry, of whom only Col. Jefferson Davis, Taylor’s son-in-law, and his 

1st Mississippi Rifles had experienced combat. The remainder of the force 

comprised Brig. Gen. Joseph Lane’s Indiana Brigade (which consisted 
17

of Col. William A. Bowles’ 2d 

Indiana Infantry and Col. James 

H. Lane’s 3d Indiana Infantry); 

Col. John Hardin’s 1st Illinois 

Infantry; Col. William Bissell’s 2d 

Illinois Infantry (to which Capt. P. 

Edward Conner’s Texas Volunteer 

Company was attached); Col. 

Humphrey Marshall’s 1st Kentucky 

(which contained a mixture of 

mounted and dismounted troops); 

and Col. William McKee’s 2d 

Kentucky Infantry. Yell’s Arkansas 

cavalry regiment and McCulloch’s 

mounted Texas Rangers constituted 

the volunteer cavalry. The only 

Regular Army troops under Taylor’s 

command were three companies 

of artillery (Capt. Braxton Bragg’s 

Company C, 3d Artillery; Capt. 

Thomas W. Sherman’s Company E, 

3d Artillery; and Capt. John M. Washington’s Company B, 4th Artillery) 

and two squadrons of dragoons (Capt. Enoch Steen’s and Lt. Col. Charles 

A. May’s squadrons of the 1st and 2d Dragoons, respectively). Command 

and control was problematic, as no units other than Lane’s brigade of two 

regiments were organized into larger formations; instead, all reported 

directly to General Wool, whom Taylor had designated as the forward 

commander. Three cannon and seven infantry companies remained at 

Saltillo to defend the American line of communications; they did not 

participate in the battle.

Santa Anna’s army dwarfed its American counterpart. More than 

15,000 men had completed the 280-mile march to La Angostura, the 

last fifty miles of which were through a waterless desert. In Santa 

Anna, the Mexicans had a charismatic leader who continually exhorted 

his soldiers to liberate Mexico. Although many of his troops were halftrained and all were physically taxed, they were highly motivated and 

ready to fight. 

Unlike Taylor, Santa Anna organized his more numerous regiments 

into brigades and divisions. Maj. Gen. Francisco Pacheco’s Vanguard 

Division consisted of regiments of the 1st and 2d Active Militia of 

Guanajuato. Maj. Gen. Pedro de Ampudia’s Light Infantry Brigade

Jefferson Davis

(National Portrait Gallery, 

Smithsonian Institution)
18

was made up of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Light Infantry regiments. Maj. 

Gen. Manuel Lombardini’s Center Division consisted of the 1st, 3d, 

5th, 10th, and 11th Line Infantry regiments, mostly veteran troops. 

Maj. Gen. Jose Maria Ortega commanded the Rear Guard Division’s 

12th Line Infantry, also filled with veterans, as well as assorted militia 

units. The cavalry riding with Santa Anna’s force was divided into four 

brigades commanded by Generals Minon, Julian Juvera, Anastasio 

Torrejon, and Manuel Andrade. Santa Anna also had an artillery train, 

engineers, and other militia and sapper (zapadore) units at his disposal. 

Finally, General Urrea commanded an observation division consisting 

of Brig. Gen. Ciriaco Vasquez’s infantry brigade supported by nearly 

3,500 cavalrymen and various irregulars; however, this unit was not 

involved at Buena Vista and instead attacked Taylor’s line of supply 

between the Rio Grande and Monterrey. 

Santa Anna’s chief of engineers, Ignacio Mora y Vallamil, personally commanded the Army of the North’s heavy artillery (approximately ten pieces), while the remaining thirty guns were interspersed 

among the various divisions. The Mexican guns were for the most 

part heavier than the American ones and not nearly as mobile. The 

numerous ravines and rough terrain prevented the heavier guns from 

moving forward to remain in range of the Americans as the battle 

progressed northward. 

Santa Anna had two other units of note. The Regiment de Hussars, 

the best-trained unit in Mexico, was Santa Anna’s personal guard. The 

Legion de Extranjeros were mostly Irish Catholic immigrants who had 

deserted from the U.S. Army; they were perhaps the most highly motivated troops on the battlefield—they knew that if they were captured, 

they might be hanged for treason. Later in the conflict, they became 

known as the San Patricio (Saint Patrick) Battalion.

