The United States has been in a mountain war in Afghanistan 

for almost a decade. Other nations have different, extensive 

experience in training and conducting mountain combat. Les 

Grau and Chuck Bartles gathered this experience in this book 

in the hope that it will benefit our mountain training community 

and assist in the preparation of brigades for mountain combat 

before they deploy to mountainous regions. 

The Foreign Military Studies Office does foreign-language 

open-source research in military topics in a variety of areas. 

Les Grau and Chuck Bartles have done extensive work in 

Afghanistan, Russia, and Central and Southern Asia. 

G) 

~ c 

Qo 

OJ 

)> 

~ r 

m 

en 

• 0 

s 

= = 

-· = I 

i 

.. 

CD 

• 

1:1. = 

a 

s 

CD 

.. 

... 

0 

~ .... 

.. 

0 

l:r 

-CD 

a 

en 

., 

:s:: 

en 

0 

Mountain warfare 

and 

Other lonv Problems: 

Foreign Perspectives On High-Altitude Combat 

Foreign 

mountain-combat 

veterans discuss 

movement and maneuver, 

training and resupply 

Lester W. Grau 

Charles K. Bartles 

Editors 

Foreign Military Studies Office 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Report Documentation Page Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and

maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,

including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington

VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE

2011 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED

 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems: Foreign Perspectives On

High-Altitude Combat

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Foreign Military Studies Office,731 McClellan Avenue,Fort 

Leavenworth,KS,66027

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 

NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 

ABSTRACT

Same as

Report (SAR)

18. NUMBER

OF PAGES

225

19a. NAME OF

RESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT

unclassified

b. ABSTRACT

unclassified

c. THIS PAGE

unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
I 

/ 

#' ® t;:J' )IhBd _ _ c:>/3341h Spctsnaz . , 

Balla lion c 1 

6 - Advanang Spetsnaz BattaiJon 

H

...,./ - Aitack cc J.~ 

"b ! - Battalion oonunand pos1 

Company 001runand post 

in Lhe deft"lts~ 

Jt' ---· ~ ...,_,..,.00 

6 - Hdicoph:r L!Dlding Zone 

... ..-~ - HcliooplcrGun Ship firing l.mc 

!54th Spclsnaz. Balla 

I 

I 

I 

~~4th Spetsnaz 

Bitlllltion- ..._ 

MUJAilTDEEN 

r:IIUNG POSITIONS: 

- DShK Heavy Maclunc Gw1 

- Recoille.5S R10o 

- 1\.lonar 

,-T -1 - MuJaludeen AMault Line 
Introduction i

Mountain 

Warfare and

other Lofty

Problems
ii Passing It On
Introduction iii

Mountain 

Warfare and

other Lofty

Problems:

Foreign Perspectiveson 

High-Altitude Combat

Lester W. Grau & Charles K. Bartles

Foreign Military Studies Office l Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
iv Passing It On

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government.

© 2011 United States Government, as represented by the 

Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an 

open source research organization of the U.S. Army. Founded as the Soviet Army 

Studies Office in 1986, it was an innovative program that brought together military 

specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics derived 

from unclassified, foreign media. The results were unclassified articles and papers 

that provided new understandings and broad access to information from a base of 

expertise in the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, and foreign and U.S. defense 

communities and universities.

Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special insight and highly 

collaborative work. FMSO conducts unclassified research of foreign perspectives 

of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered but that are 

important for understanding the environments in which the U.S. military operates. 

FMSO’s work today is still aimed at publication in unclassified journals and its 

research findings are taught in both military and civilian venues in the United States 

and around the world. FMSO is organized in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command under the TRADOC G-2.

Foreign Military Studies Office

731 McClellan Avenue

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

leav-webfmso@conus.army.mil
Introduction v

The mountains are fountains of men as well as 

of rivers, of glaciers, of fertile soil. The great poets, 

philosophers, prophets, able men whose thought 

and deeds have moved the world, have come down 

from the mountains --- mountain-dwellers who have 

grown up strong there with the forest trees in 

Nature's workshops. 

--- John Muir, John of the Mountains,1938 
vi Passing It On

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

MOUNTAIN COMBAT

1 - Ground Combat at High Altitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) 

and LTC Hernán Vázquez, Argentine Army

2 - Mountain Warfare: The Need for Specialized Training. . . 15

Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army

SMALL UNIT

3 - Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta: Spetsnaz Strike

into Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), and Ali Ahmad Jalali

4 - Small Secrets of Great Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), based on the work of Ikram Nazarov

5 - Flanking Detachment In The Mountains: 

A Soviet Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) 

and Major V. A. Selivanov, former Soviet Army

6 - Cave Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Ikram Karimov, Mountaineer Trainer and Instructor, Uzbekistan

LARGE UNIT

7 - The Campaign For The Caves: The Battles 

for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), and Ali Ahmad Jalali

RECONNAISSANCE

8 - Mountain Reconnaissance Russian Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), based on the work 

of Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army

ARTILLERY 

9 - Moving Artillery Forward: A Concept for 

the Fight in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Major Joseph A. Jackson, US Army 

SMALL ARMS FIRE

10 - The Right Way To Shoot: How to Select

Firing Positions and Firing Ready Positions 

in Mountainous Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army

11 - It is Difficult --- But Possible and Necessary --- to Master

the Skills and Techniques of Shooting in Mountains . . . 106

Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army
Introduction vii

SHELTER

12 - So That Making Camp Makes You Stronger:

Organizing Rest and Overnight Halts for Personnel 

in the Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army

RUSSIAN ARMY TRAINING

13 - Along Slopes and Tracks: Training Method 

for Overcoming Mountain Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army

14 - Forward, Up, and then Down: How to Use a Rope 

to Climb a Steep Mountain Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army

15 - Don’t Let Me Down ---Belay: Training Method for

Negotiating Mountain Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army

16 - How to “Tame” a River: Getting Across 

Water Obstacles in the Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army

17 - Train to Win: Organizing and Conducting 

Physical Training For Soldiers in the Mountains . . . . . . 139

Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army

LOGISTICS

18 - Hydro-Meteorological Support of Military

Transport Along Mountain Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Vladimir Shiryayev, Military Mountaineering Instructor, Tashkent

19 - What a Water Transport Company Should Be: 

The Need for Special Supply Delivery Transport 

Units in Mountain Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Vladimir Shiryayev, Military Mountaineering Instructor, Tashkent

COMMUNICATIONS

20 - Mountain Combat: Hard to Move, Hard to Shoot, 

Even Harder to Communicate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), Lieutenant Jason Falivene, USMC

MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS 

21 - Medical Implications of High Altitude Combat . . . . . . . . 176

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), and William A. Jorgensen, DO MC USAR

AVIATION

22 - Helicopter Landings in the Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), CW4 Anthony Reed, US Army, and CW3

James W. Grau, US Army, based on the work of COL D.B. Zipir, Russian Army

Conclusion - Further Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
viii Passing It On
Introduction ix

Foreword

The mission of the Foreign Military Studies Office is to research and 

present foreign ideas and perspectives for a better understanding of 

present and future military and security issues. Good ideas are not exclusively found in the English language or even the American military 

experience. FMSO analysts are foreign area specialists with the language 

skills, military backgrounds, and the regional experience that enables 

them to mine foreign sources for insights that uniquely enhance our 

forces’ understanding of the operational environment. Mountain Warfare 

and Other Lofty Problems uses Russian, Pakistani, Indian, Argentine, 

Afghan, and Uzbek sources.

The United States Army has been involved in a mountain war for 

a decade. After all this time, mountain combat remains a stubbornly 

difficult mission and technology can offer only modest support to the 

infantry’s mission of closing with the enemy or the logistician’s mission 

of getting support forward. Training, equipment, weapons, tactics, and 

logistics all require significant adjustment for mountain combat. This 

book covers operations and tactics, artillery, and aviation support, reconnaissance, communications, training, and logistics. It demonstrates 

that the key to enhancing effectiveness is using the terrain effectively, 

preparing the soldiers properly, and understanding the environment.

This book is not United States Army doctrine. Rather, it is offered as 

an alternate view that could help our forces successfully adapt to a 

most-challenging environment and carry out their mission. 

Tom Wilhelm

Director, Foreign Military Studies Office

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
x Passing It On

Editors

Les Grau is a retired infantry Lieutenant Colonel who fought in 

Vietnam and trained as a Soviet Foreign Area Officer. He has published over 150 articles on tactical subjects and three books on 

Afghanistan— The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics 

in Afghanistan; The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in 

the Soviet-Afghan War (coauthored with Ali A. Jalali); and The Russian 

General Staff’s The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and 

Lost (translated with Michael Gress). He has a doctoral degree in Military History with a concentration in Central Asia and South Asia. He is 

a very amature climber with some modest peaks to his credit.

Charles Bartles is a Russian linguist and captain in the US Army 

Reserve who has served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, and 

Uzbekistan. He has written on Russian military TTPs, Russian military 

reform, and security assistance programs in Russia and Central Asia. 
Introduction xi

Introduction

This book started as a pamphlet of recent Russian articles on mountain 

combat. The Russians have a lot of recent experience fighting in the 

mountains of Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, Ossetia, and Abkhazia. 

Some of these are dry mountains and some are wet. This has given their 

force a certain edge that they do not want to lose over time. However, the 

Russians are not the only peoples with experience in mountain warfare, 

training, firing, logistics, communications, engineering, fire support, 

medical support, and the like. The Foreign Military Studies Office 

(FMSO) studies the experience of other militaries with the belief that 

no nation or people have a corner on good ideas. In order to provide 

a more comprehensive treatment and collect mountain material 

under the same cover, this book includes published FMSO articles on 

foreign mountain combat as well as recent Russian publications. It is 

not intended to replace US doctrine, rather it hopes to supplement US 

material and provide a view of a different, proven approach.

Why the emphasis on Russian experience? The Caucasus Mountains, 

Ural Mountains and Pamir Mountains are part of Russia and consequently, 

the Russian Army has a long history of mountain troops, production of 

specialized mountain warfare gear, and mountain training centers. Even 

during the Cold War, when the emphasis was on high-speed maneuver 

war, the Soviets still maintained mountain troops in their force structure. 

During the Soviet-Afghan War, the mountain warfare training requirement 

steadily increased until, at the end, there were seven mountain warfare 

training centers preparing troops prior to commitment to combat.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, mountain warfare training — 

along with most other military training — slowed or stopped due to lack 

of funds. However, the Russian War in Chechnya demonstrated that 

the Russian military needed to once again promote mountain warfare 

training. In May 2007, Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest) printed a series 

of articles on mountain warfare and mountain warfare training. We have 

included these articles.
xii Passing It On

The target audience of this book is the cadre of mountain warfare 

trainers in the United States Army and Marine Corps as well as units that 

are deploying to Afghanistan. There are marked differences between 

Russian and US mountain warfare training. The Russians put much 

more emphasis on weapons firing and unit movement in the mountains. 

They emphasize long-range logistics support using vehicles, animals, 

and rivers. The US Army approach is more about knots, rappelling, 

and individual climbing skills. The USMC trains infantry battalions 

at Bridgeport, California, which includes animal packing and sniper 

training; however, it does not train the gunners, sappers, drivers, and 

logisticians who are central to mountain warfare. 

Mountain warfare training is not routinely part of the training a US 

battalion or brigade undergoes prior to deployment to Afghanistan. 

Consequently, most soldiers and marines lack individual and unit 

mountain movement skills, proper mountain equipment and the 

knowledge of how to use it. Soldiers and marines certainly have not faced 

an OPFOR in the mountains before they face a dedicated combatant in 

Afghanistan in a live firefight. Most soldiers and marines do not know 

how to fire in the mountains. Further, there are large areas of Afghanistan 

that cannot be reached by helicopter. A serious consequence of all 

this is that the Taliban has established mountain sanctuary areas inside 

Afghanistan, since coalition forces generally don’t “do” mountains 

and certainly do not trek deep inside mountain ranges. This will have 

to change and the editors offer this collection of articles with the hope 

that they will help in preparing soldiers and marines for the challenge 

ahead. 

Lester W. Grau 

Charles Bartles

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Ground Combat at High Altitudes 1

A general who allows himself to be decisively defeated in an extended 

mountain position deserves to be court-martialed. 

Carl von Clausewitz1

H igh mountain terrain is often inaccessible, uninhabitable or of no 

apparent value, yet peoples and states still fight to possess it. Long, 

bloody wars have been fought, and are being fought, for mountain real 

estate located between 10,000 and 23,000 feet [3050 and 7015 meters]. 

Over the past fifty years, high-altitude combat has raged in Africa, Asia, 

and South America. The Chinese invaded Tibet in 1953 and fought a 

subsequent guerrilla war there until 1974. From 1953 to 1958, British 

troops fought Mau-Mau separatists in the Aberdares Mountains of Kenya. 

In 1962, China and India battled in the Himalayan Mountains bordering 

Bhutan and Tibet. Soviets fought Afghan Mujahideen in the towering 

Hindu Kush Mountains from 1979 to 1989. The Peruvian government 

hunted the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas in the Andes Mountains 

throughout the 1980s. India and Pakistan have continually battled for 

possession of the Siachen Glacier since April 1984 and fight sporadically 

over disputed Kashmir as they have since 1948. Today, Colombia’s 

government troops are fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas 

high in the Andes, and Russian soldiers are fighting Chechen separatists 

high in the Caucasus Mountains.

The U.S. Army has no experience fighting in truly high mountains 

and its mountain warfare manuals deal primarily with low and medium 

mountains and stress the use of helicopter aviation to conduct that 

combat. However, helicopters cannot haul normal loads over 13,000 

feet [3965 meters] since their rotors lack thick enough air to “bite” into, 

and high altitude weather conditions will frequently shut down flying 

for days. High-altitude combat differs from medium- and low-mountain 

GroundCombatat

HighAltitudes

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) 

and Lieutenant Colonel Hernán Vázquez, Argentine Army

This article first appeared in the January-February 2002 edition of Military Review
2 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

altitude combat and requires a different orientation and force structure. 

Other armies have experience in truly high mountains and can provide 

valuable guidance and expertise. The U.S. Army needs to know how to 

conduct high-altitude mountain warfare, develop the tactics, techniques, 

and procedures to do so, and share the experience of other armies to 

understand and prepare for possible high-altitude conflicts. 

The Environment

Mountains are generally classified as low (600 to 1500 meters), 

medium (from 1500 to 3500 meters) and high-altitude mountains (above 

3600 meters). The world’s highest mountains are not in the United States, 

Europe, or Korea—where the U.S. Army is accustomed to working. The 

Himalayan Mountain chain of Asia stretches 1,500 miles and contains nine 

of the world’s 10 highest peaks. The Hindu Kush/Karakoram mountain 

chain of Asia stretches well over 500 miles with its highest peak at 28,250 

feet [8,616 meters]. The South American Andes stretches over 5,000 

miles and rise above 22,000 feet [6,710 meters] at many points. The 

Caucasus Mountains, which divide Europe and Asia, run some 700 miles 

with many peaks over 15,000 feet [4572 meters]. The Himalayan Mount 

Everest towers at 29,028 feet [8,853.5 meters] whereas the highest point 

in the United States, Mount McKinley in Alaska, is 20,320 feet [6,197.6 

meters]. The highest point in the Colorado Rockies is Mount Elbert at 

14,433 feet [4,402.1 meters]. The highest point in the European Alps is 

Mont Blanc at 15,771 feet [4,810.2 meters].2

Although high mountains occupy a good portion of the earth’s 

surface, man is not naturally designed to live and work at these high 

altitudes. When a person travels to an altitude of 8,000 to 10,000 feet 

[2440 to 3050 meters] or higher, the atmospheric changes in pressure 

and available oxygen cause physiological changes, which attempt to 

ensure that the body gets enough oxygen.3

 These physiological changes 

are pronounced among mountain people who have lived in cold, high 

altitudes for generations. Compared to lowlanders, their bodies are 

short, squat, stocky, and barrel-chested, and their hands and feet are 

stubby. Their hearts are bigger and slower beating and their capillaries 

are wider. Their bodies contain 20 percent more red blood cells than 

lowlanders’ do and these red blood cells are larger. The alveoli in 

their lungs are more open for oxygen absorption. Many develop a 

fatty epithelial pouch around the eyes to counteract cataract and snow 

blindness.4

 Populations at high altitude often use narcotics, such as coca 

or hashish, to help manage the pain and stress of high altitude. 

High altitudes are characterized by extreme cold, strong winds, 

thin air, intense solar and ultraviolet radiation, deep snow, raging 
Ground Combat at High Altitudes 3

thunderstorms and blizzards, heavy fog, and rapidly changing weather, 

including severe storms which can cut off outside contact for a week or 

longer. Avalanches and rockslides are not uncommon. Although jungle 

or forest may hug the mountain base, trees do not grow past 10,000 to 

11,500 feet [3,000 to 3,500 meters], depending on the latitude. 

Physical conditions at high altitude are often more dangerous than 

enemy fire. Superficial bullet and shrapnel wounds can quickly turn 

fatal at altitude. Movement in the high mountains often results in broken 

bones, severe lacerations, contusions, and internal injuries caused by 

falls and falling rock. Frostbite and hypothermia are a constant danger. 

Acute mountain sickness, high altitude pulmonary edema, and cerebral 

edema are frequently fatal consequences of working at high altitude. 

Mental and physical abilities decrease at high altitude and high altitude 

also induces personality disorders. Sudden weight loss is often a 

problem. The rarefied atmosphere permits increased ultraviolet ray 

exposure, which creates problems with sunburn and snow blindness. 

High altitude shelter heating is often by unvented kerosene stoves, which 

means that personnel breathe air which is thick with soot.5

Equipment will not function, or functions marginally, at high altitudes. 

On the average, vehicles lose 20 to 25 percent of their rated carrying 

capability and use up to 75 percent more fuel.6 Military generators and 

vehicles are often diesel-powered, but standard diesel engines lose 

efficiency at 10,000 feet [3050 meters] and eventually stop functioning 

altogether because of insufficient oxygen. Artillery firing tables are 

wildly inaccurate as the changed environment allows rounds to fly 

much farther. Lubricants freeze; altitude and weather limit helicopters; 

and additional animal or gasoline-fueled overland transport adds to the 

physical demands and logistic requirements of this environment. 

Getting There is Half the Fun

At high altitude, personnel have difficulty breathing because of 

decreased atmospheric pressure and subsequent rarified oxygen. 

Soldiers selected for high-altitude duty should be screened for their 

ability to function in this environment. Soldiers should be in excellent 

physical condition and have sound hearts and lungs. Short, wiry soldiers 

are preferred to tall, muscular soldiers. Selected soldiers should have 

above-average intelligence to allow them to more-readily adapt to the 

trying terrain. Personnel who have had radial keratotomy corrective 

eye surgery should not go to high altitudes because their vision may 

permanently cloud. 

All personnel should undergo an acclimatization program to 

accustom them to their new environment and to improve their 
4 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

respiratory and cardiovascular systems. A physically fit soldier can 

adapt to the cold in about 3 weeks.7 The body normally adapts to a 

higher altitude in about 2 week’s time. During the acclimatization phase, 

the body accumulates additional red blood cells which help transport 

needed oxygen.8 The Pakistani army acclimates their personnel over 

7 weeks. They begin with a 3-week stay at 10,000 feet [3050 meters] 

where personnel acclimate to the cold while they undergo daily physical 

conditioning and learn mountaineering, rock climbing, rappelling, and 

mountain survival. During the final 4 weeks, soldiers learn advanced 

mountaineering techniques, trek to 14,000 feet [4270 meters] and return; 

trek to 17,000 feet [5185 meters] and return; and finally trek to 19,135 feet 

[5836 meters]. 9

Despite all training and efforts, acclimatization is not possible at 

heights over 18,000 feet [5418 meters], so exposure at these heights 

must be limited and closely supervised. Personnel at high altitudes 

need to be rotated out every 10 to 14 days. The Indian army acclimates 

its personnel over a 14-day schedule with increases in altitude at 6 days, 

4 days and then another 4 days. The Indian army characteristically 

conducts its acclimatization by having the battalion hike from its road 

head to the staging area. All experienced armies agree that high-altitude 

acclimatization cannot be achieved in less than 10 days. An acclimated 

soldier is still not an experienced mountaineer. Experience counts and 

is not gained in 2 months of training. Some armies, such as Italy’s, believe 

that 10 years is not too long to produce a truly capable, experienced 

mountain warrior. 

Nothing is fast in high-altitude combat. Logistics support is key 

and the location of logistics dumps determines operational axes. The 

distance between the road head—the furthest point that supplies can be 

moved by truck—and the forward posts determines how many troops 

can actually man the forward posts. Forward posts can be a 3 to 14 day 

foot march from the road head. The farther the forward post is from 

Figure 1. 

Source: ROP-OO-06, Conducción de la Brigada de Montána (Mountain Brigade Field Manual) 

(Buenos Aires, Argentina: Government Printing Office, 1998), Annex 15, 279.

One Day of Rest

After Marching

6 hours

3 days

1 day

Up to 3000 meters From 3000 to

4000 meters From 4000 to

5000 meters

8

10

12

10 6 8

12

14

8

10

10

12

4

6

8

6

8

10

Hours Marching Per Day

On foot Mounted On foot Mounted On foot Mounted

Low and Medium

Mountains

High Type of Mountains

March

Normal, not affecting

combat power

combat power

combat power

Affecting

Considerably affecting
Ground Combat at High Altitudes 5

the road head, the greater the number of troops necessary to support 

it. Base camps are usually built around road heads. Supplies and men 

travel forward from the base camps through intermittent staging posts 

to the forward posts. Helicopters, porters, or mules are used to move 

supplies from the road head. Despite attempted technology fixes, the 

mule is the most efficient way of moving material in the high mountains. 

Mules require care, attention, and training. Armies with experience in 

high mountains maintain trained mules and muleteers. Even mules 

cannot reach the higher elevations, and porters must haul the supplies 

forward. 

Movement is calculated in time rather than distance at high altitude. 

Figure1 shows average movement rates of trained, acclimated personnel 

and pack animals in the mountains. 

The terrain slope as well as physical conditioning and altitude 

acclimatization of the troops determines the distance that can be covered. 

Figure 2 gives a rough average for determining distances over time 

using conditioned, acclimated troops. 

Moving in the high mountains can be perilous. Weather can rapidly 

change and columns can become lost in blizzards or fog. Trail markers 

can quickly disappear under falling snow. Snow bridges can collapse and 

swallow climbers into deep crevasses. Entire patrols have disappeared 

without a trace while moving to the Siachen Glacier. 

Line-of-sight communications is excellent in the mountains but 

difficult to achieve because of high peaks. Therefore, communications 

sites are carefully selected and often become key terrain. Very-high 

frequency radios with automatic frequency hopping, encryption, and 

burst transmission capabilities work best. Normal batteries quickly 

lose power in the cold, so lithium batteries should be the normal issue.10 

Frequently, mountain tops become part of the national communications 

infrastructure because they are crowded with military, national, and 

commercial radio and television sites and telephone relay towers. These 

vital areas need to be protected, and military platoons often garrison 

such communications sites against guerrilla attacks. 

Figure 2.

Source: Conducción de la Brigada de Montána, Annex 13, 271. Conditions for the march: day, good weather 

conditions, on a trail or road in good condition, firm ground, troops and pack animals trained and acclimatized.

Observations

Mounted troops

travel walk speed 4.0 Km/hr

4.0 Km/hr

4.0 Km/hr 4.0 Km/hr

3.7 Km/hr 7.3 Km/hr 6.5 Km/hr

8.0 Km/hr

8.0 Km/hr

8.0 Km/hr

3.0 Km/hr

4.0 Km/hr

3.7 Km/hr

7.0 Km/hr

7.0 Km/hr

7.0 Km/hr

On foot Mounted On foot Mounted

Slope 

Grade Descent

Descent

Ascent

0% to 4% Ascent

5% to 9%

Low and Medium

Mountains

High

Mountains
6 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Combat at Altitude 

There are two primary scenarios for combat at altitude. First, two 

states dispute the boundary between their countries and maintain forces 

supporting a rough line of demarcation along the disputed zone (Kashmir 

and Siachen Glacier between India and Pakistan, and the Kameng 

Frontier Division between India and China). In this scenario, opposing 

forces hold linear defenses along the line of demarcation, regardless of 

altitude, and conduct a fairly positional fight. 

Second, a light infantry force of guerrillas, smugglers, bandits, or 

forces from a neighboring state transverses the mountainous region to 

establish base camps in the mountains from which they patrol, launch 

raids, or maintain smuggling routes. This has been the pattern for a 

number of high-altitude disputes such as the Mau Mau uprising, SovietAfghan war, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Russo-Chechen wars, and 

Colombian efforts against the FARC and ELN. In this scenario, the fighting 

does not automatically gravitate to a border zone, but usually stays below 

the tree line. 

At altitude, the first enemy is the environment. The second enemy 

is the human foe. At altitude, high ground is not always key terrain. 

Frequently, key terrain is related to mobility—passes, main supply 

routes, road heads, and intermittent staging posts. Light infantry and 

artillery are the primary combat forces. 

Offensive actions in the mountains include infiltration, ambush, raids, 

patrolling, shelling attacks, limited air assault, and limited offensives. 

Pursuit is seldom possible. Envelopment is the most common maneuver 

and the frontal attack is the least desired option. Defensive actions 

include counter-infiltration, ambush, patrolling, and positional defense. 

Relief in place is routine small-unit action. 

Offensive actions should focus on interdicting logistics by blocking 

passes, denying use of supply and transit routes, capturing base 

camps and intermittent staging posts, and destroying transport.11 Force 

oriented offensive actions, such as interdicting patrols or raiding artillery 

positions, make great headlines and can boost morale, but they seldom 

have the long-term effect as actions against logistics. Offensive actions 

are small-unit actions, since only small units can be supported at altitude, 

and frequently the terrain is so restricted that too many soldiers would 

hamper the effort. Movement is by small groups moving at a walk 

to avoid sweating because sweat freezes quickly leading to frostbite. 

Objectives are close at hand so the attackers will not be exhausted 

before they arrive and will not be caught in the open by rapidly changing 

weather. Assembly areas may be nonexistent and the attackers will 

have to move directly from forward positions. The attack may have to 
Ground Combat at High Altitudes 7

go in waves if suppressive fire is inadequate or the enemy is conducting 

a reverse-slope defense. The offensive plan must be clear, as most 

mountain maps are problematic. Maneuver is dictated by terrain and the 

reserve is committed early since movement is slow and mutual support 

is very difficult to achieve. Maneuver is slow and limited in distance. 

A maneuver force can range from one or two men to a full battalion if 

weather and the enemy situation permits. 

Defending at altitude is difficult because of limited troops and 

material. When defending along a border, a battalion holds an extended 

frontage (7,000 to 8,000 yards) while a company holds 1,500 yards, so 

there is little depth, or large gaps, in the defense.12 Further, the complete 

battalion is seldom on line simultaneously. Often, a platoon holds a 

company position since the rest of the company is being held in reserve 

at lower elevations where the deterioration of the body is not as rapid. 

The platoon is rotated every 10 to 14 days. The entire company must 

still be rotated to lower elevations to recoup every 3 to 4 months. This 

means that the long, linear defense is actually a string of strong points 

built around a machine gun. Reverse slope defense, with forward slope 

observation posts is preferred, since the defensive positions often lack 

overhead cover and are susceptible to artillery airburst. 

A great deal of daily effort is required to keep snow from completely 

filling the defensive positions and hiding the trails. Permanent shelter, 

such as portable fiberglass huts, are essential at the defensive positions.13 

Fortifying defensive positions is difficult since this usually requires the 

delivery of heavy materials such as cement, sand, water, and roofing 

timbers. Sensors are a welcome addition to the defense in those areas 

where they will not be rapidly covered by snow. Defensive positions 

should be designed and stocked to hold out independently for days 

since relief in the mountains is problematic due to weather. Conversely, 

when the enemy is a guerrilla force, the defensive position is a perimeter 

defense from which patrols, ambushes, and raids are launched. 

Mountain patrolling is a common feature of the offense and defense. 

Small patrols are at risk, so platoon-sized patrols are common. Single 

patrols are useless, so multiple patrols are normal. Local guides or scouts 

are an essential part of each patrol. Detailed planning is an essential part 

of the patrol plan and includes a reaction force or reserve. The meeting 

battle is normal combat at altitude resulting from probing actions by 

opposing patrols. 

Raids are a common offensive and defensive tactic. They are 

designed to seize a point, exploit success, and then withdraw. Raids 

are a temporary measure to capture personnel and equipment, destroy 

installations, bait traps to draw enemy reaction, and attack morale. Since 
8 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

there is no intention of holding the objective for a length of time, the 

logistics burden is less onerous than a deliberate attack. Successful 

mountain raids normally incorporate an assault force, a fire support 

group, and a security element.14

Fire Support at Altitude 

Mountains restrict effective bombing and strafing by jet aircraft. It is 

difficult for them to pick out targets that are camouflaged or concealed 

by natural cover. Weather, deep shadows, and the environment also 

restrict pilots’ vision. There are few approach routes and most of those 

are along valleys, which are covered by air defense and infantry forces 

using massed fire. Climate and terrain restrict jet aircraft from diving 

freely or flying low enough to engage targets effectively. Still, camouflage 

discipline, controlled movement, and layered air defense are essential to 

prevent savaging by high-performance aircraft.15 Helicopter gunships 

are more of a danger to ground forces, but eventually altitude limits 

their effectiveness. Lightweight helicopters can serve effectively as 

artillery spotters. All aviation is subject to the vagaries of weather at high 

elevation, which is powerful, constantly changing, and often shuts down 

flying. Dense fog, high winds, and blizzards are common and whiteouts 

are a constant threat to pilots. 

Artillery remains the round-the-clock fire support system. However, 

artillery is often constrained during high-altitude combat. Sharp bends, 

high gradients, and the general condition of mountain roads restrict 

the movement of artillery, towed guns in particular. There are a limited 

number of gun positions, so artillery batteries are seldom deployed 

intact. One- and two-gun or rocket launcher positions are common. 

Consequently, the number of alternate firing positions is also restricted 

and these positions tend to become permanent. Guns should be moved 

at night for protection against enemy aircraft and artillery. However, 

night movement of guns in mountainous terrain is risky and accidentprone. Artillery positions should be constructed so that gun crews 

can defend them against ground attack. Firing positions should be on 

reverse slopes and as close to the crest as possible—considering crest 

clearance and flash-cover. Individual guns should be sited in terrain 

folds and other places where they are naturally concealed.16 Artillery 

plays a major role in logistics interdiction, counterbattery and shelling 

front-line units. Artillery can create havoc with a forward defense by 

targeting living accommodations and using airbursts against troops in 

the open.17 Mortars are frequently more effective than guns or howitzers. 

They are easier to shift around, can better engage reverse slopes and 

can be moved closer to the forward posts. 
Ground Combat at High Altitudes 9

Transport frequently determines the location of artillery and mortars 

and the supporting range of artillery. Artillery cannot be readily moved 

where there are not roads. Artillery firing points are usually located 

where ammunition can be delivered—in valleys, villages, and near road 

heads. 

Logistics Support 

High-altitude logistics are key since the terrain and unique 

environment hamper delivery to the forward troops. Logistics always 

drives the battle, but in high-altitude combat, this is especially so. 

Without good highways or railroads, dump sites cannot be readily 

moved, it takes an inordinate amount of time to shift troops from one 

sector to another, and logistics demands are considerably higher than 

in other types of light infantry combat. Trucks, helicopters, mechanical 

mules, and snowmobiles are key to mountain logistics, but above 13,000 

feet, the logistics effort shifts to the backs of mules and porters. Naturally, 

this is the point where the logistics delivery system snarls since porters 

and mules have distinct limitations and there are never enough of them. 

Trucks are important to logistics support and gasoline-powered 

trucks are clearly preferred over diesel. As the truck ascends the 

mountain, the amount of oxygen available is reduced and the engine 

efficiency drops off. Cross-country and climbing capability decline as 

fuel usage soars. Diesel engines may need to be fitted with turbochargers 

and gasoline engines may need their carburetors adjusted. Figure 3 

shows the average increase in fuel consumption at altitude. 

Helicopter-based logistics are the preferred mode in mountain 

warfare, but the mountains are not the optimum helicopter environment. 

Air density decreases with altitude and mountain winds and updrafts are 

unpredictable and dangerous. Proper landing zones are difficult to find 

and, if close to the enemy, probably under enemy mortar and small-arms 

coverage. Helicopters must follow the terrain features of the mountains 

Figure 3. 

Source: Conducción de la Brigada de Montána, Annex 16, 281.

Average Load Loaded Unloaded Observations

Good engine

performance

With good roads

Head winds increase

consumption by 10%

Light Vehicles Trucks 3 to 5 Tons

Low

Mountains

Mountains

Mountains High

Medium Up to

3000

meters

meters

meters

3000 to

4000

4000

Above

(Gasoline) (Diesel)

Type of Slope

3 to 5%

6 to 8%

6 to 8%

6 to 8%

6 to 8%

3 to 5%

3 to 5%

3 to 5%

16

17

17

18 27

18 27

20

20

20

25

25

25

25

30

30

30

30

32

32

35

35

38 33
10 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

adding predictability to their approaches and increasing the risk to 

the crew. Fog, sudden storms, icing, and variable winds can quickly 

shut down helicopter support. Mountain terrain interferes with air-toground communications and with air-to-air communications. Planning for 

helicopter support in the mountains requires detailed planning, first-rate 

liaison, and a habitual association between the helicopter and ground 

unit encompassing training and social events. Flying in the mountains 

is so different that the armies of India, Pakistan, Columbia, Argentina, 

and Switzerland have special mountain flight courses for their helicopter 

crews. 

A Step Back in Time 

High mountains are counter-technology. Mules are a good option for 

high-altitude logistics. They can use very narrow trails, can carry more 

than a human porter, and tire less over long distance. American mules 

can carry up to 20 percent of their body weight (150-300 pounds) for 

15 to 20 miles per day in mountains.18 Smaller mules in other locales 

will carry less. The maximum carrying weight for an Argentine mule 

is between 200 and 250 pounds. However, this is for low- and mediumaltitude mountains. At high altitude, the maximum carrying weight drops 

below 200 pounds. Organized mule cargo units, rather than ad hoc 

teams led by local teamsters, are the preferred option, but local mules 

are always preferred over deployed mules. 

Mules were part of the U.S. Army during World War II in Burma and 

Italy and were a critical element of the Mujahideen supply effort in the 

Soviet-Afghan war. They remain part of the force structure of many 

contemporary forces with high-altitude mountain troops. Other armies 

contract mule transport through local teamsters. Yet mules have their 

limitations. If the snow is too deep, they simply refuse to move. 

Figure 4. 

Source: Major Valero, Army of Argentina training exercise material.

Rations

Ammunition

Water

Total weight

Mules

Mules

Mules

(drinking and cooking)

(for company)

(to haul weight)

(to haul crew-served weapons)

(to haul fodder, grain, salt and

water for mules)

1,620 kilos

1,021 kilos

2,262 kilos

4,903 kilos

61 mules

20 mules

151 mules

Assault & field rations

One basic load-circumstances may require carrying more

2,565 liters

Not counting food, water, ammo, and packs carried by soldiers

Small mules haul 80 kilos; Big mules up to 150 kilos

Machine guns and mortars

5,620 kilos of fodder, 4,060 kilos of grain, 348 kilos of salt,

and 18,416 kilos of water
Ground Combat at High Altitudes 11

American mules require 10 pounds of grain and 14 pounds of hay 

per day, which also becomes part of the logistics load.19 The smaller 

mules of Argentina require eight pounds of grain and eight pounds of hay 

per day. Mules consume 25 to 30 liters of water a day and up to 50 liters 

in desert country. They also require a daily ounce of salt. Like humans, 

mules require time to acclimate to altitude. Muleteers and mules require 

about a month’s training to get them ready to work above 3,000 meters. 

Like humans, mules tire easily above 4,000 meters and need to be rested 

frequently. Mules also have to be trained not to fear the noise of firearms 

and explosives so that they do not run off during a march.20

Mules are subject to colic, heat exhaustion, injuries, and wounds. Most 

injuries and wounds result from poorly adjusted saddles, pack frames and 

harnesses. Stones, rocks, and debris on the trail can also wound a mule’s 

hoof. Local mules are more immune to disease at altitude than humans 

and all mules have a keen sense of self-preservation that keeps them 

alive in mountain storms.21 Mules require a great deal of daily care and 

training. Muleteers, farriers, blacksmiths, and large animal veterinarians, 

who have been absent from many armies for decades, are essential for 

mule-borne logistics. Mules need new shoes every 30 days and there 

are special mule shoes for snow and ice. Figure 4 shows the supply 

and transport estimate for a 171-man light infantry company planning a 

mountain march, attack and defense lasting for a total of 6 days. Since 

much of the material will be kept in dumps and moved in stages, the 

commander has managed to keep his transport requirements in hand. 

Porters should be hired from the local populace since they are 

acclimated to the elevation and are accustomed to moving around 

the mountains safely. Locals used to carrying loads have developed 

endurance and are accustomed to breathing thin air. Although a porter 

cannot carry as much as a mule, they can move in places where mules 

cannot. However, porters will probably be reluctant to work too far away 

from their homes and villages. There is always a security consideration 

when using local porters. Figure 5 shows porter-carrying capabilities. 

During the Peru-Ecuador border conflict for the Condor Cordillera 

in 1994, the Peruvian army relied on porters exclusively for resupply. 

Figure 5. 

Source: Conducción de la Brigada de Montána, Annex 17.

Up to 3000 meters 3000 to 4000 meters Above 4000 meters

Low and Medium

Mountains

High

Personnel Mountains

Man with skis

Man on foot Porter

Combat Soldier

Porter

Combat Soldier

20 Kg

15 Kg

20 Kg

12 Kg 12 Kg

12 to 15 Kg 12 Kg or less

8 to 12 Kg or less

20 Kg

10 Kg or less

15 Kg or less

10 to 12 Kg
12 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Although the fight was in medium-altitude mountains, not over 2500 

meters, the forward logistics support was restricted to porters because 

the steep mountains were covered with thick jungle, had few trails, and 

the Peruvian army lacked trained mules and muleteers. The Peruvian 

army moved its supplies from one small village to the next, using local 

villagers as porters to carry the supplies eventually to the fighting up on 

the Condor Cordillera. 

Front-line combatants need daily supplies of ammunition, food, 

water, and heat for survival. Figure 6 shows daily consumption rates of 

water and wood fuel. 

In the mountains, a battalion task orce tries to carry and stockpile 

enough supplies to operate for 1 to 2 weeks. This requires expending 

time and energy to establish supply dumps along the main supply route. 

Naturally, the shorter the supply route, the easier it is to protect. If roads, 

tracks, and trails are under enemy control, the unit might be restricted to 

helicopter supply and its inherent problems in the mountains. Logistics 

support at higher altitudes during winter may become impossible 

causing opposing forces to withdraw. 

Medical evacuation at altitude is frequently difficult. Weather or 

weight limitations may prevent a helicopter from flying to a patient. 

Often, patients must be carried on stretchers to lower elevations where 

the helicopters can reach. Soviet experience in the mountains of 

Afghanistan proved that 13 to 15 men might be involved in carrying 

one patient. Exertion at altitude is difficult and the stretcher party has to 

provide its own security as well.22 Patients cannot be effectively treated 

at altitude, but have to be evacuated to lower altitudes to survive.23

The Eternal Mountains 

Mountain terrain is difficult, movement is slow and the hazards to 

health and physical well being are significant and constant. Combat at 

high altitude is a historical constant and a contemporary fact. It cannot 

always be avoided. Training for mountain combat is not simply light 

infantry training. Special training and acclimatization is necessary. 

Figure 6. 

Source: Conducción de la Brigada de Montána, Annex 18.

Man Animal Cooking Heating

Low and

Medium

Mountains

Mountains

High

Water Wood

Drinking Cooking Summer Winter

Liters

Liters

Liters

Liters

Liters

Liters

Liters

Liters

1.5 to 2

2 to 2.5 8

5 15 10

15 10

Uncovered Tent/shelter Open

1 kg 1 kg 1 kg

1 kg

per man per man per man

per man

Every Every

6 hours 2 hours

for fire
Ground Combat at High Altitudes 13

Leadership is particularly important in mountain combat. The harsh 

living conditions, physical deterioration, and psychological depression 

inherent in mountain combat require skilled leaders. Armies with 

regimental systems and years-long association find it easier to cope with 

the leadership challenges of mountain combat. Combat is primarily 

small unit, placing a great deal of responsibility on platoon and squad 

leaders. 

Fire support is difficult. Artillery firing tables are inaccurate 

and artillery is hard to move on mountain roads. Transporting guns 

by helicopter is recommended where possible. Moving guns and 

ammunition takes an unusual amount of time. Helicopter gunships 

provide excellent support at lower altitudes. Mortars are excellent for 

hitting reverse slope positions, but have limited range. 

Logistics are a primary concern in mountain combat with transport 

to altitude requiring special effort. Sustained combat requires an 

inordinate logistics effort. Small-unit actions, where units do not remain 

for extended periods of time, do not impose the same logistics burden. 

Although the U.S. Army has not fought at truly high altitude, this may 

not always be the case. High mountains occupy much of the world’s 

surface and they are not immune to the world’s conflicts. Other nations 

have successfully fought at altitudes above 10,000 feet. Should the U.S. 

Army find itself committed at these altitudes, the experiences of other 

nations are invaluable. Preparation for such an eventuality should begin 

well before crisis dictates deployment. 

________________________________________

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 432. The authors thank mountain 

warriors Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) German Giraldo, Army of Colombia; LTC Foto Duro, 

Albanian Army; Major (MAJ) Alejandro Valero, Army of Argentina, MAJ Akbar Khan, 

Army of Pakistan; and LTC Tejbir Singh, Army of India, for their input, suggestions, 

critique, and guidance. The authors retain responsibility for the accuracy and ideas 

in the article. 

2. The Houghton-Mifflin Dictionary of Geography: Places and Peoples of the World

(Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1997), 48, 164, 165, and 450. 

3. Tim J. Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston, MA: Appalachian 

Mountain Club, 1980), 620. 

4. Syed Ishfaq Ali, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen (Rawalpindi, Pakistan: American Commercial PVT Ltd., 1991), 15-16 and 110-11. 

5. Lester W. Grau and William A. Jorgensen, “Medical Implications of High-Altitude 

Combat,” U.S. Army Medical Department Journal, to be published April 2002. 

6. Aleksey Svetlanov, “Osobennosti razvedki v gorakh” (Peculiarities of Mountain 

Reconnaissance), Voyennye znaniya (Military Bannerr) (June 2000), 13. 

7. Salman Beg Punjab, “Operations in Glaciated Areas,” Pakistan Army Journal

(Spring 1994), 5. 
14 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

8. Setnicka, 623. 

9. Ali, 16-17; Punjab, 5-6. 

10. Punjab, 7. 

11. Ibid., 8-9. 

12. Iftikhar ur Rahman, “Defensive Battle in Mountains,” Pakistan Army Journal (September 1984), 31. 

13. Punjab, 4. 

14. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen 

Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Study: DM: 

980701, 1998), 69-103 and 211-25. 

15. Sikandar Hameed, “Local Defence of Gun Area in Mountainous Terrain,” Pakistan 

Army Journal (March 1983), 35-41. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Punjab, 10. 

18. U.S. Army Field Manual 31-27, Pack Animals in Support of Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2000), 

1-2. 

19. Ibid., 2-14. 

20. Reglamento Funcional Público (Public Functional Regulation) 24-02, Reglamento 

Ganado de Servicio (Service Livestock Regulation) (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994), 

36. 

21. Ibid, Annex 18. 

22. Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy kontingent (Limited Contingent) (Moscow: Progress 

Publishers, 1994), 186. 

23. Grau and Jorgensen. 

________________________________________

At the time of original publication, Lieutenant Colonel Herán Vázquez 

was the Argentine Army’s liaison office to the US Army Combined Arms 

Center and consulting editor for the Hispano-American edition of Military 

Review, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a graduate of the Argentine Army 

War College. He has served in a variety of infantry and mountain units 

in Argentina. He served as S3 of a Motorized Light Infantry Battalion in 

the Patagonia Desert; S3 of the Mountain School Battalion; two tours as a 

member of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus with the Joint 

Operations Center, Operations Department, Headquarters Peacekeeping 

Force; operations officer for Argentine Task Force 10 “Chipre”; and tactics 

and MDMP instructor at the Argentine Army War School. He is a qualified 

mountain troop leader, commando and paratrooper. 
The Need for Specialized Training 15

Mountain Warfare-- The Need for 

Specialized Training

Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army

This article first appeared in the September-October 2004 edition of Military Review

Mountain Warfare is specialized combat with unique characteristics. Military leaders and soldiers need training and experience to 

understand the peculiarities of mountainous environments and how they 

affect combat. Armies that train for mountain combat perform much 

better than those that do not. 

During World War II, the German Army raised an entire corps of 

elite mountain troops called gebirgs jaeger (mountain troops). Although 

not all of these troops were used in the mountains, they demonstrated 

superior abilities in almost all theaters in which they were used. The 

German Fifth Mountain Division marched more than 248 miles, crossed 

mountain passes above 6,500 feet, and secured well-entrenched 

defenses on the Mestksas Line.1

 Other gebirgs jaeger captured most of 

the Caucasus mountain region in the summer of 1942. 

The US Army 10th Mountain Division, trained in the mountains of 

Colorado during World War II, captured Riva Ridge in northern Italy. US 

Army Field Manual (FM) 3-97.6, Mountain Operations, cites this action as 

clearly demonstrating the value of superior skills in mountain warfare.2

The importance of preparing leaders and soldiers for high-altitude 

combat cannot be overemphasized. 

The Pakistan Army has been in Kashmir for more than 50 years and 

has a great deal of experience in fighting in mountainous, glaciated 

terrain. While the US Army has quality training institutions for mountain 

warfare, it does not have many troops with extensive, current mountaincombat experience. A comparison of the training techniques of US and 

Pakistan armies provides insight into preparing for mountain combat. 

Training Prerequisites for Mountain Warfare 

Physical fitness is the first prerequisite of mountain-warfare training. 

The effects of cold weather and unforgiving terrain require a high level of 

physical fitness for long-distance climbing and walking, and the physical 
16 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

fitness required for mountainous terrain must be developed at high 

altitude. But being physically fit does not necessarily mean soldiers will 

be able to perform adequately at high elevations. US soldiers selected 

to attend the mountain-warfare school in Kakul, Pakistan, required 

additional climbing time to attain the desired level of physical fitness. 

The body must adjust to the thin mountain air, and climbing muscles 

must be developed.3

Mountainous terrain can be an ally or a dangerous adversary. 

In Kashmir each year, thousands of troops are introduced to the 

mountainous environment to help them understand and appreciate it. A 

marked difference exists in the performance of units that have conducted 

vigorous acclimatization training and those that have not. Weather and 

terrain-related casualties are a big indicator. During initial training in 

Colorado during the early 1940s, the US 10th Mountain Division suffered 

more casualties from weather-related injuries than from actual mountain 

combat in Italy.4 

Field Manual 3-97.6 defines high mountains as those above 3,000 

feet; however, it does not fully explain the high-altitude environment. 

Despite the fact the Pakistan Army has been fighting in Kashmir for a 

long time, operations at higher altitudes (18,000 to 22,000 feet) were not 

fully understood before the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan 

in 1984.5 During the conflict, frostbite, sunburn, and other high-altitude 

sicknesses caused large numbers of casualties. Such incidences are 

now rare, however, because troops and commanders are trained to take 

precautionary measures. 

In Kashmir, stone or wooden bunkers, which double as living 

accommodations and fighting bunkers, are found at posts below 13,000 

feet, but at high altitudes, stone structures are not practical. Cement 

will not bind, and the underlying glacier is always moving. Instead, 

prefabricated, synthetic domes (igloos) are used.6 The domes are easy 

to carry and assemble even at 18,000 feet and above. They can be 

retrieved from even large amounts of snow and set up again quickly. 

Soldiers must also be trained to wear proper clothing. Loose-fitting 

layers and insulated and polypropylene clothing that does not allow 

perspiration to accumulate close to the body are best. Developing 

frostbite from touching metal equipment with one’s bare hands is 

possible when temperatures drop to minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit. 

Pressurized sleeping bags help stabilize soldiers suffering from altituderelated sicknesses.7

Basic mountaineering and high-altitude skills are vital for soldiers 

to develop confidence and survive in mountainous environments and 

essential in combat. As mountain height increases, so does the required 

skill level. At altitudes below 13,000 feet, it might be enough for soldiers 
The Need for Specialized Training 17

to understand climbing techniques, navigation, route selection, the use 

of ropes, and procedures to avoid landslides and snow avalanches, but 

at high altitudes, soldiers must learn more complex techniques, such as 

those required for mountain expeditions.8

Because it is not always possible to transport material by helicopter, 

troops are often required to carry awkward loads, including kerosene 

oilcans, rations, and building materials for bunkers. The Soviets learned 

this lesson while fighting in difficult terrain in Afghanistan.9

At high altitudes, where it is difficult to keep weapons functioning, 

covering and protecting weapons and equipment against snow and ice 

is a necessity. Batteries often will not perform optimally in the cold, and 

complicated mechanisms, such as those in surface-to-air missiles, can 

easily malfunction. Also, artillery shells sometimes behave erratically 

because of thin air and gusting winds.10

Surviving and operating in mountainous terrain requires more 

energy than usual. A soldier who needs 3,000 to 4,000 calories under 

normal circumstances will require 6,000 or more calories in the 

mountains. To complicate the situation, high altitude adversely affects a 

person’s appetite. Soldiers tend to eat and drink less in high altitudes, 

which reduces morale and fighting capabilities and makes them more 

susceptible to mountain-related illnesses.11 US soldiers conducting 

mountain-warfare training at Abbotabad, Pakistan, which is at 4,000 

feet, lost approximately 25 pounds during a 3-week training period.12

Commanders must ensure soldiers consume proper diets and are wellhydrated. 

Physiological and psychological effects become more pronounced 

at altitudes above 8,000 feet. Soldiers must take preventive measures 

and be trained to detect signs of illness in colleagues. Common 

symptoms include severe, persistent headaches; coughing; difficulty 

in breathing; and aloofness. Other symptoms might include swelling 

around the eyelids, incoherent speech, intolerance, and even outright 

aggressiveness.13

Many problems, including altitude sickness, can occur during the 

initial stages of a soldier’s arrival at high altitude. The biggest killer, 

cerebral or pulmonary edema, is difficult to detect, but often develops if 

soldiers stay too long at high altitude.14

The normal practice in glaciated areas is to not keep soldiers above 

19,000 feet for more than three to four weeks before returning them to 

lower elevations. If soldiers experience any signs of altitude illnesses, 

commanders must evacuate them promptly. For most mountain 

illnesses, evacuation to below at least 3,000 feet is the first requirement 

for saving a person’s life.15 Delaying evacuation might not only cost 

the soldier’s life, but imperil the lives of the soldiers who might have 
18 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

to conduct evacuation procedures during bad weather. 

Replacements being sent to high-altitude environments must 

have operated at heights similar to those to which they are being sent 

for at least 10 to 15 days. If not, they could quickly become casualties 

themselves. Well-trained, acclimatized troops must be available to 

replace those at higher altitudes. 

High-altitude environments can take heavy physical and mental tolls 

on soldiers. While in the Caucasus, the Germans learned that troops 

wore down much faster in mountains despite the fact they were elite 

troops, picked for their mental abilities and physical prowess. Operations 

in such environments involve extreme physical exertion.16 Living 

conditions in mountainous terrain can be difficult. At times all movement 

is stopped, soldiers do not receive mail, and replacements might not 

arrive on time. These factors can lead to depression and boredom 

and a sharp decrease in fighting spirit. Simple tasks such as manning 

weapons, sentry duty, and patrolling require determination. 

Offensive actions in mountainous terrain are difficult and costly. Not 

only must soldiers fight the enemy, they must also brave the elements 

of harsh terrain, which are equally formidable. These conditions call for 

strong leadership by junior leaders, who must physically lead and be 

mentally tough. 

Leadership. Mountainous and high-altitude environments are 

extremely demanding and require a high level of leadership at the 

small-unit level as well as at higher levels. Leaders must understand 

the constraints placed on their soldiers’ performances and should 

include terrain and weather in planning and executing actions to avoid 

miscalculating the timeframe, logistic requirements, and force capability. 

Mountain combat is decentralized and often takes place at the 

platoon or squad level. The quality of junior leadership is decisive. The 

Russians observed in Afghanistan that even a small unit, maneuvering 

boldly, could decide the outcome of a battle.17

A hallmark of German alpine troops during World Wars I and II was 

the quality of their leadership. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, 

who began his career in a German mountain regiment during World 

War I, relentlessly advanced his small detachment in difficult terrain 

capturing one hilltop after another. 

Mountainous environments demand that junior leaders set the 

example of physical fitness and endurance. During the Pakistan-India 

conflict at Kargill in northern Kashmir in 1998, Captain Sher Khan was 

posthumously awarded the “Nishan-E-Haider,” Pakistan’s highest military 

award, for conducting daring raids with a handful of men against enemy 

patrols and convoys. His last action included a successful counterattack 

to recapture a post against overwhelming odds. Such leadership 
The Need for Specialized Training 19

inspires subordinates and raises the morale of the entire unit. 

At high altitudes, small-unit leaders must be trained to recognize 

and address physical and psychological fatigue in their soldiers, 

including loneliness, depression, and violent mood swings. The 

relationship between officers and troops is more intimate than under 

normal circumstances, so leaders should be able to identify signs of 

deterioration in soldiers before they become pronounced. 

Decisions at higher levels influence the conduct of tactical actions. 

The German Army emphasized the importance of meticulous planning 

and preparation even for small-scale operations.18

Field Manual 3-97.6 emphasizes realistic timetables based on 

reconnaissance and the commander’s practical knowledge of the 

mountain battlefield.19 Planners must understand that mountainous terrain adversely affects time and space calculations— an important lesson 

learned during the US Marine Corps (USMC) exercise Alpine Warrior at 

Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, in 1986.20

Cost-effective mountain combat requires skilled and well-trained 

troops. Soldiers cannot be sent into a fight at high altitude at the last 

moment. Doing so could invite disaster. One example of such an action 

is the employment of the 7th Indian Brigade against the Chinese in the 

1962 Himalayan conflict.21 The brigade had not been stationed in the 

mountains previously, and when things began going badly, the brigade 

was moved from the plains straight into mountain combat. The soldiers, 

who had not been acclimatized or equipped to fight in the mountains, 

suffered heavy casualties because of frostbite, edema, and other highaltitude-induced illnesses. 

