IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 10, 2009 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RICKEY E. HUTCHINGS

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County

No. I-594-137 Robbie T. Beal, Judge

No. M2008-00814-CCA-R3-CD - Filed June 16, 2009

The Defendant, Rickey E. Hutchings, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit

Court’s revocation of his 1994 probationary sentence for possession of contraband in a penal

institution. On June 22, 1998, a warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging a violation of

probation based upon the Defendant’s arrest in Gulfport, Mississippi for possession of approximately

one hundred pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell. The warrant was not served on the

Defendant until November 27, 2007, and was thereafter amended to include additional criminal

behavior. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the delay between the issuance of the probation

violation warrant and his revocation hearing violated his right to a speedy revocation hearing and,

therefore, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the warrants. Because the

Defendant was denied the right to a speedy probation revocation hearing, the judgment of the trial

court is reversed, and the warrants against the Defendant are dismissed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed; Probation

Violation Warrants Dismissed

DAVID H. WELLES,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JERRY L. SMITH and ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

F. Shayne Brasfield, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Rickey E. Hutchings.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Leslie E. Price, Assistant Attorney General;

Kim R. Helper, District Attorney General; and Derek K. Smith, Assistant District Attorney General,

for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
 We note that Mr. Smith is also the prosecutor in the present proceedings.

1

 It is unclear from the record who Sandra Rutland is and what her role was in the Defendant’s case. 

2

-2-

OPINION

Factual Background

This case has a rather complicated procedural history that we will set out in detail. On

August 8, 1994, in the Williamson County Circuit Court, the Defendant pleaded guilty to possession

of contraband in a penal institution, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-201.

Thereafter, the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years in the Department of Correction; this

sentence was suspended, and the Defendant was placed on ten years of intensive probation. The

probation order reflects that the probationary period began on October 31, 1994, and was to end on

October 31, 2004. Judgment was entered against the Defendant on November 11, 1994. After

successfully completing ten months of intensive probation, the Defendant was transferred to regular

probation. 

On June 17, 1998, the Defendant was arrested in Gulfport, Mississippi on a federal charge

for possession of approximately one hundred pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell. As a result

of his arrest in Mississippi, a revocation warrant was issued in Williamson County on June 22, 1998.

The Defendant was convicted of the federal charge. Phone records indicate that, while the Defendant

was incarcerated in Mississippi on the conviction, his attorney spoke with Assistant District Attorney

General Derek Smith on January 22, 1999, and June 23, 1999. Just two days after the June 23, 1999 1

phone call, on June 25, the Defendant was placed on federal probation, which included random drug

testing, outpatient substance abuse counseling, and payment of a $1,000 fine. According to phone

records, on June 29, 1999, following the Defendant’s release from federal custody and placement

on federal probation, the Defendant’s attorney talked with Sandra Rutland “re: reporting to 2

probation in TN,” and he also had a phone conference with Sandra Rutland and Agent Joey Kimble

of the Tennessee Drug Task Force. Phone records reflect another phone call by the Defendant’s

attorney on July 1, 1999, showing a discussion with the Defendant and his probation officer in

Tennessee and a phone call to the “US Attorney and Agent.” Later in July 1999, the Defendant met

with Agent Kimble in Tennessee; however, the Defendant was not served with the outstanding

warrant at this time. The Defendant successfully completed his federal probationary period and was

released from probation on June 24, 2002. 

In 2005, the Defendant was arrested in Putnam and White Counties in Tennessee. He was

convicted in White County for aggravated assault on August 22, 2006, and in Putnam County for

theft over $1,000 on December 19, 2006. Under the terms of the plea agreement, he received three

years of probation for these offenses. Thereafter, the Defendant was arrested on October 24, 2007,

in Jones County, Georgia for possession of burglary tools and theft. He was extradited to Tennessee

for the pending warrant charging him with violation of probation for the possession of contraband

in a penal institution conviction. 
-3-

The June 22, 1998 violation warrant was finally served on the Defendant on November 27,

2007. The warrant was then amended to include the Defendant’s convictions in Putnam and White

Counties and his Georgia arrest. On December 11, 2007, the Defendant appeared in court and was

served with the amended violation warrant, at which time the parties agreed to continue the matter

until a later date. 

