U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–499PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE NUCLEAR ARSENALS:

POSTURE, PROLIFERATION, AND THE FUTURE

OF ARMS CONTROL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 21, 2018

Serial No. 115–141

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Austin Long, Ph.D., senior political scientist, RAND Corporation ...................... 7

Patricia M. Kim, Ph.D., Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign 

Relations ............................................................................................................... 20

The Honorable Frank Rose, senior fellow, Security and Strategy, Foreign 

Policy Program, The Brookings Institution (former Assistant Secretary for 

Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, U.S. Department of State) ....... 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 2

The Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Prepared statement ........................................... 5

Austin Long, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 10

Patricia M. Kim, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 22

The Honorable Frank Rose: Prepared statement .................................................. 31

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

(1)

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE NUCLEAR ARSENALS: 

POSTURE, PROLIFERATION, AND THE 

FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL 

THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record and subject to length 

limitation in the rules. The Chair will dispense with my opening 

statement and I will file it as part of the record. I will yield to the 

ranking member, Mr. Keating, from Massachusetts. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]

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Congressman Ted Poe 

Statement for the Record 

TNT Hearing, "Russian and Chinese Nuclear Arsenals: Posture, Proliferation, and the 

Fntnre of Arms Control" 

The world today is in a new era of great power rivalry. Resurgent Russia and China are 

challenging U.S. interests across the globe. Both are rapidly modernizing their militaries to 

directly challenge America's dominance on the battlefield and to undermine our alliances around 

the world. The potential for major conflict is closer now than it has been since the Cold War. 

China and Russia's rising power has huge implications for how we trade, how we target rogue 

regimes, and how the entire international system works. While we often focus on Iran and North 

Korea's nuclear programs, we tend to overlook the two atomic arsenals that pose the greatest 

danger to our security. But with Russia and China's aggressive behavior in places like Ukraine, 

Georgia, and the South China Sea, we are forced to rethink our deterrence against such threats. 

Comparing our nuclear arsenals, it's clear China and Russia have been intent on challenging U.S. 

dominance and coercing our tfiends for some time. While we have barely upgraded some of our 

nuclear systems since they were first deployed in the early 1980s, China and Russia have 

introduced new weapons. We may be reluctant to maintain and upgrade such devastating 

weapons, but our strategic rivals are not. If we allow Russia or China to achieve nuclear 

superiority over us, the results will be dire for our allies and for the international order we have 

spent decades building. 

Just in March, Vladimir Putin unveiled several new nuclear weapons intended to make our 

missile defenses "useless." They include a new heavy ICBM, a nuclear-powered cruise missile 

with "unlimited range," and a nuclear- powered unmanned submarine designed to sneak into 

coastal cities and explode. Such a heavy investment in nuclear arms is concerning and 

demonstrates Putin's priority is not disarmament but strategic dominance. 

However, Putin left something out of his threatening display. He did not include the new groundlaunched cruise missile which the State Department has said for years is violating the INF 

Treaty. This missile undermines years of arms control negotiations and the good faith we have 

hoped to build with the Russians since the end of the Cold War. With the New START treaty 

expiring in 2021, the INF violation casts real doubt on continued strategic arms limitations with 

the Russians going forward. If the START treaty expires, the Russians will be completely free to 

expand their nuclear stockpile to what it was during the darkest days of the Cold War. This will 

likely force others-including ourselves-to also build more bombs. 

Worse, now that China is a major rival, we could be pushed into a situation more dangerous than 

the Cold War. We have been fortunate that China has kept its nuclear stockpile relatively small, 

focusing on minimal deterrence. But China is building new delivery systems to match our own 

and is not restrained to arms control agreements like those between the U.S. and Russia. China is 

rapidly building new ballistic missile submarines and mobile ICBMs which will further strain 

our military's ability to track. Beijing is also making advances in hypersonic missiles that will 

make early warning systems inetl'ective. 
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Yet, the major concern with China is its willingness to proliferate nuclear technology to rogue 

regimes. Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan have all benefited from Chinese assistance. In many 

cases, China has directly sold nuclear and missile technology to these terrorist regimes. China's 

low regard for non-proliferation standards has been irresponsible and created increased 

instability around the globe. 

For too long we have not address the source of these rising threats. North Korea and Iran are 

major problems, but they would be far more isolated and far less dangerous if they did not have 

backing from Russia and China. Even our need for missile defense-which China and Russia 

claim is so destabilizing-would be unnecessary if these ro~,>ue regimes did not have help from 

Moscow and Beijing. 

As we think about the future of our nuclear forces and the future of arms control, we must have a 

clear view of the threats we face. China and Russia are capable adversaries. Left unchecked they 

will surpass us and make the world less safe. Therefore, we must continue to engage them to 

restrict the number and capability of these terrible weapons while making clear we will not allow 

them to gain the nuclear advantage. 

Ronald Reagan once said, "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." We must 

continue his legacy by seeking a world without nuclear arms. And that's just the way it is. 

2 
4

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will also submit my 

opening statement for the record because of the delay and it occurs 

on the rollcall, and I will yield back to you. I thank our witnesses 

for being here, particularly Mr. Rose who once lived in America’s 

hometown: Plymouth, Massachusetts. I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keating follows:]

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Congressman William Keating 

Statement for the Record 

TNT Hearing, "Russian and Chinese Nuclear Arsenals: Posture, Proliferation, and the 

Future of Arms Control" 

I'd like to thank the Chairman for convening this hearing today. We're meeting today on Russian 

and Chinese nuclear arsenals and in particular, in the context of the future of arms controL 

I think it's helpful and important to step back for a moment and reflect on the global context for 

arms controL I believe it's fair to say that North Korea and Iran are the countries that come to 

mind when someone raises the issue of nuclear weapons and arms controL We have faced grave 

security threats from Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions and have had to work very 

hard to manage these threats and strive towards greater peace and stability in our time. 

With Iran, the U.S. worked closely with our allies to negotiate a framework and agreement for 

bringing Iran back into the fold on compliance with international norms and practices. There was 

accountability in that agreement, and it's hard to deny that we have been safer with that 

agreement than without it. 

Nuclear weapons- and the many strategic capabilities that go along with maintaining a nuclear 

arsenal -present some of the most challenging geopolitical, security, and frankly existential 

questions that we as a country and other countries around the world must answer. We have to 

answer these questions for ourselves, however, we must also negotiate this sensitive terrain 

alongside other countries that are not always in lockstep with our vision for what a peaceful and 

stable arms control regime should look like. 

That brings us to the topic at hand today: Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals. US. efforts with 

Russia have not always been met with resounding success. We are regularly at odds with one 

another on the extent to which we believe international laws and norms must be respected. That's 

just a fact of our relationship, but it does not have to be the end of the story. While we dislikeor even at times, condemn- Putin's actions and violations of our arms control and other 

agreements, that does not mean our hands are tied in continuing to promote global 

nonproliferation commitments and efforts to hold Russia and others accountable to them. We 

also cannot afford to pivot away from China on these issues. The development of their own 

nuclear arsenal and more advanced capabilities in space and in cyber, demand that we take 

engagement with China on these issues seriously. 

US. leadership on these issues is a matter of our own immediate and long-term security, but also 

of our ability to shape an international order based on rules, commitments, and checks. This 

order gives the U.S greater security, but it also gives governments and their people around the 

world, the peace of mind to pursue critical objectives in economic growth, security, and in other 

arenas. 

The threat of nuclear war or even just missteps on these issues are too great; we must be vigilant 

in pursuing more predictability, accountability, and stability for nuclear arms controL The US. 
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has negotiated nuclear arms control agreements in the past. We have brought together our State 

Department, Defense Department and national security experts alongside our closest allies to 

raise the standards on arms control. Our allies share our nuclear proliferation concerns and our 

goals for a world in which all countries abide by established norms and rules to prevent the 

devastation that nuclear weapons can bring. If we are going to be successful in our 

nonproliferation etTorts with Russia and China, we have to be at our best and capitalize on our 

greatest strengths. 

This has often been raised in this committee, but we cannot afford to continue with a weakened 

State Department where morale is down, where key positions remain unfilled, and where our 

foreign service officers and diplomats abroad do not have the full force and support of their own 

government behind them. 

We must also modernize our own arsenal in the most strategic and impactful way that reflects the 

complex dynamics and threat environments we face. And we cannot allow our alliances to be 

weakened. We rely on our friends and allies for our own strategic defense. The nature of nuclear 

weapons means that we cannot go it alone no matter how great we are. Our alliances make us 

stronger and it will be a dangerous mistake to forget that even for a moment. 

Yes, we have faced setbacks in our arms control agreements with Russia and othenvise. 

Negotiating arms control frameworks and agreements is a process that takes time and dedication 

to the objectives at hand. However, we can operate from a position of strength when it comes to 

Russia or China on the other side of the negotiating table. 

So I am looking forward to our hearing today and to the testimony of our witnesses so that we 

can better evaluate how to best tackle these questions before us around anns control and the 

unique geopolitical challenges presented by Russia and China. I believe there are steps we can 

take but it does require resolve to get there. Thank you and I yield back. 

2 
7

Mr. POE. Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements 

will be made part of the record, and I will ask that each witness 

keep their presentation to no more than 5 minutes. I will introduce 

each witness and then give them time for their opening statement. 

The first witness, Dr. Austin Long, is a senior political scientist 

at the Rand Corporation. Previously, he was an associate professor 

at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. 

Dr. Patricia Kim is the Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the 

Council on Foreign Relations. She was previously a fellow at the 

Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at the Woodrow 

Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 

And Mr. Frank Rose from Plymouth, Massachusetts is senior fellow for Security and Strategy in the Foreign Policy Program at the 

Brookings Institution. Previously he has served as assistant secretary of state for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance. 

Welcome to all three of the witnesses here. Each of you are limited to 5 minutes. Your statements are part of the record, so when 

you see the red light come on before you, that means to stop. 

So we will start with Dr. Long. You may make your opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF AUSTIN LONG, PH.D., SENIOR POLITICAL 

SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. LONG. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to address the 

important concerns about Russia’s nuclear posture and the future 

of arms control. I will briefly summarize key developments in Russian nuclear forces as well as some of the factors driving those developments. I will then discuss the implications of Russian nuclear 

developments for the future of arms control. 

Russia is modernizing almost every part of its nuclear arsenal including short-range systems, intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

submarine launch missiles, and air launch cruise missiles. I provide more detail on Russian modernization in my written testimony, but three developments stand out. 

First, President Vladimir Putin announced in March that Russia 

has invested in two novel, strategic nuclear delivery systems. The 

first is a long-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed autonomous underwater vehicle. The second is an intercontinental range, 

nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile. In addition, the 

U.S. Government in 2014 declared Russia to be testing and subsequently deploying an intermediate range ground launch cruise missile in violation of the intermediate nuclear forces or INF Treaty. 

Russian nuclear development is driven in large part by fear that 

the combination of U.S. nuclear, conventional, and missile defense 

capabilities could greatly reduce the effectiveness of Russian deterrence based on nuclear retaliation. These fears date back to the 

Cold War but were amplified following the U.S. withdrawal from 

the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. 

Russia’s fears, justified or not, could potentially precipitate a nuclear crisis between the United States and Russia. Russian leaders 

could perceive unrest or revolution in one of its neighbors as engineered by the United States and take what they believe to be appropriate defensive measures. U.S. and NATO leaders could take 

8

what from their perspective are equally defensive measures resulting in a crisis and possible conflict. 

Moreover, if conflict did happen, Russian military commanders 

might recommend limited nuclear use if Russia’s non-nuclear capabilities fail to terminate the conflict promptly. Whether Russian political leaders would accept such a recommendation is unknowable, 

but this scenario underscores that even if Russian intentions are 

largely defensive, nuclear crisis and limited nuclear use are possible. 

This scenario also highlights the importance of arms control, yet 

prospects for arms control are grim. Russia denies it is violating 

the INF Treaty, instead leveling counter accusations against the 

United States with no progress on this deadlock since 2014. In contrast, both sides agree they are broadly in compliance with START, 

the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or New START. New 

START expires in 2021, although there is an option to extend it for 

5 years if both parties agree. However, dialogue appears frozen at 

present as I discuss in more detail in written testimony. 

From the U.S. perspective as embodied in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Russia is an unrepentant violator of existing arms 

control agreements. From the Russian perspective, the United 

States has been neutralizing Russia’s strategic deterrent and destroying the Russian state. Given these divergent views, the instinct may be to simply walk away from arms control. 

While this is understandable, arms control can provide transparency and communication that help prevent nuclear crisis scenarios like the one described previously. For example, even as U.S.-

Russia relations have grown tense, under New START both sides 

have conducted more than a 130 onsite inspections while exchanging data thousands of times. The most comprehensive solution may 

be to start from scratch with a broader set of negotiations on new, 

mutually acceptable limits for intermediate range systems, the new 

Russian systems, and missile defenses. Yet, the United States is reluctant to limit missile defenses against North Korea and Iran even 

if it does not seek to neutralize Russia’s strategic deterrent as the 

Kremlin fears. Such a solution will also likely take a very long time 

to negotiate. 

Absent such a comprehensive solution, it seems unlikely the Russian Government will change its behavior. The United States will 

thus be faced with a stark choice by 2021: Maintain New START 

despite Russian arms control violations or allow New START to expire and possibly withdraw from the INF Treaty as well. Maintaining New START will preserve valuable transparency, yet may confirm to the Russians that the United States treats each arms control issue separately. This could encourage further violations of 

INF and other treaties. 

Allowing New START to expire would demonstrate that arms 

control violations have real consequences, yet it would mean for the 

first time in more than three decades that U.S.-Russian nuclear 

competition would be unrestrained. Perhaps a key indicator for the 

future would be how the Russians seek to present the novel systems Putin revealed in March. New START includes a provision on 

novel systems, so if the Russians are willing to address these systems for potential inclusion in New START limitations as President 

9

Putin has, himself, publicly suggested, then extension may make 

sense despite Russian violation of INF and other treaties. 

If the Russians are unwilling to engage in productive, official dialogue on these novel systems, it is hard to see a future for New 

START or, indeed, arms control generally. Thank you for your 

time, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Long follows:]

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Testimony 

Russian Nuclear Forces and Prospects for Arms Control 

Austin Long 

CT-495 

Testimony presented before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade on June 21, 2018. 
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For more information on this publication, visit Vivvw.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT495.html 

Testimonies 

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Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif 

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Russian Nuclear Forces and l'rwpectsfor Arms Control 

Testimony of Austin Long1 

The RAND Corporation2 

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

United States House of Representatives 

June 21, 2018 

I

n the eight years between the Obama and Trump Administrations' Nuclear Posture Reviews 

(NPRs), U.S.-Russia relations have grown increasingly confrontational, as vividly 

demonstrated in the arenas of nuclear forces and anns control. Two events underscore how 

dramatically relations have worsened. ln April2010, then-Presidents Dmitri Medvedev and 

Barack Obama signed the New Strategic Anns Reduction Treaty (New START) to much fanfare. 

In contrast, in March 2018, Medvedev's successor (and predecessor), Vladimir Putin, revealed 

two new Russian strategic nuclear delivery systems not covered in the text of New START. 

ln this statement, 1 draw upon unclassified sources to summarize developments in Russian 

nuclear forces and strategy over the past eight years as well as some of the factors driving those 

developments. l will then discuss the implications of Russian nuclear developments for arms 

control. 