Communications. Terrain and unpredictable weather conditions affect communications at high altitudes. Satellite communications 

and the use of command and control (C2) aircraft can offset some terrain 

limitations and reduce reliance on bulky radio equipment. Crews 

responsible for installing and maintaining retransmission stations— often 

situated on the highest peaks to provide adequate range and coverage—

must be well trained in mountain-survival techniques. Also, these isolated 

stations are targets for guerrilla bands, as the Soviets discovered when 

they tried to protect similar sites in Afghanistan.22

Fire support. Mountainous terrain significantly influences artillery fire support. Targets are located on peaks, in ravines, and on 

reverse slopes; no continuous front exists; and weather conditions are 

unpredictable. Undulating terrain and intervening crests require a large 

number of observers located on dominating heights to cover the entire 

area of operations. Gun positions that are ideal for range and coverage 

might not be suitable because of intervening features and masking fire. 

At other times a location might be tactically sound but will be an area 
20 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

prone to avalanches or flash floods. Once guns are deployed, major 

engineering and logistical efforts might be necessary to shift them to 

alternate locations in a timely fashion. 

Air burst and variable time fuzes are more effective than pointdetonating artillery rounds. Howitzers and mortars are more effective 

because of their ability to engage targets on reverse slopes. The 

Taliban used mortars to hit US troops successfully during operations in 

Afghanistan.23

Maneuver. Mountainous terrain is ideally suited for the defense. 

During World War II, some of the heaviest casualties in the Italian Theater 

occurred during an attempt to overcome German defenses at Mount 

Casino. In Afghanistan, the Russians attacked the strategic Panjshir 

Valley repeatedly but were unable to clear it despite their advantage 

in firepower and mobility.24 The line of control in Kashmir in 2003 was 

not much different from the cease-fire line of the India-Pakistan war in 

1949.25 Both Indian and Pakistan forces found that an assault on welldefended positions was extremely costly. Defense requires the control of 

dominating heights, passes, and lines of communication by strong-points. 

An integrated defense is not possible in cut up, mountainous terrain. 

During training, commanders need to understand the techniques of 

defense with all-around protection and emplacement of direct fighting 

weapons. Field Manual 3-97.6 highlights that reserves must be closer 

to important defense locations because reaction times in mountainous 

terrains are longer than usual, which could require several small rather 

than one large centralized reserve.26

Mountainous terrain offers opportunities for infiltration, requiring 

defenders to be aggressive at all times. Aggressive patrolling enhances 

security and keeps soldiers active and sharp. In Kashmir this helped 

prevent a bunker mentality. Although sensors provide some protection, 

mountainous terrain is too compartmentalized for complete electronic 

surveillance. Combat service support (CSS) elements must provide 

their own protection and must train in patrolling and perimeter defense 

while developing a mindset focused on constant vigilance. 

Offensive operations require meticulous planning and preparation 

because of the inherent strength mountainous terrain provides to 

the defender. Training plays a vital role in ensuring an edge for the 

attackers. Since the defender has an advantage, successful attacks 

should isolate the defender and keep him under constant pressure. 

The Soviets laid great emphasis on junior leaders and company-level 

mountain operations, advocating envelopment by smaller, autonomous 

groups. 

During Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, US forces used more 

decentralized combat than on normal terrain. Junior leaders’ initiative 
The Need for Specialized Training 21

and skill is vital to the mission’s success, especially in security and 

reconnaissance missions. Mountainous terrain and bad weather provide 

opportunities for small forces to concentrate and achieve surprise. 

Russian and Afghan government forces suffered heavily when they 

neglected this aspect of the battlefield environment.27

The Soviets used helicopters in Afghanistan to airlift troops and 

supplies into battle.28 Helicopter gunships effectively supported ground 

operations until the Mujahideen obtained Stinger missiles, which tilted 

the situation in their favor. 

US forces also rely on helicopters for transportation and movement in 

the mountains, requiring aviation planners to be involved in the planning 

process early. With beyond-line-of-sight and precision-guided munitions, 

aviation and air assets have neutralized many inherent problems in 

mountain warfare, but they have not eliminated the need for specialized 

training. Because mountain combat tends to be decentralized, control of 

supporting fire is more difficult. Tight control of jet aircraft and helicopter 

gunships is necessary to avoid fratricide. 

Logistics. Logistics support in the mountains is difficult and 

time-consuming. In Kashmir, a variety of transport is used for logistical 

support, road transport being the most reliable and cost-effective. At 

higher altitudes where tracks cannot be maintained because of snow and 

difficult terrain, mules are a preferred means of transport.29 At altitudes 

where even mules cannot go, porters can. Porters are local people 

capable of carrying heavy loads across difficult terrain. 

In the Caucasus Campaign, the German army used sleds, mules, and 

horses in addition to trucks.30 Recently, despite technological advances, 

the US Army had to use horses and mules in Afghanistan. Helicopters 

are a quick, versatile means of transportation, but at higher altitudes their 

lift capability is severely limited. The French Alouette helicopter can 

fly higher than U.S helicopters can, but even it can deliver only about 

180 pounds above 20,000 feet. Because helicopters cannot be used in 

adverse weather, a mixture of resources is necessary to ensure reliability 

and flexibility.31

The road network in the mountains is generally a logistician’s nightmare. Main supply routes are limited and often do not support vehicles 

that require large turning radii. Many roads do not permit two-way traffic. 

While tactical plans take into account main roads, tactical 

engagements do not usually occur close to roadheads. At Siachen, the 

Pakistan Army built roads near forward defenses, but the real challenge 

was in transporting supplies across the last few miles from roadheads to 

forward posts. 

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) analysis of the 

operation in Afghanistan recognized the need to have logistics as far 
22 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

forward as possible: “It might require additional staff work from the 

logisticians to deploy the logistics to the work area (like rations to the 

platoons, mortar rounds to the mortars), but the advantage is reduced 

expenditure of energy for those on the ground.”32

Logistics estimates and loads must be customized for the 

mountainous environment. For example, using mules requires loads 

be broken up according to their carrying capacity. Also, overages must 

be built into supply estimates because there is always a need for a 

large reserve of items that wear out quickly, such as boots, jackets, and 

gloves. If soldiers use improper or worn clothing for even a short time, 

the chance of developing altitude and cold-related sicknesses increases 

significantly. In addition, combat casualty evacuation involves many 

challenges. Air evacuation remains the preferred method, but because 

of the dispersed nature of troops, expert medical help might not be 

available quickly. Therefore, self-aid, buddy help, and the availability of 

more combat life savers in the unit is important.33

Canadian small-unit support vehicles, specially designed for 

restrictive terrain, were particularly useful for logistics support at high 

altitude in Afghanistan, whereas the bulky ground-held laser designating 

system was not. Soldiers’ personal loads of more than 50 pounds were 

too heavy at high altitudes. Equipment must be upgraded for future 

mountain warfare.34

Training for Mountain Warfare 

Recent operations by US and other Allied forces confirm the need for 

specialized mountain-warfare training. CALL’s analysis recognizes that 

soldiers with mountain experience exhibit exceptional morale, physical 

stamina, and technical competence in decisive combat operations. The 

analysis also recognizes that coalition forces specially trained in mountainous environments are better trained overall.35

Acclimatization training. Mountain troops should be stationed at 

high altitudes to maintain a high standard of physical fitness and 

acclimatization. Before World War I, German alpine troops were 

stationed in the Bavarian Alps.36 In Transcaucasia at 6,500 feet, Soviet 

troops occupied ideal terrain to train soldiers.37 Pakistan and India 

maintain a large number of troops on the line of control in Kashmir. This 

automatically provides ample opportunities for ac-climatization. The US 

10th Mountain Division, however, is stationed at Fort Drum, New York, 

which is not in high mountains. 

Although troops need to be acclimatized for any kind of mountainous 

terrain, the duration depends on the altitude at which the unit must 

operate. Acclimatization for mountains below 13,000 feet takes three to 

four weeks. Pakistan troops train by bivouacking at high altitudes and 
The Need for Specialized Training 23

conducting routine administrative activities and route marches. Each 

week they conduct hill climbing at increasingly higher altitudes to 

increase their ability to function. The rigorous training also helps identify 

soldiers who have medical problems. 

Acclimatization for higher altitudes is rigid, and the length of training 

cannot be shortened without serious consequences. Although the 

pattern of training remains the same, troops are trained at an altitude of 

between 8,000 and 10,000 feet for two weeks, followed by one month’s 

training at 11,000 feet. The troops conduct route marches, fire weapons, 

climb rocks, and cross crevasses. They then move in stages from 13,000 

feet to forward posts at heights up to 21,000 feet. The basic principle 

is to bivouac one night for about every 3,000-foot increase in altitude. 

Troops returning from leave must repeat the process. 

Because the US 10th Mountain Division is not stationed in a highaltitude environment and its soldiers are not acclimatized, deployment 

to high mountains would require an additional two to three weeks of 

acclimatization. This also applies to units that have conducted mountainwarfare training but are not currently stationed at high altitudes. Physical 

conditioning is essential to mountain combat in Afghanistan.38

Leadership training. Leadership training is extremely important for 

mountain warfare. During World War II, German alpine troops displayed 

strong leadership traits based on their culture of auftragstaktik.

39 In the 

Pakistan Army, mountain training is considered part of overall training. 

The Soviet Army recognized the critical importance of junior-leader 

initiative during its experiences in Afghanistan.40 The US Army focuses 

on leadership, but it does not have a package designed specifically for 

training at different levels of leadership in mountainous environments. 

Mountain leadership training should be based on the unique 

characteristics and demands placed on leaders. 

Junior leader training requires initiative, personnel management, 

and mental toughness. In the Pakistan Army, most of these skills are 

learned through experience and exposure to tough environments. 

During mountain-combat deployment, junior-leaders often conduct 

patrols, lead expeditions, and direct command posts, despite sometimes 

having to endure heavy artillery shelling and adverse living and weather 

conditions. The US Army Mountain Warfare School emphasizes gaining 

mountaineering skills rather than training combat leaders. The US 

Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Center has a mountain leader course 

designed for junior leaders, but it is heavily skills-oriented.41

Mountain leader training should begin with an introduction to issues 

and problems unique to mountainous terrain. Practical exercises and 

historical case studies increase leader awareness. Training outdoors in 

command positions with specific tasks, such as navigation, patrolling, 
24 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

raids, and ambushes, should be conducted at altitudes above 8,000 feet. 

Simulations that force junior leaders to make tough choices between 

their soldiers’ physical capabilities and mission accomplishment are 

essential to mountain leader training. 

 Many senior leaders consider themselves well-equipped to plan 

and conduct operations in any environment, but commanders who have 

served in the mountains as young leaders are far better at understanding 

and planning for such environments. Wargames and live exercises are 

valuable tools to help senior leaders understand mountain warfare. Live 

exercises illustrate human limitations in such an environment. 

Individual/team training. Most armies from countries with 

mountainous terrain have well-established training institutions. Location 

of training institutions is an important consideration for mountain training. 

The Pakistan Army’s High-Altitude School, at Rattu in Northern Kashmir, 

is an ideal location on the confluence of the Hindukush, Himalayas, and 

Karakorum ranges. The school conducts training throughout the year 

and includes mountain climbing on peaks ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 

feet and survival on glaciated terrain and in snowy and icy conditions. 

The Indian Army’s high-altitude warfare school is at Gulmarg, which is at 

8,000 feet.42 The US Army Mountain Warfare School is located in Vermont 

[which is at 560 feet], while the USMC Mountain Warfare School is located 

in Bridgeport, California, which is at 9,000 feet. 

The purpose of these training institutions is to train individuals 

to survive and take advantage of the extreme terrain and weather 

conditions in the mountains. Physical conditioning is the first prerequisite 

of mountain warfare. Training should be progressive, starting with light 

physical exertion followed by route marches and mountain climbing, 

culminating in test exercises in difficult terrain. Most schools have similar 

programs for this purpose. Although training individuals at heights up 

to 10,000 feet can achieve a great deal, to develop high-altitude skills, 

some training should occur above 13,000 feet. 

The ability to navigate and move across difficult terrain builds 

confidence and enables soldiers to plan and execute maneuvers 

across seemingly impenetrable and inhospitable terrain. The smallunit mountain operation exercise the US Army Mountain Warfare School 

conducts is a good example.43 Participants must navigate to six different 

sites within a set time. The exercise incorporates various skills soldiers 

need to complete actions successfully in a time-compressed, competitive 

environment. Some skills frequently required during mountain warfare 

include using rope bridges and vertical haul lines and medical 

evacuation. Mobility in winter has several prerequisites, including using 

snowshoes, skiing, climbing ice, crossing crevasses, and detecting 

avalanche hazards. 
The Need for Specialized Training 25

A key training objective in mountain training is properly using winter 

clothing, weapons, and equipment and recognizing and preventing coldweather injuries. Such skills are especially important for officers and 

noncommissioned officers who must enforce these practices. Lectures, 

demonstrations, and practical experience can help address these 

problems. The Pakistan Army’s standard training procedures cover most 

safety issues, such as frostbite prevention, high-altitude sickness, and 

pulmonary and cerebral edema. 

The Army’s Mountain Warfare School teaches winter sustainment 

using the Akhio tent and stove group. The Akhio sledge contains a 

10-man arctic tent, a diesel-fired stove, fuel, and other basic supplies. 

Kashmir tents have a short lifespan because of the wear and tear from 

blizzards and heavy snowfall. Stone structures and synthetic igloos 

are the preferred structures. In noncontiguous and nonlinear battlefield environments, soldiers must build protective shields around 

winter shelters to avoid becoming targets for raiding parties and 

artillery fire. 

Once trainees understand mountainous terrain and its effects on 

combat, the next step is to conduct small exercises involving patrolling, 

raids, and ambushes. These exercises should incorporate mountaineering 

skills in situations that tests trainees’ abilities to modify traditional tactics 

to mountainous terrain. These exercises build leadership skills, initiative, 

flexibility, and team spirit. Although no opposing force (OPFOR) 

exists in the Pakistan Army’s High-Altitude School or at the US Army 

Mountain Warfare School, an OPFOR is necessary for creating a realistic 

environment and developing mountain warfare skills. 

US Army Mountain Warfare School instructors are topnotch 

mountaineers. However, most do not have actual mountain-combat 

experience.44 Posting officers who served in Afghanistan to the Mountain 

Warfare School might address this problem. 

Collective training. Collective training is an opportunity to test 

units and formations in actual mountainous environments, reinforcing and 

building on skills gained through acclimatization and individual training 

and allowing commanders to check the viability of their assumptions and 

plans in a realistic setting. Synchronization and coordination between 

fighting and supporting arms and among all the battlefield operating 

systems are also key elements of this training. 

Collective training in winter and summer environments is a regular 

part of the Pakistan Army’s mountain training. Because altitude is an 

important consideration, reserve units train at heights equivalent to those 

at which they are expected to fight. Training is primarily mission-centric, 

based on the nature of tasks assigned to the units, and includes offensive 

and defensive tasks and small-unit actions. 
26 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

The US Army does not conduct collective training in mountain 

warfare; it focuses more on survival training rather than high-altitude 

combat.45 The USMC conducts infantry battalion training, but the training 

does not include artillery, engineers, aviation, or other supporting arms.46

Considering the unique requirements of mountainous and high-altitude 

en-vironments, these can be serious limiting factors for coordinating 

and synchronizing the combined arms fight and can easily lead to faulty 

planning and wrong assumptions about each other’s capabilities and 

limitations. 

Operation Anaconda demonstrated that fighting in the mountains is 

not a special operation or exclusively an infantry domain.47 Mountain 

warfare involves logistics, aviation, artillery, communications, and air 

assets. With the level of sophistication in these branches and services, 

there is an even greater need for collective training in order to use their 

unique characteristics fully. 

Branch-specific training. All branches and services need to 

train for mountain combat to understand the capabilities and limitations 

of their equipment. Aviation is critical to mobility, timely logistics, and 

precision firepower. Pilots should be well trained in mountain flying and 

in understanding an infantryman’s problems in mountainous terrain. 

The Pakistan Army’s 8th Aviation Squadron supports operations in 

Kashmir. Pilots have hundreds of hours of combat flying experience and 

understand the mountainous environment. 

With the enhanced capabilities of Apache helicopters to acquire and 

engage targets beyond visual range, US Army pilots, in conjunction with 

ground troops, need to practice firing in the mountains. The Russians 

recognized the need for close coordination between aviation and 

ground troops during their war in Afghanistan.48 The US experience in 

Afghanistan highlighted the need for attack aviation to train with Special 

Operations Forces and to practice using night-vision devices.49 Pilots for 

cargo and troop-carrying helicopters also need to train in mountains in 

various weather conditions. High-altitude training combining attack and 

cargo helicopters is essential for high-altitude combat.50

The US Army has a variety of sophisticated communication 

equipment. Although some equipment works well in the mountains, some 

requires improvisation and alternatives because FM communications are 

often ineffective at high altitudes and distances impeded by mountainous 

terrain.51 Shifting retransmission stations and using equipment in various 

weather conditions is essential to providing a variety of options to 

communication providers and users. 

Engineers, who are key to mobility, countermobility, and survivability, 

must also train and work in high-altitude conditions. Constructing shelters, laying minefields, providing clean water supplies, and constructing 
The Need for Specialized Training 27

bridges and roads require different considerations in the mountains. 

Training in a mountainous environment is the only way to ascertain the 

type and quantity of materials and equipment needed. 

Artillery units need to train in mountains to ensure optimum fire 

support under all circumstances and all weather conditions. Selecting 

gun positions and shifting and readjusting guns by air, as well as ground 

transport, to support various tactical contingencies require training and 

experience, as do observation and fire direction. 

In mountainous environments, CSS elements also need to learn 

how best to use trucks, aircraft, porters, and mules. Training under real 

mountain conditions helps them identify the differences in logistical 

calculations for mountainous environments. Other issues, such as 

protecting logistic bases, are equally important. The Mujahideen often 

successfully attacked and destroyed Soviet logistic bases in Afghanistan.52

Doctors and medical staff also need special training in recognizing 

and treating high-altitude-related injuries and illnesses. In Kashmir, 

doctors are fairly confident in dealing with them. During World War II, 

medics accompanying German mountain troops were experts at treating 

frostbite, snow blindness, and other problems.53 The Soviet Army 

instituted more than 100 hours of training through a special course for 

doctors and their staffs.54

Contemporary High-Altitude Operations

The US Army had a distinguished history of mountain operations 

during World War II. The 10th Mountain Division proved its utility as 

an elite mountain-trained force during the Italian Campaign. More 

than 50 years later, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan highlighted 

the continued need for specialized training in mountain warfare. The 

Army has embarked on an impressive Transformation intended to 

meet the challenges of the 21st century; expert mountain troops 

available for deployment on a short notice should be a part of this 

Transformation. 

________________________________________

1. James Lucas, Alpine Elite: German Mountain Troops of World War II (London: 

Janes, 1980), 13, 130. 

2. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-97.6, Mountain Operations (Washington, DC: US 

Government Printing Office [GPO], 28 November 2000). 

3. CPT John Clearwater, Above and Beyond, on-line at <www.pakmil/com/army/insti/ 

highalti.html>, 1, accessed 12 September 2002. 

4. Bruce C. Patton, Cold Casualties and Conquests: The Effects of Cold on Warfare,

23, on-line at <www.Armymedicine.Mil/history/Borden/medaspofharshenvrnmnts>, 

accessed 29 November 2002. 

5. FM 3-97.6. At 18,000 to 22,000 feet, the glaciated area in northern Kashmir is 

considered the highest battleground in the world. 
28 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

6. Brigadier Ghazanfar Ali and A. Ghani, Siachen: The World’s Highest Battlefield, 

on-line at <www.Pakdef.info/pakmil/army/siachen/>, 3, accessed 2 December 2002. 

7. CPT John R. Ballard, “Training an Arctic Raid Force,” Marine Corps Gazette

(February 1987): 64; LTC Salman Beg, “Operations in Glaciated Areas,” Pakistan 

Army Journal (Spring 1994): 3. 

8. Kevin Fedarko, “War at 21,000 Feet,” Outside Magazine (April 2002): 41, 44. 

9. LTC John E. Sray, Mountain Warfare: The Russian Perspective (Washington, DC: 

GPO, March 1994), 20, on-line at <www.fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fsmopubs/issues/ 

mountain>, accessed 12 September 2002. 

10. Ali and Ghani, 4. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Clearwater, 2. 

13. Lester W. Grau and William K. Jorgensen, “Medical Implications of High Altitude 

Combat,” US Army Medical Journal (April 2002): 1; Ali and Ghani, 3. 

14. Fedarko, 50. 

15. LT Craig M. Banull, “High Altitude Medicine: Case Report,” Navy Medicine 

(January-February 2000): 27. 

16. Ibid., 48. 

17. Sray, 1. 

18. Lucas, 196. 

19. FM 3-97.6, 2-15. 

20. Ballard, 63. 

21. MG D.K. Palit, War in High Himalaya (London: Lancer International, 1991), 205. 

22. Sray, 8. 

23. George J. Mordica, High Altitude Operations, on-line at <http//call.army.mil/ 

products/trngqtr/tq4-02/mordica>, accessed 2 December 2002, 7. 

24. Robert F. Baumann, “Russian Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, 

Central Asia, and Afghanistan,” Leavenworth Papers 20, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

November 2000, 141. 

25. Ahmed Ashfaq, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen (Rawalpindi: Pak American 

Commercial, 1991), 25. 

26. FM 3-97.6, 3-29. 

27. Sray, 16-18, Grau and Ali a Jalali, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen 

Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Washington, DC, GPO), 187. 

28. Gerhard Sheppe, Mountain Warfare in Europe (Kingston, Canada, 1983), 37. 

29. Fedarko, 50. 

30. Lucas, 130. 

31. Ali and Ghani, 3; FM 3-97.6, 5-7. 

32. Mordica, 9. 

33. Ibid., 5-13. 

34. Ibid., 4-5. 

35. Ibid., 4. 

36. Ibid. 

37. Sheppe, 35. 

38. Mordica, 4. 

39. Lucas, 197. 
The Need for Specialized Training 29

40. Sheppe, 35. 

41. Grau, interview by author, January 2003. 

42. Indian Armed Forces, Training Institutions, on-line at <www.indianarmedforces. 

com/def/army/def9.html>, 6, accessed 12 September 2002. 

43. Grau and Jorgensen, 5. 

44. Grau interview. 

45. Major John G. Bechtol, “Fighting the Cold: The Need for Standing Cold Weather 

Combat Capabilities,” unpublished article, Naval War College, 4 February 2002. 

46. Grau interview. 

47. Mordica, 4-5. 

48. Sray, 20. 

49. Mordica, 4-5. 

50. Ibid, 8. 

51. Ibid, 9. 

52. Grau, The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan 

(Collingsdale, PA: Diane Publishing Co, March 1996), 128. 

53. Lucas, 210. 

54. Grau and Jorgensen, 5. 

________________________________________

Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army, received an M.M.A.S. 

from the US Army Command and General Staff College. He also attended 

the Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan. He has served as 

Brigade Major of an Infantry Brigade; an instructor at the Pakistan Military 

Academy, Kakul; a company commander of an Infantry Company, Siachen 

Glacier, Kashmir; aide-de-camp to the corps commander; and a platoon 

commander and adjutant of the 12th Baloch Regiment, Infantry, Kashmir. 
30 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta: 

Spetsnaz Strike 

into Pakistan during 

the Soviet-Afghan War

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) and Ali Ahmad Jalali

This article first appeared in the December 2005 Journal of Slavic Military Studies

Lieutenant-Colonel Babushkin wanted revenge. The Mujahideen

 guerrillas maintained a large base camp in his 15th Spetsnaz 

Brigade area of operations and the Soviet command in Kabul would 

not let him go get it. The Mujahideen used their border base at Krer to 

launch forays against him and resupply Mujahideen forces throughout 

northeast Afghanistan. In February 1985, the Mujahideen “Black Storks” 

unit had massacred one of his Spetsnaz companies. Only Captain Oleg 

Mart’yanov, the deputy commander, and a wounded RTO survived. Then 

in August 1985, Captain Bykov and 50 of his men were caught during a 

reconnaissance of Krer’s well-prepared forward defenses and took more 

casualties. 

The reaction of 40th Army was gutless. They forbad any combat 

within five kilometers of the border. They were worried that Soviet 

forces might stray across the Pakistan border and create an international 

incident. The Mujahideen crossed that border daily and no one seemed 

to give a damn. Now, however, the Soviets finally had a “tongue”—a 

captured Mujahideen who served in Krer and who, with some persuasion, 

provided good intelligence on the personnel strength, weaponry and 

lay-down of the defending Mujahideen regiment. The time to settle Krer 

was now, and those bastards in Kabul were playing international niceties. 

The frigid January wind howling down the Kunar valley did nothing to 

cool his desire for revenge. (See map on page 2 of this PDF.)1

Krer–Mujahideen Bastion on the Kunar River 

By January 1986, the Soviet-Afghan War had settled into a struggle 

to strangle each other’s logistics. The Mujahideen targeted the Soviet’s 

long convoy route and trucks hauling supplies from the Soviet Union to 
Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta -- Spetsnaz Strike 31

the major garrisons in Afghanistan. Since the Mujahideen depended on 

the rural population for food and shelter, the Soviets attacked the rural 

population’s villages, standing crops, orchards, granaries, animal herds, 

windmills and irrigation systems with bombers and artillery to drive 

them off their land. This ruthless approach forced over seven million (of 

17 million) people in Afghanistan to become refugees fleeing to the cities 

of Afghanistan or the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. It also forced 

the Mujahideen to carry their own rations with them on operations. In 

order to stay in the fight, the Mujahideen were forced to create a logistics 

network of bases, dumps and caches in order to sustain their forces. 

Krer was a major logistics base supplying Mujahideen forces in Kunar 

Province and northeast Afghanistan. 

The Krer base complex was located on the route from Bajuar, 

Pakistan, a Mujahideen supply distribution point and camp. Krer was 

garrisoned by the Asama Ben Zaid Regiment. It was usually understrength but could grow to some 400 for an upcoming battle.2

 (Soviet 

intelligence estimated the regiment’s present-for-duty strength at 

500 and misidentified it as the Abdul Vakilya Islamic Regiment). The 

regiment belonged to the Sayyaf faction and was commanded by 

Commander Assadullah.3 It was well armed with mortars, recoilless 

rifles, and DShK and ZGU heavy machine guns. Krer base was located 

some 20 kilometers southwest of the Afghan town of Asadabad at the 

head of Krer canyon on the heights of Spina ridge and Spina Tsoka peak. 

The approach to Krer from Pakistan is easy and gradual, but the approach 

from the Afghanistan side is difficult. First, the broad Kunar River has 

to be crossed. A bare plateau, some 600 meters [1969 feet] above sea 

level dominates the river crossing. Then mountains rise sharply from the 

plateau until they reach some 2000 meters [6562 feet] above sea level 

along the Spina ridge. The first 1000 meters of the mountains are bare 

and then larch, aspen and juniper forests and alpine meadows begin and 

continue to the top. 

 The 15th Spetsnaz Brigade was headquartered in Jalalabad and 

commanded by LTC Babushkin.4

 The brigade’s 334th Spetsnaz Battalion 

was garrisoned in Asadabad and was commanded by Captain Grigori 

“Grisha” Bykov.5 The brigade’s 154th Spetsnaz Battalion was garrisoned 

in Jalalabad and was commanded by Captain Roman “Roma” Abzalimov.6 

The brigade drew aviation and artillery support from the 66th Separate 

Motorized Rifle Brigade that was also stationed in Jalalabad. Often, the 

brigade was augmented by forces from the Democratic Republic of 

Afghanistan (DRA) army, Sarandoy (armed police) and KHAD (KGB). The 

brigade’s primary mission was to interdict Mujahideen supplies coming 

in from Pakistan. 
32 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

The Reconnaissance Raid 

LTC Babushkin needed more information before launching a 

major effort against Krer, so he planned a reconnaissance raid against 

Krer’s forward defenses. He drafted a plan to establish ambushes at the 

fording sites along the Kunar river close by the Krer canyon approaches. 

He sent this plan up through channels and the 40th Army staff in Kabul 

approved it. LTC Babushkin then dispatched a raiding force from the 

334th Spetsnaz battalion to the ambush sites. The raiding force consisted 

of two company-command groups with about 45 men each. The two 

companies trudged through the winter night to the ambush sites. Once 

on site, they radioed their battalion Combat Control Center and reported 

that they had been in contact and were pursuing the fleeing enemy into 

Krer canyon. In fact, there had been no contact. The raiders moved 

onto the plateau. They climbed the heights until they discovered two 

forward Mujahideen posts. The company commanders talked it over 

and decided to raid the posts. They reorganized their force into three 

groups—two raiding groups and a support group that would stay on the 

mountain ridge to provide covering fire and support the raiding groups’ 

withdrawals. 

As the Spetsnaz neared the posts, it became obvious that one of the 

posts was much harder to reach due to the rugged terrain. A simultaneous 

raid on both sites was impossible. The company commanders conferred 

on the move and altered the plan. One group would first attack its post 

over the more-accessible approach route. The second raiding group 

would wait for the enemy security element in the second post to get out 

of their bunkers to determine what was going on at their neighboring 

post. The first group attacked and overran its post. As expected, the 

Mujahideen in the neighboring post occupied their positions, but when 

they could not detect a threat, they climbed out of their positions to try 

and see what was going on to their flank. At that moment, the second 

group opened up on the Mujahideen and then overran their post. 

The Mujahideen posts were well laid out—by the book. There were 

deep bunkers and storage areas for arms, ammunition and food. They 

were prepared for sustained, unsupported combat and were equipped 

with radios and telephones. The raiders held the posts for a total of ten 

minutes. They grabbed enemy weapons and blew up those enemy 

weapons they couldn’t carry. The support group fired on the remaining 

Mujahideen forward security posts in order to draw their fire while the 

raiding groups withdrew into the darkness. The raid was successful, 

developed good intelligence information and proved that there was a 

way to get around those sanctimonious meatheads in Kabul who were 
Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta -- Spetsnaz Strike 33

so nervous about border fighting. It was time to begin planning for the 

main event. 

Getting ready for the Main Event 

The information from the raid and from the Mujahideen “tongue” 

helped develop a picture of how Krer was defended. LTC Babushkin 

began planning a feint and end-run designed to destroy Krer base. The 

attack would go in on the afternoon and night of 30 March 1986. The 

334th and 154th Spetsnaz battalions would conduct the attack. They 

would be supported by a platoon of 122mm D-30 howitzers and a BM-21 

multiple rocket launcher from the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. 

DRA and KHAD troops would accompany the raid. 

The staffs of the two battalions began working together on details 

of the plan. Grisha Bykov’s 334th Spetsnaz Battalion would travel from 

Asadabad to the District Capital of Sarkani on armored personnel 

carriers. There, they would cross the river, move to the mountain and 

then dismount and climb. Their personnel carriers would cover their 

advance as they climbed up the same northern crest where they had 

earlier conducted the reconnaissance raid. They would advance up 

this crest while drawing Mujahideen attention to their approach. Roma 

Abzalimov’s 154th Spetsnaz Battalion would move from Jalalabad to the 

ferry site on armored personnel carriers. The artillery would accompany 

them. The carriers and artillery would remain on the western bank. 

The raiders would ferry across the river and secretly advance along 

the southern ridge while the Mujahideen were focused on the northern 

advance. In the morning, both battalions would link-up on Spina ridge 

near Spina Tsoka peak. They would destroy Mujahideen weapons, 

ammunition and fortifications as they advanced. Once they seized the 

ridge and linked up, they would remain for the day, destroying the base, 

and then withdraw under the cover of darkness. 

The battalions conducted mission training, issued ammunition and 

inspected equipment for the raid. Unfortunately, there was an outbreak 

of hepatitis in the 154th Spetsnaz battalion.7

 Even after drafting cooks, 

clerks and other battalion support personnel, the battalion could only 

muster 150 combat-effective personnel for the mission. Lieutenant Oleg 

Mart’yanov’s 3rd Company was the strongest with some 70 personnel. 

The 1st Company was second strongest and it was lead by Lieutenant 

Udovichenko, the deputy company commander. The 2nd Company was 

down to two platoons and moved with the battalion headquarters. 

The Raid Begins in the North 

The weather was still cold and the mountaintops were covered 

with snow. Commander Assadullah, the Krer commandant, could 

see a column of Soviet and DRA vehicles approach Sarkani in the late 
34 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

afternoon. They moved through the town and across the Nawabad 

Bridge. They headed toward his northern ridge—the main approach 

route into Krer base and the expected route of enemy attack. Heavy 

fighting broke out as the Soviets dismounted and began to attack the 

forward security positions under the covering fire of their armored 

personnel carriers. Darkness fell and fighting continued. The 334th 

Battalion had a local guide, but the battalion got lost in the darkness and 

finally ended up climbing a flank of the ridge. Getting lost was lucky 

since the Mujahideen concentrated murderous heavy machine gun 

and recoilless rifle fire against the expected Spetsnaz route of advance. 

The Spetsnaz approached the Mujahideen positions from the flank and 

systematically took them out with hand grenades. Still, both sides took 

heavy casualties as they slugged it out in the night. 

One of the Mujahideen groups that the 334th bumped into was not 

from the regiment guarding Krer. Ahamadullah Wejdani and his group 

of 16 Mujahideen were returning from Pakistan to their base in the Pech 

Valley of Kunar Province. They were armed with two PK machine guns 

and 15 AK-47 rifles. They were carrying a large load of ammunition and 

a battery-operated megaphone. They had tried to cross the river earlier, 

but the ferry operator warned them of DRA and Soviet military activity in 

the area. They decided to return to Pakistan and wait for things to calm 

down. On the way back to Pakistan, they formed a defensive perimeter 

and camped for the night. About ten PM, they heard noises that sounded 

like a stampede of wild hogs. They jumped to their feet and, in a flash 

of lightning, saw a large group of soldiers below them climbing in their 

direction. 

Ahamadullah Wejdani put his men in position to open fire on the 

soldiers during the next lightning flash. Moments later, the target was 

illuminated by lightning and they opened up on the Spetsnaz. The 

Spetsnaz returned fire and the Mujahideen ceased fire and withdrew 

up the hill. They lost their megaphone during the withdrawal. After 

the Mujahideen climbed some 300 meters, they settled in to repeat the 

process. They heard the squeal from their megaphone and realized that 

the Spetsnaz were in their old positions and playing with the megaphone. 

They opened fire on their old position and started to climb again. They 

systematically withdrew up the mountain, firing at the Spetsnaz and then 

moving out of the path of return fire. 

The Raid Begins in the South

 The 154th Spetsnaz Battalion left Jalalabad on the night of 29 March 

and arrived at the ferry-crossing site in the morning. The battalion 

dismounted and began to cross. The armored vehicles and artillery 

stayed on the western bank. The ferry was old and it took four hours to 
Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta -- Spetsnaz Strike 35

get the raiding party across. Then the group started to climb the plateau 

and moved toward the mountains. The second platoon leader of the 1st 

Company had to be replaced since he had come down with hepatitis. 

By nightfall, the southern raiding group started climbing the mountain. 

It was tough going and the group that was having the most trouble was 

the 20-man rear guard composed of DRA and KHAD troops. They were 

out of shape and refused to keep up. When the rear guard commander, 

Lieutenant N. Zubkov, radioed his problem to the battalion commander, 

Captain Roma Abzalimov replied “Abandon them. Screw them.” When 

Zubkov relayed this to the reluctant warriors from the KHAD, they realized 

that being abandoned in Mujahideen territory might be unpleasant and 

suddenly were able to keep up with the battalion. 

The terrain was rugged and the climb was tough. At several places, 

the only way the soldiers could climb up was by standing on each other’s 

shoulders. Thanks to the attack by the 334th Battalion, the 154th Battalion 

was able to climb to the top of the mountain undetected. They reached 

the Spina crest shortly before dawn. The company commanders and 

battalion commander were deciding on how to seize and occupy the 

area when a loudspeaker broke the early calm. The loudspeaker 

was waking the faithful and calling them to morning prayers. The 3rd 

Company immediately assaulted a Mujahideen firing position they 

discovered during the ascent. 

The battalion moved across the Spina crest, seizing well-constructed, 

amply-supplied Mujahideen fighting positions and digging in. By 0400 

hours, the 154th Battalion controlled the Spina crest and could fire down 

at the Mujahideen trapped below them. They overran the bases and 

supply depot and captured a lot of ammunition and many Mujahideen 

heavy machine guns and RPGs. The 1st Company moved onto the 

heights where it could dominate all the approaches into the camp from 

Pakistan. The company began to dig in some 700 meters inside Pakistan. 

The Spetsnaz controlled the area. Ahamadullah Wejdani’s group was still 

fighting a systematic retreat but was now out of ammunition and could 

see the signal rockets of the Spetsnaz above them. He gathered his men 

and withdrew through a side canyon and headed into Pakistan. 

Counterattack

Dawn broke and the winter sun warmed the troops of the 154th 

Battalion. Another lieutenant fell to hepatitis and had to be replaced. 

Around 0730 hours, 40 Mujahideen came strolling toward the 1st 

Company positions inside Pakistan. They were chattering and relaxed 

and many of them were at sling arms. When they were about 70 meters 

from the 1st Company, the Spetsnaz opened up on them. Some 15 
36 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

fell and the rest jumped behind the shelter of some rocks. About 40 

minutes later, some trucks began to move toward them from the town 

of Bajuar. When the 154th Battalion overran the Krer bases and supply 

depot earlier, Commander Assadullah had hurriedly crossed over 

to the Mujahideen camps in Bajuar to raise a relief force. That relief 

force was now loaded on the trucks. The Spetsnaz called artillery fire 

on the Mujahideen as they began to dismount from the trucks into an 

assembly area. The artillery fire slowed the Mujahideen down, but the 

Mujahideen counterattack was beginning. Soon the Mujahideen assault 

fire was so thick that the Spetsnaz had to hold their assault rifles up over 

the rocks and fire back blindly. The Mujahideen approached closer 

to the Spetsnaz. Lieutenant Osobenko continued to adjust artillery but 

it was not falling close enough to allow the Spetsnaz to break contact. 

Osobenko finally called the artillery on top of his own position. 

After a brief radio argument with the brigade commander, the 

rounds slammed onto the Spetsnaz position. The surviving Spetsnaz 

withdrew pell-mell. The Mujahideen now controlled the high ground 

and were firing directly into the command post of the 154th Battalion. 

It was now 1045 hours and the 1st and 2nd Companies were combat 

ineffective. Radio calls for help from the 3rd Company went unanswered. 

The 334th Battalion was still below the 154th Battalion and there were 

an increasing number of Mujahideen moving into the gap between the 

two battalions. The Brigade Commander finally requested helicopter 

gun ship and medevac assistance—disclosing his unauthorized raid to 

the high command. But as the first medevac helicopter approached 

the 154th Battalion, it was unable to land due to the intensity of the 

Mujahideen fire. 

Enter the Gun ships 

Commander Assadullah’s counterattack was going well. While some 

of his force overran the defending 1st Company of the 154th Battalion, 

the bulk of his force infiltrated through concealed approaches into Krer. 

His gunners occupied the high ground and fired down into the disjointed 

Spetsnaz. Commander Assadullah’s six-man security group bumped 

into the command group of the 1st Company and killed a Soviet officer 

during the fierce AK and grenade fight. The 154th Battalion was falling 

apart and only air strikes and artillery could save the pieces. 

Finally, Soviet helicopter gunships arrived overhead. Lt. Osobenko, 

who had survived the artillery strike on his own position, was now inside 

an adobe building with other Soviet wounded. Mujahideen were on the 

roof tossing F-1 hand grenades at the building doorway. LTC Babushkin 

directed Lt. Osobenko to adjust helicopter gunship fire. Lt. Osobenko 
Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta -- Spetsnaz Strike 37

called the helicopter flight leader and asked him them to hit various 

targets. Instead, the pilot answered “I am not allowed to because of the 

international border.” Then the helicopters made a dry run over the 

area, but did not fire. They did this six or seven more times and then, 

after a half hour of dry runs, a quiet, ice-cold voice spoke over the radio 

“I am tail number 25 and I am ready to fire. Give me the target.” 

Lt. Osobenko directed the gunship runs. They first cleared the 

Mujahideen from the roof of the building in which Osobenko and the 

wounded were sheltering. Then the helicopters flew repeated lowlevel gun runs at the Mujahideen. The helicopters stayed on station 

until darkness. The surviving Spetsnaz began dragging their dead and 

wounded downhill as they moved to link up with the 334th Battalion. 

Policing the battlefield 

The helicopter gunship strikes and artillery fire had saved the 154th 

Battalion from certain annihilation, but their trial was not over. Two 

companies of the 334th Battalion pushed up the mountain to link up with 

the 154th. These companies helped carry out the dead and wounded of 

the 154th. The nearest spot that helicopters could set down that was not 

controlled by the Mujahideen was on hill 1917—about ten kilometers 

away. This was not a regular landing zone, rather a rock ledge where a 

helicopter could touch down with one wheel on the ledge while ground 

troops threw the dead and wounded into the troop compartment. As 

the night passed, one of the companies of the 334th went back up the 

mountain to look for the dead and wounded. 

The morning of the 1st of April dawned as the company pushed 

forward. Soviet air and artillery strikes were pounding the Krer region. 

Later in the morning, Soviet helicopters landed the air assault battalion 

of the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade from Jalalabad. The 

troops of the 66th and the 154th were able to find and evacuate more 

Soviet dead, wounded and missing. Two patrols of the 334th strayed into 

Pakistan and discovered a Pakistani border security post apparently 

abandoned by the Pakistani border guards with the advent of the 

fighting. Finally, on the morning of 2 April, the Soviets abandoned the 

search for their two remaining missing Soviet Spetsnaz and withdrew 

completely from the fight.

Aftermath

Mujahideen casualties among the Krer regiment were 33 killed and 

40 wounded (about 25 percent of the regiment’s pre-battle strength). 

Exact casualty figures from the Mujahideen counter-attack force are 

not known. Soviet casualties have not been released. Two Soviets 

hid in one of the supply caves after the general Soviet withdrawal and 
38 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

were eventually killed following a prolonged fight. The Soviets never 

recovered their bodies. The Mujahideen captured some 60 Soviet small 

arms and felt that Soviet casualties were at least 60. Indications are that 

they were much higher. 

The Soviet 40th Army forbad any future attacks on Krer (although 

they attacked again in December 1987). The over-blown Soviet estimates 

of Mujahideen losses were over 300 casualties and they also reported the 

lurid, but fictitious, account of the Mujahideen execution of Commander 

Assadullah and his deputy for letting the base be overrun. Soviet afteraction reports also incorrectly stated that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the 

leader of the major Islamic Party faction, personally led the fighting on 

31 March.8

LTC Babushkin and his officers were quickly called on the carpet 

for an official investigation of the cross-border fight. The colonel and 

his officers were waiting for a helicopter to Kabul in a Jalalabad airfield 

hanger. Lieutenant Osobenko approached some aviators and said 

“Guys, who’s the fag who flies tail number 25?” 

The aviators stared back at him and LTC Tseloval’nik answered 

“That’s my bird. Do you have a problem with it?” 

“Yeah, what’s the idea of leaving us stranded for a half-hour while 

you made all those dry-fire runs?’ 

LTC Tseloval’nik replied, “As soon as we returned to this airbase, 

we began reloading and refueling our aircraft. Uniformed KGB officers 

immediately approached me and said ‘Explain to us, Lieutenant Colonel, 

who gave you the right to conduct combat beyond the border?’ I looked 

back at them with astonishment and denied doing so. The military 

prosecutor who was with the KGB stated ‘There was a group across 

the border and you provided fire support for them.’ ‘That cannot be,’ 

replied. ‘Here, listen to the flight recorder tapes.’ They listened to our 

tapes and heard your requests and our denials over and over again.” 

The aviators had played this charade for a half hour, then shut off the 

tapes and provided fire support. 

The inquiry found against LTC Babushkin and he was relieved of 

command and sent back to the Soviet Union. Commander Assadullah 

rebuilt the Krer base and it was soon supplying the Mujahideen in 

northeast Afghanistan again. The Pakistani Strategic Studies Review, which 

provided detailed coverage of the war reported in April on the Krer 

fighting. “Soviet forces launched air-cum-ground attack on Mujahideen 

base in Krer area killed 26 Mujahideen destroyed their entire armament 

and lost 42 men after 15 hours fighting March 26. Mujahideen killed 70 

Kabul and 50 Soviet troops and lost 42 men in their bid to break SovietKabul encirclement of Soran base in Krer area of Sarkani District March 
Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta -- Spetsnaz Strike 39

28-31.9 Mujahideen repulsed Soviet attack after hours of occupation 

of their base in Krer after inflicting heavy losses and capturing three 

Soviet troops during 48 hours fighting March 30-31.” After all the Soviet 

concern about cross-border operations, the Pakistani authorities were 

either unaware that the Soviets had crossed their international border or 

did not want to make an issue of it. 

Krer was a major stationary depot and had to be defended—the 

antithesis of guerrilla war. To hold the base, the Mujahideen built their 

defenses around heavy crew-served weapons and well-positioned 

permanent fighting positions. These protected them from Soviet aircraft 

and artillery fire. But Krer was not protected from well-trained Soviet 

light infantry who moved at night. The Mujahideen felt that Soviets did 

not fight well at night and would not fight at long distances from their 

armored personnel carriers. The Spetsnaz were the exception and they 

succeeded in overrunning Krer. However, since they did this in secret, 

they were unable to mass Soviet fire power in support until it was too late. 

The Spetsnaz vendetta ended badly—as uncontrolled actions by elite 

forces often do. 

________________________________________

1. Source of the Soviet information in Sergei Kozlov, “Karera: Novyy vzglyad” [Krer: A New 

Look], Soldat udachi [Soldier of Fortune], Number 7, 1997, pages 4-9 and 41. His account 

is based on interviews with four officer participants. The map is based on a Russian map 

from this article.

2. Asama Ben Zaid was a close companion of the Prophet Mohammad and one of the 

prophet’s military leaders. At one point, Asama Ben Zaid fought the Byzantines.

3. Commander Assadullah gave an interview to the authors. His account of the battle is in 

Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics 

in the Soviet-Afghan War, Quantico: USMC Study DM-980701, 1998, 327-330. The source 

for other Mujahideen information in this article is an unpublished interview conducted by Ali 

Jalali in the summer of 1998 with Ahamadullah Wejdani, a Mujahideen Commander from 

the Kahlis faction.

4. The 15th Spetsnaz Brigade codename was the 150th Spetsnaz Brigade. 

5. The 334th Spetsnaz Battalion was also known as the 334th Separate Spetsnaz 

Detachment and the Asadabad battalion. Its code name was the 500th Spetsnaz Detachment or battalion. 

6. The 154th Spetsnaz Battalion was also known as the 154th Separate Spetsnaz Detachment. Its code name was the 100th Spetsnaz Detachment or battalion. 

7. Viral hepatitis was common among Soviet forces and often incapacitated entire units. 

It was a product of poor field sanitation–particularly the failure of cooks to wash their 

hands thoroughly after defecating. During 1980, the entire 5th Motorized Rifle Division in 

the Western corridor of Afghanistan was rendered combat ineffective by hepatitis. See 

Lester W. Grau and Dr. William A. Jorgensen, “Medical Support in a Counter-Guerrilla War: 

Epidemiologic Lessons Learned in the Soviet-Afghan War,” U.S. Army Medical Department 

Journal, May-June 1995. 

8. Krer was garrisoned by fighters from the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan 

faction. 

9. Strategic Studies Review, April 1986, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
40 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Small Secrets of 

Great Mountains

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) 

based on the work of Ikram Nazarov 

This article first appeared in the May-June 2010 Infantry Magazine

Usual military mountain training focuses on individual climbing skills. 

How to place pitons, how to rappel down slopes, how to tie knots, how to 

ascend and descend steep rock faces or cross loose fields of scree (rock 

fragments) or shelves of snow. Armies, however, do not fight as individuals. 

They fight as units and so mountain training should concentrate on unit 

movement and unit fighting in the mountains. Units should learn to climb, 

to fire and to maneuver by teams, squads and platoons. The people who 

support the infantry— the gunners, the sappers, the logisticians and the 

transporters also need training in mountain movement and mountain combat skills. It is particularly beneficial when they accompany the Infantry 

for this training. 

Ikram Nazarov is a mountaineer instructor/trainer with more than 

forty years experience in military mountaineering. He was involved in 

training Soviet units for mountain combat during the Soviet-Afghan War 

and has trained Russian units for the mountains of Chechnya. Now he is 

working with the Army of Uzbekistan imparting mountaineering skills. 

He published the following article in the May 2008 issue of the Russian

Armeyskiy sbornik (Army Digest).1 The article demanded translation 

so that it can reach a wider audience. Although the Russian Army and the 

US Army train and fight differently, there is much in it that is of use to the 

American mountain soldier.

I

n the mountains, the time set to depart on a mission and to

 return to camp is law. If a group of mountain soldiers has not returned by the deadline, it is an emergency, and dozens, if not hundreds, 

of people will have to work under extreme conditions to find the 

“lost expedition.” In general, there are strict laws in the mountains: 

discipline above all; never leave a comrade who has fallen off a rock 

face; and, if you have to, sacrifice your own life to save him.
Small Secrets of Great Mountains 41

Another rule is that the shortest soldier always leads the column 

and everyone else keeps in step with him. In the mountains, the pace 

of movement depends on stride length. If a column is led by a soldier 

who is six foot six, his stride length will be a lot for even for a person 

of average height to keep up with. A trailing short soldier will have to 

run, not walk. The soldier at the end of the line will soon begin to lag 

behind; which, by the way, is absolutely forbidden. Remember, the 

pace of movement must always be the same throughout the column.

Your right and left legs have different stride lengths, so in the dark 

or in a thick fog you will always move a little off the track. Therefore 

you have to adjust the direction of your movement frequently. 

Mountain sickness can be a problem. There is only one way to 

deal with it—soldiers must train regularly at altitude over several years. 

Only a person who is physically fit, acclimated and trained to fight in 

the mountains need not fear this sickness.

Remember, do not leave any trash whatsoever behind. It is fairly 

easy for an experienced enemy to determine that your unit is there and 

how large it is from discarded items, chocolate wrappers and empty 

cans. It goes without saying that the enemy should not even guess that 

your group is in the mountains on a combat mission until the very last 

moment.

Get your soldiers accustomed to mountain wind, foul weather, 

sun and frost. Only then will your soldiers look on foul weather as an 

everyday occurrence. This is a factor for victory in battle. Foul weather 

is always an obstacle to your enemy as well.

You must train your soldiers so that they automatically select 

the best sites and firing positions. Small-arms firing is difficult in the 

mountains. It is difficult to fire accurately from one rock face at another, 

since you have to factor in meteorological conditions and your distance 

perception is distorted in the mountains.2

 

Remember that the best position for firing in the mountains is the 

prone position. You should always press as hard as possible against the 

rock face so that you are almost invisible. If, however, you decide to 

shoot while sitting or standing, a good shooter is sure to spot you and 

you can be sure he won’t miss. The mountain units of foreign armies 

have spent years developing a well-worked-out technique for training 

Jägers.

What gear should you to take to the mountains? The law here is 

to take only the absolute necessities. Anything extra is going to be 

a drag on you both on the march and during the fight. I know from 

experience that when you first come into contact with the enemy, you 
42 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

will not be able to assume a firing position rapidly, much less change 

it. So all these jumar ascenders,3 descent and arresting devices, pretty 

backpacks with hundreds of pockets, artificial warmers, and Chinese 

flashlights are simply going to end up discarded in the mountains.

Remember that your gear should depend on the mountain terrain 

and how you’re your target is located. In a combat situation, you should 

take a climbing rope, a 20-25 foot reepschnur,4

 two-three carabiners,5

a pair of climbing irons, glasses, and a pick. The carabiners are used 

for descent and for a lot more. The reepschnur can be used in lieu of 

jumar ascenders and descenders, and the pick can do everything: cut 

out steps in the ice, chip a stone off a rock face, arrest a fall from a rock 

face, or kill the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.

Be cautious about using imported gear. I know from experience 

that foreign carabiners such as the French- and German-manufactured 

Irbit have failed when someone falls from a rock face, if the gate has to 

bear the load. Remember that there is nothing better or more reliable 

than our Abalakovsky carabiner.

Footwear is important. In 1959, I hiked to the 22,906-foot Revolyutsiya Peak in ordinary felt boots and was comfortable, but when I 

went up the face a second time in shoes, my feet were cold. You need 

to choose climbing footwear very carefully, especially when going 16-

20,000 feet or higher. Above all, remember to put Tricouni nails on 

your hiking footwear.6 For example, some soldiers in Afghanistan’s 

mountains did not put on Tricounis because they are fairly heavy and 

seem awkward at first. Many of these soldiers paid for this with their 

lives. And you will not, by the way, find better footwear than Tricouni.

With regards to cosmetics, remember that veteran mountain 

soldiers do not need creams, ointments or lip balm for protection 

against sunburn or the wind. It is only over time that wind and sun 

“harden” the skin and lips stop chapping. That is why I recommend 

that it is better to take a first-aid kit with a good variety of medications 

instead of cosmetics.7

Under no circumstances should you take alcohol with you on a 

mission to the mountains. The popular belief is that it warms you up in 

extreme cold. Take my word for it, this is an illusion. A person who has 

been drinking, and is tired after a long march to boot, will sleep like the 

dead in the cold and will not realize that he is freezing to death.

Remember to always have a sentry in the mountains. This is 

critical for ensuring that you accomplish your mission and return 

alive. Vigilance must be at the highest level. Anyone who fought 

in Afghanistan knows a lot of examples of weary soldiers assigned 
Small Secrets of Great Mountains 43

to sentry duty who fell asleep while on watch. The result was that 

the sentry, along with the unit, never did wake up: the Mujahideen 

slaughtered the sleeping soldiers like sheep, without firing a single 

shot.

And the main thing, in the mountains the commander should 

always be the most experienced and respected person. At least that 

is how it should be. Disaster is inevitable otherwise. The commander’s 

professionalism as both a soldier and a mountaineer should therefore 

be head-and-shoulders above any rank-and-file soldier. This is the 

guarantee that all his orders will be carried out without fail.

The professionalism of the rank-and-file soldier is something that 

he gains only through years of hard combat training and systematic 

drills, as well as in marches and tactical exercises. In the final analysis, 

this is how all soldiers learn teamwork.

Remember that there is yet another rule in the mountains. Each 

soldier does what he is better at doing than anyone else. The soldier 

who knows about radio equipment is in charge of the radio and 

communications. Another soldier can always manage to light a fire in 

the mountains. He is in charge of campfires and oil stoves. The soldier 

who is best at stanching blood and bandaging a wounded comrade 

takes care of the wounded. The best shot has the sniper rifle and so 

on.