The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on February 14, 2008, on the basis that the lengthy

delay between the issuance and service of the warrant violated his constitutional right to a speedy

probation revocation hearing. At the request of the defense due to the fact that the Defendant was

in court in Putnam County, the parties agreed to a continue the matter again from February 19, 2008,

to March 31, 2008. Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss on March 31, the trial court denied

the motion, and the hearing on the probation violation was continued.

At the April 3, 2008 revocation hearing, the Defendant, while not admitting to the violation,

stipulated to the facts contained in the warrants. He requested, however, that the court consider the

time delay in serving the warrant and his current health issues. 

The Defendant testified that he served one year and one week in federal custody on the

Mississippi drug conviction. He stated that this was a reduced sentence due to the fact that he had

assisted authorities with catching a “king pin[]” who had skipped out on his bond. 

When asked if he was informed of any warrants or holds following his release from federal

custody, the Defendant testified that there had been multiple conversations between his attorney and

law enforcement officials, particularly Agent Joey Kimble in Tennessee, where he “could do some

more cooperation work along those lines[.]” He was told to report to Agent Kimble when he

returned to Tennessee. Upon his return, the Defendant located Agent Kimble and signed a

“confidential informant contract” with him, for a period lasting ten years, and he was not to inform

anyone of his confidential informant status. The Defendant stated that, at some point in time, at the

request of Agent Kimble and Customs Officer Randy Walsh, he gathered some information about

alleged criminal dealings and relayed this information to them; however, they never responded to

him. The Defendant produced an old card with a pager number for Agent Kimble on it. 

Following his incarceration in Mississippi, the Defendant returned to his home in Sparta,

Tennessee, where he had lived for thirty years. He reported to a federal probation office in

Cookeville; his probation officer was Burton Putnam. When asked if he reported to state probation

at that time, the Defendant replied that he informed Mr. Putnam he was also on state probation but

believed that his federal and state probation “were run together sort of hit—you know, hand in hand

tied at the hip at that particular point.” Moreover, according to the Defendant, Mr. Putnam explained

to him that he checked NCIC every six months and that, if there were outstanding warrants for the

Defendant, then they would be aware of that information. When he successfully completed

probation with Mr. Putnam, the Defendant asked if he had any other obligations, and Mr. Putnam,

replied, “No. . . . You know, from what I see with my records and my checks, . . . you’re free to go,

. . . you’re a free man, you can continue to travel as you have in the past.” 
-4-

The Defendant affirmed that he was arrested in Putnam and White Counties in 2005, that he

pleaded guilty to these charges, and that he was placed on state probation as a result. The Defendant

testified that he only served a few days in jail on these offenses and that he reported to his probation

officer as directed. According to the Defendant, he had three different probation officers while on

state probation. The first probation officer made him fill out forms documenting his criminal history,

and he included his Williamson County conviction. At all times, he reported to the same probation

office, which also was the same office he reported to when he was on probation out of Williamson

County. According to the Defendant, no probation officer ever informed him of any outstanding

warrants; the Defendant believed that he did not have “anything still out there.”

The Defendant testified that he was pulled over in Georgia on a routine traffic stop in October

2007. Ultimately, the police searched the vehicle and discovered the Defendant’s “work tools” in

it; he “did some contracting.” The police ran an NCIC check on him and found a hold on him. He

was arrested and taken to jail. According to the Defendant, Georgia officials said that “this doesn’t

quite play out the way . . . we thought it did” seeing that it was the Defendant’s work truck, that the

Defendant should sign extradition papers back to Tennessee, and that Georgia officials were “going

to forget about this . . . .” It was then he learned that the hold was due to the conviction out of

Williamson County. The Defendant believed the Georgia charges had been dropped. 

