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Research Report 1204

[AD

REALTRAIN VALIDATION FOR

ARMORIANTI.ARMOR TEAMS

Thomas D Scott, Larry L Mellza, Guthrle 0. Hardy, Jr., and James H. Banks

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

and

LTC L.arry E. Word 

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Office, TRADOC Systems Manager, ‘

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Tactical Engagement Simulation ~~~~~~ . ‘

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ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TECHNICAL AREA 

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U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Beh~viora and Sc~

cial Sciences

March 1979

Ap prov•d to, public r.Pseu; d

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P . 5

U. S. ARMY RESEARC H INSTITUTE

FOR TH E BEHAVIORA L AN D SOCIAL SCIENCES

A held Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WILLIAM L. HAUSER

JOSEPH ZEIDNER Cotonel , US Army

Technical Director Commander

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primory distribution of this report hee been mede by API. PI.ei, ddreu corrupondena concerning distribution of reports to: U. S. Army Rus.rth Institute for the Behiviorel end Sociel Sciences, ATTN PERI.P, 5001 Eisenho~*r Avenue. AIe~.ndria. Virgins. 22333.

FINAL DISPO&ITIO1~ This report rn.y be destroyed v

~ien it is no longer needed. Pli.es do not return it to

the U. S. Aflfl Y Ri~ irch Institut, for the Behavioral end SOCi& Sciences.

~~~~~ The findings in thu reCoil ire not to be construad as en officisi Osstertment of the A,ftty DOi’t’O’i, UnISIS ~ designated by other euthocused documents.

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Unclassified SECURITY CI.AS$I YICATI ON OP YNIS PAGE (U5i D~~

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Research Report 1204 r

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. TITLE (d as.ftS.) S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED __ -

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~~~~~~~ __________________________________________________ S. CONTRACT oR GRANT NUNSE~~.)

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a. .EW,~~~~~~ M~~~~~A$lZATI0N NAME *550 ADDRESS ,

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U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioraj~~ r~~~~~ 763743A77~~,,

and Social Sciences L 2Q763743A78~~ 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333 —... ~ WleJI4.sAII~~

II. CONTROU..INC OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS ( /, i

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I?. DISTRIBUT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ION STATEMENT (.15. ekeossl —~~~~~ M Steel 30, 0 Sffw. t k~~ *~~ssi)

4. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

IS. KEY 505505 (C 1M.S ee ~~~~~~~ ‘AM It ewee y d Idsslsfr Sy block .. 1.r)

Engagement simulation Training systems

Tactical training Armor training

REALTRAIN Performance-oriented training

Simulation techniques TOW training

aS. ASSTR*CT p’— -— oc 5 95.5 * 5r block . b,)

/ A field experiment was carried out to determine the relative effectiveness of REALTRAIN (an engagement simulation training system) and conventional

training that did not e

~~loy engagement simulation. Eight Armor/Anti-Armor

units were given a pretraining tactical test, 5 days of tactical training

using either REALTRAIN or conventional methods, and a posttraining test.

In addition , test units participated in a series of exercises in which

REALTRAIN and conventional units opposed one another. Results showe4 ths

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEIUB DAM ~~lsN~

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~~~~~ Pin general , REALTRAIN units improved more than conventional units and

achieved higher performance levels.

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Research Report 1204

REALTRAIN VALIDATION FOR

ARMOR/ANTI ARMOR TEAMS

Thomas D. Scott, Larry L. Meliza, Guthrie D. Hardy, Jr., and James H. Banks, Test Director

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

and

LTC Larry E. Word

Office , TRADOC Systems Manager, Tactical Engagement Simulation

Submitted by:

Frank J. Harris, Chief

ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TECHNICAL AREA

Approved By:

A. H. Birnbaum. Acting Director

ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

Joseph Zeidner

TECHNICAL DIRECTOR

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria , Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

March 1979

Army Project Number Tactical Team Performance

20763743A713

20763743A775

Appr~~ d for public rslssss; distribution unlimited.

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ARI Research Reports and Technical Papers are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and other research and military agencies. Any findings ready for S

implementation at the time of publication are presented in the latter part of

the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommendations for ‘official action ~

normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

___ 

S
__________________________________________________________ S

FORE WORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences (ARI) has developed a broad program for more effective training of combat units in the Army . The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) has identified small—unit tactical engagement simulation training as one of its highest behavioral science research priori— S

ties. One product of ARI’s research program is a tactical engagement

simulation training method known as REALTRAIN that provides extremely S

realistic and motivating training for small combat-arms units. The

method is described in ARI Technical Report S-4 and ARI Research Reports 1191, 1192, and 1203.

To validate REALTRAIN, ARI has projected a series of field tests S

supported by personnel of the ARI Presidio of Monterey Field Unit,

Jack J. Sternberg, Chief. This report, one of a series, presents partial findings of an experiment conducted at Fort Carson, Cob .,

January—March 1978. In addition to the authors, members of the core

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ executed the validation test were LTC Thomas J.

Ritenour and Patrick Whitmarsh of the ARI Field Unit at Presidio of

Monterey and E. Robert Cbovis and Robert F. Cunningham of Canyon Research Group, Inc. F. H. Steirihejser, Jr., Gary Boycan, Steven Medlin, S and Bruce Hamill of the Engagement Simulation Technical Area, ARI,

also gave assistance.

LTC Thomas J. Ritenour of the ARI field unit contributed out- S

standingly and was responsible for organizing and supervising the mili- S

tary support aspects of the field experiment. This research could not

have been accomplished without the support of the 4th Infantry Division

(Mechanized). Special thanks are due to the conventional trainer,

CPT James L. Prewett of the 4th Division , and the REALTRAIN trainer , S MAil Angelo Severino, Office of TRADOC Systems Manager for Tactical

Engagement Simulation (TSM-TEs). Finally , COL George J. Stapleton ,

TSM-TES, provided support and encouragement.

This research was conducted within the December 1976 Five Year

Test Program (FYTP) as approved by the Army Test Schedule and Review

Committee (TSARC) . The entire program is responsive to the requirements of Army projects 2Q763743A773 and 2Q763743A780 and the TRADOC

Systems Manager for Tactical Engagement Simulation of the U.S. Army

Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, Va. The research reported here

was conducted as part of Army project 2Q763743A775. I

SEP14 ZEIDNER

Technical Director

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S REALTRAIN VALIDATION FOR ARMOR/ANTI-ARMOR TEAMS

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

S METHOD 2

RESULTS 4

S TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT 5 

7

METHOD 7

Personnel 7

Test Staff Training 8

Test Design 9

Tactical Test 12 S

Data Collection 13

Ammunition 14

RESULTS 15

General 15

Mission Accomplishment 15

Casualties 17 S Use of Cover and Concealment 22

Observation 28

S 

Overall Performance 30

s. • APPENDIX A. OPERATIONS ORDERS AND MAPS USED IN PRETRAINING S 

AND POSTTRAINING TESTS 31

B. TEST OPERATING PROCEDURES (TOP ) 37

C. OPERAT IONS ORDERS AND MAPS USED DURING SHOOT-OFFS 49

D. CASUALTY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 55

E. DATA FORMS 59

F. CRITERIA FOR ABORTED , INTERRUPTED , AND

OMITTED TRIALS 77

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CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

APPENDIX G. PROCEDURES FOR ASSIGNING UNITS TO TREATMENTS . . . 79

H. GUIDANCE FOR TRAINERS 81

I. TERRAIN 115

J. TEST NARRATIVE 117

DISTRIBUTION 123

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Mission accomplishment: attack 15

2. Mission accomplishment : defense 16

3. Percentages of overall mission accomplishment:

attacks, defenses , and meeting engagements

(shoot—of fs) 17

4. Percentage of tested unit tanks and TOWs declared

casualties in the attack 17

5. Percentage of tested unit tanks and TOWs declared

casualties prior to OPFOR TOW withdrawal (attack) . . . 18

6. Percentage of tested unit tanks declared casualties

prior to OPFOR TOW withdrawal (attack) 19

7. Percentage of platoon leaders and p1

~

- toon sergeants

declared casualtieQ prior to OPPOR TOW withdrawal

(attack) 20

8. Percentage of OPPOR tanks and TOWs declared

casualties in the attack 20

9. Casualty exchange ratios (CER) for attack and meeting

engagements (shoot—of fs) 21

10. Percentage of tested unit tanks and TOWs declared

casualties in the defense 22

11. Percentage of OPFOR tanks and TOWs declared

casualties in the defense 22

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CONTENTS (Continued) S

Page

S 

Table 12. Casualty exchange ratios (CER) for the defense . . . 23

F 13. Number of times tested unit elements were detected

and identified by the OPFOR 24

14. Number of times tested unit elements were detected

and identified by the OPFOR during consolidation

and execution phases of the defense 26

15. Number of times OPFOR elements were detected and

identified by the tested unit 29

S 

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Schedule for one cycle of testing and training . . . . 10

2. Mean rankings of tested units based on frequency

of detection and identification of test unit

elements by OPFOR 27

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REALTRAIN VALIDATION FOR ARMOR /ANTI-ARMOR TEAM S

BRIEF

Requirements:

TO compare and evaluate the tactical performance of Armor/AntiArmor teams trained with REALTRAIN engagement simulation methods and .

Armor/Anti-Armor teams trained by conventional combat field training

methods.

Procedure:

In Phase I, eight tank platoons with attached TOW antitank weapon

and forward observer sections from the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson , Cob ., engaged in pretest field exercises to establish pretraining performance levels. This pretest included a

movement—to—contact attack , and a defense against a skilled opposing

force.

Phase II provided 5 days of carefully coordinated tactical training by REALTRAIN methods for four units and by conventional methods S

for four units.

Phase III, the posttest, repeated the pretest on different terS rain to establish performance improvement after training.

In Phase IV, test units conducted two meeting engagements against

tested units of the other training group (shoot-off exercises).

Findings :

Results were assessed for both attack and defense in terms of

mission accomplishment , casualties inflicted and sustained , and detections by the tested units and their opposing forces (10 measures).

All units performed at similar levels in pretraining tests. In S

posttraining tests, REALTRAIN units improved on an average of about

eight measures; conventionally trained units, on about four measures.

REALTRAIN units won six of seven shoot—off engagements and sustained

fewer and inflicted more casualties than did conventionally trained

units.

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Utilization of Findings:

Results from this portion of the field assessment of REALTRAIN

provide empirical evidence , gathered under a systematic and comprehensive field research program , of the greater effectiveness of

REALTRAIN over conventional combat unit training for Armor/Anti-Armor S 

S

teams. The Army is using REALTRAIN methods now, and these methods

will form the core of a total engagement simulation system for train—

ing and evaluation . The performance characteristics of Armor/Anti—

Armor teams will provide a basis for the improvement of Army training

and evaluation programs. S

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REALTRAIN VALIDATION FOR ARMOR/ANTI-ARMOR TEAMS

INTRODUCTION

The improvement of tactical training is one of the highest Army

priorities. In recent years, the Army has sought to increase the effectiveness of unit training through the introduction of the Army

Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The major thrust of the

ARTEP has been to place increased emphasis on development of

performance—oriented training and evaluation methods.

The current ARTEP stresses that unit proficiency should be judged S

on the basis of performance of appropriate missions carried out with

as much tactical realism as possible. Consistent with these emphases,

a variety of engagement simulation tactical training techniques have

been developed which promise to increase greatly the effectiveness of

combat—arms units. S

The system called REALTRAIN, which is one of this family of engagement simulation techniques, is oriented toward the tactical training of small combat units. REALTRAIN has provided small—unit commanders with the capability to conduct two-sided, free-play tactical

exercises with credible casualty assessment, weapon signature effects,

and a high degree of tactical realism.

The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), a further

advance in tactical training technology, will provide commanders of

units up through battalion level with a tactically realistic engagement simulation training methodology . Together, REALTRAIN and MILES

provide the methodological foundation of a broad, performance-oriented

trQining and evaluation program.

The Army Research Institute and TRADOC are conducting a research

program to improve Army tactical training and evaluation. This program includes the development and testing of tactical engagement simu—

lation training methods, such as REALTRAIN and MILES, and will provide

a basis for improving existing ARTEPs. Not only will trainers be able

to determine objectively the terminal mission outcomes (e.g., mission

accomplishment and casualty exchange ratios), but they will also be

assisted in determining proficiency on critical intermediate tasks.

Two major field experiments have been conducted to compare the

training effectiveness of REALTRAIN with conventional training

methods that do not use current engagement simulation techniques.

The first experiment examined the tactical performance of dismounted

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rifle squads.1’

2 The second experiment examined the performances of

Armor/Anti-Armor teams. This research report concerns the second

experiment and presents information on product measures of perform- S

ance and their immediate antecedents for Armor/Anti-Armor teams.

Other m easures of tactical performance will be explored in subsequent

papers.

METHOD

The field experiment consisted of four phases of tactical training and performance testing, repeated in two cycles. Each player

unit consisted of a tank platoon, a TOW antitank weapon section, and S

a forward observer from the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at

Fort Carson, Cob .

Phase I was a tactically realistic , ARTEP-based pretraining test

administered to establish entry-level proficiency and to establish

the equivalence of the units to be trained either by REALTRAIN or by

conventional methods.

Phase II consisted of a 5-day training period during which player

units received either REALTRAIN or conventional training.

Phase III was a posttraining test, conducted to determine the

performance improvements resulting from training.

Phase IV consisted of two—sided , free—play exercises in which

REALTRAIN and conventionally trained units opposed each other in a

meeting engagement.

Pretraining and posttraining tests (Phases I and III) consisted

of a movement—to-contact/attack followed by a defense. The scenario

for these tests was based on guidance provided in ARTEP 17-35.

Two test lanes were selected based on terrain similarity to maintain tactical realism. Each unit was administered the pretraining

test on one lane and the posttraining test on the other. In addition,

order of lane use in pretests and posttests was counterbalanced to

minimize any possible lane effects.

1

Banks, J. H., Hardy , G. D., Jr., Scott, T. D., Kress, G., & Word , L.

REALTRAIN Validation for Rifle Squads: Mission Accomplishment. ARI

Research Report 1192, October 1977. (ADA043515)

2

Meliza, L. L., Scott, T. D., & Epstein , K. I. REALTRAIN Validation

for Rifle Squads II: Tactical Performance. ARI Research Report 1203,

March 1979.

2

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— 5 .

Weapon systems played in the tests were the 105mm tank main gun ,

TOW heavy antitank weapon, and 155mm artillery.

Tested units were first given an operations order that directed

them to occupy and secure an objective about 3 km from their attack • position. The objective was defended by an opposing force (OPFOR)

TOW section located forward of the objective and by two OPFOR tanks

located on the objective. The test scenario called for the TOW section to withdraw when the lead element of the tested unit closed to

within 400 in of the TOW section’s position. The scenario also called

for the OPFOR light tank section to remain on the objective until at S

least one OPFOR tank had been declared a casualty and tanks from the 5

tested unit had closed to within 400 in. S

In a subsequent portion of the scenario, tested units received

orders to prevent OPFOR occupation of critical terrain for 1 hour.

An OPFOR counterattack on the defended position was launched after

the tested unit had sufficient time to prepare its defense. The

OPFOR counterattack was made by a tank platoon and ‘rOW section and

was supported by indirect fire controlled through the OPFOR forward

ob~erver.

In the standardized counterattack scenario, the OPFOR TOWs provided overwatch while the light section and heavy section attacked

along two likely avenues of approach. The exercise was terminated

when either the first OPFOR tank occupied the key terrain specified

in the tested unit’s operations order or 60 minutes after initiation

of the counterattack .

The OPFOR was given 2 weeks of tactical and scenario-specific

training prior to the test to bring the force to a high level of

S tactical proficiency and to insure that their attacks and defenses

during the pretraining and posttraining tests presented a standardized S 

threat. The test conditions presented extremely different objectives

for the tested units.

Upon completion of Phase I testing, units were assigned to either

REALTRAIN or conventional training on the basis of casualties inflicted

and sustained during pretests. Assignment procedures were designed to

insure that training groups, as much as possible, were of equivalent

tactical proficiency before the onset of training.

Phase II consisted of a 5—day training period during which units

received either REALTRAIN training or conventional training. Conventional training was defined in terms of the absence of current engagement simulation techniques. Casualties could be declared by the

trainer or umpires on the basis of criteria such as undue exposure of 5

tactical vehicles, force ratios, etc. No umpire was allowed to act in

a capacity similar to that of a REALTRAIN controller. Indirect fire S

was controlled through the trainer , training NCO, or an umpire, and

no Fire Direction Center was employed .

3

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Training was given by two highly experienced and accomplished

armor officers. One trained the units with REALTRAIN; the other used

conventional training methods. Both trainers were given the same

• training guidance , based on ARTEP5 that were relevant to the missions

and test unit composition. Both independently prepared a 5-day pro- S

gram of instruction (P01). Both POIs were reviewed and discussed

with the trainer to insure that the POIs were comparable and that S 

both trainers were training on the same missions, tasks, and conditions.

Phase IV consisted of tactical exercises in which REALTRAIN and

conventionally trained units opposed each other in free—play meeting

engagements. In each cycle, each unit participated in two exercises

in which it opposed each of the units in the other training group.

Two test lanes were used. For a test lane, each unit was given a separate written order from its simulated company team commander that insured a meeting engagement between the two units. Order of use of the

lanes and direction of movement on the lanes were counterbalanced for

