J-A15020-22

2022 PA Super 177

DENISE L. WILSON

v.

KYRA S. SMYERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 128 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 10, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County,

Civil Division at No(s): 797 for the year 2017.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: October 14, 2022

Kyra S. Smyers (Mother) appeals the order issued by the Bedford 

County Court of Common Pleas, which expanded the custody rights of Denise 

L. Wilson (Grandmother1) regarding Mother’s five-year-old son, L.H.S. (the 

Child). Under a previous consent order, Grandmother exercised supervised 

physical custody for an hour and a half, every other week, in Mother’s home. 

This matter involves the parties’ cross-modification petitions. Grandmother 

sought unsupervised partial custody under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1); in 

response, Mother sought to “suspend” Grandmother’s custody, stopping the

visits altogether. The trial court granted Grandmother’s relief, awarding her 

partial custody on the first Saturday of each month. On appeal, Mother argues 

____________________________________________

1 Denise Wilson is the paternal grandmother.
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that the court misapplied 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)(1) (considerations when 

awarding grandparent custody). After careful review, we affirm.

In its opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court provided 

the relevant factual and procedural history:

Mother and George Bango, Jr. (Father) began a relationship 

when Mother was 19 years old, and Father was 32 years old, 

while they both worked at [a local hospital]. Mother was 

employed in the housekeeping department while Father was 

an emergency room nurse. Father was an Army veteran 

and suffered from mental health issues. Mother’s parents 

did not approve of the relationship. Mother hid the 

relationship, and ultimately six months of her pregnancy, 

from her parents. As the relationship progressed, Father 

became more controlling and obsessive with Mother. 

Father’s mental health problems spiraled and ultimately he 

ended his own life [in December 2016, when the Child was 

approximately 5 months old].

[...] Grandmother initially filed a Complaint for 

Grandparent’s Custody on August 18, 2017. In her initial 

Petition, Grandmother requested periods of partial custody 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1).

[2] [A] hearing on the 

matter was ultimately scheduled for May 24, 2018, at which 

____________________________________________

2 Section 5325(1) (Standing for partial physical custody and supervised 

physical custody) provides: 

In addition to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating 

to standing for any form of physical custody or legal 

custody), grandparents and great-grandparents may file an 

action under this chapter for partial physical custody or 

supervised physical custody in the following situations:

(1) where the parent of the child is deceased, a parent 

or grandparent of the deceased parent may file an action 

under this section;

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1).
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point the parties agreed to an order granting Grandmother 

periods of supervised partial custody every other Friday 

from 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., to be supervised by Mother 

and to occur in Mother’s home, as well as several collateral 

provisions. These supervised periods of partial custody 

were faithfully exercised by Grandmother for approximately 

two years until the COVID-19 pandemic. The parties agreed 

to suspend the in-person periods of partial custody in 

March/April 2020 and instead Grandmother would telephone 

the Child. Grandmother made repeated requests to resume 

some form of in-person contact with the Child, which [were]

denied by Mother. 

Ultimately, Grandmother filed a Petition to Modify the 

Custody Order on July 29, 2021, which gave rise to the 

instant litigation and appeal. In her Petition to Modify, 

Grandmother requested that the visits resume and not be 

supervised, arguing that supervision was no longer 

necessary since a relationship and bond had developed 

between Grandmother and the Child such that those 

provisions were no longer necessary. Thereafter, on 

September 22, 2021, Mother filed a Petition for Modification 

of Custody, requesting that Grandmother’s periods of partial 

custody be suspended, alleging that the Child and 

Grandmother failed to develop a bond and that the Child 

identifies Mother’s fiancé as his father and [the fiancé’s] 

parents as [the Child’s paternal] grandparents.

Following hearings held on November 12, 2021, and January 

3, 2022, [the trial court] granted Grandmother’s Petition for 

Modification of Custody and by Order dated January 2, 

2022, granted Grandmother unsupervised partial custody 

on the first Saturday of each month from 10:00 a.m. until 

5:00 p.m., as well as several collateral provisions. 

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 2/11/22, at 1-3 (capitalization and format

adjusted) (footnote added).