Wool realized that Santa Anna had only four options: (1) advance 

up the Saltillo road, overwhelm the force there, and catch the 

American forces in the flank; (2) gain the heights of the plateau to 

attack the American center; (3) advance across the ground between 

the plateau and the Sierra Madre, which afforded a direct approach 

to Buena Vista, where the Americans had an advanced supply depot; 

or (4) attempt a combination of the three, hoping to break the U.S. 

line at some point. On the afternoon of 21 February, in anticipation 

of these moves, Wool began deploying his troops in an irregular 

line. To defend the Saltillo road approach, he positioned Captain 

Washington’s five-gun battery (Company B, 4th Artillery) on a 

small hill facing south down the narrows and ordered wagons filled 
19

with rocks pushed across the path to preclude any Mexican attempt 

to charge the battery with cavalry. The 1st Illinois, commanded by 

Colonel Hardin, supported the guns from hastily constructed positions. One of Hardin’s battalions was entrenched on the right at the 

narrowest point of the roadway and extended to the natural ravine; 

Hardin’s main body, with a single cannon from Washington’s battery, 

occupied breastworks on a high hill a short distance to the left and 

in front of the battery. Colonel McKee’s 2d Kentucky, on the army’s 

far right flank, provided additional security from a large hill west 

of Washington’s position. Wool posted Colonel Bissell’s 2d Illinois 

to guard McKee’s left flank. Bissell took up position approximately 

one-half mile behind the Kentuckians. General Lane’s brigade of the 

2d and 3d Indiana regiments formed additional lines behind Bissell. 

Yell’s Arkansas cavalry and the 1st Kentucky’s mounted companies 

guarded the path that led up to the plateau farther to the east. Two 

dragoon squadrons and Texas volunteers made up a mobile reserve 

force. The remaining American troops remained in Saltillo to protect 

the trains there and to serve as a reserve force. 

While the Americans moved into position, Santa Anna had a 

crucial decision to make at Encarnación, nearly thirty miles south of 

La Angostura. Although he had lost the element of surprise, Santa 

Anna doubtless felt that his superior numbers would win the day, so 

he committed his forces to the only offensive he would launch during 

the entire Mexican War. At 1100 on 21 February, his weary soldiers 

moved onto the Saltillo road for the march north, each carrying a full 

canteen and three days’ rations. He was determined to make a forced 

march to Agua Núeva, approximately twenty-three miles north over 

waterless ground, by nightfall. Pushed to the brink of collapse, the 

Mexican soldiers dragged themselves into camp at the end of the 

march. There they spent a bitterly cold night without benefit of fires 

for fear of detection by American patrols. Before dawn, they began 

their approach over the final twelve miles that lay between them and 

the U.S. Army at La Angostura. 

Buena Vista: The Battle Begins

22 February 1847

Santa Anna’s cavalry screen made contact with the Americans at 

0900 on 22 February and began reconnoitering the field. Wool notified 

Taylor, who rushed to the field with most of the Saltillo garrison. Taylor 

gave Wool direct tactical command over the American position, as Wool 
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OPENING POSITIONS

22 February 1847

0 2000 4000

Feet

Mexican Movement

American Movement
was much more familiar with the 

ground. Taylor would serve as a 

motivator and calming influence 

on the outnumbered Americans 

and would retain responsibility for 

protecting Saltillo. As the tactical 

commander, Wool decided to keep 

the newly arrived troops in reserve 

for the time being.

As the Americans watched 

the Mexican Army concentrate, 

Taylor’s veterans realized that 

this fight would be very different 

from those they had fought earlier 

in the conflict. During the two 

previous battles—at Resaca de 

la Palma and Monterrey—it was 

the Mexicans who had chosen 

strong defensive ground that the 

Americans overran. Here the 

roles were reversed—it was the 

Americans who were forced to 

make a desperate stand against an 

attacking army.

It took Santa Anna’s large 

force several hours to draw 

together and move into posi-

tion. Santa Anna placed three 

sixteen-pound guns supported 

by the Regiment de Hussars 

on the Saltillo road and Brig. 

Gen. Francisco Mejia's infantry 

brigade father west (across 

deep gullies) to protect his left. 

Pacheco’s Vanguard Division,

along with Lombardini’s Center 

Division and fourteen pieces of 

artillery, made up the Mexican 

center, while Ortega’s Rear 

Guard Division was held in 

reserve just behind the others. 

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22

Santa Anna positioned Maj. Gen. Pedro de Ampudia’s Light Infantry 

Brigade, Brig. Gen. Julian Juvera’s 2d Cavalry Brigade, and two 

batteries on the right. 

The Mexican forces were in position and ready to initiate contact 

at 1500, but Santa Anna decided it was too late in the day to undertake 

a concerted action and instead determined to probe the American left. 

He sent Ampudia’s light brigade to the base of the Sierra Madre on the 

eastern side of the pass, where they began scaling one of the peaks in 

search of a path onto the plateau.

Wool observed the movement and responded by sending three 

companies of Kentucky cavalry, Lt. Col. John S. Roane with four 

companies of dismounted Arkansas riflemen, and Maj. Willis A. 