Nazarov’s tips seem like common sense, but they are common sense 

developed over forty years of mountaineering experience. The ancient 

Roman legionaires used to call themselves “Marius’ mules” (muli mariani). 

The Emperor Gaius Marius (157-86 BC) initiated sweeping organizational 

reforms and greatly reduced the size of the logistics train by requiring 

each legionnaire to carry his armor, weapons, 15 days of rations (grain) 

and other gear. This onerous load weighed somewhere between 50 and 

60 pounds. The normal days march was about 20 miles. The Roman 

Legion spent little time in the mountains. Today, the American infantryman 

goes into the mountains of Afghanistan carrying 85 pounds or more of 

light-weight gear. Afghans jokingly call the US Infantry the “heavy mules.” 

After all these centuries, the soldier’s load is still important—particularly 

in the mountains. 

________________________________________

1. Ikram Nazarov, “Malenkie secreti bol’shikh gor” [Small secrets of Great Mountains], 

Armeyskiy sbornik [Army Digest], May 2008, pages 35-36.

2. Small-arms fire invariably goes over the target when firing uphill or downhill. This can 

be corrected through training, but most armies only conduct marksmanship training on flat 

land.
44 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

3. A Jumar is a rope ascending/descending device that was first manufactured by the 

Swiss in the 1950s. It is a metal devise that fits on a rope and has a cam that allows the 

device to slide freely in one direction.

4. The Russians adopted a variety of German technical climbing words, among them 

reepschnur or rope-cord. This refers to an auxiliary cord five to six millimeters in diameter.

5. A carabiner (karabiner in German) is a metal loop (snap-link) with a spring-gate or 

screw-gate. 

6. Tricouni nails (edge nails) are manufactured in Geneva, Switzerland, and are mounted 

on the sides of the soles of nailed climbing boots. They mount under the balls of the feet, 

toes and heel.

7. Sunscreen and Chapstick© are still essential until one develops a leather face.
Flanking Detachment in the Mountains 45

Flanking Detachment 

In The Mountains: 

A Soviet Experience

LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) 

This article first appeared in the May-June 2010 Infantry Magazine.

Defending mountain terrain has its own challenges. Mountains offer 

good observation, but the terrain also blocks observation, particularly 

close up. Mountains offer good long-range fields of fire, but mountains 

are also full of dead space and concealment. Mountain defenses are not 

continuous, but are normally separate outposts and fighting positions 

which may be mutually supporting, but usually are not. They are often 

not even in the same plane. Mountain fighting positions are difficult to 

construct and maintain. Mountain fighting positions can be stockpiled 

with ammunition, but food and water quickly runs out at these positions 

and food and water are normally supplied in the villages and hamlets 

down in the mountain valleys and canyons. Consequently, in Afghanistan, 

the Mujahideen usually congregated in the valley except when they felt 

threatened. Some security was maintained at the fighting positions, 

but this was usually slack without indications or intelligence of enemy 

actions.

Attacking in the mountains has its own set of problems. First, the enemy 

holds the high ground and, if he has occupied the area for any time, he 

has had time to establish fighting positions and emplace long-range crewserved weapons such as mortars, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and 

even direct-lay artillery. He has had time to reinforce the defenses with 

mines and other obstacles. Entries into the mountain valley or canyon 

are limited and liable to interdiction by a skilled defender. Still, the 

irregular mountain terrain offers distinct advantages to the attacker. The 

enemy is seldom able to mass fires; the terrain offers numerous concealed 

attack approaches to defending positions. Enemy withdrawal will be by 

small groups and he will often be forced to abandon heavy weapons, 

ammunition stockpiles and wounded.
46 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

A FRONTAL ATTACK...IS NOT RECOMMENDED

by Major V. A. Selivanov1

I

n April 1985, according to intelligence reports, there was a significant 

grouping of the armed opposition concentrated in the Mazlirud 

and Kakh Canyons. Their number was estimated at 1,200. Besides 

assault rifles, this group had 35-40 DShK heavy machine guns and up 

to 15 ZU anti-aircraft machine guns as well as mortars, recoilless rifles 

and rockets.2

 The main body of the enemy (400-600 men) was located 

in the village of Malakhairu. The general situation was complicated 

by the fact that earlier large-scale operations in the area showed that 

surprise was not possible and that, other than the casualties inflicted, 

the results were insignificant. The main body of the enemy, as a rule, 

managed to withdraw from the canyon before our troops arrived. The 

enemy had managed to establish a significant, well-constructed system 

of observation and early warning. Further, this region was particularly 

unsuited for air assaults and military vehicles could enter the canyon 

only on one road which ran through Mazilishakhr, Zagan, and Malakhairu 

(see map on following page).3

Considering the peculiarities of the region, during planning, 

our battalion commander determined to carry out the mission in the 

following fashion. We were briefed at an officers’ call that at 1330 hours 

on the 9th of April, the bronegruppa of the main body would move from 

its base camp along the road from the south with the mission of closing 

in to the village of Mazlishakhr by 1800 hours.4 My parachute company 

was ordered to support the departure and movement of the march 

column. Then, after the column had passed, my company was to return 

to garrison to carry out guard duty. The combat action, planned for the 

10th and 11th of April, was to destroy the enemy grouping by moving the 

bronnegruppa to link up with its paratroopers who would move from the 

west into the valley.

However, at noon on the 7th of April, my regimental commander, 

without any witnesses, gave me an order for a totally different plan.5

The new mission was a follows: at 1600 hours on 8 April, my parachute 

company would serve as a flanking detachment, and without attracting 

any attention, would secretly move to the region of Khakfakhai village 

in order to conduct a route reconnaissance for movement through the 

Afedshakh Pass. With the advent of darkness, I would leave my combat 

vehicles on the road, go on foot through the pass, enter into the Mazirrud 

valley and, by dawn, occupy positions on Khaduzan Mountain. At 

dawn on 9 April, I would be in position to adjust artillery fire and direct 

close air support with the goal of creating panic among the assembled 
Flanking Detachment in the Mountains 47

Mujahideen and not allowing them to exit the canyon before the main 

body struck them. While carrying out this mission, very strict attention 

had to be paid to the secret movement and independent actions since 

it would be impossible to support my detachment in case we were 

discovered.

At 1800 hours on the 8th of April, my company was assembled in 

the designated area near Khakfakhai village. Soon, our observation 
48 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

disclosed that groups of armed men periodically moved on the path 

through the Afedshakh Pass. There was also a group of eight Mujahideen 

located in a guard post on that very same pass. Everything appeared 

calm in the target area. Everyone discussed it and agreed that the 

“ghosts” [Mujahideen] were not expecting our force. With the onset of 

darkness, we conducted a radio check with our armored vehicles and 

our higher headquarters and then I gave the order to begin movement.

We crossed through the pass by 2200 hours, bypassing the guard 

post to the south without drawing the attention of the Mujahideen. 

During night time, this post was a main [security] link. They were tied in 

with other posts using a complex system of varying signals. Even though 

these “stinkers” were one of the [security] links, we bypassed them 

literally in 15 minutes.

Just as we began to descend into the canyon, we lost radio contact 

with our company bronnegruppa and with our higher headquarters. 

By all rules of military science, I must immediately either restore 

communications or return.6

 But then our company’s combat mission 

would not be accomplished. Therefore, I made a decision to continue 

to move and to restore communications once we reached high ground. 

I had to make this decision because I knew that if the Mujahideen 

discovered our company at night, we could only count on ourselves for 

help.

From the depths of the canyon, we heard the noise of night firing. We 

were convinced that the Mujahideen were not expecting the appearance 

of our force and had occupied their fighting positions to sort things out 

[conducted an alert]. At midnight, we entered the hamlet of Gusak. 

This is where I, the company commander, made a mistake that might 

have compromised all our measures for secrecy. Despite the ample 

number of night-vision devices that we had, we discovered too late 

that there were two Mujahideen patrols that we barely avoided running 

into. Taking necessary precautions, we lost about two hours before we 

exited the village. At 0300 hours, the company assembled at the foot of 

Khaduzan Mountain.

The heavens were clear and things were now visible thanks to the 

appearance of the moon. This additional lighting “worked” to the enemy’s 

advantage and forced us to hurry up. The first platoon, commanded by 

Senior Lieutenant A. Mikenin, climbed the mountain. After an hour, he 

reported that his platoon had occupied positions on the heights. I placed 

two platoons, under the command of Senior Lieutenant V. Plotnikov, in an 

ambush directed against the hamlet of Gusak, and I followed the path of 

the first platoon to the top. We established our primary observation post 
Flanking Detachment in the Mountains 49

on height 2705.0. I placed Lieutenant Mikenin’s platoon on the northern 

slope and I placed the other two platoons on the southern slope. From 

these positions, they could also interdict paths on the eastern side and 

partially on the western side, while blocking enemy bands located in the 

hamlet of Gusak. 

At 0500 hours, we were prepared to carry out our mission. At that 

time we were able to reestablish radio contact. Our under-strength 

paratrooper company had secretly crossed 12 kilometers of enemycontrolled territory, assembled in the rear of a strong enemy force 

and taken the commanding heights. It should be noted that the secret 

movement of my company was key to the success of the action and the 

complete lack of company casualities.

On the morning of 9 April, the bronnegrupa of the main body of the 

battalion inconspicuously passed through the village of Mazilishakhr and 

began to enter the canyon. Instantly, the signal (three individual shots) 

repeatedly rang from the mountain slopes from the north to the south 

and even the west. It announced the arrival of our force. Some 15 to 20 

minutes after the signal, a band of 120-200 men emerged from the hamlet 

of Gusak and began to advance on my company. When the Mujahideen 

were close to our second and third platoon positions, my paratroopers 

opened up on them. The deadly fire caught the enemy completely by 

surprise and inflicted such heavy casualties on them, that they were 

unable to offer resistance. The “ghosts” panicked and ran back into the 

hamlet.

At this point, I should note that the sun was in our eyes and it was 

hard to find the enemy. After five minutes, the Mujahideen suddenly 

launched an attempt to break out of the canyon to the northeast. I called 

artillery fire on them. Again, after a half hour, they attempted to bypass 

the company to the north and up the southern slope of height 2946.6, but 

they came under the fire of Senior Lieutenant Mikenin’s platoon.

From 1400-1500, we conducted two tactical air assaults [with the 

remaining two companies of paratroopers] on the western side of the 

canyon. The [bronnegruppa of the] main force, by this time, had already 

pushed through the hamlet of Gusak. The company’s mission was over.

Thinking over our combat action as a flanking detachment in the 

mountains of Afghanistan, I have arrived at several conclusions. First, 

in order to conduct combat in similar circumstances, it is necessary 

to plan to assign an element of the combat formation to be a flanking 

detachment. It will be able to secretly enter the flank or rear of the enemy 

without engaging in combat with small subunits and guard posts. It will 

be able to prevent the enemy withdrawal, hit him with a surprise attack 
50 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

to destroy him and his capabilities in order to facilitate the successful 

mission accomplishment of the main force.

The experience of conducting such operations shows that most 

successful flanking detachments are company-sized. Use well-trained 

subunits and personnel in forming the detachment. 

Second, the nature of mountainous terrain prevents small subunits 

from carrying heavy weapons and ammunition. At the same time, 

it is necessary to have sufficient fire power to conduct effective fires at 

various ranges. Besides our assault rifles and sniper rifles, my company 

carried one AGS-17 and a heavy machine gun.7

 In every squad, we 

had one AKM assault rifle with the under-barrel grenade launcher.8 Our 

ammunition load was 600-700 rounds per assault rifle and 1200 rounds 

for the machine gun. Our special gear included some night-vision 

devices.

The successful actions of a flanking detachment in the mountains 

are dependent on close, well-planned coordination with the forces 

and resources of the senior commander. Of primary importance is 

the support of artillery and aviation as well as agreement on the 

action with the main force before it departs to carry out its mission. 

Thus, in the course of combat it is impossible to fulfill the mission 

without reliable uninterrupted communications. Experience shows 

that in order to guarantee communications, it is better to establish 

retransmission stations or simply to use aircraft that are equipped 

for retransmission.

In conclusion, selection of company-grade officers for assignment to 

a flanking detachment requires care. You know that they will be required 

to make independent mission decisions while separated from the 

main body on unfamiliar territory that is controlled by the enemy. This 

requires detailed planning and thorough preparation as well as a high 

degree of individual training. In part, it is absolutely necessary that the 

commander has concrete experience working with maps, can quickly 

detect objectives in the mountains, determine the necessary data for 

their destruction, precisely direct the fires of his subordinate units, and 

skillfully use all possibilities for secret and sudden actions.

 ________________________________________

In this article, the Soviets conducted the apparent main attack with 

their armored vehicles moving into the canyon on the only road. This 

attack included the personnel carriers of two paratroop companies, 

attached tanks, and an attached battalion of self-propelled artillery. 

There was little infantry in this attack. The two airborne companies that 
Flanking Detachment in the Mountains 51

the armored vehicles belonged to conducted an air assault approximately 

six hours after the beginning of the supposed main attack to eliminate 

Mujahideen positions in the west and then to move into the canyon to link 

up with their vehicles. Helicopter gunships provided close air support to 

the air assault. The flanking detachment, which had inserted itself into the 

depths of the enemy position, was particularly useful in calling in artillery 

strikes and defeating an enemy advance and an enemy withdrawal attempt. 

Although the article provides no casualty figures, the flanking detachment 

suffered none while the Mujahideen did. 

There are some interesting aspects to this attack. The flanking 

detachment left its armored personnel carriers (bronnegruppa) at the 

dismount point. It was responsible for its own security and served as a 

mobile reserve in the event that the flanking detachment got into trouble, 

but once the flanking detachment was deep into enemy territory, the 

reserve role was problematic. A self-propelled artillery battery joined 

the bronnegrupa for the attack the following morning. The Soviets had 

entered this war with a limited ability to conduct split-Fire Direction Center 

operations. By 1986, this capability was well developed. Soviet artillery 

usually accompanied the ground attack since it was more accurate than jetaircraft in support in the mountains. Further, the artillery was often used in 

direct-lay against a stubborn enemy.

The flanking detachment was not part of the original battalion planning 

and was controlled by regiment. In the interests of operational security, 

the company’s role and presence were not disclosed to the rest of the 

battalion. The company was basically on its own for at least 15 hours except 

on-call artillery and close air support. Both require communications and 

were iffy at night. Communications were a problem and remain such in 

the mountains despite modern technology. Mountains absorb radio 

waves and distort GPS signals.9

 Satellite communications are spotty and 

a saavy opponent could jam the GPS and satellite telephone receivers in 

the mountains. Ground retransmission units are hard to move, emplace 

and defend and retransmission aircraft are few and seem to go down for 

maintenance at critical points.

The infantryman’s load remains a problem and in Afghanistan, where 

the bulk of engagements are beyond 500 meters, small-caliber supersonic 

bullets fired from short-barreled carbines are ineffective. The fight devolves 

to the machine gunners while the rest of the platoon tries to get involved. 

The Soviets issued the AK-74 with the thought that the infantryman could 

now carry more ammunition. Where possible, units such as this airborne 

unit, went back to the longer-range, medium weight 7.62 cartridge. Still, 

the weapons that the airborne carried did not give it an advantage over its 
52 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

opponent. The airborne company’s position on commanding terrain did.

Going into the mountains is critical to gaining the initiative and bringing 

the fight to the enemy’s sanctuary. Still, bulling into the mountain valleys 

and canyons without securing high ground or establishing a blocking 

force is futile. The lightly-equipped enemy will withdraw over familiar 

territory leaving his burdened attacker behind. Flanking detachments are 

an excellent way to shape the battlefield and hold the enemy in place for 

punishment. ________________________________________

1. Major V. A. Selivanov, “Nastupat’ v lob...ne rekomendyetsya” [A frontal attack...Is not 

recommend], Armeykiy Sbornik (Army Digest), October 2009, 21-22. 

2. The ZU is an anti-aircraft 23mm machine gun which comes in a single and dual-barrel 

model (the ZU-23-1 and ZU-23-2). 

3. All place names in this article have been changed. The Russian Army has become 

hyper-security conscious to the point where even place names connected with historic 

events in official accounts are now being changed. Fortunately, this silliness does not 

extend to the veterans who are no longer on active service.

4. The bronnegruppa [armored group] consists of the tanks and personnel carriers of a 

unit which, after the infantry has dismounted the carriers, are used as a separate reserve. 

It is usually commanded by the unit’s first deputy. In this case, the bronnegruppa has 

the BMPs of two companies (22 vehicles), probably at least two tank platoons (six tanks) 

and 12 self-propelled howitzers plus other vehicles supporting the mortar platoon, signal 

platoon and so on.

5. The Soviets always insured that orders and plans were witnessed and approved 

so that if things went wrong, the blame might be assigned or shifted. The regimental 

commander is undertaking a risky ploy, so he issues the order without any witnesses. 

Apparently, even the battalion commander does not know that one of his subordinate units 

has this mission. The company commander is on his own, if things go wrong.

6. The commander is already out there on his own without support and loses communication. By Soviet regulations, he is required to reestablish communications or abort 

the mission. This is a very risky decision.

7. The AGS-17 is a tripod-mounted 30mm automatic grenade launcher which fires 

rounds out to 1,700 meters. The machine gun was probably the 7.62mm PKM machine 

gun.

8. The GP-25 sub-barrel grenade launcher would fire a 40mm grenade out to 100 

meters. These paratroopers preferred the older AKM Kalashnikov, with its 7.62mm round 

over the newly issued AK-74 with its 5.45mm round. Combat in the mountains is longrange and requires a subsonic medium-weight bullet. The AK-74 was designed for close 

combat and has less range and punch over distance.

9. In the mountains, GPS accuracy can slip from a five-meter diameter circle to a 

500-meter diameter circle or more.
Cave Warfare 53

Cave Warfare

Ikram Karimov

This article first appeared in the February 2008 Armeisky sbornik 

While reading several installments of “Komandirsky praktikum” [“Practicum for Commanders”] in Armeisky sbornik [Army 

Digest], I could not help but notice some inaccuracies and even errors 

in both obstacle negotiation and ready positions for shooting. But it is 

not just a matter of a few mistakes. Unfortunately, I did not see the most 

important thing in “Komandirsky praktikum”: how to teach soldiers to 

fight in the mountains. I will therefore take the liberty of giving some 

examples of how a soldier should operate in so-called “cave warfare.”

To begin with, let me remind you that 1999 and 2000 were very 

tense years for Uzbekistan.1 Government troops were battling various 

separatist groups in the mountains. The telephone rang one evening 

and a Ministry of the Interior representative asked me to help prepare 

an operation to annihilate the separatists who were entrenched in the 

mountains and, while I was at it, train the civilian Ministry of the Interior 

personnel who were going to be the first to take part in such an endeavor.

I agreed and called in Ulugbek Pulatov, my old fellow mountaineer 

soldier and former paratrooper. We met at the staff office at the Sarisiye 

airfield and were quickly briefed in military fashion. As it happened, a 

battle was being fought in the upper reaches of the Kshut River, below 

the village of Tamarkhut, and in retreating the insurgents had taken up a 

defensive position in a cave that was hard to reach. It was on a cliff, by 

the confluence of a lateral tributary of the river, where mountain ridges 

with ravines formed a triangle in whose upper section was the cave with 

the insurgents in it— located at a height of 1,000 feet.

The rebels were ideally located, from a professional point of view: 

they had a view of the entire stretch from the confluence to the mountain 

range peaks, so it was virtually impossible to approach them unobserved. 

The government wanted to use a helicopter in the operation, but the 

mountain terrain ruled out maneuvering, and there was too great a risk 

that the helicopter would be shot down.

After carefully studying the mountain terrain, Pulatov and I saw the 

only possible way: approach the cave from above. A helicopter would 
54 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

land our group above the cave in the mountain where there was a more 

or less suitable landing area. We would then cautiously approach the spot 

where the sheer wall of the ravine in which the cave is located begins. In 

order to reach the precise spot, Ministry of the Interior personnel would 

have to make corrections to our movement by radio from points located 

opposite the wall, from where the cave entrance could be seen fairly well.

They watched the insurgents before setting the time for the attack. 

They selected early morning when the enemy would all be asleep. A 

group of six Spetsnaz soldiers were assigned to the group, three of whom 

were to make a sudden descent by rope and hang above the cave.

They formed three-man rope teams: one person would descend, 

another would belay, and the third would provide covering fire. It was 

important to gain time to hang opposite the cave entrance, which is why 

we decided that the Spetsnaz soldier who would descend first and hang 

above the entrance would throw a grenade and a smoke canister into 

the cave. And while the enemy was recovering, the rest of the Spetsnaz 

soldiers would descend and finish off the insurgents with assault rifles 

and grenades.

And after that it would be a matter of technique: the rest of the 

combat team would rush into the cave and finish off the resisting rebels. 

The entire group therefore numbered 30, of which 15 would directly 

participate in the attack while the rest would be in the support group.

Soldiers who already had combat experience were picked for these 

groups. They underwent mountain training exercises for several days 

and then conducted a whole series of battle drills in which the Spetsnaz 

soldiers trained to operate in conditions that were very close to those in 

which they would soon be going into action (see figure).

Having trained the groups, we expected that we would participate 

directly in annihilating the rebels that were entrenched in the mountains. 

However, the operation leader thanked us for our help and said that 

he did not have the right to risk civilian lives. We found out later that 

everything went exactly according to our scenario using only the 

Spetsnaz soldiers: the insurgents were caught unawares and, unable to 

offer serious resistance, were annihilated.

So the textbook that I am preparing now has a “Cave Warfare” 

chapter that offers practical advice on organizing a mountain battle using 

natural shelters, including caves.

Caves are well hidden and generally camouflaged by nature itself 

with shrubs or trees. They are excellent shelter. In guerilla warfare, it 

is convenient to use them in defense or for setting up firing ambushes. 

At one time, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan made firing emplacements 
Cave Warfare 55

out of mountain caves in particularly important areas along valleys and 

roads.

There was a case in which the Mujahideen sealed off a cave 

entrance with a large stone several meters in size which they would lift 

with powerful lifting jacks whenever they wanted to shoot at a vehicle 

convoy of our “pourers” [fuel tankers] or at a motorized rifle company on 

the march. It was easy for them to monitor their enemy and shoot at us 

through the gap (embrasure) and then put the stone back in place after 
56 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

the attack. As a result, the mountain terrain on nearby slopes and ridges 

remained undisturbed. For a long time, both Afghan and Soviet soldiers 

who came under surprise fire could not understand how the Mujahideen 

managed to vanish so quickly in an unknown direction–until it dawned 

on them to set up a watch of the slope from which our units were fired on.

If an offensive is being planned, caves can be used as a supply 

storage base or a temporary infirmary, to keep prisoners in or a place 

for soldiers to rest in. Lastly, a cave can be turned into a convenient 

command post.

The Mujahideen in the Republic of Afghanistan made use of caves’ 

tactical features: their distance from populated places, concealment, 

good camouflage in mountain terrain, and the difficulty finding and 

destroying them. In the notorious Tora Bora caves, they constructed wide 

corridors, multi-level galleries and halls, convenient passageways to 

firing positions with vehicular delivery of ammunition, and rooms for a 

hospital, recreation and headquarters.2

I remember a difficult situation that occured in the spurs of a 

mountain range. The enemy had occupied a cave. It was clear from the 

regularity of their radio traffic, that the insurgents were entrenched there. 

At night, they would go down to a nearby river for water, and in the 

daytime, they recharged solar batteries. Both the terrain and the cave’s 

location were very similar to the one mentioned earlier. A small grassy 

slope with scrub went all the way up to the cave, and there was a small 

overhang— a rocky canopy that made it almost invisible.

We set up an ambush by the water. It was unsuccessful. Then in 

the morning, snipers opened fire on the lookouts and sentries from the 

ridges opposite, preventing the insurgents from detecting our soldiers in 

time. Our soldiers were, at that moment, rapidly descending by rope to 

the cave from above. Meanwhile, it was clear to everyone that as soon as 

just one of them appeared in front of the cave, they would be killed. But 

our soldiers were not only good mountaineers but experienced fighters 

as well. When they reached the cave canopy, they leaned forward as 

far as possible and threw grenades into the cave. The grenades were 

tethered to their right arms with cord.

When throwing a grenade on a cord, the distance and trajectory of its 

flight are measured visually. It takes systematic training to master this art. 

A grenade should not be thrown from the shoulder with a sweep of the 

hand but gently away from yourself, as if pushing it away, so that it swings 

like a pendulum into the cave. So when the grenade, like a pendulum, 

reaches the cave entrance and begins to swing inside, the end of the 

cord is released, thereby sending the grenade into free flight.
Cave Warfare 57

After the grenades exploded, the soldiers finished off the insurgents 

with assault rifles.

Experience shows that if the enemy continues to offer fierce 

resistance and shoot from deep within a cave, it is a good idea to use 

smoke canisters and teargas. A rocket-propelled anti-tank flame thrower 

(RPO) is particularly effective in this case. For example, in 1982, in 

Afghanistan, Captain S. Vlasenko successfully employed an RPO in a 

fight with Mujahideen who were entrenched in a cave near the town of 

Gogamunda (Jalalabad).

I conclude this article about techniques for annihilating an enemy 

that is entrenched in a cave by underscoring the following: the success 

of such actions depends first and foremost on the soldiers’ physical, 

psychological and combat readiness, how well equipped they are with 

mountain gear, means of communication, and lightweight weapons, 

and the skill level of the support (covering fire) group. Developing the 

necessary skills requires daily training in mountains or in mountain 

training centers. It makes sense to include subjects such as the specific 

features of combat to annihilate the enemy in mountain caves in the 

mandatory training program.

Other major factors for success in a mountain battle are selection of 

the right time of day and weather conditions, as well as the psychological 

effect of our combat on the enemy that is defending the cave. 

________________________________________

1. At this time, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were involved in fighting a 

bloody civil war against the Independence Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which had 

trained and equipped in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

2. The author is probably confusing the caves at Zhawar with those at Tora Bora.
58 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

The Soviets entered Afghanistan in late December 1979 to suppress a growing insurgency and to replace an out-of-control communist 

regime with another communist, pro-Moscow government. The Soviet 

government realized too late that they were then stuck in the middle 

of a civil war fighting guerrilla forces on some of the world’s toughest 

terrain. The Soviets had planned to merely prop up the Democratic 

Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and let the Afghan communist forces 

fight the Mujahideen guerrillas. Instead, the Soviets found their forces 

increasingly drawn into the battle—a nonlinear, unconventional battle 

which they were ill equipped or trained for.

The Soviet-Afghan War was primarily fought on the tactical level, 

but the strategic focus was a struggle by each side to strangle the others 

logistics lifeline. The Mujahideen and Soviets spent a great deal of time 

and energy defending their logistics network and attacking the other’s. 

The Mujahideen targeted the Soviet lines of communication-the crucial 

road network over which the Soviet and DRA supplies had to move 

and ambushed convoys or cut off roads at critical mountain passes. The 

Soviet attack on the Mujahideen logistics was done in two phases. From 

1980 until 1985, the Soviets sought to eliminate Mujahideen support in 

the countryside. 

Early in the war, Mujahideen logistics requirements were fairly 

simple and primarily concerned with ammunition resupply and 

evacuating the wounded. The rural population willingly provided food 

and shelter to the Mujahideen, who were usually neighbors. The Soviets 

bombed rural villages and granaries, destroyed irrigation systems and 

crops, destroyed herds and launched sweeps through the countryside, 

conscripting young men and destroying the village infrastructure. The 

Soviet leadership believed Mao Tse Tung’s dictum that the guerrilla lives 

TheCampaignfortheCaves: 

TheBattlesforZhawarin 

theSovietAfghanWar

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) 

and Ali Ahmad Jalali

This article first appeared in the September 2001 Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 59

in the population like a fish in water. They decided “to kill the fish by 

draining off the water.”1

Afghanistan became a nation of refugees as more than seven million 

people left their farms and fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran or to 

the cities of Afghanistan. The Mujahideen, who were used to living off the 

good will of the rural population, now had to transport rations as well as 

ammunition from Pakistan and Iran into Afghanistan.

The Mujahideen responded by establishing a series of supply depots, 

transfer depots and forward supply points logistics bases inside 

Afghanistan. These logistics facilities made it easier to provision the 

Mujahideen, but also had to be defended. The second Soviet phase 

was to find and destroy the Mujahideen logistics facilities. The odds are 

stacked against a defending guerrilla force since the attacker has the 

initiative, armored vehicles, air power and the bulk of artillery and fire 

power. The Mujahideen tried to offset this with a wise use of terrain and 

prepared defenses.2

Zhawar was a Mujahideen logistics transfer base in Paktia Province 

in the eastern part of Afghanistan. It was located four kilometers from 

the Pakistan border and 15 kilometers from the major Pakistani forward 

supply base at Miram Shah. Zhawar began as a Mujahideen training 

center and expanded into a major Mujahideen combat base for supply, 

training and staging. The base was located inside a canyon surrounded 

by Sodyaki Ghar and Moghulgi Ghar mountains. The canyon opens 

to the southeast facing Pakistan. 

As the base expanded, Mujahideen used bulldozers and explosives 

to dig at least eleven major tunnels into the south-east facing ridge of 

Sodyaki Ghar Mountain. Some of these huge tunnels reached 500 

meters and contained a hotel, a mosque, arms depots and repair shops, 

a garage, a medical point, a radio center and a kitchen. A gasoline 

generator provided power to the tunnels and the hotel’s video player. 

This impressive base became a mandatory stop for visiting journalists, 

dignitaries and other “war tourists.” Apparently, this construction 

effort also interfered with construction of fighting positions and field 

fortifications.

The Mujahideen “Zhawar Regiment,” some 500 strong, was 

permanently based there. This regiment was primarily responsible 

for logistics support of the mobile groups fighting in the area and 

for supplying the Islamic Party (HIK) groups in other provinces of 

Afghanistan. Due to its primary logistic function, the regiment was 

not fully equipped for combat, but was a credible combat force. The 

regiment was responsible for local defense and for stopping infiltration 

of Khad and KGB agents between Afghanistan and Pakistan. They 

manned checkpoints along the road to screen identification papers. The 
60 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

regiment had a Soviet D30 122mm howitzer, two tanks (captured from the 

DRA post at Bori in 1983), some six-barrel Chinese-manufactured BM12 multiple rocket launchers (MRL) and some machine guns and small 

arms. A Mujahideen air defense company defended Zhawar with five 

ZPU-1 and four ZPU-2 antiaircraft heavy machine guns. These 14.5-mm 

air defense machine guns were positioned on high ground around the 

base.3

Defense of the approaches to the base was the responsibility of 

Mujahideen groups from the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan 

(NIFA), the Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA), and the two Islamic 

Party factions (HIH and HIK).4 There were six major Mujahideen supply 

routes into Afghanistan.5

 Twenty percent of all the Mujahideen supplies 

came through the Zhawar route.6 The overall Mujahideen commander of 

Paktia Province, including Zhawar base, was Jalaluddin Haqani, who was 

a member of HIK. 

Zhawar I

In September 1985, the DRA 12th Infantry Division from Gardez, 

with elements of the 37th and 38th Commando Brigades moved from 

Gardez circuitously through Jaji Maidan to Khost since the direct route 

through the Sata-Kandow Pass had been under Mujahideen control since 

1981. This force joined elements of the 25th Infantry Division which was 

garrisoned in Khost. General Shahnawaz Tani7 commanded this mixed 

force. The DRA military units had their full complement of weapons 

and equipment, but desertion, security details, and other duties kept 

their units chronically understrength. Since the DRA could not mobilize 

sufficient force from one regiment or division, they formed composite 

forces for these missions.8

Zhawar and vivinity.
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 61

Late one September afternoon, the DRA force began an infantry 

attack supported by heavy artillery fire and air strikes on Bori, which 

is northeast of Zhawar. Zhawar was not prepared for this attack since 

most of its major commanders, including Haqani, were on a pilgrimage 

to Mecca (the Haj). The DRA recaptured Bori and drove on to Zhawar. 

The Mujahideen reacted by positioning an 80-man group to block the 

ridge on the eastern slope of the Moghulgai mountains which form the 

eastern wall of the Zhawar base. The DRA force arrived at night and 

during the night fighting lost two APCs and four trucks. Eventually, the 

DRA became discouraged, withdrew and returned to Khost.9 Mujahideen 

from the nomad Kochi tribe (led by Malang Kochi and Dadmir Kochi) 

First battle of Zhawar.
62 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

and Gorbez Mujahideen, recaptured Bori. 

 The DRA then launched its next attempt from the town of Tani. 

They recaptured the town of Lezhi from the Mujahideen and killed 

Commander Mawlawi Ahmad Gul. The major Mujahideen commanders 

returned to Pakistan from the Haj on that day (September 4) and hurried 

north to Zhawar to take command. The Mujahideen from Lezhi retreated 

south while a 20-man Mujahideen force blocked the Manay Kandow pass. 

The pass is dominated by a high peak which is capped with a thick rock 

slab. Under the slab was a natural cave which the Mujahideen improved. 

The cave could accommodate the 20 Mujahideen during artillery and air 

strikes. The Mujahideen also dug communications trenches so that they 

could quickly reoccupy their fighting positions once the firing stopped. 

The firing positions dominated the Tani Plain and were well positioned to 

stop any infantry attack. 

The DRA repeatedly attacked the pass but could make no headway. 

The infantry would attack, meet withering Mujahideen fire and stop. Then 

massed air and artillery would pound the area. The infantry would again 

try to attack, but would again be stopped immediately. The procedure 

would then repeat itself, but the DRA made no headway during its tenday attack. After ten days, the DRA called in heavy Soviet airstrikes which 

continuously hit the mountain top. The thick rock slab began to sway 

and rock. The Mujahideen were afraid that the rock slab might shift and 

crush their cave, so they finally withdrew. It was September 14, 1985. 

As the Mujahideen fell back, the DRA established observation posts 

on high ground and started adjusting air and artillery strikes. This gave 

the tactical advantage to the DRA and their infantry moved through the 

pass. The Mujahideen rear guard desperately engaged the DRA infantry 

with machine gun fire and aircraft with ZGU machine guns. The DRA 

continued to advance and seized the high ground of Tor Kamar. Tor 

Kamar is within a kilometer of Zhawar base and well within the range 

of machine gun fire. The DRA thought that the Mujahideen did not have 

any heavy weapons and became careless and bunched their forces on 

the high ground. Two Mujahideen, Alam Jan and Muhammad Salim, were 

former tank commanders in the DRA. In the late afternoon, they moved 

their two tanks out of the caves and swung north into firing positions. 

They opened fire and their first rounds destroyed a DRA observation post 

as an artillery spotting scope and soldiers went flying. The Mujahideen 

tankers then traversed to the second observation post and destroyed it 

with their next rounds. Then they opened up on the other DRA soldiers.

The mauled DRA force fell back and maneuvered through the “bird 

droppings” saddle10 to the east side of Tamberi Ghar. The Mujahideen 

countered with blocking positions which they held for five days. Haji 
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 63

Amanullah Khan and Ismail Khan played major roles in the fighting at 

this stage. The DRA Commander, General Tani moved his CP into the 

Many Kandow Pass and tried to reinvigorate the DRA assault, but the 

Mujahideen held. During the fighting, the Mujahideen shot down a 

helicopter, but lost a major commander-, Mawlawi Fathullah. Mujahideen 

reinforcements, including Commander Mawlawi Arsalah, arrived from 

Pakistan and as far away as Jalalabad and Urgun. The DRA were getting 

chronically low on men and supplies and, after 42 days of fighting, 

General Tani broke contact and conducted a night withdrawal.

Mujahideen casualties were 106 KIA and 321 WIA. DRA and Soviet 

losses were heavy, but their numbers are unknown since they evacuated 

their dead and wounded. Zhawar was a symbol of Mujahideen invincibility in the border area and the Soviets and DRA felt that they had 

to destroy this myth. The Mujahideen were convinced that Zhawar 

was impregnable and failed to take some basic security precautions. 

September-October and April-May are historically the best months in 

Afghanistan for campaigning, since the weather is reasonable and the 

roads are dry. August-September was also the time of the Haj and the 

senior leadership of the area all made this religious pilgrimage together. 

Consequently, the senior leadership was absent when the battle started 

and other Mujahideen commanders had to take command of the battle.

Field fortifications around Zhawar were neglected and incomplete. 

The excellent field fortifications at the mouth of the Manay Kandow Pass 

bought time to improve the other fortifications. A complacent attitude 

almost cost the Mujahideen their base. Only the unexpected appearance 

of Mujahideen armor at a crucial minute prevented a DRA victory. The 

Mujahideen were able to move men and supplies from Miram Shah in 

Pakistan throughout the battle. The DRA apparently made no attempt to 

impede access by deploying scatterable mines against the route. 

Zhawar II

In February 1986, during the XXVII Congress of the Communist 

Party of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev informed the 

delegates that the Soviet Government had worked out a plan with the 

Afghan Government to conduct a phased withdrawal of Soviet forces. 

The plan would immediately be put into effect after the political situation 

stabilized. The Soviet High Command issued orders to their forces to not 

get involved in direct combat when possible, but to emphasize security 

missions, guarding lines of communication and important installations. 

Simultaneously, they adopted additional measures to strengthen the DRA 

forces. The Soviets felt that the DRA should now take the leading combat 

role against the Mujahideen and urged the DRA to again attack Zhawar.11
64 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

The DRA Ministry of Defense decided to destroy Zhawar. General 

of the Army Varrenikov12 approved the decision and the high command 

developed the plan for a combined operation.13 The plan committed 54 

under-strength DRA maneuver battalions plus DRA artillery and aviation 

to the assault.14 The 7th Infantry Division (II Army Corps) from Kandahar 

andthe 8th Infantry Division (III Army Corps) from Kabul were committed 

to the fight. From III Army Corps’ came the 14th Infantry Division from 

Gazni, the 25th Infantry Division from Khost, plus the 38th Commando 

Brigade and 666th Air Assault Regiment “Commando” also from Khost. 

The commander of the III Afghan Army Corps, General-Major 

Mohammad Asef Delavar, was appointed the leader of the Afghan 

ground forces in this operation.15 Deputy Minister of Defense GeneralLieutenant Nabi Azimi was the overall commander of the Afghan Group 

of Forces. His adviser was Deputy to the Senior Military Adviser for 

Combat, General-Major V. G. Trofimenko.16

Plan for Zhawar II.
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 65

Azimi and Trofimenko planned the offensive. They constituted an 

eastern combat group comprised of the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions 

and the 666th Air Assault Regiment. They also constituted a western 

combat group consisting of the 8th and 25th Infantry Divisions.17 The 

38th Commando Brigade was committed to make a an air assault onto 

Dawri Gar mountain which rose 3,600 meters above sea level and 

towered over Zhawar. The commando group had little experience in air 

assault missions, and the first lift was scheduled to go in before sunrise as 

the ground assault began (see map Plan for Zhawar II).

 On the February 28, government forces, covered by Soviet aviation, 

began to move out of Gardez to the combat zone (see map Prelude to 

Zhawar II). Their movement was aided by two Soviet battalions18 which 

occupied the dominant terrain between Kharzun (Mirazi Kalay) and 

Matwarkh. However, when units of the Afghan force arrived in Matwarkh 

region, they ceased further movement and stayed there for about a 

month, simply marking time. 

 Taking advantage of this passive government force, the Mujahideen 

began to launch shelling attacks against them. The Afghan forces took 

casualties, but did not move forward. The operation began to show 

signs of breaking down.19 The 25th Infantry Division had moved out of 

Khost and after engaging the Mujahideen and looting and destroying the 

villages of Sekan Dara, Kot Kalay, Chine Kalay and Seto Kalay, moved to 

secure the Naray Pass so the composite DRA force could move into the 

Khost valley. The weather was wet snow mixed with rain and a strong 

wind. After several days, the composite force moved into the valley and 

prepared for the offensive.20

Prelude to Zhawar II.
66 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

The Initial Disaster

The 7th Infantry Division was in the east with the 14th Infantry 

Division following and the 8th Infantry Division was in the west with the 

25th Infantry Division following. Sometime around midnight on 2d of 

April, the DRA began a two-hour artillery and aviation preparation of the 

target area. Then six Mi-8 armed helicopter transport ships flew from 

Khost airfield to insert the initial assault group of the 38th Commando 

Brigade. The commandos landed without opposition, but the ground 

assault ran into immediate, heavy resistance from Mujahideen defending 

Dawri Gar Mountain. The ground advance was forced to halt. 

The command post for the operation had moved from Khost to Tani 

and was in radio contact with the initial air assault group.21 Despite all 

the Mujahideen fire, the air assault group commander reported that the 

firing was far away from his location. It was now 0300 hours in the early 

morning. The DRA artillery fired an illumination round on the northern 

slope of Dawri Gar mountain. “Do you see the round?” they asked 

the commandos. “Yes, we see it. It’s about 15 kilometers from us” they 

replied. The DRA fired another illumination round five kilometers further 

away on the southern side of Dawri Gar mountain. “Do you see the 

round?” the command post again asked the commandos. “Yes, we see 

it. It’s about ten kilometers from us” they replied. The commandos had 

landed some five kilometers inside Pakistan, beyond the base at Zhawar! 

The command post informed the commandos of the fact. The insertion 

group commander quietly answered “I understand. We will withdraw.” 

But after an hour he reported that he was surrounded and locked in 

combat.22

The air assault was botched and someone, probably Generals Azimi 

and Trofimenko, made it much worse. They committed the rest of the 

brigade to combat — not onto the Dawri Gar mountain landing zone, 

which was well-populated with Mujahideen, but onto the open areas 

around Zhawar itself (see map Zhawar 2). 

 Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani was in the Zadran area when he 

saw approximately 20 transport helicopters flying over. He radioed 

the commanders at Zhawar and warned them. He expected that the 

helicopters would land at Lezhi or Darakai. After his radio message, 

he saw another group of helicopters, including some heavy transport 

helicopters, flying the same direction. These were escorted by jet 

fighters. He again radioed this information to Zhawar. Zhawar had 

700-800 Mujahideen combatants, plus air defense forces, at the time. 

However Jalaluddin Haqani, the Zhawar Commander, was at Miram Shah. 

Mawlawi Haqani also radioed this information separately to Jalaluddin 

Haqani, who set out immediately for Zhawar.23
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 67

The usual Soviet/DRA pattern for an attack on a Mujahideen base 

was to pound the area heavily with air strikes and then follow the air 

strikes with air assault landings, artillery fire, and a ground advance to 

link up with the air assault forces. The air strike gave the Mujahideen 

commanders warning, reaction time and a solid indicator where the 

attack would go. In this case, the Mujahideen were caught by surprise. 

Their intelligence agents within the DRA failed to tip them off and the 

helicopters landed the rest of the 38th Commando Brigade on seven 

dispersed landing zones around Zhawar. There were 15 helicopters in 

the first lift which landed at 0700 hours. More lifts followed to get the 

entire brigade on the ground. The first two helicopters landed on Spin 

Zhawar II.
68 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Khwara Plain. Some of the landing zones were within a kilometer of the 

Pakistani border. Most of the helicopters landed on the high ground to 

the west of Zhawar. Mujahideen gunners destroyed many helicopters 

while they were on the ground. Following the air assault, Soviet jet aircraft 

bombed and strafed Mujahideen positions. Mujahideen air defense was 

not very effective against these aircraft.

Instead of defending in positions being pounded by fighter-bombers 

and close-air support aircraft, the Mujahideen went on the offensive and 

attacked the landing zones. They quickly overran four landing zones and 

captured many of the DRA commandos. Mujahideen reinforcements 

moved from Miram Shah in Pakistan to Zhawar and took the commandos 

from the rear. The commandos were trapped between two forces and 

were killed or captured. By the end of the day, the Mujahideen captured 

530 commandos from the 38th Brigade.24

Meanwhile, Soviet aircraft with smart munitions made ordnance runs 

on the caves.25 Since the caves faced southeast toward Pakistan, the Soviet 

aircraft overflew Pakistan in order to turn and fly at the southern face with 

the smart weapons. Smart missiles hit the first western cave and killed 

18 Mujahideen outright. Smart missiles hit the second western cave and 

collapsed the cave opening trapping some 150 Mujahideen inside. This 

second cave was 150-meters long and used as the radio transmission 

bunker. The commander, Jalaluddin Haqani, who had just arrived from 

Miram Shah, was among those trapped in the second cave.26

Soviet bombers followed the attack of the aircraft with conventional 

ordnance. They dropped tons of bombs and, in so doing, blasted away the 

rubble blocking the cave entrances. The trapped Mujahideen escaped. 

The battle for the remaining landing zones continued. There was one 

group of commandos on high ground who held out for three days before 

they were finally overrun.27 The chief of counter-reconnaissance in one 

of the commando battalions managed to exifiltrate and lead 24 of the 

commandos to the safety of their own forces. It took eight days. Of the 32 

helicopters assigned to the mission, only eight survived.28

The 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions were in the corps first echelon. 

They tried to link up with the already destroyed air assault-force. In the 

course of three days, they shot up their entire supply of ammunition and 

lost control. At the end of April 9, these divisions pulled back to their 

start points. The 25th Infantry Division, located in the second echelon, 

covered the western flank, the artillery positions and the corps rear 

area.29 The 14th Infantry Division covered the eastern flank. The DRA 

had regarrisoned Lezhi since Zhawar One and continued to fight for the 

possession of the Manay Kandow Pass for some ten days following the 

air landing. The Mujahideen attacked the DRA LOCs and the airfield at 
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 69

Khost while the Mujahideen holding the Manay Kandow checked their 

advance.30

General Varrenikov sent a message to the Soviet Minister of Defense 

in which he criticized the leadership of the 7th, 8th and 14th Infantry 

Divisions and the III Corps Commander. He presented various alibis 

(weather, length of campaign, poor intelligence) and outlined his plan to 

reinforce the effort with three DRA regiments, a DRA spetsnaz battalion, 

and six Soviet battalions. He noted General Azimi’s replacement as 

operations commander and requested time to resupply and prepare the 

force to resume the offensive. General Sokolov, the Minister of Defense, 

responded with a stern reply and gave Varrenikov twelve days to prepare 

for resumption of the operation (see Annex 1). 

Once Again

The Soviet and DRA military leadership were in damage control. 

DRA reinforcements included a regiment each from the 11th and 

18th Infantry Divisions and the 21st Mechanized Infantry Brigade as 

well as the 203d Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (special forces) and 37th 

Commando Brigade.31 Following urgent requests from the leadership 

of the DRA, Varrenikov authorized five battalions of Soviet forces which 

were sent to Khost and Tani between 5 and 9 April.32 Soviet Forward Air 

controllers were assigned to work with Afghan Forward Air Controllers 

in the infantry divisions and the reinforcing Soviet unit commanders 

were assigned to work with the Afghan division commanders.33

General-Lieutenant Azimi flew off to Kabul on “important business.” 

From Kabul, he issued orders to arrest the helicopter regiment 

commander, but the commander was hiding. The helicopter pilots 

who landed the commandos in Pakistan said that the commander of 

the commandos had ordered them to land where they did.34 GeneralLieutenant Gafur from the DRA Operations Section of the General Staff 

replaced General-Lieutenant Azimi. The Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, 

General-Major Yu. P. Grekov took command of the five Soviet battalions. 

General-Lieutenant V. P. Grishin (Operations Group of the Ministry of 

Defense, USSR in Afghanistan) assumed overall coordination of all the 

forces. They reworked the operations plan while the force was refitted. 

The total DRA/Soviet force now exceeded 6,600 men. Then Varrenikov 

himself arrived at the battlefield. DRA President Karmal had requested 

that General of the Army V. I. Varrenikov take over as overall commander 

of the operation.35

While this refitting, restructuring, and replanning were going on, the 

communists kept the pressure on the Mujahideen with air strikes and 

artillery. In first battle for Zhawar, DRA/Soviet artillery and air strikes 
70 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

stopped at night, but this time they were conducted around the clock. At 

night, they dropped aerial flares for illumination. This heavy fire support 

continued for 12 days.36 The tempo of the air and artillery increased on 

the morning of April 17. Said Colonel S. Korennoy:

“Soviet pilots showed a miraculous mastery and heroism. Many of us 

saw how the aircraft of LTC A. Rutskoy, the commander of the aviation 

regiment, was shot down. . . . His aircraft seemed to draw all the air 

defense fire. He made four or five runs on the base and then we saw his 

plane dart and he then flashed from the mountain ridge into the valley. 

We felt, from the convulsive jerks, that the pilot was attempting to start 

his engine, but alas. The bang of the ejection seat rang out. The aircraft 

flew straight and level for a few seconds and then the nose dipped and 

the aircraft slammed into the ground and exploded somewhere in the 

vicinity of Barankhel. A BTR from the operations group of the 40th Army 

went and picked up the pilot.”37

Pakistan was clearly concerned with the major battle raging on her 

border. The Mujahideen lacked effective air defense against helicopter 

gunships, and the strafing and bombing attacks of high-performance 

aircraft. The Mujahideen had some British Blowpipe shoulder-fired air 

defense missiles, but they were not effective. Pakistan sent some officers 

into Zhawar during the fighting to take out attacking aircraft with the 

Blowpipe and show the Mujahideen how it was done. After climbing a 

mountain and firing thirteen Blowpipe missiles to no avail, a Pakistani 

captain and his NCO were severely wounded by the attacking aircraft.38

The renewed ground attack began on the morning of April 17. The 

25th Infantry Division led the assault in the west and the 14th Infantry 

Division led the assault in the east. In order to deceive the Mujahideen 

and divert their forces, the eastern group began its attack at 0630 and 

the western group began at 1030.39 The DRA 25th Infantry Division 

was concentrated at Lezhi. The Mujahideen had fortified the Dawri 

Gar Mountain and could cover the majority of the slopes with accurate 

fire. Multiple attacks on the mountain failed. When the artillery fire 

preparation would start, the Mujahideen would shelter in caves and 

when the preparation ceased, they reoccupied their firing positions 

and repulsed the attack. General-Major Asef, the DRA 25th Infantry 

Division Commander and Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Karaev, his 

adviser, observed this. During the night, they silently moved one of their 

regiments toward the summit and, at dawn, launched an attack on the 

Mujahideen without any artillery preparation. 

The Mujahideen did not expect this and faltered. The regiment 

captured the summit in a matter of minutes.40 The Mujahideen fell back 

from the Lezhi area into the higher mountains and slowly the DRA/Soviet 

force moved through the Manay Kandow Pass.
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 71

At the same time, the DRA/Soviet force launched a flanking column 

from the Lezhi area that moved to the east. This column moved toward 

Moghulgai Mountain on the east flank of Zhawar. There, a regiment 

of HIH Mujahideen waited in defense. However, as the DRA column 

neared, the HIH regiment withdrew without a fight. At the same time, 

Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded by attacking aircraft. He had head and 

facial wounds, but rumors spread among the Mujahideen that Haqani 

was dead. The Mujahideen evacuated Zhawar and moved high into 

surrounding mountains as the two ground columns closed onto Zhawar.41

The Mujahideen were unable to evacuate most of the stores from 

Zhawar. They pulled out the two T-55 tanks and fought the advancing 

column for awhile before abandoning the tanks in the foothills. 

Lieutenant Colonel Kulenin, the adviser to the commander of the DRA 

21st Mechanized Brigade and his political deputy were killed by a T-55 

round.42 The Soviet and DRA forces entered Zhawar. It was noon on 

1April 19, 1986.

A Short Stay

As Viktor Kutsenko recalls: 43 

“After a narrow passage of mountain road, it opened up into a wide 

canyon of 150 meters, whose sides stretched upwards for two kilometers. 

Caves were carved into the rock face of the side facing Pakistan. The 

caves were up to 10 meters long, four meters wide and three meters tall. 

The walls were faced with brick. The cave entrances were covered with 

powerful iron doors which were painted in bright colors. There were 41 

caves in all. All had electricity. Behind a fence there was a mosque with 

a beautiful brick entrance and a hospital with new medical equipment 

manufactured in the United States. They even had an ultra-sound 

machine which we moved to the Khost hospital. There was nickel-plated 

furniture including adjustable beds. There was a library with Englishlanguage and Farsi-language books. There was a bakery and by the 

entrance was a stack of fresh nan.44 

“In the storage area, there were metal shelving units where boxes 

of arms and ammunition were neatly stacked. Further on, there was a 

storage cave for mines. There was every kind of mine imaginable: 

antitank, antivehicular, and antipersonnel mines from Italy, France, the 

Netherlands, and Germany. Hand grenade and artillery simulators 

were stored separately. The demolition explosives of various types and 

detonators were stored in a separate cave. In the very furthest part of 

the base were repair and maintenance bays complete with grease pits. 

There was a T-34 tank in one of them. The tank was serviced, fueled 

and had new batteries. It started right up and drove out of the service 

bay. Above the storage caves was a beautiful building marked “Hotel.” 
72 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

There was overstuffed furniture inside and the floors were covered with 

carpets. How many of our aircraft had worked this site over and the hotel 

and caves were still intact.” 

The Afghan soldiers began to loot the base. Even the two-meter high 

brick facing wall was pulled down and hauled back to the 25th Infantry 

Division at Khost. The DRA had no intention of staying in Zhawar long 

enough for the Mujahideen to organize a counterattack. The Mujahideen 

were moving MRL up to the Pakistan border to fire on the communist 

forces.

Colonel Kutsenko was in charge of destroying Zhawar and had four 

hours to do so. He split up the detonation of the caves and buildings 

between the sappers of the 45th Engineer Regiment of the 40th Army 

and Afghan sappers. He knew that he could not destroy the caves in the 

available time. Above the caves was a 30-meter thick layer of rock. If 

they could drill a one-to-two meter shaft into the cave ceiling, they could 

have crammed that full of explosives and caused a collapse, but there 

was not time to do that before the troops had to leave. So the sappers 

stacked about 200 antitank mines in the primary caves and rigged them 

for simultaneous electric detonation. Even if they had laid ten times 

more explosives, it would not have made any difference since the force 

of the explosion would follow the path of least resistance and the caves 

would channel the force out the caves’ mouths.45 Said Kutsenko:

“And the moment finally arrived. The caves ... shot out their contents. 

After the dust settled, all of the canyon was filled with clumps of earth, 

shattered bricks and stones. The caves were swept clean, but were 

somewhat larger and their entries were partially clogged by rock slides 

from above. The gates were torn pieces of iron laying at the foot of the 

opposite canyon wall.” 46

The combat soldiers were withdrawing as the sappers remained 

behind to mine the base. The work was hard and complicated by the 

lack of time. The sappers had to depart before nightfall. At 1700 hours, 

the command was given for the remaining force to leave and head for 

Tani. The Mujahideen were quick to fall on the heels of a retiring foe. 

Anyone who would fall behind or stop would be in serious trouble. 