REALTRAIN and conventional units to overcome any potential biasing effects caused by terrain characteristics. Once contact was made, engagements continued until all tanks on one side had been destroyed.

RESULTS

REALTRAIN and conventional unit performances were similar in

pretraining tests. Both groups improved after 5 days of tactical

training. REALTRAIN units generally improved more than conventionally

trained units. In posttraining tests, REALTRAIN units performed better than conventionally trained units in that they

• Accomplished more missions,

• Sustained fewer casualties,

• Inflicted more casualties, and

• Were less often detected by the OPFOR.

Although REALTRAIN units detected the OPFOR more frequently than

conventional units, the difference was not substantial.

In shoot—off exercises, REALTRAIN units

• Defeated conventionally trained units in six out of seven

meeting engagements,

• Sustained fewer casualties than conventional units, and

• Inflicted more casualties than conventional units.

To determine the scope of pretest to posttest improvement, each

tested unit was scored on whether it improved on the basic five measures for both attack and defense. These measures consisted of (a) mission accomplishment, (b) casualties inflicted , (c) casualties sustained ,

4

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Cd) detections by tested units, and Ce) detections by the OPFOR. Resuits show that REALTRAIN units improved on an average of 7.8 measures,

and conventional units, on 4.0 measures.

In addition , tested units were ranked in terms of their pretest S

and posttest performance on 10 measures. Pretest differences between

REASLTRAIN and conventional units were not significant. In posttests,

however, REALTRAIN units were ranked significantly higher than conventional units. This finding is supported by the results (presented

above) of the shoot-off meeting engagements.

This report is one in a series based on two major field experiments comparing REALTRAIN with conventional training. These experimerits were conducted to validate the REALTRAIN training method and to

‘identify critical measures of tactical performance for dismounted in—

S fantry units and Armor/Anti-Armor teams. Subsequent reports will ex- S

S plore process measures of the Armor/Anti—Armor units’ tactical perform- S

ance in detail. These reports will provide critical information

required for the improvement of current ARTEPs.

5

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TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT

METHOD

The research was conducted at Fort Carson, Cob ., January-March

1978. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson supplied

S player and support personnel. The purpose was to validate REALTRAIN

training methodology and to identify critical measures of tactical

performance for Armor/Anti-Armor units.

During the field experiment, eight test units underwent a program of tactical testing and training. Each was composed of one tank

platoon , one TOW section, and one forward observer. The program consisted of a pretraining test, 5 days of tactical training, a post—

training test, and tactical exercises in which test units trained by

different methods opposed one another. Pretraining and posttraining

tests were ARTEP-based tactical exercises in which test units performed against a well—trained , controlled opposing force (OPFOR).

Personnel

Army test personnel were assigned duty positions based on their

individual qualifications. Personnel included data collectors, controllers, indirect fire personnel, mappers, radio control net operators,

train~ing officers and NCOs, and support personnel. Scientific staff

members monitored all phases of testing and training to insure that

test procedures and scenartos were accurately replicated.

S Players and OPFOR. Players were members of eight test units from

the 4th Division. Each test unit and the OPFOR consisted of a tank

platoon with assigned TOW and forward observer (FO) sections. Once

units were established , unit integrity was maintained for the duration

of the experiment.

Controllers/Data Collectors. Sixteen individuals (2 officers and

14 enlisted men) acted as REALTRAIN controllers and data collectors S

aboard tactical vehicles, with one controller/data collector assigned

to each vehicle. The two officers were assigned to the platoon lead- S

ers’ tanks.

During all tests, an 0-5 senior tactical controller accompanied S

the test unit and an 0-2 senior OPFOR controller accompanied the OPFOR,

each in a 1/4—ton vehicle. These two controllers were accompanied by S

civilian scientists who were responsible for the scientific execution

of trials and the collection of performance data.

7

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Indirect Fire. Eight individuals were responsible for executing

the indirect fire missions called by tested units and OPFOR. Four of S

these manned the Fire Direction Center (FDC) , recorded indirect fire S

• data, plotted missions, and controlled the firemarkers. The remaining

four were firemarkers and were responsible for placing ground burst S

simulators and smoke pots at the locations designated by the FDC.

Mappers. Ten individuals were responsible for recording routes S

and events on 1:25,000 maps. Five were assigned to the tested unit,

and five were assigned to the OPFOR. Tested unit and OPFOR mappers

were assigned corresponding positions. In each test exercise, one S

mapper was assigned to each of the two TOWs, one was assigned to the

FO, one followed the heavy tank section in a 1/4-ton vehicle, and one

followed the light tank section. Heavy and light section inappers were S

instructed to avoid compromising the routes or locations of their

sections.

REALTRAIN Control Net Operators. Four enlisted men operated the

REALTRAIN control net. They were responsible for insuring that communications checks were made, recording times of scenario events,

transmitting the correct time , recording tactical events (casualties,

etc.), and making tape recordings of tactical and control net

communications. j

Test Staff Trainin~

g

GeneraJ.. All test staff personnel received intensive training S

on theiL duties for at least 1 week and became familiar with the tactical scenario and test lanes. Data forms were reviewed by members

of the scientific staff at the end of practice exercises to insure

that the data forms were being completed properly. The data forms

used by controllers and other data collectors were modified in response

to feedback provided by data collectors. Numbered checkpoints were

placed in the field to assist mappers, controllers, and firemarkers.

Data Collectors. Controllers were trained during REALTRAIN

mini—exercises and during OPFOR practice sessions for the tactical

test. Members of the scientific staff accompanied controllers on

tactical vehicles during this training period to facilitate controller training in data collection duties. Mapper data collectors were

given extensive training and practice in map reading and in construction of map traces of vehicle routes. Net control station (NCS) personnel practiced first on tape-recorded simulated exercises and later

on OPFOR practice exercises.

Indirect Fire. FDC personnel and firemarkers executed simulated indirect fire missions and later executed f ire missions dur ing S

OPFOR practice exercises. Firemarkers received at least 1 week of

intensive training and practice. Formal training was given in map

8

-I.
-- 

- S S S S ST~~~~~~~~~~ 

S

reading, land navigation , handling of explosives, and REALTRAIN procedures for indirect fire. In practice sessions, firemarkers were

given (simulated) missions. Their actual delivery of the requested

fire was closely monitored until they demonstrated they could deliver

rounds accurately and in a timely manner.

OPFOR. The OPFOR was given 2 weeks of scenario-specific training

prior to the start of the first pretraining test. The purpose of this

training was to insure that the OPFOR executed its mission in a tac-

• tically proficient and standardized manner. S

Test Design

Schedule. The field experiment consisted of four phases of

tactical training and performance testing, replicated in two cycles.

Each cycle consisted of the testing and training of four test units

during a 3-week period (Figure 1). 5

Phase I, pretraining tests, was carried out over 4 days; one unit

was tested each day. The other three units performed maintenance or

other duties. Phase II, tactical training, occurred over a 5—day

period , and all tested units participated each day. Phase III, post—

training tests, had the same schedule as Phase I. Phase IV, shootof fs, was carried out over a 2—day period with two exercises per day.

Each unit was scheduled to participate in two shoot-off exercises, one S

on each of the 2 days.

Description of Phases. Phases I and III, the pretraining and

posttraining tests, were ARTEP-based tactical performance tests. S

Phase I tests established entry—level tactical proficiency, and

Phase III tests established performance gains and final performance

levels.

Tests consisted of a movement-to—contact/attack followed by a

defense. In the general design of the test, the tested units were

permitted free play, constrained only by the tactically realistic

orders given by their simulated company team commander (the senior

tactical controller).

The scenario for the OPFOR was carefully constructed to provide

standardized measurement and observation opportunities without coin—

promising tactical realism. Two test lanes were used, and each unit

was administered the pretrainirig test on one lane and the posttraining test on the other. The order of lane use in pretests and posttests was counterbalanced to minimize any possible lane effects. The

terrain on these test lanes was quite similar. See Appendix I for a

detailed description of the terrain.

9

- • z —

— S - -~~~~~~~~~ - S ~~S S 5~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5-

~~sS 5- S55

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_______________________________________ -5-- --- 55—----- 5

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______ 

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — r ~~

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- 

S S S S ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Upon completion of Phase I testing, units were assigned to either

REALTRAIN or conventional training primarily on the basis of casualties inflicted and sustained d~x ing pretests. Assignments were made

so that training groups, as much as possible, had equivalent tactical • proficiency before training began. (The assignment procedures are

contained in Appendix G.)

Phase II consisted of a 5-day training period during which units

received either REALTRAIN training or conventional training. Conventional training was defined in terms of the absence of current engage-

• ment simulation techniques. Casualties could be declared by the trainer

or umpires on the basis of criteria such as undue exposure of tactical

vehicles, force ratios, etc. In addition, no umpire was allowed to 

act in a capacity similar to that of a REALTRAIN controller. Indirect

fire was controlled through the trainer, training NCO, or an umpire;

no FDC was employed.

Training was administered by two highly experienced and accom- S

plished armor officers; one trained the units with REALTRAIN , and the

other used conventional training methods. Both trainers were given

the same training guidance, based on ARTEPs relevant to the missions

and test unit composition (Appendix H). Each prepared a 5-day P01.

Each P01 was reviewed and discussed with the trainer to insure that

the POIs were comparable and that both trainers were training on the

same missions, tasks, and conditions.

Conduct of training was monitored to insur e that the POIs were 

followed. However, as long as the trainers stayed within the gener— 

ally broad limits of the approved P01, they were allowed to adjust

their training to meet the particular needs of the units they were S

S training. S

The same materiel training resources, terrain, and personnel,

with the exception of REALTRAIN controllers and equipment, were avail- S

able to both trainers. Controllers are required for casualty assess— S

ment in a REALTRAIN exercise but are not required in conventional

training exercises. However, the conventional trainer was provided

with a number of umpires to assist in conventional casualty assessment. 

Phase IV consisted of tactical exercises in which REALTRAIN and

conventionally trained units opposed one another in free-play meeting

engagements. In each cycle, each unit was scheduled to participate

in two exercises, opposing each of the units in the other training

group. S

Two test lanes were used. For a test lane, each unit was inde—

pendently given a written order (Appendix C) from its simulated corn- S

pany team commander to insure that a meeting engagement between the

two units would take place. Test units participated in one exercise S

on each of the two lanes. Order of use of the lanes and direction of

11 5

- - 5—

S ~~~~~~~~~~~ 5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5 5 5~~~~ S— -5 -•• --—— -—•--- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5 ~~~~~~~~~~ S 

• 

-S

-5— ~~~~. 

-~ — -S
movement on the lane were counterbalanced for REALTRAIN and conventional units to overcome any potential biasing effects due to terrain

• characteristics. Once contact had been made, engagements continued

until all tanks on one side had been destroyed.

Tactical Test S

Attack. In the Phase I and III attack modules, the tested unit

was given a specific terrain area as its objective. The unitt s mission

was to clear the objective of all enemy forces. (See Appendix A for

operations orders.)

The tank platoon leader was told that enemy activity had been

observed in the vicinity of the objective and in a specific area of S

the terrain forward of the objective. In fact, the forward location

was occupied by the OPFOR TOW section, and the objective itself was

occupied by two tanks led by the OPFOR platoon leader.

The positions of the OPFOR permitted use of largely covered and

concealed routes of approach by the tested unit during much of the at—

tack if the units showed good terrain appreciation . The OPFOR TOWs

were part of a defense in depth, and the tested unit had to destroy the

TOWs or force them to withdraw in order to press successfully the attack on the objective itself. S

During the tested units’ initial movement-to-contact , only the S

TOWs were in position to engage elements of the tested unit. The

rules of engagement for the test scenario required the TOWs to withdraw when test unit tanks closed to within 400 m of their position.

(See Appendix B for test operating procedures.)

The scenario for the OPFOR light tank section on the objective S

required the two tanks to engage the tested unit as soon as possible

and to remain on the objective until at least one OPFOR tank had been

destroyed and tanks from the tested unit had closed to within 400 in.

Defense. For the defense modules , the mission of the test unit S

was to prevent OPFOR occupation of critical terrain for 1 hour to

prevent interdiction of a road to be traversed within the hour by a

hypothetical friendly convoy. (See Appendix A for operations orders.)

The test unit was given its mission and allowed 40 minutes to compose

and deliver orders and to consolidate and prepare its defense against

the expected counterattack.

The scenario for the OPFOR prevented their moving or engaging the

test unit at that time, but it did permit them to obtain tactical in—

formation from their designated surveillance positions. The OPFOR in

the counterattack consisted of a tank platoon, TOW section, and FO

section. ~ S S S S

12

h..5 — ---s- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ——— -i—-— - - ~~-‘ ~~ - ——~~~~ —~

--- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -

~~
- 5 -

In the standardized counterattack scenario, the OPFOR TOWs provided overwatch while the light section and heavy section attacked

along two likely avenues of approach. The exercise was terminated

when either the first OPFOR tank occupied the key terrain objective

from which it could interdict the road or 60 minutes after initiation 

of the counterattack .

S In Phases I and III, decisions regarding aborted or interrupted

trials (Appendix F) and regarding deviations from the scenario or

operating procedures were made jointly by the senior tactical control— S lers and the civilian scientists.

Casualty Assessment Procedures. Casualties could be produced by

(a) the tank main gun (105mm cannon), (b) the POW heavy antitank weapon

system, and (c) indirect fire (155mm artillery). (See Appendix D for

casualty assessment rules and procedures.)

Data Collection

General. A wide range of data was collected during the course of

the experiment. (Data forms are provided in Appendix E.) Data collec- S

tion responsibilities are discussed briefly below. In addition to the

performance data collection , scientific staff members maintained logs

on any deviation from prescribed procedures and on any unusual factors

that might have affected performance or data interpretation .

Tactical Vehicle Controllers. Controller/data collectors on

tested unit and OPFOR vehicles collected information on critical aspects of performance , including use of overwatch , detections, firing

S events, use of dismounted TOWs, etc . All data were time indexed for

comparison with data collected from other sources.

Mappers. Mappers collected time-indexed location and movement

data and prepared map traces of all tactical vehicle routes. They

noted times of halts, starts, and major firing events on their maps.

REALTRAIN Net Control Station. The NCS operators collected engagement and casualty data. NCS personnel were also responsible for

tape—recording and providing short written summaries of tactical communications among both tested units and the OPFOR. In addition, NCS

staff kept a detailed time—indexed log of all scenario—related events.

The NCS transmitted times periodically to insure that the various data

sources worked from a common time base.

Indirect Fire. Data on indirect fire were collected by the FO

data collectors/controllers , FDC personnel, the REALTRAIN NCS, and a

civilian scientist. The FO data collector provided information on

detections made by the FO, on communications between FO and other

members of the FO’s unit , on the FO’s location and movement , and on

13

__ 

t

L. 5 

- - fl -— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

555.5555 5— 55 5---—. . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ — ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~- ~~~~~~— —~~~_ A
5.

’

a

* the locations of preplotted targets. The FDC personnel recorded all S information on the indirect fire missions called by tested units and S

the OPFOR. The NCS provided information on casualties resulting from

indirect fire missions. The civilian scientist collected data on

tested unit indirect fire planning.

Narratives. Upon completion of an exercise, the senior control- S

ler, OPFOR controller , and principal scientific staff prepared an ex- S

ercise narrative. Narratives included a 1 detailed reconstruction of

* events in the exercise and description ~t aspects of performance that S

might not have been recorded on the va~

/ious data forms. These narra- S

tive sessions were tape—recorded for subsequent transcription and

editing . (A typical narrative is included in Appendix J.)

Ammunition

Direct Fire. Prior to experimental trials, all tanks were

equipped with Hoffman devices for simulating the tank main gun weapon S

signature. Because TOW backblast simulators were in short supply , most S

trials were executed using handgrenade simulators to simulate the TOW

signature . These proved adequate and could be seen clearly from a considerable distance. S

For all testing phases, tested units and OPFOR were issued nine

Hoffman rounds per tank and eight simulators per TOW. This allotment

proved sufficient to execute test phases without the need for ainmunition resupply between exercises.

Indirect Fire. During pretests and posttests, the tested unit

platoon leader was informed in his operations order that he would be

supported by 155mm artillery . Indirect fire high explosive (HE) rounds S

were simulated by groundburst simulators. The tested unit platoon

leader ’s ammunition supply rate (ASR) was 49 HE rounds and five smoke S

missions (at two smoke pots per mission).

These resources were to be used as needed over the course of both

attack and defense missions. Thus, if a unit expended its 49 HE rounds

during an attack, none would remain for the defense. In practice this

never occurred , and all tested units had sufficient HE rounds remaining

S at the end of the attack to employ indirect fire during the defense . S

The OPFOR ’s ASR was 28 HE rounds and three smoke missions. S

During the Phase IV shoot-of fs, each tested unit had an ASR of

21 HE rounds and three smoke missions. During Phase III (training)

each trainer was allotted 300 HE rounds and 120 smoke pots per cycle

to use as he judged best over the 5-day training period. Trainers

indicated that this allotment was sufficient.

14

-55. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 55S~~~~ ~~~~~~t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A S~S ~~~~~~~~~
___ 

____ S ~~~~~~~~~~ 5 5 5 5 5 ~~~~~~~ 55~~ 5 5 5 5~~~~~~~~~ 5