Mother timely filed this appeal. She presents three issues for our 

review, which we reorder for ease of disposition:
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1. Did the trial court commit an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion when it precluded [Mother] from offering 

more detailed testimony of the circumstances 

surrounding the [Father’s] conduct towards [Mother] 

and her family, culminating in the [Father] taking his 

own life (suicide), and those circumstances’ effects 

upon Mother and her extended family?

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion when, under the circumstances of the 

present matter, it ordered an expansion of 

[Grandmother’s] physical custody rights to partial 

custody, notwithstanding the lack of any appreciable 

relationship between her and the [Child]?

3. Did the trial court commit an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion when, under the circumstances of the

present matter, it overrode [Mother’s] decision (or 

denied her request) to terminate continuing contact 

between the [Child] and [Grandmother], 

unnecessarily and/or improperly overriding a fit 

parent’s decision and giving insufficient weight to the 

parent-child relationship, by ordering an expansion of 

custodial contact afforded [to] the [Grandmother] to 

partial custody?

Mother’s Brief at 7-8.

Mother’s first appellate issue concerns the admission of evidence. Citing 

her unhealthy relationship with Father and the circumstances of his death, 

Mother argued at trial that any involvement with the paternal family would 

adversely affect her mental health and, by proxy, her ability to parent. To 

support this argument, Mother sought to introduce her own testimony, as well 

as that of her family members. According to Mother, “[s]uch testimony would 

have provided significant context as to why [Mother] decided it was better to 

end an unproductive, unsubstantial relationship between [Grandmother] and 

the Child.” Id. at 32. The trial court permitted some of Mother’s testimony 
J-A15020-22

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but found Mother’s additional, proffered evidence to be irrelevant or 

superfluous. Mother alleges the court erred.

To resolve this issue, we are guided by the following principles. The 

admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed only upon a showing that the 

trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 

736, 749 (Pa. Super. 2014). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the 

exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, 

prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id.

(citation omitted).

The threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether the 

evidence is relevant. Id. at 750 (citation omitted). 

Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a 

material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more 

or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or 

presumption regarding the existence of a material fact. In 

addition, evidence is only admissible where the probative 

value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. 

Id.; see also Pa.R.E. 401; 402; 403. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court summarized Mother’s 

testimony:

The court heard a substantial amount of testimony about 

the relationship between the parents prior to Father’s 

suicide. It was obvious to this court that the parents’ 

relationship was not a very good one due in large part to 

[Father’s] serious mental health struggles. Mother testified 
J-A15020-22

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that she and Father never lived together. As the 

relationship progressed, he became more possessive and 

was obsessed with her. Mother testified that in 

approximately May 2016, Father was acting erratically, 

which culminated in a stand-off with the Pennsylvania State 

Police. Father had a firearm and attempted to kill himself 

but was taken into custody and incarcerated. Mother 

testified credibly that this was a terrifying time for her and 

her family. Father was released from jail in approximately 

September 2016. After being released, Father sent Mother 

a few emails. Father filed a custody petition, and a custody 

conference was held in October 2016. A custody hearing 

was scheduled for March 2017. Mother acknowledged 

sending Father messages expressing love, but Mother 

testified that she only did so because she didn’t want him to 

hurt himself. Ultimately, Mother filed for a Protection From 

Abuse Order on December 28, 2016. Father committed 

suicide on December 29, 2016, after being served with the 

temporary order. While acknowledging the certain and 

unfortunate effect the above events had on Mother, this 

court noted that the deceased Father is not a party to this 

action and there is no evidence whatsoever that 

Grandmother engaged in any abusive acts. Rather, the 

evidence has shown that Grandmother has acted with good 

faith throughout this custody case.[3]

T.C.O. at 10-11 (capitalization adjusted) (footnote added).

The trial court explained that it initially allowed significant testimony 

about Father’s actions and their impact on Mother, but that the court 

prohibited collateral testimony after doubting its relevance, “especially since 

Grandmother had no role in those events or the parents’ relationship.” See 

id. at 20. Mother concedes the trial court allowed her to provide information 

about the traumatic impact Father’s death had on her. However, she 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court also noted: “Grandmother credibly testified that she did not 

blame Father’s suicide on Mother, testifying that it happened because [Father] 

had mental health problems.” T.C.O. at 9.
J-A15020-22

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maintains that the court erred when it prevented her from elaborating why 

she should be allowed to end the relationship between Grandmother and the 

Child. See Mother’s Brief at 32.