The Defendant then described his myriad of medical problems: testicular cancer requiring

him to undergo radiation treatments, Hepatitis C requiring him to take Interferon, cirrhosis of the

liver, post-traumatic stress disorder, and diabetes. The Defendant introduced a letter from his doctor

at the Veterans Administration (VA) Hospital, wherein the doctor listed the Defendant’s numerous

medical issues and concluded that the Defendant “has complex medical and psychiatric issues that

would be best managed if he was not incarcerated.” He testified that he had medical coverage with

the VA and that, if he was incarcerated, then he and his family would lose his VA benefits. He was

unsure what would happen with his TennCare coverage.

Additionally, the Defendant testified that he was the primary caretaker for his very ill mother.

He testified that his wife, his seven-year-old daughter, and one of his eighteen-year-old twin boys

lived with him. 

On cross-examination, the Defendant acknowledged that he was a persistent offender at the

time he was sentenced on the possession of contraband in penal institution conviction. He conceded

that his criminal history included convictions for aggravated assault, attempted kidnapping, grand

theft, possession of cocaine, theft over $500, simple assault, simple possession of drugs, assault and

battery, and resisting arrest. The Defendant agreed that he was now a career offender. 

On redirect, the Defendant testified that he had a drug and alcohol problem, for which he saw

an addictionologist monthly. He stated that he went through outpatient treatment and attended

alcoholics and narcotics anonymous (AA and NA) on a regular basis. According to the Defendant,

his family attended AA and NA meetings with him to support him. He claimed he had been “clean”
-5-

for eleven years before he “had a slip” and that he had now “been clean” again for almost three years.

The trial court noted that the Defendant’s wife had been present throughout the proceedings. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and

ordered him to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The

revocation order provides as follows:

[T]he [c]ourt finds it very relevant that following the Defendant’s completion of

[f]ederal [p]robation in 2002, the Defendant still had another two (2) years of [s]tate

[p]robation in which he did not report to a probation officer. The court finds that the

[m]otion was properly filed, but is without merit based upon the Defendant not

reporting for two (2) years. The [c]ourt finds that the Defendant did not attempt to

allude or evade and was in essence hiding in plain sight. The [c]ourt further finds

that a year delay in the serving of the probation violation does not trigger a basis for

dismissal. 

The trial court also gave the Defendant jail “credit for time in federal prison” and “creditfor any time

served anywhere.” This appeal followed. 

Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking

probation because the proceedings were unnecessarily delayed. He contends that the State has not

been timely in its pursuit of revocation and, therefore, that the trial court should have granted the

motion to dismiss the violation warrants for violation of his right to a speedy hearing. 

A probation revocation proceeding is a continuation of a criminal prosecution and thus falls

within a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S. CONST. amends. XI, XIV; TENN.

CONST. art. I, § 9; Allen v. State, 505 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1974). A trial court must carefully balance

societal interest in punishing criminals against a defendant’s interest in a speedy trial, because

dismissal of charges is the only available remedy for violation of the right. State v. Bishop, 493

S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tenn. 1973). In Bishop, our Supreme Court adopted factors articulated by the United

States Supreme Court as the relevant analytical framework for alleged violations of the right to a

speedy trial:

(1) The length of the delay; 

(2) the reason for that delay; 

(3) the defendant’s assertion to his right to speedy trial; and 

(4) the prejudice to the defendant. 

Id. at 83-84 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).

In Bishop, the delay occurred after arrest and arraignment of the defendant, see id. at 82-83,

in contrast to the instant interval between issuance of the probation violation warrant and the
 Judge Tipton disagreed with the opinion’s analysis and concluded that the defendant’s speedy trial right was

3

triggered when the detainer from Blount County was lodged with the Department of Correction. Tillery, 2001 WL

921754, at *6 (Tipton, J., concurring). The trial court in this case also took a different view, finding that the Defendant’s

speedy trial right began when he was placed on state probation again in August 2006 and the warrant was not discovered

at that time.

-6-

revocation hearing. Our Supreme Court has expressly held that “a probation revocation proceeding

is a continuation of the criminal prosecution,” meriting consideration of the enumerated

constitutional safeguards. Allen, 505 S.W.2d at 719. Although the Allen analysis did not explicitly

apply the Bishop factors, a panel of our Court in Blackwell v. State, 546 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1976), applied them in a subsequent analysis of a delay of a probation revocation

hearing. 