~~~5 S 5 55~~~~~~ 5

RESULTS

Genera l

The results presented here are oriented primarily towar ~roduct

measures of performance supported by selected processes measures.

Findings are presented in five major sections : mission accomplish- S

ment , casualties , use of cover and concealment , observation , and

overall performance.

Mission Accomplishment

Mission accomplishment is the prime goal of any combat unit.

It is defined here as securing terrain specified as critical in the

tested units’ operations orders. In the attack , tested units were required to occupy and clear their objective . This involved destroying

or forcing withdrawal of the OPFOR. In the defense , tested units

were required to prevent the OPFOR from occupying a designated position. Finally, in the shoot-off meeting engagements , a tested unit S

was considered to have accomplished its mission if it destroyed or

neutralized the opposing tested unit. Further details are presented

in the methods section and in operations orders. (See Appendixes A

and C.)

Table 1 presents the number of attack missions successfully ac— S

complished by REALTRAIN and conventionally trained units during pretraining and posttraining tests. During pretests , one REALTRAIN unit

and one conventional unit succeeded in the attack. Following training, REALTRAIN units succeeded in three attacks , and conventional

units did not accomplish any attack missions . Thus, REALTRAIN units

improved ; conventional units did not.

Table 1

Mission Accomplishment : Attack

Training group

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 1 1

Posttest 3 0

15

_______________ 

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— —.---- -- ---- —SS— .—- 5—~ -~~~~~~~~~ -55 .. - —~ ---- — ~~~- -

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~~ 

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55 

5

Table 2 presents the number of defense missions accomplished by

REALTRAIN and by conventionally trained units. During pretests,

REALTRAIN units succeeded in one defense mission; conventional units

did not succeed in any . Following training , REALTRAIN units succeeded

in two defenses; conventionally trained units, in one defense . Thus,

both training groups improved .

Table 2

Mission Accomplishment: Defense

Training group

S 

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 1 0

Posttest 2 1

During the seven’ shoot-off exercises in which REALTRAIN and conventional units opposed each other in meeting engagements, REALTRAIN

units were superior to conventionally trained units. REALTRAIN units

won six of the meeting engagements, and conventional units won one.

Table 3 shows the mission accomp’ishment results of all three types

S of missions. Generally, both REALTRAIN and conventional units performed

poorly in pretraining tests. Following training , however , REALTRAIN S

units performed better than conventionally trained units. Overall ,

REALTRAIN units were successful in 73% of their missions after training; conventional units, in only 13%. Because of the small number of

units tested , it is important to note the consistency of the mission

accomplishment results. Moreover , in the shoot—off exercises , S

REALTRAIN units convincingly showed their superiority over the conventionally trained units.