After review, we discern no abuse of discretion. The trial court allowed 

Mother to make her case, affording her ample opportunity to present 

supporting testimony. The court even found Mother to be credible, expressly 

noting that Mother became physically emotional during her testimony. See 

N.T., 1/3/22 (Day 2), at 81. But after a certain point, the court decided that 

additional testimony regarding Mother’s history with Father, and how it 

currently affects her, was superfluous and not particularly relevant to either 

Mother’s relationship with the Child, nor the Child’s relationship with 

Grandmother. We conclude that the court’s evidentiary ruling was not 

manifestly unreasonable, and we decline to remand for further testimony.

4

Mother’s first issue is without merit.

The crux of Mother’s appeal concerns the trial court’s substantive 

custody award. We begin our analysis of her remaining issues by observing 

this Court’s scope and standard of review for custody matters:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings 

of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of 

record, as our role does not include making independent factual 

____________________________________________

4 The procedural disposition of this case is also pertinent to our decision. Here, 

Grandmother sought a modest adjustment of her custody time. Moreover, 

Mother only sought to end Grandmother’s contact with the Child in response 

to Grandmother’s modification petition. Notably, the trial court recognized 

that traumatic event occurred nearly six years ago, and the Grandparent-Child 

relationship has existed for years without any real issue.
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determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility 

and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial 

judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. 

However, we are not bound by the trial court's deductions or 

inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether 

the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the 

evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial 

court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in 

light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

S.T. v. R.W., 192 A.3d 1155, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

The Child Custody Act provides grandparents with the ability to seek 

partial custody in certain situations, including when a parent of the child is 

deceased. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1). Underpinning the statute is the state’s 

interest in protecting the health and emotional welfare of children, which 

includes ensuring that children are not deprived of beneficial relationships with 

their grandparents. See Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 886 (Pa. 2006); 

see also D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 204, 211 (Pa. 2016).

“The stated goal [of fostering the grandparent-child relationship] is not 

insignificant. In the event of a major disruption to the family environment, 

such as where there is parental abuse, neglect, substance abuse, mental 

illness, or abandonment, the interest may be especially pronounced.” D.P., 

146 A.3d at 214 (citation omitted). Our courts have recognized that the 

state’s interest extends to situations where a parent has died:

While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that a 

grandparent’s desire for partial physical custody would not 

prevail over a fit parent’s decision to limit contact in all 

cases, it refused “to close our minds to the possibility that 

in some instances a court may overturn even the decision 

of a fit parent to exclude a grandparent from a grandchild’s 

life, especially where the grandparent’s child is 
J-A15020-22

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deceased and the grandparent relationship is 

longstanding and significant to the grandchild.”

J. & S.O. v. C.H., 206 A.3d 1171, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2019) appeal denied, 654 

Pa. 517 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Hiller, 904 A.2d at 887) (emphasis original). The 

High Court has also emphasized “the many potential benefits of strong intergenerational ties” as another reason to foster the grandparent-child 

relationship. See Hiller, 904 at 886 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 

64 (2000)).

Of course, the state’s interest in protecting the grandparent-child 

relationships comes with a cost – namely, the infringement of a parent’s 

rights. See Hiller, 904 A.2d at 886. “There is no dispute that Section 5325 

burdens the rights of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, 

and control of their children; that such right is a fundamental one; and that, 

as such, it is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and 

equal-protection guarantees.” D.P., 146 A.3d at 210 (citations omitted); see 

also Troxel; and see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

Instantly, Mother acknowledges Grandmother has standing to pursue 

partial custody under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1). She does not allege any 

procedural violation, nor does she challenge the validity of that subsection, 

which was reaffirmed as recently as 2019. See J. & S.O., supra. Instead, 

Mother claims the trial court impermissibly infringed on her fundamental

custody right, by misapplying one of the relevant factor analyses prescribed 

by the Child Custody Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), (c).
J-A15020-22

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The Child Custody Act mandates two separate analyses when a 

grandparent seeks partial custody. First, “[i]n ordering any form of custody, 

the court shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all 

relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect 

the safety of the child, including [factors 1 through 16.]” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5328(a)(1)-(16).5 Second, for grandparents, the Child Custody Act further 

mandates the consideration of supplemental criteria under Section 

5328(c)(1)(i)-(iii), in addition to the factors itemized under Section 5328(a).