What Has Happened with Russia's Nuclear Weapons? 

Since the signing ofNew START, Russia has continued modernizing much of its nuclear 

arsenal, as succinctly described in the 2018 U.S. NPR3 Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces have 

deployed a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the SS-27 Mod 2, which can be mobile 

1 Titc opinions and conclusions expressed in Ulis tcstimon~· arc the author's alone and should not be interpreted as 

representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research. 

2 Titc RAND Corporation is a research organiLation Umt develops solutions to public policy clmllcngcs to help nmkc 

cOimnunitics throughout the \vorld safer and more secure. healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit. 

nonpmtisnn, and committed to the public interest 

3 U.S. Depnrtment of Defense, -Vue/ear Posture Revie~r. VVashington, D.C.. 2018, p. 8. 
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or silo-based4 It has also continued development of the SS-X-30 heavy ICBM and has begun or 

extended development of two other ICBMs 5 

The Russian Navy has deployed a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SSN-32, and a new submarine-launched cruise missile, the SS-N-30A6 The latter system can 

deliver conventional and possibly nuclear warheads; the conventionally armed version has been 

used in Syria. In addition to new nuclear delivery systems, the navy has deployed two new 

nuclear-powered submarines, the Borei-class ballistic missile submarine and the Yasen-class 

attack submarine; the latter can carry the SS-N-30. The Russian Aerospace Forces have deployed 

a new long-range nuclear cruise missile, the Kh-102, and a conventional variant, the KH-101, 

and have begun development of a new medium-range missile that is likely to be nuclear 

capable 7 

As Putin announced in March, Russia also has invested in two novel strategic nuclear 

delivery systems. The first is an extremely long-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed 

autonomous underwater vehicle, known as the Status-6 or Poseidon system." This system is 

capable of striking coastal cities or other targets from transoceanic ranges. The second is an 

intercontinental-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile, which could hold at 

risk much, if not all, of the United States 9 

Russia also continues to deploy shorter-range nuclear-capable delivery systems. In addition 

to the SS-26 short range missile system, which is deployed in parts of Russia that border the 

territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S. government in 2014 

declared Russia to be testing an intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile in violation 

4 U.S. Natimk11 Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Jlissile lhreal, Wright-Patterson Air Force 

Base, Ohio. 2017. p. 26. The SS-27 Mod 2 carries multiple independently targetable warheads and is known in 

Russia as the RS-24 Yars. 

5 U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. 2017. p. 29. The SS-X-30 is known in Russia as the RS-28 

S::mnat 

''U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. 2017. pp. 30 and 37: and U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 8. 

The SS-N-32 is known in Russia as the RSM-56 Bulava. and the SS-N-30A is known as the 3M-I~ Kalibror 

Biryuza. 

7 U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2017, p. 30. 

8 Sputnik News. "·Doomsday Machine': Russia's New Weapon Reportedly Gets Nuclear Warhead (VIDEO)." 

webpage. May 17.2018. As of Jm1e 18.2018: https://sput.niknews.com/mssia/20180517106~549993-mssiaposeidon-system-torpedo/ 

9 Defence Blog, .. New Russian Intercontinental Cmise Missile May Endanger US National Interests," 

March 25. 20 18. As ofJune 18, 20 18: h!iJrj!9.s:Jl2.'~0!:1ll)Qg5QIIIJ.l.S:El'Lllieit=I~.?li.\ltJ~.r!CQ ~t!!NJ.llill=;;Il!L~~=J1~~&'2: 

storm"). 

2 
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of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 10 The United States subsequently 

claimed that Russia was deploying this missile, known as the SSC-8. n 

While Russia and the United States are both engaged in nuclear modernization-as their 

respective arsenals still rely on systems built during the Cold War-Russia's modernization is 

much further along. Russia is also expanding its arsenal to include new systems, such as the two 

novel delivery systems Putin revealed in March and the alleged INF-violating SSC-8. In contrast, 

U.S. nuclear modernization concentrates on replacement, rather than expansion. 12 The next 

section addresses how Russian leaders might think about using this diverse and modernizing 

arsenal. 

What is Russian Nuclear Strategy? 

Over the past several years, and especially since the release of the 2018 NPR, the nature of 

Russian nuclear strategy has been a topic of intense debate. On one side of the debate is a view 

that characterizes Russian nuclear strategy as willing, perhaps even eager, to use the threat of 

limited nuclear escalation for purposes of coercion. The NPR states 

Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses 

of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or 

actual first usc of nuclear ·weapons vvould serve to ''de-escalate"' a conflict on 

terms fayorable to Russia. 13 

Proponents of this view highlight certain aspects of Russia's professional military debates on 

nuclear weapons as well as Russian nuclear activities (including exercises) and messages during 

and after the 2014 Russian occupation ofCrimea. 14 This view is sometimes referred to by the 

shorthand expression "escalate to de-escalate" or "escalate to win." 

10 U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance With ~..J.rms Control. Xonprolifi?ration, and Disarmament 

Agreements and Commitments, D.C., July 3L 2014. As of Jm1e 18. 2018: 

ll Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project. ·'US OIIicialldenti1ies Missile Believed to Violate INF Treaty_ .. 

webpage, December 8. 2017. As of June 18, 2018: !ill:"-"d~'-!!i§>-llidll"illc;l'i;i.Ql:g/l!DLITI>:ml:!iiffiiWs;.2!!iliifi!l£:: 

h£Lkl£d .. Yio!illc-inf-trcan_:{ The United States Novator 9M729. 

12 The U.S. modemizationincludes a gravity bomb. the BGl-12. which will eventually replace multiple types of 

gravity bomb: the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, which will replace the Minuteman ICBM: the ('olwnhia-class 

submarine. which will replace the Ohio-class submarine; the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon, which will replace the 

AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile; the replacement for the Trident D5 missile; and the B-21 Raider heavy 

bomber. which will replace the B-2 Spirit. The 2018 NPR also calls for supplemental nuclear capabilities, one of 

\vhich (a new sea-launched cmise missile) might constitute expansion of the U.S. arsenaL See U.S. Department of 

Defense. 2018. p. xii. 

13 U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. p. 8. 

14 See Brad Roberts. 1 he Case for U.S. Nuclear ll"eapons in the 21st Centurv. Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University 

Press, 2016: Dtwid Johnson. Russia ':o• C'onventional Precision S'trike Capahilitie:•1, Regional ('ri:s·es. and ,Vuclear 

Thresholds, Livcnnorc, Calif.: Lawrence Livcnnorc National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research. 

20 IS; Jacek Durkalec. ·'Nuclear-Backed ·Little Green Men:· Nuclear Messaging in the Ukraine Crisis:' \Varsaw: 

Polish Institute oflntenmtional Affairs, 2015: and Katarzyna Zisk, --Escalation and Nuclear 'Veapons in Russia-s 

Military Strategy," 11JeRUSJJournai,May 2018. 

3 
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30499a-6.eps

The other view in the debate is that, while Russia remains serious about its nuclear arsenal, it 

has not substantially embraced a broadened coercive role for nuclear weapons. Analysts 

embracing this view argue that neither Russian doctrine nor exercises indicate that "escalate to 

de-escalate" is in fact a policy, and point to the Russian declaratory nuclear policy that nuclear 

weapons are intended to ensure the survival of the Russian state (and perhaps, depending on 

one's interpretation, the Putin regime)." Russia's major investments in non-nuclear forces is 

cited as supporting evidence for this view. 

My own view of Russian nuclear strategy falls between these two perspectives. 16 Whatever 

the Russian military believes, senior Russian political leadership has been circumspect in 

describing the role of nuclear weapons in its strategy. While some Kremlin leaders have 

described nuclear strategy in expansive tenns, Putin has been more reserved, noting in 2015: 

"We proceed from the assumption that nuclear weapons and other weapons are the means to 

protect our sovereignty and legitimate interests, not the means to behave aggressively or to fulfil 

some nonexistent imperial ambitions." 17 

This statement by Putin accords with Russian behavior. Whatever Russia's signaling with 

nuclear weapons was over Crimea, Putin and the rest of Russia's leadership clearly believed this 

situation was crucial to Russian security. Yet in other important but less crucial situations, Russia 

did not brandish the threat of nuclear weapons. For example, Russia did not invoke nuclear 

weapons following Turkey's downing of a Russian fighter in November 2015. 18 

Russian behavior, along with Russian acquisition of substantial non-nuclear capabilities, 

including long-range precision strike, offensive cyber, and counters pace systems, suggest 

Russian leaders are preparing for a variety of military options short of a massive nuclear 

exchange.''' These options would include limited nuclear use in dire circumstances. Yet dire 

circumstances, from a Russian perspective, could occur very quickly in a conflict, as discussed in 

the next section. 

15 See Olga Oliker and Audrey Baklitsky. "The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian 'De-escalation:'A Dangerous 

Solution to a Non-Existent Problem ... War on the Rocks. 20. 2018. As of June 18. 2018: 

Vol. 60. No.2. 

16 For a more detailed discussion. see Austin Long, .. Nuclear Strategy in an Era of Great Pmver Competition, ,. 

Roundtable, February 13, 2018a. As of June 18,2018: 

17 CBS Sixty Minutes. ·'AJI Eyes onPutin, .. webpage. September 27. 2015. As of Jtme 18, 2018: 

https:/ /v..'\V\V .cbsnevvs.com/ne\vs/v ladimir -putin-mssian-president -GO-minutes-charlie-rose/ 

18 Neil MacFarquhar, "Navigator ofDmvned Russian Plane Says There \Vas No \Varning:· .. Ne1r York Times, 

November 25, 2015. As of June 18. 2018: https:!/www.nytimes.com/2015/ll/2G/worldleurope/turkey-mssia-jet.html 

19 See similar arguments in Kristin ven Bruusgaard. ·'Russian Strategic Deterrence," ,)'un1ival, Vol 58, No. -t, 

August-September 20 16_ and Dmitri (Dima) Adamsky, -·From Moscow' \Vith Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory 

and Strategic Cuhurc," Journal (~(Strategic Studies, Vo1-t.L No. 1-2. January-Fcbrual)' 2018. 

4 
16


30499a-7.eps

What Factors Are Driving Russian Nuclear Developments? 

Russian nuclear strategy and forces have been developed to meet the challenges Russian 

leaders have identified in their security environment. The major challenges, which have their 

roots in the Cold War, are the United States and NATO, with China being an important but 

secondary challenge. Russian leaders perceive the United States as untrustworthy at a minimum, 

dating back to broken promises over NATO expansion, and as actively seeking to undermine the 

Russian government20 

Russian leaders have also greatly feared US. nuclear and missile defense capabilities since 

the Cold War. The Soviets were fearful that the combination of those capabilities could greatly 

reduce the etl'ectiveness of a Soviet strike on the United States, undermining Soviet deterrence. 

In the 1970s, this fear led the Soviets to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as well as 

accept the limits on the quantity of nuclear forces in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

(SALT)21 

Yet by the early 1980s, Soviet leaders were confronted with a growing qualitative 

improvement in US. nuclear forces and the prospect of the United States leaving the ABM 

Treaty with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, aka "Star Wars"). Soviet 

assessments became deeply pessimistic, with some indicating that by the mid-1990s, the Soviets 

might only be able to strike I 00 targets in retaliation following aU S first strike22 If US 

missile defenses were even modestly effective, that number might be reduced by half, while 

highly effective defenses might reduce that number to ten or perhaps even zero. 

Russian leaders have inherited these Soviet fears from the 1980s, which were amplitied 

following the US. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. The developments over the past 

eight years in Russian nuclear strategy and forces have been an attempt to address these fears. 

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the two novel delivery systems Putin announced in March appear to have 

originated in the late Soviet period as means to circumvent SDL23 

Yet in addition to fears ±rom the Soviet era, Russian leaders have two new fears. The first is 

the "precision revolution" in conventional munitions, which Russia has observed closely since 

the Gulf War in 1991. Based on these observations, the Russians now believe a massive firststrike volley of conventional precision munitions could be etl'ective in neutralizing much of their 

strategic deterrent or crippling the government, highlighting US. "shock and awe"-style 

20 Joshun l!Aowit1. Shifrinson. "Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO 

Expansion," international Security, Vol. ~6, No.4, Spring 2016. 

21 For a more detailed discussion, sec Austin Long, "Red Glare: The Origin and Implications ofRussia's New 

Nuclear Weapons:· ll"ar on the Rocks. March26. 2018b. As of June 18, 2018: 

https://vvaronthcrocks. com/20 18/03/rcd-gbre-thc-origin-and -implications-of-russias-ncw-nuclcar-vvcapons 

22 For more detniled discussion. see Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long. '·The MAD \Vho \Vasn't There: 

Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold \VarNuclearBalance,'· Securi~v Studie.·1, Vol. 26, No. -L 2017. See also the 

declassified report by the President's Board, "The So\"iet ·war Scare,"' Feb mary 15, 

1990. As of June 18. 2018: lli.U&!i!l§,g~cillciC:LJ:n\.lL9l!wJmh£E!\J!J.I_c};c!!i:Q.::.[I]S::_:,\'Qh>0..r':t<;~::_\\';1.[:)S~:m;::!2•;_c_bhl'EcJ:!: 

ITJ~f1::HmmLR£lf:Zif~iU 

23 See Long. 20 18b. 

5 
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30499a-8.eps

campaigns. 24 Moreover, the Russians believe the United States would be more likely to use 

conventional weapons in a first strike, making such a strike more likely than one that would have 

to rely on nuclear weapons. 

The second difference is the emergence of so-called "color revolutions" on the Russian 

periphery-successful uprisings against Moscow-friendly regimes that the Russians believe the 

United States helped engineer2 ' Together, these two new fears have led Russian leadership to 

fear U.S.-sponsored unrest (as Russian leaders believe happened in Ukraine), backed up with 

precision munitions supplied by the United States and its allies. The Russians think they have 

seen this movie before in Serbia, Libya, Iraq, and, if not for timely Russian intervention, Syria. 

This combination of new and old fears about the United States, whether justified or not, has 

shaped Russian nuclear strategy and forces. Crucially, these fears also could help precipitate a 

nuclear crisis between the United States and Russia, even if neither side truly has aggressive 

intentions. Russian leaders could perceive unrest or revolution in one of its neighbors (e.g., 

Belarus) as engineered by the United States and take what it believes to be appropriate defensive 

measures. U.S. and NATO leaders could take what from their perspective are equally defensive 

measures, resulting in a crisis and possible conflict. 

Moreover, if conflict did happen, Russia might rapidly expend most of its non-nuclear 

military options. Its long-range precision strike arsenal, while capable, is not very large. Its 

offensive cyber and counterspace capabilities might likewise fail to terminate conflict and, as 

NATO mobilized, a conventional battle would inevitably begin to shift against Russia. 

Therefore, Russian military commanders might recommend limited nuclear use relatively 

quickly if non-nuclear capabilities failed to terminate the conflict promptly. Whether Russian 

political leaders would accept such a recommendation is unknowable, but this scenario 

underscores that, even if Russian intentions are largely defensive, nuclear crisis and even limited 

nuclear use is possible_2<> This possibility highlights the important but tenuous role of arms 

control, discussed in the final section. 