In general , the overall level of mission accomplishment was not

as high as had been expected . Pilot testing had shown that with good

leadership and skilled unit performance both attack and defense missions could be accomplished . However , given the low entry—level proficiency of the units and the complexity of controlling and coordinating the activities of a tank platoon , a TOW section , and a forward

observer , military observers felt that a few more days of training

would have been required to produce skilled , integrated units. (This

1

One of the eight scheduled shoot—off trials was cancelled due to inclement weather and insufficient visibility .

16

- -_ _ S_~~~~~~~~~~~~5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S -5 5S5SS _ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

— .5 S~~ — 5( ~~~ — 

.

~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~
-S 5555 5~~~~~S~~ S S~~~~~~~~~~~~•~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5_ .55

topic will be examined in later reports.) However, subsequent sections of the present report will show that REALTRAIN and conventional

units improved substantially on a number of tactical performance measures in addition to mission accomplishment.

Table 3

Percentages of Overall Mission Accomplishment : Attacks,

Defenses, and Meeting Engagements (Shoot-Of fs)

Training group

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Before training 25 13

(N = b ~ (N=8)

After training 73 13

(N= 15) (N= 15)

Casualties

Attack. The numbers of casualties sustained are critical measures of a unit ’s effectiveness and its ability to continue to function

effectively . Table 4 presents the percentage of tank and TOW casualties sustained by tested units in the attack. During pretraining

tests, both REALTRAIN and conventional units suffered devastating

losses; 86% and 82%, respectively , of their tanks and TOWs were ded ared casualties. S

Table 4

Percentage of Tested Unit Tanks and TOWs

Declared Casualties in the Attack

Training group

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 86 82

Posttest 63 75

17

I -

S t

~~~~~~~~~~~ -*5.~~ __ S _ _ _ k —--- --- -~~ — -—- ——-- —~----— -.-- - ~~~5 555

-.5.5—-S 

-5---— — 

~~~1 sZ~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ i

~~~~A
5 5 5 S .5S _55 S~ S 55 _55555 555555 5 5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

S - —-~~~~~

Following 5 days of training, REALTRAIN units decreased casual- S 5

ties sustained by 23%; conventional units, by 7%. Thus, although both

units improved , the percentage of decrease in casualties sustained by S

S REALTRAIN units was more than three times the percentage of decrease

for conventionally trained units .

Early Casualties. It will be realized that in the attack the

OPFOR TOW section occupied a position forward of the objective area as

part of a defense in depth. The scenario called for these TOWs to

inflict as many casualties as possible and then to withdraw when elements of the tested unit closed on the TOW position. The percentage

of tested units’ tanks and TOWs killed by the OPFOR before the first

TOW was forced to withdraw is an indication of how well the tested

units conducted the initial phase of the attack. During the pretest,

about two—thirds of all tested units’ weapons systems were destroyed

before the OPFOR TOWs withdrew - (Table 5).

Table 5

Percentage of Tested Unit Tanks and TOWs

Declared Casualties Prior to OPFOR TOW

Withdrawal (Attack)

Training group

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 61 68

Posttest 22 54

In the posttest, the REALTRAIN unit improved substantially (22%

casualties); the conventional units showed less improvement (54% casualties). Thus, these data indicate that after training, conventionally S

trained units were more likely to be rendered ineffective early in

the engagement than were REALTRAIN units. The REALTRAIN units, however , were more likely to survive the early stages of the engagement

with sufficient forces to enable them to press their attack

effectively.

Early Tank Casualties. The ability of a tested unit to continue

an attack effectively depends partly on the total number of weapons

systems available. Perhaps more important, however, is the number of

surviving tanks, because the lightly armored TOWs cannot continue to S

attack unsupported. Table 6 presents the percentage of tested tanks

killed by OPFOR TOWs before OPFOR TOW withdrawal.

18

S •4 S

- ~~~~ 

~~~~

—.---—

~~

- ;

~~~~~
— 5 - 5 S S S 5S S S 5_~

Table 6

Percentage of Tested Unit Tanks Declared Casualties

Prior to OPFOR TOW Withdrawal (Attack)

Training group

Test REPLLTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 65 70

Posttest 16 65

In the pretest the REALTRAIN units had, on the average, less

than two surviving tanks when the TOWs withdrew. In the posttest they

had suffered less than one tank casualty on the average and were therefore in good condition to press the attack on the objective.

The conventional units improved slightly. Seventy percent of the

tanks were declared casualties prior to OPFOR TOW withdrawal in the

pretest, and 65% were casualties in the posttest. Thus, both in terms

of total weapon systems available and total heavy armor available ,

REALTRAIN units were better equipped than conventional units to con- S

tinue their attack effectively when the OPFOR TOWs were withdrawn .

Early Leader Casualties. Sound command and control are a critical aspect of any military operation . Frequently, when leaders are

lost units cease to function in an integrated fashion and become more S

vulnerable. Table 7 shows the percentage of tested unit leaders (tank

S platoon leaders and platoon sergeants) killed before the first OPFOR 1

TOW withdrew. The results are consistent with the previous data. In

the pretest, 75% of REALTRAIN leaders were killed before TOW withdrawal;

63% of conventional leaders were killed . Following training, only 13%

of the REALTRAIN units’ leaders had been declared casualties , compared

to 63% of the conventional units ’ leaders. Thus, the results are

consistent in indicating that in terms of both firepower and leadership, REALTRAIN units were better disposed to continue their attack 

successfully than were conventionally trained units.

OPFOR Casualties. The ability of a unit to inflict casualties on

an opposing force is another critical measure of its performance.

Table 8 shows the percentage of tank and TOW casualties inflicted on

the OPFOR by the tested units in the attack. In the pretest, both

REALTRAIN and conventional units inflicted relatively few casualties

on the OPFOR. Following training , however , REALTRAIN units improved

substantially , inflicting casualties on 44% of the OPFOR; conventional

units did not improve appreciably. In these posttraining exercises,

then, REALTRAIN units used their firepower more effectively than did

conventionally trained units.

19

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ S 55 5 .5S 5S 5 -~~~~S - -

~~~--~’—~ .=- 555 S~~~~ S S 5 S ~~~~~5 55 5 5 55.~~~ _______
S 5 J

555 5~~~~~5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _5 555_55__ 5~55 S555S5S5.5555~ — S

Table 7

Percentage of Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants

Declared Casualties Prior to OPFOR

TOW Withdrawal (Attack)

Training group

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 75 63

Posttest 13 63

Table 8

Percentage of OPFOR Tanks and TOWs Declared

Casualties in the Attack

Training group

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 6 12

Posttest 44 6

Meeting Engagement Casualties. Data from shoot-off meeting engagements are fully consistent with data from the posttest attacks. S Since REALTRAIN and conventional units opposed each other in these

exercises, the casualties sustained by one training group were inflicted

by the other. Thus, REALTRAIN units sustained 29% casualties and in— S

flicted 71% casualties; the figures are reversed for conventional units.

Again, REALTRA IN units’ performance was superior to that of conventional

units. S

Casualties Exchanged. Table 9 presents summary casualty exchange

ratios (CER) for the attacks and shoot-off exercises. The CER, which

presents tank/TOW casualties inflicted and sustained in a single index, is equal to the number of casualties inflicted divided by the number of casualties sustained. Thus, the larger the CER, the more favorable the exchange ratio to the tested unit.

20

I: 

~ 

____________________ 

______________________________________

I

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ::ii_ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
—55 —5 55 -5- ~~~~_~~

__~~~~~~~~ S_ _ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —

5 - - S - S~~~~-

-

Table 9 S

a Casualty Exchange Ratios (CER) for Attack and

Meeting Engagements (Shoot-Of fs)

Training~ group

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 0.04 0.09

Poettest 0.41 0.05

Shoot-off 2.5 0.4 a

a

CER is equal to the number of tank and TOW casualties inflicted by tested units divided by the number of casualties

sustained .

The CER data show that during pretests, both training groups earned

a most unfavorable CER. During posttests, the REALTRAIN units improved S

substantially, and conventional units did not change appreciably. During shoot-off s, both REALTRAIN and conventional units showed gains over

posttests, and REALTRAIN units earned a favorable CER.

These data suggest that the pretraining and posttraining test attacks were very difficult for all tested units. In addition , these

data support the military judgment, noted above, that all units could

have benefited from additional training because neither REALTRAIN nor S conventional units achieved a favorable CER in posttraining tests.

Defense. Following the attack , an administrative halt was called S

to resupply and reconstitute the tested units to full strength . The

units were then given their defensive mission and allowed 40 minutes

to consolidate and prepare their defenses before the OPFOR launched

their counterattack .

Tables 10 and 11 present, respectively , the percentages of casual—

ties sustained and casualties inflicted in the defense. These data

generally parallel those for the attack; during pretests, both training groups sustained devastating losses of approximately 90% of their S

j tanks and TOWs. Following training , however, both REALTRAIN and conJ ventional units reduced substantially the casualties sustained , with

REALTRAIN units showing the greatest improvement. The percentage of

casualties inflicted on the OPFOR did not change dramatically from

pretest to posttest, although both training groups improved . Conven- S tional units improved more (from 14% to 32% casualties inflicted) than

did the REALTRAIN units (from 25% to 32%). In the posttraining test,

both training groups inflicted an equal percentage of casualties.

21

.

~~S 5

~ 1 _...._ _ 

S 55 5 5 5 __S SS_ S

S S S 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 555S~ _____ L. ~~~~-~~~~~~~.____ ~~~~~~~~

_. .:
— S 5~5 5 5 5 . s~~

5 -- __55—-- —S 5

~~~~~~~

I

Table 10

Percentage of Tested Unit Tanks and TOWs Declared S

Casualties in the Defense S

Training group

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 89 89

Posttest 36 54

Table 11

Percentage of OPFOR Tanks and TOWS Declared S

Casualties in the Defense

Training gro~p

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 25 14

Posttest 32 32

Table 12 presents the CERs for the defense. In the pretest, neither REALTRAIN nor conventional units achieved a favorable exchange

ratio. In the posttest both REALTRAIN and conventional units improved

markedly , but neither was able to achieve a favorable exchange ratio.

These data further support the observation that both groups could have

benefited greatly from more than the 5 days of training received in

this experiment. It is also clear that the defense test module was

quite difficult for the tested units.

Use of Cover and Concealment

General. Previous sections have shown that during pretraining

tests all units performed poorly in terms of mission accomplishment S

and in terms of casualties inflicted and sustained. Moreover, although

tested units’ performances improved after training, neither REALTRAIN S

nor conventional units achieved favorable exchange ratios in posttrain— S

ing tests. Informal observation and test narrative data suggested

22

~~~~~~ _ 5 -— S 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - .—~~~~~~~~~-5—,-S -.

,—~
~~S S ___S ___5555S~~ 

~~~~~~~~ S

that test units, especially during pretraining tests, often exposed

themselves unnecessarily and were generally careless about their use

of cover and concealment.

Table 12

a Casualty Exchange Ratios (CER) for the Defense

Training group

Test REALTRAIN Conventional

Pretest 0.28 0.16

Posttest 0.90 0.60

a

CER is equal to the number of tank and TOW casualties

inflicted by tested units divided by the number of casual— S

ties sustained.

S Table 13 presents the frequencies of detections and identifications of the tested units by the OPFOR. These data show that overall 

the frequency of pretest detections of REALTRAIN and conventional units

was quite similar, about 18 detections per exercise. REALTRAIN units

tended to be detected more frequently during attacks, and conventional

units tended to be detected more often during defenses. During post—

tests both training groups improved , with REALTRAIN units showing the

greatest overall improvement.

Attack. The attack module of the test provided ample opportunity

for tested units to display their mastery of proper employment of cover

and concealment while traversing the approximately 3 km from the att~ position to their objective. Exploratory trials conducted before the

beginning of experimental trials showed that, with sufficient care, it S

was possible to approach test lane objectives without being detected S

frequently. S

The detection data from the attack (Table 13) suggest that use of S

cover and concealment during the pretest was poor. During posttraining

tests, however , detections of REALTRAIN units were reduced by 59%; de—

tections of conventional units increased . These findings help to ex- S

plain the casualty data (Table 5) that indicate that the REALTRAIN

units tended to be rendered ineffective relatively early during pretest exercises but not during posttests.