D.R.L. v. K.L.C., 216 A.3d 276, 280 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Mother’s second and third appellate issues concern the trial court’s 

findings under Section 5328(c)(1)(i) and (ii), respectively.

Section 5328(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:

(1) In ordering partial physical custody or supervised 

physical custody to a party who has standing under section 

5325(1) or (2) (relating to standing for partial physical 

custody and supervised physical custody), the court shall 

consider the following:

(i) the amount of personal contact between the child 

and the party prior to the filing of the action;

(ii) whether the award interferes with any parent-child 

relationship;

[...]

____________________________________________

5 We have held that a Section 5328(a) analysis is also necessary when – as 

was the case here – a party seeks to modify the type of custody award. See 

A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 824 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5323(a) (“Award of custody”). Grandmother sought to modify the type of 

custody award, from supervised physical custody to partial physical custody.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)(1)(i)-(ii).

In her second appellate issue, Mother argues the trial court ignored “the 

utter lack of substance to the relationship” between Grandmother and the 

Child when considering Section 5328(c)(1)(i). See Mother’s Brief at 23. She 

concludes that the custody award was erroneous, because it “was imposed in 

the absence of a substantive, caring and nurturing relationship upon which 

[the Child] relies and derives emotional value.” Id.

For support, she cites Hiller, supra. In that case, a maternal 

grandmother sought partial custody after the mother’s death from cancer. 

Prior to the mother’s death, the child had frequent contact with the 

grandmother, especially during the last two years of the mother’s illness, when 

they saw each other almost daily. The grandmother was an active part in the 

daily routine and took on the task of preparing the child for the mother’s 

death. And given their close relationship, the trial court determined that the 

grandmother should be entitled to partial physical custody. Hiller, 904 A.2d 

at 877. 

Hiller concerned the constitutionality of the prior version of Section 

5325, which authorized grandparents to seek partial custody in the event of a 

parent’s death. Ultimately, our Supreme Court acknowledged the state’s 

interest in fostering the grandparent-child relationship and upheld the statute 

authorizing grandparent custody upon a parent’s death. Id. But Mother does 

not rely on Hiller for its holding, per se; instead, she relies on facts of Hiller 

to illustrate what, in her view, constitutes the requisite amount of personal 
J-A15020-22

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contact before a court may award a grandparent custody under Section 

5328(c)(1)(i). Mother distinguishes the instant case from the facts of Hiller

to argue that the subject Child and Grandmother had a much more attenuated 

relationship. Mother concludes that, unlike the relationship in Hiller, the 

amount of personal contact between Grandmother and the Child does not 

warrant a partial custody award. 

First, we do not construe Hiller – as Mother does – to be the yardstick 

by which a court measures the amount of grandparent-child contact before 

determining whether a partial custody award is deserved. That consideration 

is codified by Section 5328(c)(1)(i), which the trial court must weigh in 

conjunction with the other relevant factors. Second, although we recognize 

the factual distinctions from Hiller, the record in this matter does not support 

Mother’s allegation that the partial custody award was unfounded due to the

lack of personal contact between Grandmother and the Child.

In its consideration of the amount of personal contact between 

Grandmother and the Child, the trial court made the following findings:

• [T]he testimony was clear that Grandmother did not 

have a relationship with the Child prior to Father’s 

suicide on December 29, 2016. However, it appeared 

that Grandmother desired to develop a relationship 

with the baby, as evidenced by a letter sent to Mother 

on or about August 1, 2016. 

• Of relevance to this court was the fact that at the 

hearing [in May 2018], Mother agreed to entry of a 

consent order granting Grandmother supervised 

partial custody every other Friday evening. By her 

agreement, Mother allowed a relationship to begin 

between Grandmother and the Child, beginning in 
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June 2018 when the Child was approximately two 

years old. Mother testified that she agreed to the 

above arrangement because she felt compassion for 

Grandmother and wanted to make things work. 

Approximately 40 of these supervised visits occurred 

as scheduled for almost two years until approximately 

March/April 2020. 