Prospects for Arms Control 

Given the foregoing, prospects for arms control are grim. The United States maintains Russia 

is in violation of the INF Treaty, and Russia has leveled counteraccusations, including that U.S. 

European Phased Adaptive Approach missile defense launchers could be used to launch 

Tomahawk cruise missiles. There has been essentially no progress on this deadlock since 2014. 

24 Thomas McCabe. "The Russian Perception of the NATO Aerospace Threat:' lir and Space Potver Journal. VoL 

30. No. 3, 2016. 

25 Nicholas Bouchct. ·'Russia's "I\1:ilitarization'' of Colour Revolutions." Center for Security Studics-ETH Zurich. 

Janu;ny 2016. 

26 Sec also ScoU Boston and Dara Massicot, lhe Russian 

Corporaliorl PE-231-A. 2017. As of June 18,2018: ~;;.~i;;;J!~:~~~;;,;;;e,~~~;;;~and Christopher S. Clrivvis. Andre" Radifl Dara Massicol. 

with Rus:s·ia. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND 

6 
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30499a-9.eps

In contrast, both sides agree they are broadly in compliance with New START limits of700 

deployed strategic launchers and 1,550 strategic warheads. Russia claims that in February 2018 

(the deadline for meeting the treaty limits) it had deployed 1,444 warheads on 527launchers 27 

The United States was likewise in compliance, though Russia has questioned some of the 

conversions intended to limit launcher numbers. 

New START expires in 2021, although there is an option to extend it for five years with both 

parties' agreement. While there has been some discussion of New START extension, the 

progress of the dialogue appears frozen at present. The two sides have had sporadic contact on 

arms control issues, with strategic stability talks in Helsinki in September 2017. More recently, 

strategic stability was one of the topics of a meeting between Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff General Joseph Dunford and Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov in June 

2018. 

Yet a fundamental impasse remains. From the U.S. perspective, as embodied in the 2018 

NPR, Russia is an unrepentant violator of existing arms control agreements, most notably the 

lNF Treaty. lt may seek to use nuclear weapons for coercive purposes against the United States 

and its alliesn From the Russian perspective, the United States is a serial invader bent on 

destroying the Russian state (or at the very least Russian leadership). It is also seeking to 

neutralize Russia's strategic deterrent. 

lt is especially important to note that given Russia's long-standing fears, there is probably no 

future for formal, treaty-based U.S.-Russian arms control if the negotiations do not cover missile 

defense (with the possible exception of New START extension). The Russians sought 

unsuccessfully to include missile defense in New START negotiations. Today, with their "new" 

systems, they may believe they have a stronger bargaining position. Yet the United States would 

certainly want any new agreements to ensure Russia returns to compliance with the lNF Treaty 

and to involve the two new Russian systems Putin revealed in March. 

Given these divergent views, the instinct may be to simply walk away from arrns control, 

allowing New START to expire and even withdrawing from the lNF Treaty. While this is 

understandable, arrns control can provide transparency and communication mechanisms that can 

help prevent nuclear crisis scenarios like the one described previously. For example, even as 

U.S.-Russia relations have grown tense, both sides have been able to undertake more than 130 

onsite inspections while exchanging data thousands oftimes29 

The most comprehensive solution may be to start from scratch, with a broader set of 

negotiations that seeks new mutually acceptable limits on intermediate-range systems (to replace 

the TNF Treaty), "new" Russian systems, and missile defenses Yet the United States 

understandably seeks missile defenses against North Korea and Iran, even if it does not seek to 

neutralize Russia's strategic deterrent, as the Kremlin fears. Moreover, a comprehensive solution 

by its nature would likely take a very long time to negotiate. 

27 U.S. Stme Department .. New START Treajv Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. fact sheet, 

Febmarv 22.2018. As ofJune 18.2018: https://www.stme.g0\'/t/nvc/newstart/278775.htm 

28 See U.S. Department of Defense. 2018, pp. '-Tii and 8. 

2

(J U.S. Department of State, "New- St<ut Treaty Inspection Activities," 'vebpage, undated. As of June 18, 2018: 

hllps://www.statc.gov/tlavc/ncwstartlc52405.htm 

7 
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30499a-10.eps

Absent such a comprehensive solution, the current arms control regime between the United 

States and Russia will likely continue to fray. It seems very unlikely the Russian government, 

which does not acknowledge violating the INF Treaty, will change its behavior. The United 

States will thus be faced with a stark choice by 2021-maintain New START, which the 

Russians seem to be complying with, for as long as possible, despite Russian violation of the lNF 

Treaty? Or allow New START to expire and possibly withdraw tram the INF Treaty as well? 

Maintaining New START will maintain valuable transparency and channels of 

communication, yet will defacto confinn to the Russians that the United States will treat each 

anns control issue separately. This could encourage further violations of lNF and other treaties, 

as the Russians would believe New START would continue and that a successor treaty might 

even be possible in 2026. Russian leaders might even conclude the United States is so desperate 

for anns control that they could even violate New START in the future. 

Allowing New START to expire would help disabuse Russian leaders of the idea of U.S. 

desperation and demonstrate that anns control violations have real consequences. Yet it would 

mean that for the first time in more than three decades that U.S.-Russian nuclear competition 

would be unrestrained. Neither side would have the clarity on the status of the other side's 

strategic forces that years of inspections and data exchanges have enabled. 

Perhaps the key indicator will be how the Russians seek to present the two novel systems 

Putin revealed in March. New START includes a provision on novel systems: 

When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive ann is emerging, 

that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive 

arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission30 

If the Russians are willing to address these two systems at the Bilateral Consultative 

Commission (or other official venue) for potential inclusion in New START limitations, then 

extension may make sense despite Russian violation oflNF and other treaties. lfthe Russians are 

unwilling to engage in productive dialogue on these novel systems, it is hard to see a future for 

New START or indeed arms control generally. 

30 See Article V of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Prague. 2010. As ofJune 18. 2018: 

hllps://www. statc.gov /documcnts/organization/1 ~003 5 .pdf 

8 
20

Mr. POE. Thank you Dr. Long. 

Dr. Kim? 

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA M. KIM, PH.D., STANTON NUCLEAR 

SECURITY FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Ms. KIM. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, members of 

the subcommittee thank you for the opportunity to testify today on 

China’s nuclear posture, a complex and evolving topic that will 

have significant implications for the security of the United States, 

our allies, as well as global nonproliferation efforts. 

First, with China’s nuclear doctrine, China has historically sustained a relatively small nuclear arsenal that is focused on deterring a nuclear attack by maintaining a credible second strike capability, which means the ability to deliver a retaliatory nuclear 

strike in the response to an adversary’s initial first attack. According to China’s latest defense white paper published in 2015, the 

Chinese Government is committed to pursuing a defensive nuclear 

strategy and states that it intends to keep its nuclear capabilities 

at a minimum level that is solely focused on deterrence and stopping others from threatening China with nuclear weapons. 

Since China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, it has adopted a no-first-use policy, which commits to refrain from attacking 

any entity first with nuclear weapons and to never use or threaten 

the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state. 

Some, however, have raised the question of whether China is truly 

committed to this no-first-use policy. They point to various debates 

within China with some Chinese strategists calling on Beijing to 

qualify this policy and exempt certain types of non-nuclear attacks 

or others saying that China should get rid of this policy altogether 

so that it could prevent others from challenging China’s territorial 

claims. 

But it is important to note that these arguments have been countered by other Chinese strategists who say that China’s no-first-use 

policy has actually served its purpose well and that letting go of 

this policy would actually open up a can of worms. Also, it is important to note that these debates do not represent the official views 

of the Chinese Government, and they are usually carried on by retired military officials or academics within China. 

But they do provide a window into the way China’s nuclear strategy could evolve if more hawkish voices were to prevail in the future. While China doesn’t release official information on its nuclear 

arsenal, it is believed to possess a small but expanding arsenal of 

about 280 nuclear warheads. In addition to adding about 40 nuclear warheads since 2010, Beijing has focused its efforts on advancing its nuclear delivery systems as part of its broader drive to 

become a world-class military power by 2049. These developments 

have included a MIRV-capable ICBMs as well as a ballistic missile 

submarine. 

It is important, however, not to overstate China’s nuclear capabilities and to place its nuclear modernization in the broader, comparative context. The United States and Russia still possess 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons and are in the midst of their 

own nuclear modernization programs. Furthermore, China lags far 

21

behind the United States in terms of its nuclear delivery capabilities. 

Barring fundamental changes in China’s internal or external environment that wholly transform China’s nuclear calculus, it is unlikely that China will shift away from its emphasis on minimum 

deterrents and strive to reach parity with the United States’ nuclear capabilities in the foreseeable future. It is also vital to note 

that the United States actually has the greatest influence on the 

trajectory of China’s nuclear force modernization. Beijing is especially wary of U.S. capabilities that can challenge its minimum deterrent and is watching closely what we do with ballistic missile 

defense and theater missile defense. And Beijing firmly believes 

that theater missile defense especially is a U.S. tool that is meant 

to contain China. 

On arms control, I will save my remarks since I am running out 

of time for the Q&A, but China is a part of several or most multilateral arms control agreements. And in terms of nonproliferation, 

China in the past has contributed to proliferation, but it has become more conservative in recent years especially as it consolidates 

its great power status. And since joining the NPT in 1992, China 

states that it opposes nuclear proliferation. Obviously, it has not 

lived up to these commitments, and the U.S. has fined or sanctioned Chinese entities, for instance, for engaging in proliferating 

activities so there are certainly concerns there. 

Let me move to my policy recommendations briefly. I would like 

to remark that as China begins to modernize its nuclear weapons 

arsenals, I think it is very important for us to engage in bilateral 

confidence building and avoid spurring an action/reaction dynamic. 

At the same time, it is very important to strengthen our alliances 

and reassure our allies as they watch China grow its arsenal and 

also its conventional capabilities. And also it is very important to 

leverage China’s desire for stability. 

So China, Xi Jinping, has set out many ambitious goals for his 

country, and none of these can be met if a nuclear war was to 

break out on China’s borders because of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, for instance. So I think it is very important for the U.S. 

leaders to push Chinese leaders to do more in terms of nonproliferation for their own strategic interests. 

And finally, I think it is very important for the United States to 

set a leading tone on arms control. As a responsible great power, 

the United States should lead the charge and not introduce new 

nuclear weapons, work to raise the threshold for nuclear conflict, 

and continue to rally its counterparts to work toward reducing and 

ultimately ridding the world of nuclear weapons. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kim follows:]

22


30499b-1.eps

COUNCI Lon_, 

FOREIGN 

RELATIONS 

June 21, 2018 

Chinese Perceptions on Nuclear Weapons, 

Arms Control and Nonproliferation 

Prepared statement hy 

Patricia M. Kim SLt.mLon 

BefOre the 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, United States House 

Foreign Affairs Committee 

L!lllh:d Stah:s HO'IiSf' 

2nd Session, 

Hearing on "Russian and Chinese Nuclear Arsenals: Posture, Proliferation, and the 

Future of Arms Control" 

Chairman Poe, Ranking 1\fcmhcr Keating, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testif)' on China's nuclear posture, a comple:-.. and e\'olving topic that has significant 

implications fOr the security oft he United States, its alhcs, and glohal nonproliferation effOrts. 1\:fy testimony 

\viii address China's nuclcnr doctrine nnd the current state of its nuclear arsenal, its views on arms control, 

and its record on nonprolifE-ration. Twill conclude with several policy recommendations based on my analysis 

of these issues. 

CTTTNA'S NUCLE.\R DOCTRINE \ND NUCLEAR ARSENAL 

Clunu's iVudt:ar IJodi"Jtu:: 

China has historically sustained a relatively small nuclear arsenal that is fOcused on deterring a nuclear attack 

by maintaining a reliable second-strike capability-i.e. the ability to deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike in 

response to an adversary's initial nuclear attack. Such a strategy requires robust sun:eillance and radar 

capabilities to facilitate early detection, the survivability of nuclear forces from an incoming attack, and 

counter-strike capabilities that can penetrate an adversary's missile dcfCnse system and inflict significant 

damage. 1 ,\ccording to China's latest dcfCnsc white paper published in 201.'5, the Chinese government is 
23


30499b-2.eps

committed to pursuin_2; a defensive nuclear strate_2;y and intends to keep its nuclear capabilities at a ··minimum 

level" that is solely fOcused on deterring others from threatening China with nuclear weapons. 2 

Since China conducted its first nuclear test in 1 9G4, it has adopted a ·no first usc' policy which commits it to 

refrain from attacking any entity first \Yith nuclear weapons, and to never usc or thrcntcn the usc of nuclear 

weapons ag;ainst a non-nuclcar-\veapons state China's latest dcfCnse \Yhite paper released in 201.:) reaffirms 

this policy. 3 

Some have raised the question of whether China will remain committed to its ·no first usc· policy, pointing to 

debates among Chinese strategists on the utility ofupholdin_2; such a policy. For instance, some Chinese 

strategists have called on Beijing to qualif)r its 'no first usc' policy hy exempting certain t)1)es of non-nuclear 

attacks that cause extreme destruction or situations in \Yhich Chinn's conventional forces arc unable to defend 

a_2;ainst a lar_2;c-scalc fOreign invasion. Others have called for abandoning the policy all tog;cthcr to deter states 

from challenging China's territorial claims. These arguments have been countered by Chinese strategists who 

contend abandoning the ·no first usc' policy would actually increase China's vulnerability and dama_2;e its 

international image, among other consequences. Tt is important to note that these debates arc largely h1elcd 

by retired military otlicials nnd academics \Yithin China nnd do not represent otlicial views of the Chinese 

goYcrnmcnt. Howe\-cr, they do prm·ide a window into how China's nuclear strategy could evolve if more 

hawkish voices \Ycrc to prevail.-~< 

Pn:.1·enL SLale rfChina's ,\"udear .-lrJenal and Ddi·veJ:Y S.ysLnn.1· 

\Vhile China does not release oilicial infOrmation on its nuclear arsenal, it is believeJ to possess a small but 

cxpnnding; arsenal of about 2HO nuclear warheads." In addition to adding; about W \Vnrhcads to its arsenal 

since 2010, Be~jing has also fOcused its dlOrts on advancing its nuclear delivery systems in recent years as part 

of its broader drive to expand its military capabilities to become a "fully-developed great pmYer"" by 2CHD.L 

China's nuclear modernization program has f(>eused primarily on increasing the survi\·ability of its nuclear 

forces and increasing retaliatory capability. I\lost notably, China has shifted away from its older liquid-fueled, 

silo-baseJ missiles to roaJ-mobile, soliJ-fueleJ missiles, anJ has de\'eloped multiple inJependently targetable 

re-entry vehicle (1\IIRV) capable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICH!\'1) that boost its ability to penetrate 

missile dcfCnse systems. China has also developed a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) in recent years, giving 

Beijing access to a ne\Y sea-hnsed nuclear detcrrent. 7 Tn the coming years, China will continue to ""optimize its 

"Chma's .1Id!la1_1' SlraiegT, St.'ltt" Council of the Pt-'ople's Republic ofChinfl, :\'[fly 27, 20Fi 

hthJ:/ I eno-Iish.o·ov.cnlarchive/\vhice pape1·l 201.5IOJI 27 I content 2814<7:5115GlU833.htm. 

~ Ibid. 