Gorman with four companies of infantry from the 3d Indiana, all 

under the command of Col. Humphrey Marshall. He also sent the 2d 

Indiana and Capt. John O’Brien’s section of guns into the large gap 

between the main American position centered around Washington’s 

guns on the Saltillo road and Marshall’s command a mile to the 

south. 

A deep ravine hampered the Mexicans’ forward progress and 

separated the two sides. They exchanged sporadic fire over this topographic feature for several hours, but neither was able to advance in 

any numbers. A small Mexican contingent did manage to work its way 

Carl Nebel's Battle of Buena Vista (Library of Congress)
23

across the ravine before nightfall, but the American position remained 

intact. Fighting quickly tapered off, but both groups remained on the 

mountainside throughout the night. 

The night of 22 February was a miserable one for the soldiers in 

both armies. A cold drizzle fell for several hours. Neither command 

allowed campfires, so the troops huddled together for warmth. Many 

of the Mexican soldiers consumed their final rations. They would have 

to overwhelm the defenders and capture their supplies if they hoped to 

eat another meal at Buena Vista. 

At 0200 on 23 February, Wool and Santa Anna began to reposition their units for the coming fight. Ampudia received a number of 

additional troops to make a concerted effort against the American left. 

Santa Anna’s chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Manuel Micheltorena, took 

direct control of five eight-pound artillery pieces and posted them onto 

a knoll overlooking the plateau. Santa Anna augmented his troops 

on the Saltillo road and placed them under the command of General 

Santiago Blanco. With these moves, Santa Anna positioned himself to 

overwhelm the American left, assault its center, and smash through its 

defenses on the Saltillo road. 

Wool anticipated Santa Anna’s all-out effort and shuffled his own 

troops. Washington’s battery with the 1st Illinois in support remained 

in its original location on the Saltillo road. Wool reinforced Marshall’s 

position on the left side of the line with Maj. Xerxes F. Trial’s 

companies of Illinois troops and Captain Conner’s Texas Volunteer 

Company. Wool also strengthened his presence on the plateau by 

sending Bowles’ 2d Indiana, supported by O’Brien’s three guns, some 

three-quarters of a mile south and east of Washington’s position on the 

Saltillo road and just north of Marshall’s men on the mountainside. 

Bowles anchored his left on the edge of a deep ravine. Bissell’s 2d 

Illinois and Capt. Thomas W. Sherman’s battery guarded Bowles’ 

right. Colonel McKee’s 2d Kentucky moved to Bissell’s right, but 

McKee’s own right flank simply ended in the middle of the plateau 

without any protection. Wool held Captain Steen’s troops of the 1st 

Dragoons, McCulloch’s Texas Rangers, and the 3d Indiana in reserve 

to the rear of the main line. After the troops moved into their new positions, the American line stretched roughly a mile from north to south. 

Shortly before dawn, Santa Anna ordered each of his regiments 

to play reveille at a different time to emphasize the size of his force 

and intimidate the Americans. His men quickly moved into their 

predetermined jump-off points and prepared to strike across the entire 

American front.
24

Buena Vista: Second Day, Early Morning

23 February 1847

Fighting began just after dawn when Ampudia’s reinforced troops 

hit the American left. Marshall’s troops blunted the initial advance, 

but the superior Mexican manpower slowly overpowered them. The 

Americans reluctantly retreated but maintained their cohesion and 

delayed Ampudia for several hours.

Santa Anna waited until all eyes were watching the action on 

the American left before he opened the next phase of the battle. At 

approximately 0800, Mexican troops assaulted the American right and, 

an hour later, the center.

On the Saltillo road, units under Generals Blanco and Mora 

advanced toward the narrows in column formation. Gullies to their 

left and steep slopes to the right prevented the Mexicans from maneuvering off the road or into linear battle formation. Throughout the 

battle, the Mexican generals knew they would be able to better 

command and control their poorly trained troops in column formation, but they must have realized it would be very difficult to shift 

them into battle lines under fire without losing unit cohesion. Captain 

Washington’s guns took a frightful toll on the massed Mexican troops, 

but they continued to advance despite the battery’s rapid and accurate 

fire. Once the Mexicans came within range of musket fire, the 1st 

Illinois delivered several deadly volleys into their ranks. Under this 

severe pressure, the Mexican infantrymen broke and quickly retreated 

south down the Saltillo road out of the defenders’ line of fire. 

As the sound of Washington’s battery fire echoed through the pass, 

the divisions of Generals Lombardini and Pacheco started through 

a broad ravine hidden from American eyes by its high banks to the 

east. Close on their heels marched General Ortega’s division and then 

Juvera’s cavalry brigade, some 7,000 men in all. Santa Anna had made 

an excellent choice in selecting this approach for his assault force. 

The head of the ravine had a relatively shallow slope onto the plateau, 

unlike the others in the area. This allowed the Mexicans to move 

large formations and ascend onto the plateau without much difficulty. 