Rockets fired from across the Pakistan border were landing near the 

sappers and these rounds were becoming more precise. It was time for 

the sappers to join the exodus. Kutsenko gave the command to depart 

on his radio. The Afghan sappers immediately quit working and boarded 

their armored vehicles. The Soviet commander of the sappers from the 

45th Engineer Regiment answered “Right away.” His “right away” lasted 

15 minutes. Kutsenko again called him and ordered that they cease work 

and depart. Their commander again answered “Right away.” Kutsenko 

then I told him “You may stay here for an hour, but your soldiers need to 
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 73

quickly join the convoy. The Mujahideen are here and we are leaving.” 

This time, the Soviet sappers quit work and immediately boarded their 

vehicles. Kutsenko insured that everyone was on board and the trail 

party left. Kutsenko sat in the captured tank and returned to Tani on it.47

After 57 days of campaigning, the DRA held Zhawar for only five 

hours. In addition to the standard mines and booby traps, the communist 

forces planted seismic-detonated mines and sprinkled aerial-delivered 

butterfly bombs over the area. The Mujahideen returned to Zhawar on 

the following day. The first Mujahideen to enter the area were killed 

by seismic mines. The Mujahideen withdrew and fired mortars, BM12 

and machine guns into the area to set off the seismic mines. Then they 

began the slow process of finding the rest of the mines manually. The 

Mujahideen pushed forward from Zhawar to retake Lezhi and other 

areas. Since the DRA was only in Zhawar for five hours, the DRA did not 

manage to destroy the caves, but collapsed some entrances. Weapons 

that were stored in some of the caves were still intact and useable.48

Mujahideen casualties were 281 KIA and 363 WIA. DRA and 

Soviet losses are unknown, but the Mujahideen reportedly destroyed 

24 helicopters, shot down two jets and captured 530 personnel of the 

38th Commando Brigade. The Mujahideen held a field tribunal. Yunis 

Khalis and other Mujahideen commanders were the judges. They 

tried and executed Colonel Qalandar Shah, the commander of the 38th 

Commando Brigade and another colonel who landed with the brigade 

to adjust artillery fire. There were 78 other officers among the prisoners. 

They were given a chance to confess to their crimes from different 

battles and then all the officers were executed. All the soldiers were 

given amnesty since they were conscripts who were forced to fight. The 

amnestied soldiers were asked to perform two years of labor service 

in exchange for the amnesty. They did their service in logistics, were 

“reeducated” and released after two years.

Aftermath

The withdrawal of the HIH regiment, coupled with the rumors of 

Haqani’s death, greatly aided the DRA victory. Haqani’s loss, besides 

affecting Mujahideen morale, cost the Mujahideen what little command 

and control they had left at this juncture of the battle. The DRA failed 

to throw a blocking force on the Miram Shah road, although they knew 

that Mujahideen reinforcements were moving along this route. As a 

minimum, they could have employed scatterable mines on the road, but 

they left the route open.

Clearly there were intelligence failures on both sides. The DRA and 

Soviets had ample opportunity to collect information on Zhawar, but 

failed to determine the basic outline of the Mujahideen defenses and 
74 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

their manning. The DRA and Soviets never detected the presence of 

the Mujahideen regiment that slipped away at the crucial juncture and 

allowed their victory. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, should have 

been aware that Zhawar was at risk since the DRA had been moving 

forces toward the Khost valley for some forty days. Yet, the leadership 

of Zhawar was out of country during the lengthy build-up. The usual 

Mujahideen sources failed to tip them off as to the start time of the assault 

or the air assault. And, although the pathfinder commando element that 

landed in Pakistan was overrun by Mujahideen, these Mujahideen did 

not get the word to Zhawar. The Zhawar defenders were surprised by 

the air assault of the commando main body.

The DRA and Soviet reluctance to hold Zhawar for any length of time 

in order to do a thorough job of destroying the base is a strong testament 

to the ability of the Mujahideen to threaten their lines of communication. 

The commanders had no desire to risk being trapped in Zhawar and 

having to mount yet another operation to fight their way in and out of 

Zhawar. Their reserves were committed and the danger was real. 

The DRA celebrated the fall of Zhawar with parades and medals as 

a major victory. But Zhawar was back in full operation within weeks of 

the attack. Having been trapped in the caves, the Mujahideen learned 

to make connecting tunnels between caves. They reopened the caves 

and built connecting tunnels. The caves were improved and lengthened 

to 400-500 meters long.49 In retrospect, the battles of Zhawar seem to 

have been exercises in futility, but at the time, they were considered tests 

of whether the DRA could stand up to the Mujahideen after the Soviet 

withdrawal. 

________________________________________

Annex 1: Correspondence between 

General Varrenikov and General Sokolov

SECRET (URGENT)

USSR Ministry of Defense

To Marshal of the Soviet Union

Comrade S. L. Sokolov 

I report.

Preliminary results from the combat conducted by the Afghan Army in the region 

of Khost may be evaluated as unsatisfactory, although the Mujahideen suffered 

significant personnel and weapons losses. 

Reasons 

1. The forces and aviation assigned to the operation were poorly trained and the 

personnel had poor morale and fighting spirit. The combat potential of the divisions 

was weak and their potential was very limited. Further, the commanders of the 7th, 

8th, and 14th Infantry Divisions and, especially, the commander of the III Corps were 
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 75

completely unprepared to lead their forces. 

2. At the start of the operation, there was an incomplete intelligence picture and 

a wrong estimate of enemy strength. Enemy strength was much greater than determined. The close proximity of Pakistan allowed the enemy complete maneuverability 

and the unimpeded capability to replace personnel and weapons losses. Further, the 

Mujahideen were able to use strong fire support from the territory of Pakistan. This 

was particularly true against our forces moving along the border. 

Young, well-trained, steadfast Pakistanis participated directly in the battle in the base 

region of Zhawar and Miram Shah (south of Khost). 

3. This was an unfortunate time of year to conduct combat. A more advantageous time 

would have been in January to the start of February or in April. The end of February 

and March are characterized by an abundance of rain mixed with snow (particularly 

this year). This forced the troops to move through the thawed mud along the existing 

road under enemy fire. 

4. The difficult weather, length of the combat (30 days) and the “uncomfortable” 

column formation forced on the troops in their advance to the international border 

exhausted the troops and led to low morale. The short preparation time for combat in 

Khost from 31 March to 4 April did not revitalize the forces. 

5. During the course of combat, the leadership tolerated nonobjective estimates of the 

situation, false situation reports and false combat reports. As a result, they were unable 

to provide the necessary picture of the situation. 

6. There were mistakes in the conduct of the assault landing. The planning was 

conducted correctly. However, the practical application was organized unsatisfactorily. 

Because of this, the assault force was scattered over LZs located four to 20 kilometers 

from their planned LZs and this allowed the Mujahideen to defeat the air assault in the 

course of a day. The preparation of the helicopter crew navigators was unsatisfactory 

and they were poorly oriented on the terrain during the landing. They only had 

bearings and times of flight. These were the main reasons for the errors. 

Measures that were taken 

1. Additional massive air and artillery strikes were planned and conducted on strong 

points and pin-pointed enemy firing points. The “Shleyf” round was employed (on the 

approaches to the base, strong points equipped with cement structures, and armored 

cupolas of dug-in tanks). 

2. Reinforcing units were moved into the combat zone. These included the 50th 

Infantry Regiment from the 18th Infantry Division, the 81st Infantry Regiment from the 

11th Infantry Division, an infantry regiment from the 21st Mechanized Infantry Brigade 

and a battalion of spetsnaz. 

Soviet forces were moved to support the Afghan forces. These included two battalions 

from a separate air assault brigade and two battalions from a separate parachute 

regiment. 

3. All types of intelligence collection were reinforced, particularly that directed against 

the Zhadran tribe. 

4. The leadership of the Afghan forces was reinforced. With this goal, General-
76 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Lieutenant Azimi (who was ill) was replaced by General-Lieutenant Gafur to direct the 

battle.... 

The Army Chief of Staff directed the 40th Army units. Overall coordination of all the 

forces was provided by General-Lieutenant V. P. Grishin (Operations Group of the 

Ministry of Defense, USSR in Afghanistan). 

Preventive Measures (lessons learned) 

1. It is necessary to take radical measures to replenish the personnel in the Afghan 

Army (particularly in the 1st and III Army Corps). Right now, the line strength of the 

combat divisions is 200-300 men . . . . [Desertion, combat loses and an inefficient 

conscript system bled divisions down to mini-battalion size.] . . . . 

5. Refrain from conducting large-scale independent actions by the Afghan forces, 

particularly those that last a long time or are conducted far from their garrisons. 

Combat must not exceed 10-12 days. 

6. The forces must not conduct actions against Mujahideen bases located close to the 

border or in a region where it is impossible to isolate the enemy from the arrival of 

his reserves. These regions should be subjected to massive aviation strikes, dropping 

powerful bombs, scatterable mines, etc. 

Further actions 

....Consider that the result of the conduct of military actions will convey a significant 

military-political ideal, it is expedient to increase the aviation strikes to the maximum, 

to destroy enemy points and simultaneously take measures to train the Afghan forces 

for decisive battle.... 

Varrenikov

April 198650

The Minister of Defense of the USSR replied with the following order to the Operations 

Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan:

SECRET

First Deputy Chief of the General Staff

General of the Army Comrade V. I. Varrenikov

Chief Military Adviser in the DRA

General-Colonel Comrade V. A. Vostrov

The Chief Military Adviser in the DRA and his operatives were mistaken in their 

estimate of the size of the enemy groupings and their potential in Paktia Province. 

During the preparation for combat, they did not consider the changes which had 

occurred since 1985 in that region. The Mujahideen have received new weapons and 

equipment and learned from the experience of the 1985 strike in that region. The 

timing of the operation was a mistake. In the course of the operation, neither the new 

Chief Military Adviser to the DRA, General-Colonel V. A. Vostrov, nor the Operational 

Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense took the necessary measures in order to 

correct the errors in a timely manner. 
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 77

I demand: 

1. The conduct of a comprehensive estimate of the correlation of forces assembled 

in the region of Khost. Improve intelligence activities against the enemy. Conduct air 

strikes based on targets identified by intelligence and cease area bombing. 

2. Organize troop control. Subordinate the reinforcing units brought from the center of 

the country to the appropriate division commanders before accepting combat again. 

3. If necessary, delay your offensive actions for several days. Ready the units and 

subunits of the Afghan forces for the upcoming combat. Replenish their ammunition 

and material stocks and clarify their combat missions. Organize coordination with 

aviation. 

4. Your plan for the conduct of future combat will be present for confirmation by 17 

April. 

Sokolov

312/1/07 sh 

April 198651

________________________________________

1. Claude Malhauret, Afghan Alternative Seminar, Monterey, California, November 

1993. 

2. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen 

Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, to be published in 1998, xvii and Chapter 11, page 

1. 

3. Interviews with participants Lieutenant Omar and Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani in 

Jalali and Grau, chapter 11. 

4. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story, 

London: Leo Cooper, 168. 

5. Ibid, 111. 

6. Ibid. 159. 

7. General Shahnawaz Tani was from the neighboring town of Tani and enjoyed 

some popular support in the area. He later became DRA Defense Minister. 

8. Omar and Haqani. 

9. Perhaps this was a reconnaissance in force. 

10. Local name for the chalk layers in the rock that mark this saddle. 

11. Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy, Tragediya i doblest’ Afgana [The Tragedy and Valor of the 

Afghan Veterans], Moscow: Iskona, 1995, 300-301. 

12. General of the Army Valentin Leonidovich Varrenikov was head of the operations 

group of the Soviet Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan from 1985-1989. 

13. Viktor Kutsenko, “Dzhavara” [Zhawar], Soldat udachi [Soldier of Fortune], July 

1996, 24. Soldat udachi is affiliated with the American Soldier of Fortune magazine 

and does translate and print some articles on weapons and warfare from its parent 

magazine, but is an editorially-independent magazine that has enjoyed popularity in 

Russia and serves as a publishing outlet for veterans from Afghanistan, Chechnya, 
78 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. Some 60-percent of its articles are written by 

Russians. 

14. Lyakhovskiy, 301. 

15. Ibid. 

16. S. Korennoy in Lyakhovskiy, 307-308. 

17. Kutsenko, 24. 

18. The 1st and 3d battalions of the 191 Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment stationed 

in Gazni. 

19. Lyakhovksiy, 301. 

20. S. Korennoy in Lyakhovski, 306-309. 

21. The maximum size this force could have been was sixty men, since the Mi-8 could 

lift ten fully-equipped men at this altitude. 

22. Kutsenko, 24-25. 

23. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani, and Mawlawi AbdulRahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11. 

24. Following Zhawar Two, the 38th Commando Brigade became the base of the 

newly-formed 2nd Division. Casualty figures vary. The Soviet figures are 312 landed of 

which 25 survived. Korennoy in Lyakhovksi, 309. 

25. Most probably, these were KAB-1500L-PR laser-guided bombs launched from 

the SU-25 ground attack aircraft. The KAB-1500L-PR carries a 1100 kilogram (2425 

pound) warhead and can penetrate two meters of reinforced concrete buried in 20 

meters of soil. It has a one-two meter CEP (circular error probable). Yuri Zuenko 

and Sergey Korostelev, Boevye samolety Rossii [Russian Combat Aircraft], Moscow: 

ELAKOS, 1994, 170-171. 

26. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi AbdulRahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11. 

27. Ibid. 

28. Korennoy in Lyakhovksi, 309. 

29. Ibid 

30. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi AbdulRahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11. 

31. Ibid. Spetsnaz is a Russian term for Special Forces used in long-range reconnaissance and rugged fighting. 

32. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 345th Separate Parachute Regiment stationed at 

Bagram, the 4th Battalion of the 56th Air Assault Brigade and another battalion of this 

brigade stationed at Gardez and 2d Battalion of the 191st Separate Motorized Rifle 

Regiment stationed in Ghazni. The airborne and air assault battalions flew in Khost 

airfield while the Motorized Rifle Battalion drove into Tani. 

33. Lyakhovski, 301. 

34. Kutsenko, 25. 

35. Lyakhovski, 304. 

36. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi AbdulRahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11. 

37. Korennoy in Lyakhovski, 310. At the end of 1988, Colonel Aleksandr Rutskoy, who 

was by then the deputy to the 40th Army Commander for aviation, was flying in this 

same region and was again shot down-this time with an air-to-air missile. He landed 

in Pakistan and was captured, and subsequently ransomed by the Soviet government. 
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 79

He was decorated with the title of “Hero of the Soviet Union.” Later, Rutskoy entered 

politics and became the Vice President of the Russian Federation. However, in 

October 1993, he lead the opposition to Russian Federation President Yeltsin. He was 

arrested. In February 1994, he was freed from imprisonment by decree of the Duma of 

the Russian Federation. 

38. Yousaf and Adkin, 171 and interviews conducted by Ali Jalali with Mujahideen in 

the fall of 1996. Mr. Jalali’s sources chose to remain anonymous since they were 

sworn to secrecy at the time. 

39. Lyakhovski, 305. 

40. Kutsenko, 25. 

41. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani, and Mawlawi AbdulRahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11. 

42 Korennoy in Lyakhovski, 311. 

43. Nan is an unleavened oval-shaped flatbread, ranging in size from a small to a 

regular pizza. 

44. Kutsenko, 25-26. 

45. Ibid, 26. 

46. Ibid. 

47. Ibid. 

48. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi AbdulRahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11. 

49. Veterans of Zhawar have proposed to Haqani that the caves be restored and kept 

as a museum so that 200 years from now, people can visit them and reflect on their 

heritage. From 7-9 May 1990, 47 major Mujahideen field commanders from all over 

Afghanistan met at Zhawar in the first united of all major commanders of all factions. 

The purpose was to chart post-Soviet military strategy. Zhawar was chosen for the 

conference for its symbolic importance. Afghan Information Center Monthly Bulletin, 

Peshawar, May 1990. 

50. Lyakhovski, 302-303.

51. Ibid, 304. 

Ali Ahmad Jalali, former Interior Minister of Afghanistan (January 2003- 

September 2005), is currently serving as a Distinguished Professor at the 

Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) at the National 

Defense University in Washington D.C. He served as the Director of Afghanistan National Radio Network Initiative and Chief of the Pashto and Persian 

Services at the Voice of America in Washington D.C. He covered the war in 

Afghanistan (1982-1993) and extensively traveled in the former Soviet Central 

Asian republics. A former officer in the Afghan Army, Colonel Jalali served 

as a top military planner with the Afghan Resistance following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He graduated from high command and staff colleges 

in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. 

A published writer in three languages (English, Pashto, Dari/Farsi), Ali A. 

Jalali is the author of numerous books and articles on political, military and 

security issues in Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia. 
80 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

How reconnaissance groups move around in mountainous terrainis very different from how they move on level ground. In the 

mountains, they will encounter rapid rivers, cliffs, impassable ravines, 

ranges, mountain passes, and icy and snowy slopes. The scouts will 

face rockfalls and ice or snow avalanches. Severe climatic conditions 

(hurricane-force winds, thunderstorms, gales) in mountainous areas can 

negatively impact a reconnaissance group’s operational capability since 

Mountain 

Reconnaissance 

Russian Style

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) 

based on the work of Colonel Michael Panov

This article first appeared in the March-April 2010 edition of Infantry

Sensors are wonderful; unmanned reconnaissance planes are great. 

But sensors cannot detect all activity, particularly in the mountains. Heat 

sensors can be defeated with a piece of carpet or a space blanket. Motion 

sensors can be defeated by freezing in place, since many sensor platforms 

are noisy and readily detected. Sensors should not be the sole basis of 

tactical intelligence. Human intelligence, derived from the local populace, 

is an integral part of tactical intelligence. But the best tactical intelligence 

still comes from boots on the ground. Sensors can identify areas that 

require a closer look, but the eyes of the skilled scout are still the best way 

to know what is going on in the folds and recesses of the mountains. 

Movement in the mountains is difficult. It is not just the climbing and 

the effects of thinner air at altitude. The mountains can be a very harsh and 

unforgiving environment. Observation is not always enhanced by altitude 

and the distances are difficult to gauge by the novice. Communications and 

supply are difficult. The following Russian article discusses mountain conditions and movement considerations while scouting in them. 

You’re Not On the Plains Here: 

Combat Experience of Reconnaissance 

Units in Mountainous Terrain

Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007 1
Mountain Reconnaissance -- Russian Style 81

changes in weather fatigue them and the hot sun of the mountains make 

it hard to rest normally during the daytime.

However, in spite of the scouts’ enormous difficulties in the mountains, 

it is precisely the mountain conditions that provide maximum stealth 

for setting up camp and moving to combat locations. This material will 

deal with how to move about correctly in mountain terrain and put its 

advantages to maximum use. 

To operate successfully in the mountains, scouts need to be specially 

trained in conditions that most closely approximate the conditions of the 

locality in which they will have to operate behind enemy lines. From 

the standpoint of ease of movement, mountain terrain can tentatively be 

divided into: foothills (600-1,800 meters above sea level), and mountain 

(1,800-3,000 m) and high mountain areas (3,000 and above). Although 

tentative, this division is important when evaluating mountain terrain for 

reconnaissance actions.

Frequent and drastic temperature change in the mountains produces 

phenomena that are very dangerous for scouts, which is why they have 

to be able to use different external signs to identify these phenomena 

and take timely safety measures. Above all, the scouts must be able to 

determine in a timely fashion that inclement weather— thunderstorms, 

gales, snowstorms, etc.— is approaching.

Each scout should be familiar with the mountain climate and be able 

to take timely protective measures.

Solar radiation is much stronger in mountains than on plains and it 

increases with elevation. Ultraviolet rays greatly affect the human body. 

Sunburn is possible. The sun’s rays harm the retina, causing acute pain 

and at times even temporary blindness. Sun glasses should be used 

to protect the eyes. The face should be protected with wide-brimmed 

headgear or gauze covering mask; breaks and rests should be taken in 

the shade.

Thin air is one of the numerous difficulties that are encountered in 

mountain conditions. Scouts who have not been properly trained or 

acclimated to the elevation experience oxygen deprivation, which 

causes “altitude sickness,” accompanied by breathlessness, headache, 

nausea, vomiting, and so on. Thin air weakens the joints of the arms and 

legs, which could easily result in dislocation of the leg or arm even from 

a minor fall.

Thunderstorms create the risk of being struck by lightning, 

especially when scouts are on the crest of a slope, hilltop, or ledge. When 

a thunderstorm is approaching, you should seek cover in a cave or snow 

pit. Do not get under single overhanging rocks. Large metallic articles 
82 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

should be set apart and covered during a thunderstorm.

If the situation does not allow the scouts to wait out the storm because 

they have to “shake off” an enemy tail, they should continue along icy 

or snowy slopes, where there is less danger of being struck by a bolt of 

lightning, although a new danger arises, that of ice or snow avalanches.

Thunderstorms are usually accompanied by heavy rain or snowstorms, which makes it difficult and very dangerous to move in the 

mountains because the grassy and rocky slopes become slippery. 

Rain can trigger rock falls and snow/ice avalanches. You need to move 

carefully in these conditions and keep a close watch on all sides. It is 

known that atmospheric discharges more commonly strike tall, solitary 

trees. To seek cover under them from a thunderstorm is to subject 

oneself to danger.

Snowfall in the mountains makes it difficult to take one’s bearings 

and visually monitor the terrain, which could mean falling completely 

unexpectedly into a deep snow-covered fracture. Snowfall raises the 

risk of snow slides. Snow can penetrate clothes and cause cold weather 

injury. It makes sense to seek cover and wait out heavy snowfall.

Special care, belay and self-belay should be practiced if it is 

necessary to continue to move during a snowstorm. Snow slides are most 

likely on moderately steep slopes because snow does not usually stick 

on very steep slopes. There could be slides from smooth rocky slopes 

as well as from smooth slopes covered by tall grass. With thaw, rain, or 

a warm wind, the mass of snow that has accumulated in the mountains 

begins to melt and breaks away, forming wet snow slides. Slide-prone 

regions can be identified by dug-out channels, broken trees and shrubs, 

and large piles of snow at the base of a slope. These areas should be 

circumvented. If it is not possible to circumvent, the snow should be 

tested for firmness. The recommended method is to move along one 

route, following in each other’s footsteps, in single file, with more distance 

(five-six meters) between the men.

If a scout does find himself in a slide, he should do everything to 

remain on the surface of the moving snow and immediately close his nose 

and mouth so as not to be suffocated by snow powder. If, despite his 

efforts, a scout is engulfed by snow, he should assume a vertical position 

and work vigorously to make a space for air around his mouth and chest, 

and then try to burrow to the snow surface by expanding the space.

The chief causes of ice avalanches are drastic temperature changes 

in the mountains and the weight of masses of ice. To be safe, areas of 

possible avalanches should be traversed early in the morning when 

packed ice stays in place. These areas should be negotiated quickly and 

one at a time.
Mountain Reconnaissance -- Russian Style 83

Rock falls are most dangerous after sunset and in the first few hours 

after sunrise. Rock fall-prone areas can be identified by rock piles at the 

foot of slopes, visible furrows from tumbling rocks, and scree and dust 

on ledges. Dangerous areas should be negotiated quickly, one by one, 

moving from cover to cover and keeping an eye on the slopes above.

After protracted rain and abundant snow thaw in the mountains, the 

upper soil layer becomes waterlogged. In some areas there is a build-up 

of semi-liquid masses of water, sand, pebbles, dirt, rock fragments, and so 

on. These masses of dirt and stones [mud-rock flow] sometimes slide down 

the slopes and along the valleys. A mudslide usually moves slowly, but on 

occasion it can fall without warning, sweeping away everything in its path. 

It is easy to identify mudslide-prone areas because of the accumulation of 

dirt, stones, and scree in the mountain valleys and at the foot of slopes.

There are other difficulties in addition to the ones mentioned above, 

first and foremost orientation difficulties. It is difficult to take one’s bearings 

in the mountains, even with a map and compass. When choosing a 

direction on a map, it should be borne in mind that distances measured 

on a map are roughly 8-10 percent less than in actuality because a map 

shows a projection rather than the actual distance; neither does it take 

into account possible deviations from the planned route.2

It is difficult and dangerous to march at night in mountainous 

areas, especially where there are no roads or trails. Moving along an 

unexplored path at night could cause casualties.

Prior to a march, the group commander should reconnoiter the route 

to determine where there could be rock falls or snow or ice avalanches, 

and where there is cover; how to get over or bypass the hardest sections; 

where and how to ford mountain rivers [gorges]; and where to set up day 

rests or temporary cover in a thunderstorm.

In addition, the group commander needs to map landmarks that can 

easily be used at night and figure out the distances to them, as well as 

adjust route times and map reference points.

Prior to leaving the base area, the group commander should task 

his deputy or the most experienced scout with carefully monitoring the 

surroundings for at least two hours, paying particular attention to the 

direction of the planned march. The group usually sets up an observation 

post for this purpose on a commanding height to which the scout goes 

in secret and carries out surveillance with an optical device.

The unique characteristics of marching in the mountains require 

correct regulation of meals and water intake. The meals of scouts 

operating in the mountains should be substantial. With the major 

physical stress, they should receive a hot meal once or twice per day. 

A strict water intake schedule will keep the scouts combat ready and 
84 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

prevent “altitude sickness.”

While on the move, water intake should be limited to small amounts 

drunk from a canteen. A little bit of salt should be added to the drinking 

water because water in the mountains lacks salt. It is categorically 

forbidden to consume ice or snow instead of water [as they lower core 

body temperature].

A successful mountain trek depends largely on preliminary 

preparation and the group commander’s level of experience. When 

preparing for a mountain trek you should thoroughly examine your 

footgear, wash your feet and carefully smooth your socks or foot wraps 

so that they do not chafe your feet; you should lighten your load as much 

as possible, taking only vital necessities. You should place something 

soft between the load and your back, and pad the straps of the backpack 

(rucksack), using grass or moss.

You should breathe evenly while on the move, inhaling only through 

the nose and exhaling fully. You should not speak when climbing up the 

mountain and under no circumstances should you smoke. Brief threefive minute stops are usually taken to restore normal breathing rhythm.

Move at an even pace, bending slightly and not straining. When 

going uphill, tilt the body slightly forward and step on the entire sole 

without bobbing. When going downhill, tilt the body back and step on 

the heel so as not to slide or fall (figure 1).

On steep slopes, your feet should be wrapped in rope or wire, or you 

should wear specially-adapted footgear to prevent sliding. You should 

Figure 1. Descent with stick, spade or rope belay.
Mountain Reconnaissance -- Russian Style 85

loosen your belt slightly and undo your collar. Your step length should 

match the steepness of the slope. The steeper the climb, the shorter 

the step you should take. When going downhill, your step should be 

increased somewhat.

If the route is not along roads or tracks, you should walk uphill in 

a zigzag pattern rather than straight upward to make it easier, and 

“sidestep” or “herringbone” (figure 2). When going over unstable 

stones, talus, or narrow passes on a precipice, place your sole where 

there is a toehold and do not remove it until you have placed the other 

foot forward in a firm position.

Move carefully on steep rocky slopes so as not to kick downward 

rocks that could injury the scouts below. Use a stick on steep slopes. It 

is a good idea to carve out steps roughly 50 centimeters apart to make 

it easier to climb on steep, slippery, clayey, or icy slopes. Steps can be 

made by stamping in soft ground or in snow.

When going uphill on a grassy slope, your legs should be moved 

forward slightly, and the heavier the load and the steeper the slope, the 

further forward you should lean. When the climb is straight, your feet 

should be placed at an angle to each other in a “herringbone” pattern. 

The steeper the slope, the wider your foot angle should be, and the 

shorter the steps you take. Set your foot down on the entire sole. You 

should zigzag on long steep grassy slopes, and if the slope is sparsely 

covered with talus or rocks, you should move more tightly and not kick 

the talus downward.

Figure 2. “Herringbone” and “Sidestep.”
86 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

All scouts should practice mountain techniques, including those 

whose units are deployed on level ground. They can use training gorges 

for this purpose (figure 3).

Colonel Panov’s article emphasizes features of mountain movement 

and climate. Slow is fast in the mountains and steady, methodical movement, 

light packs, and acclimated physically-fit troops are necessary for mountain 

patrols. Effective patrols may last for days or weeks. Russian scouts are 

considered elite forces that perform missions that might be assigned to 

long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP) or special operations forces. 

Like US forces, scouts are assigned down to infantry battalion level.

Injured or wounded scouts are a problem in the mountains. Scouts 

frequently move at altitudes that are above helicopter ceilings. During 

the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviets usually committed 12 troops to carry a 

single casualty down to the point a helicopter could reach the patient. Four 

men would carry, four would provide security and four would be ready to 

take over the carrying mission. A small number of casualties could quickly 

decimate a patrol. 

________________________________________

1. Michael Panov, “Zdes’ vam ne ravnina...” [You’re not on the plains here...”], 

Armeiskiy Sbornik [Army Digest], May 2007, 24-26. 

2. GPS does not always work particularly well in the mountains. Mountain configurations can cause over a 500-meter circular area probable (CEP). Do not trust GPS 

readings without confirming them on the map sheet.

Figure 3. Training gorge for practicing mountain techniques.
Artillery In the Mountains 87

The United States Army is no stranger to mountainous and highaltitude war fighting. American history contains many instances of 

successfully executed mountain conflicts. Central to this success was the 

movement and use of artillery in direct support of those campaigns. The 

first notable American instance of moving artillery across mountainous 

terrain occurred when Colonel Henry Knox’s Continental Army soldiers 

wheeled, sledged, and levered the guns from Fort Ticonderoga across 

the Berkshire Mountains in the winter of 1776. These fifty-nine assorted 

cannon became the deciding factor in General George Washington’s 

siege of Boston. Other notable campaigns include the U.S. Army 

operations in the Italian Alps during World War II, the Taebaek Range 

of Korea, and the Annamite Range in Vietnam. Each of these locations 

and conditions provides ample instruction on artillery use in mountain 

warfare; yet this time fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan is proving 

to be a greater challenge than anticipated.

Strategists and commanders who consider employment of artillery 

in Afghanistan should take a fresh look at history, doctrine, and tactical 

concepts. Doing so will ensure artillery can employ optimally, and 

in sufficient strength, and of the correct caliber to create the tactical 

conditions for success. Without a significant increase in firepower 

delivered by a correspondingly lightweight and maneuverable field 

howitzer, the long-range fight in Afghanistan will devolve into an even 

deadlier and protracted conflict.

Solely relying on technology and precision munitions incrementally 

applied across the current arsenal will not achieve the conditions to 

exploit and pursue the insurgent fighters ever higher and farther into 

Moving Artillery Forward: 

A Concept for the 

Fight in Afghanistan

Major Joseph A. Jackson, US Army

This article first appeared in the March 23, 2010 Small Wars Journal blog.
88 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Operational planners, 

artillery professionals, congressional staffers, and military acquisition 

officers should examine these relevant histories, review doctrine, and 

consider their implications. These sources serve as a guide to develop 

successful and sustained operational approaches to combat the Afghan 

insurgency. They also provide a reference for adaptive tactics and 

procurement requirements for weapons needed in protracted highaltitude mountain warfare.

Defining the Operational Environment

In Afghanistan, the terrain and weather dictate the tactics and choice 

of weapons. Understanding the operational environment necessitates 

consideration of multiple factors. These dynamics include warfare in 

mountains that force non-linear fighting, training that does not prepare 

soldiers for vertical terrain, awkward and counterproductive positioning 

of the weapons, changing and treacherous weather conditions, and 

punishing temperatures that renders troops less effective.

In Afghanistan, significant mountain ranges such as the Himalayas 

and the Karakoram rise in the east. The Hindu Kush towers in the center 

of the country. The Suleman and Kirthar ranges jut toward the eastern 

border with Pakistan and extend into Baluchistan. Finally, the Paghman 

Range shrouds the capital city of Kabul. These ranges elevate more 

than two-thirds of Afghanistan’s territory above 5,000 feet. These ranges 

provide natural concealment and protection for the insurgent fighters.

Fighting in extremely mountainous terrain and at high-altitudes is 

not linear. While forces move along pre-designated phase lines as on flat 

terrain, difficulties arise in maintaining continuity between units as they 

methodically scale from one point to the next. Fronts do not necessarily 

follow contiguous and sequential sets of ridges; they may even require 

simultaneous attacks on crests, ledges, and tactical objectives in opposite 

directions. A valley floor lying several thousand meters below may 

provide the only geographical point of continuity.1

Most armies train and equip themselves for conventional warfare on 

terrain that facilitates effective command and control and allows efficient 

employment of combined arms. Ideal terrain for mechanized forces are 

wide plains, rolling hills, plateaus, deserts, or sparsely populated regions 

that favor the linear and contiguous properties of maneuver warfare. 

None of these conditions is present in the bordering highlands along the 

eastern length of Afghanistan.

Extreme terrain also constrains fire support weapons. Artillery 

faces limitations imposed by steep road gradients and sharp bends that 

prevent deployment of the support vehicles and guns. To maintain the 
Artillery In the Mountains 89

employment of guns as far forward as possible, batteries must disperse 

into sections, one or two guns per position, to maximize coverage to 

the supported units. To optimize the usefulness of the artillery, forces 

position their guns in terrain folds and on reverse slopes. Other 

positioning options include road heads, near villages, and along valleys. 

Deployment of artillery is often constrained because of logistics to 

support their use.2

Positioning of artillery becomes even more important when defending in mountainous terrain. The drastic changes in elevation and 

uneven ground make maintaining a continuous line of units tied together 

along their flanks difficult. A reverse-slope defense poses problems as 

well. While these positions mask unit movements and strengths, troops 

often lack sufficient overhead cover. Positions become susceptible to 

artillery fire and airbursts showering positions with fragmentation.3

Meteorological implications affect artillery use at higher elevations. 

Low air pressure, cold temperatures, and high wind speeds make 

standard firing tables ineffective.4

 These conditions increase inaccuracy. 

The lack of adequate maps and surveyed locations and the lack of 

precise meteorological reports increase the probability of error in range 

and altitude. Spotting rounds at high-altitude requires extra observers to 

walk rounds onto targets and to make drastic shifts to achieve accurate 

fire.

Human endurance must factor into the problem as well. Men cannot 

long endure temperatures ranging from as high as 128°F and as low as 

-15°F in the central highlands of Afghanistan and greater Southwest Asia. 

Prolonged exposure at high-altitudes depletes the strength of infantry 

units and requires frequent rotations of the troops.5

 This condition places 

greater responsibility for augmentation by the field artillery. Firepower 

must compensate for the aggregate reduction in troop strength. The 

tactical, geographical, and physical conditions interlock. Continued 

exploitation of the environmental conditions by the insurgents who are 

accustomed to these extremes allows them to engender more credibility 

than their weaponry and troop strength warrant.

Other weapons systems do not improve these circumstances. In 

fact, their limitations reinforce the demand for an artillery capability. 

Aircraft are of limited utility in high-altitude operations. Atmospheric 

conditions such as heavy rain, blizzards, fog, high winds, and low oxygen 

density limit performance. Camouflaged ground troops use the natural 

contours of the mountains that include deep shadows and overhanging 

ledges to prevent visual identification by aircraft. Aircraft use in valleys is 

dangerous; pre-positioned air defense weapons and massed small arms 

fire force aircraft to fly higher. This technique creates a visual positive 
90 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

identification problem and increases the risk of fratricide. Helicopters 

serve as good artillery spotters but weather and elevation limit their 

usefulness. Noise from approaching aircraft provides advance warning 

for units giving them time to hide among the rocks.6

The Current Paradigm

Presently, the US Army has implemented self-limiting measures 

in Afghanistan. This formidable institution refuses to commit its full 

spectrum of ground combat capabilities to overwhelm the enemy forces 

of the Taliban and Al Qaida. Instead, it continues to deploy its weapons in 

piece-meal fashion, arriving with a force that is too little too late. Nowhere 

is this more obvious than in the employment of the field artillery.

Delineating present limitations on the current artillery corps helps 

define the problem. Field Artillery battalions in support of expeditionary 

brigades continue to deploy with less than their full complement of 

cannons. Batteries often deploy with only 50-percent of their guns while 

the troops spend alternate periods serving as provisional infantry, quick 

reaction forces, augment logistics activities, and a myriad of training tasks 

focused on host nation capabilities. Additionally, the current arsenal 

lacks mobility. Cannons positioned on Forward Operating Bases arrive 

by helicopter. Once in position, they do not often reposition. U.S. artillery 

limits itself to only two calibers, 105-mm and 155-mm to engage targeted 

Taliban cells. Although these have proved effective in conventional wars 

in the mountains of Afghanistan, two is not enough. The other choice of 

weaponry, the M270, Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), provides 

a significant capability and extreme precision. However, its optimal use 

fires at targets well beyond the immediate reach of the infantry involved 

in the fighting where individual and crew-served weapons make the 

difference.

Afghanistan presents a prolonged challenge. The restrictive practices 

of US forces coupled with creative Taliban tactics create an operational 

dilemma. Direct insurgent attacks against fortified positions pit enemy 

rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns against mortars, 

and heavy and light crew-served weapons. The distance created by the 

insurgents using these weapons ensures that rifleman cannot effectively 

range them with their small arms. These tactics enable a small group of 

insurgents to attack and pin down a technologically advanced force in 

a fixed position. The result is that two divergent tactical fights emerge. 

The first fight belongs to the infantry, fighting in platoon or squadsized actions at ranges of one kilometer or less. The second fight is in 

the purview of the artillery as it attempts to fight a much deeper battle 

against selected small targets out to 30 kilometers (see figure 1). 
Artillery In the Mountains 91

Taliban groups study and comprehend the US tactics. They observe 

that artillery remains fixed on bases and lacks mobility to follow the 

infantry into the deep defiles and higher elevations. After eight years of 

conflict, insurgent fighters further understand the limitations of shell fuse 

combinations and the restrictions that the environment places on rotary 

and fixed wing aircraft. By moving under cover of the mountains and 

along remote paths, they can avoid US radar and the limited number of 

forward observers who can engage them.

Insurgent fighters use the natural shape, strength, and remoteness 

of mountains to retain their freedom of maneuver and create the 

conditions for a long-range fight. They utilize the man-made caves that 

served them well during the Soviet conflict twenty years ago. Cave 

utilization forces heavily encumbered American soldiers to pursue the 

enemy into forbidding regions often beyond the range of direct support 

artillery. While mortars may provide a quick response, they still lack 

the punch, mass, and range to support the fight in Afghanistan for the 

long-term. This lack limits the ability of offensive forces to achieve two 

important aspects of offensive operations –– exploitation and pursuit. 

The inadequate application of combat power over the past six years 

facilitated the increase in hostilities by the Taliban (see figure 2). 

As recently as 2009, improved insurgent tactics now include firing 

volleys of rocket-propelled grenades, mortar rounds, and missiles from 

the back of trucks to allow insurgent groups to maneuver to disrupt 

coalition forces and seize key objectives such as remote outposts and 

Figure 1: Field Artillery Application and Capability Gap in Afghanistan.7
92 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

towns. The lack of coalition troops in any given area and a corresponding 

lack of artillery to mitigate that deficiency in troop density has allowed 

the insurgency to fight along increasingly conventional lines not 

witnessed since Operation Anaconda in 2002.8 The tactical dilemma 

that presented itself then emerges again now. The weapon system 

designed to engage in the long-range fight (cannons, howitzers, and 

rockets) remains noticeably absent from the majority of the fighting in 

significant numbers.

The Lens of History

The Soviet occupation and American approaches to fighting in 

Afghanistan warrant attention and denote significant but important 

contrasts. For the Soviet Union’s five and two-thirds divisions, the geographical and operational limitations of Afghanistan reinforced the 

Soviet reliance on artillery as the centerpiece of their army formations. 

In contrast, Afghanistan has been an example of limited incremental 

technological application for the United States.

The complexity of fighting in Afghanistan produced an arguably 

counter-intuitive response for the Soviets. At first glance, the task of 

fighting an asymmetric enemy in largely uncharted territory would 

seem to warrant limited artillery formations in favor of lighter and more 

mobile forces. However, the experience of the Soviet artillery corps in 

Figure 2: Location and Percentage of Taliban Attacks by Region in Afghanistan. 

Source: School of Advanced Military Studies, Exercise One. 

Data Extracted from U.S. Government Accounting Office Report on Iraq and Afghanistan, March 2009.
Artillery In the Mountains 93

the prosecution of the army’s campaigns clearly noted that it remained 

a central combat arm in counterinsurgency warfare. Despite the limited 

maneuver space, winding mountain roads, and narrow valleys, creative 

methods of utilization allowed the artillery in certain circumstances to 

fight with limited or no infantry support. Moreover, the Soviet infantry 

fully appreciated the necessity for maintaining adequate fire support 

assets on all types of missions given the limited numbers of infantry 

battalions attempting to cover the entire country.

The Soviet Artillery Corps worked to integrate their weapons systems 

into the overall operational plan, rather than work to the exclusion of other 

arms. Mortars in significant numbers shared battle space with howitzers, 

aircraft, and cannons in large numbers synchronized their efforts against 

objectives, the Soviets sought to integrate as many weapons systems of 

as many calibers as possible to execute a combat mission. The Soviets 

did not permit the Mujahedeen’s tactical exploitation of the environment 

to dictate the terms of the utility of rockets and howitzers, both towed and 

self-propelled systems proved useful. The decentralization of the artillery 

to support infantry platoon, company, and battalion level operations also 

revealed that Soviet Army officers became more adaptive and innovative 

over time. Though initially resistant to change, the Soviet Army proved 

increasingly flexible and adaptive out of tactical necessity.

Two notable examples illustrate the effectiveness of the Soviet 

artillery in Afghanistan. First, the successful artillery ambush conducted 

by Lieutenant V. Kozhbergenov, a D30 (122-mm) howitzer platoon leader, 

displays the accuracy that Soviet artillery operating in decentralized 

Figure 3: Diagram of the Artillery Ambush near Talukan, Afghanistan February 1986.

Source: Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_51.html (accessed 10 August 2009).
94 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

platoons could achieve through indirect and unobserved fire planning 

(figure 3). At night, the Realii-U operator, (a seismic recording device), 

reported that 10-15 people, two trucks and pack animals were passing 

through the eastern most target area, number 112. The platoon leader 

fired three concentrations. As the Mujahedeen continued to approach 

concentration 111, the gunners fired a volley. Then, the first piece 

switched to fire concentration 110 and the third piece switched to fire 

concentration 112. Number 2 gun continued to fire on concentration 111. 

The platoon destroyed two Toyota trucks, four pack animals and six men 

as well as destroying small arms and ammunition.9

 

In a second example, the Soviets made maximum use of a battalion of 

152-mm 2S3 howitzers in direct fire mode in 1986 in the Baghlan Province 

of Afghanistan. A battalion of self-propelled howitzers employed direct 

fire across a wide front and moved forward by coordinated bounds 

by battery. Each successive bound brought the guns between 100 

and 150 meters closer to their targets. The supporting towed 122-mm 

D30 artillery battery groups continued to fire concentrations across a 

one-and-a-half kilometer front and a depth of three kilometers. These 

concentrations effectively pinned the enemy inside the valley and the 

fortified villages, while the maneuvering 152-mm batteries systematically 

reduced specific enemy targets. By matching the sequencing of the fire 

plan to map lines, the guns accurately shifted fires from one line to the 

next destroying the enemy-covered firing positions.10 The integrated 

fire plan successfully suppressed the opposition and enabled the 

capture of the village with limited exposure of Soviet troops to enemy 

fire. It eliminated the village stronghold.

For the Soviet Army changing tactics and fully integrating their 

indirect firing systems into the fighting gave them an increased level 

of success. The final withdrawal from Afghanistan rested not on faulty 

tactics. The Soviet political leadership in Moscow realized that the 

continued cost in lives and materiel could not substantiate or guarantee 

a clear political victory.12

The Artillery Gap of Operation Anaconda

In 2002, the United States committed troops to fight in Paktia province. 

Ironically, this had also been the location of brutal fighting between the 

Soviets and the mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan War. The Shahi-Kot Valley, the “Place of the King” had historically been a refuge for 

Afghan guerrillas. The valley became the scene for one of the largest 

battles of the US-Afghan War.

The fighting in the Shah-i-Kot valley rested on two inferences. First, 

that Al Qaida would not stand and fight, and second, that those weapons 
Artillery In the Mountains 95

systems at hand (mortars and fixed and rotary-wing aircraft) would be 

sufficient to handle any fighting that did occur. In the months prior to 

Operation Anaconda, the US military, coalition special operations troops, 

and local Afghan militias banded together and defeated Al Qaida and 

elements of the Taliban in their attempt to control of the city of Kandahar 

and a few weeks later at Tora Bora.12 

The United States Army did not recognize the fallacy in those 

assumptions until after fighting in the Shah-i-Kot Valley commenced. 

During Operation Anaconda, 1-18 March 2002, unlike the previous Soviet 

intervention, no artillery was present for the coalition and American 

troops. This absence of artillery created a noticeable capability gap 

that placed an increased burden on other weapons platforms such as 

mortars, helicopters, and an array of fixed-wing aircraft. Eventually, the 

application of mortars combined with air power destroyed large stores 

of enemy munitions, sealed off caves, spoiled a would-be counterattack, 

and scattered the survivors.13

Unfortunately, the notable achievements made by the use of 

coordinated close air support did not occur before significant delays, 

including fratricide, occurred in the original plan for the operation. 

Initially, the enemy retained the advantage in weapons and used them to 

disrupt the sweep through the valley. They not only possessed mortars 

of equal and greater caliber than the Americans, but also employed D30, 

122-mm howitzers that could range the length of the valley floor.14 In 

response, U.S. forces employed a number of aircraft including Apache 

AH-64 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that included A-10s, F-15Es, 

F-18s, and AC-130 gunships. These eventually bridged the gap between 

the limited mortar range and total lack of friendly artillery.

It is doubtful that the use of the current U.S. artillery arsenal in support 

of Operation Anaconda would have produced a decisive change in the 

immediate engagement. The overall inability of the artillery to support 

the mission due to a lack of expeditionary systems is the real point of 

significance. Of the two American systems that are air transportable (the 

155-mm M198 and the 105-mm M119), only the M119 howitzer might 

have provided some measure of equal range and impact to offset the 

enemy D30s. The real value of Operation Anaconda to the artillery is 

that it illustrated how unprepared the US artillery arsenal was to fight an 

expeditionary war in Afghanistan’s rugged landscape.

Future Possibilities

Fighting in Afghanistan reinforces the point that the fundamentals of 

artillery gunnery remain relevant regardless of the nature of the conflict 

and terrain. These recommendations serve as a basis of consideration 
96 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

and warning that while digital advancements in weaponry and precision 

munitions serve an important role, fighting in extremely mountainous 

terrain also requires the ability to move and to mass fire support at close 

ranges. During these engagements, aggregate rounds, not surgical 

precision establish a decisive advantage. Therefore, fundamental 

changes should match the demands of the operational environment.

Reforms must align people with devices, and that combination 

with the geography. To accomplish this, the US Army should consider 

expanding its arsenal of weapons systems and revising its doctrine. 

Specifically, the 75-mm pack howitzer is ideally suited for Afghanistan. 

This system, still in use by Pakistan and India along the Siachen Glacier 

and Kargil regions of the Kashmir, allows the artillery to move with the 

infantry into narrow defiles and up steep escarpments. It permits a high 

velocity, direct or indirect fire capability to destroy targets nested in 

caves and formidable terrain.

The 75-mm pack howitzer saw extensive wartime service with the 

US.Army issuing them to airborne and mountain units during World War 

II, (see figure 4). An airborne division, according to the organization of 

February 1944, had three 75-mm howitzer battalions. Glider units fielded 

two field artillery battalions that contained two 6-gun batteries each and 

one parachute field artillery battalion (three 4-gun batteries) totaling 36 

pieces per division. In December 1944, new Tables of Organization and 

Equipment increased the divisional firepower to 60, 75-mm howitzers. 

The 10th Mountain Division contained three 75-mm howitzer battalions, 

containing 12 guns each.15 

Figure 4: Diagram of the 75-mm Pack Howitzer from U.S. Army TM 9-319.16 

Source: http://www.ww2gyrene.org/weapons_pack_howitzer.75mm.htm.
Artillery In the Mountains 97

In the US Marine Corps, under the E-series Tables of Organization 

(TO), from 15 April 1943 divisional artillery included three 75-mm 

howitzer battalions of 12 guns each. The F-series TO from 5 May 1944 

reduced the number of 75-mm battalions to two, and the G-series TO 

eventually removed them. The Marine Corps then shifted to 105-mm 

and 155-mm howitzers. Although the G-series TO was only adopted 

on 4 September 1945, in practice in some divisions the change was 

introduced early in 1945.17

The 75-mm howitzer, during its time of employment, proved successful. Nearly 5,000 guns were produced. As a part of Lend Lease, more 

than 800 saw service with the British forces in the Balkans where they 

proved excellent for fighting in that mountainous region. Today, Afghanistan provides another opportunity to use this weapon or something 

similar.18

As a practical matter, converting these largely ceremonial guns into 

operational howitzers should not be beyond consideration. The pack 

howitzer ranges out to 9 kilometers firing high explosive, anti-tank, and 

smoke rounds. It disassembles into six components and its total combat 

configured weight is 1,009 pounds. A concept for employment would 

not require replacement of the current 105-mm and 155-mm systems 

already present in Afghanistan. Instead, these weapons would augment 

the infantry with platoons or sections of pack howitzers as they pursue 

the Taliban into the highest points along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Recommendations do not limit themselves to weapons systems. 

Training doctrine provides the link among the soldier, weapon, and the 

environment. Soldiers and leaders require access to core documents 

from which to draw relevant and expedient tactics and methods. A review 

of U.S. doctrinal history reveals that the army previously experienced 

fighting in mountainous terrain. The following points regarding texts 

and training deserve consideration. The Army should revise and publish 

Field Manual 70-10 Mountain Operations, Field Manual 70-15 Operations 

in Snow and Extreme Cold, and Field Manual 25-7 Pack Operations,

all published in 1944.19 These manuals explain in detail methods of 

mountain warfare. The lessons and methods still apply to the mountain 

ranges of Afghanistan and Southwest Asia.

Conclusion

Historical case studies and eight years of experience validate the 

need and utility of a significant artillery arsenal in Afghanistan. The 

rugged landscape provides a natural fortress for insurgents that make 

locating and destroying them difficult.20 Transnational insurgencies 

such as Al Qaida and the Taliban exploit the network of mountain ranges 
98 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

between Afghanistan and Pakistan to their advantage.21 Insurgents use 

the mountains and the protection they offer to maintain weapons parity 

with U.S. forces. American forces must adjust to the limits imparted 

by geographical and environmental conditions to offset the enemy 

advantage.

Mountain warfare dictates that combatants redefine their tactics and 

operational approaches to isolate and destroy these natural makeshift 

forts. Creating that isolation requires artillery. However, to fill that 

requirement the artillery must become mobile and directly support 

a limited number of infantry with a significant volume of fire to reduce 

and destroy these positions. The example of the Soviet Union’s forces 

in Afghanistan points to the utility of using the full spectrum of indirect 

weapons systems from mortars to rockets, towed cannon, and selfpropelled howitzers. They further reveal that field artillery can provide 

a useful and leading role in shaping operations and can directly defeat 

known insurgent defenses.

The United States Army’s institutional memory remains short and 

neglects the fact that the field artillery proved effective in massing fires 

for decades in full-spectrum operations. Whether for offense, defense, 

or in deterring enemy forces, the artillery facilitated operational success 

in numerous contingency operations.22 Maneuver commanders rely 

upon the presence of artillery to provide “firepower insurance”––having 

organic or assigned artillery capabilities present for any eventuality.

Certainly fighting in rugged terrain with artillery presents difficulties, 

but the case studies reveal that it is possible to use all types of artillery 

effectively and well beyond the confines of forward operating bases 

in Afghanistan and in the greater region of Southwest Asia. American 

forces need weapons that can destroy a smaller force in terrain not 

suitable for the current arsenal.

________________________________________

1. Lester Grau and Lieutenant Colonel Hernán Vázquez, Argentine Army. “Ground 

Combat at High Altitude,” Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. http://

fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products.htm#casia (accessed March 20, 2009) 4.

2. Ibid., 9.

3. Ibid., 5.

4. Ibid., 6.

5. Ibid., 6-9.

6. Ibid., 6-9.

7. This diagram represents more than just the present mobility gap hindering combined 

infantry and artillery missions. It also represents how artillery might be echeloned by 

caliber according to altitude to fight in increasingly higher altitudes. The weapons systems 

displayed, with the exception of the 75mm pack howitzer, are currently in use by the 
Artillery In the Mountains 99

U.S. Army. The Multiple Launch Rocket System typically engages targets beyond 20 

kilometers and serves to fight the “deep fight” in American doctrine. Joseph A. Jackson, 

Howitzers on High Ground: Considerations for Artillery in Southwest Asia, School of 

Advanced Military Studies, (Fort Leavenworth, KS October 2009) 35.

8. Alfred de Montesquiou, “Marines launch new Afghan assault against Taliban,” 

Associated Press, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090812/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan 

(accessed 12 August 2009).

9. Lester W. Grau, Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 1997) 1-9.

10. Soviet artillery proved not only extremely valuable in the offensive examples above, 

but also in support of infantry breaking contact with the Mujahedeen. The supporting 

artillery fired suppressing fires in front of withdrawing troops to keep the enemy from 

closing or immediately reoccupying their fighting positions. Additional suppressive fires 

targeted key terrain along the flanks preventing the infantry from being enveloped or from 

receiving enfilading fires. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a 

Super Power Fought and Lost. Translated and edited by Lester Grau and Michael A. 

Gress, (University of Kansas Press, 2002) 173-74.

11. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central 

Asia, and Afghanistan, (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1993) 216.

12. The US Special Forces groups to included elements of forces from USSOCOM, 

JSOC and CIA’s Special Activities Division. Other units and coalition partners consisted 

of TF 11, TF Bowie, and TF Dagger, British Royal Marines, and Canada’s 3d Battalion, 

Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, and Joint Task Force 2. The German KSK, 

the Norwegian FSK and elements of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, the 

New Zealand Special Air Service and Danish Special Forces from Jaegerkorpset and 

the Danish Frogman Corps and the Dutch Special Forces (Korps Commando Troepen) 

took part in Operation Anaconda. Steve Call, Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007) 59.

13. Ibid., 78.

14. The decision not to deploy even light artillery –– 105-mm cannons –– was deliberate. 

General Tommy Franks concluded that there was too little airlift capability to haul the 

pieces into the high altitudes. Instead, artillerymen of the 10th Mountain Division trained 

to operate the 120-mm mortar. This battle in the Shah-i-Kot Valley fueled the discussion 

on the use of mortars and airpower to fill the void where artillery pieces could provide 

a sufficient bridge in the tactical weapons system gap. The D30 122-mm howitzer 

possesses an effective range of 15.4 kilometers, with a rocket assisted projectile, this 

increases to 21.9 kilometers. In contrast, the 120mm mortar’s maximum range is 7.6 

kilometers. OP 4: Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of 

the US Experience, (Combat Studies Institute, CSI Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) 37.