1· Eric Heginbothmn et fll., Chma'.1· Hvolvmg .\"urlmr Ddern'nl: .'\It:jor DnrH'rs and !.1.\"1/njor the L 'ntinl Sialt'.\" (SrmtFJ rvTonicfl: Rnnd 

Corporation, 2017), 129-33. 

htms:! l"'""'""'".rflnd.orvlcontt"ntldnmlrflndlpubslrt'seFJrch rt'nortsiHH 1 nooiHH 1 f-J2SIHA:\\) HH 1 f-J2S.J)df See nlso J.i, ""ChiilFI's 

Evo]Ying :\uclem· Strflt<-'gy." nnd see rlrmua1 Hrj,orllo CongTe.\.1: 

.l!Jhlar_'}' and Snunly Drl-'elojnnenh fnvoh'mg lhr-: Pwj)/i/.\ !irj,uhh,. ~~(Ch11lll '1017, l-.s. D<-'pflrtment ofDt'ff>nst', 2017, GO, 

htms:l lwww.defense.r>cwll-'ortFJlsl 1 ll)ocumentslpubsi2Cll 7 C1IinFJ :\'lilitFJry l-'0\\er Heport.l-'1)[·'. 

& This estinwtt' comes fmrn tlw Stocl~holm Tntt"rnntimlfll PeflC<-' Resenrch Institute's Sf PHI rnuhook 2018 (Oxford JTniversity Press, 

2U 1 8 ), h tms:/ I sinri .oro·/ nwdin/press-rel eflS<-' I 201 8 I rnodt'rnizfl tion-nucl enr-wenpons-cm1 tim lt-'S-numht-'r-JWflCt-'li:eep<-'rS-l lt'cl int'S-JW\\"-

sinl"i-Yc-.1rbooli--out-now. 

u For ;m o\'erview ofC'hinFJ's g<-'ner.1\ Folf(y 

Heanng on Chma's 1/"orlrhwrU' .1/!lthuy r;.~j,ansmiJ., 

(Statement of Patricia I\ I. Kim), https:! ldnlHfil t's.cfr .oryl si tt'sl defaul tlfil t'SI report ndf IPfl tricifl %2ol'\irn%2CJ-%'2CJT estimony%2Clon %'2CJC'h inn%2CJ\·Til i tnry%'20E-xpnnsion%2CJ-% 

20HPSCT%2CJT\'Tny%201 7_pdf 

~ Hmu; I\ I. [{ristensen <Jnd Hobert S. ).)orris, ··chinese· nuclear forces," Ru11rlin qfthr: ,JtomH' Sdenilsts ';",z. no. 4 ('201 f-i). ,ZCF>-,Zl 1, 

hth7s:l lwww.tandfonl iiw.comldoilndfl I 0.1 OHolomJf-i~--t-02.20 1 f-J.1 18--t-0:14 
24


30499b-3.eps

nuclear fOrce structure, improve strate~ic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid 

reaction, and survivability and protection," as declared in its 2015 ddCnse \Vhite paper. b 

Tt is important, ho\vever, not to overstate China's nuclear capabilities and to place its nuclear moderni7ation in 

the bronder compnrative context. The United States and Russia still possess an ovenYhelming majority--over 

DO percent--of the world's nuclear weapons and arc in the midst of their own nuclear modernization 

programsY Furthermore, China lags far behind the United States in terms of nuclear delivery capabilities. For 

instance, the PL~\ Air Force still docs not have a nuclear mission although a strategic bomber with a nuclear 

delivery capability is currently under development. As a result, China is limited to a land and sea-based 

nuclear fOrce structure, unlike the United States \Yhich also has strate~ic aircraft capabilities. 10 Barring; 

timdamental changes in China's internal or external environment that wholly transfOrm China's nuclear 

calculus, it is unliliely Chinn will abandon its emphasis on minimum deterrence and strive to rench parity with 

the United States' nuclear capabilities in the fOreseeable future. 11 

It is also vital to note that the United States has the ~rcatest influence on the trajectory of China's nuclear 

fOrce moderni1ation.l 1 Beijing is especially wary of U.S. capabilities that can challenge its minimum nuclear 

deterrent and its retaliatory-strike capabilities. As such, the United States· expansion ofhallistic missile 

defense and prompt g-lobal strike capabilities in particular han~ raised concerns about vulnerability in 

BeijingY Chinese strategists insist that these developments hinder smaller nuclear powers (like China) from 

pursuin~ nuclear disarmament and instead force them to enhance their o\vn retaliatory-strike capabilities. 

Beijing is especially \Yary of the expansion of the United States' theater missile defense systems in East Asia, 

which is sees as a means to contain China. The United States efiOrts to develop a conventional prompt global 

strike capability has also raised concerns about presen·ing China's retaliation capabilities. As the United 

Stntes continues to develop ballistic missile dctCnsc and g;lobal strike cnpabilities, Chinese enhancements of its 

own nuclear weapons system will foii0\Y. 14 

CIIINA'S VIEWS ON ARl\IS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION 

Chma\ Pcirl!nj)a/iou In Jlullllllieral Anm Control Agreernml:i 

China is party to several major rnultilatcrnl arms control ngreements and treaties, including the Nuclear Nonprolitl~ration Treaty, the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear !vlaterial, the Chemical \Vcapons 

Convention, the Biological \Veapons Convention, and the Intcrnationnl Convention for the Suppression of 

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. China has sig;ncd but not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China is 

also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Despite the rejection of its membership to the 1\lissilc Technology 

Control Regime in 200'! on the grounds that China does not adequately restrict missile and technology 

exports, China hns pledged to abide by the rules of the group. 

China is not a p<rrticipant in the Hague Code ofOmduct against Ballistic 1\1issile Proliferation or the 

ProlitCration Security Initiative (PSI) Beijin~ has chosen not to participate in PSI, \vhich aims to stop 

!201.'!. 

1'' Annual l(,:j,ml io Congrt'S.I: Aft!lf,u."' and SrYun{y DrudojJmr-;nl.l fwuo!vmg lhr PeojJ!/.\ /i{jJUhli< :!017, fil 

11 S('t' Cn·gory ]{ulacki, Tlu: Chtttr-;sr-; .1fthiary UjHlaies Chma'x !\7

/ld{:ar SLraU:g\' (Cambridge: ofConnnwd Scientists, 

h tiDs:/ ;.., ..... ..,...,...,...,. .una1s<~..org/ si tt's/ dt>fm1l t/filt's/ <~. tt<~.ch I 201 :II C\'J/ ch inese-m wlear -str·a te ~y-full-rt>m1t't.pt lf <~.nd "Da\'id I Dgan. 

Confltmints on Chilm'fll\udt'<~.r l'orces." If ·m on lhf' Hotkx, No\'t'tnber S. 2017, 

https:! /v,aronthcrocb.corn/,;ol7/ I I /china-nuclcar-\\Capons-brcahout/. Sec also Hcginbotharn ct al., C!Jina's F:uoh·ing !v~11d.ear 

fJdnrenl.~S.+';.IQl-!-1~~ 

u Ht>ginbothmn t>t nl .. :17. 

11 1"\ulacki,:l. 

11 Ht> -,·inbothmn t>t al .. (i 1-fiS 
25


30499b-4.eps

tratlicking- of weapons of mass destruction (\V!vlD) by increasing interdiction efforts on the g-rounds that 

interdictions may "go beyond the intcrnationallaw." 15 China's reluctance to participate has been rooted more 

directly in its desire not to alienate North H_orea, a principle target of PSI, and in its principled o~jection 

against what it views as the selective targeting of certain regimes like North Korea and Iran, but not others, 

like India nnd Tsrael.U' 

}Jro.\jH:dsjhr China's }JarLiojJalion in .-lrms lledudion~· ,\'egolialion~· 

Prospects fOr arms control dialogues with China remain dim given the reality that China has a dramatically 

smaller nuclear arsenal compared to the United States and Russia. First, negotiations require an open 

accounting of existing capabilities. China is reluctant to embrace full transparency, given its desire· to maintain 

opncity to enhance the survivability of its small nuclear nrsennP7 In addition, Chinese strntegists insist that 

\Vashington and 1\loscow must first commit to significant reductions in their O\Yn arsenals before asking 

China to reduce its \Ycapons. 1b Given strained U.S.-Russia relations and accusations on both sides of violations 

of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the appetite fOr new arms control initiatives between 

\Vashington and 1\foscow seems non-existent in the ncar-term, which means arms control dialog·ue with 

China \viii also he ditTicult to pursue_I9 

China and .\'onj_Jrol!forallon 

According to China's 2005 white paper on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, China "firmly 

opposes the prolitl~ration ofv;;eapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery" and has "actively 

participated" in international non-proliferation effort.s by ti,\..!,'htening- export controls amllaw enforcement."'0 In 

practice, hmvcvcr, China has not nhvnys lived up to these commitments. The United States has long been 

concerned about China's involvement in the proliferation of\·Vl\11) and its laxity in nonproliferation dTorts. 

Chinese entities, such ilS statc-o\vned defense industrial corporations, arc kno\Yn to have aided Pakistnn's 

nuclear and missile programs throughout the lDDOs, in addition to providing sensitin~ technologies and 

material.s to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, omJ North 1\orea.'u China'.s willingne.ss to as.sist the nuclear program.s 

of other states in the past \\--ere driven by both strategic motive<;, <;uch as the desire to arm Pakistan to balance 

ag-ainst India, a mutual ri\'al, as \\·ell as economic incentiYes that oveiToJe concern.s about proliferation and 

nuclear terrorism."' 2 

Since the enrly 2000s, China has expressed greater \Yillingness to crack dmvn on prolifcriltion through official 

statements and measures to tighten export controls. \A/hilc Be~jing participated in the maximum pressure 

campaign against North Korea to an unprecedented degree thi.s past year, it ha.s cu.stomarily been un\\·illing to 

2010), 6 

https:/ I"' ww .sipri .on)·/ sites/ (kfattl t/fil(•s/fi l(•s/insi vltt/SI PH I I ttsivltt I (J(J+.J>df 17 Ilui Zhang. "A Discussion of China's Kudear Transparency Options." Paper, 12nd Annual ).feeting ofd1e Imtimte fOr >Judear 

l\-laterials :\-Icumgeruent (July 2001 ). 2 httl>'>:/ /www.bd±lTCl'lttl'r.org/ site':>/ (ld~tultl±ile':>/±iles/publication/inmmUl-chinatrans.p(lf 

18 HPginbothmn t>tal .. I:!.'J. 

~ Stt->Vt->n Piff'r, "The Dt->flth of tlw TN I' Tr·enty Could Sigt1fll fl P.S.-Russifl \ 1Tissile Rflce," ThP A'allrma1Inlf'rt'sl, Dect>mlwr 0, '2017, 

htiD:/ /nfltionalintf'rf'st.oro-/tt->anJl't->/the-deFJth-tlw-inf-tr·t>nty-coul(l-sio1J.'ll-tJs-ms8ia-missilf'-l'flC<'-2.1.':i:32 

~" "Chin.1 issues white p.1pcr on .1rms control, disflrm.1mcnt & non-proliferation," \'Iission of th(' l-'copk's Hqmblic of China to th(' 

l-nion. htg1:! /ww.,v.chinflmission.be/f'nQ/zywj/bm;/n '2:/:J:':I:'"J.'l.htrn 

"Chi1w and Prolifemtion of\Vt>apons of\-1FJ8S 

and 1\.Iissiks: Policy Issues," Conh>Tcssional Hcsntrch 

https:! lffls.my/sgp/(Ts/nuke/RL.'l l:!:!:!pd.f. Sf't-> also ·Tlw \·Tissilt> Arms Control 

.-\ssocifltion. July 2017. httrs:! /www.flnnscontrol.orvlfflct8llf't->t8/mtcr 

I .,i Bin, "ChitJ('S<' Thinhing ott :\ udc<tr \\'capons," ,\nns Control .'\ssociatiott, Dcccml)('r ~o I:!, 

hth7s:l h-:ww . .1rmscontrol.orv/ A.C'J"/201 :'"1 121Ff'.'ltltrf's/(1Jinese 'l"hinking On 1\uclf'.'lr \.VeFJpons 
26


30499b-5.eps

sign onto expansin~ sanctions on its traditional security partners. For instance, Be~jing- has often shielded 

Pyong)'ang in the past from crippling sanction«:, given its desire not to destabilize the Kim regime. These 

tendencies have also been reinforced by disgruntlement with the £1.ct that the economic burden of pressuring 

North Korea falls largely on China's shoulders. 

China's lax enfOrcement of existing sanctions has driven the U.S go\Trnment to impose sanctions on Chinese 

companies over the years.'23 According to the State Department"s compliance report on arms control, 

nonprolitCration, and disarmament agreements and commitments released earlier this year, "Chinese entities 

continued to supply missile programs of proliferation concern" in 201 7. 1 4> \Vhilc it is unlikely that these 

entities \Ycre directed by the central government to engage in transactions that violate sanctions, the Chinese 

government has not always done its utmost to constrain various domestic entities '''ho arc most likely 

motivated by economic profit. And laxity is consistent with Beijing's desire to prioritize stnbility above all. 

Instead of using punitive measures, Beqing often pushes fOr "equal-footed dialog-ue'' to "remove the root 

causes of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. However, Beijing will cooperate on sanctions and 

enfOrcement if and when it deems doing so "-ill prevent greater in«:tability, as it judged during the tense 

months oflate last year and early this year when North Korea's successive nuclear and missile tests and the 

Trump ildministration·s threats to lilunch n limited military strike against Pyongynng spurred unparnlleled 

Chinese cooperation in the maximum pressure can1paig;n. 

\Vhile China may not be a model state when it comes to et10rts fOr nonproliferation, it will most likely start to 

adopt a more responsible attitude as it consolidates its great po,ver status and its global interests gro\Y. 1\s 

China's economic and military fOotprint abroad increases, its citizens and assets \Yill become more vulnerable 

nuclear terrorism aml prolitt:>ration-rdated threats. As such \\e can expect China to take a more consenative 

appronch on nuclear proliferiltion in the coming years. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

Based. on these obsen·ations of China's nuclear doctrine and ar.senal, and its vie\\·S on arms control aml 

nonprolitCration, I would like to suggest the following- policy recommendations 

-,. Engage in bilateral confidence building and avoid spurring an action-reaction dynmnic. As 

J.iscussed above, China's nuclear fOrce moderniLation \\ill largely be influenced by the United States' 

own efforts to moJernize its nuclear tr~jectory. As such, the United States shoulJ seek to eng-ag-e in 

high-level dialogues \'1-ith China to darif)' respecti\-e nuclear policies, doctrine and capabilities, and to 

engage in confidence building measure.s to reduce the prospects of an action-reaction arms race that 

will not only be destabilizing- for the \\orld, but also prm-e highly costly for U.S. ta.'\.payers. On a 

related note, the United States should think holistically about developing ballistic missile Jeft-nse and 

pursuing new nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities that can increase the strategic vulnerability of other 

states. 