23

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Thus, after training , REALTRAIN units had improved their ability

to use cover and concealment properly to a greater extent than conventional units had, thereby providing the OPFOR fewer opportunities to

detect and engage. REALTRAIN , then , can provide an excellent vehicle

for teaching the importance of careful tactical movement and of selecting covered or concealed firing positions. S

Defense. During the consolidation phase of the defense, the OPFOR

were permitted to observe the tested units move into their defensive S

positions, but were prohibited from initiating an engagement . As in S

the attack, exploratory testing had indicated that it was possible for

the tested units to occupy sound defensive positions without unduly

exposing their locations.

Table 14, which presents a breakdown of the detections of tested

units during the defense, shows a generally high detection rate during

both phases of the defense. In the pretests, REALTRAIN and conventiona]. units were detected frequently during both consolidation and

execution phases. Although both groups improved in posttraining tests,

the REALTRAIN units’ improvement was the greatest and most consistent.

Conventional units improved greatly from pretest to posttest in the

consolidation phase, but did not improve appreciably in the execution

phase.

These detection data provide a partial explanation of the defense S

casualty data presented earlier . In the pretests, the OPFOR frequently

detected tested units moving into defensive positions and therefore

were able to engage them more easily when the OPFOR counterattack began. Moreover, as detection frequencies were also high during the execution, the OPFOR did not lack targets to engage.

During posttests., the nearly 60% reduction in detections of

REALTRAIN units’ tanks and TOWs was associated with a 60% reduction

in casualties sustained , and the 27% reduction of detections of conventional tanks and TOWs was associated with a 40% reduction in casual- S

ties sustained . Thus, the data from the attack and from the defense

indicate that poor use of cover and concealment was probably a major

factor in the tested units’ failure to accomplish their missions during pretests and for the conventional units’ failure during posttests.

The differences in the detection data were not due to a few extreme cases. Units were ranked with respect to the number of times S

tanks/TOWs from a unit were sighted by the OPFOR (data combined

across both missions). The rank of one was assigned to the unit which

had been observed by the OPFOR the most frequently, and the rank of

eight was assigned to the unit which had been observed least frequently.

Figure 2 presents the mean rankings for each training group as a 

function of pretest and posttest. The groups were similar in the pretest, but REALTRAIN units were superior after training . Thus, the S

superiority in use of cover and concealment , reflected by the decreased 

25

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Figure 2. Mean rankings of tested units based on frequency of

detection and identification of test unit elements I

by OPFOR. I

27 

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frequency of detections , was due to a general improvement in the

REALTRAIN units rather than to an exceptionally good or poor perform- 5

ance by one or two units.

Observation

General. As detections of tested unit vehicles by the OPFOR are

indicators of use of cover/concealment , so detections of the OPFOR by 

tested units are indicators of the tested units ’ alertness and their S

ability to select and use good overwatch positions. Table 15 presents

the frequency with which the OPFOR tanks and TOWs were detected by

tested units. S

Attack. In pretest attacks, REALTRAIN and conventional units detected the OPFOR infrequently. In posttest attacks, REPJ.TRAIN units S

more than doubled their detections of the OPFOR, but conventional

units made fewer detections. Because the OPFOR positions were well

concealed , it is not surprising that tested units did not detect them

often. However, even the modest number of detections made during the

posttests by REALTRAIN units was accompanied by a large increase in

casualties inflicted (from 6% to 44%) on the OPFOR. (See Tables 8 and

15.) Also , the decrease in detections by conventional units was accompanied by a decrease in casualties inflicted on the OPFOR. These

data suggest that after training REALTRAIN units had become better able 

to select and effectively use overwatch positions.

Another possibility is that increased mastery of movement techniques by the REALTRAIN units enabled them to close on the objective S

and detect and engage the OPFOR at relatively close ranges. In either

case, these data indicate an increased tactical proficiency in posttraining tests for REALTRAIN units. In contrast, the proficiency o~ conventional units did not increase .

Defense. In pretests, the tested units detected the OPFOR infrequently. During posttests, both REALTRAIN and conventional units

increased their detections of the OPFOR, with conventional units showing the greatest improvement. The nearly threefold increase in detections by conventional units was associated with a substantial increase

in casualties inflicted on the OPFOR (Table 11). The smaller gain by

REALTRAIN units was associated with a smaller increment in casualties

inflicted. These detection data are fully consistent with casualty

data presented earlier. The data suggest that, after training , tested

units from both training groups were better able to select and to use

effectively sound defensive positions that permitted observation and

engagement of the counterattacking OPFOR.

28

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Overall Performance

The preceding sections have compared REALTRAIN and conven tionally

trained units on a number of performance measures . Performance in

pretraining tests was poor . In posttraining tests, both groups generally showed some improvement. To determine the scope of improvement ,

tested units were scored on whether or not each showed improvement fr om S pretest to posttest on the five measures discussed above. These measures of performance consisted of mission accomplishment , casualties

inflicted , casualties sustained , detections by tested uni ts , and detections by the OPFOR. Tested units were scored on each measure for

the attack and for the defense , a total of 10 measures. REALTRAIN

units improved on an average of 7.8 of the 10 measures (median = 8),

and conventional units improved on an average of only 4.0 measures

(median 3.5). Thus, REALTRAIN uni ts improved on more measures than

did conventionally trained units .

In addition , tested units were ranked in terms of their pretest

and posttest performance on the same 10 measures . Pretest differences

between REALTRAIN and conventional units were not significant . In

posttests, however , REALTRAIN units (median = 6.5) were ranked significantly higher than conventional units (median 3.0; p = .057, Mann- S

Whitney U Test). This finding is supported by the results of the

shoot—off meeting engagements presented above . REALTRAIN units won

six of the seven engagemen ts and sustained fewe r and inflicted more

S casualties than did conventionally trained units. Thus, REALTRAIN

units not only improved on more critical performances than did conventionally trained units , but also performed significantly better

following training. The results presented in this report indicate that

REALTRAIN can be extremely effective for the training of Armor/Anti—

Armor units.

j

30
5 5 555555

/ 

APPENDIX A

OPERATIONS ORDERS AND MAPS USED IN PRETRAINING

AND POSTTRAININ G TESTS

r.

31

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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CTC OPORD — PHASE I & ~~~ . 

NOR TH TO SOUTH LANE

“OPFOR tanks and ATMs have been observed in the vicinity of the high

ground at 07407040 and 07857079. At 0615 hours, one medium tank was

confirmed as being in position at 07407000. No dismounted troops have

been observed . Enemy force estimated to be one tank platoon , reinforced

S with ATh’s. The TOW Section will remain attached to your platoon , one

155 Battalion is in DS of our Battalior . TF, you will have one FO Section

accompany you. No other organic support is available to you for this

mission. You will use your present location (09407300) as your Attack

Position. This position is secured by friendly infantry. Your LD is

the crest of the ridge running SE from 09207290. You will attack NLT B—

Hour along the rout e, 08907310, 08707265 , 08407160, 08407100 and seize

and secure the high ground at 07407020. See Map . You must traverse the

designated route with at least one tank section. After you clear the

objective you will consolidate your elements to secure the high ground

in that vicinity to deny its use to OPPOR. I will designat e specific

terrain f or you to def end in that area to deny the OPPOR posit ions which

overlook Hwy 11. I want you to get on the objective soonest; I will not

be able to pruvide you any help except limited artillery flres .* You

may use overwrtch positions located on the LD if you wish. Report your

arrival at , and passage of , all Phase Lines shown . I will follow your

S route of advance with the company command group. Any questions? (Ask

S quest ions in clarificat ion of your Senior Controller.) The time is now

H-Hour minus 45 otinutes.”

* We have an ASR of 49 HE rounds and 28 smoke rounds.

5 

32

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CTC DEFENSE FRA G ORDER S

North to South Lane

Recent observation reports indicate the enemy is preparing to counter attack

in our sector. We know he is occupying observation posts on the high ground

to our front . Our company team is consolidating on key terrain between Hwy 11

and 115 to secure these routes for the remainder of our task force. Your

mi ssion is to secure the high ground in the vicinity of 075700 and 074705 to

deny OPFOR int erdic t ion of Hwy 115. Charlie Company is responsible for security

of Hwy 11. Do not position any of your elements in their sector of responsibility.

Your right and left limit boundaries are indicated on the sketch map . You must

secure this terrain for at least one hour in order for the task force to pass

safely. s You will have 20 minutes to occupy your defensive positions when I give

you the signal to move out. We have not received a resupp ly of ar t illery

ammunition so that you must support your defense with the rounds remaining from

your original ASR. Do you have any questions?

33

S 5 5 S~~~~~~ ~~~~~~_ _S ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 55~~~~~~~~-~~~ ~~~S S— ~~S ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5 5
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CTC OPORD — PHASE I & III — SOUTH TO NORTH LANE

“OPFOR tanks and ATMs have been observed in the vicinity of the high

ground at 08501100 ax~

d 08157030. At 0615 hours ome medium tank was

confirmed as being in position at 08407100. No dismounted troops have

been observed . OPFOR is estimated to be 1 tank platoon reinforced with

ATMa . The TOW and FO Sections will remain attached to you , one 155

Battalion is in OS of our Battalion iT. No other organic support Is

available to you for this mission. You will use your present location

(064688) as your A ttack Position. This position is secured by friendly

infan try . You will attack NLT H—Hour in the Directlon—068684 , 073700 ,

and seize the high ground at 08507100. See Map. You must traverse the

designated route with at least 1 tank section. After you clear the

objective you will consolidate your elements to secure the high ground

in that vicinity to deny its use to OPPOR. I will designate specific

terrain for you to defend in that area to deny the OPFOR positions which

overlook HWY 11. This terraim must be neutralized so as to secure the

movement of the rest of our TP NW along HWY 11. Your LD runs generally

along the road from 066680 along the forward edge of Hill 6465. The

only help I can give you in case of contact is limited indirect fire

support. We have an ASR of 49 rnds BE and 28 rnds SMOKE. You may

occupy overwatch positions on the high ground to the rear of your LD if

you choose. Report your arrival and departure from all Phase Lines. I

will follow your route of advance. Any questions? (Ask of your Senior

Controller). The time is now 11—45 minutes.”

34

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CTC DEFENSE FRAG ORDER

South to North Lane

Recent observation repor ts indicate the enemy is preparing to counter attack

in our sector. We know he is occupy ing observation posts on the high ground S to our front. Our company team is consolidating on key terrain between Hwy 11

5 and 115 to secure these routes for the remainder of our task force. Your

S mission is to secure the high ground in the vicinity of 085708 and 087107 to

deny OPFOR interdiction of Hwy 11 south of the high ground at 094693. Charlie

S Company is occupy ing posit ions along Hwy 11 vIcinity of 089688. Do not

posit ion any of your elements in their sector of responsibility. Your right

and left limit boundaries are indicated on the sketch map. You must secure

this terrain for at least one hour in order for the ta sk force to pass safely.

You will have 20 minutes to occupy your defensive positions when I give you

the signal to move out. We have no t received a resupply of ar tillery

ammunition so that you must suppor t your def ense wi th the rounds remaining

from your original ASR . Do you have any questions?

35

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APPENDIX C

OPERATIONS ORDERS AND MAPS USED DURING SHOOT-OFFS

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COMPANY TEAl-I COMMANDER OPORD

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. Phase IV — Lane 1 — Northern Te8t Unit

I “Contact with the OPFOR has been lost. At last light yesterday, air OPs S ~ reported enemy tanks and AIMs operating in the vicinity of 06006800. - No enemy activity has been observed north of Phase Line White. The P0

and TOW sections renain attached to you. A 155 Battalion is in DS of

our Battalion TP.* Our Company Team will provid .- the Advance Guard for

our TF. The mission of the Battalion TP is to seize and secure FLOREN CE ,

COLO (15 miles SW of Camp Red Devil). You are designat’-d the point of

the Advance Guard• You will move out at H—Hour from an Attack Position S 

at your present location (09407300) . Your route of advance is shown on

: , the map. You must clear and traverse this route with at least 1 tank

~ section. You may deviate from this route only as dictated by the enemy

V situation. Other routes selected by you must vector in on your assigned

~ objective as shown on the map . You will seize and hold the key terrain

~ at 08007050 and destroy any opposing force contacted. You will occupy

k this position until ordered to move on to the SW. When you report this

r intermediate objective secure and clear of the enemy , the rest of the TV

~ S S will move . Report arrival and departure of all Phase Lines. Tank

~ trails parallel to Highways 11 and 115 are off limits . I will follow

along your route with the command group. Any questions? The time is

H-Hour minus 45 minutes.”

S 

* We have an ASR of 21 rounds of HE and 3 smoke missions.