15. The U.S. Army recently decided to use the XVIII Airborne Corps and its aligned 

divisions consisting of the 82d Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division, and the 10th 

Mountain Division to rotate through Afghanistan. These light divisions could readily 

adapt to integrate a lightweight howitzer such as the 75-mm. A suitable stockpile of 

these weapons could conceivably be left in theater while individual brigades would 

employ them. This would allow a consistent and more mobile artillery presence in each 

brigade area of operations and not increase the logistical cost of shipping more of their 

own assigned artillery of 105-mm or 155-mm to Afghanistan. 

16. The 75mm pack howitzer is a mobile, general purpose, field artillery piece. It is 

manually operated single loaded, and uses fixed and semi fixed ammunition. The firing 

mechanism is a continuous pull (self-cocking type, actuated by pulling a lanyard. The 

recoil mechanism is a hydro pneumatic type, having a floating piston and a pneumatic 
100 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

respirator. It provided direct or indirect fire and could elevate to fire high angle fire to 

deliver plunging fire on a target to a range of 9 kilometers. Data extracted from TM 

9-319 (75mm Pack Howitzer). 

17. In addition to service with mule units, the 75mm howitzer became the main gun for 

glider and parachute artillery battalions in World War II. Airborne units so equipped won 

battle honors at Bastogne, Normandy, and Arnhem. The chief difference between pack 

howitzers for mule use and those for airborne operations were the wheels. The glider 

units had spoke wheels and the parachute units had pneumatic tires. See http://ibiblio.

net/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/mil_hist_inst/a/artyC.asc.

18. Other systems are readily available on the world markets ready for use. The 

Italian-made OTOBREDA 105-mm howitzer, manufactured by GIAT industries – 

disassembles into 11 components (a section can assemble it in three minutes) and is 

transportable by pack animals. It weighs 1,310 kilograms, or 2,880 pounds. This is a 

favorable savings in weight even when compared to the 4,690 pounds for the M119. 

The OTOBREDA fires nine different charges with a maximum range of 18.1 kilometers. 

Thirty countries presently field more than 3,000 of these systems worldwide. Tests 

and actual employment of this system in demanding environments such as Sweden, 

India, and Malaysia proved successful. Within the immediate area of Afghanistan, 

India’s Ordnance Factory Board currently produces the India Field Gun (IFG), a 105-

mm howitzer specifically designed for mountain deployment. It weighs 2350 Kg 

(5,170 pounds) with a maximum range of 17.5 kilometers and deploys by either truck 

or helicopter. For heavier calibers, GIAT Industries produces the Caesar 155-mm selfpropelled howitzer. This system integrates the prime mover and gun. The gun rests 

on the truck bed. The design specifically addresses the inability of towed 155-mm 

howitzers to deploy into mountainous areas. Sengupta, Prasun K., “105-mm Guns for 

Rapid Deployment Force and Mountain Warfare,” Asian Defence Journal, no. 3 (March 

1999) 24.

19. Some reprinted field manuals do exist. Nevertheless, they remain in the prevue of 

Special Operations forces. A significant portion of the army experienced fighting in rugged 

terrain well beyond the units comprising the traditional Special Forces community in 

Afghanistan since 2002. Previous army experience from World War II captured practical 

information of mountain troops in manuals such as, FM 25-7 Pack Operations, published in 

1944. Presently published as FM 3-05 Special Forces Use of Pack Animals, Department 

of the Army, (Washington D.C., June 2004).

20. Ibid., 1-2.

21. Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd ed. 

(Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005) 65-66.

22. Ibid., 36-41.

________________________________________

Major Joseph A. Jackson is a US Army Field Artillery officer 

with de-ployment and combat experiences in Bosnia, Korea, Iraq, 

and Afghanistan. He earned a bachelor’s degree in history and 

Russian from Purdue University and master’s degrees from the 

US Army Command and General Staff College and the School 

of Advanced Military Studies. Major Jackson is presently serving 

his second tour in Afghanistan with the NATO Training Mission, 

(NTM-A). 
Small Arms Fire 101

Small ArmsFire

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) 

based on the work of Colonel Michael Panov

Marksmanship ranges are located on flat land, firing positions are 

developed for flat land, firing tables are calculated for flat land. Things 

change when you shoot in the mountains. First off, it is much harder 

to determine range in the mountains, second, if you shoot uphill or 

downhill using flat-land marksmanship techniques, you will shoot over 

the target every time. Third, the wind, the temperature and the humidity 

is different in the mountains ––and all play havoc with normal flat-land 

ballistics. In mountainous terrain like Afghanistan, the situation for the 

soldier or marine is compounded by the primary issue firearm –– the 

M16 rifle or M4 carbine. These weapons fire a light-weight, highvelocity, short-range, flat-trajectory round in an area that requires a 

heavy-weight, medium-velocity, long-range, normal-trajectory round. 

From the 1870s through the Korean War, US infantry trained to 

engage the enemy out past 900 yards and trained in the use of longrange plunging fire––a technique that works well in the mountains but does 

not work well with the 5.56-mm round. The current round’s lethality 

falls off markedly at 200 meters (50 meters with the M4 carbine using 

standard M16 ball ammunition) and the M4 is sighted for maximum 

engagement at 300 meters.

Other countries have fought in the mountains and experienced 

many of the same problems. Russia has recently fought in the Caucasus 

Mountains and in the Hindu Kush and Suleiman Mountains of Afghanistan. 

They are working on many of the issues involved with shooting in the 

mountains. Russia’s military comes from a different small arms tradition. 

They see the primary use of small arms fire as suppression of the enemy 

enabling the soldier to hold the enemy in place while artillery pummels 

him or allows the soldier to get close enough to dispatch him. The 

Kalashnikov assault rifle selector switch goes from “safe” to “automatic” 

to “semi-automatic.” The US Marine Corps and Army come from a 
102 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

marksmanship tradition of hitting the enemy with single well-aimed shots, 

although they have gotten away from that tradition over the past three 

decades and more into suppressive fire. The M16 assault rifle selector 

switch goes from “safe” to “semi-automatic” to “automatic.”

In May 2007, the Russian Army Digest began their series on mountain 

warfare with the basics ––firing positions.* 

*Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Strelyat’-tak pravil’no” (“The Right Way to Shoot”), in Armeisky 

Sbornik (Army Digest), May 2007, 19-21, and “Ochen’ slozhno, no mozhno i nuzhno” (“Very 

difficult, but possible and necessary”), 22-23, in the same edition.

The Right Way to Shoot: 

How to Select Firing and Firing Ready 

Positions in Mountainous Conditions

Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007

Mountainous terrain greatly impacts how well and effectively

 motorized rifle and tank units employ standard weapons 

(small arms). For example, there are a lot of unassailable (dead) 

spaces and hidden approaches that restrict the field of vision along 

the front as well as in depth. The varying rocky ground and vegetation 

also makes it much more difficult to locate and track targets. Indeed, 

wind direction and speed can change in a heartbeat depending on air 

temperature. Factor in that mountain climate is not at all uniform and 

extremely unstable, and that the air temperature varies considerably 

not only at different times of the year but even throughout the day, and 

sometimes even in the course of a few hours). It nowbecomes clear 

how important it is for soldiers to master the art of shooting accurately 

under such atypical conditions. In this issue of Army Digest, we offer 

just a few practical recommendations on training for firing and 

shooting in mountains. When preparing for battle in a mountainous 

area, remember that shooting accuracy is greatly influenced by the 

height difference between the firing position and the targets, shooting 

method, shooter position, limited ability to track targets on ridges, and 

other factors.

Personnel should acquire basic weapons skills during weapons 

training and range firing on level ground. Their shooting knowledge, 

proficiency and skills should then be improved at weapons training 

camps in the mountains.

Mountain marksmanship training should focus not only on firing 

position selection but also on the firing stance. The correct firing 

stance for small arms fire is critical because it stabilizes the weapon, 

thereby ensuring a hit.
Small Arms Fire 103

When considering a particular 

firing stance, it is important to 

remember that mountain conditions 

require that the position must be 

adjusted which, in turn, introduces 

new considerations or even different 

parts of the target into the ready 

position.

Let me remind you that a 

firing stance includes assuming 

a firing position and loading the 

weapon. Since there are no special 

techniques of weapon loading in 

the mountains, with the exception of the grenade launcher operator, let 

us take a closer look at position assumption. Let me point out straight 

away that the position will depend on the selected site (sloping or level 

ground) and the direction of fire (upward or downward). The firing 

position assumption technique is the same as on level ground, so we will 

consider firing stance (body, arm and leg position).

Shooting downward from a slope facing the target

Prone Position. The body is turned left and sideways at a 90o angle 

toward the plane of fire; the left leg is laid down against the slope in the 

direction of the target and the inner 

foot is thrust into a prepared hollow 

space (protrusion); the left elbow is 

thrust into the ground; the elbow angle 

is much larger than usual (120-160o); 

the right elbow is held close to the 

body. An automatic rifle is held by the 

front grip (Figure 1); a machine gun’s 

bipod is thrust into the ground and the 

gun is held by the butt (figure 2).

 When a soldier is firing a grenade 

launcher, his loader is on his right 

at of his outstretched left arm from the grenade launcher tube. The 

loader’s body is turned right sideways toward the target; the right 

leg is laid down against the slope; the grenade pack is placed 

against the slope below the body. To load the launcher, the loader 

passes the grenade over the muzzle, holding it at the top with his 

left hand keeping the propellant motor at a palm’s distance from 

the nozzle with the pin up.

Figure 1: Prone position for firing an automatic

rifle down a slope facing the target.

Figure 2. Prone position for firing a light 

machine gun down a slope facing the target.
104 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

The grenade launcher operator takes the grenade with his left hand 

from below by the nozzle and inserts it into the tube.

This arrangement ensures complete coordination between the grenade launcher operator and his assistant, enables rapid loading, and 

allows the loader to adjust fire.

Kneeling Position. The right leg is turned in the direction of fire 

at an almost 90o angle; the foot is turned so that the right side lies on 

the ground; the left leg is laid down against the slope in the direction of 

fire, and the heel is thrust into a hollow space (protrusion). The shooter’s 

right buttock is on the ground, and the left is thrust against the right heel 

(the heel keeps him from sliding down); the left elbow is thrust against 

the left kneecap; the right elbow is in the same position as for shooting 

on level ground; the automatic rifle (machine gun) is held by the front 

grip (figure 3).

 Sitting Position. The shooter can fire from two positions, depending 

on the steepness of the slope. For example, if the slope is very steep 

(figure 4), the body is barely turned in the direction of fire. The shooter sits 

on the ground with his legs downward against the slope in the direction of 

the target, digging his heels into hollow spaces (protrusions) a shoulder 

width apart; the left elbow rests on the inner left knee or on the thigh, a 

palm’s length above the knee; the right elbow lies at the top of the right 

thigh; the automatic rifle (machine gun) is held by the front grip.

The shooter assumes a slightly different sitting position on a gentler 

slope (figure 5). He sits on the ground with his legs crossed and drawn 

up under him (Eastern-style); the right heel is a support under the left 

thigh; the left heel is thrust into a hollow space (protrusion) of the slope; 

the left elbow is thrust against the thigh; the right elbow is at an 80-90o 

angle to the body; the left hand holds the automatic rifle (machine gun) 

by the front grip.

Standing Position. The body is turned left sideways in the direction 

of fire with the feet as close as possible (a wide stance causes too 

Figure 3. Kneeling position 

for firing an automatic rifle down a 

slope facing the target.

Figure 4. Sitting position for 

firing an automatic rifle down a 

steep slope facing the target.

Figure 5. Standing position 

for firing an automatic rifle down a 

gentle slope facing the target.
Small Arms Fire 105

much height difference, making the position 

uncomfortable); both feet are turned toward 

the plane of fire at 90o; the automatic rifle is 

held by the foregrip (figure 6).

Shooting upward from a slope 

facing the shooter:

Prone Position. The body is turned slightly 

toward the target; the shooter leans slightly on 

his left side; the left leg is stretched downward 

against the slope and the toecap is thrust into 

a hollow space (protrusion) in the ground; the 

right leg is firmly bent at the knee and pulled 

under the right side of the stomach; the toecap is thrust into a hollow 

space (protrusion); the arm position is the same as for firing on level 

ground; an automatic rifle is held by the front grip (a machine gun – by 

the bipod). If this does not provide the necessary angle of fire, the rifle is 

held by the magazine body (figure 7).

 When firing a machine gun, recommend that you place a support 

under the front grip to raise the barrel.

Kneeling Position. The toecap is thrust into a hollow space (protrusion); the right knee rests on the ground, the thigh is in a vertical 

position; the left elbow rests on the upper kneecap; the right elbow is 

held at an almost straight angle; the automatic rifle is held by the lower 

magazine case (figure 8). If this arm position does not provide the 

necessary angle of fire, the arm is straightened and stretched upward; 

the automatic rifle (Kalashnikov light machine gun) is held by the front 

grip.

Standing Position. The following position should be assumed when 

firing on a very steep slopes: the body is turned in the direction of fire at 

an almost 90o angle; the left leg is firmly bent at the knee, with the foot 

turned inward and thrust into a hollow space (protrusion) on the ground; 

Figure 6. Standing position for firing 

an automatic rifle down a slope 

facing the target.

Figure 8. Kneeling position for 

firing an automatic rifle up a slope 

facing the shooter.

Figure 7. Prone position for 

firing an automatic rifle up a slope 

facing the shooter.

Figure 9. Standing position 

for firing an automatic rifle up a 

steep slope facing the shooter.
106 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

the right foot stands parallel to the left 

one, the leg is straight at the knee; the 

left elbow is thrust into the left knee at 

the upper kneecap; the right elbow 

hangs down freely (the angle between 

it and the body is 30-45o); the automatic 

rifle is held by the lower magazine body 

(figure 9).

On gentler slopes, body position is 

the same as on level ground, the width 

between the feet is minimal, the feet 

are parallel, the left leg is half-bent, and 

the right leg is straight; the left elbow is 

pressed against the left side of the chest 

and the right elbow hangs down freely; the automatic rifle is held by 

the front grip or the lower magazine body (figure 10).

________________________________________

 Figure 10. Standing position for firing 

an automatic rifle up a gentle slope facing 

the shooter.

It is Difficult---But Possible and Necessary--- 

to Master the Skills and Techniques of 

Shooting in Mountains

Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007

We have reviewed some firing stance techniques for shooting in mountains. Let us pause briefly to better understand that all 

of them (techniques) are determined by the terrain features as well as 

the best firing conditions. In addition, mountain combat experience has 

confirmed that the abovementioned 

firing positions are optimal. But what is 

the best thing to do if one has to shoot 

upward or downward from a level area 

in the mountains? Here, too, there are 

time-tested techniques. Let us review 

them.

Downward shooting position

Prone Position. The body is turned 

at a 15-25o angle in the direction of fire, 

the legs are slightly spread apart, the 

right leg is half-bent; the left elbow is down over the edge of the slope; 

the right elbow is further off to the side than when shooting on level 

ground; the left hand holds the front grip of the automatic rifle. This 

shooting position is assumed by automatic riflemen, machine gunners, 

Figure 1. Prone position for firing an 

automatic rifle downward from a level area.
Small Arms Fire 107

grenade launcher gunner and snipers 

(figure 1). Kalashnikov machine gun and 

Kalashnikov light machine gun bipods 

are placed on the slope.

Kneeling Position. The right leg 

is at a 60-70o angle to the plane of fire; the 

left leg is placed a half step forward, the 

lower leg is vertical, the foot is at a 45-60o 

angle to the plane of fire; the left elbow 

is lowered as close as possible to the left 

knee; the right elbow is held at a 75-90o 

angle to the body; the automatic rifle is 

held by the front grip (figure 2).

Standing Position. The body is turned left sideways toward 

the plane of fire, the feet are no more than a shoulder width apart, the 

toecaps are turned slightly outwards; the 

left elbow rests on the hip; the right elbow 

is slightly lowered (45-60o) toward the 

body; the left hand holds the automatic 

rifle’s front grip (figure 3).

Upward shooting position

Prone Position. Position remains the 

same as on level ground, except that the 

left hand holds the automatic rifle’s magazine by the bottom (figure 4). If a support 

is used, it is higher than on level ground.

Kneeling Position. The leg position 

is the same as for shooting downward 

but the right foot is completely turned, the right side of the heel touches 

the ground, the buttock rests on the 

inner foot rather than the back of 

the heel, the left elbow rests on the 

upper left knee; the left hand holds 

the automatic rifle’s magazine by 

the bottom (figure 5a).

If this position does not provide 

the necessary angle of fire, the left 

elbow is not rested on the knee 

but is stretched upward, the elbow 

joint is straight, with the automatic 

rifle held by the front grip in this 

Figure 2. Kneeling position for firing 

downward from a level area.

Figure 3. Standing position for firing 

downward from a level area.

Figure 4. Prone position for firing an automatic 

rifle upward from a level area.
108 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

case (Figure 5b).

Standing Position. 

The standing position 

differs in only one respect: the left elbow 

rests on the left side of 

the chest rather than 

on the hip; the automatic rifle is held by 

the bottom of the magazine (figure 6a). If this 

position does not provide the necessary angle of fire, the left hand is 

removed from the support and stretched upward, the left elbow straight; 

the automatic rifle is held by the front grip (figure 6b).

It should be pointed out that when shooting upward from a level 

area (road, bottom of a ravine or pit), a “kneeling” or “standing” position will be used most 

often since a “prone” 

position will be exposed and present the 

largest target.

Training in shooting along a slope 

should focus on the 

following: if the mountain peak is to the 

right, the left leg is 

lower down the slope 

and the inner boot side pushed against the slope, and the right 

leg is bent slightly and the outer boot rand thrust against the slope 

(figure 7a). If the mountain peak is to the left, 

the right leg is lower 

down the slope and the 

inner boot side is pushed 

against the slope, and the 

left leg is bent slightly 

and the outer boot side 

thrust against the slope 

(figure 7b).

All of the above techniques ensure the most stable position and 

effective firing.

Figure 5. Kneeling position for firing an automatic rifle upward 

from a level area: (A) The left hand holds the automatic rifle 

magazine by the bottom.

Figure 6. Standing position for firing an automatic rifle upward 

from a level area: (A) The left hand holds the automatic rifle 

magazine by the bottom.

Figure 7. Standing position for firing an automatic rifle 

along a slope. (A) Slope to the right; (B) Slope to the left.
Small Arms Fire 109

These techniques do not preclude other, more advantageous 

positions for shooting in the mountains. It all depends on the specific 

conditions: steepness of the slopes, soil conditions (icy, rocky, talusstrewn, grassy or snow-covered, creviced, uneven), weather (rain, snow).

Use of fractures on the terrain, stones, boulders and crevices as cover 

for shooters improves fire effectiveness and protects the shooter from 

enemy fire. Moreover, firing positions should be selected where there is 

less dead space. Large stones, shelf rocks, openings, rain channels, trees, 

shrubs, and so on should be used to cover the shooter.

In conclusion, firing position selection and ready positions need 

to be learned, and these techniques should be practiced at specially 

prepared sites that have slopes with varying steepness, large stones, 

shelf rocks, and so on.

________________________________________

These two articles may seem to be fairly basic and simple, and they 

are. But, for those who have not done mountain shooting, they contain 

good, time-saving information. Training for mountain firing should begin 

with a dry-fire stage where coaches and trainees move up and down 

mountains while identifying targets and taking up firing positions and 

stances to quickly and accurately engage the targets while using the 

terrain for protection from return fire. Once the trainee can automatically 

and smoothly assume the proper position and stance, he can begin livefire training. Unlike conventional range fire, the coach and trainee move 

up and down and laterally in the mountains, identifying and engaging 

targets. Accuracy and speed of engagement are measured during this 

training and the tendency to overshoot the target is corrected. The trainee 

also conducts deliberate ricochet fire and plunging fire. 

 Once the trainees have mastered these measures, they should be 

reintegrated into squads for dry-fire maneuver training using bounding 

over-watch, flanking attacks and supporting and area fire while moving 

up, down and laterally in the mountains. Upon completion of this training, 

squads and platoons are ready to move into training against opposing 

forces (OPFOR) using MILES gear or simunitions. 
110 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

So That Making Camp Makes You Stronger: 

Organizing Rest 

and Overnight Halts 

forPersonnelinthe 

Mountains

Colonel Michael Panov

Originally published in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007*

It is important to get the soldiers into some sort of shelter for sleep 

and to escape storms. Naturally, the soldier’s load prohibits carrying 

much more than a shelter half for that shelter, so the soldiers will need 

to use what nature provides. 

*“Daby prival sil pribavlyal: Ob organizatsii otdykha lichnogo sostava v gorakh” (“So that 

making camp makes you stronger: Organizing rest and overnight halts for personnel in the 

mountains”) in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), May 2007, 27.

The simplest shelter in a deeply snow-covered area is a snow hole. 

If there is no time to build comfortable shelter, it is necessary to 

dig a hole (cave), place brushwood, tree branches, grass, or moss in it, 

and close the entrance (with a shelter half, snow blocks). Here you can 

rest and wait out the foul weather. If the scouts expect to use this type 

of shelter for a long time, there should be space for beds, a fire, and 

gear, a hole for smoke, and ventilation.

You need to be careful when lighting a fire inside the shelter 

because beds and stocks of wood and brushwood could easily catch 

fire. You should also guard against fumes inside the shelter where the 

fire is burning.

Although it is warm inside the shelter, it is very dangerous to sleep 

on the bare ground or on snow, even in a sleeping bag. You must make 

a bed from small branches and fir twigs. To be warmer, the bed should 

be raised off the floor and at least 40-50 cm from the fire. If there are 

several people in the shelter, one of them should always keep watch 
Shelter 111

Figure 2. Rawhide-tent type temporary 

winter shelter (left – made of skis and snow; 

right – made of sticks and shelter halves).

Figure 1. Temporary shelter in deep snow 

(left – a snow hole; right – a cave).

Figure 3. Tent setup in a mountain area.

to keep the fire going, guard the others while they rest, dry their shoes 

and clothes, and prepare a hot meal. He should also wake the other 

scouts from time to time to change their sleep position because the 

part of the body facing the fire warms up while the other cools way 

down.

Snow holes and caves (figure 1) in high mountain areas can be 

used not only for temporary shelter for the scouts but also as the main 

base for a reconnaissance group 

if it is not possible to build an 

underground shelter or convert 

a cave into a base. Rawhide tents 

(figure 2) or canvas tents (figure 

3) are more reliable temporary 

shelters where a fire can burn 

continually.

It takes a lot of energy to 

build snow shelters, even though 

they are simple. To reduce perspiration, while working you 

should remove outerwear, loosen 

your belt, and remove gear. All 

snow and ice should be brushed off clothing and shoes before entering 

the shelter.

Probable rockfall areas should be avoided when selecting a base. 

It is also dangerous to set up a base in snow or ice avalanche-prone 

areas. Neither should you select dry riverbeds or areas where there 

could be mud flows (mudslides).
112 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Russian Army 

Training 

Captain Charles K. Bartles, US Army 

based on the work of Colonel Michael Panov

Russian/Soviet military traditions are very different than those encountered in Western/NATO armies. Despite efforts to modernize and 

develop a “contract” system of service similar to the system used in the 

United States, the Russian Armed Forces are still predominately conscript. 

The Russian draft process is a much dreaded event for most Russian 

men. In Russia, poor treatment and living conditions are synonymous with 

conscription. Conscripts are paid poorly by Russian standards, and their 

abuse is a well-known facet of military life in Russian society.

Unsurprisingly, conscription avoidance has become commonplace. 

Only about 10-percent of conscription age Russian males report for service 

in the Armed Forces every year even though there are many exemptions, 

deferments, and releases that will allow a potential conscript to legally avoid 

service. Often more illicit means are utilized to dodge the draft; bribery of 

the draft boards is common, as well simply not reporting for service. The 

end result of this process is a draft that is far from egalitarian. Wealthy and 

better educated Russian men (education deferments) rarely serve, while 

the vast majority of Russian conscripts come from poorer, less affluent 

families. This has caused great consternation in the military leadership due 

to missed recruiting quotas and the low quality of conscripts.

Training a conscript force presents many challenges to Russian 

commanders. Although conditions have improved in the Russian military in 

the last several years, the Russian military budget is still a fraction of Soviet 

levels. The priorities of the Russian defense budget are developing new 

weapon systems and paying salaries, not investing in the training of short 

term conscripts. Little time or money can be invested in soldiers that will 

only serve 12 months and the Russian Army has no centralized method 

of conscript training. Russian conscripts attend no “initial entry training” 

center, but are put into training platoons upon arrival at their units of 

assignment. In the Russian system, the unit commander (battalion level) has 

direct control over his conscripts’ initial training, allowing training standards 

to vary widely between different units. 

Russia’s system of decentralized training presents a serious challenge 

for the commander of mountain troops. Any soldier operating in a mountain 
Russian Army Training l Along Slopes and Tracks 113

environment will quickly notice that the basic infantry skills (moving, 

shooting, and communicating) become quite difficult. 

The Russian commander is faced with many difficulties training for 

mountain operations. Most of his conscripts are not the best and brightest, 

will cycle out every twelve months, and he has little in the way of specialized 

equipment to conduct training. Yet despite these difficulties Russia has 

enjoyed some success in mountain warfare. The Russian method presented 

below is Russia’s approach to train short-term conscripts for the challenging 

task of mountain warfare. 

The Russian Army approaches this challenge as it does most others, with 

the simplest solution possible. Graduates of the Marine Corps’ Mountain 

Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California, and the US Army’s Mountain 

Warfare School in Jericho, Vermont, may be surprised at how little emphasis 

is placed on land navigation and survival skills. In the Russian Army, Russian 

officers perform many duties performed by NCOs in Western/NATO armies 

and are trained to a much higher standard than their conscripts. Officer training 

is on par with many Western armies. Much of the advanced aspects of 

warfare that would normally be taught to all soldiers in Western/NATO 

armies are instead taught to only officers in the Russian Army. Land navigation, as well as many other duties, is an officers responsibility, little or no effort 

is made to train conscripts in this task. As for survival skills, one advantage 

of the Russian system of conscription is that recruits often serve in the same 

geographic area from which they are conscripted. Although the Russian 

conscript may not be familiar with the exact area in which he is serving, he 

may well already be accustomed to a mountain environment. The practice 

of assigning conscripts to areas around their homes further benefits the 

unit, as conscripts are demobilized and return to civilian life. In the event 

of national emergency, demobilized conscripts may return to duty with the 

same unit they demobilized from.

Although repetition is a common training strategy for most armies, 

the extent to which it is practiced in the Russian army will seem strange 

to those familiar with training in Western armies. Short service durations, 

no professional NCO corps, and little formalized training causes much 

less emphasis to be put on individual initiative at the tactical level. Instead 

Russian officers focus on training their troops on set drills and maneuvers. 

In tactical situations Russian officers pick from a “menu” of well rehearsed 

maneuvers. In the Russian view it far better to do several maneuvers very 

well, then trying ad-hoc tactics for situations as they develop. 

Lessons for the US/NATO 

The higher quality of training at US Army’s mountain warfare schools 

is obvious, but there are still benefits to be had from studying Russian 

methods of training. These higher quality schools are available only to a 

small percentage of American troops. Most soldiers and marines deploying 
114 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Along Slopes and Tracks: Training 

Method for Overcoming Mountain Obstacles

Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007

to Afghanistan do not receive mountain training and often these schools 

cater to the training of the infantry, with few slots for support personnel. The 

Global War on Terror has changed the military’s emphasis from large scale 

conventional warfare, to low intensity conflict not characterized by defined 

fronts. There is no rear area and the “battle” can be anywhere in the Area of 

Operations. Consequently, Combat Support and Combat Service Support 

assets are in harm’s way, as much as their Combat Arms brethren but, 

often without the same level of protection and training. The challenging 

conditions of mountain warfare and lack of availability of formalized training 

presents commanders with a difficult problem—how to conduct simple 

and effective training with a limited amount of resources. This problem is 

commonplace in the Russian army, and their solution to this problem may 

prove beneficial. 

Perhaps the greatest benefit of these drills could be signatories to 

the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. This is a program for States of 

the former Soviet Union, which has focused on increasing security and 

democratic principles, while building a closer relationship with NATO. 

Although many of these nations are adopting more US/NATO ideas 

into their armies, they are still patterned off their Soviet predecessor. There 

has been many changes in leadership and allegiances of the new armies 

of the former Soviet Union in the last 15 years, but the day-to-day lives of 

the officers have changed little. Generally, the conscription systems, role of 

NCOs, duties of officers, and resource constraints of the new armies of the 

former Soviet Union are still much closer to the Soviet/Russian model than 

to any of the traditional NATO members. The training methods discussed 

will be useful, familiar, and supportable to these armies.* 

*Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Po sklonam i po tropam: Metodika obucheniya lichnogo 

sostava tekhnike preodoleniya gornykh prepyatsviy” (“Along Slopes and Tracks: 

Training Method for Overcoming Mountain Obstacles”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), 

May 2007, 28-30.

Negotiating Grassy Slopes

Objective: Teach how to negotiate grassy slopes with and without 

tracks and practice belay and self-belay with an ice axe.

Site: Rock-free grassy slopes of varying steepness overgrown by low 

grass, with and without tracks.

Outfit and Gear: Everyday uniform, boots, work gloves, climbing 

harness, ice axe, 20-tooth crampon per student.

Walking on tracks

Exercise 1. Single file, one step apart, climb 30-40 meters up a 20-
Russian Army Training l Along Slopes and Tracks 115

30o track, turn around, and descend in the same formation to the initial 

position. Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but with a full marching pack.

Ascending and descending grassy slopes

Exercise 1. Lined up abreast, facing the grassy slope (25-30o), twothree steps apart, “herringbone” up 15-20 meters, turn around via the 

right shoulder (so that the spike of the ice axe is toward the slope) and 

descend “straight forward” to the initial position. Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but on a steeper slope.

Exercise 3. Single file, facing a 25-30o slope at a 45o angle and twothree steps apart, climb up 15-20 meters, turn around and descend to the 

initial position. Repeat two-four times.

Exercise 4. Single file climb 10-15 meters up a slope at a 45o angle, 

turn at a right angle to the path of ascent and “zigzag” up the same 

distance. Then turn around and descend by the same route to the initial 

position. Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 5. Single file, “zigzag” up a steeper slope with turns every 

five-seven meters, turn around and descend by the same route to the 

initial position. Repeat two-three times.

Crossing grassy slopes

Exercise 1. Single file, left shoulder to a 25-30o slope, two-three 

steps apart, go 20-30 meters across the slope, change the ice axe ready 

position, turn around via the left shoulder, and return to the initial position. 

Repeat two-four times.

Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 

but on a steeper slope.

Self-arrest on grassy slopes

Exercise 1. Lined up and facing 

a 30-45o slope, two-three steps apart, 

“herringbone” up five-six meters, 

holding the ice axe on the slope side 

with the adze back and the spike 

forward. Lean forward, ice axe pick 

into the slope, then stick the adze 

into the slope, lie on the stomach 

and assume a comfortable position, 

holding the head of the ice axe with 

one hand and the shaft with the other, 

and brace spread legs against the slope (see figure). Stand up, turn 

around and descend to the initial position. Repeat two-four times. 

Exercise 2. While climbing up the slope (as in Exercise 1), execute a 

fall and self-arrest with an ice axe two-three times at a sudden command.
116 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Exercise 3. Execute a fall and self-arrest with an ice axe several 

times at a sudden command while zigzagging up a slope in single file (at 

a 45o angle) two-three steps apart. Perform the exercise one-two times at 

a standstill, left (right) sideways to the slope, and then on the move.

Exercise 4. Same as Exercise 3 but while descending.

Exercise 5. Execute a fall and self-arrest with an ice axe several 

times at a sudden command while descending “straight forward” and 

lined up two-three steps apart. Repeat one-two times at a standstill, and 

then on the move.

Exercise 6. Single file, standing left (right) sideways to the slope, 

two-three steps apart, execute a fall and self-arrest at a standstill with an 

ice axe. Repeat two-four times.

Exercise 7. Execute a fall and self-arrest with an ice axe several 

times at a sudden command while crossing a slope left (right) sideways 

to the slope 20-30 meters apart. Repeat three-four times.

Methodical instruction

Once familiar with the technique, the students simultaneously 

execute the techniques and actions under the general command of the 

instructor.

When teaching grassy slope negotiation techniques, the instructor 

should make sure that the students place their feet correctly and position 

the ice axe with the pick toward the slope; the students should learn to 

use the ice axe right away for support and self-arrest when falling.

Some techniques should be learned without gear or weapons, first at 

in place and then on the move. The techniques should then be executed 

in full marching gear, moving at different rates on different slopes. 

While the techniques are being learned without gear or weapons, this 

equipment should be removed and placed where it cannot fall down and 

can be put on when needed.

Students should be taught self-arrest techniques with an ice axe 

after they have, for the most part, learned the rassy-slope negotiating 

technique.

The following is the training method for self-arrest with an ice axe 

at the instructor’s sudden command: at the “Fall” command, the students 

self-arrest. It is important to learn how to move without kicking down 

loose stones. This way of walking teaches carefulness and precise 

movements.

In conclusion, the training is conducted in full marching gear 

and small arms. In addition to the “Fall” command, give the “Action” 

command while pointing in the direction of the enemy. At the same time, 

emphasize rapid and correct assumption of the ready position on a slope.
Russian Army Training l Along Slopes and Tracks 117

To prevent injury and accidents during grassy slope negotiating 

training there must be no:

l exercises on grassy slopes located under a rock mass where 

rockfall is possible or on a slope that ends in a steep cliff;

l simultaneous exercises by two groups located one above the other 

on the same grassy slope where there are loose individual stones;

l teaching of self-arrest techniques with an ice axe by falling on a 

grassy slope covered with rocks;

l ascent or descent on grassy slopes covered with loose stones 

without strict observance of the key rules of movement: keeping 

a certain distance, simultaneous turning by the entire group when 

zigzagging upwards, etc.

How to walk correctly on stones (talus)

Objective: Teach how to walk on small and large stones.

Site: Gentle slopes with small and large stones, old moraine, and a 

small rock pile.

Outfit and Gear: Everyday uniform, hiking boots, work gloves, 

ice axe.

Walking on small and large stones

Exercise 1. Line up one step apart, walk 15-20 meters on small 

stones and return to the initial position. Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 2. Walk 15-20 meters on large stones no more than a step 

apart and return to the initial position. Repeat two-three times at different 

speeds.

Exercise 3. Walk and run 15-20 meters on large stones slightly more 

than a step apart, landing on one foot in the initial position. Repeat twothree times at different speeds.

Exercise 4. Same as Exercises 1, 2 and 3 in full marching gear.

Methodical instruction

When teaching how to walk on stones, emphasize the placing the 

foot lightly, using the ice axe pick for support when off balance; and the 

danger of wedging a foot between large stones, and loose and fixed 

stones.

Negotiating talus-covered slopes

Objective: Teach the techniques of negotiating talus-covered slopes.

Site: Large, small, loose and fixed talus.

Outfit and Gear: Everyday uniform, hiking boots, gloves, ice axe.

Ascent and descent on talus

Exercise 1. Single file, two-three steps apart, climb 15-20 meters on 
118 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

large talus, turn around and descend to the initial position. Repeat onetwo times.

Exercise 2. Single file, two-three steps apart, climb 20-25 meters 

on small packed talus, turn around and descend to the initial position. 

Repeat one-two times.

Exercise 3. Climb down 15-20 meters on small talus using the 

slipping of the talus itself – sliding on the feet, as it were - along with the 

sand and small stones, and gliding; return to the initial position taking 

small steps. Repeat two-three times at different speeds.

Exercise 4. Single file, two-three steps apart, climb 15-20 meters 

on small unstable talus, step onto hardened talus (small level surface 

area), turn around and descend to the initial position. Repeat two-three 

times.

Exercise 5. Climb 15-20 meters on unstable talus in full marching 

gear and run down to the initial position one by one. Repeat two-three 

times.

Moving across talus

Exercise 1. Single file, left sideways to the slope, two-three steps 

apart, go 15-20 meters across a slope with large talus. Turn around and 

go across the slope in the opposite direction, right sideways to the slope. 

Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but on a slope with packed talus.

Exercise 3. Single file, cross a slope on unstable talus in full marching 

gear; after 15-20 meters, move to hardened talus or a grassy slope, turn 

around and cross the slope in the opposite direction. Repeat two-four 

times.

Methodical instruction

During ascent and descent on talus, make sure that the students are 

no more than two-three steps apart and that they immediately stop any 

stone movement.

To prevent injury and accidents when moving on talus, there must 

be no:

l exercises in rockfall-prone areas or on talus that ends in a steep 

cliff;

l simultaneous exercises of several groups in the same direction at 

different elevations;

l no group ascent or descent without strict observance of the basic 

rules of movement on talus;

l exercises held at sites that have not been inspected.

During exercises, it is necessary to watch the slopes and warn 

everyone there of a rockfall using the command “Rock.”
Russian Army Training l How to Use a Rope 119

Forward, Up, and then Down: How to 

Use a Rope to Climb a Steep Mountain Slope

Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007*

*Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Vpered, naverkh, a potom vniz: Kak c pomoshch’yu verevki 

podnyat’cya po krutomu sklonu gory” (“Forward, Up, and then Down: How to Use a Rope 

to Climb a Steep Mountain Slope”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), May 2007, 31-36.

Climbing using climbing stirrups

Objective: Teach how to climb on climbing stirrups.

Site: Two-three meter high cliffs and rock platforms.

Outfit and gear: Field uniforms, hiking boots, work gloves; two 

anchor ropes per squad; a backup rope (six meters) for each student.

Climbing on climbing stirrups with two anchor ropes 

Exercise 1. Students gather near two or three sites that have been 

prepared for climbing with anchor ropes. One by one, they climb on 

climbing stirrups to the top of the two to three meter platform pulling 

and securing first one and then the other end of the anchor rope. Repeat 

two or three times.

Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but in full field gear.

Methodical instruction

Carefully verify that the anchor rope is correctly secured for 

climbing with climbing stirrups.

To prevent injury and accidents, there must be no:

l start of training until it has been verified that the ropes are secured 

for climbing with climbing stirrups;

l ascent by the students by rope with stirrups until the inspector 

verifies that they have tied the knots correctly.

Rappelling

Objective: Teach sport, classic Dulfersitz and “figure eight” rappelling techniques.

Site: Grassy slopes that turn into cliffs, 45o rocky plates, eight to ten 

meters sheer rocky sections with outcroppings (terraces) above and 

below.

Outfit and Gear: Field uniform, hiking boots, work gloves; one 

30 meters backup rope and two anchor ropes – per squad; a climbing 

harness, “figure eight” rappel device, two carabiners and one back-up 

rope (six meter) per student.

Sport rappelling down an anchor rope

Exercise 1. Students gather near anchor ropes. Then, in turn, 

holding the rope with both hands in a facing stance, they rappel adown 

a 35-40o grassy slope, pressing against the slope with legs positioned far 

apart. Gloved hands should slide (grip by turns) along the rope. Repeat 
120 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

the exercise two-three times.

Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but in full field gear and self-belay 

with a Prusik knot.

Dulfersitz rappel with primary rope

Exercise 1. Secure the primary rope to a ledge or hook and throw 

the end down onto the grassy slope. Take turns passing the primary 

rope over the hips and body for a 

Dulfersitz rappel then removing it. 

Repeat three-five times.

Exercise 2. Take turns rappelling down a 40-45o grassy slope on 

a Dulfersitz rope with belay from 

above. 

Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 3. Take turns executing a Dulfersitz rappel down a 40-45o 

grassy slope with a “figure eight” 

and belay from above. Repeat twothree times.

Exercise 4. Same as Exercise 

2 but with a Prusik knot for selfbelaying.

Exercise 5. Execute a Dulfersitz 

or “figure eight” rappel on an eightten meter rock wall in full field gear 

and with belay from above (figure). Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 6. Same as Exercise 5 but rappel down the rock wall in a 

pendulum traverse. Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 7. Execute a free rappel down a recessed rock wall; use 

a Prusik knot for self-belay in addition to a belay from above.

Exercise 8. Same as Exercise 7 but with two rappels in a row.

Methodological instruction

Students should be taught how to rappel on a primary rope in 

places where there are no rockfalls and where there are outcroppings 

(platforms) eight-ten meters above each other. The students take turns 

executing the exercise. Make sure that the hook has been securely 

hammered in, that the primary rope is properly anchored, etc.

Slope steepness should be gradually increased, ensuring belay 

from above. Before executing an exercise, the students should check 

the security of the hook and the primary rope. The students should be 

required to use a Prusik knot whenever there is the slightest danger of a 

fall during an exercise.

To prevent injury and accidents, there must be no:

l exercises on deteriorating cliffs or in rockfall-prone areas;

l rappel on a primary rope until the leader has checked that it is 

securely anchored to a ring placed a ledge or to a piton;

l rappel without belay from above or self-belay with a Prusik knot;

l no execution of an exercise by the next student until the inspector 

Practicing a Dulfersitz rappel.
Russian Army Training l How to Use a Rope 121

has checked that the rappel seat is secured and the knot has been 

correctly tied for belay and self-belay;

l unmonitored ascent to the platform for descent (see Addendum).

Conduct of training

Students begin this subject after they have learned the main 

rock climbing rules and self-belay and belay techniques, and have 

developed the necessary physical qualities and endurance.

The company commander organizes and conducts the lesson 

at the mountain training center’s rock climbing training site. At the 

direction of the company commander, platoon commanders train the 

personnel in simple rock climbing techniques.

Before starting, the company commander checks that the personnel and mountain equipment are ready, and states the subject, training 

objectives, as well as the procedure for practicing the training points 

at the training sites. He then reminds the personnel of the general 

rock climbing safety requirements and takes the platoons around to 

the training sites and gives the command (signal) to start.

At training site No. 1, the platoon commander begins the lesson 

with practicing how to scale a rocky area of average difficulty while 

following the three anchor points rule. On a five to six meter rocky 

area, he selects three to four routes with overhangs, hollows, crevices 

and other unevenness for anchors and toeholds. He then explains 

and demonstrates how to execute it by personally completing one of 

the routes, after which he begins the practical training.

At the direction of the platoon commander (one per route), the 

students scale a rocky area and execute an easy rappel back to the 

initial position.

The platoon commander should follow the actions of all the 

students and correct their mistakes, focusing on correct and secure 

use of anchor points and toeholds, as well as well as watching the 

students’ self-belay.

The platoon commander then moves on to training in ascent 

and sport rappel with a primary rope. He first checks the secured 

ropes and personally demonstrates the ascent and descent. He 

then decides the order (two students ascend, two stand in the initial 

position, two stand above, and the rest watch the ascent) and trains 

the platoon to ascend and then descend the two routes.

Once the students have mastered ascent and descent, the platoon 

commander moves on to intensive training in integrated ascent and 

descent using the flow-line method.

During this exercise, the platoon commander focuses on ensuring 

that the students correctly execute the footholds and rope pulls while 

ascending, and rappel in a strictly upright position, eliminating the 

possibility of “penduluming.”

After practicing all exercise elements on the training site, the 

platoon commander does a brief review and moves to the next 

training site at the direction of the company commander.

At training site No. 2, the platoon commander begins by checking 

that the personnel have mastered the basic techniques of climbing 
122 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

a rocky area of average difficulty. When he is sure that they have 

done so, he moves on to how to scale a rocky ridge and crevice. If 

it turns out that some of the students have not mastered the climbing 

techniques (rules), the deputy platoon commander (mountain training 

instructor) provides them with additional training.

The platoon commander selects a slope with two or three horizontal or vertical ridges of varying form and steepness to teach how 

to negotiate a rocky ridge.

The platoon commander begins the rocky ridge negotiation 

training with a look at the obstacle and a demonstration of a technique 

for negotiating it, for example, sitting astride with shoulder belay from 

above. He then divides the students into shifts, decides the practice 

order (sequence) (two per ridge: one to execute the technique and 

the other to belay) and begins their practical training.

The students take their positions and prepare: the number 

ones for negotiating the ridge and the number twos for belaying, 

reporting to the platoon commander when they are ready. At the 

platoon commander’s command, the ones negotiate a ridge three or 

four meters long sitting astride it, and the twos belay and watch the 

actions of the ones. After executing the exercise, the ones position 

themselves to belay and the belayers (the twos) rappel by an easy 

route and report their observations on the performance of the ones.

The platoon commander critiques the first shift and continues the 

training in the same order, checking the preparedness of each shift. 

When he is sure that the technique has been mastered, he moves on 

to practicing negotiating the ridge sideways in the same order.

Before practicing negotiating crevices, the platoon commander 

reminds the students that various forms and sizes of crevices make 

it much easier to negotiate difficult rocky routes because they have 

convenient supports and toeholds. He then reminds them of the 

safety requirements and explains and demonstrates how to negotiate 

a vertical crevice using a horizontal thrust with back belay from above 

and a piton. When he is sure that the students have correctly grasped 

the techniques, the platoon commander decides the exercise order 

(sequence) and moves on to practical training until all students are 

fully able to negotiate the crevice as well as belay.

In the same order, the students practice negotiating a horizontal 

crevice by crawling sideways with a piton belay.

After all techniques have been practiced, the platoon commander 

does a review and leads the platoon to training site No. 3.

Here, the company commander teaches how to negotiate difficult 

rocky areas (walls).

Two routes -– one five to six meters and the other 10 to 12 meters 

high -– are prepared for ascent and descent of a difficult rocky area 

(wall). The routes’ relative positions and distance should make it 

possible to follow safety requirements while there is simultaneous 

training on both routes. The routes are checked and cleared of loose 

hanging rocks and rock debris ahead of time.

Following a brief explanation and tasking, the company commander checks the secured ropes and pitons, positions the platoon 
Russian Army Training l How to Use a Rope 123

commander to belay, and demonstrates the technique by personally 

negotiating one of the routes. He then reminds the students of the 

safety requirements, advises them of the specifics of each route, 

decides the exercise order (sequence), and begins the practical 

training. Each student should first learn how to negotiate a fivesix meter rock wall then perform a belay, after which he practices 

negotiating a 10-12 meter rock wall.

After teaching rock wall ascent, the company commander teaches 

in the same order how to perform a Dulfersitz rappel (with a “figure 

eight”) and a pulley (carabiner) descent with belay from above.

During training to negotiate difficult rocky areas (walls), the 

company commander should focus on the correct use of various crags, 

cavities and cracks for toeholds and handholds, on the coordination 

of the belayer and the belayed, on following the belay and self-belay 

rules, as well as on the condition of the ropes, carabiners and pulleys.

The platoons change training sites 1, 2 and 3 every 50 minutes at 

the commander’s command.

After all the scheduled training points have been practiced at 

sites 1, 2 and 3, the company commander at site No. 4 demonstrates 

how to set up a canyon crossing using a special cable, primary and 

backup ropes, pulleys and carabiners. He then demonstrates how to 

transport ammunition, crew-served weapons, food rations and gear, 

as well as people across a canyon.

After the practice, the company commander conducts an overall 

review and directs fixing particular weak points and preparing for the 

next lesson.

________________________________________

Addendum

SAMPLE

“approved”

Commander, Motorized Rifle Battalion

___________________________________

(rank, signature, last name)

____________ 2009

LESSON PLAN

Scaling Rocky Slopes of Varying Steepness

_____ Motorized Rifle Company

____________ 2009

SUBJECT:

“Scaling Rocky Areas of Varying Difficulty”

OBJECTIVES:

1. Train the company in the techniques of scaling rocky areas of varying 

difficulty and in self-belay.
124 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

2. Develop in the company personnel the physical and psychological 

qualities, endurance and stamina necessary for executing various tasks in 

the mountains.

TRAINING POINTS:

1. Scale rocky areas of average difficulty using various techniques.

2. Negotiate typical rocky terrain.

3. Scale difficult rocky areas (walls).

4. Move personnel, weapons and ammunition across a canyon.

TIME: 4 hours

PLACE: Alpinism training site, mountain training center.

TEXTBOOK AND GUIDE:

Training Units for Combat Operations in Mountain Regions (Moscow: 

Voyenizdat, 2007).

UNIFORM:

Summer mountain climbing gear and hiking boots, with weapons.

SUPPLIES:

Primary rope – two per squad, backup rope – one per squad, piton 

hammer – one per squad, pitons – 30, self-belay system, carabiner and work 

gloves – per student.

1. Preparatory Part – 10 minutes.

Check the training sites (mountain obstacles), personnel attendance, 

health (by asking), personnel and mountain gear preparedness; state the 

subject, training objectives and points, training procedure and time at the 

training sites; review general rock climbing safety requirements; move the 

platoons to the training sites and execute the preparatory exercises.

2. Main Part – 180 minutes.

Training Site No. 1

(50 minutes.)

(1st Motorized Rifle Platoon, Company Command)

1. Scale a rocky area of average difficulty using the three anchor 

points and self-belay rules.

2. Scale a rocky slope of average difficulty with a primary rope.

3. Execute a sport rappel.

Instructor: Platoon Commander

Training Site No. 2

(50 minutes.)

(2nd Motorized Rifle Platoon, Flame Thrower and Anti-Tank Squad)

1. Scale a rocky ridge with belay from above.

2. Scale a rock chimney.

3. Scale a rocky area of average difficulty using three anchor points.

Instructor: Platoon Commander
Russian Army Training l How to Use a Rope 125

Training Site No. 3

(50 minutes.)

(3rd Motorized Rifle Platoon, Machine Gun and Grenade Launcher 

Squads)

1. Scale a difficult rocky area (wall) with belay from above.

2. Execute a Dulfersitz rappel (with a “figure eight”).

3. Execute a pulley (carabiner) rappel.

Instructor: Company Commander.

Training Site No. 4

(30 minutes.)

(Company Personnel)

1. Train to traverse a canyon using primary and backup ropes and 

pulleys (carabiners).

2. Move weapons and ammunition using a primary rope and pulleys 

(carabiners).

3. Move personnel on two primary ropes on a pulley (carabiner) using 

self-belay.

Instructor: Company Commander

3. Concluding Part – 5 minutes.

Perform muscle relaxation exercises (while moving to the lesson review 

site); form the company, check that personnel, weapons and equipment are 

present; summarize the lesson: determine how well the techniques for scaling 

mountain obstacles have been learned, give grades, note the strengths and 

weaknesses; set tasks for eliminating the weaknesses and preparing for the 

next lesson.

Company Commander Work Procedure

1. Check the training site – on the day of the lesson before the company 

arrives.

2. Check that the company is prepared for the lessons, set tasks – five 

minutes.

3. Conduct the lesson at training site No. 3 – 150 minutes.

4. Check the organization and progress of the lessons at training sites 

Nos. 1 and 2 – 20 minutes. (at the start of each hour of study).

5. Conduct the lesson at training site No. 4 – 30 minutes.

6. Review and summarize the lesson – five minutes.

____ Motorized Rifle Company Commander

__________________________________

(rank, signature, last name)
126 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Don’t Let Me Down --Belay: 

Training Method for Negotiating 

Mountain Obstacles

Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007*

*Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Ne provedi, ctpakhovka: Metodika obycheniya voennoslyzhashashchikh preodolehiyu prepyatstviy v gorakh” (“Don’t Let Me Down, Belay: 

Training Method for Negotiating Mountain Obstacles”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army 

Digest), May 2007, 37-40.

Shoulder and back belay

Objective: Teach soldiers how to use the shoulder and back belay.

Site: Grassy slopes of varying steepness with small outcropings 

and low cliffs.

Outfit and Gear: Field uniform, hiking boots and work gloves; 

primary rope –– one for every two students; six meters backup rope, 

ice axe, and 20-tooth crampon per person. 

Shoulder belay

Exercise 1. Students assume a facing stance in pairs on a 25-30o 

grassy slope. Each “pair” is tied together with a “leader’s” knot. The 

first soldier of each “pair” descends six-eight meters, and the second 

assumes the correct shoulder belay position and feeds him the rope.

The first warns that he is going to check the belay and begins to 

jerk slightly and then more and more forcefully. The second feeds 

or tightens the rope to match the force of the jerking. The first then 

rappels the entire length of the rope and then climbs up. The second 

feeds or hauls up the rope in proportion to the descent and ascent. The 

students switch roles and repeat the exercise two or three times.

Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but check the belay after giving 

warning, first with a bob, then with a jump, and finally with a sudden fall 

(figure 1). 

Exercise 3. Paired together, the students begin to practice (by 

turns) assuming the appropriate belay position depending on the 

direction of the belayed’s movement and the expected main jerk 

movement in the event of his fall. Repeat two or three times.

Exercise 4. Same as Exercise 3 but in full field gear.

Exercise 5. Train the students to stop a 60-kilogram log falling 

from a height of two meters.

Back belay

Exercise 1. Students gather in pairs on small platforms. Each 

“pair” is tied together with a rope. One serviceman seats himself 

comfortably on the platform and assumes the belay position, bracing 
Russian Army Training l Negotiating Obstacles 127

his feet firmly. The other warns that 

he is going to check the belay and 

then does various jerks. They then 

switch roles. Repeat two or three 

times.

Exercise 2. Same as 

Exercise 1 but in full field 

gear. Jump instead of jerking to check the belay.

Methodological 

instruction

To familiarize the soldiers with shoulder and 

back belay techniques, 

they are seated on a 

gentle slope. The instructor is located below them. He explains and 

demonstrates the techniques standing up (the best trained soldiers 

may also be used to demonstrate).

After a technique is demonstrated, the students execute it simultaneously on command. Some do so individually at the commander’s 

instruction. The officer checks the execution and provides appropriate 

suggestions and explanations.

The commander must make sure that the students handle the 

rope properly, being especially watchful that the belayer assumes the 

correct position and has a good foot anchor, and that the belayed jerks 

and jumps to check the belay, gradually increasing the rope tension.

All students should be able to correctly determine the direction 

and force of the main jerk movement in the event that the belayed falls 

in order to quickly assume the necessary position and feed the rope to 

match the force of the jerk, thereby providing reliable belay.

To prevent injury and accidents, there must be no:

l lessons at rockfall-prone sites or on slopes close to precipices;

l belay training with jerks and falls on stone-covered grassy slopes;

l forceful jerks without making sure that the belayer is ready;

l belaying without work gloves.

Overhang piton and ice axe belay

Objective: Teach overhang, piton and ice axe belay.

Site: Rocky areas of low and average difficulty with sturdy overhangs and crevices of varying sizes that turn into grassy slopes. In 

winter, use icy and snowy slopes.

Figure 1. Shoulder belay training.