Streng-then alliances and the credibility of the United States' security connnit1nents. China \vill 

continue to modernize its nuclear forces into the foreseeilblc future in order to nwintilin its minimum 

deterrent capabilities in the nuclear re.:llm, ilnd as part of its larger campaign to strengthen its military 

capabilities. In the midst ofChina·s military expansion, it is vital the United States reassures its allies, 

especially in East Asia, of the credibility of its security commitments h,y clari(ying ancl reinf(Jrcing its 

"~ "Tnm. Nor-th KoreFJ, m1d Syrin K onprol if[..rntion Act: Tmpm;ed Srmctions," l ~.S. D<-'partnwnt of Smte, \ 1fr1y 29, 2U1 :), 

https:l I'"' ww .state .vov I tlistt I inl,sttal c~M M.'JO.l1ttn 

n "201 c.; Report on Adht'renct" to and Compli;mce \Yith Anns Contr·ol, Nonprolift'rfltion, ;md DisrmnFJnwnt Agreements rmd 

Commitments," l~.S. D<-'pnrtnwnt ofStflte, htms:l I\\"\VW.Stflte.onvltlnvclrlslmti2(JJ si2S(JtJ.')2.htm 

u, "Stat('lTJ('tlt by H.E. Xi .Jinping President oftlw People's 1-kpublic of China at the Nuclear Security Summit." \-linistry of [·"orcign 

Affairs oftlw Pt"ople's Hepublic of Chinfl, ht8):/ lwww.fmnrT.fl"O''·cnlrnfFJ envlwjdt fifi.'J.'JS.'Jizyjh f"ifi.'J.'JH 1 lt1 1'-J<(FJS.'\.shtml 
27


30499b-6.eps

security assurances, conducting joint exercises to strengthen alliance capabilities and interoperability, 

and resolving disputes with allies in a discreet and cooperative manner. Neglecting our allies could 

drive these states to develop their O\Yn nuclear weapons on the one hand, triggering a dangerous arms 

race in the East 1\sian region, or fOrce them to accommodate China's demands on the other hand, at the 

expense ofallinnce solidarity. The United Stntes' alliances nrc an invalunhlc nsset that enable 

\Vashington to lead collective challenges against Chinese aggression and to generally shape outcomes 

in the global arena, and their maintenance must he prioritized. 

Leverage China's desire for stability and its gro\\ling international profile and interests to 

encourage its active participation in nonproliferation efforts. Chinese President Xi Jinping has set 

out ambitious goals to develop China into a world class po\ver by 201-il. None of these goals can be 

achie\ ed if China is beset with chaos and instability, such as a vvar stemming from a nuclear crisis on 

the I\orean Peninsula. Furthermore, as more ami more Chinese assets and citiLens mm-e abroad, they 

will also become increasingly vulnerable to nuclear terrorism and other proliferation-related 

instability. U.S. leaders should le\·erage China's desire for stability and its need to protect its growing 

interests to encourage Be~jing to do more to curb nuclear prolifCration 

"r Set a leading tone on arms control. The United States' most recent Nuclear Posture Review 

announced that it \voulJ. introJ.uce t\\O new types of nuclear \\·eapons in light oft he growing threat 

from China and Russia, among other actors. As a responsible great power, the United States should 

instead lead the charge against introJ.ucing new nuclear weapons, work to raise the threshold fOr 

nuclear conflict, and continue to rally its counterpnrts to work toward reducing and ultimately ridding 

the \\·orld of nuclear \\eapons. 

30499f.eps

ESTIMATE OF GLOBAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

IN JANUARY 2018 

& USA 6 Russia 6 China, France, UK 6 other nuclear weapon-possessing states 

6 = 10 nuclear warheads 

USA 

6450 

ltmltt 

II II 

IIIIDIIIUII 

Source, SIPRI Yearbook 2018 

w"NJ.s1pn.org 

© SIPRI 201 8 
29

Mr. POE. Thank you Dr. Kim. 

Mr. Rose? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK ROSE, SENIOR FELLOW, SECURITY AND STRATEGY, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (FORMER ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION, AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. ROSE. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, members of 

the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss Russian and Chinese strategic capabilities and their implications for U.S. strategy and arms control. Let me begin by stating 

that although I am currently a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, I am testifying today in my personal capacity. 

As my colleague, Thomas Wright, notes in his recent book, All 

Measures Short of War, the United States is in competition with 

Russia and China for the future of the international order. As part 

of that competition, Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear forces and are also developing new disruptive technologies. In 

my testimony today I want to hit three areas. First, Russian and 

Chinese nuclear modernization programs; second, Russia and China’s development of asymmetric capabilities such as offensive cyber 

and counter space; and then, finally, provide you a few recommendations on how the United States should respond. 

Now Dr. Long and Dr. Kim, I think, did a nice job at outlining 

the Russian and Chinese nuclear threat, and I am in general 

agreement with that. I go into more detail in my written statement. So I really want to focus on the latter two points: Offensive 

cyber and counter space as well as my recommendations for the 

United States. 

Russia and China understand that the United States is dependent on cyber and outer space capabilities. Therefore, they are developing a series of offensive cyber and counter space capabilities designed to degrade-defeat-destroy U.S. space in cyber space networks. These types of asymmetric capabilities could have significant implications for strategic deterrents, especially nuclear command, control, and communications. 

The United States requires a comprehensive strategy to effectively manage the strategic challenge from Russia and China. The 

foundation of that strategy must be to maintain a safe, secure, and 

effective strategic nuclear deterrent. Therefore, I recommend the 

United States take the following steps as part of that strategy: 

Complete the modernization of its strategic nuclear delivery systems and supporting infrastructure, enhance the resiliency of our 

outer space, cyber, and undersea communications infrastructure, 

and maintain the cohesions of our alliances. 

From a geopolitical perspective, the U.S. system of alliances is 

one of our asymmetric advantages and something that neither Russia or China possess. And from a military perspective, the United 

States needs our allies to defend the U.S. homeland from strategic 

threats. Indeed, radars, communication stations, and relay ground 

stations based on allied territory are critical to the strategic deterrents and homeland missile defense missions. Furthermore, we 

should extend the New START Treaty and explore the role that 

30

arms control may play in helping manage great power competition 

in the future. 

We also need to engage Russia and China in bilateral dialogues 

focused on reducing the risk of nuclear miscalculation and promoting stability. We need to advance a broader international conversation about strategic stability that includes other strategic actors such as Britain, France, India, and Pakistan. We need to develop norms of responsible behavior to help manage competition in 

a merging domain such as outer space and cyber. And, finally, we 

need to explore whether the United States Government, in particular the Departments of State and Defense, is structured in a 

way to appropriately allow the United States to effectively manage 

great power competition in the strategic domain. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rose follows:]

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Statement of the Honorable Frank A. Rose 

Senior Fellow for Security and Strategy 

The Brookings Institution 

House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

"Russian and Chinese Nuclear Arsenals: Posture, Proliferation, and the Future of Arms 

Control" 

June 21, 2018 

Introduction 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and members of the subcommittee, it is an 

honor to appear before you today to discuss Russian and Chinese strategic capabilities, and their 

implications for US. strategy and arms control. Let me begin by stating that although I am 

current! y a senior fellow for security and strategy at the Brookings Institution, I am presenting 

testimony representing my personal views. As an independent think tank, the Brookings 

Institution does not take institutional positions on any issue. 

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states "that global threat conditions have 

worsened markedly since the 2010 NPR ... The United States faces a more diverse and advanced 

nuclear-threat environment than ever before." 1 In particular, the NPR highlights the return of 

great power competition. As my colleague, Thomas Wright, notes in his recent book, All 

Measures Short of War: The Contestfor 21" Cemwy and the Future of American Power, "The 

United States is in competition with Russia and China for the future of the international order."2 

Russia and China are also modernizing their nuclear forces and developing new and disruptive 

counters pace and offensive cyber capabilities. 

Indeed, strategic stability in the emerging security environment no longer follows the 

two-state (e.g., United States and the Soviet Union), one-weapon (e.g., nuclear weapons) model 

of the Cold War. Today's security environment includes multiple states and additional 

capabilities such as counterspace and offensive cyber weapons. How does the United States 

manage this competition in a way that allows the United States to effectively deter potential 

adversaries, maintain strategic stability, and reduce the risk of nuclear use? 

To effectively respond to the Russian and Chinese challenge and the emergence of 

disruptive technologies, the United States will need to complete the modernization of its strategic 

nuclear forces; enh(lnce the resiliency of its space and cyber infrastructure; nwint(lin the 

cohesion and effectiveness of its alliances; eng(lge Russia and China in bilateral strategic 

stability dialogues; pursue pragmatic anns control initiatives focused enhancing stability and 

predictability; begin a broader international dialogue on strategic stability that includes 

1 U.S. Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review 20 Js:· (Arlington VA: U.S. Department of Defense. 

2018). 

\Vright, All.tfea:o•ures /",'hort oflrar: The (~'ontestjOr the 2/:;;t (~'entury and the T'uture ofA.merican Po~rer, 

(Ne\\ Havetl CT: Yale University Press. 2017), 189. 

-1-
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30499c-2.eps

additional actors (i.e., the members of the P-5, India, Pakistan); and develop norms of 

responsible behavior for emerging domains such as outer space and cyber. 

The Russian Federation 

Russia's view of the strategic environment and role of nuclear weapons 

Any review of Russian nuclear policy needs to begin with an understanding of its overall 

geopolitical situation. Despite its aggressive actions in Ukraine and Syria, Russia faces 

significant long-term security challenges. 

First, Russia possesses no allies or durable security partners. Yes, Russia does have 

Lukashenko in Belarus and Assad in Syria, but I would not describe either of those countries or 

leaders as particularly reliable partners. On the other hand, the United States has numerous 

alliances and strategic partnerships with countries around the world. Second, Russia continues to 

face serious demographic challenges and as a result, Russia no longer possesses the strategic 

weight of numbers it once had3 

Third, Russia lacks a modern and innovative civilian economy. Besides oil and gas, what 

does Russia export on the civilian market? I can't recall many items. Indeed, Russia has always 

had a challenge transferring its strong scientific research base into innovative commercial 

products. 

Fourth, while there's no doubt that Russian conventional capabilities have improved 

since the early 2000's, which we've seen demonstrated most recently in Syria, I don't think any 

serious military analyst would argue that Russia's military capabilities are on par with that of the 

United States at the global level. 

And finally, Russia remains concerned about growing Chinese political, economic, and 

military power in Eurasia. Though Russia and China currently have a "strategic partnership," 

that partnership is fundamentally about one thing: balancing the global power and influence of 

the United States. Any student of Sino-Russian relations knows that this is a very complicated 

relationship with numerous peaks and valleys throughout its history. If you scrape beneath the 

surface, it becomes evident that there are longer-term tensions between Russia and China. 

Given these host of strategic challenges, we must ask ourselves the question: how will 

Russia guarantee its security over the long-term? In my view, the answer is very clear: nuclear 

weapons. 

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, Democratic and Republican administrations have 

sought to reduce of role of nuclear weapons in US. defense strategy. However, the Russian 

national security establishment has not shared this view. Indeed, as the US. National 

Intelligence Council noted in 2012 

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30499c-3.eps

Nuclear ambitions in the US. and Russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite 

directions. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy is a US. 

objective, while Russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role 

of nuclear weapons in its security strategy. 4 

The Soviet Union's primary motivation for pursuing nuclear reductions was driven by the 

need to reduce tensions with the United States so it could invest greater resources into the 

revitalization of its civilian economy. And Russia's subsequent pursuit of nuclear arms control 

agreements was driven by a desire to maintain strategic nuclear parity with the United States at a 

time of significant economic distress. 

For example, Russia did not sign the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 

START) because it believed in "a world free of nuclear weapons." It does not. Rather, New 

START was fundamentally about maintaining strategic nuclear parity with the United States, 

capping the number of deployed US. nuclear warheads, and providing Russia insights into the 

U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal that it would not have access to without the Treaty. 

Additionally, Russia has expressed zero interest in pursuing further strategic nuclear 

reductions, or even beginning a discussion about non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are not 

limited by New START, and where Russia enjoys a large numerical advantage. This position is 

driven by several factors. First, Russia believes that emerging technologies such a missile 

defense, outer space, and the rise of increasingly accurate conventional strike systems are 

reshaping the strategic balance. Therefore, they argue that these types of military capabilities 

must be part of any future strategic arms control discussion. Russia is particularly concerned 

about the possible deployment of space-based missile defenses by the United States, which 

Russia views as an "existential threat" to the long-term viability of its strategic nuclear deterrent. 

Second, while the Obama administration had called for negotiating an additional round of 

bilateral strategic nuclear reductions, Russia opposed this, arguing that any future nuclear arms 

reduction process must be multilateral and include China, France, and the United Kingdom. 

Russian strategic nuclear modernization programs 

Russia has been modernizing its strategic nuclear forces for over a decade. The most 

important element of its modernization program has been the development of new land-based 

intercontinental missiles (ICBMs) anned multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). 

Overall, sixty percent of Russia's strategic deterrent is deployed on land-based systems. The two 

primary ICBM modernization programs include the road-mobile Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) and the 

Sarmat (SS-30), which is reportedly carries up to 10 MIRVs5 

Russia is also modernizing the sea- and air-based elements of its deterrent. For example, 

it is building eight new Borei-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), modernizing its aging 

t1eet of strategic TU-160 and TU-95 bombers, and deploying a new nuclear-armed cruise 

missile, the KH-10 16 1n addition to aforementioned systems, the 2018 NPR notes that Russia is 

'

1 NnclearPostnre Revievv. Arlington, p. 9. 55 Shannon Kile and Hans Kristensen, "Trends in World Nuclear Forces, 2017," STPRT Fact Sheet July 2017, p.J. 

'Ibid. p.3-4. 

-3-
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30499c-4.eps

also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems: a hypersonic glide vehicle; and 

a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo7 It 

appears that these new systems are designed to ensure that Russian nuclear forces can penetrate 

any future US. missile defense system. 

That said, Russia's strategic modernization program appears to be consistent with its 

obligations under New START. Indeed, the US Department of State's annual New START 

report states: "Based on information available on December 31, 2017, the United States certifies 

that the Russian Federation is in compliance with New START.''R 

Russian non-strategic nuclear modernization programs 

Russia is also modernizing its non-strategic nuclear forces. According to the NPR, 

Russia "is building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems that are dualcapable" and that "these theater- and tactical-range systems are not accountable under the New 

START Treaty." 9 The NPR also notes that "Moscow believes these systems may provide useful 

options for escalation advantage." 10 

Of particular concern is Russia's development of a new ground-launched cruise missile 

(GLCM), the SSC-8, which is a direct violation of its obligations under the 1987 Intermediate 

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In the July 2014 edition of the US. Department of State's annual 

Arms Control Compliance Report, the United States declared that the Russian Federation was in 

violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or tlight test a groundlaunched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to produce 

launchers of such missiles. 11 Despite diplomatic efforts by both the Obama and Trump 

administrations to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty, to date, those efforts have 

been unsuccessful. 