• Grandmother testified that while the supervised visits 

were enjoyable, that having them occur where Mother 

lived with the Maternal Grandparents and [Mother’s 

minor siblings], was awkward and tense. 

Grandmother felt like she was intruding into their 

home. Grandmother testified that she referred to 

herself as “Nana” and the Child also called her “Nana,” 

and that when told “I love you,” the Child would 

respond “I love you too.” Mother acknowledged that 

she had heard the Child refer to [Grandmother] as 

“Nana” but further testified that the Child typically did 

not refer to [Grandmother] at all during visits or if he 

did, he called her “Denise.” 

• Grandmother entered as evidence several 

photographs of the Child taken during the early visits. 

This court noted that the pictures depict a happy, 

smiling Child that appeared to be enjoying his 

interactions with Grandmother. 

• In March/April 2020, due to the uncertainty 

surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties 

agreed to stop the in-person visits and instead have 

telephone calls. [...] However, the court was satisfied 

to resume visits and allow unsupervised contact while 

in a public location to occur near Mother’s home as a 

way to slowly transition to Grandmother resuming 

regular contact with the Child. [...] By all accounts, 

the several “unsupervised” [] visits went well.

See generally T.C.O. at 6-8 (emphasis original).

The trial court was primarily persuaded by the fact that Mother allowed 

Grandmother to begin a relationship three years ago, when the Child was a 

toddler. Whether Mother was motivated by guilt, or sympathy, or out of a 
J-A15020-22

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genuine concern for the Child’s best interests, she allowed Grandmother to 

become a part of the Child’s life. Indeed, Grandmother has consistently

maintained this relationship since. Although Mother’s opposition to 

Grandmother’s custody appears to be made in good faith, we find her 

appellate argument on this point to be somewhat disingenuous. Mother 

cannot expect the trial court to ignore the relationship that Mother herself 

permitted to blossom. Nor can Mother expect this Court to ignore the trial 

court’s subsequent findings.

When considering the trial court’s findings in light of the record, we 

discern no abuse of discretion. The court thoroughly considered the amount 

of personal contact between the Child and Grandmother prior to the 

commencement of the modification action. Importantly, we observe that the 

trial court awarded Grandmother partial custody for only seven hours each 

month, on the first Saturday. To be sure, the partial physical custody award

is an expansion of Grandmother’s custody (and thus necessarily an 

infringement upon Mother’s custody). But the award is not out of proportion

with the amount of personal contact between Grandmother and the Child, 

prior to Grandmother’s modification petition. Put another way, the court’s 

conclusions under Section 5328(c)(1)(i) are not manifestly unreasonable in 

light of the sustainable findings. See S.T., 192 A.3d at 1160. For these 

reasons, Mother’s second appellate issue is without merit.

In her final appellate issue, Mother argues the custody award “interferes 

with the parent-child relationship,” in contravention of Section 5328(c)(1)(ii).
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See generally Mother’s Brief at 26-30. “We have emphasized that the 

burden is on the grandparents to demonstrate that partial custody or 

[supervised physical custody] in their favor is in the child’s best interest and 

will not interfere with the parent-child relationship.” D.R.L., 216 A.3d at 279

(citation omitted); see also Hiller, 904 A.2d at 879.

Mother reasons that Grandmother’s involvement would interfere with 

Mother’s desire to begin a new life with Kevin Smith (Fiancé) and his family.

6

 

To explain, Fiancé has been involved in the Child’s life since infancy. The Child 

believes Fiancé is his father and that Fiancé’s parents are his extended 

paternal family. Mother has decided not to inform the Child about “all of the 

circumstances pertaining to the Child’s Father.” See Mother’s Brief at 28. 

Evidently, it was Mother’s intention never to tell the Child about Father or the 

paternal family – or at least not in the immediate future. According to Mother, 

the partial custody award interferes with her parental right to decide what to 

tell the Child and when. 

The trial court opined that Mother “wishes to erase the fact that the 

Child had a biological father and therefore deny [the Child] the opportunity to 

continue the relationship [with Grandmother.]” See T.C.O. at 10. The court 

said it was “gravely concerned about the effect this will have on the Child’s 

emotional health and well-being.” Id. 