Wool realized this weakness when he posted the 2d Indiana and three 

attached guns to guard this strategically important point. 

Because of the broken terrain, Bowles did not see the Mexican 

columns until they exploded out onto the plateau. The attacking 

infantrymen quickly formed into brigades and advanced against the 

2d Indiana. Wool sent a messenger to General Lane, the brigade 

commander of both Indiana regiments, that the 2d must hold its 
25

position at all costs. In response, Lane ordered O’Brien’s three guns 

forward with the 2d Indiana to stem the Mexican assault. When the 

2d Indiana advanced, it received heavy fire from both Micheltorena’s 

newly positioned battery and the front ranks of Pacheco’s division. 

O’Brien’s artillerymen fired desperately into the massed infantry and 

tore gaping holes in its lines. Sherman’s guns and the 2d Illinois also 

joined in the firing from their positions with similar effect, but the 

sheer size of the Mexican force more than offset its losses. 

Lane ordered O’Brien and the 2d Indiana forward a second time 

to secure a better firing position. The move proved costly. O’Brien 

limbered his guns and started to advance, but Bowles misunderstood 

the directive and ordered a retreat. After suffering some ninety 

casualties in a few minutes, the 2d Indiana panicked and broke for 

the rear. O’Brien reached his new position and began firing, only 

to realize that he did not have infantry support. He maintained this 

position until forced to retreat by the Mexican advance; he had to 

leave one four-pound gun behind. 

After the 2d Indiana and O’Brien’s battery gave way, the full force 

of Lombardini’s division bore down on the 2d Illinois and Sherman’s 

guns. Wool hurried Bragg’s battery to aid the 2d Illinois, but Bragg 

was slow to arrive. Confronted with overwhelming force, Colonel 

Bissell executed an orderly fighting withdrawal, which prevented 

The Battle of Buena Vista (Library of Congress)
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EARLY MORNING ACTIONS

23 February 1847

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Mexican Movement

American Movement
the Mexicans from immediately 

outflanking the entire American 

position. Sherman’s and Bragg’s 

guns ripped into the attacking 

Mexican infantry, inflicting 

heavy casualties on the massed 

ranks and temporarily halting 

the advance. Meanwhile, the 

Americans managed to retain 

some of the plateau’s critical high 

ground.

With the American left 

collapsing, Marshall’s men on 

the mountain faced encirclement. 

He quickly ordered them onto 

the plateau, but a large number 

of his cavalry remounted their 

horses and rode north toward the 

hacienda de Buena Vista, opening 

an unopposed avenue of attack 

directly to the supply depot at 

the hacienda. Fortunately for 

the Americans, a brief lull in 

the fighting gave each side an 

opportunity to regroup. But the 

situation did not look promising 

for Wool: In less than forty-five 

minutes of fighting, his entire left 

had collapsed. 

Buena Vista: Second Day, Late 

Morning

23 February 1847

Taylor reached the field with 

the 1st Mississippi shortly before 

1000 As soon as he arrived, Wool 

went to the threatened sector and 

began collecting as many troops 

as he could find to establish 

another line. While Washington’s 

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B AT T L E O F B U E N A V I STA

LATE MORNING ACTIONS

23 February 1847

0 2000 4000

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Mexican Movement

American Movement
battery and the 1st Illinois held 

their original location, the rest of 

the position was in disarray. Wool 

cobbled together the 2d Illinois, 

2d Kentucky, Sherman’s and 

Bragg’s batteries, and remnants 

of the 2d Indiana into a broken 

line that ran from Washington’s 

guns on the Saltillo road across 

the plateau to the northeast 

toward Buena Vista. As a result, 

he forfeited much of the plateau 

to the Mexicans. Wool sent the 

1st Mississippi and later the 3d 

Indiana, as well as the Arkansas 

and Kentucky cavalry, to the east 

to intercept Juvera’s horsemen 

before they reached Buena Vista. 

After taking a few moments 

to rest, Juvera’s cavalry slipped 

past the plateau before the 

American blocking force could 

take position and rode quickly 

toward Buena Vista. Only 

Yell’s Arkansas and Marshall’s 

Kentucky cavalry, along with a 

small group of Steen’s dragoons, 

made the one-mile trip north 

to the hacienda before the 

Mexicans struck. The volunteers 

dismounted and formed a defen-

sive ring around the outside of 

the hacienda. Inside the build-

ings, civilian teamsters, as well 

as remnants of the 2d Indiana and 

other units that had fled north 

after the initial Mexican assault 

on their left, made up the defense. 

Juvera’s first attack caused 

many of the dismounted Arkansas 

and Kentucky volunteers to flee. 