At a March 8, 2017 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, General Paul 

Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Statl~ confirmed that Russia has moved forward with 

the deployment of that system. Selva stated: "We believe that the Russians have deployed a landbased cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces 

Treaty." 12 

I believe it is unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with the INF Treaty. As I 

testified before this subcommittee last year, Russia's violation of the INF Treaty must be 

addressed. In that testimony, I recommended that the United States and its allies tal<e a number 

of specific actions in response to Russia's violation of the treaty that would hold critical Russian 

'U.S. Department of Defense, ··Nuclear Posture Review 2018." p.9. 8 U.S. Department of State. Anmml Report on Implementation of the New Simi Treaty. January 20 IS. 

hups :/ ;'-'"'rw .state. gov/t/avc.Lillitl:m/20 l8/ZQ05 3 8. htm. 9 lbid 

10 Ibid. 11 U.S. Department of State. -_~oJ 41J£L'Q!.."f on .·~r!li.£r..em-:jz_to w!!lidJ.mp!iance Wiih .-~rm:~ Onm:(JJ. \·~Q.!JJJJ:fl..IJJ.§..rNion_,_ 

and DJsarmamentilgreemcnts and Commiunents p. 8, July 201-J.. 12 JolmM. Dormelly. "Hill Wants Answers on Russia's Fielding of New Missiles:' CQ Roll Call. March 8. 2017. 

-4-
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30499c-5.eps

assets at risk; maintain Alliance unity; and place the blame for the demise of the INF Treaty 

squarely where it belongs -with Russia. 13 

Russia's irre:,ponsible rhetoric on nuclear weapons 

Over the past several years, Russia has been extremely irresponsible regarding its public 

rhetoric on nuclear weapons. There have been several occasions where Russian otlicials have 

threatened to use nuclear weapons against U.S. allies. For example, in March 2015, the Russian 

ambassador to Denmark asserted that if Denmark allow its Navy to participate in the NATO 

missile defense system, Danish warships would become targets for Russian nuclear missiles. 14 

That statement, and others like it, are totally unacceptable and do little to foster stability or 

reduce the risk of nuclear use. But one thing is clear: Russia views nuclear weapons as a way to 

intimidate and bully its neighbors. The NPR makes clear that the United States will respond to 

any first-use of nuclear weapons, stating that Russia should "understand that nuclear first use, 

however limited, will fail to achieve its objects, fundamentally alter the nature of a con±1ict, and 

trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow." 15 

The People's Republic of China 

Chinese nuclear policy and doctrine 

China's nuclear forces represent a fundamentally different challenge to the United States. 

While there is no doubt that China's nuclear capabilities represent a potential threat to the United 

States and its allies, I'm much less concerned about the evolution of Chinese nuclear forces and 

doctrine than I am with Russia's behavior. 

Since achieving a nuclear weapons capability in 1964, China has maintained a ''no first 

use" policy with regard to its nuclear arsenal. Under the policy, China will not to be the first to 

use nuclear weapons at any time or under anv circumstances. Available evidence suggests tbis 

remains China's policy. Additionally, whereas Russia has made numerous public threats to use 

nuclear weapons against other nations, including several U.S. allies, China has not. 

The primary challenge from China is its attempt to tilt the balance of power in the 

Western Pacific in its favor through a major conventional force build-up and development of 

anti-access, area denial and "asymmetric" capabilities (e.g., counter-space, cyber). While it is 

imperative that the United States continue to deter China's nuclear forces, our primary concern 

should be focused on countering China's efforts to gain conventional superiority in the Western 

Pacific. 

13 Fmnl<: Rose, 'Testimony on the Future of the lNF Treaty .. _ Joint subcommittee hearing by the Conmrittee on 

Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Terrorism. Nonproliferation, and Trade and the Committee on Armed Sen-ices· 

Subc01mnittee on Strategic Forces. March 30. 2017, !J!W.s.;i/foJJag!k'lffairs.home.gov/hearingljoint-subcmr.mi.tteehe:!ring -con.;;eqliences-conte"\.i -mssi.1s-violations-inf -treatv/ 14 Reuters Staff. "Russian threatened to aim nuclear missiles at Dennmrk ships if it joins NATO slricld.'' Reuters, 

March 22,2015, bltn~;llvvvr!2:.,.rcute.!2J:om/a~~}Jl~J}m~rk-mssil!L_ry~11:1:tlue3tens-to-aim-Jmci~ar-mi~j!e.;;-atdem11:rrk-slrips-ii"-it-joills-nato-sliield-!dliSKB"NOM!O!I:lL20150322. 

1 

~Nuclear Posture Review, p. 30. 

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('hinese strategic nuclear modernization programs 

Though China has been actively modernizing its strategic nuclear forces over a decade, at 

this point, we have seen no any evidence to suggest that it seeks to move beyond a "minimum 

deterrent" force or pursue strategic nuclear parity with the United States. For example, it is 

estimated that China has about 270 total nuclear warheads, as compared to approximately 4,000 

warheads in the active U.S. nuclear stockpile." 16 According to Director of National Intelligence 

Dan Coats, China's strategic nuclear modernization program is "intended to ensure the viability 

of China's strategic deterrent by providing a second-strike capability. 17'' Indeed, the overarching 

characteristic of the modernization program is to ensure that China's nuclear forces become 

more survivable, ultimately by making them less vulnerable to a first-strike by another nuclear 

power. 

The Chinese strategic nuclear modernization program consists of several elements. First, 

it is adding more survivable road-mobile ICBMs (e.g., DF-31A and DF-41) to its arsenal to 

complement its silo-based systems. 1 R China is also continuing to improve the sea-based leg of its 

strategic deterrent. The JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which is currently under 

development, will provide China "its first long-range, sea-based nuclear capability." China has 

also tested a hypersonic glide vehicle and expressed its intention to develop a next generation 

nuclear-capable bomber. 19 

Like Russia, China is also concerned about the development of U.S. missile defenses and 

the potential impact of those systems on its strategic nuclear deterrent. Missile defense is most 

likely the driver behind China's decision to deploy MIRVs on some of its ICBMs. According to 

a 2017 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "China has prioritized the 

deployment ofMIRVs in order to improve its warhead penetration capabilities in response to 

advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent. Indian missile defenses." 20 

Russian and Chinese offensive cyber and counterspace capabilities 

In addition to their nuclear modernization programs, Russia and China are also actively 

developing otl'ensive cyber and counterspace capabilities. Russia and China's development of 

these types of "asymmetric capabilities'' could have significant implications for strategic 

deterrence, especially nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems. In his 

testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 13, 2018, Director of 

National Intelligence Daniel Coats highlighted the U.S. Intelligence Community's increasing 

concerns of Russia and China's development in the otl'ensive cyber and counterspace arenas. 

16 ShannonK.ile and Hans Kristensen. "Trends in World Nuclear Forces, 2017:· SIPRI Fact Sheet, July 2017. p. 2. 17 Coats. ·'Worldwide Threat Assessment" p. 7 18 Tbid. 19 Ibid 

~()Shannon Kilc and Hans Kristensen. p. 5. 

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On Russian otl'ensive cyber capabilities, Coats noted that in the coming year, it is likely 

that "Russia will conduct bolder and more disruptive cyber operations during the next year, most 

likely using new capabilities against Ukraine ... In the next year, Russian intelligence and 

security services will continue to probe US and allied critical infrastructures 2 h He also 

indicated that the U.S. Intelligence Community expects similar actions from China. Coats 

asserted: "China will continue to use cyber espionage and bolster cyber-attack capabilities to 

support national security priorities. China since 2015 has been advancing its cyber-attack 

capabilities by integrating its military cyber-attack and espionage resources in the Strategic 

Support Force, which it established in 2015.''22 

Regarding Russian and Chinese counters pace capabilities, Coats stated: "Both Russia and 

China continue to pursue anti satellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce U.S. and allied 

military etl'ectiveness. Military reforms in both countries in the past few years indicate an 

increased focus on establishing operational forces designed to integrate attacks against space 

systems and services with military operations in other domains. " 23 

The United States Response to Russia and China 

Modernize U.S. strategic nuc/earji.Jf'ces and their supporting infi'astmcture 

The United States requires a comprehensive strategy to etl'ectively manage the strategic 

challenge from Russia and China. However, the foundation of that strategy must be continuing to 

maintain a safe, secure, and etl'ective strategic nuclear deterrent. 

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, former President Barack Obama outlined his longterm vision for peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons. But in that same speech, 

he also noted that as long as nuclear weapons existed, the United States would maintain a safe, 

secure, and etl'ective deterrent. Therefore, under the Obama administration, the United States 

began a major recapitalization of its strategic nuclear delivery systems, nuclear command, 

control, and communications (NC3) system, and the Department of Energy nuclear 

infrastructure. 

The Obama strategic nuclear modernization program included: the Columbia-class 

ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the B-21 

strategic bomber, and the Long-Range Stand-OfT (LRSO) nuclear cruise missile. Additionally, 

the Obarna administration began the modernization of the U.S. non-strategic nuclear capabilities, 

including the procurement of the nuclear-capable F-35 fighter and the B-61-12 nuclear gravity 

bomb. I believe it is critical that the United States move fonvard with the modernization of these 

nuclear delivery capabilities, the NC3 backbone, and the supporting DOE infrastructure. 

The Trump administration's NPR essentially ratifies the Obama administration's strategic 

nuclear modernization program. However, the NPR recommended that the United States also 

"pursue select supplements" to the Obarna administration's strategic nuclear modernization 

21 Coats, ''\Vorld\vide Threat Assessmento" p. 5. 

"Ibid 

,, Ibid, p.13. 

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program to "enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of US. nuclear forces." 24 These 

supplements include developing a new low-yield warhead for the D-5 submarine-launched 

ballistic missile (SLBM) and a new sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) deployed on attack 

submarines and surface ships. 

From my perspective, as long as the United States moves forward with modernization of 

the previously approved lower-yield capabilities (i e, B-61-12 gravity bomb, and the LRSO 

nuclear cruise missile), that should be sufficient to deter the threat from Russia's non-strategic 

nuclear forces and other potential adversaries. In particular, I want to emphasize the importance 

of the LRSO nuclear cruise missile and the important stand-off capability that it provides. This 

stand-off capability will become increasingly important as Russia and China continue to improve 

their air defense capabilities. 25 

Jinhance the resiliency of U.S. ;pace, cyber, and other critical infrastructure 

The US. nuclear command and control system is heavily dependent on access to outer 

space and cyber systems. As previously noted, Russia and China are dramatically improving 

their counterspace and offensive cyber capabilities. Therefore, it is critical that the United States 

flnds ways to enhance the resiliency of these systems as it proceeds with the modernization of its 

nuclear forces. Indeed, the NPR directs the Department of Defense to strengthen the protection 

US. space-based assets. It also directs the DOD to "protect NC3 components against current and 

future cyber threats and ensure the continuity ofUS.-produced information technology 

necessary for the NC3 system."26 Like the strategic nuclear modernization efforts, it is critical 

that Congress appropriate the necessary funds to enhance the United States' national security 

space and cyber infrastructure. 

In addition to enhancing the resiliency of space and cyber capabilities, the United States 

also needs to pay close attention to the resiliency of the undersea cable communications network 

Approximately 97% of the world's trans-oceanic communication transited over privately held, 

commercial, undersea flber-optic communications cables. 27 According to a recent report by the 

O±lice of the Director of National Intelligence: "Deliberate physical attacks on the UCC 

[undersea cable communications] infrastructure have the potential to signiflcantly disrupt the 

global economy and degrade national security "28 The report also notes that coordinated attacks 

on multiple undersea cables in ··a strategic manner could bring a country or region to a 

standstill."29 These concerns are not theoretical. On June II, 2018, the US. Department of 

Treasury imposed sanctions on several Russian entities involved in improving Russia's offensive 

4 Nuclear Posture Revie\v, p. 52. 25 For a greater discussion on the importance of the LRSO. see my article, "Five Myths About a Controversial 

Nuclear Weapon:· War on the Rock<, June 20. 2017, https://warontheroeks.com/2017/06/five-mvths-about-acontroversial-nuclear-\'\'eapon/ 

25 Nuclear Posture RevievL p. 58. 

'' Fmnk A Rose, "The Impact of Emerging Security Challenges on Strdlegic Stability." speech at the University of 

Virginia, December 2. 2016. https://2(/09-20] 7.statc.gov/th.n:cirb/264756.httn 

"Office oft he Director of National Tntclligcncc, "Threats to Undersea Cable Communications.'' September 28. 

2017, p. 19. b.UQ5Jf.}y,v·x~dni.~ov/files!PE/Documents/l---20! 7-AEP-Th@.ats-to-1Jn@r.s...eJl-('nhlf2: 

C'ommunicaticms.pd{. 

29 lbid 

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cyber and underwater capabilities. The release states: "Russia has been active in tracking 

undersea communications cables, which carry the bulk of the world's telecommunications 

data-"'0 

Maintain the cohesion of U.S. alliances 

Tn this increasingly competitive international security environment, America's allies are 

one of its "asymmetric advantages." The United States' worldwide system of alliances is 

something that neither Russia nor China possess. And from a military perspective, the United 

States also needs its allies to effectively deter and defend the U.S. homeland from strategic 

threats. For example, the upgraded early warning radars in Greenland and the United Kingdom 

provide early warning against strategic missile attack, track objects in outer space, and directly 

support the missile defense of the U.S. homeland; the two forward-deployed radars based in 

Japan support regional and homeland missile defense; and the relay ground stations and other 

communications around the world directly support U.S. nuclear command and control. 

Fundamentally, the security of the United States homeland is intricately linked to the security of 

our allies. Therefore, maintaining the cohesion and effectiveness our alliances must remain the 

United States' most important foreign policy objective. 

Extend the New START Treaty and explore the fitture role of arms control in managing f.,rreat 

power competition 

Despite my continuing concerns about Russia's violation of the INF Treaty, I nonetheless 

believe that the Trump administration should extend New START for an additional five years as 

allowed by the terms of the treaty, primarily for stability and defense planning reasons. However, 

I readily acknowledge that it will be politically difficult to extend New START while Russia 

remains in violation of the INF Treaty. 

As the NPR acknowledges, anns control can complement U.S. defense planning. For 

example, strategic arms control agreements like New START, by bounding the threat and 

providing transparency and predictability, have enabled U.S. defense planners to design and 

deploy with confidence an efTective deterrent that can survive a first strike by an adversary. And 

don't take my word for it, here's what General John Hyten, commander of the U.S. Strategic 

Command, said about New START: "''ve stated for the record in the past, and I'll state again, 

that I'm a- a big supporter [of the treaty]. ... When it comes to nuclear weapons and nuclear 

capabilities, that bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements are essential to our ability to 

provide an efTective deterrent." 31 Extending New START will also provide time for the United 

States and Russia to think about what a new framework for US.-Russia strategic stability might 

consist of, especially given further bilateral nuclear reductions appear increasingly unlikely. 

~(• U.S. Department of the Treasur_y, "TreasuiJ· Sanctions Russian Federal Security Services Enablers,'' press release, 

June 11. 2018. htt;ps://holne.treasmY.gov/neYvs.lpress-re1caseslsmO-+lQ 

31 '·New START is a Winner." -"ll Nuclear, March 16, 2017, 

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Beyond, New START, we should consider the role future arms control agreements 

could play in helping manage the return of great power competition in the nuclear sphere. This, 

however, this will require us to think ditl'erently about arms control than we have since the end 

of the Cold War. Over the past 20 years, nuclear arms control has been primarily focused on 

reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, and less focused addressing on what strategist 

Thomas Schelling called the character ofa weapon, or stability considerations, i.e., limiting the 

deployment of weapons that were considered destabilizing and could be used in a potential firststrike. 