____________________________________________

6 The wedding was planned for February 2022.
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However, the learned trial court determined that it was still Mother’s 

decision how much to divulge to the Child and when to do so. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the court spoke directly to Mother:

[Mother’s] been forthright with the court today which I 

appreciate as to her feelings on the matter. And it would 

seem to me with everything she’s been th[r]ough, she’s 

earned that right to be able to tell [the Child] what she 

thinks is appropriate. I would just, while it is your decision, 

ma’am, I would just very, very strongly encourage you to 

give it serious consideration moving forward when you’re 

deciding what to tell him, if anything, because in my 

experiences these things, these secrets, they don’t remain 

secrets. And it would seem to me the most important 

person in [the Child’s] life, or people I should say, are his 

Mother and [Fiancé.] And I would just ask you to consider 

how [the Child] will feel at some point, and it’s not if, it’s 

probably a matter of when he finds out that [Fiancé] is not 

his biological father. How will it impact [the Child] when he 

finds out that the two most important people in his life 

essentially lied to him? My experience in handling these 

cases is the older a child gets when he’s told, if secrets are 

kept, it has a devastating impact. 

But, ma’am, I can’t make that decision for you. You’re his 

mother. You need to make that decision. But I would just 

encourage you to just give it some real thought. Certainly 

[the Child] is not at an age to where it would be appropriate 

to tell him, I guess what we’ll call the full story. Certainly 

that would not be in his best interest. But it would seem to 

me an age appropriate factual, age-appropriate

conversation at least rooted in facts telling him that his 

biological father was ill and he died, but that he has [Fiancé] 

and [Fiancé’s] been in his life, that he loves him and he 

wants to be his dad. But, again, that’s not my job here 

today, ma’am. I would just ask you to consider it.

N.T. (Day 2) at 92-94.
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The court also acknowledged that Grandmother has respected Mother’s 

wishes thus far and cautioned Grandmother to continue to do so:

The other thing, [Grandmother], it seems to me as though 

you’ve been overall pretty respectful of the wishes of 

[Mother] as far as what’s told to the Child. I’m not going to 

specifically put it in the court order what you’re allowed to 

talk to him about, but I really don’t see where it would be in 

his best interests to have some of these things told to him 

by anybody other than his Mother. So, my point, ma’am, is 

I would expect you to continue to support her and be 

respectful of however she presents this situation to the 

Child. And I know you may not agree with that, but we’ve 

got to look at what’s in the Child’s best interest.

Id. at 95-96.

Even though the trial court ruled that Mother retained the exclusive right 

of whether, and how much, to share with the Child about his Father, Mother 

maintains that the partial custody award still interferes with the parent-child 

relationship.

For support, Mother relies on D.R.L., supra. There, the trial court found 

that the grandparents’ request for more partial custody would interfere with 

the mother’s and the adoptive father’s relationship with the child. D.R.L., 216 

A.3d at 285-86. Under our deferential abuse of discretion standard, we had 

to affirm:

In sum, we interpret the crux of [the] paternal 

grandparents’ claims as disputes with the trial court’s 

findings of fact and determinations regarding credibility and 

weight of the evidence. [The] paternal grandparents 

essentially ask this court to re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, 

and re-assess credibility. That is not our role. As evidence 

by the trial court’s opinion, the trial court performed a 

detailed and thorough analysis of the child’s best interest. 
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The trial court’s findings and determinations are supported 

by competence evidence in the record and we will not 

disturb them. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by declining to expand the 

paternal grandparents’ custodial periods with the child.

Id. (internal citation omitted) (capitalization adjusted).

Mother’s reliance upon D.R.L. is misplaced, because she fails to 

appreciate how her case differs from the procedural disposition of D.R.L. 

Here, the trial court found that an expansion of Grandmother’s custody would 

not interfere with the parent-child relationship. We must follow the same 

deferential standard of review, which means that we do not “re-find facts, reweigh evidence, and re-assess credibility.” Id. 

Applying our deferential standard, we conclude the trial court’s findings 

are supported by competent evidence. The court heard testimony that 

Grandmother has deferred to Mother’s wishes regarding the involvement of 

the paternal family. Moreover, Grandmother has promoted the parent-child 

relationship and has been supportive of Fiancé. The court opined:

The court heard testimony that Grandmother complied with 

Mother’s wishes to keep the Child’s biological Father a 

secret. Mother apparently has told the Child that 

Grandmother is just a “family friend.” While Grandmother 

disagrees with this, she has followed Mother’s wishes. 