~ 50

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COMPANY TEAM COMMANDER OPORD S

Ph ase IV - Lane 1 — Southern Test Unit

“Contact with the OPFOR has been lost. At last light yesterday air OPs S

reported enemy tanks and AThs operating in the vicinity of 09007300.

No enemy activity was reported south of Phase Line Dave. The TOW and P0

Sections remain attached. One 155 Battalion is in DS of our Battalion

TV. * Our Comapny Team will provide the Advance Guard for our TI. The

mission of the TF is to seize and secure PETERSON FIELD, COLO (15 wiles

NE Fort Carson) . You are designated the point of the Advance Guard.

You will move out at fl—Hour from an Attack Position at your present

location (07406850). Your route of advance is as shown on the map . You ,- must traverse and clear this route with at least 1 tank section. You

will seize and hold the high ground at 08007050 and destroy any opposing

force contacted. You will occupy this objective until ordered to move

on to the NE. When you report your objective clear, the rest of the TV

will move. Report your arrival and departure of all Phase Lines. Tank

tr ails parall el to Highways 11 and 115 are off limits. I will follow

your last element with the Company Team Command Group. The time is now

H—Hour minus 45 Minutes. A.0y questions?”

* We have an ASR of 21 rounds of RE and 3 smoke missions.

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COMPANY TEAM COMMANDER OPORD

Phase 1Y Lane 2 — Northern Test Unit

- “Contact with the OPFOR has been lost. At last light yesterday air OPs

~ reported enemy tanks and ATHs operating in the vicinity of 06006800.

~ No enemy activity was reported north of Phase Line Jim. The FO and TOW

. Sections remain attached. One 155 Battalion is in OS of our Battalion

TF.* Our Company Team will provide the Ad ~

nce Guard for our TF. The

mission of the TV is to seize and secure FLO}4P” ‘E . COLO (15 miles SW of

Camp Red Devil). You are designated the point oi ~he Advance Guard.

You will move out at H—Hour from an Attack Position at - - -or present

location (11357150). Your route of advance is as shown ~ the soap. You

must traverse this route with at lease 1 tank section , and ~“u may

deviate from it only as dictated by the OPFOR situation. Any additional

~ routes you select must vector on your assigned objective. You will

2 ‘ seize and secure the high ground at 08207010, destroy all enemy con—

~ tacted , and occupy this objective until ordered to move on to the SW.

12 When you report your objective secure and clear of enemy , the rest of

L the YF will move. Report your arrival and departure of all Phase Lines.

~ Tank trails parallel to Highways 11 and 115 are off limits. I will

~ follow your last element along your route of advance. The time is now

~ H—Hour minus 45 minutes.”

*We have an ASR of 21 rounds of HE and 3 smoke missions.

S 52

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Phase IV - Lane 2 ~

- Southern Test Unit

‘I “Contact with the OPFOR has been lost. At last light yesterday air OPs

~ 

reported enemy tanks and ATMs operating in the vicinity of 09007300.

~ No enemy contact was reported south of Phase Line Ernie. The FO and TOW

I Sections remain attached . One 155 Battalion is in DS of our Battalion

~ TF.* Our Company Team will provide the Advanced Guard for our TV. The S mission of the TF is to seize and secure PETERSON FIELD, COLO (15 miles

NE Fort Carson). You are designated the point of the Advance Guard.

You will move at H—Hour from an Attack Position at your present location

(05406850). Your route of advance is as shown on the map. You must

traverse and clear this route with at least 1 tank section, and you may

deviate from this route only as dictated by the enemy situation. Any

additional routes you select must vector on your assigned objective.

S You will seize and secure the high ground at 08207000 and hold it until

~ ordered to move on to the NE. When you report your objective all secure

~

, and clear of enemy, the rest of the TV will move. Report arrival and

departure at all Phase Lines. Tank trails parallel to Highways 11 and

115 are off limits. I will follow your route with the Command Group.

Any Questions? The time is now H—Hour minus 45 minutes.”

*We have an ASR of 21 rounds of HE and 3 smoke missions.

53

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APPENDIX D

CASUALTY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES

General. Weapon systems played in this experiment consisted of

(a) tank main gun (lO5nmi cannon) , (b) TOW Heavy Antitank Weapon, and

Cc) indirect fire (155mm artillery). In general, direct fire casualties were assessed when a controller aboard a firing vehicle informed

the controller aboard the target vehicle that the target vehicle had

been hit. Indirect fire casualties were assessed when a simulated

high explosive (HE ) round impacted within a specified radius of a

tactical vehicle . Firemarkers were primarily responsible for assess—

ing indirect fire casualties. The following sections describe the

specific procedures employed to assess the casualties inflicted by

each type of weapon system. The casualty assessment procedures em- S

ployed in this study followed those contained in PC 71—5, REALTRAIN, S

Tactical Training for Combined Arms Elements.

Direct Fire

Personnel. In all REALTRAIN exercises a controller was stationed

aboard each tactical vehicle. REALTRAIN controllers were responsible

for the timely and accurate assessment of casualties , for insuring

that REALTRAIN rules and procedures were followed, and for insuring

that casualties remained stationary and did not participate further

in the exercise.

Equipment

Optics. Ten power telescopes were installed on all tanks and

TOWs and were used by controllers to identify target vehicles during

engagements. On the TOW , telescopes were mounted on top of the gun—

tier ’s sight, and on tanks they were mounted in the main gun breech.

REALTRATh Panels. Twenty-inch-square, two—digit number panels 5 

were mounted on all tactical vehicles in order to identify individual

vehicles. Four panels were mounted on the four sides of all tanks,

TOWs , and the forward observers ’ 1/4-ton vehicles. Also , one panel

was mounted on the tank cupola, and one additional panel was carried

by each TOW to be used if the TOW was employed dismounted. Contro3-

lers insured that REALTRAIN number panels were not obscured by

camouflage

Radios. AN/PRC-77 radios were used by all controllers to communicate among themselves and to the RLEALTRAIN net control station.

Special headsets allowed controllers to monitor intra-tank

communications .

55

—~~ 2

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. - 

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Simulators. Tank weapon signatures were simulated using a Hoff-’

man device. TOW signatures were simulated using either a TOW backblast simulator, or, when these became in short supply , a hand grenade

simulator.

General Procedures. When a direct fire hit was made , the controller on board the firing vehicle transmitted the REALTRAIN panel

number of the target vehicle , the words “hit by” and the panel number

of his vehicle (e.g. , “38 hit by 29”). The REALTRAIN net control

station (NCS) logged this information. Next, the controller on board

the target vehicle transmitted the panel number of his vehicle and

the word “confirmed ,” (e.g., “38 confirmed”). The NCS logged the

confirmation . Only confirmed hits were counted as casualties. After S

the target vehicle controller confirmed the hit , he set off a green

smoke grenade to signify that the vehicle had been hit. Tanks were

also required to traverse the main tank gun over the rear deck and

all vehicles were required to raise a flag on their radio antennas.

In some cases, the panel number of the target vehicle could not

be clearly distinguished . Here , the firing vehicle controller transmitted the grid coordinates of the target in lieu of the target panel

number. The senior controller attempted to identify the target vehicle and , if successful , informed the target vehicle controller that

his vehicle was a casualty.

Tank Procedures. When a crew fires at a target, the tank controller immediately looks through the lOx telescope mounted in the

breech of the main gun. If the crosshairs of the telescope were on

a target and if the tank main gun simulator is detonated , the controller transmitted a hit over the REALTRAIN net.

Any target receiving a direct hit from the 105mm main tank gun

was considered destroyed . In addition , all exposed personnel or TOW

weapon systems within 10 m of the target were destroyed .

TOW Procedures. When the TOW gunner began to acquire a target,

the controller views the target through his lOx telescope. When the

gunner triggered the TOW, the controller detonated a backblast simulator (or hand grenade simulator) to the rear of the TOW vehicle .

In order to determine the time of impact of the missile , the controller had to estimate the missile flight time. Since the velocity of

the TOW missile is approximately 200 m per second , the time of flight

(in seconds) is equal to the range of the target (in meters) divided

by 200 rn/second. If the crosshairs of the controllers lOx sight were

on target at the end of the estimated time of flight, then the controller transmitted a hit over the REALTRAIN net.

No casualty was assessed if (a) the missile path was obstructed

by terrain features, foliage, etc., (b) if the target range was less

than 65 m , and (c) if the target range was greater than 3000 m . Any

target receiving a direct hit from a TOW missile was destroyed. In

56

_______ _________ 

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—
- -

~~-~- -. ‘ T ~~~~~~ 

‘

~ 

—

addition , all exposed personnel or TOW weapon systems within 10 m

of the target were destroyed .

Indirect Fire

General. Upon receipt of a smoke or high explosive (HE) fire

mission , Fire Direction Center (FDC ) personnel calculated the location

of the incoming round s and transmitted these to the firemarker nearest

the location. The four fireinarkers were responsible for delivery of

all indirect fire missions and for assessing casualties resulting -:

from HE missions.

When a firemarker received a mission from the FDC , he moved to

the location specified . Firemarkers were aided in their land navigation by 16 numbered checkpoints located on key terrain features S

throughout the test area . They were also provided with 1:25,000 topographic maps which had the checkpoints indicated .

Upon arrival at the impact location , firemarkers detonated the

rounds which had been requested . HE fire—for—effects and adjusting

rounds were simulated with the use of ground burst simulators (M115A2).

One round was detonated to simulate an adjusting round . Five rounds

were detonated to simulate a fire-for—effect , placed at the center

and corners of a 150 m by 300 m rectangle . White smoke grenades were

used for smoke screening fire—for-effects.

Following delivery of the fire mission , the firemarker reported

the delivery to the FDC and assessed casualties as appropriate. Casualties were assessed in terms of distance from the point at which HE

simulators were detonated , as follows:

0-10 meters: Tanks lose mobility and conuno. APCs and

wheeled vehicles are destroyed . All exposed

personnel are killed .

10-50 meters : Tanks lose comm . APCs and wheeled vehicles

are destroyed . All exposed personnel are

killed .

50+ meters: No effects.

Casualties were transmitted over the REALTRAIN control net in a

similar form to direct fire casualties (e.g., “38 hit by indirect

S fire”). All request times, splash times, number of rounds delivered ,

impact location , etc . were recorded in the FDC. In instances where

REALTRAIN controllers disagreed with firemarkers concerning assessed

casualties , the decision of the senior tactical controller was final.

57

- -~5 5 ~~ - — - ---~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~55~~ ,

5 S~~~~~~~~~ - - 

-

5

- — -
~~—“ --.~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ - “ ‘

~~~~~~~~~=~~~~~~ 

.‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 

~~~~~~~ 

-—------- —~~ 

--

~~~~~~ —~

When the FDC was informed that the requested rounds had been delivered , they, in turn , informed the requesting unit. The FDC did

not, however , inform the tested units or OPFOR of the effects of the S

indirect fire .

58

‘

~~~~~~~; ---- - ---

~~---~~— ~~~~-

~~~~~ -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

S
— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

- •

- ~~~~= .=~:—=----~

APPENDIX E

DATA FORMS

LIST OF DATA FORMS

Individuals Responsible for

Form No. Comp~

leting Data Forms

1 Field Scientist

3 FO Data Collector

4 Field Scientist

5 Fire Direction Center

Data Collector

6 Net Control Station

Data Collector

8 Test Unit Controllers

9 OPFOR Controllers

59

I —- S

i

- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ S ~_—~~~~_ S

I& - - - - .

~~~~ “ -

~ .5 - S .

— —.~~~~~

-.

~~~~

‘-..-.S

~~~— - ~~~~~~~~ . —~g.-_ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~ g

~~~i— -‘~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~-----‘.~.
- - -

~~ ~~~~ ~~- - TTT1T T~~~~~~- - ~ 

- S - - —

Data Form No. 1.

NAME ____________________ 

TRIAL NO. ____________

DATE __________________ TESTED UNIT I.D._______

TEST: PRE — 

POST —

SENIOR FIELD SCI ENTIST

Planning Phase

Warning Order.