This trend is clearly evident in the decision by the United States to move away from its 

long-standing arms objective of eliminating "heavy" ICBMs like the Russian SS-18 missile that 

holds 10 warheads, which we view as highly destabilizing. Land-based MIRVed ICBMs were 

reduced in the START I Treaty, and ultimately eliminated in START IL However, the United 

States abandoned this principle in the subsequent Moscow and New START treaties, in large 

part because we believed that the fundamental political relationship with Russia had changed; 

therefore, the composition of the Russia strategic forces mattered much less than it previously 

had. Unfortunately, we were wrong. In this era of renewed great power competition, the priority 

of any future agreement should be to enhance stability, not necessarily to reduce the number of 

weapons. 

I believe fanner Secretary of Defense Les Aspin got it right when he stated in 1985: 

"The whole point of arms control is to take away any incentives to strike first. .. Ifwe can reduce 

the numbers of warheads or reduce defense budgets that is frosting on the cake. But the real 

meat and potatoes of nuclear arms control is to reduce the chance of nuclear war from breaking 

out."32 

£ngage Russia and China in bilateral ,\"/ability dialogues 

In this area of great power competition, it is vital that the United States maintain open 

channels of communications with Russia and China, especially in the military-to-military sphere. 

Therefore, the Trump administration should continue the strategic stability talks that began in 

2017. However, these talks should be focused on enhancing deterrence, reducing the risks of 

miscalculation, and promoting stability -not for the purposes of achieving further nuclear 

reductions. 

With regard to China, the NPR recommends that the United States and China begin a 

"meaningful dialogue" on nuclear policy, doctrine, and capabilities. This would be a positive 

step. While China has traditionally been reluctant to engage in a robust government-togovernment dialogue on strategic issues, during the last several years of the Obama 

administration, China did show a willingness to engage more actively in fora such as the U.S.-

China Strategic Security Dialogue and the U.S.-China Space Security Talks. The Trump 

administration should build on this foundation. Recognizing Russia and China's increasing 

investment in counters pace and offensive cyber capabilities, and the implications of those 

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30499c-11.eps

capabilities on strategic stability, these bilateral dialot,>ues should include a discussion of these 

and other emerging technology issues. 

Advance a broader imemational conversation about strategic stability 

While the United States, Russia, and China have tended the dominate that debate on 

nuclear weapons and strategic stability issues, other nations, including France, the United 

Kingdom, India, and Pakistan also impact strategic calculations. For example, Russia has argued 

any future nuclear arms control discussions must be multilateral, and include all five permanent 

members (P-5) of the United Nations Security Council. In addition, the nuclear equation in 

South Asia almost certainly impacts China's calculations. 

Therefore, a mechanism should be established to enable a broader discussion on global 

strategic stability that brings the major players to the table. One place to begin may be in 

restarting the P-5 process, which was initiated in 2009 to serve as a coordinating mechanism for 

the P-5 in advance of the 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Through 

2015, the P-5 process was primarily focused on advancing arms control and nonproliferation 

initiatives. In 2015, the members of the group began a broader discussion on nuclear policy and 

doctrine, resulting in the first P-5 seminar on nuclear policy and doctrine held in New York in 

October 2016. Surprisingly, all P-5 states found the seminar to be incredibly useful, and agreed 

to hold additional events. Unfortunately, no additional events have been scheduled since October 

2016. 

The P-5 process could also be expanded to include states like India and Pakistan at the 

appropriate time. Indeed, the P-5 has previously met with India and Pakistan in the P-5 + fonnat, 

focused on finding ways to initiate negotiations on a fissile material cut-offtreaty in the 

Conference on Disarmament. 

Develop norms of behariorfor emerging domains such as .1pace and cyber 

While emerging domains like space and cyber are increasingly impacting stability, we 

lack etl'ective international norms of behavior to help manage competition. International nonns 

are important for several reasons. First, it's very ditlicult to identify irresponsible behavior when 

if you fail to detine it. Second, nonns can help reduce the risk of miscalculations and accidental 

cont1ict between potential adversaries. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet 

Union developed a number of nonns such as the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, designed to 

reduce the risk of accidents between the US and Soviet navies, and the 1988 ICBMISLBM 

Launch Notification Agreement, designed to reduce the risk of nuclear war as a result of 

misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident. 

Developing norms of behavior for emerging domains such as space and cyber could help 

manage competition between great powers and help mitigate the risk of strategic miscalculation. 

For example, both the Bush and Obama administration pursued the development of bilateral and 

multilateral norms of behavior in outer space. And since taking otlice, senior Trump 

administration officials have spoken in favor of the need for norms in outer space. In a December 

13, 2017 speech at the Eilene Galloway Space Law Symposium, Dr. Scott Pace, executive 

secretary of the National Space Council stated: 

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The Administration seeks to develop non-binding international norms that are 

complementary to the existing legal regime through both "bottom-up" best practices 

developed cooperatively with other space actors, and "top-down" non-legally binding 

confidence-building measuresY 

Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson has also repeatedly expressed support for the 

development ofnonns of behavior for outer space 34 While norms by themselves are not a 

panacea, they could play an important role in helping manage competition and reduce 

miscalculations in emerging domains. 

Organizing the US. gm·emment to address great power competition in the strategic domain 

Finally, the key point that I've tried to emphasize in my testimony today is the increasing 

interconnections between the various strategic domains (e.g., nuclear, space, and cyber). This 

leads to the question of whether the US. government is etiectively structured to operate in this 

new and challenging strategic environment, especially at the critically important assistant 

secretary-level where the vast majority of policy is made. In my opinion, it is not 

The Obama administration got off to a strong start in this area by establishing the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Global Strategic Affairs (ASD/GSA), which brought together under 

one assistant secretary most of the key strategic capabilities: nuclear forces, missile defense, 

combating weapons of mass destruction, cyber, and outer space. Unfortunately, this position was 

eliminated in 2014 for a variety of most bureaucratic reasons. This was a mistake, and 1 would 

urge the Trump administration consider reestablishing ASD/GSA or a similar organization at the 

Department of Defense. 

I would also urge the Administration to review whether the State Department is 

organized effectively to address these cross domain challenges. Responsibility for strategic 

capabilities are currently resident in a number of functional and regional bureaus within the 

Department, which in my view, may be an impediment to etiecti ve policy implementation. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, we have returned to an era of great power competition in which the 

United States, Russia, and China are competing for the future of the international order. As part 

of that competition, Russia and China are not only modernizing their nuclear forces, but also 

developing new and disruptive capabilities such as counterspace and otiensive cyber. In this new 

environment, the United States must find a way to effectively address this challenge in a way 

that deters potential adversaries, maintains strategic stability, and reduces the risk of nuclear use. 

" Scott Pace, "Space Development Law. and Values ... remarks delivered at tlie IISL Galloway Space Law 

Symposium. December 13,2017. 34 Scott Maucionc, "Air Force has a long to do list for space operations, Wilson says." Federal News Radio. 

October 5, 20 17. Ntps://tCd~mlnew§rfldio.qnn/;lir_:fu.r.ce/ 20 17/ I 0/a!r-force-l~_:lgng-to-ciQ:li~JOr-space-operarions­

\Vi] ::,on-savs/ 

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Meeting these goals will require the United States to complete the modernization of its 

strategic nuclear forces; enhance the resiliency of its space and cyber infrastructure; nmintain 

the cohesion and effectiveness of its alliances; engage Russia and China in bilateral dialogues on 

the future of strategic stability; pursue pragmatic arms control initiatives focused enhancing 

stability and predictability; begin a larger international dialogue on global strategic stability that 

includes a broader set of actors (i.e., the members of the P-5, India, Pakistan); and develop nonns 

of responsible behavior for emerging domains such as outer space and cyber. 

- 13-
44

Mr. POE. I thank all three of you for your testimony and your 

written statement, and now we will proceed to some questions. You 

have all the answers. We have some questions for you. 

Where did Pakistan get its nuclear capability, Dr. Kim? 

Ms. KIM. So I want to note, first of all, that I only work with 

open source, so there may be greater expertise here on the panel. 

Mr. POE. All right, Dr. Long or Mr. Rose, where did Pakistan get 

its nuclear capability? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I am not an expert on Pakistan, but I think if you 

look at the available evidence, there is probably a case that could 

be made that China potentially helped Pakistan, but I don’t know. 

So again, I am not an expert on Pakistan, but I think that would 

be a good bet. And you may recall A.Q. Khan played a very, very 

important role, and there is a possibility of some North Korean 

links there as well. 

Mr. POE. He has been trying to proliferate the whole world, A.Q. 

Khan. 

Do you have any disagreement with what Mr. Rose said, Dr. 

Long? 

Mr. LONG. I don’t. I agree with Mr. Rose. 

Mr. POE. All right, let me go on to something else. Russia is not 

in compliance with the INF Treaty. Do any of the three of you disagree with that statement? 

Mr. ROSE. No sir. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Kim? 

Ms. KIM. No. 

Mr. POE. And we can agree that in the last year in the NDAA 

appropriations bill, Congressman Rogers and I introduced legislation to encourage them to be in compliance. Have you seen any 

change in the Russian endeavor to comply with the INF Treaty? 

Dr. Long? 

Mr. LONG. I have not. The Russians so far as I am aware continue to deny that they are in violation of the treaty. 

Mr. POE. I used to be a judge. The guilty always denied they 

were guilty, and the more they denied the guilt, the more we knew 

they were guilty. The Russians are a perfect example of that. I 

have seen some of their ranting and raving about how they are in 

compliance and we are not in compliance. That is their position, I 

understand, but the truth is they are not in compliance. Okay. 

What are we doing about it? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I fully agree with your assessment that they are 

not in compliance. I testified before your subcommittee last year. 

Mr. POE. You did. 

Mr. ROSE. And I made a number of recommendations. Yes, we 

should use diplomacy to try to bring them back in. However, the 

Trump administration has run into the same challenges that the 

Obama administration found. 

Here is what I would say, sir. You have to put the INF violation 

in a broader context and that broader context is this: Russia does 

not believe that the Euro-Atlantic architecture put in place at the 

end of the Cold War is in their interest. And slowly but surely, they 

have been pulling out all of the building blocks associated with that 

Euro-Atlantic security architecture. 

45

Mr. POE. Excuse me for interrupting, Mr. Rose. The question is 

what should we do, not what are they doing. 

Mr. ROSE. Yes. 

Mr. POE. What should we do? 

Mr. ROSE. Well, I would recommend a couple of things. One, 

moving forward with our strategic modernization program; two——

Mr. POE. And you mean by that ratcheting up our nuclear weapon capability. Is that what you are talking about? 

Mr. ROSE. Well, what I would say, sir, is funding our existing 

program that was laid out. That is really, that is the bedrock of everything we need to do. But then I recommend a couple of other 

specific things. For example, I think we should develop a conventional variant of the long-range standoff nuclear cruise missile to 

allow us to hit targets in Russia. I think we should consider some 

limited cruise missile defense to protect specific assets in Europe. 

And thirdly, I think we need to work with our allies to make sure 

that they have precision strike capabilities such as Tomahawk and 

JASSM-ER. 

Mr. POE. All right, one more question about that. We agree that 

Russia is not in compliance. Is the United States in compliance 

with the treaty that we signed with the Russians? 

Mr. ROSE. Yes sir. 

Mr. POE. So we are abiding by the treaty. The Russians are not 

abiding by the treaty. We know they are not abiding by the treaty, 

and they are just making matters worse. I mean Putin just recently said that they have new missiles that will be able to take 

down any of our missiles that we launch. Should we take him seriously when he says that or is he just pontificating? 

Dr. Long? 

Mr. LONG. He is not pontificating, but a lot of the systems that 

he has described are in development. They are not fielded systems. 

So I think you have to take Putin’s word seriously but not to imagine that they have a much greater capability than the United 

States that has been deployed. 

Mr. POE. All right, a question about China. China is developing 

land mass in the South China Sea. It is taking reclaimed areas and 

making an island in the middle of several places in the South 

China Sea, then they are militarizing the island claiming that territory for China. 

Dr. Kim, what do you think China’s long-term plan is for those 

little military islands that they have started developing in the 

South China Sea? 

Ms. KIM. China wants to expand its control. It wants to expand 

its military presence, and that is exactly what it is doing. 

Mr. POE. So you think they are going to militarize those little islands? 

Ms. KIM. They already have begun to do it. 

Mr. POE. Yes, some of them. 

All right, my time is expired. I will turn to the ranking member 

from Plymouth, Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to focus on what 

our strategy should be in particular, and I want to look at just a 

few areas if you could comment on it. Number one, with the role 

of our allies, the strength, and Mr. Rose touched on this, the imporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Jul 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\062118\30499 SHIRL
46

tance of the role of our allies and the advantages that we have in 

that regard and what we should be wary of, particularly after our 

pulling out of the Iran nuclear agreement. Number two, the thing 

I am most concerned about, I think, is counter space and offensive 

cyber capabilities, and are we lagging in that way? I have a feeling 

we are. Should that be a real priority if we have to choose where 

to focus the most assets? 

And the third is the discussion we have. I agree with modernization, but there is also a discussion about a low-yield weapon. To 

me, once you are in the nuclear theater, you are in, and what 

sounds like a low-yield kind of weapon, my understanding is that 

has more destructive powers than Hiroshima. So how low yield, 

really, is it, and what is our strategic value in that frankly? So 

could you comment on those three things, anyone? I gave it to you 

all at once so you could prioritize. 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, with regards to the allies, it is our asymmetric advantage from a political perspective, but I want to pound the table 

on this point. The United States cannot do the Strategic Deterrence 

Mission or the homeland missile defense mission without access to 

facilities located on allied territory. So our security is intricately 

linked to the security of our allies. 

Mr. KEATING. Excuse me, what about Turkey? I should mention 

that specifically. 

Mr. ROSE. Turkey. Turkey plays an important role because they 

host a NATO missile defense radar which provides important radar 

information to protect all NATO allies including the United States. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay, I am sorry. Go ahead. 

Mr. ROSE. Yes. With regards to counter space and cyber, I think 

we are lagging, but I think we are making progress. But I think 

Congress needs to focus attention on these two areas, and the other 

area is undersea communications cables. You saw last week that 

the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned several Russian entities 

for concerns that these entities could be going after or tampering 

with undersea communications cables where 90 percent of all 

trans-oceanic communications go through. So we have got to focus 

on those issues as well. 

Finally——

Mr. KEATING. Very good. I am glad because that strikes close to 

home too because two of the areas that will be receiving grants in 

that area will be SMAST underwater research, University of Massachusetts in my district, and the Woods Hole Institution. So I 

agree with that too. 

Mr. ROSE. And finally on the low-yield system, sir, I mean it is 

a nuclear weapon. You know, a nuke is a nuke, and we want to 

try to avoid using nuclear weapons under all circumstances if possible. But at the same time, we need effective capabilities to deter 

potential——

Mr. KEATING. If I could interrupt, I just want to see if there is 

anything Dr. Kim or Dr. Long want to focus in on that in particular. But even with the additional revenues we are going to get 

for funding in these areas, we have to still choose priorities. So I 

am hearing cyber space, underwater spaces, are things that we 

should elevate perhaps——

Mr. ROSE. Yes. 

47

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. From where we are. 

Dr. Kim? 

Ms. KIM. I actually just want to address your point on allies. You 

know, I think that is our greatest, our alliance system in East Asia 

is our greatest comparative advantage. 