Testing belay 

by falling >

Testing belay 

by jumping>

Testing belay 

by jerking >

Ascent and 

pull-up >

Descent and 

rope feed >
128 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Outfit and Gear: Field uniform, 

hiking boots, work gloves; six 

meters of backup rope; an ice 

axe for each student; a primary 

rope, four pitons or ice axes, four 

artificial anchors, two hammers and 

two carabiners per “pair.”

Overhang belay

Exercise 1. The students gather 

on overhangs in pairs. The second 

student in each “pair” throws 

the rope onto the overhang and 

positions himself for belay from 

above. The first student descends 

five-six meters, and the second 

feeds him rope. Then the first tests 

the belay with a jerk and hangs freely on the rope, holding his arms out 

to the sides. Then the first climbs up and the second pulls up the rope. 

The students then switch roles and repeat the same thing. Repeat two 

or three times.

Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but the first student moves crosswise the slope instead of down, and the second positions himself to 

belay from the side.

Exercise 3. The first student moves up the slope at a 45o angle, and 

the second belays from below. Then the first rappels to the second by 

the same route to replace him. Repeat two or three times.

Exercise 4. Same as Exercises 1, 2 and 3 but in full field gear.

Piton belay

Exercise 1. The students gather by a rock wall in pairs (figure 2). 

The second student of each “pair” finds a crack, drives in a piton and 

checks that it is secure. He then clips a carabiner into the piton, inserts 

a rope in it and positions himself for belay from above after letting 

the first student know that he is ready. The first descends three to five 

meters (the second feeds him rope), tests the belay with a jerk and 

hangs freely on the rope, moving his arms out to the sides. The first 

then ascends to the second, who pulls up the rope. They switch roles 

and repeat the exercise. Repeat two-three times. 

Exercise 2. Perform the exercise in full field gear.

Artificial Anchor Belay

Exercise 1. Students gather by a rock wall in pairs. The second 

student of each “pair” finds a crack, lays an appropriate anchor in 

Figure 2: Instruction in piton belay.
Russian Army Training l Negotiating Obstacles 129

it and checks that it is secure. He then clips a caribiner to the loop, 

inserts a rope in it, positions himself for belay from above, and lets the 

first student know that he is ready. The first student descends three to 

five meters (the second feeds him rope), tests the belay with a jerk and 

hangs freely on the rope, moving his arms out to the sides. The first 

then ascends to the second, who pulls up the rope. They switch roles 

and repeat the exercise. Repeat two or three times.

Exercise 2. Perform the exercise in full field gear.

Ice axe belay on an icy slope

Exercise 1. Students gather on an icy slope in pairs. The second 

student of each “pair” screws in an ice axe above his head, checks 

that it is secure, and covers it with snow. He then inserts a piton into a 

carabiner with the gate upward, inserts a rope in it, positions himself 

for belay from above, and lets the first student know that he is ready. 

The first student descends three to five meters (the second feeds him 

rope), tests the belay with a jerk and hangs freely on the rope, moving 

his arms out to the sides. The first then ascends to the second, who 

pulls up the rope. They switch roles and repeat the exercise. Repeat 

two or three times.

Exercise 2. Perform the exercise in full field gear.

Ice axe belay on a snowy slope

Exercise 1. Students line up in pairs on a 30-35o snowy slope five to 

six meters apart. The second student of each “pair” drives in an ice axe 

halfway, throws a rope on it, and positions himself for belay from above. 

The first student then descends five-six meters (the second feeds him 

rope), tests the belay with a jerk and ascends to his partner, who pulls 

up the rope. They switch roles and repeat the exercise. Repeat two to 

three times.

Exercise 2. Repeat the same exercise in full field gear.

Methodological instruction

Sites for overhang, piton and ice axe belay training should be 

carefully inspected and cleared of unstable rocks.

The instructor uses the best trained soldiers to demonstrate the 

belay techniques to the students.

After familiarizing themselves with the exercises, the students are 

paired up, receive their assignments, and move to their designated 

sites, where they perform the exercises.

The commander observes the exercises and critiques as necessary.

The overhangs used for belay should be carefully prepared. The 

students should test the piton, artificial anchor and ice axe belay to 

make sure that they are secure.
130 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

To prevent injury and accidents, there should be no:

l lessons at rockfall-prone sites or on slopes close to precipices;

l training with a primary rope that has not been pre-tested;

l independent exercises until the students are able to conduct a 

reliable belay;

l working in “pairs” without the instructor testing the belay 

(overhang prepared, piton properly secured, rope properly placed in 

the carabiner, etc.).

Prusik and Carabiner Belay (mass) with rope hand rail

Objective: Teach rope hand rail installation plus Prusik and carabiner belay.

Site: Grassy 30-40o slope and rocky areas of low to average difficulty with narrow terraces at heights of two meters and above.

Outfit and Gear: Field uniform; hiking boots and work gloves, 

backup rope, six meters climbing harness, carabiner and ice axe for 

each student; two primary ropes, four hammers, four pitons and four 

anchors per squad.

Exercise 1. Students line up in single files on anchored ropes 

with three to five meters between them. The students take turns 

approaching the primary rope, tie themselves to it with a Prusik knot, 

and climb three-five meters up the grassy slope, moving the knot along 

the rope. After testing the self-belay in the “hands down” position by 

stepping back and jumping, the students loosen the knot and continue 

to climb. In this way they all climb up one-by-one. The next student 

begins to tie himself to the rope when the previous student reaches 

the uppermost point of the secured rail and positions himself for selfbelay or moves to a safe place. After the ascent, the students take turn 

rappelling back down using ice axe self-belay. Repeat two or three 

times.

Exercise 2. Students gather in a single file on a grassy slope sideways to a rock wall on which a rope has been anchored with carabiners 

and pitons driven in five or six meters apart. The students take turns 

approaching the primary rope, tie themselves to it with either a Prusik 

knot or a sliding carabiner, and traverse the slope, moving the knot 

or the carabiner along the slope. In the middle of the rope (between 

two pitons), they lower themselves and hang on the backup rope. 

They then ascend and continue to the end of the rope, after which they 

secure themselves to another rope with a carabiner and return to the 

starting point by another route. The next student in the squad begins 

to tie himself with a Prusik knot or sliding carabiner when the previous 

student has tested the self-belay and moved on. Repeat two-three 

times.
Russian Army Training l Negotiating Obstacles 131

Exercise 3. Same as Exercise 3 but in full field gear. The 

primary rope is stretched one 

meter above a terrace path that 

is at least three meters above a 

grassy slope. Move lengthwise 

along the terrace rope using a 

Prusik knot or sliding carabiner 

self-belay (figure 3).

Methodological 

instruction

The site selected to teach rail 

setup and Prusik knot or sliding 

carabiner self-belay, especially 

on rocky areas, should be carefully checked and cleared of unstable rocks.

The instructor should monitor the securing of the primary rope and 

the hand rail setup.

During the exercises, the instructor should ensure that the sequence and movement along the hand rails are strictly followed, and 

that the students first clip themselves to the next rail strand and then, 

and only then, unclip themselves from the previous one.

When one group of students has performed all the exercises, the 

next group trains at the same site using the rails that have been set up.

It should be pointed out to the students that at difficult points along 

the rope they must remember to move the knot an outstretched arm’s 

length away before moving on (the knot should always be smooth).

All students should make sure that the Prusik self-belay is secure.

To avoid injury and accidents, there should be no:

l lessons at rockfall-prone sites or on slopes with loose rocks;

l exercises until the instructor tests the rails and the primary rope;

l movement along the rope until the student checks that the knot 

has been correctly tied.

Figure 3. Training to use a Prusik 

knot on a rocky route.
132 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

How to “Tame” a River: Getting Across 

Water Obstacles in the Mountains

Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007*

*Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Kak “ykrotit’ ” reku: Ymet’ perepravlyat’cya cherez vodnye 

pregrady v gorakh” (“How to ‘Tame’ a River: Getting Across Water Obstacles in the 

Mountains”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), May 2007, 41-45.

Fording

Objective: Teach how to ford mountain streams and rivers.

Site: Dry mountain riverbeds with rocks; rivers 50-60 centimeters 

deep, four-eight meters wide, with current velocity of up to three 

meters-per-second (m/sec).

Outfit and Gear: Field uniform, hiking boots, work gloves; three 

poles, three primary ropes per squad; climbing harness, backup rope 

(twice the length of the primary rope), one carabiner per student.

Exercise 1. Ford a knee-deep mountain river singly with pole selfbelay and primary rope belay from the bank. Repeat one or two times.

Exercise 2. Ford a knee-deep mountain river in three ranks with 

hands on each other’s shoulders. Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 3. Ford a mountain river in a circle of eight to ten people 

using hands on each other’s shoulders. As it moves forward, the circle 

turns against the current. Repeat two to four times.

Exercise 4. Ford in a single file (eight to ten people) holding onto 

each other’s belts. Repeat two-four times.

Exercise 5. Same as Exercises 2, 3, and 4 but in full field gear.

Exercise 6. Ford a 50-60 centimeter-deep mountain river singly with 

self-belay using a carabiner or a Prusik knot on a primary rope that 

is stretched diagonally from one bank to the other 30-40 centimeters 

above the water level. Students cross on the downstream side of the 

rope at a stretched arm’s length from the primary rope. Repeat onetwo times.

Training in the various fording methods should begin with exercises in an old mountain river bed (with no water) or on a four to eight 

meter area with stones.

Select a suitable river, determine its depth and current velocity, 

and physically check (using a belay) that it is fordable.

Set up rescue stations a short distance downstream from the fording 

spot to monitor the fording. Rescue “pairs” should be linked by rope 

so that one of them is ready to render aid while the other, positioned for 

self-belay, is ready to provide belay.

The instructor must be on the bank between those fording the river 

and the rescue station and personally direct the fording.
Russian Army Training l Getting Across Water Obstacles 133

Ford in footgear and clothing. Make sure that the students do not 

lift their legs high when fording. Fording training should take place in 

sunny (warm) weather at the end of the training day.

To avoid injury and accidents during fording, there should be no:

l training at river sites that the commander has not personally 

inspected (where it has not been established ahead of time that the 

river is fordable);

l fording until the appropriate preparatory exercises have been 

practiced on land;

l fording without rescue posts;

l training in low water and air temperature or fording without 

footgear and uniform;

l fording with a carabiner or Prusik knot on a long leash from 

which it is not possible to reach the primary rope.

Water Crossing

Objective: Teach crossing of mountain rivers.

Site: Mountain rivers and rivers with scattered stones and high 

bluff banks.

Outfit and Gear: Everyday uniform, hiking boots, work gloves; 

three poles, three primary ropes per squad; climbing harness, backup 

rope twice as long as the primary rope, one carabiner per student.

Exercise 1. Negotiate a three-meter wide mountain river by jumping on stones 80-100 centimeters apart. Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but with the stones further apart 

and with self-belay with a primary rope, stretched from bank to bank, 

to which a backup rope with carabiner is attached.

Exercise 3. Negotiate a mountain river by log-crossing with selfbelay as in Exercise 2. Repeat two-three times.

Exercise 4. Take a load across a mountain river along two primary 

ropes using a pulley or carabiner. Repeat one-two times.

Exercise 5. Cross along two primary ropes using a climbing 

harness and pulley or carabiner. Repeat one-two times.

Exercise 6. Same as Exercises 1 and 3 but in full field gear.

Methodical instruction

The success of training in overwater mountain river crossing 

largely depends on skilful selection of the training sites.

Prior to training, set up rescue stations downstream not only on the 

bank but also in mid-river on separate large stones.

The instructor personally directs the crossing from the bank while 

located between those performing the exercise area and the rescue 

station. 

The instructor needs to make sure that the students jump lightly 

from stone to stone and that one arm is free for self-belay. Students 
134 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

should cross with self-belay one-by-one along a stretched primary 

rope, and they should be on the downstream side of the rope on a 

sliding carabiner at a leash distance from which they can reach the 

primary rope.

The two primary ropes should be thoroughly tested when crossing 

along a rope with a climbing harness and pulley or carabiner. Gear 

should be well assembled and secured.

To prevent injury and accidents when crossing over water, there 

should be no:

l training unless the instructor has checked the security and setup 

of the crossing;

l crossing by the next student until the instructor (mountaineer 

trainer) checks that the climbing harness fits and that the pulley or 

carabiner is securely attached to the rope;

l water crossing without belay;

l crossing training before the rescue posts are ready (see Addendum).

________________________________________

Addendum

SAMPLE

“approved”

Commander, Motorized Rifle Battalion

___________________________________

(rank, signature, last name)

____________ 2009

LESSON PLAN

Negotiating Mountain Obstacles

_____ Motorized Rifle Company

____________ 2009

SUBJECT:

“Different Ways to Cross Mountain Rivers on Foot”

OBJECTIVES:

1. Train the company in different ways to cross mountain rivers on foot.

2. Develop in company personnel the physical and psychological qualities 

and endurance to perform various tasks in the mountains.

TRAINING POINTS:

1. Fording a mountain river using different techniques.

2. Water crossing of a mountain river.
Russian Army Training l Getting Across Water Obstacles 135

3. Moving personnel, weapons and ammunition across a mountain river 

using ropes and pulleys (carabiners).

TIME: 3 hours

PLACE: Mountain river crossing (forced crossing) training site, mountain 

training center.

TEXTBOOKS AND GUIDES:

Training Units for Combat Operations in Mountain Regions (Moscow: 

Voyenizdat, 2007).

UNIFORM:

Summer field gear, with weapons.

SUPPLIES:

Two primary ropes per squad, one backup rope one per squad, one piton 

hammer per squad, 30 pitons, ten 2-2.5 meter-long wooden poles; one selfbelay system, carabiner and pair work gloves per student.

1. Preparatory Part – 10 minutes.

Check the training sites (mountain obstacles), personnel attendance, 

health (by asking), personnel and mountain gear preparedness; state the 

subject, training objectives and points, training procedure and time at the 

training sites; review general mountain river crossing requirements; move the 

platoons to the training sites and perform the preparatory exercises.

2. Main Part – 135 minutes.

Training Site No. 1

(45 minutes.)

(1st Motorized Rifle Platoon, Company Command)

1. Select and fit out a ford.

2. Ford a mountain river single file, in ranks, and in a circle.

3. Ford a mountain river along a stretched mountain rope.

Instructor: Platoon Commander

Training Site No. 2

(45 minutes.)

(2nd Motorized Rifle Platoon, Flame Thrower and Anti-Tank Squad)

1. Cross a mountain river on exposed stones.

2. Cross a mountain river by log-crossing.

3. Cross a mountain river on a suspendeed pedestrian bridge.

Instructor: Platoon Commander

Training Site No. 3

(45 minutes.)

(3rd Motorized Rifle Platoon, Machine Gun and Grenade Launcher Squad)

1. Prepare to cross using a primary rope and pulleys (carabiners).

2. Move weapons and ammunition across using a primary rope and 

pulleys (carabiners).
136 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

3. Move personnel across along two primary ropes on a pulley (carabiner) 

with self-belay. Instructor: Platoon Commander.

3. Concluding Part – 5 minutes.

Perform muscle relaxation exercises (while moving to the lesson review 

site); form the company, check that personnel, weapons and equipment 

are present; summarize the lesson: determine how well the techniques for 

scaling mountain obstacles have been learned, give grades, note the strengths 

and weaknesses; set tasks for eliminating the weaknesses and preparing for 

the next lesson.

Company Commander Work Procedure

1. Check the training and crossing sites and organize the rescue station – 

on the day of the lesson before the company arrives.

2. Check that the company is prepared for the lessons, set tasks – five 

minutes.

3. Check the progress of the lessons at the training sites and organize 

belay – 30 minutes. (at the start of the first hour of training).

4. Assist the platoon commanders at training sites Nos. 1 and 3 – 30 

minutes at each site (at training site No. 2 – in the third hour of study).

5. Review and summarize the lesson – five minutes.

____ Motorized Rifle Company Commander

__________________________________

(rank, signature, last name)

Lesson procedure

The training in different ways to cross mountain rivers typically begins 

with preparatory exercises in an old (dry) riverbed or at a specially equipped 

training site.

Prior to the mountain river negotiation (forced crossing) training, three 

sites are fitted out with different crossings.

Prior to the training, the instructor rechecks the river depth and current 

velocity to determine fordability and organize belay. A rescue station is set up 

downstream for student safety and belay. In addition, there is a rope stretched 

by each crossing (at each training site).

When the company arrives at the training area, the company commander 

states the subject, training objectives, and the procedure for practicing 

the training points at the training sites, reminds the personnel of the safety 

measures, and takes the platoons to the training sites.

When the training starts, the company commander monitors the platoon 

commanders’ teaching process, checks the rescue stations, makes sure that 

the safety requirements are followed, and helps the platoon commanders at 

training sites Nos. 1 and 3.

At training site No. 1, the platoon commander begins the lesson by briefly 

explaining and preparing the fording site. As the ford is prepared, individual 

students practice crossing the river with pole self-belay. At the same time, 

the end of the rope is taken across to the other bank, the fording is scouted 

out, and the ends of the rope are secured to the river banks using pitons, 
Russian Army Training l Getting Across Water Obstacles 137

crags, trees, etc.

After selecting and preparing a ford, the platoon commander explains 

and demonstrates on dry land how to ford a river single file, in ranks, and in 

a circle. He then moves on to practical training on the river, practicing each 

technique in sequence with the squads, which initially perform the exercises 

without weapons or marching gear, putting boots on their bare feet, and then 

in full gear.

As the students master a technique, the platoon commander intensifies the 

training and makes the squads compete for speed and quality while observing 

the safety requirements.

Moving on to fording (crossing) a river along a stretched rope, the platoon 

commander reminds the students that this method is used to cross highvelocity and relatively deep (up to the waist) rivers. He then reminds them of 

the safety requirements, demonstrates the technique on dry land and in the 

river, and moves on to practical training. One squad executes the technique on 

the river under the platoon commander’s direction, and the others practices on 

the bank under the squad commanders’ direction.

The platoon commander must be on the bank between the river being 

forded and the rescue station and personally direct the crossing. He makes 

sure that the leash with the Prusik knot (carabiner) is of a length that allows a 

student to reach the primary rope if he is pulled away by the current, and that 

the students in the water do not raise their legs high or move in step, and that 

they self-belay. 

After all the training points have been practiced, the platoon commander 

arranges for the uniforms and footgear to be dried (change of clothes and 

footwear), then gives a brief review and, on the company commander’s command, leads the platoon to another training site.

The training at site No. 2 should be conducted in the following sequence. 

First, the platoon commander explains how to cross a river on exposed rocks, 

by log-crossing and on a suspended pedestrian bridge. He then checks the 

crossing and belay ropes, demonstrates each method of crossing a river, 

reminds students of the safety requirements, and organizes the training by 

squad.

Each squad practices one of the crossing methods under the direction of 

the squad commanders, then they change places on the platoon commander’s 

command.

The platoon commander watches the squad training to ensure that the 

students jump lightly on the rocks, using the pole for support, and that they 

move slowly and out of step, two to three meters apart, when crossing by log or 

hanging bridge.

After all the scheduled overwater crossing methods have been practiced, the platoon commander does a review, summarizes the results of the 

competition between the squads, sets assignments to improve the skills 

learned, and takes the platoon to the next training site.

At site No. 3, the platoon commander explains how to prepare the crossing with primary ropes and pulleys (carabiners) then assigns students to 

work on this bank and on the opposite one, and to carry the primary ropes 

to the opposite bank by fording the river with a pole. Two crossings are then 
138 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

prepared: one for training to carry weapons and ammunition to the other bank, 

and the other for the students to cross the river. When he has made sure that 

the platoon knows how to prepare the crossings, the platoon commander 

moves on to practical training. Weapons (ammunition, gear) are transported 

first, and then the students cross. Each student should cross to the opposite 

bank one-two times along a rope on a pulley (carabiner) with self-belay.

The students return from the opposite bank by a suspended foot bridge or 

by log-crossing.

The commander does a brief review once all the scheduled crossing 

methods have been practiced.

The platoons change training sites every 45 minutes, on the company 

commander’s command.

The company commander ends the training by critiquing the exercises, 

noting to what extent the objectives were met, and summarizes the results of 

the competition between the squads and platoons. In conclusion, he grades 

the units and gives orders to fix the weak points.
Russian Army Training l Physical Training 139

Train to Win: Organizing and 

Conducting Physical Training For Soldiers 

in the Mountains

Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007*

*Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Trenirovat’cya shtobypobezhdat’: Ob organizatsii i provedenii 

fizicheskoy podgotovki voennoslyzhashchikh v gorakh” (“Train to Win: Organizing and 

Conducting Physical Training For Soldiers in the Mountains”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army 

Digest), May 2007, 46-48.

Begin to develop and improve a soldier’s physical, special and 

psychological qualities for com-bat under special conditions before 

they attend mountain training centers. Use all forms of physical 

training for soldiers and sergeants to achieve this: morning exercise, 

classes, physical training during mock combat, athletic activity. Let us 

look at each of these forms of physical training individually.

Morning exercise should include short and medium distance 

running, one to five kilometer cross-country races, as well as exercises 

on multi-purpose gymnastic apparatus (hip pull-overs, pull-ups, 

arm walking on parallel bars, parallel bar dips), gymnastic bench 

exercises, and rope and pole climbing. Soldiers should negotiate 

several obstacle and training areas multiple times or completely 

negotiate both a general and a mountain obstacle course. Sports with 

simplified rules can also be included (handball, basketball, soccer), 

and in summer –– going for a dip and swimming.

Conduct physical training classes in speed walking, track and 

field, obstacle courses, hand-to-hand combat, swimming (in summer), 

and ski training (in winter). In addition, conduct integrated gymnastic 

classes that include physical exercises, athletic games, mountain 

obstacle courses, hand-to-hand combat, and others.

After the soldiers have learned to negotiate mountain obstacle 

courses in the initial classes, they should train to negotiate them with 

weapons and in gear. Simulate enemy fire and everything typical of 

mountain combat.

Collateral physical conditioning exercises include natural mountain 

and water obstacles, speed walking, field hikes, ski treks, etc.

Mass sporting activity should focus on applied sports (general 

and mountain obstacle courses, military triathlon, track and field, skiing, 

swimming, etc.) and military-professional techniques and actions.

Before a unit goes to a mountain training center, all personnel 

undergo a medical exam to see if they are fit to train under special 

conditions and physical strain. If a serviceman’s overall grade is 

unsatisfactory, he is not allowed to participate in the mountain training 
140 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

but is given additional physical training that focuses on developing 

endurance and those physical qualities that are poorly developed.

If personnel are well prepared physically on the plains, they will 

more quickly adapt to activity in mountain conditions, the negative 

“shifts” in body functioning are mitigated, and the onset of altitude 

sickness is slowed. Mountain physical training should therefore 

aim to develop and improve the same physical, psychological, and 

special qualities and motor skills that are present prior to going to the 

mountains.

During the first two weeks at the mountain training center, physical 

training classes are held every day except on days off, and morning 

exercises take place daily for at least 40 minutes. It is important that 

there should be not only weight-lifting, body-building and gymnastic 

exercises but also short, medium, and long distance runs; cross-country 

races; six to ten kilometer full-field marches; and treks to the mountain 

training sites (the sites should be 15 to 20 kilometers from the training 

center). Soldiers must be trained in hand-to-hand combat in mountain 

conditions, and to throw a grenade accurately and far while standing, 

kneeling, lying. Also, they must be able to throw a grenade from a 

trench or bunker, on a level area, as well as downhill and uphill.

In winter, classes should also include ski training (how to move on 

skis across rugged terrain, negotiating various mountain obstacles on 

skis, Alpine skiing).

Classes are not organized by physical training category but rather 

integrate exercises from the various categories. The preparatory part 

of classes with soldiers who have been in the mountains for less than a 

week should be increased up to 15 minutes. Their physical load during 

this period should be light.

There should be two-minute breaks between exercises to catch 

one’s breath and control the pulse rate. As the soldiers adapt (10-12 

days after arriving in the mountains), training intensity and load are 

increased to what they were on the plains. Classes are conducted in 

accordance with the physical training and sport field manual.

The knowledge and skills that the students gain in the special 

mountain obstacle classes should be developed in the physical 

training classes. Mountain and physical training classes are generally integrated. This makes possible all-round general physical 

conditioning of the students, strengthens their health and makes the 

body more resistant to the impact of high altitude and combat.

Success in mountain combat tasks will largely depend on the 

students’ all-round physical training. Mountain obstacle training should 

therefore be planned so as to develop all the physical and special 
Russian Army Training l Physical Training 141

qualities of mountain marksmen, where strength is a critical quality 

of mountain combat. And strength is best developed by resistance 

exercises (barbells, weights, rocks) as well as by pull-ups on a crossbar 

or other contrivance, rope climbing, etc.

Sample exercises to develop strength:

1. Push-ups on the ground.

2. Two-leg squats without a partner, with a partner, and with 

weights.

3. One-leg squats.

4. Jumping in place on one leg or both legs.

5. Forward/backward tilt without a partner, with a partner, and 

with weights.

6. Tugging each other while standing and while sitting.

7. Throwing rocks of different weights with both arms forward 

and upward, and backward and upward over the head.

8. Pushing stones with one and both arms.

9. Pull-ups on a crossbar, tree, pole, and so on.

10. Dips on bars, poles, overhangs, etc.

11. Arm swings on parallel bars.

In the mountains, the soldiers must be able to relax their muscles 

so that when some muscles are being exerted, others are resting. 

Alternately contracting and relaxing the muscles makes it possible to 

exercise for a long time.

Sample muscle relaxation exercises:

1. Jiggle relaxed arm and leg muscles (one by one).

2. Alternate the body weight between the left and right foot.

3. Lightly massage the neck, chest, stomach and back.

A critical quality for soldiers in the mountains is endurance, which 

depends on the state and efficiency of all human organs and systems. 

There is general and special endurance: the latter is the ability to 

negotiate mountain obstacles over a long period of time and march for 

a long duration and in different terrain.

Walking and running are necessary to develop overall endurance. 

Best endurance training comes from marches, cross-country races, ski 

races, and man-made and various natural obstacle courses.

The ability to maintain balance is vital for soldiers in the mountains. 

Without balance, it is virtually impossible to master rock climbing, 

mountain-river crossing, moving across ice and talus, or conducting 

belay and self-belay.

Sample exercises for strengthening balance:

1. Balance on one leg.

2. Tilt quickly forward, backward and sideways with eyes closed.
142 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

3. Rotate the head and body.

4. Walk and run with and without weapons on a narrow surface.

5. Jump from stone to stone (circle to circle), making a firm 

landing each time.

6. Negotiate a multi-event mountain obstacle course.

Swiftness and agility are critical for negotiating the mountain obstacles and dangers related to rockfalls and snow and ice avalanches.

Exercises to develop swiftness and agility:

1. Short distance run (100 meters).

2. Running and standing long jumps.

3. Precision throwing of grenades, rocks, and other articles.

4. Negotiate standard and mountain obstacle courses.

5. Perform pommel horse jumps and vaults.

6. Perform different exercises on gymnastics apparatuses and 

calisthenics.

These exercises are used in all forms of physical training and 

during mountain training.

During mass sporting activity and rock climbing training, contests 

should be held to ease the soldiers’ and sergeants’ emotional strain.

The final stage of training should be a graded ascent to a peak 

or pass, and a qualifying test for the right to the title and badge of 

“Alpinist of Russia.”

The following exercises are recommended to test the physical 

training done at 2,500 meters above sea level: 

One kilometer cross-country run in military uniform and hiking 

boots to measure endurance (“excellent” –– 4 minutes 30 seconds, “good” 

–– 4 minutes 50 seconds, “satisfactory” –– 5 minutes 30 seconds);

Walk along a narrow ledge (length –– six meters, breadth –– 20 

centimeters, height above the ground –– two meters) to gauge balance 

(“excellent” –– walk quickly and confidently, “good” –– walk without 

stopping, “satisfactory” –– walk with stops and without falling off); jump 

from a height of two meters onto a 50x50 centimeter square on 

the ground to gauge precision and orientation in the air (“excellent” 

– land on the square and stop without hands touching [the ground] 

and no forward or backward step, “good” –– land slightly outside the 

square, “satisfactory” – same, but with hands touching the ground); 

rope climbing (primary rope, doubled) without using the legs to 

gauge arm strength (“excellent” –– seven meters, “good” –– six meters, 

“satisfactory” – five meters); one-legged squat (on an even platform, 

bench or rock; the other leg is lowered freely or stretched forward; arms 

are held in an optional position; the knee of the squatting leg touches 

the chest with each squat) to gauge leg strength (“excellent” –– 12 times, 
Russian Army Training l Physical Training 143

“good” –– 10 times, “satisfactory” –– 8 times); 15 meter jumping race 

on stones (five meter race, then jump from rock to rock; rock height – at 

least 10 centimeters; nine-ten rocks should be spaced over 10 meters 

in such a way that either the right or the left foot can tread on a rock 

once; with the last jump, land on both feet, stopping in the designated 

square on the finish line) to gauge reaction and motor coordination 

(“excellent” –– 3.9 seconds, “good” –– 4.0 seconds, “satisfactory” –– 4.5 

seconds).

Physical fitness is tested over the course of one day in the following 

sequence: walk along a narrow surface, jump from a height, rope 

climbing (primary rope), one-legged squat, jumping race on stones, 

one-kilometer cross-country race.

The physical fitness grade is made up of the grades received for 

the six exercises, namely:

“Excellent” – if at least half of the exercises are graded “excellent,” 

and the rest “good”;

“Good” – if at least half of the exercises are graded “good” or 

“excellent,” and the rest “satisfactory”;

“Satisfactory” – if more than half the exercises are graded 

“satisfactory” and there are no unsatisfactory grades.

A soldier’s fitness is graded “unsatisfactory” if there is even one 

unsatisfactory grade.

Build and equip sites and sport facilities for personnel physical 

training.

Sport facilities are built and sites equipped for military units 

assigned to mountain operations in accordance with the “Suggested 

List of Sport Facilities and Sites for Physical Training” (Addendum 2 to 

the Handbook of Physical Training and Sport in the Russian Federation 

Armed Forces). Special mountain training camps or training sites are 

also built.

Mountain training centers usually have track and field grounds, 

gymnastic courts with a gymnastic floor and multipurpose gymnastic 

equipment; rings for hand-to-hand combat; an area for throwing 

grenades accurately and for distance, downward and upward; sport 

courts (for volleyball, basketball, soccer, handball); and, if conditions 

allow, an outdoor swimming pool or aquatic facility.
144 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Hydro-Meteorological Support of Military

Transport Along Mountain Rivers

Vladimir Shiryayev in Armeisky Sbornik, September 2009*

*Vladimir Shiryayev, “Gidrometeorologicheskoe obespechenie voinskikh perevozok, 

osyshchestvlyaemikh po gornim rekam” (“Hydro-Meteorological Support of Military Transport Along Mountain Rivers”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), September 2009, 15-22. 

Shiryayev is a military mountaineering instructor in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Logistics in 

the Mountains

Supply in the mountains is tough. Helicopters cannot reach many 

areas, trucks have a hard time negotiating mountain roads, and diesel 

engines have real problems at altitude. River transport is one answer to 

resupply through the mountains and, though tricky, rivers have been used 

in this role for centuries. The following two articles by Vladimir Shiryayev 

discuss the need to move supplies by river, pack animal, and truck as well 

as do a logistics water reconnaissance. A mountaineering instructor with 

much experience in military and adventure rafting, Shiryayev presents 

ideas that have a great deal of value in mountain combat and are being 

considered for adoption by the Russian military.

The difficult mountain rivers of Afghanistan make it hard to move 

large amounts of material and the times they can be used in this role is 

seasonable. Still, serious mountain combat requires the ability to penetrate 

beyond the first mountain range and often pack animals, water transport 

and porters can penetrate where trucks and helicopters cannot.

Using mountain rivers for supply deliveries, evacuation of the 

wounded and sick, and other military transport missions require 

reliable hydro-meteorological support since they are completely dependent on the hydrographic network in combat areas. Transport operations in such unusual and nontraditional conditions will be successful 

if there is good hydrologic reconnaissance, which is the basis of hydrometeorological support for rafting.

Since the objective of hydrologic reconnaissance is to gather, 

process and provide information to the troops about the hydrologic 

network and to predict probable natural phenomena in mountain river 
Military Transport Along Mountain Rivers 145

basins, it needs to be provided by special military support. It is a key 

component of rear-area reconnaissance since it determines the routes 

for delivery and evacuation using mountain rivers, and makes transport 

safety recommendations. Given the many matters that hydrologic 

reconnaissance deals with, it may be conducted by the staff of large 

formations as well as subordinate logistic support entities that make 

deliveries to their own units and detachments within a certain segment 

of the logistics route.

The hydrologic state of a riverine network can be studied while 

preparing for and conducting an operation. The study may be based on 

the following key objectives:

l ascertain the hydrologic and topographic conditions in order to 

select a staging area; 

l study the shoreline to determine the capacity of the vortexes 

(eddies) for simultaneous loading of watercraft in the staging area and 

unloading of supplies at the destinations, or for transferring supplies 

at places where they must be portaged around impassable obstacles 

during stage-by-stage and segment transport [in stage-by-stage 

transport, the transport unit moves the entire length of the river, moving 

supplies from one dump site to the next in states. In segment transport, 

the transport unit moves the supplies along one segment of the river and 

then another transport unit moves them further];

l search the riverside in a valley (gorge) for suitable and secure 

locations for field depots and supply dumps;

l inspect dangerous rapids, narrow passages, and forest obstructions, and make recommendations on how to negotiate them;

l determine the suitability of mountain river stretches for sending 

supplies by unmanned raft, the forces and assets required for those 

purposes, and the types of rafts and packaging;

l determine the work to clear the riverbed of minefields, nonexplosive obstacles, and materiel and gear that have fallen into the water;

l determine conveyance methods based on route difficulty and 

rafting conditions;

l work up transport safety recommendations;

l mark water conveyance routes and set up beacons and directional 

signs;

l determine the possibility of safe conveyance and list appropriate 

actions in support;

l prepare charts and technical descriptions of individual obstacles 

as well as the water routes as a whole;

l do a time study of the rafting, including surmounting difficult-totraverse obstacles (individually);
146 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

l inspect the shoreline and riverside in the staging area and at 

destinations and intermediate points to identify minefields, loading and 

offloading conditions, and the possibility of using machinery for loading 

and offloading supplies from undeveloped banks;

l work up proposals and recommendations for camouflage, communication (signaling), engineer and other types of combat support of 

transport, and for the possibility of nighttime transport.

The scope and complex nature of hydrologic reconnaissance 

dictates the need to form reconnaissance groups from different services 

and specialties: rear services, hydro-meteorologists, engineers, communications, and chemical defense specialists. There could also 

be a need for hydrologists; glaciologists; camouflage specialists; 

demolitions experts; fork-lift transport vehicles and machinery experts; 

field fortification experts; and sappers. The size and composition of 

hydrologic reconnaissance groups are not fixed and will vary widely 

depending on the scope and nature of the information required.

The chief methods of obtaining information about a river are: 

large scale topographic maps, global positioning system readings; 

instrument and visual observation; ground and aerial photography; 

video recordings; and direct inspection of obstacles, shore lines and 

riversides, paying particular attention to planned intermediate mooring 

sites for stage-by-stage and segment conveyance. It is also necessary 

to thoroughly inspect the riverside in the staging area and at the supply 

destinations, whatever the means of transport.

When gathering information on a river, it is vital to familiarize oneself 

with its technical description and charts, reference and special literature, 

and the military-geographic description of the theater of operations. 

The author believes that it would be a good idea to print large-scale 

topographic maps with river characteristics annotated on them. The 

data would be derived from trekking reports. These brief characteristics 

of rafting conditions would be a great addition to the written information 

on the reverse side of the map.

Charts make transport much easier, quicker and safer by making it 

possible to take one’s bearings in a river setting and make appropriate 

decisions. The charts enable detachments to move and make supply 

deliveries more rapidly. Figure 1 shows navigational directions for a 

section of a mountain river that the author drew up for a difficult trek.

Charts and technical descriptions compiled back in peacetime can 

certainly be used for military transport, but the information they contain 

could be outdated by changing terrain factors (landslides, avalanches, 

rock falls, and so on) and the impact of manmade activities on the 

environment. Charts could become rapidly outdated in wartime when 
Military Transport Along Mountain Rivers 147

Navigability Corresponds to River 

Class (Section)

Current 

Character

Current Speed, 

meters/sec

Easy Navigable One Still Up to 2

Moderately Navigable Two Rapid 2-4

Difficult to Navigate Three Stormy 4-6

Non-Navigable Four Very Stormy Over 6

Figure 1. Chart of a 

mountain river stretch. 
148 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

heavy use of artillery and aviation, and of armored formations and units 

in areas accessible to tanks, cause a certain degree of terrain changes 

in mountain river valleys, on hill sides as well as in the riverbeds 

themselves. Furthermore, explosions and blasts could result in the 

appearance of new micro-relief features –– rapids, shallow rocky rapids, 

waterfalls, and rock dams, and where there is snow cover and in high 

mountains –– snow bridges and tunnels caused by rock falls and snow 

slides. The latter could sweep debris in its wake, often reaching the 

opposite slopes of a valley (gorge). Such obstacles can also appear 

in mountain rivers during fortification of strongholds, firing positions, 

command posts, and supply dumps. These terrain changes cannot, of 

course, obliterate water routes, but by making rafting conditions more 

difficult, they will have direct impact on water craft and transport.

Charts play a substantial role for military transport using mountain 

rivers because they provide essential information on rafting conditions 

and guide selection of tactical rafting options. An expertise in chart 

reading and chart drawing is a key component of water assault training.

Experience shows that when drawing a chart, it is a good idea to 

trace the river line and its adjacent terrain from a topographic map with 

a scale of 1:100, 000 or 1:50,000. For correct orientation when rafting, the 

tracing must be marked with the mouths and names of rivers and creeks 

that join the water route, elevations, canyons, bluffs, waterfalls, hydrostations, cableways, ferry sites, and trails running alongside the river 

(figure 1).

During hydrologic reconnaissance, all obstacles and their characteristics, and the recommended methods for clearing them are 

promptly marked on the traced river line. Information should not be 

entered after reconnaissance as this could result in distortion. Rafters 

may mark the information immediately on the mapsheet, but it may end 

up being very crowded because of the large volume of river data.

The diagrams should use a legend, for which the author offers some 

suggestions (figure 2), and it is a good idea to note the obstacle name 

(number), location and difficulty as appropriate, for example, 2EN, 

5DN, 9NN, and 17MN. Here, the numbers “2, 5, 9, and 17” indicate the 

sequence number of the obstacle from the staging area, and “EN, DN, 

NN and MN” indicate the degree of difficulty. In this instance, the second 

obstacle is easily navigable, the fifth is difficult to navigate, the ninth is 

non-navigable, and the seventh is moderately navigable.

Remember that on mountain rivers which might flood after rain or 

which have some form of controlled flow there could be significant daily 

fluctuations in water level, causing obstacles to be partially submerged 

or to appear in other places where current charts indicate that there are 
Military Transport Along Mountain Rivers 149

none. Obstacles can also emerge when a mud flow carries debris from 

lateral gorges (at both low and high altitudes) during glacial mudflows.

Therefore, the numbering of rapids marked on old charts should 

be checked against the location of lateral flows. And if an obstacle 

is by the mouth of a lateral flow, it is a good idea to add a geographic 

name to the numbering, for example, “Aksai Rap. 25 NN.” This means 

that the rapids are located at the mouth of the Aksai stream and is 

non-navigable for transport purposes. “Sarykamyshsky Rap. 20 DN” 

means difficult to navigate rapids at the mouth of the Sarykamyshsky 

stream. Rapids should be numbered sequentially only if there are few 

geographic features or conspicuous landmarks on the route and they are 

considerably far apart.

Regardless of whether a technical description of a rafting route 

is available, all hydrologic reconnaissance data should be entered in 

1. Above-water rock.

2. Rock partially submerged at a shallow 

depth.

3. Submerged rock that could impact craft 

position if traversed.

4. Eddy (section of a channel with reverse 

current).

5. “Pin spots” where the current may pin 

rafts against the shore (forms at a concave 

bank).

6. Rock (bluff bank).

7. Riverside rocks (rock debris, detritus).

8. Vertical rises.

9. Slanting rises.

10. Riverside shoal (forms at a convex bank).

11. Log barrier (riverside).

12. Log barrier (solid).

13. Navigable channel on some river 

stretches.

14a. Whirlpool.

14b. Swirl.

15. “Mushroom” water cushion, usually 

pulsating.

Recommended legend for charting 

navigability 

EN – Easily navigable.

MN – Moderately navigable.

DN – Difficult to navigate.

NN – Non-navigable.

NWR – Navigable without reconnaissance but 

reconnaissance would be useful.

Figure 2. Examples of legends for charted obstacles
150 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

a log that specifies the type, length, density, and distinctive features of 

the obstacles; corresponding landmarks; the recommended line of 

movement; opportunities for mooring enroute and size of eddies; and 

trail quality and height above the water level. For example, “Krutoi 

Rapids 27 DN –– abrupt riverbed narrowing; 2 meters drop behind the 

first (left) turn; many flooded rocks, ‘tight barrels’; water slams heavily 

against right bank cliffs at the exit from the rapids. Conclusions: portage 

loads and watercraft along left bank trail.” Example two: “Calm 28 km 

stretch, river width –– 40–50 m, no above-water rocks or log barriers, 

depth –– 1.5–2 m, average current speed –– 2–2.3 m/sec, swell –– not more 

than 0.5 m. Conclusions: these characteristics, as well as the smooth 

turns, no pin spots or rocky banks make possible through conveyance in 

either piloted vessels or by unmanned raft.”

Completeness should be a consideration when assessing the quality 

of mountain trails that might be used for stage-by-stage and segment 

conveyance. It often happens that these primitive transportation 

lines marked on a map are virtually nonexistent in some stretches. 

Landslides, mudslides, runoff on slopes, and grass and shrub overgrowth 

gradually remove these land supply lines. The sharp drop in tourists in 

mountainous areas over the last 16 years has had a negative impact on 

trails and their proper maintenance.

If time allows, it is a good idea to diagram rapids on a 1:1000 scale, 

marking only those rocks, cliffs, currents and whirlpools that could affect 

passage. A diagram of rapids should show the recommended line of 

movement for vessels and mooring sites for offloading or transferring 

supplies to pack loads if the river route cannot be followed further. Trails 

Figure 3.
Military Transport Along Mountain Rivers 151

on which the load and watercraft can be portaged past the rapids to 

continue the trip should be indicated.The broken line in Figure 3 shows 

the safest rafting route in very difficult rapids. The vessel in the right turn 

of the river moves rightward early to avoid being pinned against left bank 

cliff at 3. The steeper river gradient drastically increases current speed 

from location 2. In order to avoid eddy 4 when going from one end of 

the rapids to another, the crew rows vigorously to the left immediately 

after pin spot 3 and keeps as close as possible to the left bank, avoiding 

the tangle of submerged and flooded rocks 5. Making allowance for 

the fact that the river again makes a right turn and that the water slams 

heavily against the concave (left) bank, and that there is the danger of the 

craft striking above-water cliffs 6, and then 7, which are aligned, the crew 

makes every effort to go rightward and passes close to the right bank. 

Having cleared the final stretch, the raft crosses the current and moors at 

sandbar 8 on the left (convex) bank.

Watercraft (catamarans, inflatable boats, flotation rafts and kayaks), 

helicopters, ground vehicles (motor vehicles, armored personnel 

carriers, motorcycles, mountain bikes, and mountable animals, best 

of all horses), as well as paragliders and hang gliders can be used for 

hydrologic reconnaissance and data gathering. But helicopters and 

catamarans should be regarded as the most efficient of all the transport 

and reconnaissance assets listed because they are particularly mobile 

(photo 1). The catamarans’ maneuverability and speed make it cheaper 

to study a body of water on the spot. Helicopters make it possible 

Photo 1. Bird’s eye view of a mountain river’s channel and flood plain.
152 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

to survey a large part of a river valley in a short time, identify difficult 

spots, and pass on the information to crews reconnoitering on the 

water. Immediate and extensive information on rafting conditions 

obtained from air reconnaissance enables staffs to process information 

and make an appropriate decision more speedily. There is also the 

option of combining these transport assets with a catamaran crew 

surveying obstacle-free stretches of a river from a helicopter, and 

using their watercraft to survey the stretches with rapids.

Open military source reports which state that helicopter reconnaissance can be carried out at an absolute altitude of no more than 

2,500 meters significantly understate these aircraft’s capabilities in 

mountainous terrain. Experience shows that helicopters can fly to 

altitudes over 5,000 meters and land and take off at 4,000 meters altitude 

in hard-to-reach areas. For example, MI-4 helicopters delivered supplies 

(construction materials, equipment, diesel engines and other machinery) 

to an altitude of 3,800 meters above sea level during construction 

of the Lednik Abramova (Abramov Glacier) high mountain hydrometeorologic station. Furthermore, the tactical radius for deliveries was 

50 kilometers, and the cargo weight was 0.7–0.8 tons. Numerous drops 

to mountain climbing expeditions in Central Tyan-Shan and Pamir, as 

well as glaciologic research in other high mountain areas of Central Asia 

confirm the considerable high altitude capabilities of the helicopters 

(MI-8MTV).

Hydrologic reconnaissance would be incomplete if it were confined 

to gathering information about the water transport route and the 

riverside area where supply dumps are to be set up, supplies loaded and 

offloaded, and loads and watercraft portaged –– for segment and stepby-step transport. Hydrologic reconnaissance is especially important 

for enhancing the ability of troops and logistic services units to survive 

in high mountain areas and must thoroughly and regularly survey the 

man-made (dammed) and glacial (ice-dammed) lakes that abound in 

the basins of rivers with glaciers and a lot of erosion terrain formation 

(photo 2). Some glacial lakes break out regularly. The break-out of the 

well-known Mertsbakher ice-dammed lake in Central Tyan-Shan can, to 

some extent, be forecast since it takes place annually (from late July to 

mid-October, and most often in August-September) causing powerful 

floods on the Inylchek and Sarydzhaz Rivers with a peak discharge of 

1,000–2,000 cubic meters per second. Still, it is impossible to forecast 

the break out of the enormous number of small lakes that form on the 

surface and in the moraine deposits of glaciers.

Consequently, helicopter survey of the high mountain area of 

river basins is important where there is combat and logistics support 
Military Transport Along Mountain Rivers 153

activity. It makes sense to land observers with radios and safety and 

survival gear at the most potentially dangerous high mountain lakes to 

study and analyze the processes underway at the site, record the level 

of the water accumulating on the surface and in the moraine deposits of 

glaciers, as well as to preempt attempts by the enemy’s sabotage and 

reconnaissance groups to blow up the glacial (rock) dams to deliberately 

flood the locality.

As regards the need for aerial hydrological reconnaissance of 

high mountains (snowcap region), mention should be made of the 

SARNIGMI hydrographic party’s many years of experience conducting 

such observations back in Soviet times. Unfortunately, the economic 

hardships that set in after 1991 sharply reduced the scope of aerial 

and ground hydro-meteorologic observations. The disastrous July 

1998 glacial mudflow in the Shakhimardan River valley resulted from 

the melting of glacial dams, followed by water discharge from a small 

lake that had formed in the terminal moraine deposits of the ArchaBashi glacier (Alai Mountain Range, photo 3). This vividly disclosed the 

severity of the current challenge of ensuring the safety of the whole area.

Later overflights of the Pamir-Alai and Western Tyan-Shan mountain ranges identified lakes whose parameters were determined 

visually: length, width, shape, surface area, shore line configuration, 

and approximate water volume. The surface of each glacial basin 

was surveyed. When a body of water was found, the helicopter would 

pass over the site several times until all information, including the 

exact time and location, were logged. Relevant notes were also made 

on topographic maps. Special reference books and catalogs of USSR 

Photo 2. Erosion terrain formation. Photo 3. Glacial mudflow.
154 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

glaciers were used in the aerial survey. Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry 

of Emergency Situations hydro-meteorologic service detachments 

landed on lakes that were potentially dangerous.

Lakes that emerge from the ice twitches [the sudden downstream 

movement of the ice cover of a glacier] of glaciers formed in lateral 

gorges to the river can block the principal riverbeds and present a 

major danger to troops and logistics units. Some glacial dams can be 

200 meters high. If they burst, they will cause catastrophic flooding 

of mountain rivers, destroying transport supply lines and towns. The 

Voyenno-Gruzinsky road has, on more than one occasion, been put out 

of commission by mudrock flows on the Kabakhi River and then on the 

Terek River. Transport supply lines in Alaska, including Stikine River 

traffic, are currently threatened by at least six glacial lakes. The torrential 

flooding that occurred on the Rio Plomo and then on the Mendoza River 

in January 1934 wiped out seven bridges and 13 kilometers of the TransAndean Railway along the Mendoza gorge and through the Cumbre 

Tunnel from Argentina to Chile. It took 10 years to rebuild the railway. 

In Karakorum, the world’s largest mountain range, there have been at 

least 50 glacial lake bursts over the last 150 years, spawning colossal 

floods. The water level in some rivers rose by more than 20 meters, and 

the discharge reached 19,200 cubic meters per second with a water 

flow of 30–40 kilometers per hour. During one such flood on the Shyok 

River, a large right tributary of the Indus, villages on the lower terraces 

were damaged while those high (60–90 meters) above the river were 

not affected by the flood wave, even though it reached 15 meters (Yu.B. 

Vinogradov. “Etyudy o selevykh potokakh” (“Sill Flow Etudes”), L., 1980).

These phenomena and the scale of the destruction they wreaked 

show how vital it is to ensure the safety of the troops and logistics units 

and agencies, to which end personnel, weapons, vehicles, supplies, and 

command posts should be located out of the reach of flood waves and sill 

flows.

Hydrologic reconnaissance groups may use the suggested classification of natural obstacles by navigability and the table data to assess 

a water surface and issue recommendations for using mountain rivers as 

military supply lines (transport and evacuation routes).

Easily navigable obstacles. They may take the form of single rocks, 

several sandbars, small waves, weak pin spots, straight slightly sloping 

flows and rapid flows (photo 4). 

All types of watercraft with maximum supply loads may be used with 

such obstacles. The vessels’ line of movement is determined by reading 

the water. Belay can be used. The vessels could also be joined onto 

more powerful watercraft or separate sections of a pontoon bridge could 
Military Transport Along Mountain Rivers 155

be used as unmanned rafts to be 

intercepted later at the offloading 

site. Positive velocity (strokes 

with oars forward) can be used 

to increase speed on rowed rafts, 

and especially on oar-propelled 

vessels (catamarans, flotation rafts, 

and inflatable boats). Stretches 

with easily navigable obstacles 

are convenient for refining technical and tactical rafting techniques such as spacing between 

vessels and maintaining contact, 

crew belay, reading the water to 

determine the line of movement 

and following it.

Moderately navigable obstacles. They allow a trained crew 

to move loaded watercraft. This 

obstacle category includes simple rapids and shallow rocky 

rapids, some rock groups, slight 

rises, stronger pin spots and rapid 

flows (photo 5). These obstacles 

can be traversed by all types of 

watercraft with belay. In some 

cases there may be a slight drop 

in speed when obstacles are reconnoitered from shore and belay 

is organized from the water. The 

commander of the rafting detachments determines the distance 

between crews based on the situation and the character of the river. 

Rafting experience shows that 

vessels should be spaced approximately 30–100 meters apart to 

avoid collisions while moving and 

ensure crew safety during belay. 

The vessels’ line of movement 

in most cases is determined by 

reading the water.

Photo 4. Easily navigable obstacles.

Photo 5. Moderately navigable water 

obstacles.

Photo 6. Difficult-to-navigate obstacles.

Photo 7. Non-navigable obstacles.
156 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Difficult to navigate obstacles. These are characterized by rapid 

currents and great difficulty – powerful rapids and pin spots, slanting and 

pulsating rises with reversed crests, foamy holes (“kettles,” “barrels”), 

powerful whirlpools, tight vortexes, current disturbances, swirls, abrupt 

discharges, and rocky pockets. It takes a lot of courage to clear these 

obstacles. If they follow one another in quick succession, plan on making 

the trip in vessels that have a lightened load or have been completely 

unloaded (photo 6). The distance between the crews should be 

increased but should not exceed 100 meters. In some cases, belay is 

completely eliminated during movement and each crew is on its own. 

Load and watercraft portage is not ruled out. Obstacles in this category 

can be successfully cleared in maneuverable vessels that are stable and 

fairly buoyant. If there are enough forces and assets, it is a good idea 

to plan to belay from the water downstream of the rapids. Difficult-tonavigate obstacles on transport and evacuation routes can significantly 

slow supply delivery and evacuation of the wounded. In some cases it 

will take two-three times longer than a trip on easy stretches of the same 

length, which is based on just travel time. It may take as long to make 

the first trips on unexplored routes and when there are insufficient forces 

and assets for safety.

Non-navigable obstacles. It is impossible to clear them on any 

type of watercraft, even unloaded, or with a highly trained crew (photo 

7). Mooring teams must be dispatched beforehand to help crews when 

such obstacles are present on a conveyance and evacuation route. This is 

all the more necessary in cases where watercraft mooring is compulsory 

and unmanned flotation rafts, separate sections of a pontoon bridge and 

other rafts on the mountain river have to be intercepted. Examples of this 

group of obstacles are waterfalls, rock and log barriers, and rapids with 

macro-fragmental jams where narrow passages make rafting impossible. 

With engineer support, some types of these obstacles, for example solid 

log barriers, can be removed to provide an unobstructed passage and 

evacuation route.

The suggested organization of hydro-meteorologic support for 

military transport on mountain rivers, and the classification of natural 

obstacles by navigability, make it possible to use water routes very 

efficiently and safely as military supply lines in hard-to-reach localities. 

The foregoing recommendations may be useful for the staffs and logistics 

services of formations and task forces when suddenly called upon to 

provide uninterrupted supplies to troops, move military contingents, and 

provide material and transport support for combat and operations in 

special conditions.
Military Transport Along Mountain Rivers 157

________________________________________

Mountain logistics is tough and requires ingenuity and some ancient 

skills to succeed. It is apparent that:

1. Mountain artillery support is a function of how far forward artillery 

ammunition can be delivered.

2. 155mm artillery systems are hard to get out of valley plains and 

smaller, direct-fire artillery or rocket launchers that can be broken down 

into transportable pieces are optimum (75mm or thereabouts).

3. Mortars are great, but like aircraft, give the enemy time to react to 

incoming fire. Mortar ammunition above 81mm is hard to manpack.

4. Most soldiers do not know how to care for, load and lead pack 

animals, but this can be a vital skill.