1. Did the Platoon Leader issue a warning order to his subordinates?

Yes ( ) No ( )

2. If a warning order was issued , did it include:

a. Movement instructions to the unit? . N/A (. ) Yes ( ) No ( )

b. Location of enemy position? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

a

c. Time of- the attack? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

Supple!n~ntation of Information Provided in the CTC Attack Order

3. Did Platoon Leader move to a vantage point 5 in the area of the attack position and make

a personal recoQ.naissance? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No C )

4. If the Platoon Leader makes a personal recon—

naissance , was he accompanied by the

FO? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

5. Did the Platoon Leader request additional

information from the Company Commander? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

6. Did Platoon Leader discuss location of TO

J positions with the FO? N/A (. ) Yes ( ) No ( )

Issuance of th e Order

-

S 7. Did th e Platoon Leader. issue the order to

all section leadErs? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

60

- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~
-. — - —~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~-~----~~- 

— i

-

Data Form No. 1 (conti.tued)

Senior Field Scientist

Planning Pha se

8. Was the order issued from a vantage

point where the persoi

~

s receiving the

order could view the terrain? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

9. Did the attack-order include:

a. Information on OPFOR composition? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

b. Information on OPFOR location? N/A C ) Yes ( ) No ( )

c. . Information on artillery support? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

d. Specific instructions to each

section? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

e. Information about communications? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

f. Routes of advance for each -

section? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

g. Provisions fo r overwatch? N/A C ) Yes ( ) No ( )

h. Location of overwatch positions? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

i. Tempo~

ral coordination b~

etween S 

overwatch and maneuver? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

j. Temporal coordination between

smoke screening and maneuver? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

k. Temporal coordination between

suppressive artillery fire and

maneuver? N/A ( ) Yes ( ) No ( )

10. Content of Order (Sum marize order for each section with respect to

overwatch positions and specific roles to be played by each section.

Indicate routes of advance fo r each section on map).

Si

Heavy Section:

61
r 

~~~~~~~~~ .- - - 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Data Foxin No. 1

Senior Field Scientist

Planning Phase

Content of Order (continued )

Light Section:

TOW Section:

FO Section:

-1

62

-~~~~~~~ S~~~ __ 

-

~ - -

~~~~~

- - - - - - —

.—~~~~~ -.- 

—- - — - 5- ;- - —-- —

~

-.-

~~

--- ‘S—

~~

- 5-

-— ~~~~—~

- -~ ---~~~~5.~ .

~

- .

‘1- - , - 

~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~

5 5 5

Data Form Nq. 1

Senior Field Scientist

Planning Phase

Provisions for temporal coordination between overwatch and maneuver :

Provisions for temporal coordination beteen smoke screening and maneuver:

Provisions for temporal coordination between suppressiv e artillery fire

and maneuver:

a

i

i - S

63

— ___

.*•;,. ~~~~~~~~~~ 

- —5—-- —5--- —-——----.-5--- S..~_ - -

—---—5—----—- S~~~~~~~ 5• ~

__~~~~ ~~~~ •

~~

dI

~~_~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~ _ ..

~~ Eii~

15- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --5-.~ -~~~~~ - 5.~~~~-—-.--- .- ~~ -S~~~~~~~ -~~~~~
- - 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -

TO DATA COLLECTOZ

Data Form No. 3

NAME —______________ TRIAL NO. ______________

DATE ______________ 

TESTED UNIT I.D._________

PEA.SE II III IV -V VI

Platoon Leader’s Order

1. Does Platoon Leader ’s order include:

a. Location of planned fires - Yes ( ) No ( )

b. Location of smoke screening Yes ( ) No ( )

2. Give location of each planned fire from PL’s order:

1. ________ 

2. ____________ 3. ____________ (8 digit coordinate)

Time: S 

—~~~~~~ __________

4. _______ 

5. ____________ 6. ____________

Time: __________ __________ ______

V _____________ 8. _____________ 

9. _____________

Time: - .

3. Give location of each smoke screen from Pt’s orde r :

1. _____________ 

2. _____________ 3. _____________ 

(8 digit coordinate)

Time: ____________ ____________ ____________

4. _____________ 

5. _____________ 

6. _____________

Time: ____________ ____________ ____________

7. ______ 8. ______ 9. ______

Time: ___________ ___________ ___________

4.. Location of initial observation point selected by FO (8 digit -

- coordinate) — as determined by data collector .

64

- -5 - 5 -

~

— - S_ - . _____________
TITT -~- TTT - - - - , - - - 

- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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65

S: 

____
—

Data Form No. 4

NAME __________________________ TRIAL NO. ______________

DATE — TESTED UNIT I.D._________

TEST: PRE -— POST____

SENIOR FIELD SCIENTIST

DEFENSE S

1. Did Pt issue an order for the defense? Yes ( ) No ( )

2. Did PL assign a general location of the

positions for:

a. Heavy Section Yes ( ) No C )

b . Light Section Yes ( ) No ( )

C. TOW Section Yes ( ) No ( )

d. P0 Yes ( ) No( )

3. General locations assigned:

a. Heavy Section

b. Light Section

C. TOW Section

d. P0

66

--———~~~~~~~ -- -—- - - -- --——-—~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~— —~~~ —-.

~~~~~- -

~~T~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

~

- 

- ~ ___~

.~~~*t __,~~f

1. ~~~~~~ —

5-—.—- 5 -.~~~~~~ - 5 5-- -5--— -

~~~-—- .—~~. _.,_a~

. ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —
--—-. 5- ~~—---- - - - yr

Data Form No. 4 (continued)

Senior Field Scientist

Defense

4. Does Pt assign a specific task to:

a. Reavy Section Yes ( ) No( ) b . Light Section Yes ( ) No ( )

c. TOW Section Yes ( ) No C ) d. P0 Yes ( ) No( )

5. Tasks assigned:

a. Heavy Section:

b . Light Section:

c. TOW Section :

d. FO:

67

-

~

— - --- —— f-- -

-5-—— —~~ — ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~— I 5-
- S - -r--—---~ 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _J~ - ~~~

5- -

~~

-‘----~ - Z ~~T - - —

Data Form No. 4 (continued)

Senior Field Scientist

Defense

6. Did Pt order include preplanned ar tillery

fire? Yes ( ) No ( )

7. Locations of preplanned artillery fire:

8. Did Pt order include smoke screening

missions? Yes ( ) No ( )

9. Location of smoke screening missions:

10. Did PL order provide for temporal coordination between

— artillery suppressive fire and maneuver? Yes ( ) No C ) 

S

11. Provisions for coordinating artillery suppressive fire

and man euver were:

12. Did PL order provide for temporal coordination

between smoke screening and maneuver? Yes ( ) No ( )

13. Provisions for coordinating smoke screening and

maneuver were:

68

--

~~~~~~~~---~~

‘

LIrL -

~~~~~~~~~~ _~~~~~~——4

S. ~~ - -

~~~-—~~~~~~ -~ --~~~~~~ . 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~ - - - - - 5 

— ~~~~_

___ ____

Data Form No . 4 (continued)

Senior Field Scientist

Def ense -

14. Did PL order provide for coordination of over-watch and maneuver? Yes ( ) No ( )

15. Provisions for coordinating overwatch and

maneuver were:

16. Did PL order provide: 

a. Check Points Yes ( ) No ( )

b. Phase Lines Yes ( ) No ( )

c. Audible Signals Yes ( ) No ( )

69

4 -. .5-— — — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —5-- ~S -~ ~~5_5__~~~_~ -~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ — — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —~~~~~—- ~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Data Form # 5 FIRE DiRECTION CENTER

Trial No. ___________________ Test ______ 

3.. __________ 5. -

Date ______________________ Training _____ 2. — 6. _________

Unit I. D. __________________ 

Shoot—Off _____ 3. __________ 7. -

Name _____________________ 

CAT ______ 

4. _________ 

8. -

C

o C ‘.4 0

C U .1

~

equest ~~~ Location! 0—T Splash EDS ~ Time ~~~~ Adjustment Azimuth Time Fired ~ ~ .

~~ Casualties

70

__________ 

t 

- 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- - , _~~~~_ , _ ‘5-~~ 

- 

5-

~~~~~~~~~, 5-_~

5-

Data Form No. 6

Page 1

NET CONTROL SHEET

Date_________________ TEST: PRE POST

(Circle One)

Trial No._____________ NAME:_________________

Unit I.D.______

TIME EVENT

1. CTC order is issued .

2. Platoon Leader has issued order to platoon. START OPFOR,

_________ — START Tac. Tape ________

3. First element crosses LD, a ttack begins. START Rt . Tape

— 3a. Consolida tion of OBSJ begins with remaining f orce , 20 m m . 

—

4. A ttack Module and consolidate end. STOP Tapes.

4a. Admin. Halt , TU casualties are resurrected.

5. 1~~~~~~e~ .1o4~

pie begins wi th f ull f orce , 20 mm max . to consolidate.-

6. Consoli fation of Defensive Position Ends.

7. OPFOR Counterattack Begins.

8. Defense Nodule ends STOP all Tapes S

71

- - . ----

-- ---- -- --- - S

~~~~~~~

-

—5- —5- — —--— —-—--5---- -- _ . - ~~~~~~~~~ ~ a.~

.. -_ ,

~ g~

j4 

— 

A
Form No. 6 ATTACK

DATE ___________________________

TRIAL _______________________

___________ 

TESTED UNIT _________ 

OFFOR

Veh . TC ~

oad Dr. Curi Veh. TC Load Dr. Cun

Vehicle N~ N~~ N~~ N~~ N~~ Vehicle No. N~ N~~ N~~ N~~ —

TK PL _ _ _ __ _IK_ PL

TX

TX ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

TK PSG — — — — — —

TK

5 T0W LD~~~~~~~~~~_ — -

_ _-— —- -

~~~~~~~~~~~~

___ 

10

md.

TCT Firer - Time Conf Fire Comments

72

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ _
- — — —. ‘5- ‘r -r-.- ~~ -- -

~

Form No. 6

DEF~~ SE/COUN ’rLRATTACK

DATE __________________________

TRIAL _____________________

-

___________ 

TESTED UNIT __________ 

OPFOR

Veh. TC ~

oad br . Gun Veh . TC Load Dr. Cue

Vehicle No. No. No. No. No. Vehicle No. No. No . No. No.

TK PL _ S~~~~KPL

TK — —— — - _____ ____ — — — —

TK —S - 

IK-__------- — — — — -— -—

TK PSC — — — — I!~~P5G _ — — — —--

_ 

__ 

—iii

___ 

10

md.

TGT Firer T5me Conf Fire — 

Comments

73

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74

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~~ o t—• z — - _____________________ _______ 

—

75

- - -_ _

. _ ._.__.___ ._ _. —~~~ S_~~~~ _5.~

__ __SS~_SS 

—. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _~ 

— 

bIUI..’

~

__ _•___

~~~~~_ 

— _ — _

~~~~.. 5- S5_~~ — —
r v—--r.- ,-, ~~~~~~ - — -.---. ,_ - -

~~-~~- S ~

—w j 

~FN -

APPENDIX F

CRITERIA FOR ABORTED , INTERRUPTED , AND OMITTED TRIALS

A. A trial will not be started if any one of the following criteria

are met :

1. Any tested unit vehicle is not operational in the ECC area.

2. More than one tested unit vehicle is not operational in the

attack position .

3. During Phase I , in one or more of the test unit crews :

a. The TC, gunner or driver is not MOS qualified ; or

b. The TC, gunner or driver is not present.

4. During Phases III or IV , in one or more of the tested unit

crews , the TC , gunner or driver did not participate in Phase I.

5. Any OPFOR vehicle is not operational in the ECC area.

6. More than one OPFOR vehicle is not operational in the OPFOR

initial start position .

7. Some of the crew of any OPFOR vehicle (TC or gunner) has not

been trained in the OPFOR duties and action sequences.

8. Any platoon tactical net radio , REALTRAIN NCS radio or FDC

net radio is not operational .

9. The test lane has been judged un trafficable (determined by

Senior Field Scientist and the Senior Tactical Controller).

10. Weather is sufficiently inclement as to preclude meaningful

exercise data to be gathered (determined by Senior Scientist

and Senior Tactical Controller) .

11. One or more controllers are missing from either the tested

uni t or from the OPFOR .

B. A trial will be interrupted for correction of operational problems

if any one of the following criteria are met :

1. More than one tested unit vehicle or more than one OPFOR

vehicle becomes nonoperational.

77

- - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _——_ --—- — S——~~~~~~~~— — - -S —

—-.5—-- ~~S~5- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘-5- — )—.--——--~ .-. —i- U— ~ - 

~~~~ ~~,

~~~~_ _ * ~ .r ~~~~~~~~~ ‘I L5i1?::_~

. 