Mr. KEATING. Is Iran, pulling away from that deal do you think 

that could hurt our ability to——

Ms. KIM. Iran, pulling out of, I mean certainly when our allies 

are asking us to stay in, I think it is damaging to walk away from 

a deal that we have committed to. But, you know, turning back to 

East Asia and the Korean Peninsula, I think it is very important 

during this time when China is starting to expand its military capabilities and our allies are watching this happen, it is very important that we reassure them that we continue to hold regular military exercises. 

Mr. KEATING. Do you favor THAAD, implementation of THAAD 

in South Korea? 

Ms. KIM. You know, the purpose of THAAD is to defend against 

a North Korean nuclear threat. The threat still exists so in that 

sense yes, but I think it will be very difficult to sustain an argument for THAAD now that we have signed on to an agreement to 

pursue a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. 

Mr. KEATING. If I could interrupt. 

Dr. Long, just to hear from—thank both of you, yes. 

Mr. LONG. Briefly on the question of low-yield nuclear weapons, 

the United States already fields relatively low-yield systems in the 

air lag of the triad. The discussion in the Nuclear Posture Review 

is about expanding that capability to the submarine portion of the 

triad. It is a relatively inexpensive option if you believe that capability is needed and it improves the odds of delivery. But the utility 

would depend very much on the circumstances. 

Mr. KEATING. And where would you rank that versus, you know, 

increased counter space and cyber investments? 

Mr. LONG. I think in terms of priorities, it is one of the least expensive parts of modernization. So I think counter space and offensive cyber capabilities, and I commend the NDAA last year for calling for a cyber posture review to see what the gaps are. But fundamentally I think the low-yield option is not going to be the big 

tradeoff with those systems. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. I thank all of you. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. The chair 

recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, and thank you to the witnesses for 

joining us today. And I appreciate the depth of your submitted testimony, and I don’t want to focus on all that, but I found it very 

helpful. Maybe trying to narrow and focus in on a specific region, 

the Middle East, but I will also include North Korea. Russia and 

China as well have—it has been reported—have helped Iran, Syria, 

and North Korea in their nuclear programs. 

To what extent do you believe that the two countries have helped 

these programs with proliferation, and to what extent, if any, are 

you aware of sanctions on China and Russia for their activities? 

And I will take it to the next logical conclusion, what should we 

be doing to address it and prevent it going forward? 

48

Mr. LONG. I will just touch on Russia. Russia has certainly provided support to aspects of Iran’s nuclear program including helping build the reactor at Bushehr. I would say the main support 

Russia has given to Iran has been more in the political sphere and 

also in the general military arms sphere. So they have sold a variety of systems to Iran. A lot of that was delayed pending the 

JCPOA but has since gone forward. Russia still believes the 

JCPOA should be maintained. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So to the extent, let me just add that Russia 

now is essentially the linchpin in holding the Assad regime in 

power. Any evidence of Russia’s support for a nuclear program in 

Syria? 

Mr. LONG. As far as I am aware, the support that the Assad regime has received has not been from Russia. It has been more from 

North Korea, according to open sources. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. All right, Mr. Rose? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I am not really that competent to respond to that 

question, but let me get the second part of your question, and that 

is do we need to work with Russia and China to prevent this proliferation. Absolutely. And that is one of the reasons why I recommended these bilateral strategic stability dialogues. One of the 

agenda items in those bilateral dialogues needs to be nonproliferation concerns around the world and trying to get them through a 

bilateral channel to stop any bad behavior. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Kim? 

Ms. KIM. Yes, so I would just add to that. I think for China in 

the past, in the second half of the Cold War China did help, for instance, Pakistan with its nuclear weapons program. But having 

said that, I think in recent years—in recent decades—China 

hasn’t—I don’t think it is the central government that has been directly helping countries like North Korea with their nuclear weapons so much as China’s lax enforcement of sanctions and export 

controls. 

So that is really where China doesn’t live up to its expectations, 

and I think according to the State Department’s compliance report 

on arms control and nonproliferation, Chinese entities continued to 

supply missile programs of proliferation concern in 2017. So the 

concern is still there, and I think it is very important for the 

United States to work with the central government of Beijing to get 

them to crack down on these subnational actors who are probably 

motivated by profit more than strategic concern. 

Mr. ROSE. Yes sir. I would agree with Dr. Kim’s assessment. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great, thank you. Shifting gears a little bit and, 

you know—the last minute that I have—the long term implications 

as we are moving down a path with North Korea with nuclear 

weapons, Iran pursuing nuclear weapons, China, Russia expanding 

their arsenal—how do we ensure that U.S. strategic interests are 

preserved and ultimately long term that we are reducing, someday 

maybe even eliminating, the threat of nuclear war? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, do you mind? What I will say is, one, I think we 

have to maintain a strong strategic deterrent. But we also—and I 

talk about this in my testimony—we need to begin a broader discussion on the future of global stability that brings other actors 

such as India, Pakistan, the U.K, and France into a broader discusVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Jul 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\062118\30499 SHIRL
49

sion. We do have a process in its infancy through the P5 process, 

and I recommend in my testimony that we build on that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. 

Dr. Long? Dr. Kim? Anyone have——

Ms. KIM. I would just add that I think the United States needs 

to set the tone because no one else will in terms of working toward 

Global Zero. And so I think we should be working to raise the 

threshold of nuclear conflict not introducing new weapons, and that 

is something that the United States needs to lead the push for. 

Mr. LONG. I would just echo Mr. Rose’s comments about the need 

to maintain a strong strategic deterrent even if that in some cases 

will seem to lead away from Global Zero at least in the medium 

term. It is my belief that maintaining that strategic deterrent will 

be necessary for the foreseeable future. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Again, thank you for sharing your perspectives, and I am out of time. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. We will have another short round of questions. Let’s 

talk about submarines. The United States—and just disregard conventional submarines and talk about nuclear submarines only. My 

understanding is that the United States has about 14. The Chinese 

have six—rapidly developing and building more. The Russians 

have about six—developing rapidly more, the ability to of course 

take their nuclear weapons with their missiles anywhere they want 

to in the world. 

I have also—it is my understanding—this could be right or 

wrong, I don’t know, but that was also the long-term goal of the 

North Koreans—to go nuclear, to have nuclear submarines along 

with nuclear weapons and missiles as well, to develop that for the 

same reasons because you can move those submarines around. 

How are we combating, if we are combating—what are we doing 

about those facts that Russia and China, primarily, are we able to 

keep up with what they are developing or not or what is your perspective in that issue—nuclear subs with nuclear weapons on the 

board? 

Dr. Long? 

Mr. LONG. So it is true that both Russia and China are working 

to modernize their strategic nuclear missile submarines. The Russians have deployed a new class. The Chinese are trying to do so 

as well. The United States plans to deploy a new, more advanced 

system to replace our Ohio-class submarines—the Columbia-class 

submarines—so that is part of the nuclear modernization program. 

There is also the counter, which is to pursue anti-submarine warfare capabilities which typically have been a competence of the 

United States Navy—something the Navy is, I think, putting a renewed emphasis on after having spent much of the past 15 years 

more focused on threats in the Middle East. 

Mr. POE. Any other—Mr. Rose? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I don’t have anything more to add than what Dr. 

Long’s——

Mr. POE. Dr. Kim? 

Ms. KIM. I don’t have anything to add. 

Mr. POE. And I want to go back to the South China Sea. What 

is the United States doing about the South China Sea? When I was 

over there it didn’t seem like we were doing much about patrolling 

50

the South China Sea with the Navy. Has that changed any? Do you 

know, Dr. Kim? What is the United States’ policy about keeping 

the sea lanes open, which I think is what China wants to do, close 

the South China Sea except with permission of China? 

The United States has always been the world leader in keeping 

the sea lanes open all the way back to the Barbary pirates day. Is 

that still our policy or not? 

Ms. KIM. Yes, it is, sir, and the United States’ tool for enforcing 

that is freedom of navigation patrols, so that is what the United 

States has been doing. There is a debate about if we need to do 

more and so, you know. 

Mr. POE. Well, do you think we ought to do more? 

Ms. KIM. It is hard for me to say at this time, but of course there 

could be more done. But I would say that I think it is more important to work with our allies so that they are also participating in 

these patrols so that they are also, you know, claiming or standing 

up for their claims. And I think it is very important that the 

United States keeps a neutral position so right now we don’t take 

any sides on who owns what. 

Mr. POE. Are you talking about the countries that are affected 

in the South China Sea? 

Ms. KIM. Yes, I am. 

Mr. POE. Vietnam is a good example. 

Ms. KIM. That is right. 

Mr. POE. And others that are concerned about China claiming 

the South China Sea. 

Ms. KIM. Yes. That is correct. 

Mr. POE. So you think it is their responsibility to some extent to 

take care of their own business? 

Ms. KIM. Well, I think we should encourage them to stand up for 

their rights. I think the United States’ presence in the area can encourage them to do more and to speak up for their claims and 

hopefully push all the sides to come to some sort of agreement on 

what to do about the status of these disputed territories. 

Mr. POE. All right, thank you. 

Mr. Keating? 

Mr. KEATING. I was just going to expand a little bit because we 

ran out of time on the idea of where to put our priorities and in 

terms of our nuclear priorities. In terms of the triad in particular, 

I mean how much—if we are going to look at where we are going, 

where to invest, where to more maintain our position—where do 

you think the emphasis should be on land-based weaponry? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, let me say I support the triad. I used to be somewhat skeptical but the more I have learned, very similar to Secretary Mattis. I mean you may have heard that he was initially 

very skeptical of the long-range standoff weapon and the groundbased strategic deterrent. But as you walk through these issues 

and you look through the challenges, it becomes more, I think, 

clear why you need these redundant capabilities. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. But here is what I wanted to focus in on. 

So yes or no, do you all agree we should maintain all aspects of 

the triad? 

Mr. ROSE. Yes. 

51

Mr. KEATING. Okay, thought so, but now to what extent? If you 

are looking at the need for cyber space and other areas—you have 

mentioned underwater threats as greater threats—what level of 

confidence do we have just saying we have enough on the land 

based? We can modernize but not expand it—but really concentrate 

on the others. If you could just, all three, comment on that. 

Mr. ROSE. Yes. Sir, though I support the triad, I think we face 

a challenge with fitting the modernization program into existing 

budgets. My priorities would be: Number one, the subs; two, B-21 

plus the LRSO; and then three, GBSD. 

Mr. KEATING. All right, thank you. 

Dr. Kim? 

Ms. KIM. My technical expertise doesn’t extend here so I won’t 

comment. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. Dr. Long? 

Mr. LONG. I generally agree with Mr. Rose, but I don’t know that 

I would agree with the prioritization. Part of the challenge is most 

of these systems have to live for a very long time. We are talking 

they will outlive probably anyone in this room, and so I think it 

is hard to say which capabilities will be of greatest utility 70 years 

from now. 

Mr. KEATING. Where can we cut back, if anywhere? 

Mr. LONG. I am skeptical there is a lot of room for cutback in 

the nuclear modernization program. It was a bipartisan agreement 

that I think, you know, needs to be maintained if for no other reason than that it is something that has been agreed to broadly. Both 

sides of the aisle, I think in both the Obama and Trump administrations, have more or less signed up for this program. I think 

it——

Mr. KEATING. Yes, but you are not elected. So do you have any 

opinion outside that framework? 

Mr. LONG. I think realistically, it is the capabilities we need. I 

don’t see a need for a great expansion of this, but I would be concerned about where we would be. I mean most of these programs 

take so long to field. Now we can talk about acquisition and maybe 

there are ways to improve that. But given the realities we face, I 

think it will be tough to say we can do with less of that given that 

we won’t even know what we will get at the end of a program for 

10 to 20 years. 

Mr. KEATING. Dr. Rose, do you want to comment any further on 

that? 

Mr. ROSE. Well, again, I support the triad. But as I have spoken 

and written about, I am concerned, you know, when you look at the 

existing budgets and our other priorities, because in addition to 

strategic modernization, we have to recapitalize our entire conventional force. So it is going to be a challenge. I think what is going 

to be required is that our elected leaders and the heads of the departments, including the Office of Management and Budget, watch 

this modernization program closely to make sure we are delivering 

the capabilities on time and on budget. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes. 

Dr. Long? 

Mr. LONG. If I could just add one thing. If there is one area I 

think should be prioritized—and it is discussed in the Nuclear PosVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Jul 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\062118\30499 SHIRL
52

ture Review and Mr. Rose has mentioned it—is nuclear command 

and control. These systems typically are if not neglected at least 

harder to manage in the aggregate. 

Mr. KEATING. Right. 

Mr. LONG. They are not a discreet submarine, missile, bomber. 

They are more dispersed across land, across space, et cetera. So I 

think that if you are going to place emphasis anywhere, it touches 

on cyber because you have to make these systems cyber resilient. 

It touches on space because they extend into space. 

Mr. KEATING. You preempted the last question I think I will 

have time for, and that is the threat of, you know, cyber on our systems. Obviously you prioritize it, so you think it is a great threat. 

Dr. Kim? Dr. Rose? Do you want to add to that because clearly 

we have the greatest system in the world, and if that is threatened, 

it will be rendered weak. 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I fully agree with that assessment. I was going 

through Director of National Intelligence Coats’ annual threat assessment. Over the last 10 years the number one priority had been 

terrorism. This year it was cyber threats. 

Mr. KEATING. Quite a statement. Okay, I thank all of you again 

and I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I have one more question, sorry. Take these entities—

ISIS, Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. In your opinion, which 

is the greatest threat to the United States? You just can pick one. 

Dr. Long? 

Mr. LONG. A lot would depend, but I think if you take the viewpoint of the Department of Defense as Secretary Mattis has expressed and Chairman Dunford has expressed, Russia is the only 

country that can pose an existential threat to the United States. 

Even China, at least at present, would have a hard time doing 

that. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Kim? 

Ms. KIM. I would say our long-term strategic competitor in all domains will be China. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

And Mr. Rose? 

Mr. ROSE. I agree with both of them. 

Mr. POE. No, you have to break the tie. 

Mr. ROSE. That is why. But, you know, let me leave you with this 

last point. We have multiple threats we need to deal with. That is 

why we need our allies and strong alliances. 

Mr. POE. Right. I thank you all. Thanks again for waiting for us 

while we were in a series of votes. This concludes the subcommittee, and the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you very 

much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(53)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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30499n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 205I5-6128 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

TO: ME!VffiERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade in Room 2172 of 

the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

http ://www.F orci gnAffai rs. house. <lov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, June 21,2018 

2:00p.m. 

Russian and Chinese Nuclear Arsenals: Posture, Proliferation, and the Future 

of Arms Control 

Austin Long, Ph.D. 

Senior Political Scientist 

RAND Corporation 

Patricia M. Kim, Ph.D. 

Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow 

Council on Foreign Relations 

The Honorable Frank Rose 

Senior Fellow 

Security and Strategy 

Foreign Policy Program 

The Brookings Institution 

(hm11er Assistant Secretary jiH Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, 

U.S. Department of State) 

By Direction of the Chairman 
55

Æ


30499m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _____ r:_er_r_m_·is_m:_, _N<_m_:_•p_ro_ll:_lfe_ra_t_io--'u,_a_"_"_n_·a_rte _____ HEARING 

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"Russian and Chinese Nuclear Arsenals: Posture, Prol(f'emtion, am/the Future of Arms Control" 

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