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The few remaining soldiers fended 

off the initial assault, but Colonel 

Yell died fighting the Mexican 

lancers. As the Mexicans reformed 

for a second attempt, Steen’s 

dragoons successfully charged 

their left flank and broke Juvera’s 

column in two. One part continued 

toward the hacienda, where the 

Americans beat back two separate 

assaults, thanks in large part to 

the protection of the hacienda’s 

thick stone walls. Juvera’s second 

column continued past the hacienda into a small valley, where it 

immediately came under fire from 

1st Lt. John F. Reynolds’ section 

of Sherman’s battery, which had 

raced across the plateau to help 

check the Mexican attack. 

Juvera’s columns attempted to 

reorganize south of Buena Vista, 

but Reynolds continued to shell the massing cavalry. Colonel May 

soon arrived with his squadron of dragoons and forced the Mexicans 

to flee in confusion. Davis, from his position on the plateau to the 

south, observed the fleeing Mexicans and moved to block their line of 

retreat. Juvera’s survivors fought their way through the Mississippians; 

Davis was wounded but remained on the field during the fighting. 

Another threat emerged on the plateau as the 1st Mississippi 

moved back into its previous position. Shortly after noon, Ortega’s 

Rear Guard Division, with General Torrejon’s 3d Cavalry Brigade

screening it, attempted to flank Davis and Bissell to the east. The 

American regiments formed an inverted “V,” with the open end 

pointing toward the Mexicans. Tactical doctrine at the time called 

for an infantry regiment to form a square against a cavalry threat, as 

several American units did at Palo Alto. Instead, Davis and Bissell 

took full advantage of the ground they defended. Sherman sent one of 

his guns to aid Davis, who posted it on the 3d Indiana’s extreme right.

Torrejon moved against the unusual arrangement and closed 

within 100 yards of the American position under artillery fire. At 

eighty yards, he ordered an all-out charge. Davis gave the order to 

Wool at Buena Vista

(Library of Congress)
31

fire only when Torrejon’s force came within seventy yards of his own 

men. The deadly effectiveness of the close-range volley brought the 

Mexicans to a standstill. Additional musket volleys and canister from 

Sherman’s gun discomfited the surviving lancers still further. Seeing 

that the advance had stalled completely, the Mississippians charged 

forward and drove the lancers away. 

Torrejon’s force, along with some of the infantry swept up in his 

lancers’ retreat, took shelter in a nearby ravine. Once there, however, 

they became trapped and were unable to return to the main Mexican 

line. At approximately 1300, as the Americans prepared to attack 

the isolated force of some 2,000 men, Mexican officers approached 

with a white flag. Taylor ordered all firing stopped and Wool met 

with the officers. They asked what General Taylor “wanted.” Wool 

took the flag and tried to meet with Santa Anna but was greeted by 

artillery fire. The flag of truce had been a ruse that allowed the bulk 

of Torrejon’s and Ortega’s men to slip past the Americans and regain 

their own line. 

After nearly seven hours of desperate fighting, another lull fell 

over the battlefield. Both sides recovered as many of their wounded 

as possible and rested their tired men and horses. While the Mexican 

attacks had turned the American left, threatened the American forward 

supply depot at the hacienda de Buena Vista, and cost Taylor a number 

of casualties, Santa Anna had failed to drive the U.S. Army out of La 

Angostura. The Mexican general decided to take a final gamble with 

his superior manpower. He sent General Minon’s cavalry brigade on a 

wide sweep eastward around the American position to capture Taylor’s 

primary supply center at Saltillo. Minon never attacked, however, 

because he found the depot too well guarded. Meanwhile, Santa 

Anna massed as many men as possible to drive through the center of 

the American line. He moved his artillery forward, called up all his 

reserves, and created a new unit out of the wreckage of Ampudia’s, 

Lombardini’s, Pacheco’s, and Ortega’s divisions. He placed this unit 

under the control of Brig. Gen. Francisco Perez, the only Mexican 

leader not yet engaged. The newly formed command began moving 

toward the plateau at approximately 1500.

Buena Vista: Second Day, The Final Attack

23 February 1847

The assault force’s vanguard reached its objective at 1700. The 

Mexicans emerged from one of the ravines and immediately ran 
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B AT T L E O F B U E N A V I STA

FINAL ATTACK

23 February 1847

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Mexican Movement
into fire from several sections 

of O’Brien’s and Thomas’ guns, 

which were guarding the center 

of the plateau. The Mexicans 

quickly backtracked into the 

ravine to escape the artillery’s 

concentrated fire and await 

reinforcements.

The Americans viewed this as 

a general retreat. Colonel Hardin, 

apparently without receiving 

directions from Taylor or Wool, 

ordered the 1st and 2d Illinois and 

2d Kentucky regiments forward 

in pursuit. But instead of finding 

the Mexicans falling back, they 

stumbled directly into the main 

body of Perez’s force. Shocked 

and too close to use their muskets, 

the American volunteers were 

drawn into a bloody hand-tohand melee. Hardin and Lt. Col. 