~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
— --—5--- —-5- 5-.--- , 5- 5-”.’~~

5-’

~~~ ”~~~~~~

’ 

5 _ 5 5- - -

2. More than one of the controller radios becomes nonoperational

on the NCS frequency.

3. The REALTRAIN NCS radio(s) becomes nonoperational.

4. Failure of the tested unit to follow critical elements of

the CTC order. (Interruption of trial is a last resort :

The Senior Tactical Controller and Senior Field Scientist will

try to correct problems without interrupting the trial.)

5. Failure of the OPFOR to follow the OPFOR scenario. (Interruption of trial is a last resort : The OPFOR Coordinator and

the OPFOR Field Scientist will try to correct problems without

interrupting the trial.)

6. An injury occurs such that it would be dangerous for the injured party to continue the exercise .

C. A trial will be shorted only if , in the jud gment of the Test Di—

rector and the Senior Scientist , a condition listed in “A” or “B”

(above) is sufficiently serious to preclude the safe conduct of

the exercise or the collection of meaningful performance data.

78

______ 

______ ‘ ;

~~~~~~~~~~

—

— ~~~~~ :_ -
________ s 

~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

APPENDIX G

PROCEDURES FOR ASSIGNING UNITS TO TREATMENTS

The procedure below will be followed in assigning test units to

treatments (REALTRAIN (RT)) or conventional training (CT)).

From baseline test (Phase I) results :

1. Calculate ratio of track losses , tested unit/OPFOR, for each

tested unit;

2. Determine operational time (total exercise duration less

administrative times out) for each unit;

3. Multiply track loss ratio by operational time for each unit.

Call the product P;

4. Rank units , within each cycle , by P;

5. In the first cycle , assign units ranked 1 and 4 to RT , ranks

2 and 3 to CT ;

6. In the second cycle , assign units ranked 2 and 3 to RT, ranks

l and 4 to CT.

t

79

— -.5-
_______ -v--- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

--5--

~~~~~~~~~~ -

5-

~~~~~~~~~~~ - -~~~~~ -~~~~~~~~~

-

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -

—-—- ---

~~~ ‘5~~~ --

APPENDIX H

GU IDANCE FOR TRAINERS

81

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APPENDIX I

TERRAIN

The training and field testing area was roughly rectangular in

shape , approximately 3 ,000 meters wide by 7,000 meters long. The

long axis ran generally northeast to southwest . Two key terrain

features dominated this area. The first was a ridge , about 3 ,000

meters long which crossed the northeast end of the area. With an

evaluation of 6 ,600 feet, this ridge was some 200—300 feet above the

general ivel of the surrounding terrain. The second feature was a

ridge , 800 meters long and 6,450 feet in elevation , which dominated

the southeast extremity . Between these two features the terrain was

both varied and difficult , but trafficability for both tracked and

wheeled vehicles could be classified as good . Of the total area,

some 60% could be categorized as open , 30% as wooded and requiring

close maneuver , and the remaining 10% as too rugged for use. The

critical terrain, in a military sense , was a ridge 25 00 meters long

and about 6,400 feet elevation which bisected the area. To the

northeast of this ridge the terrain was generally open and gently

rolling , and provided a wide choice of high speed avenues of approach .

However , good terrain appreciation was required to recognize the cover

provided by the deceptively gentle changes in elevation . Toward the

southeast end , three draws provided deep—cut cross corridors which

canalized movement. Again , good terrain appreciation was required

to use and negotiate these draws. Overall, the nature of the terrain

favored the attacker as it provided adequate cover and concealment

along with sufficient open areas for mutual support among maneuvering

sections .

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TERRAIN USED IN PRE-TRAINING AND POST—TRAINING TESTS

116

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~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ - - - -—- - - - - — -
APPENDIX J

TEST NARRATIVE

SOUTH TO NORTH LANE

PL Attack Order

The order was issued from a vantage point where the unit could

view the terrain. All vehicle commanders were present when the order

— was issued.

The platoon leader planned to attack the objective on the eastern

flank with the heavy section while the light and TOW sections provided

overwatch for the attacking element. The light section and one TOW

were to travel towards the objective using a route which was in the

general vicinity of the following coordinates: 073690, 080686 ,

084690, and 085700. The light section and TOW were then to remain

south of the objective and cover the attack by the heavy section.

The heavy section and one TOW were ordered to travel towards the objective via a route bordering Highway 11 to a point in the vicinity of

102701. The TOW was then to provide overwatch from the high ground

at 103705 while the heav~ section moved towards the objective.

The heavy section and one TOW were to move out of the attack posi—

tion and move to an overwatch position at a point crossing grid 690.

This element was then to provide overwatch for the light section and

TOW as the latter element moved to a point where their route of ad-

- 

vance intersected grid 690. The light element was then to provide

overwatch for the heavy element as the latter moved to the intersection

of their route of advance and grid 700. The light element was then to

move to grid 700 while the heavy element provided overwatch. From that

point in time the light element was to overwatch the heavy element from

the vicinity of grid 700. Overwatching elements were to notify maneuvering elements that overwatch had been provided by giving the message uv set uv over the radio.

The P0 was assigned to travel with the heavy section. The PL order

included a request for smoke screening at 092708 to cover the attack on

the objective. This mission was to be registered. The PL ordered the

P0 to provide preplanned IL.E. on the objective . No mention was made of

the time when these missions were to be employed.

117

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PL Defense Order

The order was not issued from a vantage point where the unit could

view the terrain . All vehicle Commanders were present when the order -• was issued.

The PL believed that the enemy would attack the objective via the

western avenue of approach, and the PL said it was unlikely that the

enemy would attack across the open ground to the east of the objective.

The elements were thus assigned so as to cover the western approach.

No elements were assigned to the eastern boundary of the objective.

The light section was ordered to take up positions on the north central

edge of the objective . The TOWs were assigned to positions on the western boundary of the objective. The heavy section was assigned to the

north—western edge of the objective . The positioning of the light

section provided some cover of the eastern approach.

The PL told the TOW section to ground-mount their weapons and he

told the tank commanders to send out OPs.

The PL requested H.E. missions in the general vicinity of 087713

and 082718. These locations were selected because of the PL’s expectations of an attack from the northwest. Provisions for the times when

these fires were to be provided were not included in the order.

The Attack Tested Unit

Six of the tested unit crews were not briefed on the attack order

given by the Platoon Leader. There was some confusion as they started

to leave the assembly area about who was going to go where. There was

no one left in overwatch. The heavy section took the low ground out of

the attack position , so their movement was covered and concealed. The

light section and the TOWs moved across the LD, moving north simultaneously with no one in overwatch position.

OPFOR Point of View: The tanks moved like columns of ducks. They

followed each other--came out of the woods and stopped in the center

clearing and were dead shots. The TOWs moved very well. The OPFOR

tank 37 saw 56 and shot him. 56 was moving well, but not quite well

enough. 80 moved right near where 56 got shot. He just pulled up a

little too far in the woodline and the OPFOR got him.

How many of the tested unit vehicles were seen crossing the LD

shortly thereafter? The only one seen near the LD was 24, and he was

shot by 20. Then 3 minutes later, 13 was shot. Within 6 minutes they

got the light section. They moved badly with the exception of the TOWs.

Right. It ’s probably significant that the TOWs 56 and 80 were hit not

by the OPFOR TOWs , but by the OPFOR light section.

118

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The general route selected by the Platoon Leader did afford cover

arid concealment. That is why they were not piôked up initially as they

moved out of the assembly area. The light section deviated from the

route indicated by the Platoon Leader. They crested early, and of

course they were the first two to go. The light section and TOWs were

moving in generally the same direction , but they were not covering each

other. They were moving independently. There was not a single transmission between the Platoon Leader and his light section, or between

either section of the tanks and TOWs. There was absolutely no coordination. When the light section bought it, the TOWs were left on their

own . The heavy section Platoon Leader had gone clear south of Peanut

Mountain, instead of attacking north. He was three grid squares south

of that mountain before he figured out where he was.

The TOWs continued to move, and the controllers asked them, “Where

are your tanks?uv Neither one of the TOW section leaders had the foggiest idea about the location of the tanks or made any attempt to try

to call them. The TOWs, af ter the light section moved, continued to

move in covered and concealed routes. However, the TOWs were just moving one behind the other in the attack. Why? I don’t know. They were

very noisy in their movement. Thatu s how the OPFOR initially picked

them up. They were crossing open areas. The OPFOR was occupying those

areas which they were trying to get across. For a good portion of the

attack, the TOW section was leading the attack and didnut know it. They

both poked out of the woodline and were killed.

The heavy section finally got turned around and headed back north.

They got clear out of that major creek east of it, just on the other

side of Tank Trail 11 and were moving right across the open, across

that ridgeline and moving right in line, 1, 2, 3.

k Where they went south is off the maps, I take it.

Right--they circled back around north and then in the vicinity of

084684. Somewhere from thereabouts. The first tank got hit and the

next two tanks continued to move. They moved right up behind them and

around dead vehicles. The TOW took them, 1, 2, and 3.

The FO elected to move with the TOWs after he had problems with

his vehicle. He never called any fire missions.

No one in the tested unit ever detected an OPFOR vehicle of any

kind. Again a couple of controllers indicated that they saw OPFOR

vehicles and should have been some observation of TOW 20 and TOW 41

when they engaged the vehicles. The Platoon Leader split his elements.

He did not attempt to conununicate with them to find out if they were

on their route or if they were doing what they were supposed to do.

Thus, their movement was not coordinated . Part of the problem was

that he was so far south of that mountain that he could not talk to

them.

119

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Defense

Again, 6 of the 8 crews were not briefed on the defense order.

The Platoon Leader did take the heavy section and the TOW section cornmanders up and pointed out the locations where he wanted them. One

of the TOWS failed to occupy a position he had indicated, and thus

both TOWs ended up in the western sector. One TOW was supposed to be

overlooking the eastern flank of the objective.

What did the OPFOR see as the TU moved into position?

TOW 20 saw Tank 24, Tank 29, and another tank. TOW 41 saw what

they thought was 39. The heavy section saw 39, 36, and 22. They had

general location on 80 and 56. They couldn ut tell who 56 was because

he didn ut have his number up front. The OPFOR thought the set-up of

the Pu was outstanding . Their area movement was not too bad , but they

had smoke and noise all over the place. The TU selected good fire po—

sitions, but the PU was not really disposed to accomplish their mission.

The Platoon Leader had only one vehicle in the position to cover

the eastern flank. He did not have enough elements to cover his eastern approaches to the objective. He was disposed fairly well to cover

the movement of the heavy section from the west because most of his

elements were in that location . The Platoon Leader was the first to

get killed , and the P0 was with the Platoon Leader. With the first

shot, the Platoon Leader and all the indirect fire capability was gone.

No other PC ever elected to get up on the net and use indirect fire,

so the tested unit did not fire any indirect fire. Tanks 13 and 36

crews had ample opportunity with their observers out to pick up move—

ment of the heavy or the light section , but neither saw the OPFOR until

the very last minute. All the tanks were kept running in the defense.

They couldn’t hear very well but their observers that were forward had

observation of the area where there was movement. They failed to report their observations .

There were some fairly good positions picked within the defense

area, but the observation was not that good. And there was no coordination between the elements. There were three elements placed within

about 50 meters of each other, two TOWs and Tank 13, when the fire

mission came in. When the OPFOR fire-for—effect came in, all three

vehicles were effectively damaged. They lost both TOWs and two of the

crew members on Tank 13. The damage inflicted caused the remaining crew

members on Tank 13 to pick up and move out of the area. They moved

right into the OPFOR light section and were destroyed . The entire

western sector was then open to the OPFOR. As the OPFOR approached the

objective, they detected the last tested unit tank. It was not until

the last minute that the tested unit tank decided that somebody was in

front, and it pulled right out in the open to try to engage. The OPFOR

hit the last TU tank. There was no communication after the Platoon

Leader and the Platoon SGT were hit, and they were the first two vehicles

to go. None of the other tanks or TOWs communicated with each other.

120

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It appeared that the test unit never really got into a final position. The first vehicle that was hit was 39, and 39 was still moving.

Everybody was set up except for the heavy section. The heavy section

was still moving with the Platoon Leader, and they had not settled down

into defensive positions when the consolidation period was up. They

moved out on time, but the heavy section was late moving into position.

The Platoon Leader physically ground guided the light section to position. The Platoon Leader’s tank did not know where he was. The heavy

section was just left sitting without any guidance until the PL came

back to get his heavy section. He put the heavy section in one location and then decided he did not like it. He pulled out and moved down

the creek. By that time, he had used up about all of his time.

The OPFOR, in fact, had accomplished the mission at 1427. They

were on the objective and moving to the checkpoint 17.

What time did the exercise begin?

The exercise began at 1403.

121

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