IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIC J. LAWRENCE : 4:08-cv-2066

Plaintiff, :

 :

v. :

 :

OFFICER MARK MATTERN : Hon. John E. Jones III

and LAUREN CARNEY :

:

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

February 12, 2010

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

Pending before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

Defendant, Officer Mark Mattern (“Mattern”) on September 1, 2009. (Doc. 26).

For the reasons that follow, the Motion shall be granted.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Plaintiff Eric Lawrence (Mr. Lawrence) initiated the instant action by lodging

a Complaint against Officer Mark Mattern (“Mattern” or “Defendant”) and Lauren

Carney (“Carney”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) on November 13, 2008 alleging

deprivations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights in violation of 28 U.S.C. §

1983. On September 1, 2009, Mattern filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along

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with a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. On or about September 4, 2009, the

Plaintiff’s claims against Carney were discontinued and ended. (Doc. 23). On

September 16, 2009, Mattern filed a Brief in Support of the September 1, 2009

Motion. (Doc. 25). On September 17, 2009, Mattern amended the September 1,

2009 Motion by filing the instant Motion. (Doc. 26). Subsequently, Mr. Lawrence

filed a Counterstatement of Material Facts and a Brief in Opposition to the Motion. 

(Docs. 35, 36). Having been fully briefed, the Motion is ready for disposition. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes “that there is no

 genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Initially, the moving party bears the burden

of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant meets this burden by pointing to an

absence of evidence supporting an essential element as to which the non-moving

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325. Once the moving party meets

its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). An issue is “genuine” only if there

is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving

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party, and a factual dispute is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the

action under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 248-

49 (1986).

In opposing summary judgment, the non-moving party “may not rely merely

on allegations of denials in its own pleadings; rather, its response must ... set out

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The nonmoving party “cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond

pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine

issue for trial.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). 

Arguments made in briefs “are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a

factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Jersey Cent.

Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985). 

However, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the non- moving party. P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of

Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006).

Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a disagreement about

the facts or the proper inferences that a fact finder could draw from them. Peterson

v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). Still, “the mere

existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

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otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; there must be a

genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 247-48. 

III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS:

On November 8, 2006, Judge Kleinfelter of the Court of Common Pleas of

Dauphin County entered a Temporary Protection from Abuse Order (The “PFA”)

naming as Plaintiff Mrs. Lawrence on behalf of her minor children, Genesis

Bordner and Joshua Bordner. (Doc. 21-2 p. 7). The PFA provided that the said

minors were shielded from any abuse or harassment by Mr. Lawrence. (Id.). On

November 17, 2006, a hearing on the merits took place. Although Mr. Lawrence

was not present, he was represented by Attorney Erb. (Doc. 1 ¶ 14). An order of

the Court was entered on November 17, 2006 memorializing certain agreements

reached at the hearing. (Doc. 21-2) (the “Order”). 

According to the Order, Mrs. Lawrence was granted exclusive possession of

the marital residence as of November 20, 2006. (Id. ¶ 2). In addition, the Order

provided that if Mr. Lawrence desired any article of personal property from the

home, “he must make that request through his attorney,” who shall in turn

communicate with Mrs. Lawrence’s attorney. (Id. ¶ 3). 

On November 17, 2006, subsequent to the Hearing, Mr. Lawrence returned to

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the marital residence and discovered that Mrs. Lawrence had taken a number of

things that did not belong to her. (Doc. 1 ¶ 16). He then called Attorney Erb, who

made a list of these items. (Doc. 1 ¶ 16). Later that day, Mr. Lawrence received a

call from Attorney Erb who, per the instructions of Mrs. Lawrence’s attorney, told

him to contact Mrs. Lawrence at Carney’s house, the place she was residing. (Id. ¶

17). Consequently, Mr. Lawrence phoned the residence of Carney looking to speak

with Mrs. Lawrence. (Id. ¶ 19). Carney answered the phone and told Plaintiff that

he was not allowed to call the residence per the PFA. Mr. Lawrence explained that

he was under the impression that the PFA had been dropped and that he had

permission to call Mrs. Lawrence.1

 (Id. ¶ 20). 

Carney phoned the police to inform them of her belief that Mr. Lawrence had

violated the PFA. Mattern responded to the call and investigated the scene at the

scene of the Carney residence. (Doc. 21-2 p. 84). At that time, Carney and Mrs.

Lawrence told Mattern that they believed the PFA had been violated. Carney asked

Mattern to look at her home telephone to confirm that Mr. Lawrence’s number was

present on the caller ID system. (Doc. 21-2 p. 111). Mattern looked at the PFA,

both physically and through the Commonwealth Law Enforcement System

1

 Mr. Lawrence contends that at the time of the phone call, the PFA was void and had, in any

event, been issued in favor of the children. Furthermore, during the phone call, Mr. Lawrence told

Carney that he had permission to speak with Mrs. Lawrence. (Doc. 35 ¶ 14). 

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Assistance Network (CLEAN), and confirmed that it was still in effect. 

Accordingly, Mattern filed a complaint and incident report requesting a warrant for

the PFA violation. After the warrant was signed, Mattern arrested Mr. Lawrence at

his residence. Following this incident, it was determined that there was no basis for

arresting Mr. Lawrence and the charges were withdrawn. (Doc. 35-2 pp. 4, 36). 