Henry Clay Jr., son of the famous 

Senator and outspoken critic of 

the war against Mexico, were both 

mortally wounded while fighting 

a holding action to allow their 

men to fall back to the plateau. 

The American artillerymen fired 

round after round of canister into 

the Mexican lines at point-blank 

range but were overwhelmed 

by the seemingly inexhaustible 

manpower. Two of O’Brien’s guns 

were overrun when the majority 

of their crews were wounded and 

the horses necessary to pull them 

to safety were shot. The situa-

tion was critical—it appeared that 

Santa Anna would break through 

and win the day.

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Bragg’s battery and the remainder of Sherman’s, some ten 

additional guns, raced forward toward the breach on the plateau 

with orders from Taylor to “maintain the position at every hazard.” 

Lacking infantry support, the two audaciously unlimbered their 

guns a mere fifty yards from the Mexican line. Desperate to wreak 

as much havoc as possible on the approaching Mexican formation, 

they loaded the cannon with double canister and fired. The American 

guns cut down scores of Perez’s men. Each discharge from the 

massed artillery blew gaping holes in the tightly packed columns, 

and the attack stalled in the face of the murderous cannon fire. The 

severe undulations of the terrain prevented the numerically superior 

Mexican force from shifting from column to line formation, which 

kept all but the most forward troops from firing while maximizing 

the destructive effects of the American artillery. When the lead units 

recoiled from the point-blank fire, the soldiers behind them were 

unable to deploy. 

One of the most famous quotes from the Mexican War was uttered 

at this time. As Bragg began firing, he sent an aide to Taylor for additional instructions. Taylor responded with “Tell him to give ‘em hell!” 

This exchange has been romanticized and altered by many writers. 

The most common altered version has Taylor calmly informing his 

subordinate to add, “A little more grape, Captain Bragg.” This version 

almost certainly is inaccurate, as the American guns were firing 

canister rounds, not grapeshot. Another version has Taylor saying, 

“Well, double-shot your guns and give ‘em hell, Bragg.”

Seeing his attack wavering, Santa Anna committed Torrejon’s and 

Andrade’s cavalry to try to break the American line. As the lancers 

charged, Captain Washington’s battery began lobbing spherical shell 

(exploding shells) into their formations. The accurate firing forced the 

cavalry to break off and try to reform out of range of the artillery. 

An unexpected rain squall in the valley stopped all hostilities at 

approximately 1800. By that time, both sides were exhausted. The 

Mexican assault had spent itself. While they had managed to gain a 

foothold on the plateau, the Mexican infantry had suffered significant 

losses at the hands of the U.S. artillery. American artillerymen had 

also checked the cavalry advance. 

Taylor’s force had fared little better. Many of his infantry regiments suffered significant losses. His artillerymen were fatigued after 

nearly twelve hours of constant maneuvering over broken ground. 

They had lost a number of guns, horses, and other equipment during 

the close-quarters combat on the plateau. 
35

During the lull, the Mexican forces slowly withdrew toward their 

original line. Taylor and Wool collected what men they could and 

began piecing together another defensive line. The American troops 

spent another sleepless night on the plateau and braced themselves for 

an assault in the morning. Most realized that in their current state they 

could not repulse another Mexican advance. When dawn broke on the 

morning of 24 February, they were stunned to find that Santa Anna had 

withdrawn his army toward Agua Núeva during the night. The soldiers 

cheered as word spread, while Taylor and Wool embraced each other. 

The U.S. Army had withstood Santa Anna’s onslaught.

Santa Anna’s decision to retreat was a major tactical blunder. He 

still had a huge numerical advantage over Taylor, and he had pushed 

the Americans to the brink of collapse. Taylor and Wool could not 

have withstood another assault on the plateau. On the other hand, 

Santa Anna’s force, although numerous, was tired and hungry after its 

long forced march and had sustained heavy casualties, primarily at the 

hand of the U.S. artillery. Santa Anna apparently decided that the risks 

of another attack at Buena Vista were too great. Instead, he decided to 

escape and prepare to meet Winfield Scott in Vera Cruz.

The costs to both sides were great, especially compared with the 

opening battles of the war. Taylor lost 272 men killed, 387 wounded, 

and 6 missing in action. This represented some 14 percent of his total 

force engaged. Santa Anna’s men fared even worse: Mexican losses 

amounted to 591 killed, 1,048 wounded, and some 1,894 missing or 

deserted—nearly 18 percent of his army.

Shortly after the battle, Taylor felt it necessary to defend his decision to engage Santa Anna’s force south of Saltillo against charges of 

poor military judgment leveled by members of Polk’s administration. 