Furthermore, Grandmother testified that she would be in 

favor of [Fiancé] adopting the Child, so that the Child would 

have all the benefits afforded by an intact family unit. 

However, Grandmother felt that the Child should also be 

able to have a relationship with the paternal side of his 

family, including his teenage half-sister[.] Despite 

disagreeing with Mother on this issue, Grandmother has 

followed Mother’s wishes. There was no evidence that 

Grandmother has not supported the parental relationship 
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between the Mother and the Child. In her testimony, 

Grandmother was complementary of Mother and Fiancé. 

Grandmother credibly testified that she was never critical of 

Mother, Fiancé, or the maternal grandparents and never 

said or did anything during visits to undermine Mother’s 

position of importance in the Child’s life. Grandmother 

credibly testified that she did not blame Father’s suicide on 

Mother, testifying that it happened because he had mental 

health problems. 

T.C.O. at 8-9 (capitalization adjusted). 

Perhaps we would have concern if the trial court gave Grandmother 

carte blanche to tell the Child the unvarnished truth, without regard to 

Mother’s careful consideration about how best to inform the Child. Had the 

court done so, then we could envision how its award might run the risk of 

parental interference under Section 5328(c)(1)(ii). But that is not what 

occurred here. The trial court utilized a deft touch, reserving for Mother the 

right to inform the Child about his parentage, while imploring the parties to 

appreciate the “minefield” created by withholding the truth. See N.T. (Day 2) 

at 97. Given the court’s decision, Mother’s argument – that a partial custody 

award interferes with her ability to create a new family unit with Fiancé – fails

on its own terms: Grandmother is supportive of Mother; Grandmother has 

abided by Mother’s wishes about what is told to the Child; and Grandmother 

is in favor of Fiancé adopting the Child.

Briefly, we dispose of Mother’s ancillary arguments regarding the trial 

court’s application of Section 5328(c)(1)(ii). Mother wished that Grandmother 

refer to herself as “a close family friend” and not “Nana.” After some 

deliberation, the court allowed Grandmother to refer to herself as “Nana.” Id.
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at 97-99. We discern no error or abuse of discretion. First, as we discussed

in detail above, the state has an interest in fostering the grandparent-child 

relationship. The Legislature has codified that interest in the Child Custody 

Act, which explicitly refers to grandparents. It might lead to an absurd7result

if a grandparent, who obtained an award under a grandparent custody statute, 

could not self-identify as the grandparent. Second, the testimony reveals that 

the Child already refers to Grandmother as “Nana,” at least some of the time.

Insofar as Mother alleged that the partial custody award causes parental 

interference because the award adversely affects her mental health, we 

conclude this argument merits no relief. We note that the trial court found 

credible Mother’s testimony that the circumstances of her relationship with 

Father cause her stress and anxiety. But the court did not conclude that this 

emotional toll meant that Grandmother’s partial custody award interfered with 

the parent-child relationship. The court was not persuaded that a relatively 

modest expansion of Grandmother’s custody would now produce such distress 

that it would cause parental interference.8 Such a determination was within 

the court’s purview.

In sum: the trial court did not error or abuse its discretion when it 

determined that Mother’s additional testimony about her history with Father 

____________________________________________

7 Courts must not interpret a statute in a manner that leads to an absurd 

result. See, e.g., C.B. v. J.B., 65 A.3d 946, 953 (Pa. Super. 2013).

8 The trial court also encouraged Mother to consider Grandmother’s proposal 

that the parties seek some type of counseling. Evidently aware that these 

professional services can be costly, the court stopped short of including it in 

the custody order.
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was irrelevant; the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that 

Grandmother and the Child had a prior, beneficial relationship under Section 

5328(c)(1)(i); and the court’s award would not result in parental interference 

under Section 5328(c)(1)(ii), as Mother retained the right to determine how 

best to reveal to the Child the truth about his parentage. Apart from these 

holdings, we echo the thoughtful remarks delivered by the trial court. We 

sympathize with the trauma the parties have endured, applaud their endeavor

to be respectful toward each other, and encourage them to continue being 

mindful of the Child’s best interests.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/14/2022