Both the District Attorney and the victim/witness program confirmed that the PFA

applied only to Genesis and Joshua Bordner and not to Mrs. Lawrence herself. 

(Doc. 35-2 p. 5). 

After the charges against Mr. Lawrence were withdrawn, the instant action

was instituted seeking recovery for First Amendment violations, false arrest, and

malicious prosecution. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. First Amendment Claim

The First Amendment provides “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the

freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,

and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. AMEND 

I. A plaintiff seeking to recover under a First Amendment retaliation claim must

show that (i) he engaged in a protected activity; (ii) that the defendants responded

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with retaliation; and (iii) that the protected activity was the cause of the retaliation.

Creveling v. Columbia County, 2008 WL 1826907 *5 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 

At the outset, we note that when an officer arrests an individual for which he

reasonably believed he had a valid arrest warrant, First Amendment rights are not

implicated. See Creveling, 2008 WL 1826907 *5. Here, Plaintiff has not provided

us with any evidence indicating Mattern acted for any reason other than to

effectuate what he thought was a valid arrest warrant. Although ultimately Mattern

was found to be mistaken in his belief that Plaintiff had violated the PFA, there is

no indication that the arrest was motivated by any desire other than to bring the

Plaintiff to justice. The record evidence is completely bereft of any indication that

Mattern harbored an ulterior motive or desire to retaliate against Plaintiff. 

Accordingly, it is our determination that the First Amendment claim brought by

Plaintiff should be dismissed. 

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Insofar as Defendant is moving for summary judgment based on an

independent Fourteenth Amendment Claim made by Plaintiff, Plaintiff has stated, to

the contrary, that he makes no such claim. (Doc. 36 p. 7). Accordingly, we

properly construe Plaintiff’s invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool for

making the protections of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. See, Duncan v.

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Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Consequently, there is no independent Fourteenth

Amendment claim that needs to be resolved by this Court. 

C. False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims

At the outset, we note that, the tort of false arrest and detention is available

when a person has been confined without legal process; however, if a person has

been arrested pursuant to a warrant, his remedy is to sue for malicious prosecution,

as the essence of this tort is the perversion of proper legal procedures. Burt v.

Ferrese, 871 F.2d 14, 16 (3d Cir. 1989). With this distinction in mind, we address

these claims in sequence. 

A plaintiff may succeed in a § 1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a

warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the evidence: (i) that the police

officer “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made

false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant;” and

(ii) that “such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of

probable cause.” Id. (emphasis added). It is important to note that, an arrest warrant

issued by a magistrate or judge does not, in itself, shelter an officer from liability

for false arrest. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000); see also

Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997). 

We focus our attention on the first prong to determine whether any

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reasonable jury could find that Mattern knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless

disregard for the truth, represented in the warrant application that the PFA was in

effect and applied to Mr. Lawrence. See Russo, 212 F.3d at 786. In making this

determination, we note that “negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient.” Id.

(citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). Quite simply, Plaintiff has not

adduced any evidence indicating that Mattern’s conduct constituted anything more

than negligence or innocent mistake. A reasonable jury could not conclude

anything more than that Mattern, working quickly and erring on the side of caution,

simply misread the PFA. While this may have been negligent, it is well to note that

officers are trained to move quickly in these cases, as domestic violence incidents

can play out with alarming alacrity. Moreover, in this Court’s experience, most

PFAs contain the estranged spouse as a party in her own right, so Mattern’s

misreading and assumption that she was a protectant here was not unreasonable.2

Given the exigencies that attend domestic violence calls, we decline to hold

Defendant to the standard of perfection that Plaintiff seeks to have us impose.

While the arrest of Plaintiff was unfortunate and no doubt embarrassing, it is well to

remember that it did not take place in a vacuum. A series of events preceded it that

2 We also observe that the minor children who were the subject of the PFA evidently

remained in Mrs. Lawrence’s custody, which further complicated Defendant’s attempt to

interpret and act on the PFA.

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triggered a PFA in favor of Plaintiff’s children, which indicates that at least in part,

he himself set the stage for the regrettable sequence giving rise to this case.

Accordingly, we will grant the instant Motion to the extent it addresses Plaintiff’s

false arrest claim.

With regard to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, he

must show that: (i) the Defendant initiated criminal proceedings against him; (ii) the

criminal proceedings terminated in his favor; (iii) the Defendant initiated the

proceeding without probable cause; (iv) the Defendants acted maliciously or for a

purpose other than bringing the Plaintiff to justice;

3

 and (v) the Plaintiff suffered

deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of “seizure” as a result of the legal

proceeding. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)

(emphasis added). 

As previously discussed, there is nothing in the record to indicate that

Mattern’s conduct constituted anything other than a negligent mistake. Therefore,

Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of adducing evidence from which malice or

an ulterior motive can be inferred. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the fourth

prong of the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution analysis. Accordingly, we

3

 The analysis of the probable cause determination is based on the objective facts

available to the officers at the time of the arrest. Lynn v. Cristner, 183 Fed. Appx. 180, 183-84

(3d Cir. 2006).

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will grant the instant Motion to this extent.

For the foregoing reasons, we shall grant the instant Motion in its entirety.4

An appropriate Order shall enter. 

4 We need not address Defendant’s qualified immunity argument because we have

already dismissed Plaintiff’s claims on other grounds. 

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