5. Just because its water does not mean it is a job for the US Navy.

6. Transportation units need to be capable of self defense.

7. Helicopter supply is a limited option. 

8. Transportation units need mountain and river training just as much 

as maneuver forces. –– Editors 
158 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

What a Water Transport Company Should 

Be: The Need for Special Supply Delivery 

Transport Units in Mountain Areas

Vladimir Shiryayev in Armeisky Sbornik, August 2008*

*Vladimir Shiryayev, “Kakoy byt’vodno-transportnoy rote?” (“What a Water Transport 

Company Should Be”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), August 2008. Shiryayev is a 

military mountaineering instructor in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

The challenging geography and physical conditions in mountainous regions greatly affects soldiers’ combat and all types of logistics 

support. Material and transport support and the techniques and methods 

of supply delivery require an improved logistics support system, 

redundant delivery supply routes, and, most importantly, new specialized 

transport units.

The training of military units using the proposed TO&Es shows that 

shows that a separate water transport company (mountain) --- SWTC(M) 

meets all the requirements for mountain operations and is best suited for 

this purpose. The company should include the prescribed number of 

water transport platoons and squads, as well as other combat, logistical 

and technical support units (figure 1).

The suggested mountain water transport company’s TO&E structure 

will meet the daily requirements of a mountain battalion using up to a 

class three river with severe rafting conditions and a five-fold buoyancy 

(figure 2). A 38-man water transport platoon is best suited as the 

mountain water transport company base unit. Comprised of three water 

transport squads, it has a 52.5 ton maximum carrying capacity (the 

capacity of all inflatable elements).

The optimum number of men for a water transport squad is twelve. 

The crew may have two, three, four and sometimes six people, depending 

on rafting conditions. A squad can deliver a mountain platoon’s daily 

material requirements in one trip.

It makes sense to use the wire-framed inflatable rafts on transverse 

gondolas and catamarans as the separate mountain water transport 

company’s primary regular watercraft. Each has a maximum carrying 

capacity of 7.5 and 2.5 metric tons, respectively. 

Figure 3 shows the carrying capacity and minimum number of 

recommended watercraft (one set) needed to perform the tasks of a 

separate mountain. With 4-5-fold buoyancy, it is seemingly inadvisable 

to use catamarans for cargo transport since their carrying capability is 

considerably less than rafts. 

Counting the weight of the crew and weapons (400 kilograms), their 

useful carrying capacity is just 230 and 100 kilograms, respectively. But 

even under such conditions (technically difficult rapids), a mountain 

water transport company can carry 32.5 metric tons and deliver 20 
Mountain Transport Companies 159

metric tons of useful cargo to fill a mountain unit’s daily material requirements.

NOTE: The author proposes using this company for both upstream and 

downstream transport. Upstream transport will require rowing, belaying, 

or towing from the banks. Where this is impossible, he envisions use of 

--------- River Rafting Classifications and Bouyancy --------

Class 1: Smooth river with only small rough areas that might require some maneuvering. 

(Skill Level: Very Basic)

Class 2: Some rough water, perhaps with some rocks that might require some maneuvering. 

(Skill Level: Basic)

Class 3: Whitewater with small waves and perhaps maybe a small drop, but no real danger. 

It might require significant maneuvering. (Skill Level: Experienced)

Class 4: Whitewater with medium waves, perhaps with rocks and a considerable drop 

requiring sharp maneuvering. (Skill Level: Experienced)

Class 5: Whitewater with large waves, fast water, probably including large rocks and 

hazards and a large drop that requires skilled maneuvering. (Skill Level: Advanced)

Class 6: Not navigable due to substantial whitewater, large waves, rocks and hazards, plus 

substantial drops that may destroy water craft. 

Four or five-fold buoyancy refers to a water craft’s ability to carry four to five times its weight.

Information extracted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafting assessed on July 15, 2010. 

Figure 2.

swtc (m) 

COMMAND 

8 pers., 2 

catamarans 

Main Units 

114 pers. Supply Units 

100 pers. 

Water Transport Platoon 

38x3 pers. 

18 WIR 

9 Catamarans 

Combat Support 

Platoon 

38 pers., 9 

catamarans 

Vehicular 

Platoon 

KamAZ-43105-

17 

Supply Platoon 

38 pers., 6 WIR, 

3 catamarans 

Water Transport Squad 

12x9 pers. (2 watercraft + 1 

catamaran)x9 

Recon. Squad 

12 pers., 3 

catamarans 

Pers. Transport 

Squad 

KamAZ-43105-8 

Administration 

Squad 

12x2 pers., 

4 WIR, 2 

catamarans

Engineer Squad

12 pers., 3 

catamarans 

Communication 

Squad 

12 pers., 3 

catamarans 

Technical 

Support Squad 

KamAZ-43105-1 

Watercraft, Food 

and Equipment 

Transport Squad 

Watercraft Repair 

and Assembly 

Squad 

12 pers., 

2 WIR , 1 

swtc (m) 

COMMAND 

8 pers., 2 

catamarans 

Main Units 

114 pers. Supply Units 

100 pers. 

Water Transport Platoon 

38x3 pers. 

18 WIR 

9 Catamarans 

Combat Support 

Platoon 

38 pers., 9 

catamarans 

Vehicular 

Platoon 

KamAZ-43105-

17 

Supply Platoon 

38 pers., 6 WIR, 

3 catamarans 

Water Transport Squad 

12x9 pers. (2 watercraft + 1 

catamaran)x9 

Recon. Squad 

12 pers., 3 

catamarans 

Pers. Transport 

Squad 

KamAZ-43105-8 

Administration 

Squad 

12x2 pers., 

4 WIR, 2 

catamarans

Engineer Squad

12 pers., 3 

catamarans 

Communication 

Squad 

12 pers., 3 

catamarans 

Technical 

Support Squad 

KamAZ-43105-1 

Watercraft, Food 

and Equipment 

Transport Squad 

Watercraft Repair 

and Assembly 

Squad 

12 pers., 

2 WIR , 1 

Total personnel -- 220 

Maximum carrying capacity (Cmax) 

– 237.5 metric tons

Primary units, including company 

command (18 rafts (WIR), 11 

catamarans) – 162.5 metric tons 

(122 personnel).

Support Units (6 rafts, 12 

catamarans) – 75 metric tons 

(100 personnel).

Figure 1. TO&E of a Separate Mountain 

Water Transport Company, SWTC(M). 
160 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Water 

Transport 

Units

No. of 

Personnel

No. of 

Rafts 

on 

Gondolas

Cmax’

(Tons)

No. of 

Catamarans

Cmax’

(Tons)

∑Γmax’

(Tons) 

Water 

Transport 

Units

Class Rivers

Carrying Capacity 

(when River Class)

3 4 5

Crew 4 1 7.5 1 2.5 7.5:2.5 2.5;0.83 1.88;0.63 1.5;0.5

Squad 12 2 15 1 2.5 17.5 5.83 4.4 3.5

Platoon 38 6 45 3 7.5 52.5 17.5 13.1 10.5

Company 

Command 8 – – 2 5.0 5.0 1.67 1.25 1.0

Company 122 18 135 11 27.5 27.5 54.17 40.63 32.5

vehicles and pack animals to bridge the gap in moving supplies and 

disassembled watercraft upstream. ________________________________________

Inclusion of catamarans in platoons and squads ensures crew 

safety since they are more reliable for belaying large watercraft and 

intercepting crews undergoing some emergency.

One of the best separate mountain water transport company 

manpower distribution options on watercraft is as follows: 44 servicemen, 

including the company command, carry supplies on catamarans, while 

78 carry them on rafts. There are 12 four-man raft crews and the rest are 

made up of five-six men. This manpower distribution on the rafts has to 

do with the disposition of platoon commanders and their deputies. There 

are other possible crew configurations, depending on rafting conditions.

Platoon commanders should be appointed from among officers who 

have been trained in combat rafting, and their deputies, as well as squad 

and crew commanders should be appointed from among the chief 

warrant officers, sergeants and privates who are best trained in mountain 

river rafting.

During rafting, the platoon and squad movement columns are to be 

formed in such a way that a catamaran crew is at the head of each unit 

pointing out the route as well as dangerous local obstructions and, if 

necessary, berthing sites. 

A drawback of this military unit model is that the separate mountain 

water transport company is outfitted with rigid-frame watercraft, which 

means that a lot of time and materials are spent making them. In 

southern regions and the Thule, where there is no forest cover, watercraft 

frames have to be made from dural (titanium) tubes, making them more 

expensive.

Figure 3. Carrying capacity and minimum number of watercraft needed for a 

Separate Water Transportation Company (Mountain), SWTC(M), minus support units.

Total of 29 watercraft in a set: 18 rafts; 11 catamarans.
Mountain Transport Companies 161

This drawback is compensated for by the long useful life of 

watercraft frames made from these metals (ten years or more based on 

the experience of sport rafting). These watercraft can be disassembled 

into pieces weighing no more than 8 kilograms each, making it possible 

for the equipment bearers (the very same rafts-men) to carry them to 

the staging area (SA) after the trip. Since the catamarans have adjustable 

crossbars, it is possible to change the width of the watercraft so that they 

can negotiate the narrowest waterways and to arrange and brace the 

supplies conveniently and securely.

A separate mountain water transport company should have a second 

and even third set of watercraft in order to reduce the time between trips. 

They could also serve as company reserves in the event that craft are lost, 

and to replace craft that are temporarily out of commission. Additional 

sets will greatly speed up supply delivery. For example, a second 

catamaran is prepared to leave while the first is transporting a load.

The physical and geographical differences of a mountain region 

dictate the specific approach to the structure, composition and equipping 

of the water transport units. Another separate mountain water transport 

company model option is also possible. Without changing the TO&E, the 

its supply delivery capability can be increased by 55 metric tons if all 

water transport craft are switched to wire-framed inflatable rafts, getting 

rid of the catamarans (which carry 66.7% less than rafts). This model can 

used on high mountain rivers, as well as for class two rivers on which 

there are no difficult obstacles. Figure 4 shows the parameters that 

will determine a separate mountain water transport company’s supply 

carrying capability in the second option. 

On class one rivers, therefore, with the same number of personnel, 

the number of raft crews can be doubled by reducing them to two men, 

Figure 4. Second model Separate Water Transport Company (Mountain), 

SWTC(M), supply carrying capability.

Water 

Transport 

Unit

Mountain Rivers

Class One Class Two

Unit 

Composition 

(Men)

No. of 

Rafts

Carrying Capacity 

(Tons)

Unit 

Composition 

(Men)

No. of 

Rafts

Carrying Capacity 

(Tons)

Max Class 

1.5

Max Class 2 Class 3

Crew 2 1 7.5 5.0 4 1 7.5 3.75 2.5

Squad 12 6 45.0 30.0 12 3 22.5 11.25 7.5

Platoon 38 18 135.0 90.0 38 9 67.5 33.75 22.5

Company 

Command 8 4 30.0 20.0 8 2 15.0 7.5 5.0

Company 122 58 435.0 290.0 122 29 217.5 108.75 72.5
162 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

making it possible to increase the number of rafts to 58, with a total 

maximum carrying capacity of 435 metric tons, which is equivalent to 

two sets of such watercraft.

As is apparent from figures 3 and 4, the optimum composition of 

men, equipment, TOE, and their watercraft and carrying capacity are not 

a constant. The amount of military cargo that can be delivered depends 

on the class of the mountain river, watercraft specifications (number, type 

and volume of inflatable elements in their construction), and the raftsmen’s technical and physical training.

The amount of cargo carried on mountain rivers may change even 

within the limits of a single operational area that encompasses mountain 

regions with varied physical and geographical conditions. For example, 

the rivers of East Pamir are level while those in West Pamir, which may 

run the same direction, are mostly whitewater and full of rapids. This 

affects the water transport units, whose thresholds (class 5) are laid out in 

the first Separate Water Transport Company (Mountain) model, figure 3.

The fact that the mountain forces and military units operate in 

varying directions and within the task forces’ main advance makes 

another military formation transport model possible, Depending on 

transport volume, logistical factors and physical and geographical 

conditions, it could include: one-two water transport companies, onetwo pack transport companies, a company of carriers, and combat, 

logistics and technical support units. Its three or five company (650 to 900 

men) composition makes the military unit an independent tactical unit 

capable of delivering cargo and protecting, defending and safeguarding 

its assets without diverting combat formations from their primary tasks.

The separate mountain transport battalion organization and staffing 

structure is based on a modular structure in which a water transport 

company (any of the models or a combination thereof depending on 

logistical and physical and geographical factors) and a company of 

carriers are separate modules.

The entire separate mountain transport battalion or, depending on 

operational and logistical factors, separate detachments (modules) may 

deliver supplies, making it possible to maintain the transport capability of 

the other separate mountain transport battalion detachments (modules). 

Figure 5 shows an alternative way for separate mountain transport 

battalion/detachments to deliver supplies. 

The separate mountain transport battalion should include pack 

transport units to carry loads across passes that are inaccessible to 

vehicles. Their tasks will be: to deliver supplies from a higher rear 

echelon to the supply units of mountain forces and detachments or 

directly to their combat formations; and to transport supplies to final or 
Mountain Transport Companies 163

Staging Area (SA)

(Pack Transport Company - Two)

PTC-2

Carrier company

PTC-2

Supply Bge Cmd

Military Vehicular Road Command

PTC-1

Pack Transport Company - One

WTC(m)

KBAD

halfway delivery points from the helicopter pads and airfield landing 

strips of military transport aircraft. That and to deliver supplies from a 

higher rear echelon to the staging area for further transport by water; 

deliver loads from the river (at the destinations) to where the brigade 

(regiment) or battalion is deployed; return the watercraft to the staging 

area after the trip; reinforce the water transport units to carry loads 

and watercraft by land when impassable rapids appear on the route 

during stage-by-stage transport; if the situation changes, maneuver the 

watercraft into lateral or adjacent gorges (new directions).

Unlike the separate pack transport company (SPTC) that existed in 

the Turkestan Military District prior to 1991, the structural model of the 

proposed separate mountain water transport battalion’s pack transport 

company (PTC) requires supply platoons to switch to pack animal 

squads. This is primarily because of the nature of the mountain terrain 

and the limited capability of pack animal squads to move across rugged 

terrain. If necessary, a company’s supply platoon can be reinforced, 

for example with a third squad of a third pack transport platoon. In this 

way, while maintaining the general parameters of the organizational 

staffing structure, a separate pack transport company becomes a military 

formation with much better capability thanks to internal structural 

changes.

Loads can be delivered to the river by pack from the field warehouses of formations (corps, army) located behind a pass, airfield 

landing strips and helicopter pads by placing the supplies on the ground 

or alternatively in watercraft.

Operational planning and execution need to correlate the capabilities of pack transport and water transport formations. For example, 

Figure 5. Separate Mountain Transport Battalion unit supply delivery methods.
164 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

a pack transport company (PTC) that is part of an separate mountain 

transport battalion (213 pack horses that can deliver 17 to 20 metric 

tons of supplies depending on the elevation of the terrain and the lay 

of the land) roughly corresponds to the capabilities of a water transport 

company (WTC) on a class 5 river. This is 20 metric tons of useful load, 

not counting the weight of the crew, weapons and watercraft frames 

(figure 3). But on class one rivers, where a water transport company’s 

capabilities increase sharply and can be 270-290 metric tons per trip 

(depending on the conveyance method --- in piloted vessels or by raft), 

pack transport is less efficient than water transport by a multiple of 14 to 

17, assuming parity of personnel.

This considerable disparity between a pack transport company 

and a water transport company capabilities in high mountain conditions 

reduces water conveyance volume to a minimum. In order for the units 

to be at par with each other, it will be necessary to use 3,600-3,870 pack 

animals whose maintenance at elevations above 3,500-4,000 meters, far 

from supply bases and with a constant need for fodder resupply, will 

cause additional difficulties and is, in our view, problematic.

At the same time, one should consider coordination between these 

military formations since pack transport can be used to the maximum 

in the preparatory period of an operation (battle) to stockpile supplies 

on the ground in the staging areas. By using a shuttle method and given 

a reserve of time, the number of service animals can be reduced to a 

single pack transport company. It will take six to 35 days to deliver the 

loads to the staging area at the specified volume (290 metric tons), with 

one-three trips per day, depending on the distance (5-30 kilometers).

An expert might question the use of pack animals and military 

rafting when there is modern technology such as helicopters. However, 

practice shows that it is difficult to use MI-8 MTV transport helicopters 

above 3,500 meters because of the thin air, which greatly reduces their 

cargo capacity. Their useful cargo capacity does not exceed 0.5-0.8 

metric tons even at a minimum tactical radius of 50 kilometers and an 

ambient air temperature of up to 20°C. It is estimated that it will take 

340 to 580 helicopter flights to deliver the load of the watercraft of a 

second model water transport company (58 rafts) when the river class 

is between 1 and 2. Even with drops (airborne delivery) or helicopters 

hovering at minimal height with no landing, it will take 290 helicopter 

flights. A comparison of these statistics casts doubt on these helicopters’ 

ability to collaborate effectively with water transport formations on high 

mountain plains.

 In order to resolve the challenges of delivering supplies to high 

mountain plateaus, military transport aircraft can be used in the assembly 
Mountain Transport Companies 165

areas of water transport military units and detachments at the staging 

areas. These aircraft could deliver supplies from frontline or center 

depots, thereby avoiding intermediary logistical channels --- army and 

corps logistics --- and possibly frontline logistics as well.

Military transport aircraft can deliver supplies to high mountain 

plains by landing (without turning off the aircraft engines) on unpaved 

air strips or by parachute. This experience was gained back in Soviet 

times, when East Pamir had the USSR’s highest altitude airfield in Murgab 

with an elevation of over 3,600 meters. Transport aircraft flights have 

currently been resumed to hard-to-reach areas of the Pamir, specifically 

Murgab, in AN-26 aircraft, whose flying specifications make it possible to 

deliver up to a five-metric-ton load to such elevations over a distance of 

more than 700 kilometers.

The use of water transport formations in mountain and coastal areas 

will enable all logistical elements to meet another serious challenge – 

ferrying supplies, vehicles and pack transport across the numerous 

mountain rivers. After all, in a combat situation a retreating opponent or 

his special operations groups operating in the rear of our formations and 

military units are going to blow up bridges, which is why water transport 

formations make the military units and logistical elements more mobile 

since the watercraft used on mountain rivers make it possible to set up 

pontoon bridges, and assault and ferry crossings.

Let us look as an example at the exercises in which the Republic of 

Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Defense special operations units participated. 

The units demonstrated how to set up a pontoon bridge from catamarans 

that took part in operational rafting during the exercises. It took 45 

minutes to assemble, set up and secure a 15-meter long bridge to move 

the pack transport across a mountain river gorge.

The proposed water transport formations (mountain) can also be 

used to maneuver pack transport units on class one mountain rivers by 

placing the animals on wire-framed inflatable rafts (WIR) with appropriate area (deck) setup. This can greatly reduce the energy used 

by the pack animals as compared what they would use if they had to 

cover those distances over the mountains on foot. There have been 

instances of equipment and large domestic animals being transported 

considerable distances --- 200-250 kilometers --- on rafts along mountain 

taiga [subarctic forest] rivers. The deck area of a 3x7.5 meters WIR raft 

can hold up to six pack horses, that is, as much as a KamAZ-4310 truck.

The difficult mountain terrain and numerous rock projections 

and rock falls make it hard or impossible to deliver supplies by pack 

transport. This is why a separate mountain transport battalion needs a 

carrier company that can carry 3-3.5 metric tons of supplies. Its purpose 
166 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

is not just to take loads from the river up to where the supply companies 

of the mountain forces and military units are deployed or at times to 

the supply platoons and firing positions of mountain battalions. This 

separate mountain transport battalion has much broader functions, first 

and foremost to reinforce water transport units when supplies are being 

prepared for military rafting --- to waterproof the loads and take them 

from the packing site to the river in the staging area.

It also has to provide stage-by-stage and area-by-area transport that 

could require additional forces to carry supplies around impassable 

rapids, and to do the same with watercraft during stage-by-stage 

transport in order to expedite delivery.

It also has to return the watercraft to the staging area when there is 

no other way to transport them such as during area-by-area transport 

when one set of watercraft is being returned to the loading point while 

another is transporting supplies further to the offloading sites.

It also has to perform search and rescue for loads and watercraft that 

were sent unmanned and did not reach their destination at the expected 

time (grounded, stuck on an obstacle, caught in a vortex, etc.). It also 

carries out the orders of the senior officer as the logistical situation 

unfolds.

A separate mountain water transport company and a separate 

mountain transport battalion should have regular vehicle units in order 

to make them more mobile and autonomous. For example, a company 

has a vehicular platoon made up of a personnel transportation squad, 

a transportation squad (mixed) for food, materiel, petroleum, oil and 

lubricants (POL), and a maintenance and repair squad –– a total of 17 

to 20 vehicles. And a separate mountain transport battalion includes 

a vehicle company made up of personnel and service animals transportation platoons, as well as two-three squads to transport food, materiel 

(one-two squads) and POL. The number of vehicles could vary widely 

depending on the number of major units. For example, the fleet could 

number 95 to 100 vehicles for a regular three company strength (water 

transport company, pack transport company, and motor vehicle transport 

company).

Given the nature of modern military operations, it is a priority to 

make logistics support and its structural elements more robust and 

viable. This also fully applies to the proposed water transport and 

mountain transport detachments and military units. It is important 

to equip them with armored personnel carriers, portable anti-tank 

rocket launchers and anti-aircraft rocket launchers, communication and 

reconnaissance assets, and engineer explosives. It follows from this 

that a separate mountain transport battalion should have a company to 
Mountain Transport Companies 167

protect, defend and safeguard the battalion, which would include the 

combat support platoons.

Thus, despite its seemingly unwieldy organizational structure, a 

separate mountain transport battalion is a universal transport formation 

that can take supplies to the most remote and hard-to-reach mountain 

regions. It is also universal because the units are capable of maneuvering 

independently and protecting and defending its forces and assets, often 

without having to be reinforced by other logistics and combined arms 

units and detachments. With their own vehicles and tanker trucks, water 

and pack transport companies and motor vehicle units can cover large 

distances of 1,000-1,500 kilometers in the mountains with two-three 

fuel loads (in fuel tanks, the tanker trucks and additional containers 

in the cargo area). After the work is completed, the same vehicles 

can be used to transport supplies from the depots of task forces, and 

sometimes combined forces, to water transportation companies and 

pack transportation companies for further transport. If necessary, pack 

transport can redeploy water transport units into cut-off rafting areas 

while livestock rafts enable pack transport units to maneuver around 

difficult mountain passes.

Let us cite for comparison purposes the size of the tactical military 

formations of foreign armies as we consider how to optimize the 

composition of the proposed separate mountain transport battalion. In 

Germany’s ground forces, mountain-infantry, transport, supply battalions 

number up to 900 men. Medical transport battilions have more than 

1,000, while pontoon battalions have roughly 800 personnel.

The above demonstrates that corps (army) logistics needs to have 

two-three regular separate mountain water transport company or 

separate mountain transport battalions in the areas of operation of first 

echelon forces and military units of the army corps (army) that are 

operating in mountain districts and regions with a developed hydrographic network that allows use of water transport units. Depending on 

the length and classification of the mountain rivers and the delivery 

amount and deadline, these forces and assets could be sent to reinforce 

the rear of a first echelon motorized rifle division or motorized rifle 

brigade (mountain) in order to make them autonomous (Armed Forces of 

the Main Capitalist Countries, M., Voyenizdat, 1988, pp. 163, 172).

France’s alpine ground forces infantry battalion has roughly 900 men 

and up to 130 vehicles (ibid., pp. 213, 217). Italy’s separate alpine ground 

forces brigade numbers 5,777 men, and an alpine battalion, 950 (Ground 

Forces of the Capitalist Countries, M., Voyenizdat, 1980, p. 400).

Given the tasks of the military units and detachments (deliver 

supplies; maneuver supplies, forces and assets; evacuate the sick and 
168 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

wounded, damaged weapons and materiel; and arrange mountain 

river crossings), separate mountain water transport company and 

separate mountain transport battalion functions should be regarded as 

a key task of logistical rather than material support. The transportation 

departments of the task forces’ logistics administrations (corps, army, 

front) need to set up mountain transport offices to coordinate the actions 

of these specialized transport formations in order to strengthen the 

logistics groups and increase their capability to provide timely and 

comprehensive support for combat in hard to reach and isolated theaters 

of operation.

The deputy commanders in chief (commanding officers) of logistics 

task forces must have a reserve of mountain water transport formations 

to make rapid supply deliveries to troops in theaters of operation with a 

developed hydrographic network.

Given the large spatial scope and depth of present-day operations 

in mountain regions, there may be a need for mountain transport 

brigades (MTB) that could include the proposed separate mountain 

transport battalion forces and assets for operational, logistical and 

technical support, as well as a helicopter assault squadron with airfield 

maintenance units. Based on the modular principle, being highly mobile 

and with a high degree of tactical independence, these specialized 

mountain transport forces could consistently deliver supplies in isolated 

theaters of operation, reacting flexibly to a rapidly changing situation. 

Final conclusions as to the advisability of the proposals made in this 

article can be drawn following special military research and operational 

command and staff exercises in a mountain area.
Communications in the Mountains 169

Mountain Combat: 

Hard to Move, 

Hard to Shoot 

 --- Even Harder to 

 Communicate LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) 

and Lieutenant Jason Falivene USMC 

Originally published in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, September 2006.

Communicating in mountains is a challenge since there are few ideal spots for communication. FM radios, which are line of sight 

systems, frequently cannot communicate because their signals are 

absorbed by terrain folds and features. If all the force is on the same 

side of the mountain and the mountain forms a bowl, FM communications 

are usually possible. However, radios located on the same side of the 

mountain at different altitudes have difficulty communicating because 

of intervening terrain and communications dead space. If the force is 

deployed on the same side of a mountain which curves out, communications are especially difficult. Even FM radios located on the summit 

of the mountain have difficulty communicating with radios located further 

down the mountain slope due to dead space. Communications sites 

must be carefully selected --- and often become key terrain. When lineof-sight communications in mountains are possible, communications are 

excellent, but there are few sites where line-of sight is possible to all other 

elements in the net. There are often only three solutions–either move the 

radio to where it can communicate, set up a radio retransmission site, or 

relay messages across the net. 

Radio retransmission sites are expensive in terms of personnel and 

equipment. TO&Es normally do not provide adequate personnel and 

equipment to provide several retransmission sites. Further, since the 

retransmission team must work away from the main body, it must have 

enough personnel to protect itself and haul all its gear to the retransmission location. Batteries, antennas, guy wires, rations, water, weapons, 

ammunition, and personnel gear are heavy. Moving a site is labor intense. Maintaining a site is also a chore. Fresh batteries, chow, and water 
170 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

have to be carried to the site and personnel rotated. If the mission is not 

static defense, the retransmission site has to constantly shift to yet another 

site where it can adequately support its unit. Such sites are not easy to 

find --- or reach --- yet the communications teams must keep up with the 

advancing force which is usually moving along easier terrain. 

The Soviets in the mountains of Afghanistan

During the Soviet-Afghan War, Soviet forces often entered the 

massive Hindu Kush mountain chain or the imposing Sulieman range. 

Radio retransmission sites were essential. The Soviets often used Mi-9 

VZPU command and control helicopters or other helicopters to conduct 

retransmission support during movement.1 Often, the Soviets lacked 

sufficient personnel and equipment to establish enough groundbased retransmission stations. Then, the Soviets had to resort to radio 

relay–a long, tedious process involving relaying the message to various 

stations until it eventually reaches the intended recipients. At first, 

communications troops made errors during radio relays. The Soviets 

solved this problem by requiring their communicators to physically 

record all messages prior to relaying them. Then they trained their 

communicators to write clearly and quickly on standard forms using 

capital letters while never lifting the pencil from the paper. The 

communicators would repeatedly listen to various transmissions and 

record them to gain proficiency. Over time, these simple drills improved 

their accuracy and relay time significantly.2 

UHF radios also present problems in the mountains. Like FM, UHF 

signals are absorbed by intervening terrain, yet UHF are not restricted 

to line-of-sight and can bend somewhat over mountain tops. The Soviet 

tactical UHF radios were normally able to communicate out to 100 

kilometers over open ground. They could also communicate out to 100 

Figure 1: Deploying radios to direct the transmission over a narrow mountain 

peak (both radio operators must be able to see the mountain peak). 
Communications in the Mountains 171

kilometers with an intervening mountain as long as the transmitting and 

receiving stations were on high ground and the intervening mountain 

was midway and no higher than 200 meters above the stations. Taller 

mountains and multiple peaks interfered with UHF communications. A 

single, closer, yet lower, peak cut transmissions to 20-22 kilometers and 

that was only if the mountain crest was narrow and both stations were 

aimed at the sharp peak. UHF communications distance was cut to 10-

12 kilometers if the intervening peak rose up to 100 meters higher than 

the stations. If there were a series of 200 to 400 meter peaks between 

stations, transmission distance was cut to 9-10 kilometers–and only if 

both stations were far enough away from the mountain bases and used 

whip antennae. Large, domed mountains cut UHF transmissions to 

5-6 kilometers, while cut-up rugged mountain terrain further limited 

transmissions to 4-5 kilometers. UHF communications were frequently 

lost while moving along mountain roads or in the “silent zone” on the far 

side of mountains.3 

 The Soviets took various measures to support UHF communications 

in the mountains. These measures included: 

1. Select communications sites that have a narrow single mountain 

crest between them. Aim the transmissions at the highest peak. Keep 

the sites away from the mountain base (figure 1). 

2. Deploy radios away from the mountain base to a distance at least 

equal to the distance of the slope between the base and mountain crest.

(figure 2). 

Mountain Peak

No reception

“Silent zone”

Commo

reception

Figure 2.
172 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

3. Deploy radios to commanding heights to improve their line-ofsight to the top of the intervening mountain. 

4. Deploy the radios where they can communicate over a single 

mountain rather than a series of peaks and defiles. 

5. When confronted with a large, domed mountain, deploy the radios 

away from the base of the mountain and on high ground (figure 3).4 

There are other problems in establishing radio communications 

in the mountains. Erecting antennae is one of them. The hard stony 

ground makes it difficult to pound in stakes for ground wires and guy 

wires. Winds and slope make it hard to aim and tune antennae. Winds 

frequently tear down antennae. Another problem is that the optimum 

communications site may not be the optimum tactical location. Signal 

sites are often deployed separately from their main body. These sites 

are attractive targets that do not have a lot of combat power. Weather is 

another problem. Mountains get more than their fair share of thunderstorms, ice storms, and snow. Antennae attract lightning. Antennae ice 

over rapidly and the ice decreases the transmission power significantly. 

Ice has to be removed, but this is not easy to do on a long antenna on 

a mountain during a snowstorm. Diesel engines do not run very well 

at high altitude, yet most communications generators are diesel-fueled. 

Standard radio batteries do not handle cold well and therefore the moreexpensive lithium batteries are necessary in the high mountains. Finally, 

communications personnel need to be relieved, rotated and rested 

regularly in order to maintain good communications. 

The US Army in the mountains of Afghanistan 

The US Army experienced the difficulties of communicating in the 

mountains of Afghanistan. Although the it has far more satellite communications radios (SATCOM) than the Soviets did during the SovietAfghan War, the Army experienced many of the same difficulties. During 

operation Anaconda, 101st Air Assault and 10th Mountain Division units 

formed a single brigade --- Task Force Rakkasans. TF Rakkasans found 

communications a challenge, but they were able to make them work.5

Figure 3: Deploying radios to direct the transmission over a domed 

mountain (most of the transmission is lost in the air).
Communications in the Mountains 173

 The base radio for the ground forces was the SINCGARS family of 

FM radios. Since the force landed inside a mountain bowl and the range 

of the battlefield was not too great, the FM radios worked surprisingly 

well, however, terrain folds frequently absorbed signals. “If you can’t 

talk, move” was the working solution, although some wags observed 

that “communications drives maneuver.” The fire direction net, brigade 

command net and battalion internal nets were all on FM radio. The 

task force did not use the frequency hopping option on the SINGARS 

since they also talked to neighboring special operations forces (SOF) 

on FM on a single frequency. During the two-week operation, the task 

force changed its frequency only once — and this was due to constant 

interference and bleed over from another net. A major advantage of FM 

radio was that ground forces could communicate with helicopter aviation 

once they were flying in the bowl. However, once the helicopter cleared 

the crest of the bowl, FM communication was lost. 

 The helicopters talked to each other on UHF radio. The ground 

forces had little luck with UHF radio. Unlike SINCGARS, UHF traffic was 

plain text. The pilots could talk to the main headquarters at Bagram (over 

100 miles away) on UHF. TF Rakkasans had little confidence or success 

using UHF on the battlefield, nor did they use HF radio. Canadian 

forces and SOF used HF radio to send scheduled reports, but not for 

combat. The ground forces did not bother taking VHF radios since they 

considered VHF as “unreliable and too complicated”, and “big and 

bulky and useless.” Indeed the 60-pound weight of the issue VHF radio 

is prohibitive on any terrain. 

 The AN/PSC-5 TACSAT radio was the primary means of communications beyond the mountain bowl during Operation Anaconda. 

Encrypted satellite communications were reliable, but the narrow-band 

width assigned to ground forces by the DAMA (demand assigned 

multiple access) system made communications very slow and hard 

to understand. Three battalions and the brigade had to share one 25 

kilohertz channel! Further, the brigade’s TACSATs were not data capable 

which frustrated speed of communications and accuracy. The USAF 

and SOF, on the other hand had broadband TACSAT and enjoyed good 

communications. If no helicopters were in the bowl, TF Rakkasans had 

to contact the AWACs aircraft by TACSAT. Since AWACS lacks TACSAT 

retransmission capability to helicopters, AWACs would manually relay 

messages to the helicopters. 

 Other means of communication were Iridium satellite telephones. 

Although they are difficult to encrypt, they provided excellent emergency 

communications and allowed the brigade to enter SIPERNET through 
174 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

laptop computers. Much necessary communication was done on the 

Internet through the SIPERNET-Iridium connection. Further, the Iridium 

net transmitted and received at normal speed while the TACSAT net was 

very slow and hard to understand. No wire communications were used, 

since wire is heavy and the brigade had limited lift capability. Radio 

batteries lasted about a day and fresh batteries were a key logistics 

concern. 

Task Force Rakkasans had two TACSAT narrow-band nets (one each 

from the 101st and 10th divisions), a USAF broad-band TACSAT net used 

by the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) to talk to supporting high-performance 

aircraft, an FM fire direction net and a FM command net. There were 

no brigade administrative and logistics or intelligence nets due to the 

limited number of TACSAT nets available. In order to save time and 

insure accuracy, when the brigade commander spoke, he spoke only to 

his commanders and everyone else stayed off the net. Due to the heavy 

fighting, there was no command and control helicopter over-flying the 

battlefield. The brigade staff worked out of Bagram where they had 

access to the Predator UAV feed coming into the 10th Mountain Division 

Headquarters. Each battalion had two TACSAT radios and the normal 

compliment of FM radios. Battalions were on the brigade TACSAT 

command net, the brigade FM command net, the brigade fire direction 

net and internal command net. 

Special Operations Forces had quality FM, UHF and wide-band 

TACSAT radios which provided good communications throughout the 

operation. Air Liaison Officers had good communications with their 

wide-band TACSAT radios throughout the operation. 

Operation Anaconda highlighted the problems with DAMA 

and demonstrated the need to issue broad-band TACSAT radios to 

conventional forces. It further demonstrated the need for data-capable 

TACSAT radios and more satellite coverage. It also showed the need for 

TACSAT radios in helicopters. 

Roger. Out. 

Despite dramatic advances in communications technology, communicating in mountains remains a problem. Satellite communications 

systems provide greater capability, but they have problems operating 

around terrain folds as well. Bandwidth and lack of data capability 

are further serious drawbacks. There is a role for FM and UHF. Iridium 

phones with computer data link are particularly valuable. Much of the 

staff work and battle management was accomplished in secure chat 

rooms. The problem with chat rooms, however, is that anyone with access can join in. The siren call to participate in an operation, even 
Communications in the Mountains 175

remotely, brought a lot of strap-hangers and time-wasters into the chat 

room. 

Operation Anaconda demonstrated the need to have over-thehorizon communications with aircraft and the main headquarters. 

Further, the operation demonstrated the need for a survivable command 

and control aircraft. Data burst technology was not available. 

Communications in the mountains is possible but requires planning, 

training and experience. It also requires better equipment and improved 

bandwidth. 

________________________________________

1. The Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. 

Gress), The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Kansas University 

Press, 2001, 210-221. 

2. Yu. Kuzimichev and S. Ponomarev, “Perepriem i retranslyatsiya v gorakh” (“Relay and 

Retransmission in Mountains”), Voyenniyy vestnik (Military Journal), December 1986, 74. 

3. “Radiosvyaz’ na YKB-stantsiyakh v gorakh” (“UHF Radio Communications in 

Mountains”), Armeyskiy sbornik (Army Digest), February 1997, 44-45. 

4. Ibid, 45. 

5. This section based on an interview with Captain James Riley, Signal Officer, 3d 

Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division at Kandahar, Afghanistan on May 13, 2002 and an 

interview with Captain Francisco Ranero, Signal Officer of 1-87th Infantry Battalion, 10th 

Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York on June 11, 2002. 
176 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Medical Implications 

of High Altitude 

Combat

LTC Lester W. Grau (ret.) 

and William A. Jorgensen, DO MC USAR

Originally published in the US Army Medical Department Journal, April-June 2003.

The fact that a piece of land is inaccessible, uninhabitable or of little practical value is no guarantee that nations will not fight 

over it. Long, bloody wars have been fought and are being fought for 

inhospitable mountain real estate located between 10,000 and 23,000 

feet [3,050 and 7,015 meters] in elevation. Examples of such high altitude 

combat include the 1953-1974 Chinese invasion of Tibet and subsequent 

guerrilla war, the 1953-1958 Mau-Mau rebellion where British troops 

fought rebels in the Aberdares mountains of Kenya, the 1962 Sino-Indian 

War in the Himalayan mountains bordering Bhutan and Tibet, SovietMujahideen combat in Afghanistan’s Hindu Kush mountains from 1979 

to 1989, the Peruvian government’s clashes with Sendero Luminoso 

guerrillas in the Andes throughout the 1980s and the Indo-Pakistan 

continuing conflict over the ownership of the Siachen glacier which 

began in April 1984. Recent (1999) Indo-Pakistani clashes in the Kargil 

area of disputed Kashmir again demonstrate that high altitude combat 

is often contemporary combat. Tens of thousands of combatants have 

perished in inhospitable ice, snow and rock while battling for national 

prestige, water rights, survival or geographic positioning. 

The United States Army has not had to fight at such altitudes, but with 

the war on terror, the possibility of United States military commitment 

to such areas is not all that remote. Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan 

is the highest altitude ground fight [10,500 feet] in US history. Since the 

Army is still inexperienced fighting at these altitudes, it should draw from 

the experience of others. There are some distinct medical problems 

that medical personnel should plan for in the event of a high-altitude 

contingency operation.

High-Altitude Medical Considerations

The world’s highest mountains are in the Himalayan and Karakoram 

mountain chains of Asia. The Himalayan Mount Everest towers at 29,028 

feet [8,853.5 meters] whereas the highest point in the United States, Mount 
Medical Considerations 177

McKinley in Alaska, is 20,320 feet [6,197.6 meters]. The highest point in 

the Colorado Rockies is Mount Elbert at 14,433 feet [4,402.1 meters].The 

highest point in the European Alps is Mont Blanc at 15,771 feet [4,810.2 

meters].1 Man is not naturally designed to live and work at these high 

altitudes. Any time a person travels to an altitude of 8,000-10,000 feet 

[2440-3050 meters] or higher, the atmospheric changes in pressure and 

available oxygen cause physiological changes which attempt to insure 

that the body gets enough oxygen.2

 These physiological changes are 

pronounced among mountain peoples, who have lived in the cold and 

higher altitudes for generations. Their bodies are short, squat, stocky 

and barrel-chested when compared to those of lowlanders, Their hands 

and feet are stubby. Their hearts are bigger and their bodies contain 

20-percent more red blood cells. Their red blood cells are larger than 

those of lowlanders. Their heartbeat is slower and their capillaries are 

wider. The alveoli in their lungs are more open for oxygen absorption. 

Many develop a fatty epithelial pouch around the eyes to counteract 

cataract and snow blindness.3 

High altitudes are characterized by extreme cold, strong winds, “thin” 

air, intense solar and ultra-violet radiation, and rapidly changing weather 

including severe storms which can cut off contact for a week or longer. 

Personnel should be screened and acclimatized before deploying to 

high altitudes since these conditions at high altitude are usually more 

dangerous than enemy fire. Medical personnel should prepare for the 

special demands of high altitude treatment and care. Bullet and shrapnel 

wounds, which normally are not serious, can quickly prove fatal at 

altitude. Movement in the high mountains often results in broken bones, 

severe lacerations and contusions and internal injuries caused by falls 

and falling rock. Frostbite and hypothermia are a constant danger. Acute 

mountain sickness, high altitude pulmonary edema, and cerebral edema 

are frequently fatal consequences of working at high altitude. Mental 

and physical abilities decrease at high altitude and high altitude also 

induces personality disorders. Sudden weight loss is often a problem. 

The rarefied atmosphere permits increased ultra violet ray exposure 

which create problems with sunburn and snow blindness. High-altitude 

shelter heating is often by unvented kerosene stoves, which means that 

personnel breathe air which is thick with soot. 

Medical personnel will be exposed to the same dangers of working 

in high altitudes and much of their normal medical equipment will not 

function, or function effectively, at high altitudes. For example, hospital 

generators and vehicles are often diesel-powered. Diesel engines lose 

efficiency at 10,000 feet [3,050 meters] and eventually do not work at all 

due to the thinness of oxygen at higher elevations. Helicopters cannot 

haul heavy loads over 13,000 feet [3,965 meters] as their rotors lack thick 
178 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

enough air to “bite” into. Altitude requires additional animal or gasolinefueled overland transport which adds to the physical demands and 

logistic requirements of medical support in this environment.

Screening and Acclimatization

At high altitude, there is less oxygen and atmospheric pressure. The 

soldiers selected for high-altitude duty should be screened for their 

ability to function in this environment. Soldiers should be in excellent 

physical condition and have sound hearts and lungs. Short, wiry soldiers 

are preferable to tall, over-muscled soldiers. Selected soldiers should 

possess a higher level of intelligence in order to allow them to morereadily adapt to the trying terrain.4

 Personnel who have had radial 

keratotomy (RK) corrective eye surgery should not go “to altitude” 

as their vision may permanently cloud. Personnel records should be 

screened for previous high-altitude sickness. Some personnel can be 

administered acetazolamide (diamox) prophylaxis, however, personnel 

with sulfa allergy or G6PD deficiency cannot use acetazolamide. 

Personnel with the sickle cell trait should be excluded since rapid 

exposure and dehydration could set them up for splenic syndrome. 

Further, certain medications (i.e. any benzodiazepine such as valium) 

inhibit acclimatization and personnel using these should be carefully 

evaluated.5

All personnel should undergo an acclimatization program to accustom them to their new environment and to improve their respiratory 

and cardio-vascular systems. A physically-fit soldier can adapt to the 

cold in about three weeks.6 Experience shows that the body normally 

adapts to a new altitude in about two weeks time. During the acclimatization phase, the body accumulates additional red blood cells which 

help transport needed oxygen.7 The Pakistani Army acclimatizes their 

personnel over a seven-week cycle. They begin with a three week stay at 

10,000 feet [3,050 meters], where personnel acclimate to the cold while 

they undergo daily physical conditioning, and learn mountaineering, 

rock climbing, rope rappelling and mountain survival. During the final 

four weeks, the soldiers learn advanced mountaineering techniques, 

trek to 14,000 feet [4,270 meters], return and trek to 17,000 feet [5185 

meters] and then return and finally trek to 19,135 feet [5,836 meters].8

Despite all training and efforts, acclimatization is not possible at heights 

over 18,000 feet [5,418 meters], so personnel exposure at these heights 

must be limited and closely supervised.9

 

Medical personnel should advise logisticians and planners on 

special considerations for high altitude combat. For example, lightweight, pre-cooked, high-caloric rations that are high on carbohydrates 

are essential and aid acclimatization. Supplementary candy and soups 
Medical Considerations 179

will help off-set the inevitable loss of appetite at altitude. Boiling water 

from snow for purification takes an unwarranted amount of fuel and 

so provisions have to be made to provide water or water purification 

equipment to the soldiers “at altitude” where dehydration is a constant 

threat. NCOs need to “push water” to compensate for the diuretic effects 

of acclimatization. Troops working above 15,000 feet should be issued 

pressurized sleeping bags. These bags, which are inflated with a foot 

pump, have been tested to provide equivalent pressure of 8,370 feet 

[2,550 meters] while at 13,600 feet [4,150 meters].10 Medical personnel 

should further recommend a rotation program where highest-altitude 

exposure is limited to ten to fourteen day increments. 

During the Soviet-Afghan War, Soviet doctors and physicians’ 

assistants often accompanied small units on high-altitude missions, since 

the patients required immediate medical care and evacuation (medevac) 

took too long to save many patients.11 Limited medical staffing in the 

US Army will prevent many doctors and physicians assistants from 

accompanying the high-altitude patrols. Therefore, the brunt of the 

responsibility for saving injured and sick soldiers will fall on the combat 

medic. In addition to the medic’s normal skills, he will need to be trained 

in mountain rescue techniques, treatment of altitude-specific medical 

problems and high-altitude medevac procedures. The medic should 

accompany the unit during the acclimatization process and rotate in and 

out of the high-altitude area with the unit.

In an emergency, diamox can be given to nonacclimated personnel 

(125mg twice a day) starting the day before ascent and up to two days 

after ascent. However, this is an emergency measure that should only 

be used for a forced ascent to over 10,000 feet in one day. Normal 

acclimatization is preferable. There are side effects to diamox, such as 

peripheral paresthesias (numbness in the extremities) and bone marrow 

suppression. The possibility of bone marrow suppression is relatively 

rare, but cannot be ignored.12

Frostbite

Frostbite is the most common injury at altitude. Frostbite is a 

continual danger, but especially so following any exertion. Sweat 

rapidly freezes around the toes and fingers. Frost bite may be classified 

as frostnip, superficial frostbite, or deep frostbite, depending on the 

severity of the case. Frostnip usually occurs on the tips of the ears, nose, 

fingers, toes and cheeks and it noticeable as a whitening of the skin. 

Simple warming of the area is usually sufficient treatment. If it advances 

to superficial frostbite, the affected areas will be firm and have a white 

waxy appearance. Warming and gentle massaging of the area are the 

necessary treatment. As the area rewarms, it may turn a mottled blue 
180 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

or purple and swell. Nerve damage may also accompany superficial 

frostbite. In case of deep frostbite, major areas of tissue are frozen and 

killed. The areas are cold, pale solid and hard. Infection and amputation 

often result. The patient must be evacuated. 

Medics should be cautioned that once the frozen area is thawed, do 

not allow it to refreeze and do not to thaw unless continual warmth and 

litter evacuation are available. It may be necessary to prevent thawing 

in order for the injured soldier to walk out. Once thawing occurs, the 

severe pain prevents the patient from walking out, although codeine, 

aspirin or morphine should help the patient.13 Evacuation at altitude is 

often difficult. Weather or weight limitations may prevent a helicopter 

from flying to the patient. Often, patients must be carried on stretchers 

to lower elevations where the helicopters can fly to. Soviet experience 

fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan proved that 13 to 15 men might 

be involved in carrying out one patient. Exertion at altitude is difficult 

and the stretcher party had to provide its own security as well.14

Hypothermia

Hypothermia is the result of the body losing heat faster than it 

can produce it. The body’s core temperature begins to drop and the 

patient shivers violently, has trouble using his hands and is generally 

clumsy. When the core temperature falls to 90o-95o Fahrenheit [35o-32o

Centigrade], the patient becomes uncoordinated, has difficulty 

speaking and is disoriented and apathetic. As the core temperature 

continue to lower, the patient becomes more irrational, lapses into semiconsciousness and eventually unconsciousness and cardiac arrest. If the 

patient cannot be re-warmed on site, the patient needs to be evacuated. 

Medics should be equipped with the mountaineering “hydraulic sarong,” 

a re-warming device that wraps around the patient and circulates a 

warmed liquid from a camp stove or catalytic generator around the 

patient’s body. “Hot oxygen” breathing units, which use a soda lime 

and CO2 reaction to warm oxygen, can also aid in re-warming the body 

core.15 When a hypothermia casualty’s body core temperature drops 

below 90o, when he stops shivering or when he passes out, extra care 

must be given to handling him or he may develop cardiac arrhythmia 

and sudden death.16

Falls and Climbing Injuries

Fractures, severe lacerations and contusions or internal injuries often 

result from falls or by being hit by falling rock. The ABCD’s of trauma 

should be followed, and the patient examined for spinal injury as one 

of the first checks. Medics should not hesitate to put a cervical collar 

on fall victims with suspected cervical spine injuries, particularly since 

these can usually be cleared in the field, avoiding an unnecessary/

hazardous medevac.17 Field splinting and immobilization should also 
Medical Considerations 181

be done before the patient is moved. The spleen, liver and kidneys are 

the most likely organs to rupture and bleed internally from a fall. A torn 

diaphragm or intestine is also a possibility in falls and climbing injuries.18

Mountain Sickness, High Altitude Pulmonary Edema, 

and Cerebral Edema 

Mountain sickness or altitude sickness normally begins as a 

headache and may include insomnia, loss of appetite, vomiting, cough, 

shortness of breath, irregular breathing, tightness in the chest, loss of 

coordination, swelling around the eyes and face, general weakness and 

reduction in the volume of urine produced. The patient will lose physical 

coordination and mental acuity and tire quickly after mild activity. 

Mountain sickness normally takes at least 24 hours to develop but nonacclimated personnel often develop the symptoms within 6 to 12 hours 

(if they are quickly transported to elevations at 11,475-14,750 feet [3,500-

4,500 meters]). Treatment involves awareness of potential problems, rest, 

sleep and a good meal. Should that fail, the patient should descend to a 

lower altitude for a few days rest until he improves.19

Moderate mountain sickness involves the same symptoms, but their 

intensity increases and urine output is often more reduced. If a day of 

rest does not help the patient, he should be brought down immediately. 

Usually, an early descent means an early recovery.20

Severe mountain sickness occurs in about 2-3-percent of mountain 

sickness cases and involves high altitude pulmonary edema and/or 

cerebral edema. Twenty percent of acute severe mountain sickness 

cases prove fatal. Signs and symptoms of high altitude pulmonary 

edema, the collection of fluid in the lungs, include persistent cough, 

gurgling chest sounds, red frothy sputum, breathlessness, and tachypnea 

and tachycardia. Younger soldiers (under age 25) and soldiers with 

a history of pneumonia or other respiratory illness are prone to high 

altitude pulmonary edema. The symptoms of cerebral edema, swelling 

of the brain due to fluid, include headache, difficulty in balance, loss 

of coordination and labored breathing. Severe mountain sickness 

may prove fatal within a few hours. Proficient medics may administer 

nifedipine and dexamethsone and, if available, administer oxygen or 

use a Gammow bag (pressurized bag also known as a certic bag).21 The 

patient still needs to be brought down. Oxygen, Diamox, Tylenol, aspirin, 

codeine, Decadron, Valium, Lasix, Phenergan, or morphine have all been 

used to help the patient during descent.22

The best prevention of mountain sickness is a gradual ascent with 

plenty of fluids and food provided to the soldiers. Climbing soldiers 

need to avoid overexertion. The worst approach is to drive or fly the 

soldiers from low to high altitude and then let them out to finish the 

ascent.23
182 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

“Siachen Syndrome”

The change in barometric pressure and reduced quantity of oxygen 

at high altitude leads to mental status changes as well as physiological 

and psychosomatic changes. The Pakistani Army has noted that for 

every rise in a thousand feet, a person’s temperament may change. A 

good-natured soldier at 19,000 feet may become irrational and selfish 

at 20,000 feet, introverted at 21,000 feet and unhinged at 22,000.24 

Topic Lecture Practical

Exercise

Introduction to goals, missions and content of high altitude medicine. 

Special features of high-altitude physiology. Acclimatization to high altitude: Short 

term and long term. Mountain pathology.

2 2

Acute mountain sickness: etiology, pathogenesis, clinical picture, treatment and 

prevention. Pulmonary edema. 

2 2

Effects of high altitude on the nervous system, heart vessels, excretory system, 

gastro-intestinal tract, and circulatory system. Diagnosis, treatment and prevention.

2 2

Peculiarities of the course of “normal” illnesses at high altitude 2 2

Directing an acclimatization program. Personnel selection and prognosis of their 

health in the mountains. Medical oversight and preventive medical examinations.

2 2

Examination — 2

Special features of mountain trauma. First aid for accidents — 2

Diagnosis of trauma, broken bones of the extremities, methods of moving immobile 

patients

2 4

Evacuating patients in the mountains — 4

Wounds, methods of stopping hemorrhage, bandaging 2 6

Depression 4 4

Traumatic shock, fi rst aid for shock from mountain accidents and trauma 2 4

Emergency medical service and transport of patients with trauma to the head, spine, 

chest, stomach and pelvis

2 6

Special features of medical treatment of freezing, frost bite and snow blindness 2 —

Emergency medical service for drowning victims 2 —

Examination — 2

Special aspects of organizing medical support for forces in the mountains 2 —

Rigging medical gear for evacuation and treatment in the mountains 2 2

Screening soldiers for service in the mountains 2 4

Oxygen equipment and its use 2 4

Training drills for high-altitude treatment — 20

TOTAL 34 74

COMBINED PHYSICIAN’S CURRICULUM FOR MOUNTAIN RESCUE AND COMBAT

Combined Physician’s Curriculum for 

Mountain Rescue and Combat28
Medical Considerations 183

Although not recognized as a disease, the so-called Siachen syndrome 

has been noted among veterans of fighting on the Siachen glacier. Its 

symptoms include disorientation and different psychological disorders. 

The experience has resulted in psychiatric treatment for some of the 

veterans.25 Team-building, discipline and productive activity help prevent 

the apathy which leads to Siachen syndrome.26 

Training the Medical Force for High-Altitude 

The Soviet Union had a special course to train doctors to function 

effectively at high altitude. The course was founded in 1987, the seventh 

year of the Soviet-Afghan War, and was taught at the Kirghizistan medical 

institute alongside normal medical courses and prepared military 

and civilian doctors for mountain rescue and high-altitude treatment 

duties. (see figure). The course met twice monthly in hour-and-a-half 

sessions. The course devoted 34 lecture hours and 74 hours of practical 

application to medical topics. Another 792 hours were devoted to 

mountaineering training, of which 47 were lecture and the remainder 

practical application.27 Although it would be difficult to find the time 

to train US military medical doctors to the same standard, the medical 

topics taught at the course may prove of value when planning a training 

course for medical personnel who may serve at high altitudes.