We apply those factors in the instant case. The question of whether the right to a speedy trial

has been denied is a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, subject to de novo review. See

State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tenn. 2005). 

I. Length of delay

After the probation violation warrant was issued on June 22, 1998, eight years and five

months passed before the warrant was served on the Defendant. Ultimately, on March 31, 2008, a

hearing was held on the motion to dismiss, and the revocation hearing occurred on April 3, 2008.

Any delay approaching one year generally triggers further inquiry into the remaining three factors.

See State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tenn. 1997). 

The State cites to State v. Timothy Tillery, No. E2000-01996-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL

921754, (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Aug.16, 2001), for the proposition that the Defendant’s right

to a speedy trial was not implicated until the warrant was actually served on November 27, 2007.

Because the delay between his arrest and revocation hearing did not approach one year, further

analysis on the remaining factors would be unnecessary if we credit this argument. First we note that

Tillery’s precedential value is diminished due to the fact Judge Tipton wrote a separate concurring

opinion and Judge Witt concurred in results only. 3

The Tillery opinion relied on Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, in support of its conclusion that a

defendant’s right to a speedy probation revocation hearing is not triggered until the defendant is

arrested on the probation violation warrant:

[I]n Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, a case which post-dates Allen by twenty-three years, our

supreme court explicitly held “that the issuance of an arrest warrant alone does not

trigger a speedy trial analysis and that the right to a speedy trial is not implicated until

there is an arrest or a formal grand jury accusation.” 956 S.W.2d at 491. Because

there is no formal grand jury accusation in a probation revocation proceeding, it

would appear that an actual arrest for the probation violation would be the triggering

factor for a speedy trial right. 
 Once a defendant is brought into custody on the warrant, the trial judge shall inquire into the allegation of 4

a probation violation “at the earliest practicable time.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(b).

-7-

Tillery, 2001 WL 921754, at *2.

We first note that in Utley, the issue presented did not involve a speedy hearing on a

probation violation warrant. The issue in Utley involved a speedy trial on original criminal charges.

We decline to adopt the rationale of Tillery and instead conclude that Allen is still the prevailing law

under the circumstances presented herein. In Allen, a delay of two years and eight months between

issuance of a revocation warrant and the revocation hearing merited consideration under the

defendant’s right to a speedy trial. See Allen, 505 S.W.2d 715. The defendant in Allen was not

served with the probation violation warrant until the day of the probation revocation hearing. He had

been incarcerated on other charges, and no action was taken regarding the probation violation

warrant until the defendant inquired about it. Id. at 716.

This issue was squarely addressed in Allen, and we decline to extend Utley to probation

revocation proceedings in the context of when a defendant’s speedy trial right is triggered. It is

precisely because there is no formal grand jury accusation in probation revocation proceedings, as

opposed to a criminal charge, that we will not extrapolate the rationale from Utley to the present

situation. Probation revocation proceedings are commenced when the trial judge issues the warrant;

the warrant serves as the formal accusation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(a). No further action

is required. In our view, the issuance of the warrant is the triggering mechanism. 4

Additionally, in Tillery, it was noted that recent cases of this Court cited Allen for the

proposition that a lengthy delay between the issuance of a probation violation warrant and the

hearing on the probation revocation may violate a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Tillery, 2001

WL 921754, at *2 n.6 (citing State v. Randy R. Wilson, No. M2000-01537-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL

523368, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, May 16, 2001); State v. Lawrence Ralph, Jr., No.

M1999-01635-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 775592, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 16,

2000)). We find this to be the prevailing view after the Tillery decision as well. See State v. Mathis

Lamar Meadows, No. W2006-02534-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1215050, at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

Jackson, Apr. 24, 2007); State v. John William Matkin, III, No. E2005-02701-CCA-R3-CD, 2007

WL 120048, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jan. 18, 2007); State v. Markettus L. Broyld, No.