Many also questioned Taylor’s failure to follow Scott’s directive 

to remain in Monterrey. Taylor argued that whatever his losses at 

Buena Vista, the consequences would have been far more severe had 

Santa Anna caught the American force in Monterrey. It became clear, 

however, that administration officials no longer supported Taylor and 

that he would not play a significant role in the remainder of the war.

War Ends in the North

Santa Anna stopped to rest for a short time at Agua Núeva before 

beginning the long trek back to San Luis Potosi. Taylor’s men briefly 

advanced as far south as Encarnación to monitor the Mexican retreat 

and make sure they did not turn back toward the American camp. 
36

By March, however, Taylor abandoned his advanced positions and 

consolidated all his forces at Monterrey.

While the fighting raged at Buena Vista, General Urrea had led his 

cavalry brigade around the American position into its line of communications and united with irregulars under General Canales, who had 

been conducting guerrilla operations. Together, on 22 February they 

severed the strategically important Monterrey-Camargo road, which 

carried supplies to Taylor’s force from the Rio Grande. For the next 

two weeks, they terrorized the local population and ambushed several 

supply trains, killing all the teamsters and drivers. Urrea also launched 

raids against many of the isolated American garrisons along the route, 

especially Marin, the main link between Camargo and Monterrey. 

American forces were able to defend themselves, but the flow of 

supplies ceased. On 2 March, Taylor sent a large relief force north. 

They caught up with Urrea’s forces outside Marin on 16 March, but 

the Mexican general slipped away before he became fully engaged. 

Taylor reopened the Monterrey-Camargo road but did not completely 

eliminate the threat to his line of communications. 

Taylor’s forces spent the remainder of the war in various garrisons around Monterrey. They fought no other major engagements 

and instead focused on counterinsurgency operations. Taylor himself 

stayed in Monterrey through 6 November 1847, when he transferred 

command of the Army of Occupation to Wool. Granted leave by the 

War Department, Taylor returned to his plantation in Baton Rouge, 

Louisiana, in time to mount his successful bid for the presidency in 

1848. 

Wool maintained command over the Army of Occupation for the 

remainder of the conflict and ultimately succeeded in limiting guerrilla 

attacks against his forces. He also worked to normalize everyday life 

for Mexican citizens by reopening schools and other public places. 

Analysis

The Buena Vista campaign offered the U.S. Army a variety of 

lessons, none of which was formalized into doctrine until William 

Hardee, a captain in the Mexican War, wrote a new tactics manual 

in 1855. The practical experience of the junior officers, most West 

Point trained, influenced their thinking up to and in many cases 

throughout the American Civil War. The battle of Buena Vista illustrated the importance of being able to concentrate forces quickly when 

conducting operations deep in enemy territory, especially when you 
37

are outnumbered. The battle further reinforced the informal doctrine 

of deploying artillery in advanced positions without infantry support, 

which many officers who fought in the Mexican War attempted to use 

in the Civil War fifteen years later. The Army learned that divisions 

and their subordinate brigades, under experienced commanders, were 

necessary to control the actions of multiple regiments. 

In terms of operational movement, General Wool’s 800-mile 

march from San Antonio, Texas, to Buena Vista was one of the bestconceived and best-executed maneuvers of the war. Wool’s strict 

disciplinary measures kept his three thousand soldiers well in hand 

during the march, and he continually planned for future operations 

throughout his expedition. For example, Wool reconnoitered the route 

from Monclova to Saltillo long before he received General Worth’s 

message to hurry south in December 1846. Wool put his entire force 

on the road toward Saltillo within hours of receiving Worth’s call for 

aid and marched his men 120 miles in less than four days to reach 

the threatened American position. Wool’s action, which forced Santa 

Anna to abandon his first planned attack against Taylor’s army, was a 

textbook example of rapidly concentrating divided forces. Wool also 

chose and defended La Angostura pass. He deserves great credit for 

being the architect of the American victory.

Artillery was a key factor in Taylor’s victory at Buena Vista. The 

artillerymen used their access to the plateau and the Saltillo road to 

move rapidly across the battlefield and reach critical points where 

their firepower was needed. Furthermore, they audaciously unlimbered 

their guns close to advancing Mexican forces, often without infantry 

support. They used this aggressive tactic to stem several attacks 

that could have easily enveloped and decimated the small American 

force. Without the artillery, Taylor’s inexperienced and outnumbered 

infantrymen would probably not have withstood Santa Anna’s offensive. However, while the use of unsupported artillery proved very 

successful against Mexican flintlock muskets, Civil War artillerymen 

who faced rifled musket fire found deploying forward without infantry 

to be deadly.

The circumstances leading up to the battle at Buena Vista 

also led to internal divisions within the American officer corps. 