Medic’s training for high altitude combat will necessarily involve 

many of the same skills needed in mountain search and rescue units. 

Medics will have to know how to rig patients and litters for evacuation 

from precarious positions. The search and rescue community has a 

wealth of information that can be tapped for military medical use. Search 

and rescue personnel in the Yosemite National Park region developed 

a field medical kit for use by EMT personnel. It can be carried in a 

single medium sized pack with an internal frame or carried by several 

members of the unit since the kit is divided into modules. This kit 

provides a starting point for planning a high-altitude medic’s kit.29

DIAGNOSTIC MODULE

Scissors

Blood pressure cuff

Stethoscope

Watch with sweep second hand

Penlight

Hemostat

Two thermometers (clinical and 

hypothermia)

Two pair tweezers

Three airways (adult, child and pedi)

One syringe bulb

One 50 cc suction syringe and catheter

SIGNAL & SURVIVAL MODULE

Flare gun and three flares

Orange hand-held smoke flare

Signal mirror

Whistle

Compass

Knife

Matches

Pencil and pad 

Yellow plastic tube tent

Two space blankets

Maps

Toilet paper
184 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Thinking lofty thoughts

The United States military is faced with a variety of challenges as it 

converts from a forward-deployed to an expeditionary force. Part of 

being an expeditionary force is planning and preparing for contingency 

missions in various regions. One possible contingency is deployment 

to a high-altitude region. US Army regular and National Guard units that 

currently train in the mountains and Alaska are already aware of some 

of the problems involved in working at altitude and in the cold. They 

know that such a contingency mission would be difficult, but with proper 

INTRAVENOUS MODULE

Two 1000 cc bags lactated Ringer’s

One 500 cc bag 5% dextrose in water

Two Macro solution sets

One Pedi solution set

Two 20-gauge catheter needles

Two 18-gauge catheter needles

Two 16-gauge catheter needles

Two 14 gauge catheter needles

Two 19 gauge butterfly needles

Two 21 gauge butterfly needles

One roll 13mm tape

Five gauze pads, 5x5mm

Ten Band-Aids

Ten alcohol swabs

Four towelettes

Three tourniquets

TRAUMA & DRESSING 

MODULE

Two triangular bandages

Two Kerlix

Four Kling

Six Surgipads, 20x19 cm

Three rolls of tape

One Ace bandage

One Betadine scrub

Three swabs

Six towelettes

Ten gauze pads, 10x10mm

Ten Band-Aids

Two Steri-strips, 13mmx100mm

Two Steri-strips, 6x75mm

One pair bandage scissors

Ten ammonia inhalents

One 25X75 cm large trauma dressing

OXYGEN MODULE

One D tank of oxygen

Oxygen mask and nasal cannula

Two oxygen bottles

DRUG MODULE

Injectable:

Two Meperidine HCL (Demerol) 

100 mg

One Benadryl 50 mg

One Xylocaine (Lidocaine) 100 mg

Two Narlozone (Narcan) 0.4 mg

Two Epinephrine (adrenalin) 

1:1000 1 mg

One Valium 10 mg

One 25g. Dextrose in 50 cc 

preloaded syringe

Two bicarbonate preload

Topical Neosporin ointment

Syringes & needles

Three 3 cc with needles

Two 1 cc with needles

Five alcohol swabs

Oral:

15 aspirin tablets

10 Seconal tablets, 100 mg

10 Dexadrine tablets, 5 mg

10 Codeine tablets

20 Salt tablets

20 Lomotil tablets

Syrup of Ipecac

Activated charcoal

SPLINTS MODULE

Two full-leg air splints

One arm air splint

One ankle air splint

One wrist air splint

One wire ladder splint

One cervical collar

One towel for cervical collar

Trauma dressing
Medical Considerations 185

foresight and preparation, medical personnel can meet the challenge 

and protect the force. 

________________________________________

1. The Houghton Mifflin Dictionary of Geography: Places and Peoples of the World, 

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997, 48 and 450.

2. Tim J. Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club, 

1980, 620.

3. Syed Ishfaq Ali, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen, Rawalpindi: Pak American Commercial PVT) Ltd., 1991, 15-16 and 110-111.

4. Salman Beg Punjab, “Operations in Glaciated Areas,” Pakistan Army Journal, Vol. 

XXXV, No. 1, Spring 1994, 5.

5. Comments of Lt. Keith E. Thompson, USMC Mountain Warfare Training Center, 

Bridgeport California, in December 2002.

6. Punjab.

7. Setnika, 623.

8. Ali, 16-17 and Punjab, 5-6. 

9. Pravin Sawhnee, “Kashmir’s Cold War,” Jane’s International Defense Review, 

December 1997, 59. 

10. Punjab, 5 and Thompson.

11. Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in 

Afghanistan, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999, 193-196.

12. Thompson.

13. Setnicka, 618-619.

14. Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy kontingent (Limited Contingent), Moscow: Progress 

Publishers, 194, 186.

15. Setnicka, 612-618.

16. Thompson.

17. Ibid.

18. Setnika, 609-612.

19. Setnika, 621-623; and V B. Malkin and V. V. Litovchenko, “O profilaktike gornoy 

bolezni” (“Prevention of Mountain Sickness”), Voenno-meditsinskiy zhurnal (MilitaryMedical Journal), September 1982, 38.

20. Setnika, 621-623.

21. Thompson.

22. Setnika, 621-623; Malkin and Litovchenko, 38; and A. M Murzaliev and P. N. Gol’dberg, 

“Lechebno-evakuatsionnye meropriyatiya pri ostrykh narysheniyakh mozgovogo 

krovoobrashcheniya v gorakh” (“Treatment and Evacuation Measures for Acute Disruption 

of Blood Circulation to the Brain in the Mountains]”) Voenno-meditsinskiy zhurnal (MilitaryMedical Journal), December 1991, 19. Also, see Dennis La Ravia, Uzvaiantha Ganji, 

Robert Lahasky, and Lynn Pittman-Cooley, “Review of Cerebral Edema: High Altitude 

Illness,” US Army Medical Department Journal, January-February 2000.

23. Setnika, 623.

24. Ali, 12.

25. Pravin Sawhnee, “Kashmir’s Cold War,” Jane’s International Defense Review, December 1997, 60.

26. Ali, 13.

27. A. V. Dergunov and V. M Didichenko, “O podgotovke vrachey-gornospasateley” (“Preparing Physician Mountain Rescuers”), Voenno-meditsinskiy zhurnal (Military-Medical 

Journal), May 1991, 16.

28. Dergunov and Didichenko, 16-17.

29. Setnika, 599-602.
186 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Helicopter Landings 

in the Mountains: 

Lessons From the 

Soviet-Afghan War

LTC (Ret) Lester W. Grau, CW4 Anthony Reed, 

and CW3 James W. Grau

Flying helicopters in Afghanistan is a challenge. Its difficulty and danger 

are usually underestimated by aviators who have not experienced it firsthand. Most airfields and heliports are located from 1,000 to 1,800 meters 

(3,000 to 6,000 feet) above sea level. The omnipresent abrasive dust eats 

rotor blades and engines. In the summer, in the south, temperatures reach 

45° to 52° Celsius (113° to 126° Fahrenheit). In the north, the summer 

temperatures reach 40° to 45° Celsius (104° to 113° Fahrenheit). Strong 

winds are common in the afternoons and evenings, especially in the central 

and western parts of Afghanistan. These winds reduce visibility and create 

dust storms. The average mountain range is some 3,000 to 4,000 meters 

(10,000 to 13,000 feet) high. These flying conditions reduce engine power 

and lift capacity, lower the flight ceiling, complicate takeoff and landing, and 

decrease the reliability of the aircraft.1

At the peak of the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviets deployed three 

helicopter regiments, seven separate helicopter squadrons, and one 

helicopter detachment to Afghanistan.2

 The deployed helicopters were the 

Mi-24 helicopter gunship, the Mi-8MT armed transport helicopter, the Mi-6 

heavy transport helicopter, and the Mi-9VZPU airborne command post.3

During the nine-plus years that the Soviets were in Afghanistan, they lost 329 

helicopters (127 Mi-24, 174 Mi-8MT and 28 Mi-6). Part of the reason for the 

loss was pilot fatigue. The sortie rate for pilots reached six to eight flights in 

a 24-hour period. This worked out to 600-800 flights a year with over 1,000 

hours flying time (US aircrews are currently meeting the same amount of 

hours on deployments). The tour of duty for pilots was two years.4 Pilot 

fatigue was not the only problem. The enemy, the special flying conditions 

and the pre-tour training all contributed to the problem. It took time and 

experience flying in the mountains for bold pilots to have a chance at 

becoming old pilots.

Flying in mountains adds additional demands on the pilot. The 

Russian publication, Army Digest, recently published the following article 

about their experiences of flying and landing helicopters in Afghanistan’s 

mountains.5 The authors hope that this information will be useful to our own 

rotary wing community when flying in Afghanistan’s mountains or in any 

other high altitude environment. 
Helicopter Operations 187

Landing a Helicopter in the Mountains

Colonel D. B. Zipir in Armeisky sbornik, January 2010

The helicopter’s ability to land on small mountain sites makes it an indispensable system for combat and special missions. Training for 

a mountain landing is one of the basic and yet most complicated forms of 

training. It demands thorough training and the consideration of a whole 

range of conditions by the crew. Among these are weather conditions; 

actual helicopter takeoff weight; the site’s suitability for landing and 

takeoff; the tactical situation; and the enemy’s air defense capabilities. At 

the same time, there must be close coordination among the crew, within 

the tactical team and also with the forces for whom the flight is being 

conducted. Statistics emphasize the difficulty of this type of flying: the 

largest number of serious incidents, accidents and catastrophes occur 

during the approaches, landings and takeoffs at these sites.

This article is based on the experience of flights and landings at 

small sites away from an airfield. Its purpose is to inform commanders 

and flight personnel about the special conditions encountered when 

landing helicopters in the mountains.

Figure 1. Minimum dimensions for a helicopter landing site at different elevations. These 

values are figured for sites with bordering obstacles of a height of AH≤15 meters, [AH being 

the equivalent of “Above Touchdown Level.”]

Special features of landing site selection from the air.

Evaluate a site’s suitability for landing by flying over it at a speed 

and flight altitude close to the minimum allowed [Effective Translational 

Lift], since this is optimal for inspecting landing conditions. As a 

rule, evaluate the overall landing zone characteristics during the first 

pass. Make a second pass to drop a smoke canister and make a more 

detailed inspection of the site’s surface and obstacles on this and other 

approaches.

When it is necessary to select a site in a canyon, fly over the canyon 

at an altitude and speed that allow executing a turning maneuver to the 

necessary heading for continued flight in the canyon and for a 180° turn 

for an inspection approach to the site and to drop a smoke canister.

The minimum dimensions of helicopter landing sites at different 

elevations are listed in Figure 1. These landing sites are restricted by 

bordering obstacles of a height of AH≤15 meters.

Site Elevation 

(Meters)

Site Dimensions (Meters)

Mi-8 Mi-24 Mi-26 Ka-50 Ka-27 Mi-2

0 — — 65x80 50x130 50x130 75x200

up to 500 — 50x130 65x250 50x130 50x130 75x240

up to 1,500 55x120 50x175 65x285 50x150 50x150 75x280

up to 2,000 55x165 50x240 65x300 50x180 50x180 75x320

up to 3,000 55x255 50x270 65x315 50x300 50x300 —

up to 3,500 55x300 50x340 65x350 — — —

up to 4,000 55x345 — 65x365 — — —
188 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

Usually the obstacles at 

the edges of mountain landing sites are natural. They are 

hillsides, large stones and 

sometimes trees. It is necessary to evaluate the obstacles 

both in terms of flying over 

them with a ∆H>10 meters 

[altitude correction greater 

than 10 meters]6

 during a 

landing approach and taking 

off from them, as well as in 

terms of their influence on 

rotor lift while hovering. Remember that, when flying 

by a hillside, the main rotor 

axial airflow flow conditions 

will be similar to a “vortex 

ring state,” and crevasses at 

the edge of a landing site 

decrease the effect of the in 

ground effect “air cushion.” 

Main rotor lift decreases in 

both cases (figures 2-3). In most cases, one cannot count on the use of 

the in ground effect cushion at mountain landing sites.

Hovering close to any restricting surface imposes peculiarities on a 

helicopter’s behavior and the piloting technique. If the angle of a surface 

slope changes, then the influence of this surface from 0° to a slope angle 

of 45° will have an impact, on the “air cushion effect” — from 45° to 

135° as a “vertical face effect” (figure 4), and from 135° to 180° as a 

“ceiling effect” (figure 5).

The special feature of evaluating slopes is the fact that only from H<5 

meters [H (height) is less than 5 meters] can one evaluate a gradient with 

sufficient precision, and consequently, determine a site’s suitability. It 

might seem readily apparent from H=100 meters, that a site is suitable 

for landing a squadron of helicopters, yet from H=50 meters it becomes 

apparent that it will only handle a flight [two helicopters], while at H=3 

meters, it is clear that it will be difficult to select a relatively flat place for 

one helicopter. Be ready for this.

Slopes also create a problem during hovering. First, a gradient 

greater than 5° significantly reduces the effect of the “aircushion” 

influence; second, a peculiarity of the “air cushion” effect is that to 

maintain a hover, one must bank in the direction of the slope equal to the 

gradient while hovering near the ground. With gradients greater than 3°, 

it is necessary to move over the site using hover taxiing. 

Figure 2.

Figure 3. Main rotor flow characteristics 

while hovering over a crevasse.
Helicopter Operations 189

In some cases, one can determine the condition of the site’s surface only after the flight engineer 

exits the aircraft.

While hovering over the edge 

of a crevasse, only part of the main 

rotor operates with the in-ground 

effect. At the same time, this creates a 

tipping moment in the direction of the 

crevasse (figure 3). Adjust the cyclic 

in the direction opposite the crevasse 

to compensate. Take this special 

feature into account, especially at 

maximum CG (center of gravity) or 

gross takeoff weight values.

When hovering a helicopter near a vertical face, the so-called 

“nozzle effect” occurs. Flow at the face distorts and vertical speed 

components increase in the plane of the blade’s rotation, which leads 

to a decrease of local angles of attack and aerodynamic loading on 

the blades passing close to the vertical face. As a result, a moment 

emerges directed toward the face. The moment’s magnitude increases 

and renders a strong influence from a distance of 0.6-0.7 Ø NV [0.6 to 0.7 

diameter of the main rotor blade].7

 To counteract the moment, the pilot 

must adjust the cyclic in a direction away from the face (figure 4). During 

certain circumstances (high mountains, site location near a vertical wall, 

maximum loading, a weak power plant, etc.), there may not be enough 

power to overcome this moment.

Sometimes a helicopter has to hover under a surface (for example, an 

overhanging rock ledge, creating the so called “ceiling effect” (figure 5).

The ceiling effect deforms the inductive velocity fields in the plane 

of rotation, due to the characteristic flow. Inductive velocity decreases 

because of the change of the flow’s direction absorbed by the blade. The 

angles of attack on the blades increase, and, consequently, the main rotor 

lift grows. The helicopter tends to “adhere” to the overhanging surface.

The landing site’s surface should allow landing or hovering over it at 

a set altitude. The nature of a site’s surface influences the conditions of 

Figure 4. 

Figure 5.
190 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

the “air cushion” formation. 

Gradients close to maximum values significantly 

reduce the influence of the 

“air cushion” effect. Rocks 

measuring more than 15-20 

centimeters erode the “air 

cushion,” create problems 

in selecting a landing site, 

and require hovering the 

helicopter at H>1 meter 

with subsequent deviations 

(figure 6).

Operator’s Manuals for all types of helicopters limit the permissible 

wind velocity for landings and takeoffs from sites with gradients. It is 

5 meters-per-second for takeoff and landing in any direction. At U>5 

meters-per-second [Wind velocity is greater than five meters-persecond], takeoff and landing must be made only into the wind.

It is important to evaluate the surface of a landing site for the 

possibility of formation of dust vortices during hovering (brown out).

Features of crew actions at the landing site selection stage.

Aircraft commander (Pilot in Command) --- Conduct the approach 

to inspect the site and drop a smoke canister in accordance with the 

heading, taking into account the direction and velocity of the wind and 

the terrain. At the same time, the estimated lateral wind component 

should not exceed those limitations established by the Operator’s 

Manual for hovering.

Co-pilot — During flight over the landing site, in accordance with the 

true altitude reported by the flight engineer and according to readouts of 

the barometric altimeter, calculate and report to the aircrew commander 

the “zero” landing site altitude according to the barometric altimeter. 

Calculation formula:

Ho =Hbar, -Hi , where 

Ho — site “zero” altitude;

Hbar —barometric altimeter readouts;

Hi — radar altimeter readouts.

Flight engineer --- At the moment of passing the landing site, 

determine the true flight altitude according to the radar altimeter and 

report it to the pilot-navigator (navigator, co-pilot).

Features of approaching and landing at a site.

For safety purposes, make two passes and two approaches to the site.

l on the first pass, after finding the site, pass over it with a speed 

reduced to 80-100 kilometers-per-hour [40 to 50 knots], and determine 

Figure 6.
Helicopter Operations 191

the dimensions of the landing site, any obstacles in the direction of the 

expected approach and takeoff, and the condition of the landing site 

surface;

l on the second turn, after determining that the landing site is 

suitable, make an approach to drop a smoke canister and conduct a 

detailed inspection of the site;

l on the third turn, conduct a pass to determine the direction and 

velocity of the wind according to the smoke trail;

l and on the fourth turn, conduct the landing approach.

Approach parameters for all turns are the same as those described 

for the first pass. Decrease the flight altitude and speed on the approach 

glide slope for inspecting and dropping the smoke canister to the 

minimum values allowed for the landing site conditions. 

Drop a smoke canister on each potential landing site, but insure that 

they are not located close to each other. When using the NSP canister, 

your time is severely limited for determining the direction and velocity of 

the wind since it has a short burn time.8 If you use the PSh-type canister, 

use black or orange smoke.9 Poke no fewer than four holes into each 

PSh canister (if there are less, the canister may not ignite because of 

insufficient oxygen at those landing sites with an elevation greater than 

2,000 meters [6,500 feet]) and loosen the contents of the canisters in the 

openings that you made.

Select the approach direction, if possible, along ridges and canyons, 

and over terrain with fewer fractures but with the same lighting. 

After passing over the site and determining that it is a potential 

landing site, make an approach to drop the canister.

Climb to 50-100 meters after dropping the canister, then turn back 

to the site to determine the wind conditions from the smoke trail. At 

H=150 meters relative to the site, bring the helicopter into level flight. 

There is sufficient time while you climb and turn back to the site for the 

canister to ignite and to form a smoke trail (figure 7). After determining 

the wind according to the smoke trail, make your landing approach by 

one of four methods depending on the wind (figure 8). During your next 

pass, evaluate any obstacles on the approach and during a takeoff into 

Figure 7.
192 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

V, kph U, m/s 0 3 5 7 10 15

80

Ф=15

tgp, sec

50 38 31 26 19 10

Ф=10 50 35 27 20 11 0

100

Ф=15 40 31 25 20 14 5

Ф=10 40 28 20 17 0 0

With two 180-degree turns

Small Box Pattern

V, kph U, m/s 0 3 5 7 10 15

80

Ф=15

tgp, sec

41 32 27 23 17 10

Ф=10 37 26 20 15 9 0

100

Ф=15 30 23 19 15 10 0

Ф=10 25 16 10 6 0 0

Figure 8. Methods of approach to a site depending on wind direction.
Helicopter Operations 193

Tear Drop Turn

V, kph U, m/s 0 3 5 7 10 15

80

Ф=15 CA 21 23 24 26 28 33

tgp,s 50 41 37 32 27 20

Ф=10 CA 30 33 37 41 49 63

tgp,s 50 40 34 29 22 13

100

Ф=15 CA 30 32 33 35 38 44

tgp,s 40 34 30 26 22 15

Ф=10 CA 42 45 50 55 63 78

tgp,s 40 32 27 22 16 7

Standard Turn

V, kph U, m/s 0 3 5 7 10 15

80

Ф=15

tgp, sec

33 23 18 13 7 0

Ф=10 24 12 6 0 0 0

100

Ф=15 20 12 7 0 0 0

Ф=10 9 0 0 0 0 0
194 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

the wind. While making approaches at V=80 kilometers-per-hour [40 

knots] to sites with an elevation greater than 2,000 meters, one must be 

guided by tgp10 for V=100 kilometers-per-hour [50 knots] because of 

adjustments to instrument speed.

In mountainous terrain, it is impossible, in the majority of cases, to 

maintain a stationary hover while viewing the ground just ahead from the 

left side of the helicopter. This is due to the limited dimensions of the 

landing sites — and the location of the helicopter’s “wheel mounting.” 

This may occur at convex or concave landing sites, and also at sites 

constrained by obstacles. Therefore, it is necessary to hover and maintain 

a stationary hover relative to a reference point.

Consider the helicopter’s sluggishness during a landing approach —

the increased pilot response and reaction times required for unforeseen 

changes in flight parameters. Here, a pilot should expect a longer 

time in changing aircraft speed after changing his angle of pitch, than 

when flying at lower altitudes. The greater the flight altitude, the more 

sluggishly the helicopter performs. Altitude affects a pilot’s perceptions 

and sensations. When flying at H=1,500 meters [4,920 feet] in calm 

weather, it feels like the approach is being made with a tail wind of U≈3 

meters-per-second and at H=2,500 meters [8,200 feet], with a tail wind of 

U≈5 mps (deduct this accordingly from the speed of a head wind).

A relatively steep glide path allows approaches with less collective 

pitch applied, but this profile requires larger pitch angle changes to 

adjust forward speed, and therefore larger engine control inputs. This 

causes difficulties if the pilot does not have the required skills.

It is necessary to maintain forward airspeed at or below V=50 

kilometers-per-hour indicated [27 knots], bearing in mind the increase 

between your indicated and true air speeds, above V=50 kilometersper-hour — according to the Doppler and drift-angle UMS.11 Maintain 

the approach angle by keeping the intended landing site in the cockpit 

window. Also evaluate the helicopter’s position according to the artificial 

horizon indicator during the third approach. Check main rotor RPM 

during transition to in ground effect airflow. It is easier during landing 

when the helicopter’s nose is heavy: speed is decreased in the smaller 

angles of approach, and the field of view of the landing area becomes 

better.

The habit of correlating the helicopter’s speed using visual cues 

from the ground’s movement as seen through the side windows is 

inapplicable in the mountains — the approach, as a rule, is executed via 

a chasm or along a slope. One must control the speed according to the 

instruments. Knowing how to assess a helicopter’s speed and observe its 

rate of change only by approach rate toward the landing markers— is an 

indicator of developing good habits in the accomplishment of approach 

planning.
Helicopter Operations 195

Problems often occur when removing the throttle control from 

the stops. The need to switch on the augmented power (AP) (for 

Mi-8 helicopters with TVZ-117MT engines) usually occurs at the final 

stage of deceleration — the most intensive and demanding stage for 

the pilot. In order to decrease the reaction time required, remove the 

throttle from the stops and shift it upwards a little before approaching 

a site with LN>1,760 meters [Line = 5,775 feet]. Take into account 

that a small shift of the throttle upwards, even without the blinking of 

the AUGMENTATION ON advisory light, augments the power plant’s 

power. If the pilot forgets afterward to return the throttle control to the 

stops, then he will have increased fuel consumption. Bear in mind that 

even the TVZ-117VM and TVZ-117V engines (Mi-24), for the most part, 

also react with an increase of power at the movement of the throttle 

upwards, even though power is supposed to be exclusively controlled 

by the “automatic device.” 

Know how to use the following feature when necessary. A moveable stop control system is supposed to allow shifting the angle 

control rod of the tail rotor system through its entire range. However, 

a malfunction of the “automatic device,” an error of the air pressure 

sensor caused by the “air cushion” while hovering, or the incorrect 

regulation of directional control inputs are possible. In critical cases 

such as these, switch off the moveable stop control system by pulling 

the circuit breaker on the pilot’s electrical panel. Doing so locks the 

position into the upper limit. 

During an approach, the helicopter may encounter a downdraft, 

or, due to an abrupt wind decrease or downward force by the wind, 

the helicopter may encounter main rotor axial airflow that skews its 

behavior. This requires a hard pull on the collective pitch combined with 

a hard right pedal. If, at the same time, the main rotor RPM falls below 

92-percent, or the right pedal reaches its stop, cease pulling pitch and 

use the reserve altitude available to gain speed and perform a go-around 

for a repeated approach. Banking right with the right pedal at the stop 

gives a short-term effect of cessation of the turn with a subsequent sharp 

increase of the angular velocity. This occurs during a decelerating turn 

as a result of the need to increase collective pitch due to the decrease 

of lift (Tu) during the bank and to maintain glide trajectory. You should 

perform a go-around, if possible, by turning away to the left and 

decreasing collective pitch. 

 In the other case, if the helicopter gets into an updraft or the winds 

increase, there is an increase of main rotor lift, the helicopter gains altitude 

(decreases vertical descent speed), and, to preserve the glide slope, one 

must vigorously decrease collective pitch. The correct reaction in this 

case, after passing L=250 meters to the site, is to go around for another 

approach.
196 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

During a landing approach using maximum power or with an 

inaccurate assessment of the power plant’s capabilities, there is a certain 

“point of no return” on the glide slope. Once this is crossed, the pilot 

loses the ability to correct the situation by terminating the approach with 

a go around. One can get into this situation in mountains not only for 

subjective reasons — errors in the pilot’s technique and assessment of 

available engine power — but also for reasons independent of the pilot. 

For example, the winds at the final stage of the approach allow sustaining 

glide slope parameters, but then the winds drop sharply before the 

helicopter has reached the site ground effect. The helicopter is in a 

flight profile with no surplus power. The pilot’s instinctive reaction is to 

increase collective pitch, trying to sustain the glide slope. This leads to 

main rotor droop, an increase of the vertical descent speed or pushing 

the right pedal to the floor and changing the helicopter’s heading. 

When unable to increase speed or to turn away, “disrupt” the main rotor, 

creating an angle of pitch that will allow a landing with a forward and 

vertical speed close to zero. In this case, the relatively steep glide path 

increases the chance of a successful outcome of the flight.

Maintaining a hover in winter conditions, and also at a high-mountain 

landing site covered with ice is difficult, even if hovering over the site 

does not create a snow cloud of powdered snow. The whiteness of the 

snow, the absence of a level natural horizon line and sunny weather all 

create difficulty in controlling the spatial position of the helicopter, even 

with a high-contrast reference point. The presence of several contrasting 

reference points at the site eases the situation. When needed, an 

automobile tire or another contrasting object should be thrown onto the 

snow when passing over the site.

Select the landing location after a moving hover at a minimum 

altitude (down to one meter). When needed, disembark the flight 

engineer and “set the wheels” according to his commands.

It is permissible to land and take off with a snow cover thickness of 50 

centimeters and 15 centimeters for a running takeoff (10 centimeters for 

the Mi-24). Taxiing along a snow-covered (dust-covered) site during the 

absence of horizontal visibility is permitted at Vw<10kph [wind velocity 

is less than 10 kilometers per hour], turns are permitted while taxiing at 

Vw<5kph, but turns in place are prohibited.

An AI12 start is guaranteed only up to H=3,000 meters [9843 feet 

MSL] because the decreased pressure in the AI air system is lower than 

that minimally required for start up. Do not switch off the engines after 

landing above this altitude.

Features of crew actions at landing approach and landing stage.

Aircraft commander — Depending on winds, make an approach 

to drop a smoke canister. Use an appropriate approach method from
Helicopter Operations 197

figure 8. After coming out of the 4th turn, order the flight engineer 

into the cargo hold to prepare to drop the canister. Glide to the site to 

Hi=15meters, decreasing air speed to the minimum allowed. After the 

flight engineer’s report that he is ready, at the calculated glide slope 

points, give the command: “Ignite it” and “Drop.” Remember the 

barometric flight altitude during this pass over the site. After the canister 

has been dropped, put the helicopter into a climb to an altitude 135 

meters [443 feet] above the altitude used to pass over the landing site 

and increase speed to 80 kilometers per hour [40 knots]. After reaching 

H=50-100 meters, turn back to the site; evaluate the direction and strength 

of the winds according to the smoke trail; evaluate obstacles along the 

specified landing and takeoff heading; make a pass over the site; and 

make the landing approach using one of the methods depending on the 

winds.

Co-pilot --- After defining the winds according to the smoke trail, set 

the approach heading on the Doppler meter and report the heading and 

approach method to the aircrew commander. Turn on the coordinates’ 

meter during a pass over the site.

Flight engineer --- Upon receipt of the command, “Prepare to drop 

the canister,” go into the cargo hold, put on the safety belt, hook it to the 

cable, prepare the canister for lighting, slightly open the cargo hold door 

and report readiness to the aircrew commander. After receiving the 

command, light the canister fuse and report to the aircrew commander. 

After receiving the command for dropping the canister, drop it out, close 

the door, report to the aircrew commander, remove the safety belt and 

return to your workstation. Monitor engine operating power and report: 

“Operating power nominal,” “Flight state takeoff,” etc. Upon the gas 

temperatures approaching the maximum value, count backwards: “To 

maximum temperature 30°..., 20°.., maximum temperature.” After the 

hover, go into the cargo hold on the aircrew commander’s order, examine 

the rear hemisphere in the blisters and look for any obstacles beneath 

the wheels. Report the results to the aircrew commander. On the aircrew 

commander’s order, disembark from the helicopter, move around to the 

aircrew commander’s field of view, evaluate the underlying surface, and 

with gestures assist the aircrew commander about the direction of the 

displacement and the landing location. Always remain in the aircrew 

commander’s field of view throughout the process.

Features of approaching and landing at a site in a canyon.

Approaching and landing at a site in a canyon is distinguished 

from the approach and landing at a site on a flat plain or elevation. The 

distinctions are connected with the fact that approaches to the site always 

are made along the length of the canyon. The bottoms of canyons, as a 

rule, slope and the mountain slopes descend to the bottom of the canyon 
198 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

at different angles. The angle of the approach may be variable and the 

flight path to the approach may be crooked (figure 9).

After finding a site in a canyon, it is necessary during the initial pass 

over it to evaluate the flight altitude relative to the site according to the 

two-pointer altimeter (according to the difference of the radio altimeter 

and two-pointer altimeter readings). 

Pull the helicopter into a climb, set 

V=80 kilometers per hour, “press in 

tight” to one of the canyon faces (for 

the Mi-8 and Mi-26, the right 

wall is preferable). After attaining 

an altitude that allows a 180° turn 

according to the width of the canyon 

(figure 10, bring the helicopter into 

level flight and make the 180° turn. The 

width of the canyon is the distance from the helicopter to the canyon 

wall in which the turn is being 

made. Add 100 meters for error 

in determining the distance and 

to compensate for turbulence during the turn.

Calculate your approach so 

that you can pull out of the fourth 

turn at a distance that allows 

your descent in accordance with 

the parameters of the “low speed” 

glide slope (depending on flight 

altitude relative to the landing site). 

Figure 11 shows the dependence 

of vertical speed on the speed 

and altitude relative to the landing 

site.

Ф W 

(kph)

Turn R 

(m)

Turn 

(m)

Gorge 

width (m)

20o

80 138 276 380

100 216 432 540

30o

80 87 174 280

100 136 272 380

40o

80 60 120 220

100 94 188 290

Figure 10.

V at Point of 

Beginning of 

Descent (kph)

Vy of Descent (mps) from D=1km

From 

H=100m

From 

H=150m

From 

H=200m

120 3.3 5.0 6.7

110 3.0 4.6 6.1

100 2.8 4.2 5.5

90 2.5 3.8 5.0

80 2.2 3.3 4.4

70 1.9 2.9 3.9

60 1.7 2.5 3.3

50 1.4 2.0 2.8

40 1.1 1.7 2.2

30 0.8 1.2 1.7

20 0.6 0.8 1.1

10 0.3 0.4 0.6

Figure 11.

Figure 9.
Helicopter Operations 199

Remember that during visual valuation of the distance and elevation 

of the landing site, flight illusion occurs at a lower altitude and shorter 

distance relative to the site because of the proximity of the ground’s 

surface and large rocks.

Estimate the flight altitude relative to the site according to the twopointer altimeter and the distance to the site according to the Doppler 

indicator. Fly 15 meters over the site, if possible, at the minimum speed 

for the conditions. Drop the canister and put the helicopter into a climb 

at V=80 kilometers-per-hour [43 knots] (figure 12).

Pay special attention to maintaining control of the flight during the 

approach. Flights over inclines or obstacles on mountain slopes are 

executed with ΔH≥10 m [altitude correction is equal to or greater than 

10 meters]. At the same 

time, the low point of 

the helicopter, in the 

majority of cases, is the 

tail rotor (figure 13).

After a 180° turn, if 

needed, move to the center of the canyon, deter_

mine the direction and 

speed of the wind at the ground in accordance with the smoke trail and 

execute an approach maneuver for landing into the wind.

During approach to a “bowl” type canyon landing site, mark out 

in advance the slope, abeam the hovering location and a readily 

identifiable reference point. (figure 14). With large angles of closing onto 

the landing site, do not use a steep glide slope for the approach where 

V<60kph [velocity is less than 60 kilometers per hour—32 knots] and 

Vy>3m [vertical speed is greater than three meters per second].

Figure 12.

Figure 13.
200 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

In “box” canyons (those having an approach only from one direction), 

make the approach for the canister drop at an altitude that allows 

turning back at V=80 kilometers per hour [43 knots] and maneuver 

room for a second approach. Evaluate the direction and speed of the 

wind according to the smoke trail and land. The landing and takeoff 

are executed with opposite headings (figure 15); therefore, pay special 

attention to the direction and speed of the wind. Do not approach and 

land with U>5m [wind velocity is greater than five meters per second].

Adjust the approach and vertical speed to approximate the parameters of a “low speed” glide slope. Where needed, change of flight 

direction while following the center of the canyon (figure 14). 

The nature of the main rotor’s flow in the presence of axial airflow 

(figure 16) during hovering over a site of limited size at the bottom of a

Figure 15.

Figure 14.
Helicopter Operations 201

canyon causes a decrease of 

main rotor lift, which must be considered while evaluating possible landing sites and making 

landing calculations.

Features of taking 

off from a site.

Take off from a site vertically, if the helicopter hovers

at H>3 m, or with a running takeoff where Hh>1 m [hover altitude is 

greater than one meter]. Where possible and needed, make a down 

slope takeoff while increasing speed in the descent.

For takeoff, after the helicopter breaks away from the ground, create 

an angle of pitch with the cyclic that provides increased speed without 

the helicopter’s descent. Increase the collective pitch until the engines 

have reached their peak, not allowing the main rotor RPM to be less than 

92 percent.

Use augmented power (emergency power) for landing and takeoff 

with the Mi-8 helicopter.

Mi-8MT helicopters have TVZ-117MT engines, the maximum power 

of which is augmented power (AP) that assumes manipulation using 

the engine controller. Mi-8MTV helicopters have TVZ-117VM engines, 

the maximum power of which is emergency (EP), and the engines are 

supposed to reach it automatically.

For an approach using augmented power, after lining up on the 

landing path, move the throttle upwards until the AUGMENTATION 

ON warning begins to blink, while not allowing the main rotor RPM 

to decrease less than 94-percent or increase more than 98-percent. 

Remember that while augmentation power is on, with collective pitch 

greater than 8°, there is an automatic correction to the left. This correction 

must be manually adjusted to the right and checked periodically to 

insure that it is in the extreme right position.

The throttle must be moved upwards until the AUGMENTATION ON 

warning blinks for takeoff in augmented power while not allowing main 

rotor RPM >101%-percent Increase the collective pitch smoothly during 

takeoff, now allowing the main rotor RPM to fall <94-percent. At collective 

pitch >7°, the warnings are constantly lit and reversing your correction is 

possible. After a climb to H=100 meters, make certain that the correction 

is to the right, in turn bring the throttles to the center position to the lock, 

and make certain the warning lights go out.

With a “light” main rotor and incorrect engine control adjustment, 

turning on augmented power may lead to a main rotor RPM increase 

>101%, and it is necessary to turn off the augmented power. In this 

case, to use the augmented power, after entering the landing path, 

Figure 16.
202 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

remove the throttles from their stops and slightly shift them upwards, 

and with main rotor transition to axial airflow (V≈35 kph), move it 

closer until the AUGMENTATION ON warning blinks. During takeoff in 

augmented power on such a helicopter, immediately after the transition 

to axial airflow, while not allowing an RPM increase >101-percent, make a 

correction to the right until it stops and set the throttles at the stops. This 

all occurs at the stage of the aircrew commander’s most intense work in 

piloting the helicopter. One must be ready for it.

Experience in the use of helicopters with TVZ-117VM engines shows 

that in the majority of helicopters, moving the throttles upwards also 

increases engine power, while in the flight manual states that it operates 

automatically with the augmented power on and there is no need to 

move the throttles. An increase of main rotor RPM leads to the very same 

effect on some helicopters with the readjustment. In any case, the pilot 

must competently use the equipment, know the special features and use 

all the capabilities for a safe flight.

Evaluation of a helicopter’s capabilities in accordance 

with a power plant’s margin of power.

This characteristic is most important for the flight’s outcome and 

is difficult for evaluation. It occurs because the existing theoretical 

methodology does not allow taking into account fully the special features 

of a specific helicopter and the actual conditions of the approach and 

landing. In the flight manual, the only correction for wear of the blades 

during the first compressor stage is turning on the anti-icing system and 

the dust protection system, which is insufficient in real conditions. Real 

power plant power and adjustment of automatic fuel controls depend on 

wear and a number of parameters subject both to change while flying 

the helicopter and making adjustments. That leads to the fact that the 

power plant’s operational parameters, in a number of cases, do not 

correspond to the maintenance instructions and are in conflict with the 

expected results.

Analysis shows that the primary reason for such a situation is 

inexperience in using the automatic fuel controls. There are no 

consequences when flying level terrain because of the relatively large 

power reserve of the power plant. Indeed, it is against regulations to all 

of the helicopter’s power plant and main rotor capabilities in making 

flights in mountainous terrain and during execution of combat missions.

Often during flights in the mountains, the possibility or impossibility 

of landing at a site must be evaluated beforehand. The following 

method is used in this case. If the flight engineer cannot say precisely 

the maximum temperature of the gases generated by each engine (with 

a precision to 10° Celsius), then at the site altitude at which the landing 

will be made, check the augmented power (emergency power) of the 

engines in flight. 
Helicopter Operations 203

The purpose of the check is to determine the maximum temperature 

of the gases. The temperature of the gases is the most objective indicator 

of the reserve power of the engines. Cessation of gas temperature 

increase always means that the engine has “yielded” all possible power. 

It is necessary to set V=100-120 kph in level flight for the check, while 

moving the engine throttles downward, increasing speed in level flight 

by removing collective pitch until the moment the gas temperature 

no longer rises or the main rotor RPM has decreased to 92-percent. 

Remember this maximum temperature obtained from both engines (in 

practice they almost never are “log book”). 

During the landing approach, the flight engineer, knowing the 

maximum temperatures of the gases, indicates to the aircrew commander 

according to the weaker engine the difference between the actual and 

maximum values. The aircrew commander, at the same time, must take 

into consideration that if the gas temperatures have reached maximum, 

further collective pitch increase will lead to a loss of main rotor RPM 

or the placement of the right pedal at the stop. This will allow making 

a decision to land or break-off of the approach in time. One must pay 

attention to the nature of the change of the power and reserve power 

required in a hover depending on the elevations of sites and the takeoff 

weight of the helicopters.

Conclusion

This is an interesting read on mountain approaches and shows that 

the Russian helicopter pilot still does a lot of “stubby pencil” calculations 

during flight. US aviators use their Performance Planning Card or PERF 

page (in glass cockpits) to the same effect. The procedures in the article 

may also strike the US aviator as overly cautious and time-consuming. The 

entire article is about approaches and no US aviator is going to routinely 

make three passes before landing. Aviators can save this precious time 

during the mission by expending it in extensive training before deployment. The smoke canister methods described in this article, while still 

used by some of our allies, are not going to be applicable to US Aviators, 

especially Apache pilots. The co-pilot/gunner is not going to carry smoke 

canisters in his cockpit, nor is he going to open his crew station door while 

on approach.

The challenge of high altitude and mountain flying is more than just 

approaches. One of the problems Colonel Ziper does not discuss is the 

frequent mountain updrafts and downdrafts that make flying in Afghanistan 

quite exciting at times. The ceilings on Russian helicopters are usually 

higher than ours, but the principles of flying remain the same. Even without 

an enemy, mountain flying is a risky business and the ground unit that we 

support will not always understand why we need to use certain headings 

and profiles when coming to their assistance. Power management, properly 

adapting/reacting to wind shifts, avoiding FOD and an active enemy are all 
204 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems

part of mountain flying. So what should aviators do to prepare for a tour in 

Afghanistan’s mountains?

USAACE’s The Army Aviator’s Handbook for Maneuvering Flight and 

Power Management and Chapter 3 of FM 3-04.203 Fundamentals of Flight, 

are the bibles for flying in the mountains, (and every aviator deploying 

to Afghanistan should study them). Afghanistan’s flying conditions are 

not those of Iraq, and a unit should train for mountain flying well before 

deploying there by simulating conditions during as many flights as possible, 

both in the aircraft and in the simulators. Even simple traffic pattern flights 

can be geared towards high altitude training by simulating a lower max 

torque available. During garrison training, practice maneuvering flight 

while exceeding the 30°/60° limits in order to become familiar with 

aerodynamic behaviors of the aircraft such as “mushing.” But stay within the 

30° / 60° limits during maneuvering flight in Afghanistan. There will seldom 

be any tactical benefit, and exceeding the 30°/60° limits there can put the 

crew and aircraft at unnecessary risk. Flying with smooth and slow control 

movements is optimum, especially in low density altitude environments like 

Afghanistan,. 

Remember that the power margin and bucket speed in a mountain 

environment will differ from airframe to airframe. It is not in the best 

interests of CH-47 and UH-60 crews to outfly their AH-64 escort which may 

have narrower power margins due to gross weights that are significantly 

increased by their weapon loads. Yet it is common for CH-47s to fly a lowlevel or contour profile to the base of a mountain and then climb, possibly 

forgetting that the escort Apache has to start its climb earlier and may be 

forced to call “heavy metal” in order to catch up and effectively perform 

its escort mission. Wind direction and velocity are important factors when 

flying in the mountains, and the winds will vary all the way to the top. Rotary 

wing aircrews should remember that their AH-64D escort has a wind 

reading capability which will provide wind heading and velocity at the AH64D’s current location. While other aircraft should take advantage of this 

and any other available winds information before making an approach, it 

does not substitute for learning good wind and terrain analysis.

There are ten rules of thumb applicable to all helicopter aviators flying 

in the mountains:13

1. Slow down and perform maneuvers with less intensity for all aspects 

of the machine. Aggressive left turns and aggressive forward application of 

the cyclic will increase torque.

2. Always leave a way out.

3. Know where the winds are.

4. Crew coordination is critical. Make sure everyone knows what is 

going on all the time and split up the duties during the entire flight and 

during the approach.

5. Update performance planning throughout the flight to be aware of 

power margin, bucket speed and minimum safe single engine airspeed.
Helicopter Operations 205

6. Be aware of hypoxia and take care of your body—get plenty of rest, 

watch your diet, stay physically fit and avoid tobacco. 

7. Your senses and perceptions can be unreliable in the mountains—

trust your flight instruments. 

8. Go-arounds are free.

9. An aircrew’s decision to abort because of adverse meteorological 

conditions must be accepted by the command.

10. Self-removal of aircrew experiencing emotional stress or illness 

must be encouraged and not criticized. 

Of course, the enemy remains a concern. Afghanistan is one of the few 

places on the planet where the air defense threat from ground forces may be 

firing from above the helicopter. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Mujahideen 

DShK gunners would often emplace multiple machine guns above passes 

and on flight paths with the hope of downing a helicopter through blade or 

transmission strike. The Mujahideen also used narrow canyons with some 

sort of bait in it to draw a single helicopter down away from the support of 

its wingman. Caves dug into canyon walls contained DShKs which would 

fill the air with bullets — or a cable might be stretched across the narrow 

canyon. Potential landing zones were covered with heavy-weapons fire and 

land mines. Shoulder-fired air defense missiles were often sited at the end 

of runways. Maintenance test pilots usually fly a predictable pattern in a 

given area and the Mujahideen were quick to pick up on that.

Flying in Afghanistan is demanding and unforgiving. Like anything 

else, training, rehearsals, common sense and a bit of caution will assist the 

bold pilot in becoming an old pilot.

________________________________________

1. The Russian General Staff (translation, commentary and editing by Lester W. Grau and 

Michael A. Gress), The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas, 2002, 210-211.

2. Ibid, 318. Viktor Markovskiy, Zharkoe nebo Afganistana (The hot sky of Afghanistan), 

Moscow: Tekhnika-Molodezhi, 2000, 101 lists four regiments and ten separate squadrons.

3. Russian General Staff, 210.

4. Ibid, 221.

5. Colonel D. B. Zipir, “Posadka vertoleta na vysokogornye ploshchadki” (“Landing a 

helicopter in the mountains”), Armeyskiy sbornik (Army Digest). January 2010, 31-39.

6. It is DH>10 in the original, but is probably ∆H>10. The Cyrillic D [Д] looks similar to ∆. 

7. Ø is the diameter, NV is the main rotor blade. In figure 4, ΔT is the lift or thrust 

differential. 

8. The NSP (Nazemnyi signal’nyi patron — ground signal cartridge) is a smoke grenade 

with a fold-out “leg” base to stabilize the unit.

9. The PSh-M is a smoke pot that comes in black, orange and yellow smoke.

10. The tgp is the flight time required to achieve a horizontal plane before entering the 

glide path.

11. UMS is probably the “universal multiprocessing system”.

12. AI are Aleksandr Ivchenko helicopter engines. The AI-9 is the most popular.

13. The ten rules of thumb are extracted from FM 3-04.203 Fundamentals of Flight, FM 

1-202 Environmental Flight, USAACE The Army Aviator’s Handbook for Maneuvering Flight 

and Power Management, AR 40-8 Temporary Flying Restrictions due to Exogenous Factors.
206 Passing It On

Conclusion

Throughout the history of organized militaries, there has been a tension in how best to organize forces for future combat. One school 

of thought, driven by the budget and the vain hope for simplicity and 

predictability, have tried to make all combat, combat support and combat 

service support units the same by branch and function. They would have 

the same TO&Es, same training, same equipment and, consequently, 

would perform identically on the battlefield. Recent versions of this 

school advocate modularity, so that the Defense Department can “plug 

and play” by attaching and detaching interchangeable units for various 

contingencies — sort of a national defense Lego© set. Until the current 

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the school’s credo was “if units can do 

maneuver warfare well, they readily can do the “lesser forms of combat” 

(mountain, counterinsurgency, jungle, urban, riverine) well. The other 

school sees combat as a complex, hard-to-predict matter that requires 

well-trained and equipped forces to conduct maneuver warfare plus 

specially-trained, specially-equipped forces to deal with the lesser 

forms of combat. In the past, this has led to the development of “elite” 

forces — paratroopers, rangers, mountaineers, jungle fighters, arctic 

warriors, special forces, commandos and the like. 

These forces are not cheap and, during peacetime, there is often a rift 

between “big army” and the specialized community. This school’s credo 

is the reason for these specialized forces is that “big army” does not 

have the time, resources or need to train all soldiers for all contingencies. 

Of course, elite units are not usually big enough to handle a large 

contingency over an extended time, so “big army” may then need to 

train quickly to meet the additional demands of urban, mountain, jungle 

or whatever combat.

Foreign forces that have experience fighting in the mountains reflect this experience in their training, organization and equipment. 

Most foreign countries with serious mountains in their country or on 

their borders have trained mountain units. Their mountain soldiers are 

trained in far more than basic knots, rappelling, piton placement and 
Conclusion 207

individual climbing skills. They are trained in unit mountain maneuver 

and unit mountain tactical drills; they conduct live fire exercises in the 

mountains as well as extended exercises in the mountains. Mountain 

warfare is more than infantry combat and foreign mountain troops train 

their gunners, sappers, drivers, medics, logisticians and aviators along 

with their mountain infantry. 

The Soviets/Russians have fought two recent wars in the mountains—

in Afghanistan and in Chechnya. In Afghanistan, most Soviet soldiers 

were trained in one of seven mountain warfare centers prior to deployment. Their airborne, air assault and special operations (Spetznaz) 

forces carried the fight to the guerrillas in the mountains. In Chechnya, 

the initial city fighting went against the Russians, but they rallied, gained 

control of the urban and built-up areas and eventually moved into the 

mountains to confront the guerrillas that they had pushed there. It has 

been a long, brutal campaign, but generally the Russians now control 

Chechnya and most of the Chechen guerrillas have left the country. The 

Russians did not control Chechnya until they controlled the mountains. 

The Russians further fought a quick, if not particularly elegant, campaign 

against Georgia in the low mountains of Southern Ossetia. This campaign 

was quick because the Russians understood mountain combat and the 

need to control chokepoints and lines of communication in mountain 

combat.

India and Pakistan arguably have the best-trained and mostexperienced mountain troops, but Chinese Mountain Brigades and Light 

Infantry Divisions also have experience with insurgents in Tibet and 

Xinjiang Province. The Columbian Army has a wealth of experience 

with fighting in heavily-forested and jungle-covered mountains.

This book was written for the mountain training community and 

for units that will actually fight in the mountains. It is not US doctrine. 

It is somebody else’s idea on how to deal with common problems encountered in the mountains. It is offered for your consideration. 
208 Passing It On

Suggestions for 

Further Reading

Lt Col Syed Ishfaq Ali, Fangs of Ice (Story of Siachen), Rawalpindi: Pak 

American Commercial (Pvt) Ltd, 1991. A Pakistani perspective on the 

fighting Indo-Pakistani fighting in Kashmir over the Siachin glacier — the 

highest battlefield in the world. Plenty of tactical detail.

Christopher Duffy and Bill Younghusband, Eagles Over the Alps: 

Suvorov in Italy and Switzerland, 1799, Emperor’s Press, 1999. Russian 

mountain campaigning in the Alps by one of Britain’s best historians.

A. B. Feuer and Bob Dole, Packs On: Memoirs of the 10th Mountain 

Division in World War II, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole books, 2006. A good 

history of the training and deployment of the US Army’s only mountain 

division during World War II.

D. M. Giangreco, The Soldier from Independence: A Military Biography 

of Harry Truman, Minneapolis, Zenith Press, 2009. Chapters 12-16 provide an excellent account of a battery fight in the Vosges Mountains. 

Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat 

Tactics in Afghanistan, originally published by NDU Press in 1996, now 

published by Mentor Enterprises of Huntsville, Alabama. Translation 

and commentary of Soviet tactical experience of Soviet veterans that was 

compiled by the Frunze Military Academy.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-27, Pack Animals in 

Support of Special Operations Forces, USGOVPO, 2000. An excellent 

guide to the forgotten, but still necessary, skills involved with animal 

logistics transport in difficult terrain.

Martin Helprin, A Soldier of the Great War, New York: Harcourt, 

Brace and Company, 1991. Novel about an Italian soldier fighting in the 

mountains during World War I. Well researched and a good read.

Major General D. K. Palit, War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in 

Crisis, 1962, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991. Best single Englishlanguage book on the 1962 Sino-Indian War in the Himalayan Mountains.
Conclusion 209

Ali Ahmed Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: 

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, originally published with 

color maps by Quantico: USMC Special Study, 1998, and now by 

Mentor Enterprises of Huntsville, Alabama. Like the Marine Corps 

edition, Mentor’s also includes color maps which are integral to 

understanding the tactics, and the reader is cautioned against Afghan 

Guerrilla War and other unauthorized printings which have poor quality 

black and white maps. The authors interviewed more than 100 Mujahideen commanders to record their tactical experience in their war 

with the Soviets. 

Andrew M. Roe, Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the 

Land of Bin Laden, 1849-1947, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010. 

Good study of the British struggle in the Northwest Frontier Province and 

Waziristan bordering Afghanistan.

Russian General Staff (translation and commentary by Lester W. Grau 

and Michael Gress), The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought 

and Lost, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. An operational 

overview of the Soviet mountain war in Afghanistan and the role of all the 

branches. 

General Sir Andrew Skeen (commentary by Lester W. Grau and 

Robert H. Baer), Passing It On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan’s 

Frontier, Fort Leavenworth and Fort Benning: Foreign Military Studies 

Office and Maneuver Center of Excellence, 2011. Reprint of an excellent 1932 guide for British lieutenants and captains fighting on the 

border with Afghanistan. The terrain and enemy have not changed. 

Dodge Billingsley and Lester Grau, Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen 

Tactics in the Russian Chechen Wars 1994-2009, Ft. Leavenworth and 

Quantico: Foreign Military Studies Office and United States Marine 

Corps, 2012. Chechen tactical experience based on interviews with 

Chechen combatants who fought in mountain, urban and open terrain. 

The book has color maps for clarity. 
210 Passing It On
Conclusion 211

acclimatization 3-4, 22-23, 41, 81, 178-179

avalanches 3, 80

belay 54, 82, 126-131

carabineers 42

cave fighting 53-57

cerebral edema 3, 181

classification of mountains 2, 16, 81-82

climbing injuries 180-181

communications 5, 19, 51, 169-175

defensive actions in the mountains 7-8

diesel engines 3, 177

fire support 8-9, 19-20, 87-98, 157

flanking detachment 45-52

footwear 3, 42, 84

frostbite 179-180

GPS 51, 86

grassy slopes 85, 114-117

helicopters 10, 36-37, 66-68, 152, 186-205

hypothermia 3, 180

infantryman’s load 43-44-51

Jumar ascenders 42

leadership 13, 18-19, 23,43,83

logistics 4, 9-10, 21-22, 144-168

maneuver 20-21

medical evacuation 12, 180

mountain operations 58-77

mountain sickness 3, 81, 181

mules 5, 10-11 

offensive actions 6-7, 53-57, 58-77

pace of movement 6, 41

physical fitness 15-16, 139-143

physiological changes 2, 17, 177

porters 11-12

pressurized sleeping bags 16, 179

psychological changes 3, 182-183

pulmonary edema 3, 181

reconnaissance 32-33, 80-86

river crossing 132-138

rock falls 3, 80, 82-84

rope work 54, 119-125

shelter 7, 16, 25, 110-111

small-arms fire 41, 101-109

solar radiation 3, 81

talus 85, 117-118

thunderstorms 81-83

training 22-27, 112-143

trash 418

water transport 144-168

Index