M2005-00299-CCA-R3-CO, 2005 WL 3543415, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec. 27,

2005).

It follows, then, that the almost nine-year delay between the issuance of the warrant and the

Defendant’s probation revocation hearing is “presumptively prejudicial.” See Barker, 407 U.S. at

530. The length of the delay, therefore, requires us to inquire into the remaining factors. 

II. Reasons for the Delay

In State v. Wood, 924 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. 1996), the Tennessee Supreme Court identified

several possible reasons for delay: 
-8-

(1) Intentional delay for the purpose of tactical advantage over the defense or

to harass the defendant;

(2) bureaucratic indifference or negligence; 

(3) delay necessary to the fair and effective prosecution of the case; and 

(4) delay acquiesced in or caused by the defendant. 

924 S.W.2d at 346-47. Factors (1) and (2) are weighed, heavily and somewhat less heavily,

respectively, against the state. Id. at 346-47. Factor (3) is weighed against neither party, and factor

(4) is weighed against the defendant. Id. at 347.

Here, the delay appearsto be attributable to bureaucratic indifference or negligence. “Delays

between indictment and trial which are occasioned . . . by the prosecuting attorney . . . must be

considered the responsibility of the State.” State v. Kolb, 755 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1988) (citations omitted). The State neglects to point out that a “hold” could have been placed upon

the Defendant during the time he was in federal custody if the State intended to pursue the allegation

of a probation violation following his release. In fact, defense counsel conversed with the Tennessee

district attorney general’s office while the Defendant was incarcerated; their last conversation

occurred just two days before the Defendant’s release from jail. After his incarceration in

Mississippi, the Defendant returned to his home in Sparta, Tennessee, where he had lived for thirty

years. He reported to federal authorities and apparently worked as a confidential informant for the

Tennessee Drug Task Force. The Defendant testified that, based on the information he had received,

he believed that his federal and state probation “were run together sort of hit—you know, hand in

hand tied at the hip at that particular point.” Also, according to the Defendant he asked his federal

probation officer Burton Putnam if he had any other obligations after successfully completing his

probation in 2002, and Mr. Putnam replied, “No. . . . You know, from what I see with my records

and my checks, . . . you’re free to go, . . . you’re a free man, you can continue to travel as you have

in the past.” Furthermore, following his convictions in White and Putnam Counties, the Defendant

was again placed on state probation, and the warrant went undiscovered by the State. The State

offered no valid reason for the delay.

The inordinate delay between June 22, 1998, and service of the warrant on November 27,

2007, can only be charged to lack of due diligence by the State. The delay in this case was

unnecessary and “the product of bureaucratic miscommunication or indifference . . . which,

reasonably speaking, was not unavoidable.” See State v. Matthew Melton Jackson, No.

M2005-01374-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1896350, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 7, 2006)

(citing Kolb, 755 S.W.2d at 474-75); see also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 51-52 (1970)

(Brennan, J., concurring). “[S]heer bureaucratic indifference weighs heavily against the

government.” United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258, 262 (4th Cir.1980). Due to the degree

of negligence involved in this case, this factor must be assigned considerable weight. See State v.

Monty Earl Picklesimer, No. M2003-03087-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2683743, at *4 (Tenn. Crim.

App., Nashville, Nov. 24, 2004). 
 At the motion to dismiss hearing, the State argued that the Defendant could not complain about his speedy 5

trial rights due to the two continuances agreed to and sought by the defense. The trial court did note that both

continuances were “not in any way meant for the purposes of delay.” We agree with the trial court that valid reasons

existed for both continuances. The motion to dismiss hearing occurred just four months after the Defendant received

the probation violation warrant. The Defendant’s demand for a speedy trial was not negated by the subsequent

continuances.