During the initial phase of the war, the U.S. Army’s small group 

of professional officers fought well, bonded, and helped vindicate 

the importance of the Regular Army. A rift developed, however, 

between Generals Taylor and Scott that many of their subordinates 

perpetuated in the following months. Taylor never forgave Scott for 
38

requisitioning the bulk of his troops without formally requesting 

the transfer. Officers under both commanders took sides and helped 

sow the seeds of discontent. Throughout the remainder of the war, 

relationships remained politically charged, and officers often leveled 

public and unsubstantiated attacks against their fellow officers from 

the other camp. 

Buena Vista had several implications for the United States. First, 

the battle was politically important for Zachary Taylor. He survived 

President Polk’s plan to discredit him and limit his public appeal. 

Instead, Polk unknowingly set the stage for Taylor’s greatest victory 

and helped him easily secure the Whig nomination and ultimately win 

the 1848 presidential contest. 

The victory also had a powerful effect on the American view of 

volunteer soldiers. Although some units had broken and run, others 

stood and fought well. For some, the Army’s success at Buena Vista 

confirmed the widely held belief that an army of citizen-soldiers could 

triumph in the face of any enemy force, no matter its size. This popular 

belief ignored the fact that it was American artillery, commanded by 

trained professionals, that had ultimately won the day. Without the 

constant movement of well-served American guns to each crisis point, 

Santa Anna and the Mexican Army could well have won their victory. 

While the artillery deserves much of the credit for the U.S victory, 

Santa Anna’s failure to carry the field at Buena Vista was principally 

due to the eminently defensible terrain held by U.S. units, which 

forced the Mexican Army to fight in column rather than line and 

greatly hindered Mexican efforts to quickly reinforce the success 

their units had on the battlefield. Because of the terrain, Santa Anna’s 

attacks occurred at isolated points and irregular intervals along the 

American front, which gave the U.S. artillery time to race to trouble 

spots and repulse the Mexican advances. Santa Anna also suffered a 

failure of will on the night of 23 February, when he decided not to risk 

another attack and the possible disintegration of his army because of 

lack of food and water. 

Santa Anna remained undeterred in his fight against the invading 

Yanqui, even as he and his force limped back to San Luis Potosi. 

When he learned of the coming American offensive at Vera Cruz, 

he shifted his attention from the defeat by Taylor’s small Army of 

Occupation and began preparations to meet General Scott’s army. He 

focused all of his considerable energy on stopping the new American 

assault aimed at the heart of Mexico. 
39

After the battle of Buena Vista, Santa Anna’s supporters managed 

to convince the Mexican public that the battle and subsequent withdrawal from Buena Vista constituted a victory. In so doing, they 

were able to rally public support for both Santa Anna and the conflict 

against the American invaders. Indeed, the reported “success” at 

Buena Vista ensured Santa Anna of a strong military reputation among 

his compatriots throughout the war. As for his soldiers, they had done 

everything asked of them. They had marched nearly five hundred 

miles in forty days over grueling terrain; fought a dispiriting battle that 

they had nearly won; and suffered 10,500 casualties from battlefield 

losses, hunger, disease, and desertion. The men had been let down by 

their commander, not the other way around. 

Santa Anna took several of the elite units that had been part of his 

Army of the North—including the Regiment de Hussars, the Legion de 

Extranjeros, and General Ampudia’s Light Infantry Brigade—south to 

Mexico City. These units formed the core of his newly created Army 

of the East to meet Scott’s invasion. Later, the remaining organizations 

from the Buena Vista campaign marched eastward to Mexico City’s 

defense, but the Mexican Army never again came as close to success 

as it had at Buena Vista. For the Mexican Army, the campaign and 

battle at Buena Vista was one of the great “might-have-beens” of the 

Mexican War. With great effort and self-sacrifice, Santa Anna’s Army 

of the North came close to making the cost of the war perhaps more 

than the United States was willing to pay. However, with the Mexican 

defeat, the United States was poised to strike deep into Mexico in a 

bold attempt to win the war in a single stroke.
40

Further Readings

Bauer, K. Jack. The Mexican War, 1846–1848. New York: Macmillan 

Publishing Company, 1974.

Carney, Stephen. Gateway South: The Campaign for Monterrey. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004.

Davis, William C. Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour. New 

York: HarperCollins, 1991. 

DePalo, William A., Jr. The Mexican National Army, 1822–1852. 

College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1997.

Lavender, David. Climax at Buena Vista: The Decisive Battle of 

the Mexican-American War. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of 

Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

Smith, Justin H. The War with Mexico. New York: Macmillan 

Company, 1919.


COVER

The Battle of Buena Vista (Library of Congress);

below, A Little More Grape Capt Bragg (Library of Congress)
BUENA VISTA 1847

CMH PUB 73–4

PIN : 084251–000