-9-

III. The Defendant’s Demand for Speedy Trial

A defendant must seek a swift trial by timely asserting that right. Both the Tennessee and 5

United States Supreme Courts have recognized that “an accused who is unaware that charges are

pending against him or her, as is often the case where an indictment has been sealed and not served,

cannot be penalized for his or her failure to assert the speedy trial right.” Wood, 924 S.W.2d at 351

n. 13 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652-54; Wright v. State, 405 S.W.2d 177, 180

(Tenn. 1966)). The Defendant is under no duty to bring himself to trial; the “primary burden, after

all, is on the courts and prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial.” Id. at 347; see also

Jackson, 2006 WL 1896350, at *4 . It appears from the record that the Defendant was unaware of

the probation violation warrant until after his October 2007 arrest in Georgia; over eight years and

five months had passed after the warrant’s issuance but before it was served on the Defendant.

Therefore, the Defendant “cannot be penalized for failing to assert his speedy trial right earlier.”

State v. Simmons, 54 S.W.3d 755, 760 (Tenn. 2001). Just two and half months after service of the

warrant, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the warrant alleging a violation of his right to a

speedy trial. Once he became aware of the allegation, he timely made a demand for the right.

Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of dismissal of the warrant. 

IV. Prejudice Against the Defendant

The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is whetherthe accused has suffered

prejudice from the delay. 407 U.S. at 532. When evaluating this factor, courts must be aware that

the right to a speedy trial is designed (1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial,

(2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and (3) to limit the

possibilities that long delay will impair the defense. Bishop, 493 S.W.2d at 85; see Smith v. Hooey,

393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969). The Defendant argues that he suffered prejudice by the delay because he

lost the possibility of serving this sentence concurrently with the sentence he served in federal

custody and that the correctional system is not equipped to handle his present medical needs. 

While the prejudice factor is the most important of the factors identified in Barker, courts

must examine the totality of the factors and each and every circumstance relating to those factors in

determining when the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial. Picklesimer, 2004 WL

2683743, at *5. In Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, the United States Supreme Court determined that a

“defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he

is serving . . . [unless] trial on the pending charge is postponed . . . .” 393 U.S. at 378. In that case,

the Court identified the lost possibility of concurrent sentencing as one harm that could result to an

incarcerated prisoner and said this lost possibility relates to the interest in avoiding undue and

oppressive pretrial incarceration. Simmons, 54 S.W.3d at 755. Similarly, in this case, the Defendant
The trial court in this case, presumably in an attempt to minimize the prejudice to the Defendant, gave the 6

Defendant credit for time served in federal prison and for time served “anywhere.” As noted by the State in its brief, this

was not permitted by statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-101(c). Moreover, given the length of time that has passed,

the extent of the prejudice is unclear. 

-10-

could have addressed the issue of concurrent sentencing or early parole had the State conducted the

prosecution with due diligence. See Picklesimer, 2004 WL 2683743, at *5. 6

The Defendant was unaware of the allegation until November 2007; the evidence, therefore,

is not particularly compelling as to whether he experienced undue anxiety or concern as a result of

public accusation. There was evidence, however, that the Defendant suffered from numerous

medical conditions which he acquired during the almost nine-year delay and that his treatment could

be compromised if incarcerated. See id. As for the third factor, 

while it was not conclusively established that the defense would have been impaired,

. . . an adverse effect upon preparations is not essential to the establishment of the

denial of a right to speedy trial. In Doggett, for example, the Supreme Court

dismissed the prosecution, finding a delay of over eight years due to the negligence

of the prosecution to be ‘egregious’ and involving the presumption of prejudice,

‘compromis[ing] the reliability of a trial in a ways that neither party can prove or, for

that matter, identify.’

See Picklesimer, 2004 WL 2683743, at *5 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655). Moreover, “the

presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.” Doggett, 505 U.S.

at 655. We find Doggett applicable to facts presented in this case. 

In our view, an examination of the Barker factors establishes that the Defendant has been

denied his right to a speedy probation revocation hearing due to the nine-year delay between the

issuance of the probation violation warrant and the Defendant’s revocation hearing. A dismissal

on grounds of the denial of a speedy trial is warranted.

Conclusion

Because the Defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial, the judgment of the Williamson

County Circuit Court is reversed. The probation violation warrants are dismissed. 

______________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE