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THE COST OF BEING A PUBLIC COMPANY 

IN LIGHT OF SARBANES–OXLEY AND THE 

FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, 

SECURITIES, AND INVESTMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 18, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 115–31 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina, 

Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

SCOTT TIPTON, Colorado 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

BRUCE POLIQUIN, Maine 

MIA LOVE, Utah 

FRENCH HILL, Arkansas 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia 

THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

TED BUDD, North Carolina 

DAVID KUSTOFF, Tennessee 

CLAUDIA TENNEY, New York 

TREY HOLLINGSWORTH, Indiana 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

RUBEN KIHUEN, Nevada 

KIRSTEN SUTTON MORK, Staff Director 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, SECURITIES, AND INVESTMENT

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Chairman 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois, Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

BRUCE POLIQUIN, Maine 

FRENCH HILL, Arkansas 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia 

THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

TED BUDD, North Carolina 

TREY HOLLINGSWORTH, Indiana 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, 

Ranking Member 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

July 18, 2017 ..................................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

July 18, 2017 ..................................................................................................... 53 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, JULY 18, 2017 

Berlau, John, Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise Institute .......................... 12 

Blake, John, Senior Vice President, Finance, aTyr Pharma, Inc. ....................... 7 

Brown, J. Robert, Jr., Lawrence W. Treece Professor of Corporate Governance, 

Director, Corporate and Commercial Law Program, University of Denver 

Sturm College of Law .......................................................................................... 10 

Farley, Thomas W., President, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) ............. 5 

Quaadman, Thomas, Executive Vice President, Center for Capital Markets 

Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce .................................................. 9 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Berlau, John ...................................................................................................... 54 

Blake, John ....................................................................................................... 59 

Brown, J. Robert, Jr. ........................................................................................ 66 

Farley, Thomas W. ........................................................................................... 81 

Quaadman, Thomas ......................................................................................... 87 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Huizenga, Hon. Bill: 

Written statement of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation ........... 98 

Testimony of J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor, George Mason University 

School of Law, from March 11, 2010 ........................................................... 102 

Testimony of J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor, George Mason University 

School of Law, from July 29, 2009 ............................................................... 107 

Waters, Hon. Maxine: 

Written statement of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. ...................... 179 

(1) 

THE COST OF BEING A PUBLIC COMPANY 

IN LIGHT OF SARBANES–OXLEY AND THE 

FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE 

GOVERNANCE 

Tuesday, July 18, 2017 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, 

SECURITIES, AND INVESTMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Huizenga [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Huizenga, Hultgren, Duffy, 

Stivers, Wagner, Poliquin, Hill, Emmer, Mooney, MacArthur, Davidson, Budd, Hollingsworth; Maloney, Sherman, Lynch, Scott, 

Himes, Ellison, Foster, Sinema, Vargas, Gottheimer, and Gonzalez. 

Ex officio present: Representatives Hensarling and Waters. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Investment will come to order. Without objection, the 

Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the subcommittee at any 

time. 

Today’s hearing is entitled, ‘‘The Cost of Being a Public Company 

in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley and the Federalization of Corporate 

Governance.’’ 

I now recognize myself for 3 minutes to give an opening statement 

I find it extremely concerning that the number of publicly traded 

companies is approximately half of what it was just 20 years ago. 

Since 2000, the average number of IPOs has dwindled to 135, compared to more than 450 annually in the 1990s. It is important to 

note that there has not been a corresponding downtrend in the creation of new companies over this same period. 

According to an Ernst & Young publication in 2016, there were 

only 112 initial public offerings or IPOs. This should be concerning 

to every single member of this committee, regardless of one’s political affiliation. 

While there are many factors as to why the number of public 

companies has declined, the main challenges that I continue to 

hear about are how difficult it is to go public and how difficult it 

is to remain public as a company. 

2 

The Securities and Exchange Commission has estimated that the initial regulatory compliance for an IPO costs a massive $2.5 million, followed by ongoing compliance costs of $1.5 million annually. 

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), in addition to other Federal corporate governance regulations, resulted in significant costs 

to a company that a company must consider when making the decision to go or remain public. 

The extensive corporate disclosure regime that public companies 

must navigate is not only costly, but it also exposes potentially sensitive information that can be used by competitors, and increases 

a company’s litigation risk. We need to balance certain information 

the regulators and investors need to know with what is proprietary 

information. 

I find it extremely troubling that during the tenure of former 

SEC Chair Mary Jo White, the SEC seemed more interested in 

pursuing highly politicized Federal corporate governance mandates 

than its core mission. Instead of working to protect investors, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets, and helping to facilitate 

capital formation, it seemed the SEC focused on exerting societal 

pressure on public companies to change their behavior through disclosure rules such as the conflict minerals and pay ratio rules. 

That, in my opinion, is not the proper role of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 

I look forward to working with SEC Chairman Clayton to refocus 

the SEC and advance a more expansive capital formation agenda. 

Let’s continue to build upon the successes of the bipartisan JOBS 

Act by further modernizing our Nation’s securities regulatory structure to ensure free flow of capital, job creation, and economic 

growth. 

It is time to get the Federal Government working to ensure that 

American businesses are able to raise the capital they need to expand, support innovation, and reward hard-working Americans. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. 

And the Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Maloney, for a 5- 

minute opening statement. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I thank the chairman for holding this important 

hearing on Sarbanes-Oxley, and a series of important oversight 

hearings. 

But I also think it is important to remember why we passed Sarbanes-Oxley in the first place. It was in response to an enormous 

wave of corporate scandals. Huge, well-known, respected companies 

like Enron and WorldCom had been reporting fraudulent earnings. 

And when their frauds were exposed, they went from investmentgrade companies to bankrupt within a matter of months, rocking 

our markets and losing the savings of thousands of workers 

I have always said that markets run more on confidence than on 

capital. And these scandals destroyed investors’ confidence in our 

markets. Many investors decided if they couldn’t trust the financial 

statements of companies like Enron and WorldCom, then they 

couldn’t trust any company’s financial statements anymore. 

So Congress had to step in to restore investors’ confidence in our 

markets and in the accuracy of corporate financial statements. Sarbanes-Oxley did impose Federal corporate governance requirements 

3 

on companies, but this was necessary because these corporate governance changes affected the accuracy of financial statements that 

were governed by SEC regulations. And the Federal Government 

has regulated financial statements for public companies for over 80 

years. 

Corporate governance issues have long been split between the 

States and the Federal Government. Ever since the Great Depression, and the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934, 

certain companies have been subject to Federal regulation, so this 

is absolutely nothing new. 

Companies that have a certain number of shareholders—today 

the threshold is 2,000—have been subject to SEC disclosure rules 

for over 80 years. These companies are known as reporting companies and there are over 9,000 of them in the United States. Corporate governance issues that affect financial reporting for these 

SEC-regulated companies can and should be handled at the Federal level. 

This is especially true when a corporate governance issue affects 

the reliability of a company’s financial statements because the most 

basic confidence that investors need is confidence in the accuracy 

of a company’s financial statements. 

As an investor, if you are going to commit your capital to a company, you need to know at a minimum how much money the company already has, how much it is expected to make every quarter, 

what its normal day-to-day operating costs are, and how much it 

already owes to other creditors. 

If investors can’t have a basic level of confidence in these financial statements that the numbers are accurate and any major caveats are disclosed, then they simply won’t commit their capital to 

that company. 

Some of the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley relate to corporate 

governance issues, such as the requirement that public companies 

have independent audit committees, the requirement that companies maintain effective internal controls over financial reporting, 

and the requirement that CEOs and CFOs personally certify the 

accuracy of their financial reports. 

We can remember the hearings we had here where CEOs and 

CFOs said they had no idea what the financial statements of their 

companies were. This was technically a federalization of a corporate governance issue. But it was necessary because these corporate governance issues affected the reliability of financial statements that were regulated under the SEC disclosure rules. 

The question as always is, where do we draw the line? Which 

corporate governance issues are best handled at the State level and 

which at the Federal level? 

This is an ongoing exercise, and I welcome the opportunity to 

hear the testimony today and to review the current corporate governance regime to determine if we need to draw the line in a different place. 

I have a letter from the Council of Institutional Investors, which 

represents major pension funds across our country, and I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to submit it in the record. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

4 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you so much, and I look forward to this 

hearing. 

And I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentlelady yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Hultgren from Illinois, for 2 minutes for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I am sure that this statistic or something very similar will be 

cited a number of times today, but I would like to make sure to 

highlight it as well: The number of U.S. public listings fell from 

8,025 in 1996 to 4,101 in 2012, whereas non-U.S. listings increased 

from 30,734 to 39,427. In other words, while new listings rose 28 

percent overseas, they fell 49 percent in the United States. This is 

a serious problem. 

The evidence of regulatory burden has been mounting, and it is 

important that this committee fight for healthy public markets. 

The JOBS Act was pivotal to this work, but it was only the beginning, especially as Dodd-Frank requirements continue to be implemented and as these are compounded with existing disclosure requirements for public companies 

This is why I co-sponsored the Fostering Innovation Act, sponsored by Kyrsten Sinema and Trey Hollingsworth of this committee, to extend the temporary exemption for an additional 5 

years for certain emerging growth companies. 

Chairman Huizenga’s Congressional Review Act Resolution, now 

signed into law, nullifying the Dodd-Frank-mandated Resource Extraction Disclosure Rule from the SEC was also a key part of this 

committee’s work to address new Dodd-Frank burdens on public 

companies. There is a lot more work to be done by this committee 

and the SEC to this effect. 

For example, I was pleased to see the June 29th announcement 

from the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance that it will be permitting all companies to submit draft registration statements for 

review on a non-public basis. I hope this popular JOBS Act provision contributes to a more robust public market. 

Personally, I have been focused on the need for reforms to the 

SEC’s Rule 14a-8. It has clearly been hijacked to achieve social objectives, which may have some merit, but have nothing to do with 

investor protection or capital formation. 

I look forward to the recommendations coming from our witnesses on this issue and others, and I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman yields back. 

Today, we are welcoming a great panel here that I think is going 

to give us some great insight. First and foremost, we have Mr. Tom 

Farley, who is president of the New York Stock Exchange. He 

joined NYSE in November of 2013 when ICE acquired the New 

York Stock Exchange and Euronext. 

Next, we have Mr. John Blake, who is the senior vice president 

of finance for aTyr Pharma. His background includes a medical device company and a semiconductor company, so he has some broad 

experience, and he is a certified public accountant as well. 

Mr. Tom Quaadman is the executive vice president of the Center 

for Capital Markets Competitiveness at the U.S. Chamber of ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:05 Jun 06, 2018 Jkt 028750 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\28750.TXT TERI
5 

merce. Mr. Quaadman also holds a degree from New York Law 

School. 

And then we have Professor J. Robert Brown, who is the Lawrence W. Treece professor of corporate governance, and director of 

the corporate and commercial law program at the the University of 

Denver Sturm College of Law. He has also been an arbiter for 

FINRA. 

And last but not least, Mr. John Berlau is a senior fellow at the 

Competitive Enterprise Institute. Mr. Berlau is an award-winning 

journalist in both the financial and political fields, and he is a contributing writer for Forbes. 

We welcome all of you here today. We appreciate your time, and 

your effort in being here. 

And with that, Mr. Farley, you will be recognized for 5 minutes 

for your opening statement. And without objection, all of your written statements will be made a part of the record. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS W. FARLEY, PRESIDENT, THE NEW 

YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (NYSE) 

Mr. FARLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Thank you. 

Mr. FARLEY. Thanks for having me back. And thank you, Congresswoman Maloney, and all the members of the subcommittee. 

On behalf of the New York Stock Exchange, we appreciate you having us here to discuss these important issues, and in fact, thank 

you. 

We have submitted our written testimony, so I am just going to 

hit a few of the Cliff Notes, and in fact, try to make it shorter because your comments were all so on the mark. 

Great entrepreneurs and the dynamic companies that they create 

are the lifeblood of our economy. They create jobs. They stimulate 

wages. And they create investment returns for all Americans, not 

just a privileged few. 

I grew up down the street from here in Prince George’s County, 

in Bowie, Maryland. And I witnessed firsthand the impact that 

these incredible entrepreneurs can have. 

In 1996, Kevin Plank founded Under Armour from the trunk of 

his car right here in Prince George’s County. And the business 

grew with fits and starts for 10 years. But it wasn’t until 2005, 

when they took Under Armour public, that the explosive growth 

really ensued. 

The company went public at a valuation of $600 million, and ultimately topped $15 billion. I would go home to crab feasts and holidays and there were stories aplenty about, ‘‘Hey, I have a job, a 

great job at Under Armour,’’ or ‘‘I invest in Under Armour stock 

and I am making dough to be able to put our family in a better 

place.’’ Or even just, ‘‘I am wearing Under Armour clothes and I 

take great pride in it.’’ 

I saw how people were able to provide a better life for themselves 

because of a great company like Under Armour. The fact of the 

matter is that story is dormant. It is dead. There has not been a 

story like that in 10 years. 

You see, young dynamic companies used to go public. In the 

1980s, the 1990s, even in the 2000s, the early 2000s in the early 

6 

days, think Apple and Microsoft, and more recently, Netflix, 

Salesforce, Google, Chipotle, and many other examples, but not one 

has done that since 2007—a company valued at a billion and a half 

or less, a U.S. operating company that has achieved evaluation 

north of $10 billion. 

Clearly, there is something something wrong there and and we 

should all address it. 

You mentioned that IPOs are down dramatically, Chairman 

Huizenga, but I will just reiterate that the 1990s, as you pointed 

out, were a great time for IPOs. In fact, the minimum number of 

IPOs was 350 in a given year here in the United States. In the current 10-year period, the maximum IPO number is 250, not 350. 

So what can we do about that? We propose that we think of it 

in three different ways. First, let’s end regulatory mission creep. 

Second, let’s level the playing field for listed companies, particularly vis-a-vis serial litigants and proxy advisory firms. And third, 

let’s really focus on small to mid-sized businesses. 

So first, just briefly, with respect to regulatory mission creep, 

Congresswoman Maloney is absolutely right. Sarbanes-Oxley was 

put in place for a set of very good reasons and it was done in a 

bipartisan fashion. And the idea of Sarbanes-Oxley was, let’s put 

these internal controls in place. 

The issues came about because not only did it put internal controls in place, but it required that an external auditor-for-hire come 

in and verify them, attest to them. It created a quasi-governmental 

organization, the PCAOB, which for 15 straight years has expanded the scope of Sarbanes-Oxley. 

And all these just put such a great cost on corporate America. 

And actually the benefits are not entirely clear. The data doesn’t 

show clearly that we have reduced fraud or greatly inspired confidence, but what is clear is we have far fewer public companies. 

And so our recommendations with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley are 

that first, we do away with the requirement that auditors attest to 

the internal controls. That is something that exists today under the 

JOBS Act for EGCs, and we are suggesting, let’s extend it to all 

companies. Second, let’s narrow the definition of internal controls 

under Sarbanes-Oxley. And third, and most importantly, let’s require that the PCAOB not pass new rules and regulations that 

could in any way burden public companies. 

Second, level the playing field. There are hundreds and hundreds 

of shareholder class action lawsuits every year, as many as 500. 

The preponderance of those, or a majority of those, are questionable in nature. 

Our recommendation is that in this country we move to a loserpays model, much like in the U.K.: If you lose your shareholder 

class action lawsuit, you pay the legal fees. 

This would still allow a voice, which is very, very important for 

shareholders, even small shareholders who have been harmed. But 

it would limit it to the most meritorious cases. 

Second, let’s level the playing field vis-a-vis proxy advisory firms. 

Let’s require them to register with the SEC and be transparent 

about how they manage their many conflict of interests, but also 

how they go about evaluating companies. This is a real sore point 

for listed companies. 

7 

Finally, reduce the burden on small to mid-sized companies. And 

I have 10 seconds left, so I will do that quickly. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Or we can wait until questions. 

Mr. FARLEY. Yes, I think I will just hit it in Q&A. Essentially, 

we think we should extend the the emerging growth company 

(EGC) qualification under the JOBS Act, to not just end at 5 years, 

to hit any company that meets those characteristics. 

Thank you, I look forward to Q&A. Sorry for running over, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farley can be found on page 81 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman HUIZENGA. All right. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Blake, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN BLAKE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

FINANCE, aTyr PHARMA, INC. 

Mr. BLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Maloney. I appreciate the subcommittee’s work to support small 

businesses and ensure they have access to efficient liquid public 

markets, a vital component of the biotech capital formation ecosystem 

As a senior vice president of finance of aTyr Pharma, a small 

public biotech in San Diego, I can attest to the utmost importance 

of public capital. Since the JOBS Act was enacted 5 years ago, we 

have seen more than 200 IPOs in our industry alone. 

aTyr undertook a successful IPO in May 2015 using key provisions of the JOBS Act. But neither going public nor being public 

is easy. Roadblocks exist that can divert capital away from science, 

reduce investor confidence, hamper long-term value creation, and 

distract a company from its core mission. 

These barriers reduce the viability of capital formation in our 

public markets to fund life-saving innovation. In some instances, 

they lead companies to stay private longer or opt for a merger rather than an IPO. In others, a company still goes public but sees its 

precious capital syphoned off for compliance burdens. 

Many smaller issuers must allocate a disproportionate amount of 

resources, including staff and legal costs, to operate as a public 

company. The attention of management is often distracted by external forces that have the potential to influence shareholders, 

often at odds with the goal to create long-term value and help patients. 

I am encouraged that the subcommittee is holding today’s hearing to examine the impact of such roadblocks on smaller public 

companies. And I support the work you are doing to bolster America’s capital markets for growing innovators. 

In particular, I want to thank Representatives Sinema and Hollingsworth for introducing their Fostering Innovation Act. 

The JOBS Act’s 5-year exemption from SOX 404(b) is a perfect 

example of how very targeted relief has saved millions of dollars 

from compliance activities and instead directed those funds towards science and innovation activities that allow growing biotechs 

to provide benefits to patients and shareholders. This bipartisan 

bill builds on the success of that provision. 

8 

The auditor attestation required by SOX 404(b) is very helpful to 

shareholders of larger organizations with complex internal control 

environments often spanning geographies, diverse accounting systems, and multiple product lines. 

However, such attestation is not useful to investors in emerging 

pre-revenue companies. Since many biotechs will still be in the lab 

when their 5-year exemption expires, the Fostering Innovation Act 

extends the exemption in a very targeted way. 

The continued cost-savings in the bill are vital because every dollar spent on a one-size-fits-all burden is a dollar diverted from the 

lab. I also support Congressman Duffy’s Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act. 

I want to be clear that I believe proxy advisory firms play an important role in the health of our capital markets. I believe that 

greater transparency, accuracy, and engagement with smaller 

issuers can only further benefit shareholders. 

Proxy advisory firms’ outsized influence on emerging companies 

can be uniquely damaging to small, growing biotechs, especially in 

light of conflicts of interest and opaque standard-setting processes. 

Their one-size-fits-all approach diverts resources and distracts company management. Mr. Duffy’s bill to regulate proxy firms would 

be a welcome change from a status quo whereby companies contort 

themselves to satisfy proxy advisors. 

Shareholder value is also impaired by the manipulative actions 

of some short-sellers. I believe honest short-selling plays a necessary role in the health of our capital markets and can aid liquidity and price discovery. 

However, the lack of transparency around shorting has given rise 

to manipulative behaviors that disincentivize long-term investment 

in innovation. Protected by the absence of any disclosure requirements, short-sellers have discovered that the unique biotech business model enables them to easily orchestrate a short-term stock 

drop. 

Long-term biotech investing is already a risky prospect so introducing further uncertainty discourages investors and ultimately 

harms the viability of capital formation in our markets. I believe 

that there should be a short disclosure regime complementary to 

the existing long disclosure requirements. 

Short transparency would shine a light on manipulative behaviors and ensure that investors have the full range of information 

they need. The JOBS Act has shown the strong impact of a policymaking drive toward capital formation and away from the one-sizefits-all burdens and outsized emphasis on the short term in our industry. 

I applaud the subcommittee for considering further initiatives to 

support small business innovators, and I look forward to answering 

any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blake can be found on page 59 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Thank you. 

Mr. Quaadman, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

9 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS QUAADMAN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR CAPITAL MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS, 

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Huizenga, 

Ranking Member Maloney, and members of the subcommittee. We 

appreciate the continued focus of this subcommittee on issues regarding business creation and growth. 

Public companies are an important source of strength, growth, 

innovation, and resiliency for our economy. While the United 

States remains the gold standard for public companies, we are entering the third decade of a decline of public companies in the 

United States. 

That number started to go down in 1996, 4 years before the tech 

bubble burst, and has gone down 19 of the last 20 years. In fact, 

the IPO markets have not recovered from the burst of the tech bubble. 

But the gains and great strides of the Reagan and Clinton Administrations have been wiped out. We have roughly the same 

number of public companies today as we did in 1982, despite the 

fact that the population has grown by 40 percent and real GDP has 

increased by 160 percent. 

For entrepreneurs today, staying private or being acquired are as 

viable options as going public. There is no one cause for this decline, but I think there is a two bucket-set of issues that we need 

to look at. 

One is benign neglect, and that is the inability of policymakers 

to move forward on important issues. We have a lack of proxy advisory firm oversight, a rise of a small number of gadflies who are 

monopolizing the shareholder process, a failure to reform proxy 

plumbing in 14a-8 rules. And we have a disenfranchisement of retail investors in director elections and shareholder proposal votes. 

The second bucket deals with intrusive intervention. From the 

New Deal until 2002, corporations were governed by a combination 

of state law and corporate bylaws. Federal security laws were for 

disclosure of information for investors to engage in reasonable decision-making. 

That system was built upon a foundation of 150 years of State 

laws which has allowed directors and shareholders to develop diverse governance structures to fit the needs of the business. 

The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley has thrown that system out of 

balance. To be clear, Sarbanes-Oxley was passed to address a crisis 

which needed to be dealt with, and there are some good things in 

Sarbanes-Oxley. However, putting the merits and demerits aside, 

the most far-ranging consequence of Sarbanes-Oxley was the federalization of corporate governance. 

The Dodd-Frank Act ran through that door and that trend is continuing unabated today. Special interest activists are using the 

boardroom to push political agendas, and the Federal Government 

is acquiescing. As an example, the conflict minerals rule is a use 

of securities laws to try and resolve a foreign affairs and human 

rights crisis. 

The Reg-K concept release, which has some very, very good 

things in it, has opened up the door for environmental social governance or ESG issues to enter into the boardroom. If you are an 

10 

emerging growth company with $500 million in revenues today, if 

you were to go public it would cost you $2.5 million, or about 5 percent of your revenues. 

What are you going to get for going into the public capital mar- kets? $1.5 million in recurring compliance costs. You are buying 

shareholder proposal fights, director fights, and increased liability. 

Those are the reasons why Michael Dell, several years ago, said he 

would want to put all those issues aside so he can manage and 

grow his company. 

This situation must be reversed. SEC Chair Jay Clayton has 

made these issues a priority. And we encourage all stakeholders to 

work with him on those issues. Congress has a role. I believe that 

the Duffy bill on proxy advisory firm oversight is an important step 

forward to rebalancing this system. 

The business community also has its own responsibilities. The 

business community must resolve issues like board diversity on its 

own before we have government mandates. 

We must also enhance the power of the States. As an example, 

this month, Delaware, under the leadership of Governor Carney, is 

going to authorize the use of block chain for proxy plumbing. The 

SEC has yet to read comment letters that were submitted 7 years 

ago on its proxy plumbing concept release. 

And at the Chamber we are also issuing our own constructive 

proposals. Yesterday, we joined with other members of the Corporate Governance Coalition for Investor Value and sent a letter to 

the SEC, asking the SEC to move forward on its resubmission 

threshold rulemaking petition to deal with the gadfly issue. 

Next week we are going to issue a set of 14a-8 reforms, and later 

this summer or early fall we are going to issue a new IPO report 

to build upon the successes of the JOBS Act. 

So Chairman Huizenga, again, thank you for this hearing, and 

I look forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Quaadman can be found on page 

87 of the appendix.] 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Thank you very much. We are on a roll 

with people yielding back. 

Professor Brown, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., LAWRENCE W. 

TREECE PROFESSOR OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, DIRECTOR, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER STURM COLLEGE OF LAW 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Maloney, and members of the subcommittee. NASDAQ, in its recent 

Blueprint on the Capital Markets stated that, ‘‘We have the most 

innovative and transparent markets in the world.’’ I agree with 

that assessment. 

But what exactly does that mean? Amazon went public in 1997, 

raising $48 million, although confessing that profitability wasn’t in 

sight. In hindsight, purchasing shares in Amazon may seem obvious, but back then it wasn’t. 

Two years later, Webvan, a grocery delivery company, raised 7 

times the amount of money as Amazon in an IPO. Webvan looked 

more like the future than Amazon. It wasn’t long before Webvan 

11 

was bankrupt, and Amazon was on its way to issuing 450 million 

shares and obtaining a market capitalization of almost a half a trillion dollars—a success of the capital markets. 

So to me, ‘‘innovative’’ and ‘‘transparent’’ means capital markets 

that encourage investors to invest without knowing whether they 

are investing in Webvan or Amazon. It is about investor confidence 

in our capital markets and willingness to take risks. 

In 2001, this confidence was in doubt. Enron, at one time the 

10th largest company in the United States, proved to be a 

Potemkin village. Investors could not trust the financial statements 

issued by even our largest public companies. 

In that environment, SOX, in a remarkably bipartisan fashion, 

stepped in and implemented much-needed reform. SOX strengthened the role of the board, particularly the audit committee, improved the quality of audits, and increased the responsibility of top 

officers for financial statements through certification and providing 

for the clawback of their performance-based compensation if based 

on false financial statements. 

SOX went further. SOX also emphasized the importance of internal controls, the backbone of financial statements, by assigning responsibility for creating them, reviewing them, and assessing them. 

And all of these changes had one thing in common: They promoted 

investor confidence in financial disclosure. 

The topic of reform of the public markets has returned. Some 

have phrased the relevant question as, how can we lower the cost 

of public company status? In my opinion, that is the wrong question. 

SOX teaches that the most important question is, how can we enhance investor confidence in our public markets? Any proposed reform that may impair investor confidence should be viewed warily. 

Cutting back on auditor review of internal controls falls into that 

category. So does the imposition of substantial restrictions on 

shareholder proposals. 

Those who seek to restrict the use of shareholder proposals often 

criticize activists, those investors deemed to focus on the short 

term. The best way to confront those with a short-term horizon is 

to engage with those who take a longer-term view 

Shareholder proposals provide management with the collective 

views of shareholders, whether on governance matters such as 

shareholder access, or on environmental matters where this year 

proposals addressing environmental matters received majority support at Exxon and Occidental. 

Proposals can be an important component of the communication 

process between companies and their long-term shareholders. Substantial restrictions on the use of shareholder proposals will weaken, not strengthen, these relationships 

That is not to say that reform of the public markets is not important. The hallmark of the public markets is transparency, and 

transparency comes from disclosure. The system of disclosure needs 

to be updated. We need to move from an analog to a digital universe in how information is filed and accessed. 

We need to modernize the system of disclosure, one that was 

largely written in the 1980s before anyone had even heard of someVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:05 Jun 06, 2018 Jkt 028750 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\28750.TXT TERI
12 

thing called the Internet, much less social media or artificial intelligence. 

But I would add that the starting point of disclosure reform is 

not disclosure overload, but disclosure effectiveness, that is, providing investors with the information that they need to be willing 

to purchase shares whether in Webvan or in Amazon. Thank you, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown can be found on page 66 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Thank you. 

And Mr. Berlau, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN BERLAU, SENIOR FELLOW, 

COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. BERLAU. Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Maloney, 

and honorable members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to present testimony on behalf of my organization, the 

Competitive Enterprise Institute, a Washington-based free market 

think tank. It is our mission to advance the freedom to prosper for 

consumers, entrepreneurs, and investors 

Despite the conversation on more recent financial regulation 

from laws such as Dodd-Frank, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 

still very much matters. 

The mandates to audit internal controls from the law’s Section 

404, as interpreted broadly by the Public Company Accounting 

Oversight Board or PCAOB, the accounting body created by this 

law, are still a primary concern for companies considering going 

public on U.S. stock exchanges. 

In reading through S-1s, the forms that companies file with the 

Securities and Exchange Commission when contemplating going 

public, I still always see prominent mention of the cost SarbanesOxley imposes on being a public company. 

Auditing costs imposed by SOX are some of the biggest drains on 

these firms. However, some of the biggest costs SOX imposes are 

to middle-class American investors looking to build wealth in their 

investment portfolios. This is the primary reason the law should be 

overhauled. 

In the early 1990s, then-small firms such as Starbucks and Cisco 

Systems were able to get capital from the public to grow, and middle-class investors grew wealthy with them. 

Before SOX, 80 percent of the firms going public had IPOs of less than $50 million, which included Starbucks and Cisco Systems 

and, as Professor Brown mentioned, Amazon, which was $48 million. 

However, a few years after SOX, 80 percent of firms went public with IPOs greater than $50 million. This is a big change for small 

and mid-sized public companies, which now face additional hurdles 

when raising capital. However, it is middle-class investors who 

have been most harmed by being almost totally shut out of this 

early stage of growth of America’s fastest growing companies. 

Instead, these financial opportunities are being snapped up by 

the accredited investor class that has the freedom to buy shares in 

companies that aren’t weighed down with much of SOX and other 

mandates. 

13 

Directly fingering SOX, President Obama’s Council on Jobs and 

Competitiveness observed that well-intentioned regulations aimed 

at protecting the public from misrepresentations of a small number 

of large companies have unintentionally placed significant burdens 

on the large number of smaller companies. As a result, fewer highgrowth entrepreneurial companies are going public. 

SOX has also had adverse consequences on the lack of job creation. As President Obama’s Jobs Council and others have noted, 

90 percent of a public company’s job creation occurs after it goes 

public. 

This is important in comparing the public equities markets before and after SOX because when you look at those, the first thing 

that is apparent is that despite a recent uptick in IPOs, there are 

far fewer public companies today. 

In 2001, the year before SOX became law, there were more than 

5,100 companies listed on exchanges such as NASDAQ and the 

New York Stock Exchange. By 2015, there were just 3,700. 

This is a purely American phenomenon because from 1996 to 

2012, non-U.S. stock listings rose 28 percent, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. 

The good news is that with the Jumpstart Our Business Startups 

Act (JOBS Act), Members of Congress from both parties have realized that smaller public companies should not be subject to all of 

the mandates of Fortune 500 companies. 

However, there is much more to be done, and I urge Congress to 

pass bipartisan initiatives to allow middle-class investors to build 

wealth by expanding exemptions for investment crowdfunding and 

creating ways for non-wealthy Americans to qualify as credited investors. 

And I would also urge Congress and the SEC to narrow the definition of internal controls to processes that have been proven to 

prevent fraud. 

Thank you, again, for inviting me to testify, and I look forward 

to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berlau can be found on page 54 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

And with that, I will recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

First, I want to start out by saying that I wholeheartedly understand and agree that the scandals leading into Sarbanes-Oxley required action. 

And there is a lot of debate about the details of Sarbanes-Oxley 

both at the time when it was passed and now. But it seems like 

the time is ripe after 15 years to give it a thorough review. 

One of the concerns I have is that companies are staying private 

or, interestingly enough, we are seeing them reverting back to 

being private after they had been public. 

And I think ultimately the question is, why is this important? 

And it is not for the board of directors. It is not for the corporate 

management that we need to asking this. 

But I think, as Mr. Berlau just pointed out, and it is such a great 

phrase that I wrote it down, the ‘‘accredited investor class,’’ not Mr. 

and Mrs. IRA, have caught most of the uptick in the stock market 

14 

recently. Why? Because we are having such a limited number of 

these companies going to public ownership. 

And that leads many of us to be saying, look, Wall Street is 

doing just fine—no offense Mr. Farley; I know you facilitate that, 

and it is needed—but this is why Main Street is struggling. 

And if we don’t have that focus, as Mr. Berlau was just pointing 

out, that focus on that low, moderate, hardworking taxpayer who 

is trying to save up, to put kids through college, and get themselves retired, and to catch a little bit of that upswing, if we are 

not even giving them that opportunity, we have a duty and an obligation to remove those barriers or lower those barriers. 

And I think that is certainly the motivation of why we are doing 

this and one of the reasons why I think we can be successful, because I anticipate that we have great commonality in that. 

Now, Mr. Farley, in your testimony, you mentioned that over the 

last 15 years, compliance and administrative costs have adversely 

affected those IPOs. 

So what specifically—you had started your three points on mission creep of regulators and the level of the playing field. Small 

and mid-sized companies need to be the focus and maybe those 

EGCs, so would you care to expand on that for a moment? And 

then I want to move onto another question. 

Mr. FARLEY. Can you restate the question? I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Sure. Just, what specifically can Congress 

do as we are looking at these compliance costs and administrative 

costs for these public companies for which we—it is $2.5 million, 

according to the SEC, to become public, and $1.5 million a year to 

remain public. 

Mr. FARLEY. And just quickly, I wholeheartedly agree with your 

comments about accredited investors. Again, I go back to, I live in 

New York City in the Village, but I always spend time here in P.G. 

County. 

There are a lot of accredited investors that I meet up in Manhattan. I have yet to meet one in Prince George’s County who has benefited from explosive growth of a private company. 

What can Congress do? Just to reiterate what I said, but hopefully do it quicker, with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley, eliminate the 

requirement that an auditor attest to the internal controls. That is 

very costly, and that is something that could potentially scare a 

private company off from going public. 

In addition, narrow the definition of internal controls, or at a 

minimum have a review of that periodically to make sure it is not 

expanding. 

And also, similarly related, make certain that the PCAOB, with 

their annual or every other year pronouncements, are not expanding the scope of Sarbanes-Oxley. 

I would finish by saying that with respect to small companies, 

there are actually two things to consider: the JOBS Act works quite 

well; and the Emerging Growth Company (EGC) onramp that was 

provided is very helpful. Let’s expand that. Let’s not have it end 

at 5 years. Let’s have it exist for all small companies that are public. 

15 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Okay. I have just a moment here, and I 

want to move on quickly, maybe questioning the motivations of 

why we are wanting to refocus the SEC. And, as I said in my opening statement, disclosure rules such as conflict minerals and pay 

ratios have embodied sort of these special interest groups, what 

they want to see in these corporate disclosures from political spending and climate change and child labor, human trafficking—all important issues. 

But even Chair Mary Jo White sat here and said, ‘‘That is not 

their strength. That is not their sweet spot.’’ In fact, in 2014 the 

SEC, in a letter response from myself and Mr. Hensarling and Mr. 

Garrett at the time, said, ‘‘Since 2011, the SEC staffers have spent 

7,196 hours at the cost of $1.1 million solely to write the pay ratio 

rule.’’ 

That’s 7,000 hours that could have been put towards a secure 

market, that could have been put towards making sure that we 

have the investors protected. And to me, and very quickly, do any 

of these provisions really provide any material information to investors? That is what I want to know. 

Mr. Berlau, Mr. Quaadman, Mr. Farley, very quickly, and then 

I will expend my time. 

Mr. BERLAU. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think the internal controls, which is the costliest one that I have looked at—the problem 

is internal controls can be defined broadly. 

But even a set of—in one case, a set of office, who has the office 

keys can be determined as having the internal control. So I don’t 

really think this is necessarily the kind of information that investors want to know. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Mr. Quaadman? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. To the disclosures you were talking about, 

they don’t provide material information for investors. They actually 

cause problems within the boardroom. 

Just one example, pay ratio. The City of Portland has now 

passed a tax based on the pay ratio disclosure. So they are now 

going to tax that pay ratio. And that proposal is beginning to follow 

around the soda tax. So I think it also shows how those disclosures 

can be used in harmful ways as well. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. And Mr. Farley, quickly? 

Mr. FARLEY. The sad reality is that as we expand disclosures 

dramatically, it actually makes them less approachable for the everyday investor. In fact, you referred to a 20-year period, Chairman 

Huizenga, where the number of public companies went down by 

half. The median word count of the average disclosure doubled during that period, and there have been studies that show they are 

less understandable than they ever have been. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. I am well over my time. I appreciate that, 

and thank you for the indulgence. 

With that, the Chair recognizes the ranking member of the full 

Financial Services Committee, Ms. Waters of California, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. I appreciate this discussion. 

And Professor Brown, I heard you loudly and clearly when you basically agreed with Ken Bertsch, the executive director of the Council of Institutional Investors, who wrote, ‘‘The number of U.S. IPOs 

16 

has little to do with overregulation, and the U.S. capital market for 

emerging companies is vibrant.’’ But thank you for your comments 

on that subject. 

But I really want to talk about activist investors. Republicans 

continuously claim that special interest groups and activist investors are abusing the SEC shareholder proposal rules to advance 

their own goals at the expense of the company and its management. 

However, it is my understanding that shareholder proposals may 

serve an advisory role and are mostly successful at encouraging 

dialogue between shareholders and management. Is that your understanding as well, and do you believe that proposals can have a 

significant, positive impact on companies? 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you for that question. I know I spoke loudly. 

I come from a family of 7 kids, and if you didn’t speak loudly, you 

weren’t heard. So I may overdo that sometimes. 

The discussion in here about what information is important to 

shareholders, I can tell you one way to figure that out: Look at 

what shareholders are voting for. When you look at these shareholder proposals, an enormous number of them in the governance 

area get majority support from shareholders. 

And when you look at the ones on environmental proposals, I 

think as I mentioned in my remarks, two of them got majority support at Exxon and Occidental. That is no small feat. So what these 

votes are telling you is shareholders want this information. 

We can debate in here how important we feel it is, but these returns that are coming in on these shareholder proposals are telling 

you what shareholders want. 

And more and more of these social policy kind of proposals, they 

are averaging around 30 percent. So it is not a majority on average, but that is a lot of shareholders who still want it. 

And then I would just add finally, that these proposals are almost always advisory. They are not commands. They don’t tell the 

board, you must do something. They just say, here is our opinion 

on this issue, and they leave it to the board to decide what to do 

with that information. They are providing the board with information. And I think as a fiduciary, as a director, that is information 

that you want to hear. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. And as you stated in your 

testimony for this hearing, ensuring investor confidence in the accuracy of financial statements was a critical component of SOX. 

Can you describe some of the most significant factors affecting the 

reliability of financial statements prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? 

Mr. BROWN. I think that SOX did a remarkable job in restoring 

faith in financial statements. And they did it through strengthening gatekeepers. They did it through creating a regulator which, 

by the way, was very creative. 

It was a nonprofit corporation. It wasn’t a typical bureaucracy. 

I think they did it by encouraging officers to want to have more accurate information by having to certify the financial statements. 

So, SOX took a lot of steps. 

But I also want to emphasize improvement in internal controls. 

This is the backbone of financial statements. If you can’t have conVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:05 Jun 06, 2018 Jkt 028750 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\28750.TXT TERI
17 

trols in place to make sure you are recording your transactions 

properly, you are not going to have accurate financial statements. 

If you take an auditor at the Big Four down to the Monacle for 

a couple of drinks and you ask them, what do you think about this 

whole review of the internal controls? Some of them might admit 

that the review of the internal controls can be more important than 

the audit itself in making sure that the financial statements are 

accurate. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentlelady yields back. 

With that, the Chair recognizes the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Hultgren, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all so 

much for being here. I appreciate your testimony, Mr. Quaadman. 

It’s good to see you again. I appreciate you being here, and I appreciate you testifying today. 

I would like to hear a little bit more from you about the damaging effects of SEC’s Rule 14a-8 and the Chamber’s renewed effort 

to bring about some reform that will allow public companies to 

focus on material disclosures. 

The Chamber just submitted a petition for rulemaking regarding 

resubmission of shareholder proposals failing to elicit meaningful 

shareholder support back in 2014, but it was never taken up under 

the prior leadership of the SEC. 

Section 844 of the Financial CHOICE Act proposes a number of 

meaningful reforms. Your testimony, I think it was on Page 9, 

mentions that the Chamber will soon release a set of proposals to 

reform SEC Rule 14a-8, and I am certainly looking forward to reviewing those. 

I wonder if we could get a sneak preview of those recommendations? This subcommittee has heard some important ideas for reform, such as revisiting the resubmission thresholds, with which I 

definitely agree. So I am eager to hear what else we can do. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Sure. So number one, just with the resubmission 

threshold issue for a second, we have a very small number of what 

are known as gadfly investors, five or six individuals who literally 

submit hundreds of proposals over a period of time. And that has 

frustrated the rights of the majority. 

So if you are getting proposals that are getting very low support, 

it costs the company investors time and money. So the proposal 

that we have actually set forth there is actually based off of Chairman Arthur Levitt’s proposal from the Clinton Administration SEC 

on how to deal with those issues. 

The other issue, too, in terms of 14a-8 reforms, Chair White, a 

few years ago, in what is known as the Whole Foods decision, basically abdicated the role of the SEC to be the gatekeeper, the umpire, as to what proposals should go forward or not. And this was 

after a long period of time where the SEC staff was allowing more 

and more political disclosures to come through. 

I think 30 percent is different than 70 percent. If 70 percent or 

80 percent or 90 percent of shareholders don’t want to have something disclosed, that means they don’t want to have it disclosed. 

And if they don’t want to have repetitive proposals going forth, this 

is something that needs to be addressed. 

18 

So this is one of the issues that I raised in my opening statement 

as to the cost and burden that go along with that, which shareholders don’t want. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Yes. On a similar note, Mr. Quaadman, on page 

80 your testimony mentions the importance of the SEC, the 

PCAOB and the FASB agreeing to a common definition of ‘‘materiality’’ in financial reporting. I wondered if you could please explain 

the importance for establishing a common definition? And do you 

have any specific recommendations for how the committee can facilitate this work? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. The Cox Commission back in 2008 had actually issued a set of very far-reaching reforms as to financial reporting. They were never acted on because of the financial crisis. 

One of the proposals that was at the center of that is that the 

SEC, the FASB, and the PCAOB have differing definitions of ‘‘materiality,’’ which actually leads to standard setting that doesn’t necessarily match up. If you take a look at some of the recent PCAOB 

standards that they have done, the differences there between them 

and FASB have not made for good enforcement. 

So FASB, to its credit, has actually put out a proposal to have 

a definition of ‘‘materiality’’ that matches up with the Supreme 

Court definition in TSC Northway. And they have come under attack by special interest investors because they would rather have 

as much disclosure as possible. 

But when you talk to FASB, they will tell you if you go in and 

talk to, let’s say an insurance company, an insurance company is 

not going to need an accounting standard around or a disclosure 

around inventory because they don’t sell inventory. That is something that you are going to look at Macy’s for. 

So I think to get all three entities on the same page is actually 

something that is going to help investors in the long run. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Great, thank you. 

Quickly, Mr. Berlau, thanks for being here as well. Your testimony recommends that Congress narrow the SOX definition of internal controls to processes that have proven their effectiveness in 

preventing fraud. 

In an effort to establish some goal posts, I wonder if you could 

provide some examples of currently established processes of internal controls that are not effective? 

Mr. BERLAU. There was the Wall Street Journal report of the 

auditor requiring the company to document who has the office 

keys. The problem is Sarbanes-Oxley didn’t define internal controls, and then the PCAOB has its own very broad definition. 

And so the SEC should exercise that authority over the PCAOB 

that it has, but Congress should act, too, to actually ensure that 

this doesn’t waste companies’ and shareholders’ time. And I can get 

back to you on the— 

Mr. HULTGREN. Great. We will follow up if that is okay? My time 

has expired. Thank you all very much for being here. We appreciate it. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from 

New York, Mrs. Maloney, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

19 

Professor Brown, I would like to ask you about the decline in the 

number of IPOs in the U.S. in recent history. Some people have 

claimed that companies are not going public anymore because regulations have made it too onerous for public companies. 

Yet, as you know, 74 percent of the decline in U.S. public companies from its 1996 peak occurred prior to 2003 and the passage of 

Sarbanes-Oxley. And the total number of U.S.-listed companies has 

stabilized since the 2008 crisis, ranging between 4,100 to 4,400, 

while the number of foreign companies listed and listing in the 

U.S. has increased. 

Isn’t it true that the JOBS Act actually encouraged companies to 

stay private longer? In the JOBS Act we increased the threshold 

when companies became subject to SEC regulation from 500 shareholders to 2,000, which clearly makes it easier for companies to 

stay private longer. 

And we made it easier for private companies to sell securities to 

sophisticated investors, which allows them to raise capital without 

going public, plus the availability of capital, the low interest rates 

have all contributed. So isn’t some of this decline in the number 

of IPOs an intended consequence of the JOBS Act? 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Congresswoman Maloney. I don’t think 

that there is any question that part of the explanation for the number of public companies is the vibrancy of the private markets. 

There is a lot of capital sloshing around in the private markets. 

I also don’t think that there is any question that one of the reasons that the private markets are so active is because of regulatory 

change. I think there have been a lot of things that have facilitated 

activity in the private markets. 

You point to a couple of them in the JOBS Act. We just heard 

earlier in testimony why accredited investors are getting these 

deals and ordinary investors are not. Well, one of the things the 

JOBS Act did was permit general solicitations to accredited investors. They facilitated that dynamic to take place. So I agree with 

that. 

I also think that some of the concern over the public markets 

was because in 2016, we had a particularly low number of public 

offerings. 

But in the first 6 months of 2017, we have already had more 

public offerings and raised more capital than all of 2016. So I think 

we have to also be careful in looking at our data points in sort of 

assessing how these markets are doing, relatively speaking. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. And I would now like to ask Tom Farley, 

president of the New York Stock Exchange—thank you for keeping 

the name—you noted in your testimony that you were concerned 

about the decline in the IPOs. And what are the public policy benefits of having more companies go public rather than staying private? 

Mr. FARLEY. Sure, thank you. The public policy benefits are primarily twofold, Congresswoman. First, I give you the example of 

my father. Defined benefit pension plans, which, by the way, is the 

way the world is going generally, are going away. And so someone 

like my father and the millions and millions like him cannot invest 

in Airbnb in the private market in any meaningful way, but he can 

20 

invest in a company that goes public like Under Armour in 2005. 

The very wealthy, they can invest in Airbnb. 

That, to me, is a societal issue, number one. Number two, public 

companies create more jobs. Anywhere from 75 to 90 percent of all 

jobs created by public companies, depending on the time period you 

look at, are created after the point they go public. 

And perhaps more importantly, the inflection point of job creation lifts off when they are a public company. But those are the 

tangible reasons why it is a public policy good. 

There is also the psychological element, which is the aggregate 

market cap is going up. The number of companies is going down. 

That says that only big companies find it easy to be a public company, and there is an issue with small to mid-sized companies. 

To have a really great free enterprise system, we want it to work 

for all companies. We want it to work for big companies, small companies, the real estate brokerage in Manhattan or the hair braider 

in Harlem. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. Very quickly, Professor Brown, as you 

know, companies frequently complain about Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley, which requires auditors to attest that companies have 

effective financial controls in place. What is your assessment of 

how effective 404(b) has been? 

Mr. BROWN. I think that Section 404(b) and attestation is critical. I think that it better ensures the accuracy of financial statements. And I think accurate financial statements benefit investors. 

They can make better decisions. Maybe they will pay a higher price 

for shares because they are less concerned about financial risk or 

the risk that the financial statements are false. 

It benefits officers because they make better decisions when they 

understand the finances of their own company and the accuracy of 

their own records. And it benefits independent directors, who have 

a fiduciary duty to know how the company is doing. 

And I would just add with independent directors, it is not easy 

for them to go to their own company and say, hey, can you get this 

attestation done, because it looks like they don’t trust their officers. 

It is better to just have that be a requirement so that the independent directors know this step is being taken and they can be 

more certain of the accuracy of their financial statements. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Quaadman, very quickly, what are your 

thoughts on Section 404(b)? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. So 404(b) I think, one, you need internal controls 

for businesses to grow from small to large, but two things. One is 

for smaller companies, those costs need to be scalable, but number 

two, and there has been an ongoing issue with existing public companies where their internal control costs over the last several 

years, particularly amongst middle-market companies, has gone up 

by over 300 percent. 

This is partially because the PCAOB forgets that ‘‘public company’’ are the first two words in its name, and they don’t bring in 

the public companies to talk about what critical audit issues are. 

And that has led to a breakdown as to what a balanced system 

should be. 

When Jim Schnurr was the Chief Accountant at the SEC, we 

opened up a dialogue with him, and with Chair Doty, to try and 

21 

address these issues, and we did to some degree, but we are going 

to continue to do so. And we are actually, later this year, going to 

issue a proposal with some ideas as to how to actually address 

those issues. 

Mrs. MALONEY. That would be very helpful. My time has expired, 

thank you. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The Chair recognizes the chairman of our 

Housing and Insurance Subcommittee, Mr. Duffy, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DUFFY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to welcome 

the panel. Thank you all for being here today. For many of you, I 

want to thank you for the kind comments you have made on our 

corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act. 

As many of you know, we introduced this in the last Congress. 

Congressman Carney, now Governor Carney, and I worked closely 

together on this proposal. We had wide bipartisan support from 

across the aisle. This language is now included in the CHOICE Act. 

We hope that we will get good movement not just here in the 

House but also in the Senate. 

But I want to drill down a little bit with our panel and just, 

again, I want to hear Mr. Farley and Mr. Blake, any concerns that 

you have about the transparency, the competition, and the accountability of our—basically there are two proxy advisory firms that 

now operate today. 

And Mr. Quaadman, too, if you want to jump in? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Sure. There is not a lot of transparency. Let me 

just put it that way. 

Mr. DUFFY. So there is not a lot of transparency? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. Glass Lewis is a black box. And while there 

is some ability to, let’s say, engage with ISS, that has actually been 

a problem as well. So I think we need to look at it in two ways. 

One is, and I think this is what your bill drives at and what the 

SEC tried to do a little bit with their 2014 guidance, is there needs 

to be a process for how those firms actually develop their recommendations. And those recommendations need to be linked back 

to the fiduciary duty and economic return of their clients. 

I think there are also additional problems that your bill addresses as well is the conflicts of interest of both of those firms was each 

of those firms have different conflicts of interest. ISS was going in 

the consulting business, Glass Lewis being owned by an activist investor. 

So I think oversight is important and I think it is a way to actually bring some rationality into proxy advice. 

Mr. FARLEY. I would just highlight that this, too, is a small company versus large company issue. We recently had about 25 listed 

companies gather at the New York Stock Exchange to talk about 

issues that were giving them difficulty, and this was one of them 

we discussed. 

And what we learned is that it is much more painful for the 

small companies because, for example, the proxy advisory firms 

will have this opaque process. They will come up with an opinion, 

and they will publish it at times without consulting the company 

or notifying them of what their process is or what their results are. 

And it will be published with some errors. We are all human. We 

all make errors from time to time. But because they haven’t run 

22 

it by the company that is now out in the market, and it is very difficult for a small company without a public relations machine to be 

able to correct that information. 

And so that is why we are advocating for more transparency in 

terms of the processes of those proxy advisory firms, as well as 

more collaboration from them with those companies that they are 

opining on. 

Mr. DUFFY. Mr. Blake? 

Mr. BLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Duffy. I appreciate the work you are 

doing in this area. I have to echo Mr. Quaadman and Mr. Farley’s 

comments. It really is an issue with the smaller issuers, especially 

around the transparency and the engagement that they have with 

the smaller issuers. 

Their methodologies tend not to be published and we have to go 

through a process to discover what the methodologies are in order 

to comply with them. And the resourcing, which I think your bill 

addresses for the proxy advisory firms to engage with the smaller 

issuers is very important. 

We want to be able to engage in a dialogue and at least explain 

our side of the story in terms of what our governance policies are 

and our executive compensation policies are. 

Mr. DUFFY. But if you look at these two main proxy advisory 

firms, and we look back in 1987, institutional investors had 46 percent of our market. Now they have grown to 75 percent of the market. What role do proxy advisory firms have on corporate governance? It is substantial, isn’t it? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. 

Mr. DUFFY. And then, do they have the best interests of shareholders in mind? And does their one-size-fits-all benefit shareholders or negatively impact shareholders? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Let me actually give you one example with that. 

With the passage of Dodd-Frank and through a lot of work of members of this committee, there is a provision in there on say-on-pay 

votes where investors and shareholders are supposed to determine 

the frequency of those votes, 1, 2, or 3 years. 

And what had happened, of course, for a proxy advisory firm, is 

if you have an annual vote there is a pecuniary interest in doing 

that. So of course the advisory firms immediately came out and 

said, no, there needs to be an annual vote. And of course that is 

exactly where it all then went. 

So shareholders were disenfranchised, Congress’ intent was overruled, and the advisory firms profited from that. 

Mr. DUFFY. That is right. So they made a recommendation that 

helped their bottom line but wasn’t in the interest of the shareholders— 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Correct. 

Mr. DUFFY. —per your example. We get a lot of stories that come 

our way, but stories from one specific proxy advisory firm, ISS, we 

got one that came in that said, we heard this is the ISS calling one 

of the companies. We heard you had a negative recommendation. 

And this, by the way, the recommendation isn’t even out yet. We 

heard you have a negative recommendation. Oh, by the way, do you 

want to buy our consulting services? 

23 

And there is supposed to be a firewall between the two divisions, 

but when their recommendation isn’t even out yet and here the 

offer is coming in to buy our services, that gives us some concern. 

That is like Vinny saying, ‘‘Oh, I heard you were robbed last night. 

Do you want our protection services?’’ 

It is outrageous and I think this is, per your testimony, ripe for 

reform. And I am getting tapped down right now, but I look forward to any other input you might have on how we could improve 

our product and get this across not just the House and the Senate, 

but improve corporate governance and the transparency and accountability of proxy advisors. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. And yet somehow, the gentleman managed 

to get another 20 seconds. Okay. 

[laughter] 

With that, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Scott, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The Enron 

scandal broke right at the same time that I first entered Congress 

15 years ago. And as I recall, there was just great fear and anxiety 

after Enron went down. 

But right after that, the most startling thing happened: Arthur 

Andersen, a 100-year-old company, disappeared, collapsed overnight, which garnered great fear, and that was the move that 

Oxley dealt with, how can we quickly eliminate this fear and move 

to confidence? And that was done. 

But Mr. Farley, I have just been listening back and forth on the 

404 situation, and I tend to think that you basically agree with me 

that Sarbanes-Oxley institutionalized transparency in financial reporting and boosted confidence in the public markets, which reduced that fear. 

Yet, in your testimony you highlight that Section 404 has a specific example of one part of Sarbanes-Oxley that has disproportionately impacted small and mid-sized companies. 

So there is some air in the middle of this because it is my understanding that Section 404 requires issuers to publicly publish the 

scope, the adequacy, and the truth of their internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. 

It just seems to me that Section 404 is vital to instilling that confidence, to reducing that fear and transparency in our markets and 

getting that confidence back. To me, Section 404 seems pretty important and perhaps the premier piece of Sarbanes-Oxley that will 

prevent another Enron or Arthur Andersen. 

So I value your insight on this and could you address that error 

that is in there? It seems to me that on the one hand, you are saying positives about Section 404, but you come and show some 

weaknesses as far as the small and mid-sized firm. Would you clarify that? 

Mr. FARLEY. Yes, and as usual, Congressman, I think there is 

probably more agreement on this issue between you and I than disagreement. It is a tricky one. 

And what I mean by that is you are right. There were tremendous scandals that did undermine investor confidence. And they 

24 

were really lousy. It was Enron, WorldCom, and there were repercussions for those scandals. People went to jail in both cases. 

In fact, there was a very tragic suicide that came about as a result of that. So there were consequences, but yet those consequences don’t solve that investor confidence issue. That really 

dented investor confidence. 

So the idea of, let’s put in place Sarbanes-Oxley to inspire investor confidence, that made sense at the time and it was 98 to 0. But 

as Chairman Huizenga said, you always want to go back and you 

want to—in the Senate it was 98–0—you want to go back and you 

want to look at these things from time to time and do you want 

to say did they work? 

And that is where I am suggesting to you and your colleagues 

that there are some issues. The New York Stock Exchange is not 

advocating we abolish Sarbanes-Oxley, nor is it advocating we abolish Sarbanes-Oxley 404. 

Mr. SCOTT. I don’t want to lose my time here. 

Mr. FARLEY. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Give me some examples of where it hurts the small 

and mid-sized firms? 

Mr. FARLEY. Sure. I had breakfast last week—I don’t think he 

would mind my sharing this anecdote, but this happens all the 

time, Congressman; I could give you a list of them—with the CEO 

of Shake Shack, Randy Garutti. And I said, ‘‘How is it going?’’ And 

he said, ‘‘It is okay, but I spend a lot of my time staying in compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley 404 a lot more than I otherwise would 

have thought.’’ 

And he said, ‘‘Look, we are a small company. You think of us as 

a big company with a big brand, over $350 million in revenue, 

which makes us a small public company. And having to implement 

404, put the internal controls in place, verify that they work and 

have them attested to by an accounting firm is difficult for us.’’ 

Actually, the last part he didn’t go through all those specific instances, but he said complying with it and complying with all the 

applicable regulations are very difficult. Those sort of conversations 

I have over and over again, which is why we focused on small to 

mid-sized businesses in our testimony. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you advocate taking some kind of legislative action to Sarbanes-Oxley to address the concerns of these small businesses? 

Mr. FARLEY. We do, in two ways. One, we are recommending 

that we eliminate the auditor attestation requirement for all companies. And in the absence of that for small companies, we are advocating that we extend the EGC benefits that exist today for all, 

without an arbitrary 5-year time duration. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that extra 40 seconds. Thank 

you. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. I am paying for my earlier sins, yes, of allowing myself to go long. 

But with that, I recognize the chairwoman of our Oversight and 

Investigations Subcommittee, Mrs. Wagner from Missouri, for 5 

minutes. 

25 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you all for 

appearing today to discuss issues that affect the cost of being a 

public company, particularly around corporate governance issues 

and the growing trend of special interests using the Federal securities laws to advance their own agendas. 

This has increasingly led, as we have heard outlined by most of 

our witnesses, more time and resources having to be directed toward dealing with these issues which typically have nothing to do 

with long-term shareholder value. 

As a result, small businesses that are considering going public 

increasingly are being deterred, as Mr. Farley has spoken about, 

due to the unfavorable corporate governance climate. 

Mr. Quaadman, why do you believe, just as a 30,000-foot argument here, these special interests have been able to become more 

active in the corporate governance space? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Part of it is, and this is the conversation we 

were having with Mr. Hultgren earlier, that the SEC to some degree has allowed it. So when they have stopped being that umpire 

in terms of shareholder proposals where they have allowed more of 

these issues to come in, that has allowed these things to seep 

through. 

I also think, as I said in my testimony, Sarbanes-Oxley sort of 

kicked the door open, but then Dodd-Frank rushed through. So we 

started to see a lot of disclosures and a lot of issues start to come 

in. 

And I think we are at the cusp now where ESG issues, so environmental, social, and governance, are now beginning to pick up 

steam and there have been some efforts, particularly from Europe, 

to try and bring that over here. But I think we need to be very, 

very careful with it because those issues are in the eye of the beholder and very often investors just don’t want them in the boardroom. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The SEC and Congress have recently turned to 

the disclosure system to address social, political, and environmental issues that are irrelevant to reasonable investors’ investment in proxy-voting decisions, and while important on some level, 

are more efficiently, and I think effectively, addressed through 

other means. 

As a result, investors today receive voluminous, complex information that is often immaterial to their investment or voting decisions. Could you please elaborate, Mr. Quaadman? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. You have to take a look at, there are various cottage industries that are beginning to form up around ESG. I took 

a look at one report from one group and they had two different disclosures from similar companies: one that dealt with the reduction 

in fuel costs; and then another dealing with a reduction of CO2. 

So they said, the first company that was talking about reduction 

in fuel costs really should have a different type of disclosure. But 

the thing is that first disclosure dealt with the bottom line, which 

is what investors care about. 

And that is, I think, where we are getting away from the fact 

that those are the issues that a long-term investor cares about. 

26 

Mrs. WAGNER. And let’s turn to materiality. What is the current 

definition of ‘‘materiality’’ used by the SEC to determine what 

should or should not be disclosed to an issuer? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. You need to go to Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 

decision in TSC Northway where what he basically said that you 

need to take the total mix of information that will allow for a reasonable investor to make a decision. 

And then he goes on to say it is not everything. It is just what 

is a reasonable amount of information to do that. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Should it be changed or updated? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. No, it should not, because that is what investors 

have hung their hat on for decades. 

Mrs. WAGNER. If the definition of ‘‘materiality’’ were to be expanded, say to require disclosures of information that might be important to any investors, what would be the practical impact or 

what are we saying is the practical impact? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. You can take it through its logical extension 

that you would want to know what the trade secrets are of Apple 

for their new iPhone 8, which of course is ludicrous, because then 

how is Apple ever going to be able to make any money off of that? 

And there is a group of people, particularly within the the investor 

advisory committee in the SEC, who are trying to push for a fraud 

definition of ‘‘materiality’’ which would overturn Northway and effectively everything that is disclosable at that point. 

Mrs. WAGNER. And does expanding the scope better protect investors? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. No. No, it actually will drive investors— 

Mrs. WAGNER. Well, why not? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. It will drive investors and companies out of the 

public markets into the private markets. I think we have to take 

a look at while stock buybacks have been a cause celebre for 

some— 

Mrs. WAGNER. Yes. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. —it is a massive reallocation of capital away 

from the public company markets. We have disadvantaged one part 

of our capital market system for the sake of the other. And we need 

to have balance there. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I agree. Thank you, Mr. Quaadman, very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentlelady yields back. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses again for helping us with this 

issue, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Professor Brown, so let’s go back. We have the Enron situation 

and WorldCom, Tyco International another one, instances where 

especially with Enron, Arthur Andersen was actually in collusion 

with Enron. 

That is why they went out of business. So they were hiding a lot 

and conducting some fraudulent practices there where investors 

were not able to understand truly what the financial underpinnings 

for that company was. 

27 

And remember at the time we had just gone through energy industry deregulation and so Enron took advantage of all that deregulation and perpetrated a huge fraud, billions of dollars in fraud 

against the American investors. So that is why we have what we 

have now. 

Now, I understand the costs, especially for my smaller and midsized companies is excessive. How do we strike that balance where 

we want to maintain the integrity and the reliability of the financial information that we get from these companies? We want to 

make sure that they are being honest with us and accurate. Yet, 

we don’t want to pummel them and cause them to have these huge 

massive costs. 

I am encouraged that I see some—there are a couple of firms out 

there now that have cloud-based, Internet-based accounting systems that help you with compliance. 

I think that DNA Technologies, which is a private company, they 

don’t even have to comply, but they have adopted some of this 

cloud-based technology to make it a little bit less expensive. 

How do we strike that balance where we get the information that 

we need to make prudent investment decisions and yet try not to 

overwhelm, as Mr. Quaadman has said, these growing companies 

and give them some air to breathe? How do we strike that balance? 

Mr. BROWN. It is a fair question. And, of course, we can see these 

costs. They are real. It is harder to see the benefits. They are a little bit more broad-based so it is sort of hard to analyze this. 

I talked to an auditor who audits smaller companies, and what he told me was—he said because of the $75 million break where 

when you go above it you have to do the attestation and below it 

you don’t. He said that when we have these smaller clients we lose 

them at $75 million because they look at us and they say, well, you 

don’t know how to do the attestation. I have to get a bigger firm. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Mr. BROWN. So, sometimes we put in regulatory reforms and that 

actually increases the cost. If they could stay with their small auditor, maybe the cost structure for the attestation by that small auditor would be cheaper because there would be more competition in 

the marketplace. 

Mr. LYNCH. What about the frequency of compliance? I know in 

some other areas, rather than have people file yearly, we allow 

them to file every 18 months. And their financial situation does not 

necessarily change that drastically over an 18-month period. 

Can we look at changing the interim between filing requirements 

to maybe reduce by a third what the cost might be to a company? 

Although I don’t want to get away from the attestation piece where 

the auditor has to actually come in and say, okay, this was done 

properly. 

I think if we lose that—there is not enough accountability in the 

system as it is. Nobody goes to jail, nobody admits wrongdoing; 

there are massive payoffs and fines, but nobody admits wrongdoing. You really do need accountability. Is there a way that we 

can reduce the cost by spreading out the period of compliance filings? 

Mr. BROWN. I will say also, kind of consistent with what you just 

said, human nature. If you are inside a company and you are reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:05 Jun 06, 2018 Jkt 028750 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\28750.TXT TERI
28 

sponsible for internal controls, and you know somebody from the 

outside is going to come in and look at them, you are going to do 

a better job. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Mr. BROWN. So there is this effect, this broad-based effect from 

the notion that the third parties are coming in. I think it is a risky 

thing to start reducing the frequency of disclosure. I think that is 

something that for investors, will potentially make them less interested in these smaller companies. And we don’t want to create that 

dynamic either. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, well, just I want to put this out there. I am willing to work with my colleagues across the aisle to try to figure out 

a way to reduce costs, and with our panelists I know we get differing opinions. I would like to maintain the integrity of our markets and the information that the public gets regarding these companies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence, and I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hill, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panel 

being here today. 

I had a really fun event yesterday. I was up at the opening of 

the NASDAQ with a mid-cap company from my home district that 

was celebrating 20 years in the public markets. And they went 

public back in 1997. I think the market cap was in the $50 million 

range or so, something that many companies wouldn’t do today. 

They wouldn’t be able to absorb the kind of IPO costs of $2 million or $2.5 million or more and then the annual ongoing costs that 

are sort of the regulatory regime that we have today if they are not 

a unicorn-type company that has really low traditional maybe corporate administrative costs, and so going public is really a capital 

raising-only activity. I appreciated Professor Brown’s comment 

about Amazon in that regard in terms of the last 20 years. 

But for a normal business, and certainly a community bank 

would be considered sort of a normal cost basis business, I am not 

sure it would be as good. 

On SOX, having been an independent director under SOX in a 

public company and looking at it, to me I like the independent director aspects of it. Professor Brown, I liked the financial reporting. 

I don’t mind the attestation. I would tell everybody that is still 

redundant. We all attested to the financial statements as public 

company officers before we had to sign yet again another page to 

that effect. 

And I love the attitude of, let’s have more saber-toothed tigers 

on our compensation committees—I think that is great—instead of 

college roommates. I think that would be wonderful, but I don’t 

think you can get that done through statute very effectively. 

So, a couple of questions that struck me probably following up on 

my friend, Mr. Lynch. Mr. Berlau, if you would talk a little bit 

about your views on 404 from the standpoint of, is there a way 

under AICPA rules or through peek-a-boo that we could tailor 404 

rules? 

29 

We talk a lot in this committee about tailoring of bank regulations between community banks and the G-SIFI giant Wall Street 

global banks. So instead of, like, changing reporting dates could we 

just have the peek-a-boo direct auditing standards change between 

scope on companies? What are your views on that? 

Mr. BERLAU. Yes. I think there are several things that can be 

done. And it is kind of ironic that it was accounting scandals that 

prompted SOX, and yet it has been also been called the ‘‘accountant’s full employment act,’’ because of all the work it creates for 

them. 

The word is, as you pointed out, attestation that is actually in 

the law Sarbanes-Oxley in Section 404. The PCAOB has—Public 

Company Accounting Oversight Board—has interpreted that to 

mean a full-blown audit and has a very broad definition of the term 

‘‘internal control.’’ 

So I think there are things Congress can do to narrow that definition. I think the SEC should exercise the oversight that the Supreme Court gave it in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, to have 

it narrow the definition and also to say an attestation does not necessarily mean a full-blown audit— 

Mr. HILL. Yes. 

Mr. BERLAU. —like you audit the numbers. 

Mr. HILL. I think that kind of scoping would be good and sort 

of a common-sense approach. I know in the JOBS Act, and in subsequent bills here, we have supported raising the market cap that 

it is even applicable for. And I am not opposed to those ideas, but 

maybe a longer-term solution is that kind of scoping where either 

through the auditing standards or, as you say, through the level of 

attestation that we are requiring a public accounting firm to put 

their name on, which means then they are going to do an audit, 

which in fact means you are double auditing companies. 

Another suggestion, maybe Mr. Quaadman on this, what about 

the idea that once I have 3 years of attestation on 404 standards 

that maybe that attestation. I still self-certify, I still sign as an officer, but maybe that audit attestation is every other year or every 

3 years, again, sort of like a bank exam scope? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. 

Mr. HILL. I think that is again where my friend Mr. Lynch was 

going with his line of questioning. What are your thoughts on that? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. I think that is an important step forward. I 

think it is also important to remember that the audit profession 

has done a lot here, too. But if an auditor is inspected by the 

PCAOB and there is a problem with that audit, that partner’s career is over. 

Mr. HILL. Right. Right. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. So I think we have to remember that as well. 

Mr. HILL. Right. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Dr. Foster, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the 

committee and I want to say I am very impressed at the bipartisan 

thought that is going into this. 

30 

I am a proud co-sponsor of the Fostering Innovation Act—I think 

our side’s co-sponsor is Kyrsten Sinema—but it is an example of 

really the sort of sensible tweaks that should be made, because this 

is, in the end, a matter of balance. 

I would like to return for a second to the question of internal controls. We have heard arguments that these should be narrowed and 

things like keys to the business may or may not be worth pushing. 

Though you have to think about the case of Coca-Cola. If they 

lose their magic formula and it gets posted on WikiLeaks, there 

could be a big hit, because they happen to maintain that. 

Another area, related area, that maybe we could think about 

broadening and strengthening has to do with cyber security, insider 

threats. This is a huge deal. The market value of firms like Yahoo 

were just crushed because when it became public that a large fraction of their accountholders had been hacked, which hurts the market value of companies enormously. 

Pharma startups are regularly under cyberattack suspected from 

the Chinese, by companies that are trying to steal their intellectual 

property which is often the only thing that they have that is worth 

anything. 

And so I was wondering, particularly in the area of cybersecurity, 

if maybe internal controls, the definition of internal controls and 

the way they are audited should possibly be strengthened a little 

bit given the huge risk that makes to the actual valuations of companies? Does anyone have any comments on that? 

Mr. BLAKE. I am happy to jump in here. Cybersecurity was an 

issue that we looked at in our last round of internal control testing 

in our company. And really, if you look at the pronouncements on 

internal controls it really allows for a risk-based application of how 

you evaluate your internal controls, and so that is where it really 

centers on what you identify as key controls. 

Cybersecurity would fall under IT general controls in that framework. And for us as a small biotech company, our risks of 

cyberattack or releasing personal information are pretty limited. 

Even when we receive patient data, it is de-identified data. It does 

not have the patient’s name or identifiable information. 

So when we evaluated that risk we actually determined that it 

was very low, and that we didn’t need to purchase cyber insurance, 

for example. So from a practical standpoint, when you look at the 

smaller issuers, it is important to look at what types of data that 

they are exposed to. 

Mr. FOSTER. Any other comments on— 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Sure, Mr. Foster, thank you. That is a great 

question. I think cyber is probably the most vexing and complicated 

issue the boards are dealing with. I think, along the lines of a year 

ago, and I think we need to have a dialogue between the PCAOB, 

COSO, the SEC, and the national security agencies and businesses 

on how to best address these issues. 

Very often with cyber, if you take a look at the traditional norm 

with corporate governance issues, it is to disclose. However, there 

are other forms or other agencies in the government that sometimes don’t want businesses to disclose. 

So I think you are right to see if there is a way to maybe work 

to get proper internal controls in place, but then also to make sure 

31 

that we have an appropriate regime that balances the need for the 

governance issues that we need to address, as well as the national 

security issues that we need to address as well. 

Mr. FARLEY. I agree. It’s a hugely important issue. I am glad you 

bring it up. We wouldn’t be in favor of new federally-mandated internal controls. However, we do think there is an opportunity for 

Congress to be very helpful in just allowing for more information 

sharing between the agencies and companies and companies within 

the same industry. Thank you for bringing the issue up 

Mr. FOSTER. All right, yes. I was just thinking if there was 

some—if you only have the attention to devote to the value of a 

company that the typical investor in a publicly held company would 

have, if there was just a simple standardized thing that they are 

not doing massively stupid and lazy stuff on cybersecurity. 

I don’t know how that would be just because, obviously one line 

of code can make the best—you can have all the best systems in 

place and then oh, but where we didn’t do this particular update 

and the Heartbleed bug has made us completely vulnerable. 

And so it is very hard to guarantee that you are never going to 

be vulnerable to this sort of stuff. And yet if you have a bunch of 

people running obsolete versions of Windows on their laptop, and 

these are your research scientists going home and completely making all of your core I.P. vulnerable to anyone on the Internet, it is 

a problem. 

And I’m trying to understand, if there is at least a basic set of 

standards that could be used to judge compliance with internal controls. Anyway it is just—and so I wanted to bring it up. 

Just one last question quickly, this decline in the number of publicly held companies, I was wondering if it has ever been studied 

whether high-net-worth people keep more of their money in privately held companies compared to middle-class investors, because 

what we are seeing here may simply be, my guess is that is very 

true, that very wealthy people put a lot more of their money 

through private equity venture capital and so on into nonpublic 

firms, and we might just be seeing a reflection of the fact the 

wealth is piling up at the top in this country. Is anyone aware, has 

that issue been studied and looked at quantitatively? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. FOSTER. I urge you to have someone take a look at it. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. It sounds like you have gotten a homework 

assignment. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Stivers, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having 

this important hearing and I appreciate all the witnesses being 

here. 

And I have a couple of questions for Mr. Quaadman. First, under 

the JOBS Act and a few other changes that have happened, we 

have seen companies be able to stay in private hands longer and 

not go public, and if I am asking the wrong person this question, 

other people can chime in. 

What impact does that allowing those companies to be in private 

hands longer have on the company’s valuation and growth potential? 

32 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes, so let me just take that in a couple different 

ways. Number one, I thought Ernst & Young issued, and I think 

Chairman Huizenga raised this at the beginning of the hearing, a 

very thoughtful report on the decline of public companies in private 

markets. 

Look, the JOBS Act did two things: it liberalized the private 

markets; and it also tried to make it easier for business to go to 

the IPO markets. I think on liberalizing the private markets, it certainly did so. I think we need to do more work in terms of the IPO 

process. 

We have seen an explosion in the number of unicorn businesses, 

so those private businesses that are a billion dollars or more. I do 

agree with many of the other comments of my fellow panelists here 

that unfortunately, I think benefits accredited to investors, and it 

actually shuts out retail investors. So I think it is a matter of— 

Mr. STIVERS. And that is the next part of my question, what does 

it mean to the average investor who doesn’t have the net worth, 

or other things to be an accredited investor? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. When a company goes public there is an economic growth positive that comes with it. So the Kauffman Institute looked at the IPOs from 1996 to 2010 and found that 2.2 million jobs were created. There is a wealth aspect that comes along 

with that, and there is also a revenue growth. So there are multiplier economic benefits that accrue with that. 

Mr. STIVERS. Great. 

Does anybody else have any input there? 

Mr. BERLAU. Yes. I think if the number of public companies 

keeps shrinking, you could have a very real issue of too many dollars from retail investors chasing too few stocks, which could have 

some negative effects. 

Small and mid-cap companies can be a part of a diversified portfolio because in large part because of the regulatory burden, you 

are depriving middle-class investors from having these in their 

portfolio like they could have with Amazon and with Home Depot. 

And I think if you liberalize the public markets, you would get 

some entrepreneurs who would choose that rather than if it would 

give them another option if they don’t want to put up with venture 

capitalists, the high demands like you see on Shark Tank. 

Mr. STIVERS. Sure. And Mr. Quaadman, one follow-up question. 

So, obviously we all care about, and I am glad that this committee 

is shining light on the additional burden and compliance that 

might discourage some companies from going public. 

I am curious. There seems to be a fight or a disagreement about 

whether private capital markets have grown as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley or independent of Sarbanes-Oxley. Do you have an 

opinion on that? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. I think what we have done is—look, if we are 

going to have an economy that is humming, we need to have both 

private and public markets that are operating optimally. 

I think what we have done is we have sort of squeezed down on 

the public company model in a way that has shifted resources over 

to the private markets, not necessarily because the private markets 

were all that more attractive, but because we have actually created 

some disincentives on the public company side. 

33 

So I think that is what our argument would be, is that we need 

to have a rebalancing of that. And I do think we need to take a 

look at it, particularly in terms of corporate governance, of how do 

we get back to maybe more of a balanced system where the States 

in that State-competitive model have actually allowed for a lot of 

diverse systems that work, rather than have a one-size-fits-all system that is more European, that hasn’t had the same economic 

benefits there. 

Mr. STIVERS. Sure. And I think that gets to my final question of, 

what components of Sarbanes-Oxley represent the biggest cost or 

compliance challenges, especially that might be felt more acutely 

by smaller companies? And how can we create the balance that you 

are talking about that ensures the integrity and ensures that we 

have both public and private capital? 

And I have given you 12 seconds to answer, Mr. Blake. 

Mr. BLAKE. Okay. So I will go quickly here. I just want to echo 

some of the comments that were made about 404 and SarbanesOxley. It certainly served its objectives in restoring investor confidence, but in terms of saving costs, especially for the smaller 

issuers, the 404(b) requirement for auditor attestation is exactly 

the right solution in terms of relief of cost and when striking that 

balance. 

I want to remind everyone that under the guidelines, officers of 

the company—I sign off on the 302 certification that says we have 

effective internal controls. We are also under the application of 

404(a). 

Mr. STIVERS. Is there a level of company at which we should 

make that divide, change that level of where, especially for the medium-sized company? 

Mr. BLAKE. Certainly. 

Mr. STIVERS. And I know I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BLAKE. Certainly. The emerging growth companies under the 

JOBS Act, the relief for an additional 5 years would be a great 

place to start. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my nonexistent time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman yields back. 

With that, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, 

Mr. Himes, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HIMES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks very much 

for the interesting discussion; I really appreciate it. I have been interested in this for a long time. I was a supporter and helped with 

the JOBS Act, and I think it has done some pretty good things. 

Some of our worst fears have not materialized. 

But at the time, I was very, very concerned with the way facts 

were presented and the way analysis was done, because this is important. And so I just want to highlight one fact, which is we talk 

about declines in numbers of publicly traded companies. 

Almost all of the decline that we have seen since the dot-com 

bubble, 1995–1996, 75 percent of the decline actually in the number of public companies occurred prior to the passage of SarbanesOxley. In other words, the dot-com peak was 8,000 and some 3,000 

companies went away as a result of the deflation in that bubble 

prior to Sarbanes-Oxley. 

34 

We have seen a fairly slow decline since then, which I guess is 

worthy of consideration. But I have two questions, and by the way 

my numbers come from an Ernst & Young report. This is not the 

‘‘Democratic Research Service’’ producing this. 

Section 404(b), we hear a lot about it, very interesting question— 

another fact, since 2005, just to use that as a baseline, the number 

of public company material financial statement restatements has 

gone down 90 percent from 460 restatements in 2005 to 51 restatements in 2016. And the net income involved in those restatements 

has gone down from $6 billion of aggregate net income restated in 

2005 to $1 billion. 

That is pretty dramatic. And that has to be a big deal. I am 

going to ask that as a question. When the number of restatements—I am an investor and I have much more confidence, not 

just in the number of restatements that are likely to occur, but in 

the dollar value—that is 404(b). Is that not really worth something? And I am not pointing that at anybody. I am just saying 

there is some real value there. 

Mr. BROWN. In my opinion, it is. And I would add to that statistic that in the first 2 years after 404(b) was put in place, there 

were 1,000 restatements each year, I think when 404(b) was put 

in place, I think when we had this attestation requirement for the 

first time. 

So for the first time, third parties are coming in to the company 

and saying, let me see how you do this. We found a lot of mistakes. 

And then what happened was, after these procedures were put 

in place and they were there for longer and longer, the number of 

restatements went down. I think that is a good piece of evidence 

of why investors should have greater confidence in our financial 

disclosure system. 

Mr. HIMES. Okay. 

Mr. Blake? 

Mr. BLAKE. So, two points. One is I think we should also take 

into consideration what investors care about. And our shareholders 

have never asked me in any one-on-one meeting or any setting, for 

that matter, if we are 404(b)-compliant. What they care about in 

our setting is our cash balance, our cash runway, and what we are 

going to do in terms of our clinical development plans. 

Mr. HIMES. Do you have net income? 

Mr. BLAKE. No. 

Mr. HIMES. Okay. You don’t have net income. I cited a net income figure. I was in the business for a long time. Investors care 

about net income. 

Mr. BLAKE. Absolutely. 

Mr. HIMES. I am not going to argue with you. I take your point. 

I actually think there is some balance here. But I am struck by 

that, $6 billion in net income restatements prior to Sarbanes-Oxley 

down to $1 billion. There is some value there. 

Mr. BLAKE. Yes, absolutely, and I wholeheartedly agree with you 

that 404(b) serves a purpose for larger organizations. I have been 

at an earnings-driven company, and it is important if you have a 

large footprint geographically with complex accounting systems, 

lots of lines of code that need to be evaluated, personnel. 

35 

I have a staff of five in accounting in my organization. I have 

been in organizations where there are over 4,000 finance staff. So 

there is a big difference in the level of internal control audit necessary for that company versus us. 

Mr. HIMES. Okay. Thank you. I have one other question that just 

really interests me. We haven’t talked a lot about something that 

I hear. 

I have a lot of private equity in my district. I hear this from private equity folks, and I certainly hear it from public-company 

CEOs, which is the incredible focus of the investor, the public market investor, on quarter-by-quarter earnings and the disincentive 

that puts on somebody like you, Mr. Blake, making a 3-year investment that may look pretty tough next quarter and the quarter 

thereafter. 

So my question is, is there anything we can do about that? And 

as public policymakers, is there anything we should do about that? 

Mr. BERLAU. Yes, Congressman Himes, I can, and it is a very 

good question. I think we should give public companies the option 

of, if they want to, doing it like they do in Europe and do it every 

6 months instead of every quarter and let investors decide. There 

is, I think, data to show that it does make companies more shortterm-oriented. 

Mr. HIMES. Is there a public policy rule there? 

Yes, Mr. Quaadman? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. No, I was just going to say, Congressman Himes, 

Tom Donohue gave a speech in 2005 asking companies to move 

away from quarterly earnings guidance because there are studies 

that CFOs and company management are going to start to make 

decisions that don’t make long-term economic sense for a company 

in order to hit that target. 

So I think if we are going to foster long-termism, that is something that needs to be addressed. 

Mr. HIMES. Thank you. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. STIVERS [presiding]. Thank you. 

The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. 

Emmer. 

Mr. EMMER. Thank you to the Chair. And thanks to the panel 

for being here today. It is interesting. I haven’t been here all that 

long, but I think on this issue, this should not be a partisan issue 

at all. This is really an American issue. 

And when it comes to domestic economic policy, like so many 

things that we deal with here in Congress, we seem to have a problem with the well-intentioned, bipartisan, one-size-fits-all law that 

was passed for purposes that, again, are not partisan. 

Everybody wants full disclosure. Everybody wants people to 

enter the marketplace and be able to participate on a level playing 

field, no matter how big that individual or company is or how 

small. 

But it seems that the law that was passed for well-intentioned 

purposes, now we have some experience with it, it is showing us 

that there are some issues. And people have to acknowledge, and 

I think we are, on both sides of the aisle, acknowledging that this 

is important. 

36 

But it is not just about the economic growth that we get from a 

company when it goes public. And I think one of you testified, 

maybe it was you Mr. Quaadman, about how the majority of the 

jobs are created after a company goes public. 

It is not just the jobs that follow. This is about, to me, the modest or small or beginning investor. It is about them getting the opportunity to participate and potentially prosper in the marketplace. 

We heard testimony today about the decline of public companies in 

this country. I think the statement has been that today we have 

half as many public companies as we did some 20 years ago 

In Minnesota, we are still home to 17 Fortune 500 companies. 

We have a history in our State of inventors, of innovators, of visionaries. Some argue that we haven’t been launching our new 

ideas, our start-up companies into public offerings the way we 

should be 

There was a May 2015 article in our Minneapolis Star Tribune 

that was entitled, ‘‘Star Tribune 100: Signs Point to a New Round 

of Companies Going Public.’’ According to that article, this was the 

only IPO of a Minnesota company in 2015. And it had been the 

first since 2009, so almost 6 years 

Now, it said in that article that the biggest difference between 

the Star Tribune 100 in 2015, and the Star Tribune 100 ten years 

earlier was, ‘‘There are fewer small companies with between $50 

million and $200 million in annual revenue rising through the 

ranks.’’ 

Now a year later, and remember the headlines said, ‘‘more public 

offerings looks like more public companies are in the offing,’’ a year 

later, in May of 2016, our Star Tribune reported on a company 

called Tactile Systems as being the first Minnesota company in a 

year to try to go public. 

And that article pointed out that we only had 7 companies in 

Minnesota between 2011 and 2016 that made public offerings or 

went public. John Potter, a partner in Minneapolis’ office of 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an expert on mergers and acquisition 

activity, was quoted in that article. And he was saying that there 

is no shortage of companies with the size, scale, and value, but 

they have found capital elsewhere. 

So Mr. Quaadman, I will start with you, and maybe Mr. Berlau, 

you can weigh in. This is a matter of marketplace fairness. Where 

does the beginning investor enter if these start-up companies are 

staying private and they are getting it from wealthy investors as 

opposed to somebody who is trying to enter the marketplace? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. That is a problem we have been talking 

about this morning where I think those investors have been shut 

out. I think there has been a prevailing thought that while they invest in mutual funds or they invest in other vehicles, then they 

sort of get the benefits that way. Well, if those retail investors 

want to be able to benefit from a company going public, they should 

be able to do so 

And I believe that Chair Clayton actually raised this as an important priority of his in his New York Economic Club speech last 

week. And this is an issue that he wants to tackle. 

There is one other issue I want to just sort of throw out there, 

but this is probably the subject of another hearing. We also have 

37 

a big problem on the other end where there has been Census Bureau data. There is an interesting study by the Economic Innovation Group about how dynamism is failing on the other end, that 

we are no longer creating businesses at the very start. And that 

has not recovered since the 2008 financial crisis. 

So we have it on the one end where we are not creating public 

companies anymore. We are actually declining. We are also not creating new businesses at that rate. 

And it is a problem because if you take a look at the Fortune 100 

today, 20 of the Fortune 100 were started from 1975 to 2000. 

Mr. EMMER. Right. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. So we are no longer creating that backfill, and 

we are actually losing the innovative edge we have always had. 

Mr. EMMER. Thank you. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

With that, the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison, is recognized. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Maloney. I am here to recognize that maybe the decline in publicly 

traded companies could be a problem for reasons that people on 

both sides of the aisle have identified. But I am not yet persuaded 

that Sarbanes-Oxley is the reason. I am here to give you guys a 

chance to convince me otherwise. 

I am looking at this chart up here, and according to this chart, 

as you can see, if you look at, say, the 1990s and up until, say, 

2000, so that is a steady decline upward when it comes to the ROI 

for U.S. companies. You see a drop there in 2000, right before 2002, 

which is the dot-com bubble. 

But then you see after Sarbanes-Oxley is passed, it goes back up 

again until the mortgage collapse. And then it sort of starts going 

back up again, and then we have seen that steady decline. 

My point is this would suggest to me that maybe Sarbanes-Oxley 

is not the problem. If it is a problem that we need more publicly 

traded companies, shouldn’t we fix the thing that is causing the 

problem? 

Next slide, please? Now, I am curious about this. I was wondering whether or not mergers was one of the problems. Whether 

and how, sort of just other potential reasons because I would like 

to help fix the problem. 

But I would like to know exactly what is the heart and soul of 

why we have seen this drop, because I buy your argument that if 

John and Jane Doe need be able to go—it is easier for them to invest in a publicly traded company than some private equity thing 

which they are never going to hear of or get invited to be a part 

of. 

So based on this chart, the last one, and whatever else you know, 

why is Sarbanes-Oxley the cause of the drop in publicly traded 

companies? And by the way, I want you to know on the front end, 

as a proud, bleeding heart liberal, I did vote for the JOBS Act because it was proven to me that smaller startups might need to be 

able to get reduced costs so that they can onramp a little cheaper 

to be an IPO. 

Do you want to take that one on, Mr. Blake? 

38 

Mr. BLAKE. Sure. So at least my view is that Sarbanes-Oxley is 

not the single cause— 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you. 

Mr. BLAKE. —of the decline in the delisting or incentives to go 

public. However, it is one of the components to it. And it certainly 

is a barrier to entry, so to speak, from a compliance cost perspective, especially for a small company wanting to— 

Mr. ELLISON. Right, Mr. Blake. But it does have the benefit of 

stopping some of the harms that led to it. 

Mr. BLAKE. Absolutely. 

Mr. ELLISON. Look, I will tell you, regulations are going to stop 

some things and maybe even good things. But they are going to 

hopefully prevent some really bad things, too. 

Mr. BLAKE. That is right. 

Mr. ELLISON. And so— 

Mr. BLAKE. And just to provide some color, so what does an internal control environment look like at a company like ours? I am 

the sole check signer for the entire company. I sign every single 

check. 

And so we have a footprint, as I mentioned, of five accounting 

staff. And then the investors ask us about three financial metrics. 

Certainly, I am not suggesting that the financial statements are 

not important. But I am suggesting that the relative importance of 

404(b)is probably much lower than— 

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Farley, could you take about 30 seconds to answer my question, if you can? Because I do want to see if Professor 

Brown or Mr. Quaadman wants to get in or Mr. Berlau? 

Mr. FARLEY. I will do it very quickly. 

Mr. ELLISON. Yes. 

Mr. FARLEY. A number of comments have been made today about 

the benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley. I agree. And a number of comments 

have been made about the difficulty with complying with SarbanesOxley and the high cost, and I agree with that as well. 

So we are not suggesting—I don’t think anyone has suggested, 

let’s do away with Sarbanes-Oxley. It is just a good time to look 

at it and say, is it having an impact? And the mergers line that 

is so big on there? 

Mr. ELLISON. Yes. 

Mr. FARLEY. Companies are merging because two companies 

complying with Sarbanes-Oxley is twice as expensive as one. 

Mr. ELLISON. Yes. 

Mr. FARLEY. And so that is part of what is driving it. 

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Brown, do you have any take on this? 

Mr. BROWN. Yes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Is this where, if we say that the drop in publicly 

traded companies is a problem, what does Sarbanes-Oxley have to 

do with fixing the problem? 

Mr. BROWN. Yes. I think Sarbanes-Oxley had a positive effect. 

But I want to just say what you are raising, which I think is the 

most critical issue, I think there is lots of agreement in this panel, 

in this room, that if there is a regulatory thing out there that is 

harming the markets and not benefitting investors, we should get 

rid of it. We all agree with that. We want liquid, innovative markets. 

39 

But what I am afraid of is, like 404(b), we could pull that out 

or reduce its use or something and learn, in fact, it doesn’t increase 

the number of public offerings, but it does reduce our confidence in 

our financial statements. 

So part of what you are asking is, is SOX the problem? So I 

think we really need to work hard at identifying what, if anything, 

is the problem before we take steps to fix it. 

Mr. ELLISON. I agree. I think that is all the time I have. Thank 

you, gentlemen. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. MacArthur, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MACARTHUR. I thank the Chair. And thank you all for being 

here. 

Mr. Quaadman, the Chamber represents what, 2 million, 3 million businesses? Public? Private? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Both. 

Mr. MACARTHUR. Big? Small? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Both. 

Mr. MACARTHUR. All industries? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MACARTHUR. Is it fair to say you are agnostic about capital 

structures? That whether they are public or private is all good by 

the Chamber as long as American business is prospering and growing and thriving, it is all good by the Chamber? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. And that is why I had mentioned in an earlier 

answer that we need to have balance. If we are going to have an 

efficient economy, we need to have both private and public capital 

markets operating efficiently. 

Mr. MACARTHUR. And I agree with that. So this question keeps 

coming up, why a 50 percent decline in public offerings over a period of time. I can think of two major advantages, major, major advantages to being public, or to investing in a public company as opposed to private. 

One is liquidity. That is a big deal for people. You want to buy 

a new car or send your kid to college or buy a home or do whatever, it is nice to be able to sell that stock quickly and get your 

cash and do what you want to do with it. So liquidity is a big, big 

issue. 

And valuation gets a pop from liquidity. Maybe a third. I don’t 

know. I have seen lots of different statistics. 

So being able to get money and being able to have it be worth 

more, get that stock being worth more, are two major motivations 

for public offerings and public investment. And yet, despite those 

major incentives, it is going the other way. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MACARTHUR. And so I think it is a fair question to ask what 

in the regulatory environment might be driving that? Is there anything else that you can think of that would be driving it, in terms 

of major themes, not nets, but major themes that would be driving 

this trend? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. I think you need to take—and this is what I was 

talking about earlier in my opening statement. You need to take 

a look at the basket of issues there. So if you take a look at the 

40 

disclosures, you take a look at some of the financial reporting 

issues or some of the incongruities that exist with the PCAOB. 

You take a look at other issues, even financing issues. What it 

has done is it has loaded down the best system we have ever created that still works well for existing public companies. If you are 

large, existing public companies, you can engineer and spend your 

way out of it. 

But what it does at the end of the day is it creates barriers of 

entry for businesses to go public. And that is why, even though the 

decline in public companies has been small, the IPO market has 

never really recovered from the tech bubble bursting. 

So I think Sarbanes-Oxley is a component of it. But it is one of 

many different reasons that, when they interact, cause those barriers of entry. 

Mr. MACARTHUR. So it is a cumulative effect. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Correct. 

Mr. MACARTHUR. I would ask you this, and then maybe Mr. Farley as well. Mr. Berlau suggested in his opening remarks that it 

is really the investor of moderate means who suffers the most because people who are accredited investors always find a place to 

put their money 

And they find investment opportunities that maybe are not available to investors of moderate means who now don’t have the same 

capacity to access these liquid, higher valuation markets. 

Would you both agree that—or Mr. Blake, too, you can weigh 

in—it is investors of moderate means who seem to suffer the most 

from that? 

Mr. BROWN. Yes. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. And when I was talking benign neglect in 

my opening statement, it was really that the SEC has ignored retail investors. 

Mr. BLAKE. Yes, and I would also agree. And you can argue that 

the accredited investors have access to those private company valuations that get that pop when they achieve liquidity and valuations 

in public markets. 

Mr. MACARTHUR. I think one thing I am hearing this morning 

that is striking me is there is maybe no one piece of SarbanesOxley that is driving this or at least that is driving it so clearly 

that you could put a marker there. 

But there is a cumulative effect of this environment we have created that makes it difficult for private companies to want to go into 

that. And it is robbing investors of moderate means of opportunity. 

And maybe I will finish with this, one thing that strikes me is, 

Sarbanes-Oxley creates a framework where companies have to put 

information out there and then have to explain it. 

There is an adage in politics: When you are explaining, you are 

losing. I think it is even more so with business because they are 

forced to explain things that are very, very difficult to get into. And 

every explanation raises more and more questions. 

I guess I would end with, it seems to me after listening to testimony, that it really is incumbent on us to try to lift some of this 

burden from our business environment. I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady from Arizona, Ms. Sinema, is now recognized. 

41 

Ms. SINEMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My first question is for Mr. Blake. Under the JOBS Act, emerging growth companies are exempt from certain regulatory requirements for 5 years after their initial IPO. 

And one of the requirements that emerging growth companies 

are exempt from is Sarbanes-Oxley’s Section 404(b) which, of 

course, requires public companies to obtain an external audit on 

the effectiveness of their internal controls for financial reporting. 

In an effort to ensure that costly regulations don’t stand in the 

way of success for biopharma and other companies on the cutting 

edge of scientific and medical research, Congressman Hollingsworth and I recently introduced the Fostering Innovation Act, 

which is our bipartisan legislation that temporarily extends the 

Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404(b) exemption for an additional 5 years, 

just for a small subset of emerging growth companies. 

And as you know, these companies have an annual average rev- enue of less than $50 million and they have less than $700 million 

in public float. 

So my question for you, Mr. Blake is, in your opinion, if enacted, 

how would this very narrowly targeted legislation benefit emerging 

growth companies, specifically biopharma companies, as they work 

to develop life-saving medicines? 

Mr. BLAKE. Thank you, Ms. Sinema, for that. And we, of course, 

support the Fostering Innovation Act. It would have a very real impact on our bottom line. Every dollar saved on compliance costs can 

be repurposed for hiring a scientist, putting it into an experiment 

in the lab, or adding more patients to our clinical trials. 

And just to give you a flavor of what that compliance cost would 

be for our profile, I think it is very targeted legislation that would 

affect the profile of companies that we live in. We will still be in 

the lab, beyond the 5-year exemption in clinical trials. The costs probably would increase anywhere from $100,000 to $250,000, from my estimates. Our current audit fees are approximately $270,000. That could go up anywhere from 50 percent to 80 

percent. We would increase our internal control consulting fees by 

approximately $50,000. 

So if you start to look at this, it could be over 5 years of that 

exemption and a $1.25 million cost savings. And that is very real 

in terms of running clinical trials. 

And then if you look at the 200 companies in our space that have 

gone public under the JOBS Act and aggregate that savings over 

5 years, that could be hundreds of millions of dollars in compliance 

cost savings that would actually be directed towards helping patients. 

Ms. SINEMA. Thank you. And Mr. Blake, a follow-up question. 

For the very specific subset of emerging growth companies targeted 

by the Fostering Innovation Act, the reporting requirement is costly and, I believe, unnecessary because management is still required 

to assess internal controls. 

A number of the emerging growth companies, by definition, have 

limited public exposure. But if the company or a majority of its 

shareholders determine that an audit was beneficial, would they be 

able to obtain an external audit on the effectiveness of their internal controls for financial reporting under this legislation? 

42 

Mr. BLAKE. Yes. Absolutely. It is certainly optional. And that is 

the way the proposal is written. If any stakeholder—that could be 

a shareholder, that could be a lender—would like the auditor attestation, you could certainly incrementally request that of your auditors and pay for it. 

Ms. SINEMA. Thank you, Mr. Blake. 

I have a question now for Mr. Quaadman. As part of the JOBS 

Act, Congress directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to 

amend Regulation A to allow small companies to raise up to $50 

million in offerings, exempt from full SEC registration. These 

amendments, known as Regulation A-Plus, exclude certain potential issuers, including Exchange Act reporting companies. 

As a result, thousands of companies that already meet the SEC’s 

high disclosure requirements are ineligible to use Regulation APlus to cost-effectively raise the funds they need to grow and hire. 

In your opinion, would it be beneficial for SEC reporting companies 

to be able to access Regulation A-Plus? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. And first off, I thank you and Mr. Hollingsworth for introducing that bill. We support anything that is going 

to drive more liquidity to smaller companies. So we think this 

would be a positive step in the right direction. And we also support 

other issues such as pieces of legislation such as venture exchanges 

as well. 

Ms. SINEMA. Wonderful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you Mr. Quaadman. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentlelady yields back. 

With that, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 

Davidson, for 5 minutes 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our 

witnesses. I have really enjoyed your testimony. And it is an honor 

to talk with you today. Prior to coming to Congress, I built a small 

group of manufacturing companies and ran into some of these challenges. 

As you look at what you are up against with the prospect of capital structure out there, it seemed that the government had an increasingly important role to play in what was a pretty small company. I think we had about seven people in the accounting group 

when I left. 

And so the kinds of controls that would be applied are very different. I am encouraged by some of the dialogue I have heard here 

just talking about Reg-A. Reg-D, however, draws this line between 

accredited investors and sophisticated investors. 

And for the average guy, at the end of the day, it is their money. 

So I am just curious, what is the premise? What have you seen in 

terms of market participation by people who aren’t considered accredited investors? 

What is the important distinction there—Mr. Farley, maybe, as 

an operator of an exchange? 

Mr. FARLEY. I don’t have an answer. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. No answer? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. I will take a crack at that. I think this committee has actually done, I think, a lot of good work in looking at 

where the lines in terms of a credit investor should be. And I think 

43 

what we want to do is we want to be able to look at it in such a 

way that there are only going to be certain financial products that 

some people are going to be able to handle. And they should be the 

only ones to invest in it. 

I think one of the things that Mr. Schweikert, when he was a 

member of this subcommittee, actually put on the table, which I 

thought was a good debate was, do we need to move those lines? 

And I think we need to do that. 

One of the issues that we have also raised with the SEC in terms 

of the JOBS Act implementation—and this is why I do think economic analysis is an important tool, is for the SEC to also do an 

analysis 3 years out, after the regulations have been put in place 

to actually see how it is working, if there are issues, as you are sort 

of raising. Where there are problems do we need to address them 

or not? Or do we maybe need to liberalize things a little more? 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Yes, thank you. And so you highlight Congressman Schweikert’s bill. I am passionate on the same topic, things 

that—it seems to me that it is really just the main effect of these 

accredited investors, sophisticated investor definitions are to create 

deal flow for bigger people. 

The reality is that if we still believe in capitalism, which is what 

we are trying to access, then we believe it is people’s money. I don’t 

know that any of you are subject matter experts on lottery systems, 

but we don’t stop people from spending money on lottery tickets. 

And clearly the risk of losing your capital in the lottery is much 

greater. 

So, what are some of the reforms that you look at that could 

draw the line? If you have a Ph.D. in physics and you are developing the product and the intellectual property but you just graduated, you are not going to meet the current thresholds of accredited investors. Are we trying to protect that guy from owning 

shares of a company? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. I think where we need to start, and this 

also goes to Mrs. Wagner’s question about materiality, is we need 

to start with TSC Northway and its progeny, the Supreme Court 

cases and other cases where the courts have talked about the basic 

skills that an investor needs. 

And I think if you take a look at that and then you sort of look 

at the income levels but also the educational levels, that is where 

we really need to start to look at who is it that we have left outside 

the box that maybe should be inside the box? 

Because I think what we have also done is we have been looking 

at investors in some ways in terms of a 1970s or 1980s model. And 

I think we have much more of a sophisticated investor base than 

we used to have, and I think we need to recognize that. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Correct. And just as an example, charter financial 

analyst, somebody could finish that. They know as much about materiality as we can assess anyway in terms of exams and credentials. But currently they would also potentially be excluded from 

this. 

So these are things that I hope we can expand to and I hope we 

can do it in a bipartisan way. But I guess the last piece I would 

talk about is with respect to cause and effect. I don’t think it got 

enough attention in your answer. 

44 

What is driving mergers? Well, the cost of compliance, not just 

Sarbanes-Oxley, but it is rationale. So to look at the fact that well, 

there is more merger activity and say, Sarbanes-Oxley is not a 

cause, you are looking at the regulatory hurdle being there as 

maybe one of the factors to be able to say that, gee, this is the root 

cause. 

But the reality is, as I think you alluded to, capital is going to 

find a return. We hope that it finds a return here in the United 

States of America. And I hope to participate with my colleagues in 

doing that. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. The gentleman from New Jersey has 

unfortunately left, but he argued that when you are explaining, you 

are losing, which is a campaign adage, therefore we shouldn’t force 

companies to disclose what they would have to explain. 

It is true that is a campaign adage, but I would hope that the 

level of honesty and disclosure that we find in the public markets 

for securities is not designed to parallel the level of honesty in disclosure we find in successful political campaigns. 

So he says when you are explaining, you are losing. No. When 

you are disclosing, investors are winning. When you are explaining, 

investors are winning. 

Now, there is a thinking here in Washington that if people are 

eating more pepperoni pizza, it must be because somebody dropped 

a bill or passed a regulation. Not everything is Washington. Yes, 

there has been some decline at times in the number of public companies. 

Maybe that is because the people running companies are tired of 

the tyranny of the quarterly report, the hostile takeover, and the 

high frequency trading. 

I have talked to so many businesspeople who say, look, I have 

a long-term plan and I don’t want to have to justify my quarterly 

numbers. Then you look at the 2008 crash and I say, I don’t want 

to be part of that. 

So there are a lot of reasons to stay private that have nothing 

to do with Sarbanes-Oxley, a bill that was passed 15 years ago in 

this House—432 to 3. And I understand why we spend a lot of time 

in this room attacking Dodd-Frank. Dodd was a Democrat. Frank 

was a Democrat. 

This was Oxley’s bill. I am surprised that this is the focus, but— 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. SHERMAN. If you will give me some more time, sure I will— 

Chairman HUIZENGA. I have been pretty generous with the gavel. 

But— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. —the intent of this hearing is to explore 

after 15 years of a, as I had—and I know you weren’t here when 

I had acknowledged this, and the ranking member had talked 

about this. There was a very difficult time that prompted this response. 

45 

The question that I and others have is, okay, 15 years into it, 

and when we are seeing some other things there may have been 

circumstances that have changed, why would we not explore that? 

So please don’t misinterpret this as we are trying to repeal and 

replace Sarbanes-Oxley the way that some have argued that DoddFrank should be. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I couldn’t—I agree with you. Any bill can be improved. I am not just referring to this hearing. I have seen Sarbanes-Oxley beat up again and again, but any bill can be improved. 

I was here when Sarbanes-Oxley was written and we were not 

on Mount Sinai. 

It did not come to us in golden tablets. And even Dodd-Frank, 

which after all has two Democratic authors, did not come to us on 

golden tablets. Any bill can be improved, and I am glad that is the 

focus of these hearings. 

Looking at Dodd-Frank, 74 percent of the decline in U.S. public 

companies from the peak in 1996 occurred to prior to 2003 when 

Sarbanes-Oxley was passed. The total number of U.S. companies 

has stabilized since 2008, ranging from 4,000 to 4,400, while the 

number of foreign companies listing in the United States has increased. 

And I think it is the foreign companies that give us the test here. 

Over the last 20 years, 90 percent of foreign companies choose to 

list in their home market. That makes sense. But there are some 

companies that say they want to list somewhere other than their 

home country. Where do they pick? 

Of those companies that decide to list outside their home market, 

the U.S. is the favored venue with almost twice the listings of its 

closest competitor. So what does this tell us? 

Companies abroad who could list in Moscow or Panama, or if 

they think the regulations are too tough, there there is St. Kitts, 

they have all chosen the Sarbanes-Oxley choice by a 2:1 ratio over 

the chance to have no regulation or very little regulation. 

Apparently companies choosing, choose the system where investors have the protection and can invest in confidence. And of course 

there are only two U.S. companies that have chosen to list abroad 

in 2016. 

Then the other reason we have seen a decline in public companies is private capital is more available. We have had a growth in 

venture capital. We have had low interest rates, and in this room 

we wrote the JOBS Act to make it easier to stay private, and now 

we are here criticizing the fact that more companies aren’t public. 

As the gentleman from Connecticut pointed out, financial statement restatements have declined to almost one-tenth of their frequency in the years immediately following the passage of the Act 

in 2005. 

There were 459, or the gentleman from Connecticut says 260, restatements, last year 51. So I want to focus then not on the cost 

of these internal control reviews, but on the benefits. 

Professor Brown, a new study from the University of Washington 

and Georgetown University of 5,300 smaller companies that are exempt from 404(b) found that they saved $338 million in audit costs 

because they were exempt, but they lost $856 million that they 

46 

would have earned if they had better internal and better remediated their internal controls. 

Are you familiar with this, and are companies exempt from 

404(b)? Do they have a bone to pick with us because by exempting 

them we have deprived them of this push to get the internal control that would have saved these companies $856 million according 

to the study? 

Mr. BROWN. Congressman, I think that study shows how hard it is to try to quantify these things. It puts this $388 million cost, 

total cost on these 404(b) things, attestations. 

The truth is, I think they are overstating it, because what they 

are doing is they are looking at companies that go from exempt to 

non-exempt and probably they are changing auditors and probably 

going to a more expensive auditor so all of that cost is not necessarily the 404(b). 

So they may be overstating the cost. But what they are also 

doing is saying when you don’t have good numbers you don’t make 

as good of business decisions in your own company. 

And there is a cost associated with that as well, so they try to 

quantify that. So it may well be that by exempting companies out 

of 404(b), we are not doing them any favors. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I like the focus of these hearings 

if it is to improve Sarbanes-Oxley, and I think that is what the 

focus is, and I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Hollingsworth, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. I thank the panelists for being here this 

afternoon and I appreciate the dialogue and honest discussion 

about some of the challenges as well as some of the opportunities 

that we face. 

Representative Sinema and I have worked on both the Improving 

Access to Capital Act as well as the Fostering Innovation Act, and 

specifically 404(b) is talked about quite a lot here. 

Mr. Blake, in your understanding of our Fostering Innovation 

Act, is there anything that absolutely bars you from pursuing a 

404(b) audit and compliance if you so elected to? 

Mr. BLAKE. Not at all. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. Right. 

Mr. BLAKE. If we elected to have the internal control audits performed, we could do that. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. So if the cost of equity capital went up significantly in not doing a 404(b), you could make the business decision to say, we should pursue a 404(b), lowering our cost of equity 

capital because it makes sense for our business to do so? 

Mr. BLAKE. Absolutely. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. All right. Apologies to Mr. Sherman, I have 

not read the Georgetown report, but the $338 million that was 

gained through savings but according to them $856 million that is 

lost, I guess my question for Mr. Quaadman is, is it the job of the 

Federal Government to sit in the boardroom of these companies 

and tell them what they should pursue and what they shouldn’t 

pursue in order for them to make an economic decision that makes 

business sense for them? 

47 

Mr. QUAADMAN. No. The board is going to make the decision they 

feel is best for the company with the business judgment rule, and 

the market ultimately is going to decide if they made the right decision or not. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. So ultimately the owners of that business, 

the ones who have those dollars at stake are the ones best suited 

to make the decision on whether they should pursue this extra 

level of compliance, which may, in fact, according to this study at 

least, serve to save them money or lower their cost of equity capital? It is not the Federal Government’s job to sit in their boardroom and tell them what they should and shouldn’t do with their 

own money? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. I think it is an issue, like—it is an issue 

where the board should make those decisions. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. Right. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. I think we need to take a very strong look at 

other issues such as management guidance that needs to be updated. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. Right. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. I think there are a number of other issues at the 

PCAOB that need to be addressed. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. Right. One last comment before we go to 

fostering innovation. Again, this is a narrow fix. We are not saying 

everybody should be exempt from 404(b). Certainly, larger and 

larger companies are growing more and more complicated, operating around the world. 

There are some safeguards that might need to be in place for 

them, but this is a very, very small fix focused on companies with 

less than $50 million in revenue and $700 million in float. 

And like Mr. Blake has attested to, the opportunity for them to 

deliver more dollars to cures and fewer dollars to compliance represents a real opportunity for a more dynamic company for the opportunity for us to realize those cures over the long run. So I continue to be supportive. 

In addition to that, I want to turn my attention—Mr. Ellison had 

presented a couple of charts here earlier and I had recognized them 

from a Credit Suisse report about the declining number of U.S. 

companies. 

And certainly Credit Suisse does talk about mergers being a 

case, but I wanted to read two or three sentences from just below 

those charts that were omitted. ‘‘Overall, it appears that the benefit of listing has declined relative to the cost and only larger companies can bear the cost of being public.’’ 

And then just after that it says, ‘‘The cost of being public has 

gone up,’’ which means that it makes sense only for larger companies to list. ‘‘The population of companies eligible to list falls as the 

size threshold rises. Thus, the median age of companies has risen 

dramatically over the last 15 to 20 years.’’ 

I think with the evidence that we have seen today it is hard to 

argue that those aren’t accurate statements just below those charts 

that were presented. 

So I wanted to talk a little bit about how companies might be 

able to access capital, especially once they are public and reporting 

to the SEC. 

48 

Mr. Quaadman and I have done some work on Regulation APlus, which has been talked about here. And I am just a believer 

in giving companies many different opportunities and avenues by 

which they can raise money and they can make, again, the decision 

that suits them best for what they want to pursue. Can you talk 

a little bit about Reg-A-Pluses,’ I guess, the context for that and 

the setting by which companies might make the decision to pursue 

that less than $50 million offering? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes, it is actually one of the great innovations 

of the JOBS Act is that we were restricting the ability of smaller 

companies to raise capital. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. Right. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. So with the changes that were made to Reg-A, 

Reg-A-Plus with the JOBS Act, we have actually liberalized that, 

and I think the interesting innovation that you are pursuing with 

Representative Sinema is to actually now extend that to listed companies as well. 

So I think it is going to help provide liquidity to the smaller public companies as well as smaller private companies. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. Again, no part of this legislation says you 

have to follow Reg-A-Plus rules and only offer it this way. All we 

are doing is providing more and more avenues for companies to be 

able to elect what is in their best interests and their ownership’s 

best interest. 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Correct. It is voluntary and the marketplace will 

decide if that is a successful venture or not. 

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. I love it. I say it in here all the time. Sam 

Walton used to say, ‘‘People choose with their feet and their wallets.’’ And I just want people to have the opportunity to choose. 

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Budd, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. BUDD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And again, thank you to the panel. 

So Mr. Quaadman, as my colleagues have mentioned, we are seeing a decline in the attractiveness of equity markets for raising 

capital. This has a twofold negative effect: one, on the companies 

that can’t access the market; and two, on the investors who just 

don’t get the returns. 

Is the fact that more and more offerings are private actually 

driving the creation of two parallel markets, one lower return for 

the average middle-class investor, and the other for more sophisticated investors and the wealthy? I think we have talked about that 

today, but if you could elaborate on that? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. Yes. We have certainly seen, and this is why I 

said I think we have seen where for a variety of different reasons 

the government has sort of put the thumb on the scale of public 

markets and sort of kept that down a bit. And I think that has 

hurt the democratization of wealth in that it has not allowed for 

retail investors to be able to access and enjoy the benefits of an 

IPO. 

And I am very heartened to see that Chair Clayton, the new SEC 

Chair, has actually said that is a priority that he wants to address. 

49 

Mr. BUDD. Okay. So in one way, if we see these highly regulated 

markets and lower IPOs, that actually worsens income inequality? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. It does that and it harms economic growth overall. 

Mr. BUDD. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Blake, there is a great deal of concern on our side about frivolous shareholder proposals making it into the companies’ proxy 

statements. So let’s say that a proposal that management believes 

is unhelpful for the company’s ability to create long-term value for 

its investors or its shareholders, and that makes it onto the ballot. 

Walk us through the process that management uses to make the 

case that it is unwise, that it increases cost to management? Tell 

us about how that affects the company’s resources and focus? 

Mr. BLAKE. I can speak a little bit generally. I haven’t dealt with 

that firsthand, but certainly the proposals that are able to get on 

the ballot may or may not be in the interests and long-term value 

creation of the company. 

And you certainly want to keep management’s attention and 

mind share focused on the core aspects of the business, whether 

that be running clinical trials, helping patients, getting our drug 

approved, ultimately are the core focus of management. 

So any issues that are brought onto the ballot that can distract 

from that are bad for the shareholders. 

Mr. BUDD. In general, how did that make it on and then once 

they are on and it is against the best interests of the shareholders 

economically, for instance, how do we get those off or how do you 

get those off? 

Mr. BLAKE. I don’t have any firsthand experience with that process. 

Mr. BUDD. You don’t have that firsthand experience. Anybody 

else? 

Mr. Quaadman, have you had to study that? 

Mr. QUAADMAN. No, I have not. 

Mr. BUDD. Thank you. 

Mr. Berlau, looking towards some of these additional disclosure 

requirements from the SEC in regards to conflict minerals, which 

we mentioned earlier, and payments to government regarding resource extraction, which we were fortunate enough to overturn 

with a Congressional Review Act a few months ago, does that require staff resources at the SEC to enforce? 

Mr. BERLAU. Yes. I think it really does divert the SEC from its 

core mission of investor protection when it is pursuing certain social agendas, however noble they may be. The conflict minerals has 

also had other negative consequences. 

The New York Times has reported that by acting as a backdoor 

tariff for some of the materials like gold and tin from the Congo 

and adjoining areas, some companies are just avoiding the Congo 

and regions near it because there is no way for them track whether 

they might have gotten gold that has been used 5 times or tin that 

might have come from the Congo. So it is actually impoverishing 

the regions. 

Mr. BUDD. But for the fact that the SEC actually requires resources of the SEC to enforce this? 

Mr. BERLAU. Yes. 

50 

Mr. BUDD. And you would say—and then— 

Chairman HUIZENGA. Will the gentleman yield for one second? 

Mr. BUDD. Of course. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. We had talked about the CEO pay ratio 

and that the SEC’s estimate is they had over 7,000 manhours put 

into that. The response from a couple of years earlier about conflict 

minerals was over 20,000 hours. 

And if you extrapolate 7,000 hours was over a million dollars, 20,000 hours means over $3 million of the SEC’s resources were 

put into that one specific rule. And I yield back. 

Mr. BUDD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is very relevant, and 

it actually answers my next question, does it cause extra expense 

for companies to comply with, so the answer is obviously yes. 

But do you think they add to the problem of information overload 

for investors? 

Mr. BERLAU. I think very much so. There are other ways. You 

don’t have to mandate disclosure necessarily for concerned investors to find out or to engage in a dialogue with a company. It is 

just that the SEC’s core mission should be investor protection. 

If you could indulge me, I wanted to—the point about whether 

Sarbanes-Oxley was the cause of some of the decline or how much 

of a factor it was, there have been companies that have actually 

said they are delisting or deregistering because of Sarbanes-Oxley, 

including British Airways and the small restaurant chain Max & 

Erma’s. They gave that as their primary reason for delisting from 

American markets. 

Mr. BUDD. Thank you very much. I am out of time, but it seems 

that it doesn’t help companies, it doesn’t help investors, obviously. 

And then when we refer to the conflict minerals, it does not help 

those developing nations. So we can see where we stand in muchneeded reform for this. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman HUIZENGA. The gentleman yields back, and thank you 

for your indulgence in recognizing me there briefly as well. 

I would like to thank our witnesses today. This has been, I think, 

very illuminating, very helpful as we are exploring this and doing 

this review of 15 years under Sarbanes-Oxley. 

We do have a little bit of business here. Without objection, I 

would like to submit the following statements for the record: a 

statement from the Business Roundtable; testimony of J.W. Verret, 

assistant professor at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason 

University, and ‘‘The Misdirection of Current Corporate Governance Proposals.’’ 

Testimony also by Mr. Verret, assistant professor, about, ‘‘The 

Conflicts Between Institutional Investors and Retail Investors and 

Using Federal Securities Laws to Regulate Campaign Finance.’’ 

And also an article by Mr. Verret, ‘‘Federal Versus State Law, 

the SEC’s New Ability to Certify Questions to the Delaware Supreme Court.’’ 

Then we also have an article by Mr. Verret again, ‘‘Uberized Corporate Law Toward a 21st Century Corporate Governance for 

Crowdfunding and App-Based Investor Communications.’’ 

And then finally, a publication by J.W. Verret, ‘‘Chapter 16, Ending the Specter of Federal Corporate Law.’’ 

51 

So without objection, those will be submitted. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous 

materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. 

And with that, again, thank you, gentlemen, for your time and 

your effort in being here, and our hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(53) 

A P P E N D I X 

July 18, 2017 

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28750.001

COMPETITIVE 

ENTERPRISE 

INSTITUTE 

Testimony of John Berlau, Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise Institute 

Before the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 

Securities, and Investment 

Hearing: "The Cost of Being a Public Company in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley and the 

Federalization of Corporate Governance" 

.July 18,2017 

Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Maloney, and honorable members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for this opportunity to present testimony on behalf of my organization, the 

Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), at this hearing reflecting on the l5'h anniversary of the 

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 

CEI is a Washington-based free-market think tank, founded in !984, that studies the effects of 

regulations on job growth and economic well-being. It is our mission to advance the freedom to 

prosper for consumers, entrepreneurs, and investors. 

In America, we value entrepreneurs and the innovative products and services they bring. It is true 

that a lucky few entrepreneurs are finding it easier to raise capital through private offerings 

among wealthy angel investors and venture capitalists, who as members of the wealthy 

''accredited investor" class are free to buy shares in companies that are not weighed down with 

many of the regulatory burdens public companies face. So imagine how many more 

entrepreneurs could launch businesses and grow them if the public markets were more open to 

them. Unfortunately, many financial regulations imposed over the past 15 years have made 

access to those markets much more difficult for many fledgling firms. 

Much of the recent debate on financial regulation has focused on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act. However, its predecessor, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, is still 

out there and still very much matters. The mandate in the law's Section 404 to audit "internal 

controls," as interpreted broadly by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 

(PCAOB)--the accounting body created by this law-remains a major concern for nearly every 

company considering going public on U.S. stock exchanges. 

Sarbox, or just simply SOX, as the Jaw is colloquially known, has caused auditing costs to 

double, triple, and even quadruple for many finns. 1 We can see this by reviewing the filings of 

Form S-1 that companies considering going public must submit to the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (SEC). Nearly every S-1 that T have read makes prominent mention of the costs 

Sarbanes-Oxley imposes on companies seeking to go public. This has resulted in a rush for the 

exits from U.S. exchanges and very slow traffic at the entrance doors for initial public offerings 

(lPOs). 

1310 l Street, NW, 7th Floor Washinglon, DC 20005 202 331 1010 cei.org 
55 


28750.002

The trivial minutiae that Section 404 requires companies and their accountants to document-at 

high cost-has done little to prevent massive mismanagement or outright fraud at troubled firms. 

Companies fully subject to SOX rules, such as Countrywide Financial and Lehman Brothers, still 

published misleading financial reports and imploded in scandal during the financial crisiswhich occurred five years after the law was enacted. As Hal Scott, Nomura Professor of 

International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School, has written, despite the "high costs, it 

remains empirically unclear whether adherence to SOX 404 achieves its intended benefit: 

reduced incidence of fraud or opaque or aggressive accounting practices by public companies."2 

In comparing the public equities markets now versus when SOX was enacted, it becomes 

apparent that there are significantly fewer public companies in the United States today. This 

year's slight uptick in IPOs-following a decade-low number of stock offerings in 2016--

obscures that over the past 15 years, the number of firms listed on U.S. exchanges has dropped 

off dramatically. In 2001, the year before SOX became law, there were more than 5,100 

companies in which everyday U.S. investors could purchase stock on exchanges like the New 

York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. By 2015, there were just 3,700--fewer than during the 

"bear market" year of 1975, when publicly traded stocks numbered more than 4,700. 3 

Moreover, this drop appears to be a purely American phenomenon. Non-U.S. stock listings rose 

28 percent from 1996 to 2012, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.4 

President Obama's Council on Jobs and Competitiveness directly fingered SOX when it 

observed in its Interim Report: 

Well-intentioned regulations aimed at protecting the public from the misrepresentations 

of a small number of large companies have unintentionally placed significant burdens on 

the large number of smaller companies. As a result, fewer high-growth entrepreneurial 

companies are going public.5 

There are other adverse consequences of entrepreneurs delaying or forgoing taking their 

companies public. One is job growth, or rather the lack of it. As President Obama's Jobs Council 

observed, "the data clearly shows that job growth accelerates when companies go public." As the 

Council and others have noted, 90 percent of a public company's job creation occurs after it goes 

public.6 

Another is the diminished ability of the average American investor to build wealth in his or her 

portfolio. In the early 1990s, 80 percent of companies launching JPOs-including Starbucks and 

Cisco Systems-raised less than $50 million each from their offerings. 7 Entrepreneurs were able 

to get capital from the public to grow their firms, while average American shareholders could 

grow wealthy with the small and midsize companies in which they invested. 

Today, however, Sarbanes-Oxley is shutting out average investors from the early growth stages 

of the next Cisco and Starbucks. A few years after SOX was enacted, 80 percent of firms went 

public with JPOs greater than $50 million, while IPOs greater than $1 billion have become a 

normal occurrence.8 Faccbook waited to go public until it could launch an IPO of$16 billion.9 

Home Depot went public in I 981, when it had just four stores in the Atlanta area. Co-founder 
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Bernie Marcus has stated repeatedly that he never could have gone public back then had SOX 

been in place. 10 Home Depot may never have grown into the chain it is today, but even if it had, 

ordinary investors would not have been able to share in that wealth from that growth. 

The good news is that members of Congress from both parties have recognized that smaller 

public companies should not be subject to all of the same mandates as giant corporations in the 

Fortune 500. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, signed by President Obama in 

2012, gave small and midsize companies a temporary exemption from the SOX "internal 

control" mandates and carved out a path for companies to raise $50 million or less without fully 

registering with the SEC. 

There is much more to be done, and I urge Congress to pass bipartisan initiatives to allow 

ordinary investors to build wealth both by expanding exemptions for investment crowdfunding 

and creating ways for non-wealthy American to qualify as accredited investors. 

I also urge Congress to narrow Sarbanes-Oxley's definition of"internal controls" to processes 

that have proven their efl"ectiveness in preventing fraud. 

Finally, I urge the Securities and Exchange Commission to exercise its authority over the Public 

Company Accounting Oversight Board to narrow its definition of"internal controls." 

Thank you again for inviting me to testify. I look forward to your questions. 

1 Monica C. Holmes and Darian Neubecker, "The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 On the Information 

Systems of Public Companies," Issues In Information Systems, Vol. VII, No. 2 (2006), 

http://iacis.org/iis/2006/HoJmes Neubecker.pdf. 2 Hal Scott. "How to Improve Five Important Areas of Financial Regulation," in Rules For Growth: Promoting 

Innovation and Growth Through Legal R~form (Kansas City, Mo.: Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 20 II), p. 

128. 

3 Andrew Whitten, "Why Are There So Few Public Companies in the U.S.?", National Bureau of Economic 

Research 

http://www.nber.org/digest/sep 15/w2118l.html. 

'Ibid. 

5 President's Council on Jobs and Competitivenes, Taking Action, Building Confidence, p. 19, http://files.jobscouncil.com/jobscouncillfiles/20 !Ill 0/JobsCouncil_lnterimReport _ Oct11.pdf. 6 lbid. 

7 Ibid, p. 17 

'Ibid. 

9 Evelyn M. Rusli and Peter Eavis, "Facebook Raises $16 Billion in !.P.O.," May 17, 2012, 

https:l /dealbook.nytimes.com/20 12105117/facebook -raises-16-billion-in-i-p-o/ 10 Bernie Marcus: We Couldn't Start Home Depot Today, Job Creators Network, October 10, 2013, 

https:/lwww.jobcreatorsnetwork.com/press __ releaseslmarcus-we-ccouldnt-start-home-depot-todayl. 
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About John Berlau 

John Berlau is a senior fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute specializing in financial and 

banking regulatory policy. His work focuses on the impact of public policy on entrepreneurship 

and the investing public. He is a columnist for Forbes. com and has been published in The Wall 

Street Journal, The New York Times, The Atlantic, Politico, Washington Examiner, Investor's 

Business Daily, National Journal, National Review, Reason, and many other media outlets. 

Before joining CEI, Berlau was an award-winning financial and political journalist. He served as 

Washington correspondent for Investor's Business Daily and as a staff writer for Insight 

magazine, published by The Washington Times. In 2002, the National Press Club awarded him 

the Sandy Hume Memorial Award for Excellence in Political Journalism. In 2003, Berlau was a 

media fellow at the Hoover Institution in 2003. He graduated from the University of 

Missouri Columbia in 1994 with degrees in journalism and economics. 

Relevant Articles 

"Let Small Businesses Fuel Job Growth Again," Forbes. com, January 8, 2016, 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/20 16/0 1/08/dodd-franksmallbusiness/#2340f718fd5b 

"Why fue DOL Rule ls Bad for Small Savers," Wealfu Management, May 3, 2016 2016 

http ://m. we a 1 thmanagement.com/ commen tary/ber 1 au-wh v-do l-ru I e-bad -small savers 

"CFPB Anti-Arbitration Rule Will Harrn Consumers and Fin Tech," Forbes.com, August 

23, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnber1au/20 16/08/23/cfpb-anti-arbitrationru 1ewill-hann-consumers-and-fintech/#56ad781 05a5b 

"Obama Regulations Aren't the Only Target," The Wall Street Journal, December 30, 

2016, https://www. wsj .com/articles/obamas-regulations-arent -the-onl v-trumptarget1483053980 

Free to Prosper: A Pro-Growth Agenda for the 115'h Congress, Banking and Finance 

chapter https://cei.org/agendaforcongress/finance-20 17 

"Five Key Financial Regulation Reforms," OnPoint No. 228, Competitive Enterprise 

Institute, April 25, 2017, https://cei.org/contentlfive-kev-financial-regu lation-rcforms 

"SO Xing It to the Little Guy," OnPoint No. 112, Competitive Enterprise Institute, June 7, 

2007, https://cei.org/studies-pointlsoxing-it-little-guy 

Relevant Speaking Events 

September 2016, Alternative and Direct Investment Securities Association in Las Vegas 

April2016, Fundit conference in Las Vegas 

March 2016, South by Southwest Interactive in Austin 

December 2015, Crowd Financing Summit in Washington 

October 2015, Money20/20 conference in Las Vegas 

May 2015, FinTech Global Expo in San Diego 

March 2015, Silicon Valley Crowdfunding Conference in Mountain View, California 

October 2014, CFGE Crowdfund Banking and Lending Summit in San Francisco 

28750.005

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. 

Friday, Dec<'rnber '20lf3 

Obama's Itegulations Aren't the Only Targe
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Biotechnology 

Innovation 

Organization 

John Blake 

Senior Vice President of Finance 

aTyr Pharma, Inc. 

On behalf of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization 

Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, 

Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Investment 

The Cost of Being a Public Company in Light of 

Sarbanes-Oxley and the Federalization of Corporate Governance 

July 18, 2017 

Executive Summary 

aTyr Pharma is a clinical-stage biotechnology company based in San Diego, California. The 

Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) represents aTyr and 1,100 other innovative 

biotech companies, the vast majority of which are pre-revenue small businesses. 

aTyr undertook a successful IPO in May 2015 using key provisions in the Jumpstart Our 

Business Startups (JOBS) Act. In the five years since the JOBS Act became law, 212 

biotech companies have gone public as emerging growth companies (EGCs). 

A healthy public market is key to funding the search for innovative, next-generation 

medicines and maintaining the U.S. as a global leader in 21" century industries like 

biotechnology. 

BIO supports policies to build on the success of the JOBS Act that increase the flow of 

capital to innovative small businesses and decrease capital diversions from the lab to 

unnecessary compliance burdens. 

Costly compliance burdens that do not protect investors and external actors that do not 

prioritize long-term value creation can disincentivize public capital formation and make it 

difficult for growing biotechs to succeed on the public market. 

BIO supports the Fostering Innovation Act, which would extend the JOBS Act's SarbanesOxley (SOX) Section 404(b) exemption for an additional five years for former EGCs that 

maintain a public float below $700 million and average annual revenues below $50 million. 

BIO supports the Corp.Qrate Governance Reform and Transparency Act, which would provide 

for SEC oversight of proxy advisory firms and foster accountability, transparency, 

responsiveness, and competition in the proxy advisory firm industry. 

BIO supports enhanced short selling transparency in order to shine a light on manipulative 

trading behaviors that disincentivize long-term investment in innovation. 

BIO Contacts: David Lachmann Charles Crain 

dlachmann@bio.org ccrain@bio.org 

(202) 747-1286 (202) 962-9218 
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Testimony of John Blake 

Good morning Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Maloney, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. My name is John Blake, and I am the Senior Vice President of Finance at 

aTyr Pharma, a clinical-stage biotech company based in San Diego, California. 

aTyr is a small business with just 66 employees, all of whom are dedicated to our ongoing 

search for therapies to treat a variety of severe and rare diseases using our knowledge of 

Physiocrine biology, a newly discovered set of physiological pathways. By focusing on 

immune pathways in disease, we believe our therapeutic candidates have the potential to 

restore patients to a healthier state, achieve homeostatic balance, and ultimately lead to 

improved clinical outcomes. To date, the company has generated three innovative 

therapeutic candidate programs in three different therapeutic areas. Our first product 

candidate is designed to treat rare muscular dystrophies with an immune component. Our 

second therapeutic candidate is a potential therapeutic for patients with rare pulmonary 

diseases. Finally, our third program is a preclinical research program in a third therapeutic 

area. 

aTyr's story is mirrored across the biotech industry. The Biotechnology Innovation 

Organization (BIO) represents aTyr and over 1,100 other innovative companies making 

similar progress on the path toward medical breakthroughs. These ground breaking 

companies - over 90% of which are pre-revenue small businesses are at the forefront of 

an all-consuming effort to combat and cure diseases, treat patients and provide relief to 

their families, and save lives in the U.S. and around the world. 

In order to fund the decades of research that it takes to develop a single breakthrough 

medicine, growing biotechs turn to a range of both private and public investors. Because 

biotech R&D is undertaken without the benefit of product revenue, small business 

innovators are entirely dependent on external capital to finance the $2 billion biotech 

development pathway. Capital formation, to put it lightly, is of paramount importance in 

our industry. 

In 2015, aTyr raised $86 million through an !PO to fund Phase 1b/2 clinical trials for our 

first product candidate. Before our !PO, we had raised $172 million in venture financing 

over 10 years, for a grand total of over $250 million raised since 2005 - and we are likely 

still years away from presenting a drug candidate to the FDA for final approval, a time 

period during which we will remain steadfastly free of product revenue. 

The prodigious capital requirements of cutting-edge biotech research, as exemplified by 

aTyr's financing story, make the work of the Subcommittee extremely vital to the industry's 

success- and, ultimately, to the health and well-being of the patients we serve. The 

Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, passed five years ago with bipartisan support 

in both the House and Senate, is a shining example of the impact that targeted 

policymaking can have on biotech capital formation. The law has supported more than 200 

biotech IPOs through its smart combination of increased access to capital and a decreased 

regulatory burden for growing companies. I am encouraged that the Subcommittee is 

considering ways to build on the JOBS Act's successes by continuing to support the growth 

of small business innovators on the public market. 

Though the public capital markets are an essential component of the biotech financing 

ecosystem, roadblocks that decrease the capital potential of an offering, reduce long-term 

liquidity and investor confidence, or distract a company from its core mission have the 

potential to deter or delay necessary offerings. For instance, burdensome regulations like 

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Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) divert innovation capital away from the lab, while 

external forces like proxy advisory firms and manipulative short sellers increase costs and 

deter vital investment. These barriers, and others, reduce the viability of the public market 

as a capital formation option for emerging biotechs, ultimately harming issuers, investors, 

and patients alike. Given the importance of public capital formation for life-saving 

innovation, I am hopeful that the Subcommittee can take action to enact regulatory and 

corporate governance policies that bolster America's world-leading capital markets and 

prioritize both capital formation and resource efficiency for innovative small businesses. 

SOX 404Cbl and the Fostering Innovation Act 

Regulatory costs are a key incentive for companies to stay private rather than brave the 

public markets. Despite the positive economic benefits of IPOs (namely, a sharp increase in 

job creation), many private small businesses choose to deter or delay their offering because 

of the high costs of being a public company. For companies like aTyr that do not have the 

luxury of remaining private and must go public in order to fund our research, expensive 

regulatory requirements siphon innovation capital from the lab, diverting funds from science 

to compliance on a quarterly and annual basis. Disclosure burdens and other compliance 

metrics obviously offer protections for investors, and BIO strongly supports appropriate 

investor safeguards. However, costly one-size-fits-all requirements do not benefit 

companies or their investors, and BIO supports efforts to institute right-sized regulations 

that do not impose unnecessary expenses on growing innovators. 

As the Subcommittee examines the impact of SOX in light of its lS'h anniversary, I would 

encourage it to consider ways to reduce the cost burden of the law - and particularly of 

Section 404(b ), which has a uniquely damaging impact on smaller biotechs. The 

requirements of Section 404(b) provide important protections for investors in large, 

multinational, revenue-generating corporations, but applying the same requirements to 

biotech small businesses with few employees (most of whom are scientists and medical 

professionals) diverts funds from and ultimately delays scientific progress. 

Section 404(b) requires an external auditor's attestation of a company's internal financial 

controls that provides little-to-no insight into the health of an emerging biotech company -

but is very costly for a pre-revenue innovator. The most direct policy impact of the JOBS 

Act has been the five-year exemption from Section 404(b), a vitally important reform that 

allows small public companies to choose how to allocate scarce investor funds. This optional 

allowance has been utilized by virtually all of the emerging growth companies (EGCs) in our 

industry, with the support of our investors. 

Biotech investors demand information about the growth-stage companies in which they 

invest and spend countless hours learning as much as they can about the company's 

science, the diseases it is treating, the patient population its drug candidates will target, its 

FDA approval pathway, and a hundred other variables that will determine the company's 

ultimate success or failure. Indeed, the testing-the-waters process created by the JOBS Act 

has been so successful for the biotech industry because it allows companies a platform to 

disseminate more and more detailed information to potential investors. But the information 

that these investors want and need does not align with what is required by SOX -and yet 

virtually all biotechs are subject to this one-size-fits-all mandate that can cost them over $1 

million per year once their EGC exemption expires. 

Thanks to the JOBS Act, aTyr has been able to spend dollars on R&D and job creation over 

the last two years that otherwise would have been earmarked for SOX compliance, and we 

still have three years of IPO On-Ramp eligibility remaining. However, it remains the case 

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that the biotech development timeline is a decades-long affair. It is extremely likely that 

aTyr will still be in the lab and the clinic when our EGC clock expires which is to say that 

we will still not be generating product revenue. At the dawn of year 6 on the market, we 

estimate that our compliance costs will nearly double, an increase that will be paid for with 

valuable innovation capital that would be better-used covering clinical trial and research 

expenses. 

Most biotechs that went public under the JOBS Act will find themselves in the same 

predicament in the next several years still reliant on investor capital to fund their 

research, but facing a full-blown compliance burden identical to that faced by commercial 

leaders and multinational corporations. 

To address this problem, Reps. Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ) and Trey Hollingsworth (R-IN) have 

introduced the Fostering Innovation Act (H.R. 1645), which would extend the JOBS Act's 

SOX 404(b) exemption for certain small companies beyond the existing five-year expiration 

date. This important bill recognizes that a company that maintains the characteristics of an 

EGC but has been on the market beyond the five-year EGC window is still very much an 

emerging company. 

The Fostering Innovation Act would apply to former EGCs that have been public for longer 

than five years but maintain a public float below $700 million and average annual revenues 

below $50 million. These small businesses would benefit from an extended SOX 404(b) 

exemption for years 6 through 10 after their IPO. The additional five years of cost-savings 

would have the same impact as the first five years emerging companies would be able to 

spend investor capital on growing their business. In the biotech industry, that means small 

business innovators can remain laser-focused on the search for breakthrough medicines. 

If a company eclipses $50 million in average annual revenues, its full SOX 404(b) 

compliance obligations would kick in. The Fostering Innovation Act does not grant a carte 

blanche exemption - it is targeted specifically at pre-revenue companies, because revenue 

is the key indicator of company size, and of the ability to pay for expensive compliance 

obligations like Sarbanes-Oxley. Maintaining the JOBS Act's public float test of $700 million 

while drastically lowering the revenue test from $1 billion to $50 million limits the Fostering 

Innovation Act to a specific universe of truly small companies - instituting a company 

classification regime for years 6 through 10 post-IPO that accurately reflects the nature of 

small businesses while also supporting their growth. 

Under current law, small, pre-revenue companies are often required to file the same reports 

as revenue-generating, profitable multinational corporations. Under the Fostering 

Innovation Act, these emerging companies will save millions of dollars that can be utilized to 

fund groundbreaking R&D and life-saving medical research. BIO commends Reps. Sinema 

and Hollingsworth for their leadership on this vital legislation, which last year was approved 

on a bipartisan basis by the House Financial Services Committee and then passed by the 

House via voice vote. I am hopeful that the Subcommittee will support the Fostering 

Innovation Act in order to enhance capital formation and company growth at America's prerevenue businesses. 

Proxy Advisory Firms and the Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act 

Biotech companies value shareholder input, and strive to implement corporate governance 

policies that place shareholder value at the forefront of our decision-making processes. At 

aTyr, we place an emphasis on long-term value creation for investors - a vital metric of 

success given the extended nature of biotech R&D. During the development process, there 

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are frequently scientific setbacks unrelated to the quality of company management or the 

corporate governance policies we have in place. Indeed, good and stable management 

teams in our industry have, time and again, used the knowledge gained from these shortterm delays to ultimately develop life-changing therapeutic innovations - delivering 

exceptional long-term shareholder value in the process. 

The ups and downs inherent to groundbreaking scientific advancement, combined with the 

general volatility of stock prices in our industry, can at times create a disconnect between 

the creation of shareholder value and the external recognition of it. Biotech management 

teams put considerable energy into communicating the company's progress to shareholders, 

and industry investors generally understand the nature of biotech investing. Everyone 

involved is in it for the long haul. As such, outside actors that place an emphasis on shortterm metrics, often at the expense of long-term value creation and patient impact, can be 

particularly disruptive. Recent industry experiences with proxy advisory firms underscore 

the divide between short- and long-term approaches to shareholder value creation, and 

highlight the need for oversight of the proxy firm industry. 

Despite their significant influence on emerging companies, proxy advisory firms (the 

universe of which is functionally limited to just two firms) generally refuse to engage in a 

productive or transparent dialogue with smaller issuers, instead relying on one-size-fits-all 

recommendations that do not take into account a company's or its shareholders' unique 

circumstances. Furthermore, the conflicts of interest inherent in the business model of 

those firms which engage in business consulting in addition to providing proxy 

recommendations raise serious concerns. 

Proxy advisory firms pose a particularly acute risk for growing innovative companies like 

aTyr. Emerging biotechs operate in a unique industry that values a strong relationship with 

investors, yet they often are held to standards that are not applicable to their business. 

These one-size-fits-all recommendations, developed with minimal input from the company, 

do not accurately reflect the true nature of an emerging biotech, and are often focused on 

quarterly metrics rather than long-term scientific advancement and shareholder value 

creation. 

Even in instances where a proxy firm has not yet made a recommendation, their influence is 

felt in boardrooms across the industry as companies strive to structure their corporate 

policies to satisfy the firms- rather than making decisions in the best interest of the 

company's growth. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that the consulting arms of the 

firms also put pressure on smaller issuers, raising significant conflict of interest concerns. 

Dealing with issues created by proxy firms' beliefs about corporate governance can distract 

company management and divert vital resources from the ultimate mission of any biotech -

delivering ground breaking treatments to patients. 

BIO believes that proxy advisory firms should be more transparent and open to input in 

their standard-setting processes, particularly with regard to issues unique to small 

businesses. We also believe that the firms with conflicted business models should be 

required to avoid potential conflicts of interest. 

In the 114'h Congress, Rep. Sean Duffy (R-WI) and then-Rep. John Carney (D-DE) 

introduced the Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act, which would provide 

for SEC oversight of proxy advisory firms. By ensuring that firms have processes in place to 

engage in a dialogue with smaller issuers, the legislation would make it more likely that a 

firm's recommendation is relevant to a company's business model and allow small 

businesses to focus on long-term growth. Further, the bill's regulation of conflicts of 

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interest would ensure that the proxy firms are actually acting in the best interests of 

shareholders. 

BIO strongly supports the Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act, which last 

year passed the House Financial Services Committee on a bipartisan basis. Passage of 

legislation to regulate proxy firms would be a welcome change from a status quo that forces 

companies to contort themselves to satisfy proxy advisors rather than making decisions in 

the best interests of the company and its shareholders. BIO applauds Rep. Duffy for his 

continued interest in this important bill, and we are hopeful that the Subcommittee will 

support it in the 115"' Congress. 

Short Selling Transparency 

As I have discussed, long-term value creation is key to biotech capital formation -

shareholders often hold their investment for more than a decade before seeing a return. 

While most long-term investors can hold out through short-term ups and downs, growing 

biotechs also face concerted efforts from manipulative short sellers that impact shareholder 

value far more than the day-to-day realities of scientific uncertainty. These deliberate 

trading strategies can make long investors skittish about providing the capital necessary to 

fund the decades-long, billion-dollar development pathway intrinsic to life-saving research. 

The unique business model of groundbreaking innovation leaves emerging biotechs 

particularly vulnerable to stock manipulation via abusive short selling strategies. The high· 

stakes nature of their research (both the uncertainty associated with scientific advancement 

and their limited portfolio of product candidates), combined with thinly traded stocks and 

strict FDA rules about disclosing the status of ongoing clinical trials, can be exploited by 

short sellers who prioritize short-term profits over the long-term health of patients. Abusive 

short trading strategies harm growing companies and disincentivize long-term investment in 

innovation. 

BIO acknowledges that appropriate shorting can support the stable, liquid markets that fuel 

the growth of emerging biotech innovators. However, we strongly believe that the current 

lack of transparency related to short positions is enabling trading behaviors that unfairly 

harm growing companies, long-term investors, and, most importantly, patients. BIO 

members face a consistent and significant risk of manipulation by short sellers, who are 

protected by the lack of disclosure required of short positions. 

Company management has a fiduciary duty to protect shareholders, but the lack of 

transparency around short positions makes it exceedingly difficult to police short 

manipulation effectively. This consistent risk of manipulation, and the lack of information 

available that would allow companies to combat it, disincentivizes the long investment 

necessary to fund life-saving biotech R&D. 

BIO believes that increased short transparency, designed to complement the existing long 

disclosure regime, would shine a light on manipulative behaviors, allow market participants 

to make informed trading decisions, and ensure equitable rules for all types of investments. 

Specifically, we would support required disclosures of investors taking significant short 

positions, modeled after the beneficial ownership disclosure obligations in SEC Regulations 

13D and 13G. 

The current disclosure regime for long positions exists to provide information regarding 

persons that may have potential influence over, or control of, an issuer. Investors taking 

short positions, on the other hand, face no public disclosure requirement, despite the 

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significant infiuence they exert on issuers. Their power stems not from voting rights, but 

rather from the ability to engage in manipulative trading behaviors that harm growing 

companies and disincentivize long-term investment in 21" century innovation and job 

creation - yet there is not a parallel disclosure regime for the reporting of short positions. 

BIO sees no public policy justification for this disparity between the disclosures required of 

long and short investors. Both groups are making predictions based on the risk and/or 

reward a given company presents, but only one group is required to disclose its holdings 

and transactions. We have clearly seen that this information asymmetry can be harmful to 

emerging issuers and their investors. 

Notably, BIO supports a short disclosure regime that is complementary, rather than 

identical, to the existing long disclosure requirements. The long disclosure trigger in 

Regulation 130 (5% of a class of an equity security) is unlikely to capture short 

manipulation for the simple reason that few short sellers take a large enough short position 

to cross the 5% threshold - yet still find it easy to manipulate a company's stock even if 

they are short far less than 5%. BIO would support either a lower disclosure trigger or a 

standard based on a different metric than outstanding shares (for example, trading volume 

could be a more appropriate measure given that the depressive effect of short sales on a 

stock price is largely a function of the volume and frequency of short transactions relative to 

the overall securities transaction volume). 

Issuers, investors, and patients are all impacted by the current lack of short transparency. 

A commonsense disclosure regime for short positions would shine a light on manipulative 

practices while giving investors and companies the information they need to make informed 

market decisions. 

Conclusion 

The bipartisan JOBS Act showed that targeted policymaking designed to support job 

creation and capital formation at small businesses can have a dramatic real world impact. 

The many JOBS Act success stories in the biotech industry, including aTyr, are attributable 

to the one-two punch at the core of the law: First, it allows small companies enhanced 

access to investors, increasing the capital raising potential of an offering. It then provides 

them with targeted relief from costly regulatory burdens, decreasing the amount of capital 

diverted from research. This combination is critical for biotech innovators, and provides a 

useful model for the Subcommittee to follow as it considers further ways to support the 

growth of small public companies. 

Unlike in many other industries, emerging biotechs are almost always looking to go public 

given the capital-intensive nature of our research. But that does not mean that conducting 

an !PO or staying a public company is an easy choice. Growing public biotechs face a 

constant array of costly regulatory burdens and short-term-oriented external actors both 

of which distract company resources from the mission of delivering cures and treatments to 

patients in need. Congress can support these small business innovators by enacting 

legislation that enhances the capital formation ecosystem, reduces regulatory burdens, and 

incentivizes long-term funding for the next generation of breakthrough medicines. 

I appreciate your dedication to these vital issues, and I look forward to supporting your 

work in any way I can. 

7 
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STURM COLLEGE OF LAW 

Testimony of .1. Robert Brown, Jr., 

Lawrence W. Treece Professor of Corporate Governance, Director, Corporate & Commercial 

Law Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law 

Before the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 

Securities, and Investment 

Hearing: "The Cost of Being a Public Company in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley and the 

Federalization of Corporate Governance" 

July 18, 2017 

Sarbanes Oxley at 15: 

The Success of"Quack" Corporate Governance 

Imagine a financial system where investors could not be sure that some of the most 

widely traded public companies were nothing more than a house of cards, where the system of 

regulation and governance was sufficiently porous that a massive fraud could be perpetuated at 

one of these companies without detection by gatekeepers, whether accountants, lawyers or 

directors, and where employees suspecting financial fraud were blocked from reaching the board 

of directors with their concerns. Imagine further that, because of inadequate accountability and 

weak internal controls, investors could not be sure that even the largest public companies had 

accurate financial statements. 

In late 200 l, these circumstances were not a matter of imagination but reality. Enron 

proved to be an $80 billion Potemkin village, going from the I O'h largest company to bankruptcy 

in the course of a few years. The problems, however, were deeper than the need to uncover 

fraud. In the years following the collapse ofEnron, companies would discover errors and be 

forced to restate their financial statements in record numbers. The crisis demonstrated that the 

disclosure system could not be trusted to produce accurate and complete financial information 

about public companies. 

Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX") sought to reassure investors by strengthening the system for 

financial disclosure. The legislation did so in a number of innovative ways. A regulator was 

created to oversee public company accounting firms but, rather than add another government 

agency, Congress assigned the task to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 

("PCAOB"), a non-profit corporation overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission 

("Commission" or "SEC"). 

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Congress strengthened the role of the gatekeeping function of the board, primarily 

through I isting standards applicable to audit committees. Boards were encouraged to add 

financial expertise through a system of''comply or explain," something widely used in Europe 

but, until SOX, not in the US. Information flow to the board was increased and companies had 

to put in place mechanisms designed to allow employees to make confldential complaints to the 

audit committee about concerns over Jlnancial disclosure. 

2 

Agreement on the need to restore investor confldence was widespread and SOX proved 

to be a truly bipartisan event. The legislation passed 99-0 in the Senate and 423-3 in the House 

ofRepresentatives. 2 Despite the label of''quack" corporate governance, SOX succeeded in 

putting in place mechanisms that promoted investor confidence by raising the quality of Jlnancial 

disclosure. 3 

I. SOX and Financial Disclosure 

SOX adopted a number of mechanisms for improving the integrity of the financial 

disclosure process. The role of gatekeepers was strengthened and responsibility assigned for the 

development, assessment, and review of internal controls. Officers were required to certify 

financial statements in quarterly and annual reports. Audit quality was enhanced and penalties 

for participation in financial fraud and false disclosure were increased. 

A. Disclosure Integrity 

SOX strengthened the role of the audit committee, addressed the system of internal 

controls, and mandated disclosure to shareholders of relevant concerns. 

I. Audit Committees 

SOX made four broad changes to the audit committee structure. 4 Limited to independent 

directors, committees were encouraged to promote the financial sophistication of the members. 5 

Section 407 required that all public companies include a ''flnancial expert'" on the audit 

committee or disclose the reasons for not doing so. Financial expertise was to be obtained 

through education or experience and was reflected in an understanding of financial statements 

1 https:/lwww.govtrack.us/congresslvotes/1 07 -2002/s192 2 https:l/www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/107-2002/h348 

3 See Roberta Romano, 1he Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 1 I 4 Yale L. J. 

1521 (2005). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley Legislating in Haste, Repenting in Leisure, UCLA 

School oj"Lmv, Lmv-Econ Research Paper No. 06-14, University of California, Los Angeles- School of Law, Date 

posted to dataha>e: May 1. 2006 (stating that SOX "sacrificed the American economy at the altar of short-term 

political gain."). For a response to these critics. see J. Robert Brown, Jr .. Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes Oxley 

and Quack Corporate Governance, 90 Marquette L. Rev. 309 (2006). 4 Section 303 also required the adoption of rules prohibiting interference with an audit. 5 Section 407 required the Commission to issue rules requiring reporting companies to disclose "whether or not, and 

if not, the reasons therefore, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least one member who is a 

financial expert, as such term is defined by the Commission." Shareholders must be infonned of the persons 

designated as financial experts. See Item 407 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR §229.407. 

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(including their preparation), internal controls, and audit committee functions 6 Evidence 

indicates that the use of financial experts has become widespread. 7 

Second, the audit committee received expanded jurisdiction, obtaining "direct" 

responsibility "for the appointment. compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered 

public accounting firm employed by that issuer" 8 and receiving a guarantee of"appropriate 

funding." 9 

3 

Third, SOX enhanced the information that had to be reported to the audit committee. The 

committee was, for example, required to be told about "significant deficiencies and material 

weaknesses'' in the internal controls. 10 Auditors were required to inform the committee of all 

critical accounting policies and practices. 11 Listed companies had to put in place a system for 

allowing employees to provide anonymous complaints about .. concerns regarding questionable 

accounting or auditing matters.'' 12 The complaints could alert directors to problems that, at a 

minimum, required additional investigation. 

Fourth, the committee was given an enhanced role in ensuring auditor independence. 

SOX prohibited independent accounting firms from engaging in certain non-audit services. 13 For 

those that were permitted, they were conditioned upon audit committee approval and disclosure 

to shareholders. 14 

2. Internal Controls 

SOX also sought to promote the accuracy of financial disclosure by strengthening the 

system of internal controls. Internal controls required to ensure that records were maintained and 

transactions "fairly reflected.'' In addition, controls were to provide "reasonable assurances" that 

matters were recorded properly, expenditures and receipts authorized. and unauthorized 

transactions detected in a timely fashion. 15 

Section 404 provided that management had to assess the el1ectiveness of the company's 

internal control over financial reporting on a yearly basis and disclose the assessment to 

6 See Section 407 of SOX. For the dctinition, see Item 407(d)(5)(ii) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR §229.407(d)(5)(ii). 7 The Sarbanes Oxley Act at 15. E&Y. 2017, at 9 (noting that "on average, 60% of S&P 500 audit committee members 

are fom1ally designated financial experts"). 8 See Section 301 of SOX, codified as 15 USC §78f(m). The requirements were to be implemented as mandatory 

listing standards by the exchanges. 9 See Rule 1 OA-3(b)(5 ). 17 CFR §240.1 OA-3(b)(5). A representation thatthe material has been disclosed to the audit 

committee must be made in the certification filed by the CEO and CFO. See ltern 60 I (b )(31) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 

§229.60J(b)(31 ). 

w See Section 204 of SOX, codified as 15 USC §78m(k). 11 The requirement was added to Regulation S-X. See 17 CFR §210.2-07. 

"See Rule JOA-3(b)(3), 17 CFR §240.10A-3(b)(3). 1

' See 17 CFR §210.2-0 1 (auditors are not deemed '·independenf' to the extent providing specified non-auditing 

services). 

14 See Exchange Act Release No. 47265 (Jan. 28. 2003) ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act further requires disclosure in periodic 

reports of non-audit services approved by the audit committee."). 15 Rule 13a-15(f), l7CFR§240.13a-15(f). 

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4 

shareholders in the annual report. 16 Intending to ensure that the controls were "designed to 

prevent or detect material misstatements," the assessment could not characterize the system as 

effective to the extent it contained one or more material weaknesses. 17 

The provision also provided that the company's public accounting firm was required to 

"attest" to the assessment made by management. As part of the assessment process, therefore, 

management knew that the analysis would be subjected to third-party review. Presumably the 

attestation requirement encouraged a more thorough assessment in at least some cases. 

B. Audit Quality Improvement 

SOX sought to improve audit quality by enhancing auditor independence and improving 

auditor oversight. 18 Most significantly, SOX ended self-regulation and created the PCAOB. 19 

Created as a nonprofit corporation and not as "an agency or establishment of the United 

States Government,'' the PCAOB was assigned to ·'oversee the audit of public companies ... in 

the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports ... ··The Board was given 

the authority to establish auditing standards and to conduct inspections, annually for large firms, 

every three years for the others. In addition to assessing the audits, the inspections evaluated 

"the sufficiency of the quality control system ofthe firm ... " 

The Board was also received the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and impose 

disciplinary sanctions, including revocation of a firm's registration with the PCAOB. The 

bearings, however, were required to be confidential unless the parties agreed otherwise which, as 

a practical matter, did not occur. Moreover, confidentiality provided incentives for delay. The 

results of any proceeding could be appealed to the Commission, with confidentiality remaining 

until the Board's sanctions were allowed to take effect20 

C. Management 

SOX also sought to improve the quality of financial disclosure hy increasing the 

responsibility of officers. 

16 See Item 308 of Regulation S-K. 17 Exchange Act Release No. 47986 (June 5, 2003) ("The final rules therefore preclude management from detennining 

that a company's internal control over financial reporting is effective if it identifies one or more material weaknesses in 

the company's internal control over financial reporting.'"), 18 Auditor independence was enhanced through a prohibition on the performance of some non-audit services. The 

legislation included exemptions for other services, including tax services, but required that they be approved by the 

audit committee_ Rotation of the audit partner was also required. See Section 203 of SOX, codified in Section 

10A(j), 15 USC §78j-l(j). 10 See Section 101 of SOX. 20 See Section 107 of SOX. 

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5 

Section 302 required the CFO and CEO to certify the financial statements included in the 

annual and quarterly reports. 21 The officers had to represent that they had '·reviewed the report'' 

and that the report did not, based upon their knowledge, contain any untrue statement of a 

material fact ... ''22 The certifications also had to acknowledge that the effectiveness of the 

system of internal controls had been evaluated and that the auditors and audit committee had 

been informed of any significant deficiencies. 

Section 303 prohibited improper influence of audits. Otlicers and directors could not 

take any action to "fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent public 

or certified accountant engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of that 

issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially misleading."23 

Section 406 required a code of ethics for senior financial officers or an explanation as to 

why one was not required. The code was designed to promote "honest and ethical conduct, 

including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and 

professional relationships" and ''full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in the 

periodic reports .. .'' 24 Changes or waivers to the code had to be made public. 

SOX also imposed a number of substantive obligations on boards. Section 304 required 

that where the company restated earnings due to material noncompliance as a result of 

misconduct, compensation was to be clawed back. Specifically, the CEO and CFO would be 

required to return any incentive based compensation paid within a year after issuance of the 

financial statements. 25 In addition, Section 402 of SOX imposed an almost absolute ban on 

extensions of credit to executive officers and directors26 Loans during the Enron era had been 

made on highly favorable terms27 and in some cases involved an assumption of risk "that no 

financial institution was willing to assumc.'' 28 SOX prevented future reoccurrences by ban·ing 

the transactions. 

Rule 13a-14, 17 CFR §240.13a-!4. 

See Section 302 of SOX, codified in Rule 13a-14, 17 CFR §240.13a-!4. 23 See Rule 13b2-2(b ), 17 CFR §240.13b2-2(b ). 24 See Item 406 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR §229.406. 25 See SJ::C v. McGuire, Litigation Release No. 20387 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2007) (noting that the settlement was "the first 

with an individual under the 'clawback' provision (Section 304) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to deprive corporate 

executives of their stock sale profits and bonuses eamed while their companies were misleading investors."), 

"' 15 USC' §78m(k). 27 Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Wor!dcom, Inc., 

Dennis R Beresford, Nicholas dell. Katzenbach, C.B. Rogers, Jr., March 31. 2003 ("The Company did not have a 

perfected security interest in any collateral for the loans for most of the time period during which they were 

outstanding."). See also !d. ("Ebbers was not required to make regular payments; rather, payments were required 

only on the Company's demand, and no payments were demanded. The promissory notes provided that the interest 

charged to Ebbers would be equal to the !luctuating rate of interest charged under a WorldCom credit facility, 

almost always the lowest rate available to World Com at the time, and a rate of interest lower than that of Ebbers' 

other outside loans. Moreover, this rate was lower than the average rate WorldCom paid on its other debt.''). 28 Report of Investigation, supra note 27. 

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D. Enforcement 

SOX also included a number of provisions designed to deter wrongdoing. 29 False 

certifications were subject to still penalties30 Destruction of audit records was criminalized31 

and existing prohibitions on the destruction of corporate records were strengthened. 32 

Whistleblower protections were included for the first time. 33 The Commission was given the 

authority to bar individuals from serving as officers and directors of public companies in 

administrative proceedings. 34 

II. Looking Forward 

SOX addressed serious concerns with the public securities markets. The concerns had 

reduced investor confidence and had the capacity to threaten the integrity of the markets. 

Concerns have again arisen over these markets. Some have pointed to a reduction in the number 

of IPOs and the presence of a large number of unicorns (companies with a value of more than $1 

billion) that have chosen to remain in the private equity markets. 35 

Unicoms have a number of reasons for delaying IPOs. The strength of the private 

markets proyides a degree of flexibility over the timing of public otTerings that did not exist in 

earlier eras.-'" Moreover, with the prevalence of dual class stock structures, founders, rather than 

private equity funds, likely have greater say over the timing of a public offering. 37 Finally, small 

investors are not excluded from the markets but can participate in pre-IPO companies through 

the purchase of shares in various mutual funds 38 

"See Section 807 (amending 18 USC§ 1348). 30 See Section 906 (adding 18lJSC § 1350). 

"See Section 802 (adding 18IJSC § 1520). 

See Section 802 (amending 18 USC§ 1519, the anti-shredding provision). 

D Section 806 (adding 18 USC §1514A) 

''Section 1105 (amending Section 21C of the Exchange Act, 15 USC §78u-3). 35 Corrie Driebusch, !PO Mar/u!t Isn't Quite Back as Many Startups Are Still Holding Out, WSJ. July 5, 2017, 

('"'More than 160 private companies are valued at $1 billion or more, including ride-hailing company Uber 

Technologies Inc. and Airbnb lne.'"). 

6 

l~> Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation C!f Private Capital and the Decline q(the Public: Company, 68 Hastings 

L. J. 445 (20 17) ("That is, even if public company disclosure requirements had remained constant over the last three 

decades, there would likely still be a dearth of public companies today, due to the increasing case of raising capital 

privately."). The Commission has taken a number of steps to facilitate the development of the private markets. See 

Rule 144A, 17 CFR §230.144A. The robust nature of the private markets, therefore, represents a product of 

regulatory development. 17 Vnicorns often rely on dual class stock structures that leave control in the hand of founders rather than private equity 

investors. Founders, therefore, may have greater control over the decision to go public and may have less incentive to do 

so than private investors. 38 Small investors can participate in the private equity market through mutual funds. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Portfolios 

Are investing in Unicorns, DEALBOOK, May ll, 2015 ("While public investors and 401(k) contributors have long 

complained that they can't get access to shares of hot technology companies before their initial public offerings, that's 

actually not the case anymore. Fidelity, T. Rowe Price. BlackRock and Janus, among others, have been quietly putting 

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7 

Public markets remain active 39 and retain their allurc. 40 They facilitate secondary trading 

and allow shares to he used as cash for acquisitions or compensation. The markets continue to 

provide a unique source of capital for companies with few assets and I ittle history of 

profitability. Amazon went public in 1997 and raised a mere $54 million yet today has a market 

capitalization of about $450 billion.41 Snap was able to go public in 2017 despite an apparent 

lack ofprofitability. 42 

Private markets also have their drawbacks. Valuations are subjective. 43 Nor do they 

have in place the same protections that are designed to ensure the accuracy of financial 

statements. 44 These investments can. therefore. pose substantial risk, 45 some of which are related 

to inadequate transparency. 

The public markets can always be improved. As SOX taught, however, refonn should 

have as the goal the promotion of investor confidence. In considering reforms, the hallmark of 

the public markets is transparency and disclosure. 46 Investors could benefit from an improved 

system of disclosure. At the same time. care should be taken with respect to any reform that 

might impair the system of disclosure or could limit governance rights of shareholders. Neither 

will promote investor confidence and encourage investment. 

A. Effective Disclosure 

Investor confidence will benefit from improved disclosure. The cmTent disclosure 

regime is largely based upon Regulation S-K47 Much of the regulation was put in place in the 

1980s and has not been significantly updated. 

The Commission did more recently instigate a review of the disclosure system48 

Concerns existed, however, that the focus was on disclosure ··overload" rather than disclosure 

shares of private companies like Uber, Pinterest and Space X into their investment funds, hoping to lift the returns of 

certain mutual funds."). 

"See Driebusch, supra note 35 ('"Companies making their stock-market debuts in the first half raised roughly $28 

blJlion, above the first-half average going back the last two decades, according to data provider Dcalogic."). 

"See KaraM. Stein, Commissioner, SEC. Lighting Our Capital Markets, July II, 2017 ("From 2009 through 2014, 

investors supplied nearly $17 triJ]jon in primary capital- providing capital directly to companies in exchange for 

debt or equity securities.''). 41 Shares are trading at about $1000. Amazon has 477.170,618 shares outstanding. See Amazon, Form l 0-K, Feb. 2, 

2017. 

"James B. Stewart, flow a Money-Losing Snap Could Be Worth So Much. NYT, March 2. 20!7 ("The company lost 

$514.6 million in 20 !6 and $372.9 million the year before, according to the prospectus it tiled in February. It has lost 

money every year since it began commercial operation in 2011 and has warned it may never earn a profit"). 43 See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Keynote Address at the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley 

Initiative, March 31, 2016, ("Nearly all venture valuations are highly subjective."). 44 Jd. ("the risk of distortion and inaccuracy is amplified because start-up companies, even quite mature ones, often have 

far less robust internal controls and governance procedures than most public companies,''). 4

s Moreover, private funds themselves can be highly risky investments. See Ryan Dezember. F'rom $2 Billion to Lero: 

A l'rivate-Equity Fund Goes Bust in the Oil Patch. WSJ. July 16. 2017. 46 Stein, supra note 40 (''Investors also use the price discovery available in the public markets to determine the value 

of private companies.''). 47 17 CFR §229.10, et seq. 

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effectiveness. 49 Effectiveness can and should result in the elimination of repetitive disclosure 

and boilerplate. But effectiveness should have as a first principle the development of a system 

designed to provide investors with the information needed to make informed investment 

decisions. 

8 

Reform of the disclosure system should focus on both content and delivery. The system 

of delivery must move from an analogue. to a digital. universe. This may require the reporting of 

infonnation on a more continuous basis and in a manner that can be accessed easily through 

machine readable software. 

With respect to content the system needs to be updated. Disclosure should be designed 

to assist in the assessment of business sectors that did not exist in the 1980s. Moreover, the 

disclosure system should take into account the interest of long term investors in the sustainability 

of business models. Whether a result of consumer taste. technology or climate change, 

disruption to business models can occur today at an accelerated pace. Shareholders should have 

greater awareness of these risks and efforts at reduction of the risk. 

I. Effective delivery 

Reform in the accessibility and delivery of information may be as important as changes to 

the content of the disclosure system. Indeed, SOX recognized this need. Section 409 authorized 

the Commission to require disclosure ''to the public on a rapid and current basis" in plain 

English 5° 

More data should be produced in formats that are machine readable. The use of 

structured data allows investors to recover large amounts of information in a cost effective 

manner. 51 In addition, the SEC is currently working on the second generation of EDGAR, the 

electronic data base for public filings. This is an opportunity fo~ a ground-breaking, generational 

change in the way information at the SEC is filed and accessed. '

2 

2. Disclosure Effectiveness 

48 Exchange Act Release No. 78310 (July 13, 2006 ) . 

.\')Keith F. Higgins, Director. Division of Corporation Finance, Disclosure Effectiveness, Remarks Before the 

American Bar Association Business Law Section Spring Meeting,. April 11, 2014 (''So now, I'm going to put the 

ball in your court and make it clear why I'm talking about disclosure effectiveness to this particular audience today . 

. . There is a growing concern about disclosure overload."). 50 See Section 13(i), 15 USC §78m(i). 51 Concept Release. Exchange Act Release No. 77599 (April 13, 2016) ("When registrants provide disclosure items in a 

standardized data format, investors can more easily search and obtain specific information about registrants, compare 

common disclosures across registrants, and observe how registrant-specific information changes across reporting periods 

as the same registrant continues to file in a structured data fonnat.''). 52 See The ,1\/eedfor the Cost ~Effective Retrieval oflnformation by Investors, Recommendations of the Investor Advisory 

Committee of the SEC, adopted July 25,2013, available at 

b!!Q~./ /v.,'WW -~c:.gov/spotlightiinvestor-advisory-committee-20 12jdata-tagging-resolution-72513 .pdf The IAC 

recommendation proposed, among other things, that the Commission adopt a "plan to convert infonnation filed with the 

SEC into tagged data." 

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9 

Investors, particularly those with long term investment strategies, arc increasingly 

interested in the ability of companies to maintain their business model in a rapidly changing 

economy. Shifts in technology, regulation, government policies, and reputation,'3 evolving labor 

practices and consumer tastes, and the effects of climate change, can threaten a business model. 54 

J nvestors would benefit from a disclosure regime that required more insightful discussion into 

the sustainability of the company's business model. 55 To be effective, sustainability disclosure 

would need to include analysis of long tcnn changes and would need to address efforts to reduce 

these risks56 

3. Disclosure Modernization 

The contents of the disclosure system needs to be modernized. Management's discussion 

and analysis (MD&A) is one area in need of reform. Disclosure in the MD&A is meant to allow 

investors to see the company "through the eyes of management.''57 This includes future trends 

based upon cutTent facts. 58 MD&A has been described as .. [ o )ne of the most important elements 

necessary to an understanding of a company's performance ... " 59 

The level of disclosure in the MD&A. however. is both inadequate and out of date. One 

fonner official of the Commission described the contents as having .. too much elevator 

music." 6° Concerns include boilerplate,61 repetition, 62 and rote calculations. 63 Academics have 

"The Commission has noted this possibility. See Exchange Act Release No. 6!469 (Feb. 12, 2010) ("Another 

example of a potentia) indirect risk from climate change that would need to be considered for risk factor disclosure 

is the impact on a registrant's reputation."). 54 Letter from Bloomberg LP. to the SEC, July 21. 2016, available at https:/iwww.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-

l6/s70616-264.pdf ("Because some of these changes are already causing certain market disruptions (as only a few 

examples, decline of the coal industry, rapid transformation of the energy industry, increasing use of artificial 

intelligence in financial infOrmation and product development), we believe it is consistent with the SEC's authority 

and mission to integrate these considerations in rulernaking. "). 

'

5 Sustainability has been defined as the "capacity to endure:' See Nancy S. Cleveland, Sustainahility. Share Value, and 

Reporting, Sustrana LLP, Sept. J 2. 2014. 

<;o The Commission could, for example, add a line item requirement that addresses sustainability. For additional 

discussion of this topic, see Letter to Mr. Brent fields, Secretary, SEC, from .l. Robert Brown. Jr., on the Need for 

Environmental, Social and Governance Disclosure, Oct. 3, 2016, 

https :/ /papers.ssrn.com/soB/papcrs.cfm?abstract_ id-- 284 7197 

"Exchange Act Release No. 26831 (May 18. 1989). 

"Exchange Act Release No. 48960 (Dec. 19, 2003) ("One of the principal objectives ofMD&A is to provide 

information about the quality and potential variability of a company's earnings and cash flow, so that readers can 

ascertain the likelihood that past performance is indicative of future perfOrmance."). 59 Exchange Act Release No. 48960 (Dec. 19. 2003) ("'One of the most important elements necessary to an 

understanding of a company's performance, and the extent to which reported financial information is indicative of 

future results, is the discussion and analysis of known trends. demands. commitments, events and uncertainties."). 

""The Roundtable On The Integration Of The 1933 and 1934 Acts, SEC Historical Society. William 0. Douglas 

Open Meeting Room, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C., March 21, 2002 (Statement by 

Alan Beller, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, 2002-2006), at 126 ("I think that in too many MD&As you 

could probably take a pretty large portion and put it in the waste basket and you wouldn't lose a lot of value. There 

is too much elevator music, and not enough really useful analysis."). 

"' Exchange Act Release No. 45312 (Jan. 22, 2003) ("The discussion should be limited to material risks, and, as 

with MD&A generally. should be sufficiently detailed and tailored to the company's individual circumstances, rather 

than 'boilerplate."'). 

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chronicled deficiencies in MD&A64 MD&A could be improved by providing for greater 

specificity. 

10 

The section could also address the use of financial metrics that are common to an 

industry but are not part of the audited financial statements. In the social media space, 

companies ol"ten refer to ·'user growth'' as an important metric 65 References to "'same store 

sales"" also commonly occur in the retail sector. Yet these metrics are not determined on the basis 

of a uniform formula and therefore do not promote comparability. 66 MD&A could define these 

terms. facilitating comparability. and require disclosure of trends that were implicated by these 

metrics. 

B. Financial Statement Quality 

Ensuring investor confidence in the accuracy of financial statements was a critical 

accomplishment of SOX. While some additional costs were imposed on individual companies, 

the benefits to the market of these changes appears to have been significant. 

I. Auditor Attestation 

Debate has arisen around the application of Section 404(b) and the requirement that 

auditors ·'attest'' to management's report on intemal controls. The Section requires mandates 

additional services by the auditor and therefore adds additional cost. At the same time, however, 

review by auditors increases investor confidence in the quality of the financial statements.67 

See Jackson M. Day. Deputy Chief Accountant, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Call Them As You See 

Them, AICPA National Conference on Banks and Savings Institutions, November 2, 2000 ('"All too often. companies 

merely repeat, in VID&A. the amounts or disclosures included in the financial statements. or merely recalculate new 

amounts from those provided in the financial statements. These practices fall short of providing inYestors with the 

required disclosures.''). 6

:< Business and Financial Disclosure Required b.v Regulation S-K. Exchange Act Release No. 77599 (April 13, 

2016) (noting that in the 2003 release, the '"staff also discouraged registrants from providing rote calculations of 

percentage changes of financial statement items and boilerplate explanations of immaterial changes to these figures, 

encouraging them to include instead a detailed analysis of material year-to-year changes and trends.''). 

M SV Brown & JW Tucker, Large-Sample F. vidence on Firms· Year-over-Year AfD&A itfodifications, 49 Journal of 

Accounting Research 309 (20 l l) ("The combined trends of increasing MD&A length and decreasing MD&A 

modification scores suggest that, over time, managers increasingly usc boilerplate disclosure (i.e .. standard disclosure 

that uses many words with little finn-specific or fiscal-period-specific content). Moreover, we find that the price 

responses to MD&A modifications have weakened over time. These findings suggest a decline in MD&A usefulness in 

recent years despite the SEC 2003 guidance on improving the MD&A.'"). 65 Twitter, Snap and Facebook refer to '"user growth." 66 5,'ee Howard Schilit, Financial Aletrics Shenanigans, AAil Journal, August 2010 ("because same-store sales fall 

outside of GAAP coverage, no universally accepted definition exists, and caJculations may vary from company to 

company. Worse, a company's own calculation of same-store sales in one quarter may differ from the one used in the 

previous period.""). 67 See Testimony of Ken Bertsch, Executive Director, Council oflnstitutionallnvestors, Before the Committee on 

Financial Services, United States House of Representatives, April28, 2017, Hearing on Financial CHOICE Act, at 

12 ("We believe Section 404(b) continues to be significant as it provides investors with reasonable assurance from 

the independent auditor that a company maintained effective internal control over financial reporting. This assurance 

is an important driver of confidence in the integrity of financial statements and in the fairness of our capital 

markets."). 

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11 

Review also provides management, including outside directors, with a more accurate 

understanding of the financial condition of the company. 68 Corporate decision making benefits 

as a result. 

Criticism of the attestation requirement with respect to small issuers is easy to 

understand. The requirement increases out-of-pocket costs. But in fact, the overall benefits to 

the public markets are significant. Studies indicate that companies not subject to the attestation 

requirement have a higher rate ofrestatements69 Moreover, a recent study indicates that the 

benefits of attestation outweigh the costs. 70 Misreporting as a result of faulty internal controls 

can also deprive corporate officials of accurate information and impair the quality of their 

decision making. 

Efforts have been made to lower the costs associated with these services. The 

Commission has taken steps to minimize the impact of this requirement on companies going 

public. 71 Exempting large numbers of companies permanently or for protracted periods of time 

from the requirement may well have negative consequences to the system of financial reporting 

and harm investor confidence. Moreover, to the extent that the costs of the review of internal 

controls increasingly becomes baked into the traditional audit process, the savings from 

elimination may be far less than expected. 

2. PCAOB Disciplinary Proceedings 

The PCAOB has significantly improved the quality of audits which in tum has improved 

the quality of financial statements. 72 Moreover, the Board has taken steps to integrate empirical 

data into the regulatory function 73 and has instituted post-implementation review designed to 

68 See Weili Ge, Allison Koester, & Sarah McVay, Benefits and costs ofSarbanes-Oxley Section 404(b) exemption: 

Evidenceji·om small firms' internal control disclosures, J. of Accounting & Economics (forthcoming) ("'Consistent 

with these findings, accounting information generated by effective internal control systems is more useful for 

managerial decision making. and firms that disclose and subsequently remediate ineffective internal controls 

experience an improvement in operating performance"). 69 Internal Controls: SEC Should Consider Requiring Companies to Disclose Whether They Obtained an Auditor 

Attestation, GA0-13-582, July 2013, at 15 ("Our analysis is generally consistent with a number of studies that have 

found that exempt companies restate their financial statements at a higher rate than nonexempt companies. These studies 

suggest that having an auditor attest to the effectiveness of a company's internal control over financial reporting 

generally reduces the likelihood of financial restatements."). 70 .)'ee Bene,jits and costs r?{Sarhanes-Oxle_v S'ection 40.f(h) exemption, supra note 68. 71 Study and Recommendations on Section 40.f(b) r?f the Sarbanes-Uxley Act of 2002 For Issuers With Public Float 

Between $75 and $250 Million As Required by Section 989G{b) ufthe Dodd-Frank Wail Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act of 20 I 0, Staff of the Office of the Chief Accountant of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 

Commission, April 2011, at 2 ("The Commission provided that Section 404 compliance is not required in an IPO 

and in the first annual report after an JPO"). 

"SOX at 15, supra note 7 ("As the 15th anniversary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 ... approaches, we at EY 

believe it is important to reflect on the dramatic, positive change in the accuracy of financial reporting and quality of 

auditing in the United States since its enactment.''). 71 The PCAOB has set up the Center for Economic Analysis. See James Doty, Chair, PCAOB, Testimony on the 

PC AOB 20 I 7 Budget and Strategic Plan, Dec. 14. 20 I 6 ("In 2017, we plan to integrate the Center for Economic 

Analysis with our Office of Research and Analysis, which monitors areas of potential audit risk."). 

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"look back at significant rulcmakings ... to evaluate the overall effect of the rule or standard."74 

With respect to the disclosure of auditing partners, the Board has put in place a search en9inc 

that will allow investors to search by engagement partner. audit firm, or public company. 5 

The PCAOB has also used enforcement to improve the quality of audits. In bringing an 

action, however. the disciplinary proceedings are confidential. Moreover. confidentiality must 

remain in place during the pendency of any appeal to the Commission. The entire process can 

take years before violations become public and can encourage delay. Bipartisan legislation has 

been introduced in the House and Senate to lift this requirement of confidentiality and should be 

adopted. 76 

C. Shareholder Proposal Process 

Investor confidence will not be enhanced through severe and unnecessary restrictions on 

governance rights. Such restrictions have been proposed with respect to the shareholder proposal 

process. 77 Because proposals are precatory, they do not command but merely advise. Proposals, 

therefore, provide management with insight into the collective views of shareholders. As a 

result, they represent an important component in the engagement process between managers and 

long tetm shareholders. 

Nonetheless, proposals have surfaced that would severely restrict the right of owners to 

submit proposals. Calls have arisen to increase the ownership threshold for submission to l% of 

the outstanding shares and to increase the holding period to three years. 78 As a result, eligible 

shareholders would need to own not 15 shares of Apple for 12 months but 53 million shares for 

36 months. Instead of acquiring $2000 worth of securities, they would need to invest almost $8 

billion79 Few shareholders would meet these revised eligibility requirements. 

Efforts to reduce these rights have, for the most part, been opposed by shareholder 

groups. 80 Assertions, therefore, that the limitations will benefit shareholders by improving the 

74 Auditing Standard No.7, Engagement Quahly Review, 2016-01, available at 

https://pcaobus.org/EconomicAndRiskAnalysis/CEA/Pages/post-imp!ementation-review.aspx 

75 The search engine is here: https://pcaobus.org!Pages/ AuditorSearch.aspx 76 PCAOB Enforcement Transparency Act of20 17. S. 610. 1!5'h Con g .• l" Sess .• 2017 & PCAOB Enforcement 

Transparency Act of2016, HR 6251, !14'h Cong .. 2"" Sess .. Sept. 28. 2016 (amending l 5 USC 7215(c)(2) to 

provided that "Hearings under this section shall be open to the public, unless the Board, on its own motion or after 

considering the motion of a party, orders otherwise."), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/1 15th-

£Q!]giTSs/senate-bill/6 l 0/text & https://w\Yw.congress,.gQy/1 l 4/bills/hr625l IBJL.LS-ll4hr6251 ih.xml 77 Shareholder proposals are governed by Rule 14a-8. 17 CFR §240.14a-8. 78 The Promise of Market Reform, Reigniting America's Economic Engine, NASDAQ, 2017 (''Deleting this 

meaningless dollar threshold and instead requiring that a proposing shareholder hold at least 1% of the issuer's 

securities entitled to vote and increasing the holding period to three years, would ensure that shareholder proposals 

representing the views of a meaningfltl percentage of the companies' long-term owners are considered at 

shareholder meetings."). 79 Apple has more than 5 billion shares outstanding. On July 15. 20 !7, the closing price was $149.04. A shareholder 

would have to own approximately 53 million shares to meet the 1% requirement. See Apple, Form 10-K, Sept. 24, 2016, 

("5,332.313,000 shares of common stock were issued and outstanding as of October 14, 2016"). 80 See Testimony of Ken Bertsch, supra note 67, at 2-3. Criticism typically comes from non-shareholder groups. 

See Afodernizing the S'hareholder Proposal Process. Business Roundtable, Oct. 31, 20 16 (''For proposals related to 

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relationship between owners and managers are misplaced 81 Moreover, calls for additional 

restrictions on the use of the shareholder proposal rule cannot be explained by excessive usc. 

During the 2017 proxy season, shareholders submitted 827 proposals to public companies, down 

from the prior year82 and down from earlier periods. 83 

The proposed restrictions also cannot be justified on the basis of cost. The actual expense 

of adding a proposal to the proxy statement is likely nominal. With companies already having to 

draft and circulate the prox~ materials to shareholders, an additional proposal adds at most a 

modest amount of volume. 4 Moreover, these expenses have probably been reduced through the 

advent of electronic dissemination of proxy materials. 85 

To the extent "costs" also include the expenses associated with efforts to exclude 

proposals, such amounts are a consequence of management, not shareholder, behavior. 

Companies can minimize the costs by including the proposal in the proxy statement. Indeed, 

with the number of no-action requests down from earlier decades, companies seem increasingly 

comfortable with this approach. 86 

Shareholder proposals have, however, changed in one significant respect. Shareholder 

support has grown. Governance matters, whether majority vote provisions or shareholder access 

bylaws, routinely obtain majority support. 87 Similarly, environmental and social proposals have 

topics other than director elections, a truly reasonable standard could be to use a sliding scale based on the market 

capitalization of the company, with a required ownership percentage of0.15 percent for proposals submitted to the 

largest companies and up to I percent fOr proposals submitted to smaller companies. Additionally, if a proposal were 

submitted by a group or by a proponent acting by proxy, the ownership percentage sliding scale could be increased 

to up to 3 percent."). 8 t See The Promise o.fJHarket Reform, supra note 78 (''current regulations governing the way shareholders access a 

company's proxy statement can poison the company shareholder relationship by amplifying the voice of a tiny minority 

over the best interests of the vast majority."). 

"Elizabeth Ising, Ronald 0. Mueller, & Lori Zyskowski, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 21!16 

Proxy Season, GlBSON Dl!NN. June 298. 2017 ("For 2017 shareholder meetings, shareholders have submitted 

approximately 827 proposals, which is significantly less than the 9! 6 proposals submitted for 2016 shareholder 

meetings and the 943 proposals submitted for 2015 shareholder meetings."). 

"The numbers are consistent with earlier periods. See Exchange Act Release No. 39093 (Sept. 18. 1997) ("Between 

300 and 400 companies typically receive a total of about 900 shareholder proposals each year."). In 1982, shareholders 

submitted 972 proposals. See Commissioner James C. Treadway, Jr.. Shareholder Proposal Rule, Remarks to £0ison 

Electric Tnstitute Seminar on Current SF.C Developments, Washington, D.C., June 23, J 983, at l, 

https:/ /www .sec. gov /news/speech/ 1983/0623 83 tread way. pdf. 84 Proposals and supporting stalements are limited to 500 words. See Rule 14a-8(d), 17 CFR §240.14a-8(d). Statements 

of opposition in contrast are not subject to a space limitation and can be significantly longer than the shareholder 

proposal. 

"See Rule 14a-16, 17 CFR §240.14a-16. 86 ln 1983, companies filed 495 requests for no action relief See Memorandum to John Huber and Linda Quinn from 

Bill Morley, Re: Shareholder Proposals, Nov. 16, 1983. at 2 ("noting 414 contested proposals in 1983. with 328 letters 

issued by the Division and 495 contested proposals in 1982, with 315 letters issued by the Division). posted at the SEC 

Historical Society, http://www.sechistorical.org/ 87 See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Brovm, Corporate Ciovenu.mce. Shareholder Proposals, and Engagement between 

.\!anagcrs and Owners. 94 DU Online L. Rev. 300 (2017). 

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grown in popularity, receiving around 20% of the votes in 2016. 88 In 2017. environmental 

proposals received majority support at both Exxon and Occidental. Proposals on board diversity 

have received levels of support far above earlier eras. 

Imposition of substantial restrictions on the use of the rule will reduce the availability of 

infonnation to management and impair the engagement process between owners and managers. 

The role of the Commission as "infonnal arbiter" will be reduced. 89 

Nor will concern over the relevant issues go away. Even without adequate access to Rule 

1 4a-8, shareholders will continue to seek changes with respect to governance practices, 

environmental policies, and sustainability matters. They will, however, be forced to lind 

alternative mechanisms of influence, whether public campaigns addressing corporate behavior, 

litigation over the level of disclosure, or inspection requests for documents relating to board 

oversight. The shift in approach will add cost and uncertainty to the engagement process. 

Efforts to justify the restrictions through reference to the use of the rule by small 

investors is misplaced. Proposals submitted by these investors mostly involve corporate 

governance topics and mostly receive substantial support. 90 Preventing retail investors from 

using the rule will deprive them of a significant role in the governance debate and deny all 

shareholders the right to speak on important initiatives. Moreover, the proposed solution a 

dramatic increase in the ownership thresholds- will have indiscriminate effect. Even large 

institutions will sometimes have difliculty meeting the requirements. 

Efforts to restrict the right of shareholders also seem contrary to those who express 

concern over "activists,'' hedge funds and other investors who arc alleged to promote short tenn 

rather than long term strategies. 91 Companies can address concerns about these investors by 

improving engagement with long term shareholders. 92 Yet restrictions on the use of shareholder 

Rs See Elizabeth Ising, Ronald 0. Mueller, & Lori Zyskowski, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2016 

Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN, June 18, 2016, at 12 ("Ninety-one of these [environmental and social] proposals have 

been withdrawn, and 125 of these proposals have been voted on, averaging support of 20.7% of votes cast."). 89 Significant reduction in this informal role has, in the past, been opposed. See Exchange Act Release No. 40018 (May 

21, 1998) ('"a number of commentcrs resisted the idea of significantly decreasing the role of the Commission and its staff 

as informal arbiters through the administration of the no-action letter process."). 

\!O James McRitlchie is one of the individuals who makes significant usc of the rule. Ten ofhls shareholder access 

proposals went to a vote between Jan. I, 2016 through June 30, 20l6. They received the following percentages: 

Apple (32.7%); Kansas City Southern (26.8%); QUALCOMM Incorporated (46.9%); Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. 

(19.9%); CSP Inc. (7.5%); Genomic Health. Inc. (35.5%); Medivation, Inc. (63.5%); Proto Labs. Inc. (71%); 

SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (88.2%); and SolarCity Corporation ( 11 .4%). See Annex A, 2016 Pn.>XJ' Season, 

SIJLUVAN & CROMWELl., July 11, 2016. See also Dave Michaels, Republicans Declare Hlar on Corporate Gadflies, 

Financial Regulation Newsletter, WS.T, May 5, 2017 ("Mr. Chevedden, for instance, has sponsored 91 proposals 

since 2007 that garnered more than 50% support, J SS data shows. The average rate of support for his proposals was 

39%."). 

91 The Promise of1\1arket Reform, supra note 78 (''While the term 'activist investing' is complex and some forms of 

activism achieve worthy goals, the trend toward exerting pressure for shorHerm gains at the expense of long-term health 

is concerning. Nasdaq especially believes that the goals, tactics and financial arrangements of activist investors should be 

examined by policy makers and made transparent to the companies and their other shareholders.") 40 See Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Some Thoughts for Board of Directors in 2017, Dec. 8, 2016 

(''One of the most promising initiatives to address activism and short-termism is the emergence of a new paradigm of 

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proposal process would have the opposite effect by curtailing an effective mechanism of 

communication between management and long term shareholders. 

15 

Similarly, some critics of Rule 14a-8 favor private action over prescriptive rules in 

determining govemance standards. The shareholder proposal rule is the primary mechanism for 

shareholders to initiate private action. Restricting the use of the rule will likely weaken private 

action and result in increased pressure for prescriptive rules. 

Ill. Conclusion 

Reforms are needed in the capital markets. More can be done to facilitate innovation and 

transparency. 93 Reflecting the lessons teamed from SOX, these markets can best benefit from 

reforms designed to increase investor confidence. 

corporate governance that seeks to recalibrate the relationship between corporations and major institutional investors in . 

order to restore a long-term perspective."). 93 The Promise of Jvfarket Rrform. supra note 78 (''A central reason for the success of U.S. capital markets is that 

American public companies are among the most innovative and transparent in the world."). 

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TESTIMONY OF 

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE PRESIDENT THOMAS W. FARLEY 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES CAPITAL MARKETS, SECURITIES, AND 

INVESTMENT SUBCOMMITTEE 

JULY 18, 2017 

Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Maloney and members of the Subcommittee, we 

appreciate your interest in the issues public companies face, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 

of 2002 (SOX), federal corporate governance mandates, as well as other factors that may 

impact a company's decision to go or remain public. My name is Tom Farley and I am 

President of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). I am here today on behalf of the 2300 

companies that list on the NYSE. Our listed companies are responsible for many of the most 

impactful innovations in American business over the last 225 years. These innovations have 

improved the lives of Americans and global citizens and embody the U.S. entrepreneurial spirit. 

Robust U.S. Capital Markets Benefit the Entire U.S. Economy 

Today, the New York Stock Exchange is the world's largest with total listed company market 

capitalization of more than $25 trillion representing nearly one-third of the world's total market 

value. The U.S. capital markets are the destination of choice for investors and companies as 

they provide unparalleled access to capital, liquidity, and trusted regulation. Robust U.S. capital 

markets benefit the entire U.S. economy. 

We cannot, however, take for granted the fact that the U.S. will always be the world's premier 

destination for capital-raising, job growth, and innovation. The regulatory environment for public 

companies over the past 15 years has grown increasingly difficult to navigate --threatening the 

tradition of public shareholders fostering innovation. The number of public companies in this 

country is down by half over the past 15 years. By choosing to remain private and not access 

the public markets for capital and liquidity, a company may severely limit its opportunity for 

economic growth, hiring, and wealth creation, and the American public is deprived of investment 

choice. 

An Intercontinental Exchange Company 
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Despite the many benefits of being a public company, the cumulative effect of layers upon 

layers of regulation is lessening the attractiveness of the public markets. Public companies 

must meet significantly more complex regulatory requirements than their private counterparts, 

both during the IPO process and after a company goes public. While NYSE applauds smart 

regulation to ensure the protection of issuers and their investors, we also believe in a regulatory 

environment that supports a healthy, robust pipeline of companies that seek to become and 

remain public, which in turn will benefit job growth all across the nation, on Main Street, in 

pension funds, 401ks, savings vehicles of all kinds, and will contribute to the U.S. economy as a 

whole. 

NYSE supports the stated goal of SOX to foster the accuracy of financial reporting. We also 

believe that it is important-- as this Subcommittee is doing -- to take a detailed look at the 

regulatory systems in place -- and SOX specifically -- and how they affect a company's decision 

to enter or not enter the public U.S. capital markets system. We believe it is possible to both 

protect public confidence in the integrity of U.S. capital markets, and to make those markets 

more accessible to an innovator. a CEO, or any of our sons and daughters-- the next great 

generation of business leaders --to grow a business and create jobs. 

Key Impacts of SOX 

NYSE is proud to be the home of the world's greatest public companies, and we take our 

responsibilities to the marketplace and to our issuers and their investors very seriously. NYSE 

supports efforts to ensure that investors have the utmost confidence when investing in public 

companies. That is why NYSE values transparency above all else, and that is why NYSE's 

markets have the most stringent regulatory listing requirements that exist in the capital markets 

space. 

SOX was adopted and signed into law by the Bush Administration in July 2002 on an 

overwhelmingly bipartisan basis. Though it has significant costs and shortcomings, SOX 

institutionalized transparency in financial reporting and, at the time of its adoption, boosted 

investor confidence in the public markets. SOX also provided a blueprint for the NYSE to revise 

and augment our listing requirements, further enhancing our ability to regulate the markets we 

operate. 
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While costs associated with becoming a public company have always been significant, 

compliance with certain provisions of SOX today sets considerably higher barriers-- not just 

financially for public companies but also for entry into public markets for private companies, 

particularly for small and midsize private companies. For public companies, compliance with 

SOX requires dedicated personnel, significant financial resources, outside consultants, auditing 

and law firms. Compliance with SOX Section 404 specifically has proven to be a significant 

hurdle: designing, implementing, and maintaining complex systems required to satisfy SOX's 

internal controls over financial reporting requirements can command millions of dollars in 

outside consultant, legal, and auditing fees, in addition to other internal costs. Public companies 

are devoting more time and resources than ever to grapple with administrative procedures and 

controls mandated by SOX Section 404, which disproportionately affect small and midsize 

companies. 

Improving the Environment for Public Companies and Private Companies Considering an 

/PO 

The burdens of SOX are but one aspect of being a public company today. In recent years, as a 

result of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 1 through the 

SEC's rulemaking agenda, and in response to calls from the investor community, public 

companies are engaged more than ever before in evaluating corporate disclosures and 

demonstrating compliance with a myriad of new and enhanced regulatory requirements. The 

increasingly difficult class-action litigation environment for public companies today amplifies 

these concerns across the board. 

Disclosure Effectiveness 

The SEC disclosure regime requires that publicly held companies disclose exposure to material 

risks regarding known trends, events and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have 

material effects on the company's business, financial position or results of operations. The 

length and complexity of these disclosures continue to increase, while the readability of these 

documents is at an all-time low. These disclosures cover situations that relate to material 

corporate governance matters, including those known colloquially as "environmental, social, 

governance" or "ESG" matters. Investing based on environmental, social and governance ideas 

is rapidly gaining momentum, fueled by concern about policy issues and focusing on 

1 Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173 
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corporations both as a source of irritation (e.g., CEO pay) and a source of hope (e.g., reduction 

of greenhouse gas emissions). NYSE supports the SEC's 2016 "Disclosure Effectiveness 

Review" Concept Release2 and the Commission's report on ways to modernize and simplify 

Regulation S-K3 as an appropriate starting point for considering refinements to existing 

disclosure mandates and addressing the materiality of ESG matters. The SEC should continue 

to revisit ways to streamline existing disclosure requirements by completing its "Disclosure 

Effectiveness Review." 

At the NYSE, we interact with the best companies in the world and serve as a meeting place for 

the exchange of ideas. In that role, as a hub for best practices and innovation, we have a 

strong appreciation for the importance of corporate responsibility including efforts across the 

environmental, social and governance space. Many of our listed companies have implemented 

innovative and impactful initiatives that exemplify what it means to be a good corporate citizen, 

including those devoted to ESG. 

Enhancing the JOBS Act 

The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 20124 was an excellent starting point in 

bringing innovation to the public markets, but there is more to be done. At the NYSE, we 

recently completed the first Regulation A+ IPO on a major exchange, something that would 

have been impossible prior to the JOBS Act, bringing to market an incredible company--

Myomo, Inc. that is changing the world for Americans with neurological disorders so that they 

can work and live independentlys These and other innovations born out of the JOBS Act need 

further support and enhancement from Congress and the SEC. 

For example, NYSE supports raising the annual gross revenue threshold ceiling for companies 

to remain an Emerging Growth Company ("EGC") to above $1 billion (thereby permitting more 

companies to benefit from the protections afforded under the JOBS Act). We also support 

providing additional protections for "low revenue issuers" to qualify as EGCs because their 

business involves a significant amount of research and development (for example, those 

2 Concept Release Available at: https:i/www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-70.html 3 SEC Division of Corporation Finance, "Report on Modernization and Simplification of Regulation S-K" 

(November 23, 2016), available at https://sec.gov/files/sec-fast-act-report-2016.pdf. This report was 

required by Section 72003 of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 

Stat 1312 (2015). 4 The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112-106, H.R. 3606. 5 http://myomo.com/myomo-inc-trades-new-york-stock-exchange-mktl 
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companies in the biotech sector of the market). And we believe EGCs and companies with less 

than $250 million in gross revenue should be exempted from the SEC's costly financial 

statement format requirements -- known as XBRL format. All newly public companies, 

especially EGCs, should also have the opportunity to choose to have their stock only trade on a 

single nationally-registered stock exchange until their stock liquidity meets a minimum threshold 

level. 

NYSE applauds the recent action by the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance to extend the 

process for confidential submission of draft registration statements, currently available only for 

IPOs of EGCs, to IPOs of companies that are not EGCs, as well as for most follow-on offerings 

made in the first year after going public. This sensible change will make the public offering 

process more time-and cost-efficient, without adversely impacting the quality of public 

disclosure available to investors. 

Regulating Gatekeepers 

With the adoption of SOX in July 2002, so came the founding of the Public Company 

Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Born out of a desire to restore investor confidence in 

the independence and integrity of public companies' auditors, Congress gave the PCAOB broad 

authority to establish rules to the extent it determines may be necessary or appropriate in the 

public interest or for the protection of investors-" In carrying out Congress' mandate, the 

PCAOB regulates gatekeepers for public company internal controls and disclosures (i.e., public 

accounting and auditor firms). 

Our listed companies are deeply committed to setting high standards for management and the 

audit profession for financial reporting and corporate audit functions. Over the past several 

years, however, our listed companies are increasingly concerned that the PCAOB's regulatory 

agenda is expanding the organization's footprint beyond the originally intended scope by virtue 

of the PCAOB inspection process and corresponding changes to issuer internal control 

systems. In many cases, the cost of demonstrating compliance for purposes of supporting an 

audit review or PCAOB inspection, in addition to actual costs of compliance with the underlying 

regulatory requirement, is rising steeply. This is an unforeseen consequence of PCAOB 

6 H. Rep No. 107-414, at 16-17 (2002). 
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regulation that is unnecessarily increasing costs and burdens for public companies, and the 

Commission should address it promptly. NYSE wholeheartedly supports the recent remarks of 

SEC Chairman Clayton that, when creating or approving rules the Commission should consider 

compliance costs and should "have a realistic vision for how rules will be implemented as well 

as how the Commission' and others intend to examine for compliance." 7 

Conclusion 

In the last 15 years, compliance and administrative costs for public companies have adversely 

affected the U.S. !PO market Analysis shows that smaller private firms' are increasingly 

incentivized to seek acquisition instead of listing their shares on public markets. No one wins 

when companies of all sizes -- both public and private -- are forced to shoulder regulatory and 

administrative burdens that impose steep costs without clear benefits, thereby hindering 

economic growth, expansion, hiring, and capital-raising. 

As regulators, as businesspeople, and as Americans, we must prioritize a regulatory 

environment that incentivizes companies at home and abroad to grow, to hire, and to enhance 

our economy. Regulation that skews decision-making away from growth, away from hiring and 

expansion, and that limits the public's ability to access capital and to invest in their futures must 

be evaluated very carefully and critically. 

7 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton remarks available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/remarks-economicclub-new-york 
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Statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

ON: The Cost of Being a Public Company in Light of 

Sarbanes-Oxley and the Federalization of Corporate 

Governance 

TO: House Committee on Financial Services, 

Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities and 

Investment 

BY: Thomas Quaadman, Executive Vice President, Center 

for Capital Markets Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of 

Commerce 

DATE: July 18, 2017 

1615 H Street NW I Washington, DC I 20062 The Chamber's mls~ion js to adYance hurnan through an economic, 

political and social system based on freedom, 

incenti\'e, in.itiati\-c, opportunity and rcspon~.ibility. 

1 
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The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world's largest business federation, 

representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and 

regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations. The Chamber is 

dedicated to promoting, protecting, and defending "\merica's free enterprise system. 

More than 96% of Chamber member companies have fewer than 100 

employees, and many of the nation's largest companies arc also active members. We 

arc therefore cognizant not only of the challenges facing smaller businesses, but also 

those facing the business community at large. 

Besides representing a cross-section of the American business community with 

respect to the number of employees, major classifications of American business--e.g., 

manufacturing, retailing, services, construction, wholesalers, and finance-are 

represented. The Chamber has membership in all 50 states. 

The Chamber's international reach is substantial as well. We bclie,·c that global 

interdependence provides opportunities, not threats. In addition to the "\merican 

Chambers of Commerce abroad, an increasing number of our members engage in the 

export and import of both goods and services and have ongoing investment activities. 

The Chamber favors strengthened international competiti,·encss and opposes artificial 

U.S. and foreign barriers to international business. 

2 
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Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Maloney and members of the 

Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Investment. My name is Tom 

Quaadman, executive vice president of the Center for Capital Markets 

Competitiveness ("CCMC") at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce ("Chamber"). 

This hearing, "The Cost of Being a Public Company in I ,ight of SarbancsOxley and the Federalization of Corporate Governance" is an important hearing that 

is needed to examine the reasons behind the steady decline in the number of public 

companies over the past twenty years. In short, we need new policies that will make it 

more attractive for businesses to go public and to remain public. 

The public company model has been a key source of strengd1 and growth 

which has made the United States economy the strongest and most prosperous in 

world history. When businesses go public, jobs are created and new centers of wealth 

arc formed. During the 1980's and 1990's, stories of the Microsoft executi,·e assistant 

or the UPS dri,·er becoming a millionaire were not uncommon after a company went 

through the initial public offering ("IPO") process. 1\ 2012 study done by the 

Kaufmann Foundation found that for the 2,766 companies that went through the 

!PO process between 1996 and 2010, employment cumulatively increased by 2.2 

million jobs1 Other benefits also accme to companies when they go public, such as 

revenue growth. 

The public capital markets are also not static and help to support innovation. 

Only about 12% of the Fortune 500 companies in 1955 were still on the list in 2014, 

while the other 88% have either gone bankrupt, merged, or fallen out of the Fortune 

500.' This system of creative destruction has forced businesses to change \Vid1 the 

times, or be replaced by new entrants with innm·ative ideas and products meeting the 

needs of consumers and an ever changing marketplace. 

1n the 20 years from 1996-2016 the number of public companies dropped in 19 

of those years. The one year where there was an increase is attributable to the passage 

of the Jumps tart out Business Startups Act ("JOBS Act") that ·was spearheaded by this 

Subcommittee. To put it in ec-en starker measures, a recent article by the Wall Street 

Journal pointed out that we have roughly the same number of public companies today 

as we did in 19823 Since 1982, the United States population has grown by 40% and 

Revenue Growth for l'.S. fPOs June 1996-2010 

3 
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the real G D P has increased by 160'/o, yet the number of public companies has 

remained stagnant. The gains made during the Reagan and Clinton Administrations 

have been >w-iped out. 

U.S. Publicly Traded Firms (1975·2015) 

These mettics alone demonstrate that d1c Securities and Exchange Commission 

("SEC") needs to step up its game when it comes to their statutory missions of 

competition and capital formation. Fortunately, new SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has 

made the public company crisis a top p1-iority and we and we hope other stakeholders 

will work with him and the SEC to correct this problem. Last month, the Division of 

Cmvoration Finance-under the leadership of Director Bill Hinman-announced that 

the SEC would allow all companies to submit draft registration statements for TPOs 

on a contldential basis, thus extending a popular provision of the JOBS Act to ali 

businesses, regardless of size. This was an extremely positive development and shows 

that the SEC is getting serious about carrying out: its statutory mandate to facilitate 

capital formation. 

No one single event or regulation lies at the heart of the public company crisis. 

Like straw upon a camel's back, the burdens and reporting requirements associated 

with hcing a public company have steadily accumulated over the years, to the point· 

where many businesses today are saying "no thanks" to a model that was once the 

ultimate dream of ;\merican entrepreneurs. The JOBS Act was a good first step 

towards arresting this worrisome trend, but there is more that can and should be 

done. 

4 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 

Sarbancs-Oxley was passed in response to a series of corporate scandals that in 

some ways undermined the confidence investors had in the American capital markets. 

Sarbancs-Oxlcy represented the first major step in "federalizing" corporate 

governance. Traditionally, corporate governance has been structured under the state 

laws where a business is incorporated, as well as the by-laws of the corporation. This 

system has allowed directors and shareholders to create a governance structure that 

fits the needs of the business and its investors. From the time of the New Deal up 

until the passage of Sarbanes-Oxlcy, \v~th some exceptions in the area of 

compensation, the role of securities laws was a disclosure-based regime intended for 

investors to have the material information needed to make informed investment 

decisions. 

Sarbanes-Oxlcy st3rtcd to place the Federal government in a more predominate 

role in corporate governance, intruding on the long standing precedents of state 

corporate law and corporate by-laws. For example, Sarbanes-Oxlcy created specific 

requirements for the composition of the 1\udit Committee and its operation. It also 

created a quasi-regulatory body in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 

("PC\013"), an entity vv~th expansive authority and tremendous influence m~er the 

manner in which public companies arc operated. 

The Dodd-Frank Act 

This trend towards greater federal mandates has been accelerated by the 

passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 

("Dodd-Frank"). Dodd-Frank mandated new rules on compensation committee 

independence, pay versus pcrfonn;1nce, cornpcnsat-ion disclosures, cla\-v-back policlcs, 

incentive compensation rules for financial firms, "say on pay" ,~otes, new disclosures 

regarding the Chairman and CEO structures, conflict minerals disclosures, resource 

extraction disclosures, and mine safety report disclosures. If that's not enough, the 

Investor ;\dvisory Committee at the SEC-created by Dodd-Frank-has produced 

recommendations that would further expand the SEC's reach into corporate 

governance, such as the mandated usc of universal proxy ballots in contested director 

elections. 

More troublingly, it seems that in a post-Dodd-Frank world it has become 

trendy to try and usc the federal securities laws in order to ad\"ancc some type of 

social or political objectiv-e. Since the passage of Dodd-Frank, bills have been 

introduced-though not passed-which would require human trafficking disclosures, 

5 
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political and lobbying spending disclosures, and mandates for cyber-security expertise 

on corporate boards, to name just a few. The federal securities laws should never be 

used as a vehicle to solve a problem or crisis that is better left addressed by other 

mechanisms of government. 

Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank (the "conflict minerals rule") is an instructive-and 

heartbreaking-example of how such disclosure mandates can haYe the opposite of 

their intended effect. The conflict minerals rule was sold to the public as a way to 

reduce violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR C), by rcc1uiring 

companies to "shame" themsckes if their products contained minerals sourced from 

that region. In reality, the rule has caused conditions on the ground in the DRC and 

surrounding areas to further deteriorate as legitimate mines haYe been shut down, and 

millions of miners and their families haYe been dri\•en deeper into poverty. To add 

insult to injury, public company shareholders are forced to pay billions of dollars in 

order to comply with a regulation that is so obviously harming a vulnerable region of 

the world. 

The courts have also taken notice and held in the conflict minerals case that a 

disclosure solely designed to shame a company violates the First Amendment. And in 

the case of Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank (the "pay ratio rule"), several pieces of 

legislation at the state and local level have cropped up around the country to 

implement a pay ratio "tax" in certain jurisdictions. In fact, the city of Pordand, 

Oregon passed such a measure last year. These taxes are a development that was 

never considered by Congress or the SEC when Dodd-Frank 'vas passed, and justify 

the Chamber's longstanding position that the pay ratio rule was never about providing 

material information to investors. 

J'he Challenges of Being Public Today: 

These legislative mandates have been coupled with the exponential growth of 

the proxy statement and corporate disclosures. Furthermore, the SEC has largely 

failed or been unable to provide oversight over proxy advisory firms, modernize 

corporate disclosures, and update information delivery systems or reform proxy 

plumbing systems. The SEC has also gradually receded from its duty as a gate keeper 

on what shareholder proposals are allowed under Rule 14a-8, increasingly permitting 

agenda-driven items to work their way into the board room and shareholder meetings. 

This has allowed a small group of gadfly investors to dominate the shareholder 

process and frustrate the views of a majority of shareholders. J\11 of this has occurred 

while businesses are facing increasing pressure to disclose and engage shareholders on 

environmental, social and governance issues, many of which investors have deemed 

.immaterial. 

6 
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In 2014, the Chamber released a report that included a number of 

recommendations which would modernize SEC disclosures for the benefit of both 

issuers and investors.' In addition to the average of $2.5 million in regulatory costs 

for undergoing an !PO, the SEC has estimated that annual compliance costs for 

public companies awragcs $1.5 million5

-again, a not-insignificant amount of money 

for a small public company that is focused primarily on t,>rowth. 1\luch of this cost 

stems from the SEC's overly complex and confusing disclosure regime, which even 

institutional investors have a difficult time understanding-" 

These have all combined to drive up costs, increase the number oflawsuits and 

cot1)0rate liability, and distract management from growing the company. To put this 

into perspective, the final report from the 2011 JPO Task Force found that 92'~·o of 

CEO's found that the administrative burden of SEC reporting reguircmcnts was a 

significant challenge to going public7 

This federalization of corporate governance has also made a fundamental 

change to the way corporations arc governed. Traditionally, under the state law 

system, governance systems were diverse and nimble. The oldest U.S. corporations 

have tended to usc different leadership structures to meet the needs of the business 

and their investors at that point in time. This di\Trsity has allowed for new and 

innovative goycrnance changes to occur organically and tl1rough a process amongst 

the stewards of a company. 

Take for example the recent "controversy" over companies that choose to go 

public under a dual-class share structure that limits voting rights to only certain 

irwcstors. Many of these companies have completed successful IPOs with heavy 

investor interest, and some deals have been significantly oversubscribed. Instead of 

fC(]Uiring businesses to submit to a myopic~ \Xlashington-ccntcrcd vie\v of ho\.v a 

corporation should he structured, companies should be free to choose their own 

structure, and investors should be free to choose where they want to place their 

money. If you don't like the corporate structure, don't buy the stock. The markets 

would help determine if the business got it right or not. 

~Rebuilding the JP() On~ Ramp https:/ /wv.'W.S<'c.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rdm1lding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf 

7 
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28750.041

Under a more federalized system, there is a standard way of thinking and 

changes increasingly occur through lcgislatiYe or regula tO!)' mandate. Rather than the 

board determining the long-term strategy of success, they arc increasingly bogged 

down with mandated regulatory compliance issues. Corporations arc being forced 

into a "one size fits all" model that is more expensive, pro,·ides less opportunity to 

grow, and makes it more difficult to mn a business. 

There have been beneficial developments that have occurred m·er the past 

several decades. Shareholders arc more empowered and communications benvccn 

businesses and investors have increased. Businesses are understanding that they must 

increase board diversity on their own rather than have a mandate imposed upon them. 

Nevertheless, the U.S. public company system-which is still the global gold 

standard by far, has been increasingly turning into a net negative. 1\s a result, 

businesses and investors are walking away from an ever shrinking public company pie. 

Amct~ca's entrepreneurs arc just as comfortable staying pt~vate, or being acquired as 

they are going through the JPO process. That is not good for the long-tenn t,>rowth 

of the American economy. 

How to Fix a System that Needs Fixing 

We must strike a new balance between our Federal and state systems. To 

highlight just one example, since 2010, the SEC has had an outstanding concept 

release to refonn proxy plumbing-the backbone of voting on shares and 

transparency, yet the SEC has not made any proposals in this area or taken any action. 

Contrast this with a recent development in the state of Delaware, where-under the 

leadership of Covcrnor John Carney, a fonner member of this Subcommittee-the 

state is on the verge of allow~ng corporations to nsc blockchain technology for proxy 

voting. 

The Chamber has tried to offer constmctive proposals to address other issues. 

In 2013, the Chamber proposed substantive financial reporting reforms and in 201 S 

proposed reforms with the PC;\()B to address incongruities related to the lack of 

public company input into audit policies. The SEC Chief Accountant and PCAOB 

have established a dialogue 'vith the business community on these issues but more 

needs to be done. Similarly, d1e SEC, PCAOB and Financial1\ccounting Standards 

Board ("F ;\SB") should agree to a common definition of materiality in financial 

reporting. Unfortunately, the recent letter by the SEC's Investor Advocate regarding 

FASB's efforts in this area is off the mark for nvo reasons: 1) the letter indicates that 

the SEC, the agency tasked with overseeing financial reporting, isn't speaking 'W~th 

one voice, and 2) tl1e investor advocate fails to understand the import of this issue for 

8 
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both businesses and their investors-" 1\dditionally, if the PCAOB's standard on 

critical audit matters is approved in its current fonn, liabilit)' for businesses and audit 

firms will increase, and financial reporting may become a less effective tool for 

investors. 

The Need to Prioritize Reform 

Earlier this year, the Chamber released a report that emphasi?-ed the 

importance of the Supreme Court-articulated materiality standard d1at has effectively 

governed corporate disclosure for decades. \YI c believe that the materiality standard 

should continue to serve as the touchstone to determine what companies arc required 

to disclose, and that any efforts to require disclosures beyond \vhat is material should 

be rejected by Congress and the SEC. 

Over d1c next few months, the Chamber \Vill come out \vith new reports and 

proposals on how tu address d1esc issues. \Jext week, the Chamber will release a set 

of proposals to reform SEC Rule 14a-8. These mles were originally intended to 

facilitate communication and collaboration between management and shareholders to 

help solve matters of importance related to ilie company. Instead, the outdated rules 

under Rule 14a-8 have allowed the mechanism to become a sounding board for 

activists to push pet issues which are often wholly unrelated to enhancing the 

underlying value of a company's stock. This has been a tremendously detrimental 

development for corporate governance in the United States, and only serves as 

another deterrent for companies to go public. 

At a minimum, we believe that tl1e resubmission thresholds under Rule 14a-8 

for proposals iliat receive low levels of shareholder report should be raised so that 

investors arc not forced to rcf,,;Stcr their opposition and bear the costs on multiple 

occasions to unpopular proposals. \'1/c also believe that proponents should be 

rccluirccl to provide greater disclosure as to their ownership of shares as well as their 

motives, and that the SEC should reassert many of the exemptions that currently exist 

for exclusion from a company's proxy under Rule 14a-8. 

Later this year we will issue recommendations to help expand upon many of 

the "on-ramp" provisions of the JOBS Act, as well as some longer term suggestions 

for how to make "being" public more attractive for companies. For example, further 

simplifying disclosures (and providing furtl1cr exemptions for disclosures such as 

11,2017 

9 
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28750.043

conflict minerals) for emerging growth companies (EGCs) would be a good place to 

start. Expanding eligibility for usc of the Fo1m S-3, and permitting more companies 

to be classified as well-known seasoned issuers (WKSls) would also help make being 

public incrementally more attractive. Put simply, we believe that it is important for 

the SEC and Congress to continue to build on the JOBS Act and help make it easier 

for businesses to stan, and be given the opportunity to grow into larger ones. 

Another pressing issue is the outsized influence that proxy advisory f=s have 

on corporate governance in the United States. The proxy advisory industt)' has been 

dominated by two companies-Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") and Glass 

Lc'W~S & Co. ("Glass Lewis"), which collectively control 97°(, of the proxy adYice 

market.' lt has been estimated that TSS and Glass Lc\\~s effectively "control" 38% of 

the shareholder vote because if the two tl.rms make the same proxy ,·oting 

recommendation, it moves that percentage of the vote ab~cnt a vocal campaign 

against their position. 10 

ISS and Glass Lewis also continue to operate with an alarming lack of 

transparency and accountability, which has tl1e effect of undermining confidence in 

the system of proxy voting in the United States. These two fmns have yet to take 

steps to ensure that their voting recommendations are developed on clear, objective, 

and empirically-based corporate governance standards to help management and 

im·estors evaluate and improve gcwcrnancc as a means of increasing shareholder 

value. They arc also riddled with conflicts of interest, and internal processes that have 

not kept \~th other changes in the proxy system. 

For these reasons, the Chamber strongly supports tl1C "Corporate Governance 

Reform and Transparency Act". This legislation would require proxy advisory firms 

to register \~tl1 the SEC, and become subject to a robust and entirely appropriate 

oversight regime. \'Vc commend Congressman Duffy for his work on tJ1is issue, and 

look forward to working with him on the legislation during this Con1,rress. We \~ll 

also continue to work with the SEC on its 2014 Proxy 1\dvisoty Firm Guidance as 

well. 

The Chamber views the continued efforts of this subcommittee as an 

important factor for the dynamic changes that make our economy and our capital 

markets the envy of the world. W c bclieYe that the next few years present Con1,>rcss, 

<J There are other firms such as Egan Jones \Vhich provides a full array of pro:!,.;· advisol)· ser<;ices and i\lanifcst which 

However, these firms are 

Lewis 12.9°/o ~ourcc: Da\·id, Shareholder \Totes and 

Proxy Advisors: Evtdcnce from Say on Pay (Fchruary 25, 2013). 7th .\nnual Conferenn· on Empir1cal Legal Studies 

Paper. 

10 
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the SEC, and the private sector \v~th a golden opportunity to achiev-e great victories 

for American businesses and investors, and we stand ready to assist in any way we 

can. 

11 
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28750.045

DTCC 

The Honorable Bill Huizenga 

Chainnan 

July 18,2017 

Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Investment 

2129 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Investment 

4340 Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. Federal Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Re: Hearing entitled "A Review of Fixed Income Market Structure" 

55 WATER STREET 

NEW YORK. NY 10041-0099 

TEL: 212-85$-7522 

mpozmaurer®dtcc.co,n 

Dear Chainnan Huizenga, Ranking Member Maloney, and Members of tile Subcommittee, 

The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation ("DTCC")1 appreciates tile Subcommittee 

on Capital Markets, Securities, and Investment's ("Subcommittee") oversight and interest in tile 

fixed income market. The Subcommittee's hearing entitled "A Review of Fixed Income Market 

Structure" ("Hearing") was timely and raised important issues about tile fixed-income markets. 

As an integral part of tllose markets, DTCC is submitting tllis letter to address some of tile issues 

raised in the Hearing related to tile U.S. Treasury market. We also understand that tile 

Subcommittee is planning subsequent hearings on tllesc important topics, and we look forward to 

continuing a constructive dialogue witll the committee in order to share our views and infonn t11e 

Subcommittee to help ensure changes tllat serve the marketplace as a whole and tile public. 

DTCC's wholly-owned subsidiary, tile Fixed Income Clearing Corporation ("FICC"),2 is 

a critical part of tile U.S. Treasury market. FICC is a clearing agency registered witll tile 

DTCC provides critical infrastructure to serve all participants in the financial industry, including investors, 

commercial end-users, broker-dealers, banks, insurance carriers, and mutual funds. DTCC operates as a 

cooperative that is owned collectively by its users and governed by a diverse Board of Direl:tors. DTCC's 

governance structure includes more than 300 shareholders. 

FICC is designated as a systemically important financial market utility ("SIFMU") pursuant to Section 805 of 

Title Vlll of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of2010 ("Dodd-Frank") in 

recognition of its critical role in the national financial infrastructure. 
99 


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DTCC 55 WATER STREET 

NEW YORK NY 10041-0099 

TEL: 212-855-7522 

mpazmanlet@dlcc.corn 

Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"). It provides central counterparty ("CCP") services to 

its customers in the U.S. government securities market, which includes facilitating the 

submission, comparison, risk management, netting and settlement of Treasury securities 

transactions. 

As the primary CCP for Treasury securities, FICC is committed to maintaining the safety, 

soundness and resiliency of this critical market. We agree with the Subcommittee that requires 

having and adjusting to market changes in a responsible manner for the benefit of the entire 

system. Likewise, the rules promulgated by the SEC for Covered Clearing Agencies - the 

registration category for FICC - are designed to ensure appropriate risk-management standards 

and safeguards are being met by all CCPs serving the U.S. cash markets. 

Within this framework, DTCC is committed to responding to market-structure changes 

in the Treasury securities market to meet our customers' needs and serve the interests of the 

marketplace as a whole. Toward this end, DTCC has expended considerable effort, especially 

in recent years, to expand access to clearing for more and different types of market participants 

across asset classes. These efforts serve as evidence of DTCC' s commitment to tailor clearing 

and settlement services that respond to market demands. 

FICC has launched recently two initiatives that should expand access to clearing, and its 

associated benefits, while building on existing risk safeguards at FICC and among its members. 

First, FICC submitted ~~ and the SEC issued an order approving - a rule change that expands 

the types of entities that are eligible to participate in FICC as Sponsored Members.3 Previously, 

to become a Sponsored Member an entity was required to be a registered Investment Company 

under the Investment Company Act of 1940, be a "qualified institutional buyer" ("QIB")4

, and 

have at least one Sponsoring Member willing to sponsor the entity.5 FICC eliminated the 

requirement that a Sponsored Member be a registered Investment Company and clarified that a 

firm whose entity type does not fall clearly into one of the enumerated categories in Rule 

144A's QIB definition may still qualify for Sponsored Membership so long as it meets the 

financial requirements listed in paragraph (a)(! )(i) of Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.6 

Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 34-80563 (March I, 20 17) (SR-F!CC-20 17-003). The FICC 

Rulebook defines "Sponsoring Member" and "Sponsored Member" in Rule 3A. Generally, a Sponsoring 

Member is permitted to submit to FICC for comparison, novation and netting certain types of eligible 

transactions between itself and its Sponsored Members. The Sponsoring Member is required to establish an 

omnibus account at FICC for all of its Sponsored Members' FICC-cleared activity, which is separate from the 

Sponsoring Member's regular netting account. For operational and administrative purposes, FICC interacts 

solely with the Sponsoring Member as agent for purposes of the day-to-day satisfaction of its Sponsored 

Members' obligations to FICC. 

Q!B is defined in Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933. 

!d. at2·3. 

!d. 

2 
100 


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DTCC 55 WATER STREET 

NEW YORK. NY 10041-0099 

TEL: Z12-1!55-7522 

mpozmantel@d!cc.cotn 

Critically, this expansion of Sponsored Member eligibility did not alter risk management 

practices applicable to Sponsoring Members. 7 

Second, FICC also sought approval to broaden the clearing of tri-party repurchase 

agreement ("repo") transactions.8 The SEC recently approved a change to FICC's rulebook 

broadening the pool of entities that would be eligible to submit tri-party repo transactions for 

central clearing at FICC.9 Specifically, FICC established the "Centrally Cleared Institutional 

Tri-Party Service" or the "CCITTM Service."10 To effectuate the proposed CCIT Service, FICC 

created a new limited service membership category for institutional cash lenders. 11 The SEC 

approved this rule change as welt. 12 

These examples illustrate the progress being made to modernize the existing Treasurysecurity marketplace in a manner that is consistent with the SEC's and Congress' broad policy 

goals. But there is more to do. 

The U.S. Treasury Department issued a Request for Information ("RFI") last year 

asking stakeholders for their views about the Treasury market structure, includiny the growing 

presence of principal trading firms ("PTFs") in the Treasury securities markets. 3 As DTCC 

and others shared in that context, unlike the trades of Treasury securities between bank dealers, 

PTFs' trading activity typically is not cleared by a CCP, such as FICC. 14 This bifurcates the 

Treasury market, with a growing percentage of the market being bilaterally cleared by PTFs, 

while much of the bank-dealer trading activity continues to clear at FICC. 1

; 

ld. at 17. 

Repo transactions involve the sale of securities along with an agreement to repurchase the securities on a later 

date. Bilateral repo transactions involve a cash lender (e.g., a money market mutual fund, pension fund, or 

other entity with funds available for lending) and a cash borrower (typically a broker-dealer, hedge fund, or 

otl1er entity seeking to finance securities that can be used to collateralize the Joan). In the opening leg of the 

repo transaction, the cash borrower receives cash in exchange for securities equal in value to the amount of 

cash received, plus a haircut. In the closing leg of the repo transaction, the cash borrower pays back the cash 

plus interest in exchange for the securities posted as collateral. In tri-party repo transactions, a clearing bank 

tri-party agent provides to both the cash lender and the cash borrower certain operational, custodial, collateral 

valuation, and other services to facilitate the repo transactions 

Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 34-80574 (May 2, 20 17) (SR-FICC-20 17-005). 

'

0 !d. at 3. 

11 !d. 

12 ld, at 15. 

" !d. 

04 DTCC RFI Comment Letter (March 18, 2016) at 2. 

, !d. 

3 
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28750.048

DTCC 55 WATER STREET 

NEW YORK. NY 10041-0099 

TEL: 212.SSS-7522 

mpottnanfer@dtcc.com 

In the response to the RFI, market participants from across the financial sector generally 

expressed broad support for greater clearing of Treasury securities transactions. 16 Greater 

clearing of Treasury securities would provide several benefits, including the reduction of 

aggregate counterparty and credit risk in the system; increased transparency; more efficient use 

of collateral; and increased balance sheet relief for CCP members. 

To address these challenges, DTCC has been in active dialogue vvith its various 

stakeholders from the marketplace as well as the official sector. Among FICC's members, the 

legal structure and risk profile of PTFs would be relatively unique and do not fit neatly into 

FICC's traditional categories of Clearing Members or Sponsored Members. Nonetheless, 

DTCC is committed to finding a solution to expand the clearing of Treasury securities in a 

manner that adheres to the framework established by both Congress and the SEC, and that 

would help deliver the policy goals envisioned by the official sector and market participants 

alike. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on these important issues. We hope we can 

be a resource to the Subcommittee going forward. Please let us know if you have any questions 

or comments. 

s/~ 

Murray Pozrnanter 

Managing Director 

Head of Clearing Agency Services 

16 Remarks by Acting Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets Daleep Singh at the SIFMA Fixed Income 

Market Structure Seminar (May 24, 2017) (available at httt>s:l/www.treasury.gov/press-centeripressreleases/Pages,'il0465.aspx). 

4 
102 


28750.049

MERCATUS CENTER 

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 

Conflicts between Institutional Investors and Retail Investors in 

using Federal Securities Laws to regulate Campaign Finance 

TESTIMONY 

J.W. Ven·ct, Assistant Professor 

George Mason University School of Law 

Before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on 

Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises 

10:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 11, 2010 

2128 Rayburn House Office Building 

Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and distinguished members of the 

Committee, it is a privilege to testify in this forum today. My name is J.W. Verret. I am 

an Assistant Professor of Law at George Mason Law School, a Senior Scholar at the 

Mercatus Center at George Mason University and a member of the Mercatus Center 

Financial Markets Working Group. l also direct the Corporate Federalism Initiative, a 

network of scholars dedicated to studying the intersection of state and federal authority in 

corporate governance. 

The one group with the most to gain from H.R. 4537, "The Shareholders Protection Act 

of 20 I 0," are large institutional shareholders that have unique conflicts of interest. The 

group that stands to suffer the most from the legislation under consideration today are 

ordinary main street shareholders who hold shares through their 40l(k)s. 

There are two types of shareholders in American publicly traded companies. The first are 

retail investors, or ordinary Americans holding shares through retirement funds and 

40l(k)s. Half of all American households own stocks in this way. The other type of 

investor is the institutional investor, including union pension funds as well as state 

pension funds run by elected officials. H.R. 4537 seeks to give those institutional 

investors leverage over companies for political purposes at the expense of retail investors. 

We have seen numerous instances where institutional shareholders usc their leverage to 

achieve political goals, like Caplcr's insistence on environmental or health policy 

changes paid for by ordinary shareholders. 

H.R. 4537 attempts to contort the securities laws to regulate campaign finance risking 

and limiting the ability of companies to communicate with legislators by giving special 

interest institutional shareholders, such as unions, power to stop those communications. 

This bill does not limit union political spending in any way and has nothing to do with 

the investor protection goals of the Securities Exchange Act. 

http://www.mercatus.org 
103 


28750.050

Shareholders have two available remedies if they become dissatisfied with the 

performance of their companies. Shareholders can sell their shares, or they can vote for 

an alternative nominee in the next annual election of the Board. They do both with some 

frequency. In the rare event that political advocacy actually results in cmruption, there is 

a third line of defense in place. If the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors, which 

is independent of company management, determines that any political donations are 

inappropriate they are required under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to stop them 

immediately. 

The structure of American corporate law rests the authority to manage the day-to-day 

affairs of the company, including decisions of how to invest the company's funds, with 

the Board of Directors. Putting corporate expenditures to a shareholder vote, as H.R. 

4537 requires, is the first step toward turning shareholder votes into town hall meetings. 

Some shareholders may want the company to locate a new factory in their town or give 

away free health benefits for employees without regard to whether the expenses risk 

bankrupting the company. Shareholders choose the board of directors and delegate 

authority to make these decisions to the board in order to avoid that very problem. 

Political risk poses a danger to the 40l(k)s of ordinary Americans more now than ever 

before. Political leaders responsible for policies that subsidized dangerous mortgage 

practices through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now seek to expand financial regulations 

to generate the appearance of responsive action. 

The Supreme Court recently affirmed that corporations have a constitutional right to 

advocate on behalf of their shareholders. Corporations do so particularly to protect the 

property rights of those shareholders from expenses associated with regulations whose 

benefits may exceed their cost. Many reputable companies spend money for this 

purpose. Berkshire Hathaway, one of the most highly regarded companies in America, 

spent $3 million dollars last year advocating for the interests of the company and its 

shareholders. 

This bill purports to re-define state corporate law to make un-voted expenditures a 

violation of the corporation's fiduciary duty to its shareholders. This represents a serious 

misunderstanding of how corporate law is structured. As Justice Powell wrote: "No 

principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State's 

authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting 

rights of shareholders." 

The Shareholder Protection Act of 2010 has absolutely nothing to do with reforming 

financial regulation in response to the financial crisis, and is indeed a distraction from 

that vital work. It risks giving powerful institutional investors, such as pension funds and 

state elected treasurers' dangerous leverage over the retirement savings of ordinary 

Americans. To call H.R. 4537 a "Shareholder Protection Act" is fundamentally 

misleading. 

http://www.mcrcatus.org 
104 


28750.051

Federal vs. State Law: The SEC's New Ability to Certify 

Questions to the Delaware Supreme Court 

By J. W. Verret 

In the summer of 2007, the Delaware legislature 

amended the Delaware Constitution to permit the 

Securities and Exchange Commission to certify 

questions of law directly to the Delaware Supreme 

Court. 1 This ability to provide advisory opinions, if utilized by the SEC, is poised to enhance 

Delaware's dominance as the state of incorporation 

for publicly traded corporations. The SEC has not 

announced it has initiated any rule specifying an 

otricial procedure to certify questions of law to the 

Delaware Supreme Court. Thus, in the event of an 

internal controversy, one wonders whether a letter 

from the SEC General Counsel or Director of the 

Division of Corporation Finance would be sufficient, or whether it must be signed by a majority 

of the Commissioners. Nevertheless, barring such 

internal dissent, this development adds a fascinating chapter to the symbiotic, though at times rival, 

relationship between the SEC and Delaware as the 

primary sources of American Corporate Law. 2 

The primary mode through which Delaware 

corporation law interacts directly with the securities laws arises when shareholders attempt to place 

bylaws onto the corporate ballot. Under the DGCL, 

the bylaws of a corporation may contain any provision not in conflict with the DGCL, and may be 

adopted by the shareholders, or, if given the power 

to do so in the corporate charter, the board of directors-' Rule 14a-8(i)(2) permits the exclusion of a 

stockholder proposal if it would, "if implemented, 

cause the company to violate any state, federal, or 

foreign law to which it is subject. "4 Delaware law on 

the legality of proposed bylaws is, however, somewhat unclear when it comes to whether proposed 

bylaws are in conflict with the DGCL' 

It is uncertain, for instance, whether a bylaw proposal purporting to remove board authority to alter 

or amend that bylaw would be legal under Delaware 

law. Though unclear, directors may have the authority to unilaterally eliminate bylaws not otherwise 

.!. W Verret is an Associate r~f Skadden, Arp,l; Slate, Meagher & 

Hom LLP and recent~v ser\'cd as a law clerk fbr Vice-Chancellor 

John W Noble of the Delaware Court of Chancery 

The Corporate Governance Advisor 12 

protected by the DGCL6 Some commentators have 

argued that 109(a) requires at least some shareholder bylaws be protected from board amendment7, some argue that such a provision would be 

highly suspects One recommendation is to simply 

require unanimous board approval of amendments 

to shareholder bylaws, in the hopes that at least one 

independent director might holdout.9 

In any case involving the legitimacy of a bylaw, 

boards are also likely to make a more general argument in reliance on DGCL 141. which specifies 

that "The business and affairs of every corporation 

organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 

under the direction of a board of directors." 10 Thus, 

they will argue that a bylaw at issue is in conflict 

with this general grant of authority to the board. 

One useful analysis is that the types of bylaws which 

would withstand such a challenge would be bolstered by four key characteristics: (i) a bylaw relates 

to fundamental changes in the structure of the corporation rather than day to day business decisions 

(ii) it constrains board action rather than requiring 

affirmative action (iii) it relates to procedural rather 

than substantive decisions and (iv) it relates to a 

re-allocation of corporate governance relationships 

rather than business strategy 1 1 

The standard method to support an assertion of 

illegality for the purposes of 14a-R was traditionally 

to secure an opinion from a Delaware corporate 

lawyer reasoning that a particular bylaw was not permitted and then seek exclusion by way of no-action 

relief from the SEC", but there was no facility for 

the SEC to communicate directly with the Delaware 

courts. In 2006, Professor Lucian Bcbchuk, director 

of the Harvard Law School Center on Corporate 

Governance, submitted a bylaw proposal for inchrsion on the proxy solicitation materials of Computer 

Associates, Inc (CA) which sought to limit the 

board's ability to adopt a poison pill and required a 

unanimous vote of the board to amend the proposed 

bylaw. CA filed for no-action relief on the grounds 

that the proposed bylaw was illegal under state law, 

but Bebchuk challenged the assertion of illegality 

in the Delaware Court of Chancery" and the SEC 

Mardi/April 2008 

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156527 
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refused to comment on the no-action request due 

to the pending litigation.' 4 Behchuk's suit sought a 

declaratory judgment that his proposed bylaw was 

legal in addition to an injunction prohibiting CA 

from excluding the proposed bylaw from its ballot. 

The Court ruled that the issue was unripe for adjudication, reasoning that only a bylaw passed by the 

shareholders reached the stage at which it became 

a justiciable controversy. This holding would make 

placing bylaws on the ballot nearly impossible, however, as the target could exclude it claiming a stale law 

violation under 14a-8 (despite the DGCL's murky 

jurisprudence on that matter) and the shareholders 

would be left with only the remedy of ex-post challenge in federal courts. In the risk -averse institutional 

investor community, such a remedy would be insufficient to permit bylaw challenges to succeed. 

With this new ability to certify questions directly 

to the Delaware Supreme Court, the SEC would 

be hard pressed to claim an inability to rule on the 

legality of a 14a-8 exclusion. The SEC could certainly rule in favor of a challenging company and 

grant no-action relief without choosing to certify 

to Delaware. Nevertheless, a shareholder could then 

utilize his implied power under 14a-8" to challenge 

the SEC ignoring its power to clear up the issue. 

That failure. combined with the fact that even the 

Court of Chancery in Bebchuk v. CA recognizes the 

uncertainty in the state law governing this area, 16 

would offer significant evidence for a federal court 

to rule against such an SEC no-action decision, 

especially since no-action findings are not considered agency rulemaking and thus not subject to 

Chevron deference.! 7 

The types of bylaws that will be proposed arc limited only by the creativity of the shareholders offering the proposal. The first, and likely most popular, 

type will relate to the process whereby the board of 

directors is elected. A recent addition to Section 216 

of the DGCL, adopted in August of 2006, specifies 

that "A bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary 

for the election of directors shall not be further 

amended or repealed by the board of directors." 

Thus, the DGCL has blessed the legality of bylaws 

relating to elections, but that docs not mean that all 

questions surrounding election bylaws have been 

resolved. For instance, what about a bylaw that, 

instead of specifying the number of votes necessary 

for success. instead specifies a method for counting (or excluding) supervoting shares from certain 

decisions, or a method for excluding broker street 

voles, or changes to the record notice period? 

Complicating this issue is another provision of 

14a-8 permitting exclusion of bylaws that relate 

to an election. 18 Governance gurus will be familiar 

with the SEC's most recent attempt at proxy access. 

The SEC considered two proposals: one which 

would specifically permit election bylaws being 

placed on the corporate proxy and another which 

would interpret 14a-8 to disallow placing such 

bylaws. Chairman Cox, the deciding vote on a four 

person panel, opted to support exclusion of election bylaws despite his initial support 19 of proxy 

access (by election bylaw). Chairman Cox offered 

his decision as a temporary one, claiming that the 

prospect of litigation facing companies in light of 

uncertainty in interpretations of 14a-8 spoke in 

favor of a temporary resolution, but promises to 

look at the issue again in 2008.'0 The legitimacy of 

Cox's uncertainty objection is called into question, 

though, by his failure to certify a question concerning bylaw legality to the Delaware Supreme court 

to resolve that aspect of the uncertainty. 

Bylaws may also relate to the issue of poison 

pills, as in Bebchuk v. CA. Though the court in that 

case never actually ruled whether the proposed 

bylaw was legal, under Section 157 of the General 

Corporation Law. the power to create and issue 

rights and to determine the duration for which 

rights may be issued and maintained is explicitly 

vested in the directors, not in stockholders or others.21 Thus it seems that poison pill bylaws are least 

likely to survive Delaware review. De-staggering 

of the board is another popular issue and a more 

open question when it comes to bylaws. As the form 

and subject matter of bylaw proposals veer off the 

beaten path of previous derivations. their legality 

becomes more uncertain. 

The most interesting implication of the new 

Delaware certification is that it can permit the SEC 

to resolve pressure from Congress or interest groups 

by leaving open ended aspects to its rule-making in 

areas that may overlap with state law. For that matter. 

future rules proposals could make more usc of state 

Jaw carve-outs. For instance, the new independence 

definitions added to the NYSE listing standards in 

the wake of the Sarbancs-Oxley reforms have been 

much criticized. but imagine if the SEC had defined 

an opt-put L'I'OSS referencing independence as defined 

under Delaware law. The SEC could then, in the 

Volume 16, Number 2 13 The Corporate Governance Advisor 

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstraet=1156527 
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28750.053

event that Delaware case law was unclear, consult the 

Delaware Supreme Court in advance of an enforcement preceding it may later consider. 

Going forward, the likelihood that the Delaware 

certification capability will have a significant effect 

on corporate law will depend on the SEC's willingness to certify questions, and the Delaware Supreme 

Court's willingness to accept the appeaL In that 

event. and especially if the SEC revisits a bylaw 

oriented version of proxy access for elections, one 

should expect that election bylaws will be the first 

order on the agenda. 

Notes 

I. Del. Cons!. §I 1(8) (2007). 

2. Edward Rock and Marcel Kahan, Symbiotic Federalism 

and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573, 

*!616 (2005). 

3. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 109(h) (2007). 

4. !7 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 

5. Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, 

Dcadhund Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay 

for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 511. 546 ( 1997). 

6. See Gen. DataComm Indus. Inc. v. State of \Vis. Invest. 

Board. 731 A.2d 818,821 (Del. Ch. 1999) in the context of a motion for expedited proceedings. question 

of whether a stockholder-approved bylaw can be repealed by 

a board of directors with such authority has not been 

answered by a Dc!awnrc Court. However. the Supreme 

decision in Centaur Partners and the views of a learned commentator (Professor Lawrence Hamcrmesh) suggest that the 

allirmativc answer may be the correct one."). See Am. Int'l 

Rent a Car. Inc. v. Cross, No. 7583, 1984 WL 8294, at *3 (Del. 

Ch. May 9, 1984) (Berger, VC) ("If a majority of American 

International's stockholders m fact disapproved of the Board's 

amendment of the bylaw, several recourses were, and continue 

to be, available to them. They could vote the incumbent dire(> 

tors out of oflicc. Alternatively, they could cause a special 

meeting of the stockholders to be held fOr the purpo:.e of 

amending the bylaws and, as part of the amendment. they 

could remove from the Board the power to further amend the 

provision in question."') (emphasis added). 

7. Professors Coates and Faris consider the issue in some 

depth. John Coates & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation 

The Corporate Governance AdYisor 14 

Shareholder Bylaws: Post Quickturn Alternatives 56 Bus. Law. 

1323 CWOl). In their view, the .. best argument in response is 

that Section \09(a) of DGCL reserves to the shareholders 

the residual authority to adopt. amend, and repeal bylaws. If 

the shareholders' residual authority under Section 109(a) is to 

mean anything, the argument would go, it must mean that the 

shareholders may adopt a bylaw that is beyond board repeaL" 

!d. at 1368. They also note possible ways to uphold a 

provision, either by that the repeal of the bylaw a 

violation of or that it is a Blasius like disenfransh<trdLoklcrs. /d. at I 369. 

R. See Larry Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and 

Stockholder-Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 Tul. 

L Rev. 409. at 469-470 (1998) (Arguing that a bylaw which purports to limit a director's ability to amend the bylaw is highly 

suspect under Delaware corporate law). 

9. Coates and Faris, supra, at 1356. 

I 0. Del. Code tit. 8, § 141 (2007). 

11. Profes<;or Coffee also explores these four dimensions that 

seem to indicate whether a bylaw restricting the power of the 

board might he upheld, See John C Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw 

Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the outcome of Corporate 

Control Contests?, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 605 (1997). 

12. See Bebchuk v. CA, Inc .. 902 A.2d 737. *739 (Del.Ch., 

2006). 

13. See Bclxhuk v. CA. Inc. 902 A.2d 737, *739 (Del.Ch., 

2006). 

14. See CA, Inc .. SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 1547985, at 

*I (June 5, 2006). 

15. See Roosevelt v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co .. 958 E2d 

416 (D.C Cir. 1992). 

16. See Bebchuk v. CA, Inc .. 902 A.2d 737, *742-744 (Del.Ch. 

2006). 

17. See Roosevelt v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co .. 958 F2d 

416, *427, (DC Cir. 1992). 

18. Sec Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, l7 C.F.R. ~ 240.14a-8 

(2007). 

21. 8 Del. C.§ 157. 

March/April2008 
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MERCATUS CENTER 

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 

The Misdirection of Current Corporate Governance Proposals 

TESTIMONY 

J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor 

George Mason University School of Law 

Before the Senate Committee on Banking 

Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance and Investment Hearing entitled 

"Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving Corporate 

Governance" 

2:30p.m. on Wednesday July 29, 2009 

538 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Bunning, and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee, it is a privilege to testify in this forum today. 

My name is J.W. Verret, and I am an Assistant Professor of Law at George Mason 

Law School, a Senior Scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and a 

member of the Mercatus Center Financial Markets Working Group. J also direct the 

Corporate Federalism Initiative, a network of scholars dedicated to studying the 

intersection of state and federal authority in corporate governance. 

I will begin by addressing proxy access and executive compensation rules under 

consideration and close with a list of contributing causes for the present crisis. 

http://www.merc;:ttus.org/ 
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I am concerned that some of the corporate governance proposals recently 

advanced impede shareholder voice in corporate elections. This is because they leave no 

room for investors to design corporate governance structures appropriate for their 

particular circumstances. 

Rather than expanding shareholder choice, these refonns actually stand in the way 

of shareholder choice. Most importantly, tl1ey do not pennit a majority of shareholders to 

reject the federal approach. 

The Director of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters said it best, "we think less 

is more, fewer votes and less often would allow us to put more resources toward 

intelligent analysis." The Brotherhood of Carpenters opposes the cun-ent proposal out of 

concern about compliance costs. The proposals at issue today ignore their concerns, as 

well as concerns of many other investors. 

Consider why one might limit shareholders from choosing an alternative means of 

shareholder access. It can only be because a majority of the shareholders at many 

companies might reject the federal approach if given the opportunity. 

Not all shareholders share similar goals. Public Pension Funds run by state 

elected officials and Union Pension Funds are among the most vocal proponents of 

shareholder power. Main street investors deserve the right to determine wheilier they 

want the politics of Unions and State Pension funds to take place in their 40 I ks. 

2 
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The current proposals also envision more disclosure about compensation 

consultants. Such a discussion would be incomplete without mentioning conflicts faced 

by proxy advisory fim1s. Proxy advisory firms advise institutional investors on how to 

vote. Current proposals have failed to address this issue. The political clout enjoyed by 

these firms is evidenced by the fact that the CAO of Riskmetrics, the dominant firm in 

the industry, was recently hired as special advisor to the SEC Chairman. 

To close the executive compensation issue, I will note that if executive 

compensation were to blame for the present crisis, we would see significant difference 

between compensation policies at those financial companies that recently returned their 

TARP money and those needing additional capitaL We do not. 

Many of the current proposals also seek to undermine, and take legislative credit 

for, efforts currently underway at the state level and in negotiations between investors 

and boards. This is true for proxy access, the subject of recent rulemaking at the state 

level, and it is true for federal proposals on staggered boards, majority voting, and 

independent Chainnen. 

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002 and was an unprecedented shift in 

corporate governance designed to prevent poor management practices. Between 2002 and 

2008, the managerial decisions that led to the current crisis were in full swing. I won't 

argue that Sarbanes-Oxley caused the crisis, but this suggests that corporate governance 

reform does a poor job of preventing crisis. 

3 
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And yet, the financial crisis of 2008 must have a cause. 1 salute this Committee's 

determination to uncover it, but challenge whether corporate governance is the culprit. 

Let me suggest six alternative contributing factors for this Committee to investigate: 

i) The moral hazard problems created by the prospect of government bailout; 

ii) The market distortions caused by subsidization of the housing market through Fannie 

Mae, Freddie Mac, and federal tax policy; 

iii) Regulatory failure by the banking regulators and the SEC in setting appropriate riskbased capital reserve requirements for investment and commercial banks; 

iv) Short-tenn thinking on Wall Street fed by institutional investor fixation on finns 

making, and meeting, quarterly earnings predictions; 

v) A failure of credit rating agencies to provide meaningful analysis, caused by an 

oligopoly in that market supported by regulation; 

vi) Excessive write downs in asset values under mark-to-market accounting, demanded 

by accounting firn1s who refused to sign off on balance sheets out of concern about 

exposure to excessive securities litigation risk. 

4 
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Corporate governance is the foundation of American capital markets. If this 

Committee tinkers with the American corporate governance system merely for the 

appearance of change, it risks irreparable damage to that foundation. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

5 
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School of Law 

UBER-IZED CORPORATE LAW: 

TOWARD A 21 5

T CENTURY CORPORATE 

GOVERNANCE FOR CROWDFUNDING AND 

APP-BASED INVESTOR COMMUNICATIONS 

J.W. Verret, 

George Mason University School of Law 

Journal of Corporation Law, 

Vol. 41, No.4, pp. 101-143, 2016 

George Mason University Law and 

Economics Research Paper Series 

16-14 

This paper is available on the Social Science Research Network 

at ssrn.com/abstract=2763896 
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Verret Fmal 4/12!2016 4:28PM 

Uber-ized Corporate Law: Toward A 21st Century 

Corporate Governance for Crowdfunding and App-Based 

Investor Communications 

J.W. Verret* 

This Article begins with a thought experiment about how corporate governance of 

small public companies trading on new pla(forms--like crowdfunding portals (or 

alternatively, "crmrdfunding exchanges '}·-might be expected to evolve to make 

corporate governance easier and more flexible for users New opportunities could 

involve increased use of default rules whereby shareholders or owners defer direct 

participation in governance (in line with the Bainbridge director primacy argument). 

subject to default participation rules developed on crowdfimding platform apps (in a 

multitude of ways, including through open source method~). 1 They could also include 

more shareholder empowering regimes. In examining the heterogeneous corporate 

governance needs that crowdfunded firms are likely to have. this Article will link 

contributionsfi·omthe New Institutional Economics, or "Themy of the Firm'' Literature, 

to corporate entity formation to provide a .flavor for the range of "outside the box" 

innovations that may be possible in a new and more competitive corporate chartering 

racefi'eefi·om thefederal overlav. 

Of all the claims made in this Article, the strongest is that increased use of 

arbitration-rather than litigation-to resolve shareholder claims against company 

defimdants will be a necessary element to reinvigorated charter competition fi!r 

crowcffimded jirms. 'l'l1e St'C currently prohibits full use of arbitration of shareholder 

claims against companies. This Article argues that since antifi·aud actions under the 

Securities Exchange Act of 193-1 and stale corporate governance claims are now largely 

interchangeable, the S1iC's intransigence on arbitration, in spite of'federal case law 

favoring arbitration generally, must be addressed to make state law arbitration a viable 

alternative means of adjudication fill' stales that compete with Delaware as sources (}f 

business entity law. 

The Author thanks the George Mason University School of Law and the George MilSon Law School Law 

and Economics Center for Research support. I appreciate helpful comments from Stephen Bainbridge, Roberta 

Romano, Bruce Kobayashi and participanls at the George Mason Law and Economics Center's Henry Manne 

Scholar Forum. Before they passed away, I received unparalleled mentorship from Henry Manne and Larry 

Ribstein that encouraged my development of the ideas in this article 

I. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corpora/e Governance, 97 Nw 

U. L REv. 547, 583 (2003) 
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Verret Final 4il2/20!6 4:28PM 

102 The Journal of Corporation raw [Vol. 41:4 

I. PRELUDE: A WINDOW INTO THE 21ST CENTURY WORLD OF CORPORATE 

GOVERNANCE ........................................................................................................ 103 

JL CROWDFUNDING: AN EVENT WINDOW TO RENEW CORPORATE FEDERALISM ........... l 04 

A. Ulhat is Crowdfimding7 .................................................................................... 105 

B. The Economics ofCrowdfonding Demonstrate that Crowdfunding Will 

Require a Level (?f J-7exibility that Current Federal Preemption Would Not 

Facilitate ......................................................................................................... 11 0 

1. Expected DemandfiJr Arbitration ............................................................... 110 

2. Expected Demandfor Non-Traditional Governance Structures ................. 112 

3. Expected Demand for Novel Shareholder Participation for Some 

Crowdfimded Firms. Particularly Public Hybrid Firms with 

Constraints (Enduring or Limited) on the Profit Afaximi:::ation 

Objective .................................................................................................... l 14 

4. Expected Demand to facilitate Adaptive Funding Methods ....................... 1.16 

5. &.peeled Demand to Facilitate Their Organic Growth .............................. 119 

6. Expected Demandfor Unique Dissolution Procedures ............................... 121 

C. One Perspective on Uberization: An Interest Group Stmy Suggesting 

Crowdfimding Can .Make Corporate Federalism Stick ................................... 122 

D. A Second Perspective on Uherization: App-Based Interaction Changes the 

Information Cost. Conventional ~Visdom (if/he Collective Action Story of 

Corporate Lmv ................................................................................................ 124 

E. Analogue to Crowdfunding?: The U.S. Over-the-Counter Pink Sheets 

Afarket ............................................................................................................. 126 

F Analogue to Crowdfimding: The London AIM Market .................................... 129 

III.THE STATE OF CORPORATE FEDERALISM ................................................................... 130 

A. When The Federal Overlay Is Rolled Back, Innovation Sprouts: The Case 

(!{Publicly Ji·aded Master Limited Partnerships ............................................ 131 

IV. ARI3TTRATTON OF DISPUTES BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS AND BOARDS, AND A 

CODE ADAPTED FOR THAT PURPOSE, TO COMPETE WITH DELAWARE .................. 132 

A. Arbitration is Key to Challenging Delmvare .................................................... J 32 

B. Does Ribstein's Uncorporalion Thesis Fill the Gap in Demand? .................... 135 

C. The Federal Government and Delmvare Both Discourage Arhitralionfor 

Public Company Shareholders ........................................................................ 137 

D. Arbitration Will Require a Novel Code Design, and {lnitial(v) an Advisory 

Opinion 1\lechanism ........................................................................................ 141 

E. Blending the Economics ofCrowdfimding Firms with a NeH' Corporate 

Law S;-~~tem Free of the Federal Overlay ........................................................ 142 

V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 143 
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Verret Final 4/12/2016 4:18PM 

2016] Uber-ized Cmporale Lmv 103 

l. PRELUDE: A WINDOW INTO THE 21ST CENTURY WORLD OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 

Imagine downloading a "crowd fund app"2 and selecting a few dozen companies for 

purchase of shares costing roughly $100 each. When you set up your crowd fund app, you 

are prompted with a series of questions with choices. One might read: "Do you wish to 

(I) receive updates about company elections and participate in shareholder votes for the 

board; (2) select a default of voting for the management recommended slate of nominees 

in all elections; or (3) vote for management nominees unless a list of material negative 

events recommended by Crowdfund Inc. has occurred?" You may be notified with other 

messages: "You may change your voting defaults under the settings tab at any time," and 

possibly, "Do you want to be reprompted with this question any time you purchase new 

shares through Crowd fund App?" 

Periodically, you may receive updates on your app. You check the app a few months 

later and find an update which states: "A bidder has made an offer of $120 for your share 

in Techmarket Inc., and will cease purchases when he has acquired 90% of the shares. If 

the bidder is successful in acquiring 90% of the outstanding shares, your interest may be 

frozen out and you may be required to accept an offer that may be lower than the tender 

offer. If so, you may also submit a request for appraisal at that time (sec here for more 

about the appraisal process). The most recent closing price for one share is $110. Do you 

wish to accept?" 

You select "no." A few days later, you receive another update: "The bidder has 

acquired a 90% stake in Techmarket Inc. and has invoked the freezeout statute. You may 

either accept the freezeout price of$110, or choose to join an arbitrated appraisal process. 

Pursuant to arbitrated appraisal, over a 24-hour period an independent accountant will 

determine whether to award you the freezeout price, or to award you an amount either 

higher or lower than the freezeout price. If you select arbitrated appraisal, and you wish 

to register your preference for the arbitrator (which includes an algorithmic weighting 

incorporating preferences submitted by both the controlling shareholder and frozen-out 

shareholders), a list of eligible arbitrators can be found at the link below accompanied by 

user ratings of those arbitrator candidates." Periodically, you check your crowd fund app 

to track the status of your investments; you examine updates about other pending 

litigation and elections in companies in which you are invested, selecting from menus if 

you choose to participate. 

You may later open the crowd fund app to find an update stating: "Techmarket Inc.'s 

annual election is taking place in 30 days. You may access the proxy statement filed with 

the SEC at the following link. Your default settings are to vote with management unless 

the company has issued a restatement of its finances because of a significant prior fraud 

or error discovered in its quarterly reporting. The company has issued such a restatement 

in the last year. Please vote for a maximum of 12 candidates from the nominees provided 

by the Board of Directors or those nominated by shareholders with a greater than 5% 

stake in the company, who are allowed to nominate candidates pursuant to the company's 

corporate charter, included in the list below." 

The app might also prompt: "You have subscribed to voting recommendations from 

Corporate Governance Analytics Inc. That crowdfunding portal analysis provider 

2. Apps have become shorthand for computer operating applications utilized on smartphones. 
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Verret Final 4/l2!20l6 4:2& PM 

104 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 41:4 

recommends you vote for eight candidates from management and four candidates 

recommended by shareholders listed below. To follow that recommendation, click this 

button." Or, alternatively, if you do not have time or inclination to participate in that way, 

those decisions could all be made for you according to default actions you select per 

stock, or for all stocks, in your settings tab. These defaults provided to aid your decisionmaking on the app-based platform could be developed via an open source method, in 

which corporate governance professionals-like corporate lawyers--design the defaults 

and thereby attempt to augment their professional reputations. 

II. CROWDFUNDING: AN EVENT WINDOW TO RENEW CORPORATE FEDERALISM 

Investors and entrepreneurs will soon face corporate governance challenges as 

crowdfunded companies-traded on small crowdfunding portal exchanges-soon go 

online pursuant to a recent SEC rule. 3 Corporate governance entity forms created for 

large public firms may not be best for this novel, ultra small scale public firm. Similarly, 

existing off-the-rack LLC options intended primarily for private firms may not exactly fit 

(particularly Delaware's model). Moreover, powerful interest groups controlling 

corporate innovation in the leading state of entity formation may have conflicts that limit 

innovation sufficient to meet required needs. In any event, a federal overlay that 

selectively preempts corporate governance, and could preempt it further in unexpected 

ways, further limits incentives of states active in chartering competition to further 

innovate. 

This Article argues that unless a complete rethinking of the federal overlay in 

corporate governance is undertaken, investors and entrepreneurs may miss their "Uber 

moment" in business entity formation competition as crowdfunding portals go online in 

coming years. Imagine if the Romans were prohibited from recognizing the separate 

entity formation that facilitated the creation of the aqueducts, or if the 19th century 

incorporation model (where state legislatures were required to pass a new bill to create 

every new business entity) was still in effect as the nation's economy entered the 20th 

century. That is the precipice on which business entity law currently sits. 

In part, the new crowdfunding platforms are interesting for the simple fact that they 

open up the possibility for a new experiment in corporate governance. It may be the ca..'>e 

that crowdfunding firms have unique dynamics very different from the type of finns 

currently traded on public platforms, and this Article will explore why that may be the 

case. But even if they are similar, crowd funding nevertheless opens up an opportunity to 

apply corporate governance innovation to a totally new public exchange platform free 

from pre-existing path dependencies. O'Hara and Ribstein note that "amending a public 

corporation's charter is costly and cumbersome" and therefore incumbent public firms 

may find it costly to change their individual corporate charters to reflect economic need 

and must rely on new provisions in codes developed by other jurisdictions for innovative 

changes. 4 This does not entirely limit innovation; for example, Grund fest notes that many 

firms adopted new forum selection bylaws prior to Delaware specifically recognizing that 

3. Crowdfunding, 17 C.F.R pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240. 269, 274 (2015), 

https//wwwscc.gov/rules/final/20 15/33-9974 .pdf 

4 Larry E Ribstein & Erin Ann O'Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL L. REV. 

661, 700 (2008) 
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2016] Uber-ized Corporate Law 105 

option. It does suggest, however, that particularly paradigm-shifting corporate 

governance innovation will require new initiative. 5 Thus, the advent of crowd funding in 

itself may open a window for some of the ideas presented in this Article. The difficulty of 

changing paradigms for large publicly-traded firms suggests that innovation is more 

likely to begin with new firms entering the market. This is particularly true with respect 

to smaller firms funded by entirely new methods that are not subject to the path 

dependent pathologies6 that currently drive choice of forum and choice of law for large 

public companies. 

This Part of the Article below will explain what crowdfunding means and explore 

the unique economic attributes for small public firms to argue that crowdfunded firms 

will require innovative and heterogeneous options not presently permitted by the federal 

overlay in corporate governance. This Part will also explore two smaller firm, lightly 

regulated exchanges in the United States and Great Britain to develop useful insights for 

the crowdfunding platform world. This Part will also consider how crowdfunding's 

interaction with app-based user interaction will lower the costs of shareholder interaction 

with firms. Finally, this Part will explore how the unique attributes of crowd funding are 

likely to help make federalism reforms that are likely to endure, based on a public choice 

analysis. 

A. What is Crowdjimding? 

Ethan Mollick defines crowdfunding as: 

[A]n open call, essentially through the Internet, for the provision of financial 

resources either in form of donation or in exchange for some form of reward 

and/or voting rights in order to support initiatives for specific purposes ... 

[including] internet-based peer-to-peer lending . . . and fundraising drives 

initiated by fans of a music group .... Crowdfunding refers to the efforts by 

entrepreneurial individuals and groups--·-<:ultural, social, and for-profit·· to 

fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions from a 

relatively large number of individuals using the internet, without standard 

financial intermediaries. 7 

In a sense, crowdfunding in the United States has not really happened yet. Thus far, the 

SEC has prohibited sales of ownership in firms through this technology without 

registration as a securities exchange and without each individual project or firm on the 

platform registering as a public company. This results in ensuring that a multi-million 

dollar proposition remains outside the range of possibility for small scale projects and 

most firms contemplated on crowdfunding platforms. 

5. See generally Joseph Grund fest, The History' and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 

Clauses: An Empirical Analysis (Stan. L Rev .• Working Paper No. 427, 2012), http//papers.ssm.com/sol3/ 

papers cfm?abstract_id~2042758 (observing that forum selection bylaws were adapting to allow intra-corporate 

litigation to occur in jurisdictions that specialize in that state's corporate law). 

6 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Cmporote 

Ownership and Gorernance, 52 STA<'l. L. REv. 127 (1999) (analyzing structure-driven and rule-driven 

pathologies of prior corporate structures and their effects on new corporate structures). 

7. Ethan Mollick, 71w Dynamics cifCrowdfunding: An Exploratmy Study, 291. Bus. VE1\'TURING 1, 2 

(2013) 
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In the USA JOBS Act, signed into law in 2012, Congress recognized the growth 

possibilities of crowdfunding and ordered the SEC to approve a light-touch regulation 

regime for crowdfunding platforms. Once the SEC's rule implementing crowdfunding 

exchanges is fully implemented by crowdfunding portals, then some version of what has 

previously evolved in stunted quasi-crowdfunding platforms will be expected to thrive. 

But in advance of the rule's implementation, crowdfunding has been limited in that 

funders are prohibited by law from obtaining a direct monetary interest in the firms they 

fund. 

Prior to crowdfunding going online with adoption of a final SEC rule, most 

crowdfunded projects do not include an equity ownership component, but instead consist 

of contributions in exchange for in-kind benefits. Kickstarter is the largest operator of 

such a pre-crowdfunding platform in the United States. One open question will be 

whether attributes seen on the crowdfunding pre-cursor Kickstarter will continue to hold 

as Kickstarter firms transition to crowdfunding platfom1s able to sell ownership equity. 

Agrawal posits that, though crowdfunding platfonn Kickstarter does not permit the 

issuance of equity shares, and indeed crowdfunding will not involve the sales of equity 

until the SEC's rules for crowdfunding pursuant to the JOBS Act are finalized, the 

dynamics of crowdfunding on the pre-cursors Kickstarter, and a European analogue 

Sellaband, can inform how some of the economics of equity crowdfunding are likely to 

play out. 8 

Kickstarter is the most popular of the pre-crowdfunding sites. Crowdfunding on 

Kick starter has resulted in funds as small as $1000 to fund an event, clearly not what one 

would classically define as a firm, but for the top 50 largest projects funded by 

Kickstarter, 45 of them have become surviving business entities. 9 Mollick describes 

projects funded on Kickstarter as encompassing a wide variety of heterogeneous 

objectives. He generally divides those objectives into those encompassing a "patronage 

model" whereby funders act as philanthropists and do not expect a financial return, 

"reward-based" model where funders expect some in-kind benefit such as preferential 

access to a funded product, and an "investment model" through which funders seek to 

obtain profit. 10 The profit model on Kickstarter is somewhat limited, in that federal 

securities laws prohibit the sale of equity securities with registration absent some 

exemption (and the exemption for crowdfunded equity securities required by the JOBS 

Act which was just recently finalized). I! 

8. Ajay K. Agrawal ct al., Some Srmple Economrcs <?{ Crowdfunding 5 (NBER, Working Paper No 

I 9133, 20!3), http//www.nbcr.org/papors/wl9133.pdf. 

9. Mollick, supra note 7, at 2. Tbe "Veronica Mars Movie" ProJeCt is one of the largest funded projects 

on Kickstarter. It was a tan-funded movie, continuing a story line from a canceled series, and raised $5.7 

million by offering funders m-kind benefits ranging from regular movie productions updates (for $I dollar 

contributors) to a role m the movie (for a single $10,000 funder) and a range of other benefils for funders in 

bct\.veen. The Veromca _Mars tvfmrie Project, KJCKSTARTER. 

https://wwwkickstarter.com/projects/559914737/the·veronica-mars-movie-project/description (last visited Mar 

28, 2016). 

10. Mollick, supra note 7, at 3. 

11. ll1c third model thus can only offer l\.mders preferential access to purchase securities at a later date, 

some form of royalty sharmg, or other close approximation of a future stream of revenue, while carefully 

avoiding the SEC's test lor an equily securily which is largely dependent on the presence of direct revenue 

sharing 
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20161 Uher-ized Corporate Law 107 

Mellick's study of crowdfunded firms suggests they often combine these objectives. 

Mollick notes one odd example of a Kickstarter project in which a user posted, as a joke. 

a proposal to fund a statue of Robocop to install in Detroit, which subsequently went on 

to raise $67,000 in six days.l2 This suggests a somewhat organic quality to crowdfunded 

projects, with initiators at times unsure of the ultimate evolution of their project (and 

indeed, whether their proposal will be a one time discrete project or will evolve into a full 

fledged firm). Mollick posits that a number of features unique to Kickstarter help police 

fraud, "including threshold funding, active participation by large communities, frequent 

interaction between founders and potential funders, and the ability of founders to 

broadcast signals of quality through rich descriptions and biographic information." 13 

Mollick conducted a study of 48,500 crowdfunded projects with combined funding 

of $237 million on the Kickstarter website, and found that number of Facebook friends, 

geography, and underlying project quality are the key drivers of success in crowd funded 

firms.l4 Mollick describes the geographic component as "founders proposing projects 

that reflect the underlying cultural products of their geographic area (such as country 

music in Nashville, Tennessee)." 15 

Mollick notes that in crowdfunded ventures "the money is raised up front, and, in 

the case of reward-based crowdfunding, without any clear legal obligation from the 

project initiator to deliver their promised rewards. For the dishonest, this creates an 

opportunity for fraud.'' 16 This Article will consider the potential corporate governance 

innovations which may serve to reduce agency costs that flow from this problem. And yet 

Mollick does not find a significant rate of fraud with respect to Kickstarter projects. 17 He 

does however find a significant delay rate, which could be merely a result of the unique 

risks and challenges of crowd funded firms or which could result from opportunities for 

shirking created by the crowdfunding environment. 

This suggests that a corporate governance modification or innovation which would 

be quite useful in this context would be a rule of review which focused on the initial 

intent of the entrepreneur as intended toward a legitimate business venture, albeit fraught 

with risk, as opposed to a purely fraudulent project. By contrast, the focus of fiduciary 

duties in traditional corporate law is on the day-to-day business decisions of the 

executives. It also suggests a role for arbitrators in engaging in the fact-based inquiry of 

whether a project's goals have indeed been met, and perhaps a default option then 

triggered to give the original funders a statutory referendum on whether to continue the 

firm's existence or liquidate it. 

Agrawal examine a precursor to Kickstarter based in Amsterdam called Sellaband, 

which funded new music bands. Sellaband operated free from U.S. federal securities laws 

and was therefore able to share profits with funders. IS The Sella band platform took a role 

in the governance of funded projects, and after posting a profile of the band and a demo, 

12. Mollick, supra note 7, at 3; see also Bryan Hood, Detroit's Robocop Statue Almost a Reality, N.Y 

POST (Jan. 22. 2014, 6:13 PM), http://nypost.com/20 14/01/22/detroits-robocop-statue-almost-a-reality/ 

13. Mollick, supra note 7, at 14 (describing the Robocop statute funding prank). 

14. !d. 

15. ld.at2. 

16. !d. at 1 L 

17. /d. 

18. Agrawal et al., supra note 8, at 7. 
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would collect $10 futures investments in the band. 19 If the band failed to raise $50,000, 

funding was returned to investors. If it did, the money was used to fund production of an 

album recording, pursuant to a budget approved by the Sellaband platform. Kickstarter's 

role in reviewing projects on its platform was more limited~public disclosure indicates 

its diligence is limited to rooting out fraud, not to meter investment quality20 To the 

extent that crowdfunding platforms themselves could potentially invest in some of their 

projects, it could serve to minimize agency costs along the Sellaband model, but they are 

unfortunately prohibited from doing so by the JOBS Act. 

Agrawal describes how crowd-based diligence can also be effective in rooting out 

fraud, given that a large community of users can pool resources. 21 As crowd funding 

platforms go online, erowdfunding investors or analysts could seek to build reputations as 

star pickers and thereby serve as repeat players, or informational intermediaries could 

evolve. Agrawal notes that another solution to reputational constraints and adverse 

selection problems on crowdfunding platforms is to break up the project financing into a 

series of milestones. 22 

Information problems not resolved by intermediaries could be resolved by the signal 

of an initial anchor investor. For example, seed funding from a venture capital (VC) 

could be a vitally important initial signal for crowdfunded entities. This way 

crowdfunders could free ride on the initial investment of diligence by the VC. On the 

other hand, the VC has a chance to observe what the firm does with the crowdfunded 

money to detern1ine whether additional funding is worthwhile. They would also have a 

valuable si1:,'11al in the publicly traded price of the crowdfunded firm which they might use 

to gauge the value of their investment through a market process. All of which will 

suggest a need for adaptive funding mechanisms that allow for the possibility of applying 

contingencies to shareholder rights that may not be permitted under existing federal 

corporate governance rules or state law regimes. 

Focusing on Sellaband again for a moment, invoices were sent to Sellaband for 

payment of band expenses, and any profits were split equally between funders (who also 

get a free CD), artists and Sellaband. During the three-year period of the Agrawal study 

34 albums obtained $50,000 in funding. Agrawal observed that crowdfunded investments 

under the Sellaband model are highly path dependent, and as amount previously invested 

grows, the propensity of investors to invest tends to accelerate quickly. 23 This suggests 

crowdfunding platforms may find value in more variability in the disbursement and 

control rights of different groups of shareholders, and may value a structure that 

facilitates giving different stages of preference to multiple classes of shares to attract 

large blocks of shares initially, as well as maintaining variable voting and cash 

distribution rights to facilitate subsequent rounds of funding. Delaware's corporate law 

code is far too rigid to accommodate such a level of flexibility in shareholder control 

rights, and the residual obligation of contractual good faith and fair dealing in Delaware's 

interpretation of its LLC code would similarly threaten full utilization of an entity form 

19. Id 

20. !d. at 25 

21 ld at 28 

22. !d. at 25. 

23. Agrawal ct al., supra note 8. at 16 
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20!6] Uber-ized Corporate Law 109 

with necessarily fluid and variable control rights. Agrawal also notes how an initial 

tranche of "friends and family" investment tends to be local and signals to other, more 

distant investors, the entrepreneur's commitment to the project24 

If investments by large block investors can serve the same signaling function for 

crowdfunded finns (as if, for example, a VC fund offers a small slice of funding to a 

startup, but awaits further funding on a crowdfunded platform contingent on the firms 

ability to raise a block of funding via the crowdfunding portal), then that same signaling 

effect could facilitate crowdfunding. VC's are typically thought of as pre-IPO funders, 

but small tranches of crowdfunded capital could be contemplated betwixt rounds of 

funding from a VC firm. This may call for variability in share class rights, and indeed for 

an element of contingency in share class rights which could change upon subsequent 

rounds of funding. This suggests a need for more variability than can initially be expected 

from the Delaware corporate code or is permitted by the residual obligation of good faith 

and fair dealing in Delaware's LLC code. It may also demonstrate the folly of the 

NYSE's prohibition on dual class share issues for post-IPO firms-as a rule which 

crowdfunded exchanges should certainly not emulate (though, since the exchange's limits 

on dual class shares was a result of pressure from the SEC, there is reason to suggest they 

will similarly be pressured to do so). This sort of variability could be evidenced in several 

ways. For instance, there could be a right to issue shares with voting or outright control 

rights that trump the rights of existing shareholders. Relatedly, there is also the right to 

issue shares that have dividend rights that trump the rights of existing shareholders. These 

rights could potentially water down other rights of existing shareholders, upon a 

subsequent opportunity to obtain VC financing. All of which would be prohibited by 

nearly all national exchanges, including the Nasdaq's new venture exchange. 

Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb describe what is currently by far the greatest 

success story on Kickstarter, which was the development of the Pebble watch. 25 An 

entrepreneur had secured $375,000 from an angel investor to produce a watch which 

could synch with Blackberry and iPhone devices, but needed another $100,000 to finish 

production and was unable to obtain it. He turned to Kickstarter, where he promised 

funders a watch in exchange for every $120 contributed. He raised $100,000 within two 

hours, and an additional $10 million within 37 days2 6 He promised delivery by 

September 2012, but production fell behind and he was unable to deliver until May 20 13 

(though he did eventually fill all orders). 27 The competition of the Pebble watch 

eventually led Apple to respond by offering a smartwatch of its own. This example 

suggests the value of linking !ranches of venture capital investments with crowdfunding 

tranches in an early stage startup. 2R 

Some of the benefits of crowd funding to issuers include an ability to bundle funding 

24 ld at 19-20. 

25 ld at 3-4 

26 !d. at2. 

27. !d. at 3. 

28. Agrawal posits that some firms may actually prefer non-equity based crowdfunding to equity 

crowdfunding, as it could limit the dilution of subsequent rounds of financing to venture capital finns, and they 

note that after Pebble ·s successful crowd funding venture it chose to obtain additional capital through a more 

traditional Reg. A offering. Additional flexibility and heterogeneity in share class differentiation could help to 

bridge that gap. Agrav.'al et al, supra note 8, at 6. 
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110 The .Journal of Corporation Lmv [Vol. 41:4 

in-kind benefits, including participation in the underlying project itself and recognition 

for funders, as well as obtaining information such as the strength of a consumer 

preference for future production by their participation in equity funding2 9 Agrawal 

notes, for example, how funders were highly involved in the initial design of the Pebble 

watch, and suggested numerous modifications that were subsequently included in the 

watch. 30 This suggests that investors may need new means of communicating with 

entrepreneurs other than the classic modes of shareholder voting and shareholder 

proposals. It also suggests that potential for misapplication of controlling shareholder, 

equitable subordination, or veil piercing doctrine in this context to inhibit shareholder 

participation in idea development at crowd funded firms. 

B. The Economics ofCrowdfunding Demonstrate that Crowdfunding Will Require a 

Level of Flexibility that Current Federal Preemption Would Not Facilitate 

The last Section made some initial suggestions about corporate governance 

innovation which would be useful at crowdfunded firms, but this section will explore the 

range of corporate governance flexibility which will likely be required by crowdfunded 

firms in more depth based on application of the New Institutional Economic or firm 

theory economic literature. It will particularly explore innovation which would not be 

easily accommodated by the federal overlay present in the current corporate governance 

system. Some of these suggestions are speculative and may not ultimately prove in high 

demand for crowdfunded firms, while other unexpected innovations may develop in a 

corporate governance system freed from the federal overlay. Nevertheless speculation 

about useful corporate governance innovations in this space may help to convince readers 

of the range of potential innovations that will be precluded in the crowdfunding space as 

a result ofthe federal overlay. 

1. Expected Demand for Arbitration 

The fractionalization of ownership on crowdfunded platforms may be such that 

arbitration of claims could be a more useful means to determine the fact question of 

whether the crowdfunded entity operated within the boundaries of its stated objective. 

Fractionalized shares may be so small that shareholders in a class may be unable to 

monitor conflicts between attorneys and the represented class for example, and thus this 

Article will argue that they may require means of adjudicating their rights which 

represent a low cost to firms. Thus, traditional class actions may be expected to destroy 

the fledgling firm with long delays and expensive litigation, and thereby prevent 

accomplishment of some objective which the initial investors value highly. This may 

generate interest in an entity form that combines features of default corporations with 

features of LLCs, and may be more usefully enforced through an arbitration method of 

business code enforcement3 1 Schramm notes that particular emphasis on defining donor 

29 !d. at I I 

30. ld 

31. Some may argue that a new quasi non-profit business organization fonn which limits the profit 

maximization 0~1ective may be applicable for flnns in this space, such as the LC3 organization fonn developed 

in Oregon and Washington state. The LC3 business en1ity fom1 will not likely fit this model well, as that code 

form takes an already nebulous concept like the duty of good faith, loyalty, and care, which is currently 
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2016] Uber-ized Corporate Law Ill 

intent in the non-profit context can facilitate separation of ownership from control to such 

an extent that something resembling more of a classic finn becomes possible. 32 

Therefore, in lieu of nebulous fiduciary duty type standards, non-profit crowdfunding 

firms may find it helpful to more clearly explain the parameters of their mission, or the 

contours of a specific project or groups of projects. They may find it so helpful that 

agency costs can be policed through arbitration fact-finding to determine whether the 

contractual specification has been met. Alchian and Demsetz and Fama and Jensen33 

explore the role of residual claimant owners in monitoring firm employees. 34 In some 

sense one type of project funded on Kickstarter, mixed motive firms, may be seen as 

blending the presence of residual owner monitors with partially non-profit firms. If the 

defining objective of the firm can be completed to achieve a fixed goal but will take place 

over an uncertain timeframe, then owners of mixed-motive crowd funded firms can be 

thought of as residual claimants with a contingent claim. Once the firm's initial objective 

has been met, any subsequent profits are subject to an ownership claim pursuant to 

contractual rights provided in the charter. Before that time the finn's obligation can be 

thought of as unconstrained by a requirement to maximize profits. If the initial project 

has been met, and along the way it becomes clear that the one time project has generated 

spillover value that can become an enduring finn, shareholders may find value in a code 

that has a default means for the shareholders to reassess whether they want to firms 

separate existence to continue. 

For example, consider the investor in a biotech development for a drug to cure an 

ailment affecting a very small number of victims, one of whom happens to be a distant 

relation or contact (e.g. Face book "friend") of the investor. This model of financing is 

expected to grow in the future, which may well include crowd funded financing. 35 For an 

investor/donor at the margin the lack of potential profit may have otherwise limited their 

interest. Investors may then buy in with a preference for some hope of profit, but which 

hope is seconded to a primary purpose of spending the maximum amount toward R&D 

required to cure the disease, even if it maxes out their investment. 

A business entity charter for such an institution will likely not be well-served by a 

broad, indeterminate fiduciary duty obligation of managers to owners with all its 

attendant doctrinal baggage. It may also be ill-served by a pure fiduciary opt-out in an 

LLC form, as some intermediate third-party review could reduce agency costs and 

interpreted within a loose profit maximization norm. and makes it even more nebulous. Bainbridge describes 

how stakeholder based duties for corporate directors would only make accountability problems worse, as 

directors would be able to "play off one constituency against another:· Bainbridge, supra note l. at 583. Thus, a 

contractually-based obligation dralted more specifically to the goal of the proJect ts likely to prove far more 

useful m this context, particularly 1f 1t also utilizes an arbitration based framework for interpretation 

32 See generally Carl J. Schramm. Law Outstde the Market: The Social Utilitr of the f'rimte 

Foundation, 30 HARV. JL & PUB. POL'Y 355 (2005) (emphasizing donor intent in a non-profit setting). 

33 See generally Annen Alchran & Harold Demsetz, Production. Infimnation Costs. and Economic 

Organi=ation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (showing the role of residual claimant ovmers); see also Eugene 

F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership from Control. 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) 

(demonstrating the same) 

34. See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 33 (showing the role of residual claimant owners). 

35. Lia Steakley. New Crowdfunding Sites Apply Kickstarter Model to Jfealth and Medicine, STANFORD 

MEDICiNE (July 12, 2012), http://scopcblog.stanford.edu/20 12107/l2/new-crowdfunding-sites-applyKickstarter-model-to-health-and-medicine/. 
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112 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 41:4 

thereby prove helpful to both managers and investors, particularly with respect to the 

question of when it is necessary to continue a project's separate existence or require 

dissolution. In any event, this Article in a later Part will demonstrate that the dominant 

Delaware LLC entity form does not actually permit full fiduciary opt-outs for those firms 

that would seek a full opt-out. 

These firms may be better served by a fact-based inquiry into whether the initial 

objective has been met should a shareholder challenge a firm that is seemingly dragging 

its heels to maintain discretion over the firm by delaying accomplishment of its objective. 

The tirms may also be better served with a mode of arbitration that is not administered by 

judges, but instead is administered by professionals in that particular business, such as 

our example medical industry researchers. 

Some have argued that the broad fiduciary duty obligations imposed by Delaware 

corporation Jaw are gap fillers for contractual arrangements between shareholders and 

boards that cannot anticipate every contingency. Bainbridge describes the role of 

fiduciary duties as gap fillers for corporate contracts. 36 This may be true, but Delaware's 

fiduciary jurisprudence is not the only form of useful gap filler. The more specific goalbased review explored in this article could prove a more effective alternative in many 

crowdfunded firms, particularly mixed-motive firms. There may also be some expected 

demand for conflicts policies for board members serving in multiple business endeavors 

or methods of defining whether a non-profit "objective" has been met both would appear 

useful in this context and await legal innovation and interpretation. 

Note also that this analysis does not suggest utilizing the Delaware corporate code or 

LLC code, or some variant, and merely arbitrating it with reference to Delaware 

precedent. Instead it suggests an entirely new form of code, with duties and obligations of 

corporate officers designed to be optimally determined via an arbitration model. 

Williamson describes arbitration as a frequently superior means of enforcing 

contracts as, when it employs specialized arbitrators, can make use of superior 

information to slower and less efficient court based systems (particularly when a court 

will subsequently enforce the arbitrated award). 37 Williamson also notes that arbitrators 

have means of learning information during a controversy that are not as constricted as 

those in litigation. 38 Crowdfunding may well prove Williams right, if the federal overlay 

in corporate governance can be rescinded to allow arbitration-based alternatives to 

blossom. 

2. l-.,xpected Demand for Non-1/·aditional Governance Structures 

Another characteristic typical of projects operating on Kickstarter is that a small 

number of entrepreneurs work for the organization, which would serve to minimize the 

incidence of internal rent seeking within organizations between division directors in a 

large public firm39 So while crowdfunded firms will not obtain the same scale 

36. Bainbridge, supra note I. at 586. 

37. Oliver E. Williamson. The Economics ofGorernance, 95 AM. ECON. REv. I, 14 (2005). 

38. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. 

R. 519.527(1983) 

39. DANTEL F. SPULBER, 'j)JE THEORY OF THE FIRM: MICROECONOMICS WTTJ! ENDOGENOUS 

El'<TREPRENEURS, FIRMS, MARKEl'S, AND ORGANIZATIONS 49 (Cambridge \Jniv. Press 2009). 
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2016] Uber-i::ed Cmporate Law 113 

efficiencies as larger public firms, they will minimize some of the internal organizational 

monitoring costs typical of larger firms. 

A case study of the largest profit-based crowdfunded project in the Pebble watch 

suggests that funders provided funding to the only verifiable aspect of the firm, meaning 

the biography of the inventor and the signal that he had been provided funding for his 

idea by a VC. but the production itself was almost exclusively outsourced. 

lf that dynamic holds true for crowdfunding as ownership in the new model, 

crowdfunded firms may stay especially tight and small, merely internalizing the 

discovery of an idea and an individual's ability to utilize their networks in obtaining 

subsequent VC financing, and otherwise rely in large part on outsourced production. 

While this Article explores below that non-profit crowdfunded firms are likely to demand 

significant participatory rights, in cases as these the identity of the entrepreneur may be a 

substantial portion of the value of the organization, and so the entity may require strict 

limitations on shareholder participation rights. 

If that is true, however. then contractual counterparties like suppliers may face 

significant hold up problems. Klein, Crawford and Alchian note that contractual 

counterparties in the development of firm-specific assets can have incentives to engage in 

opportunistic behavior once production has begun to appropriate quasi-rents. 40 

Klein and Leffler suggest that sunk investments like advertising to obtain brand 

name capital, combined with premium revenue streams, can serve as a signal that firms 

will not engage in such opportunistic behavior, but for a brand new startup like those 

anticipated on crowdfunding exchanges this may prove difficult. For those crowdfunded 

firms for which potential appropriable quasi rents are high, such as a new startup that has 

a totally new product which requires a unique production process and which outsources 

all of its production, Klein Leffler solutions will prove difficult for as long as the firm is 

unable to generate significant brand name capital. 

Klein, Crawford and Alchian suggest that vertical integration is a solution to this 

problem. Thinking along a continuum of solutions it may be the case that partial 

integration, through partial sharing of control rights, could also serve to either minimize 

opportunistic behavior or, in the case of board seats, provide a low cost means of 

monitoring opportunistic behavior. 

Williamson argues against the utility of suppliers placing monitors on corporate 

boards, in part because they can themselves use their positions to appropriate quasi-rents. 

Williamson describes providing seats on the Board of Directors as a cumbersome 

instrument to provide contractual enforcement to stakeholders, in that it "such protective 

powers as it possesses are compromised by inviting broad patticipation on the board." 41 

While this may be true in some cases for much larger firms, crowdfunded firms with 

a small number of large firm specific production contracts may find board placement of 

large suppliers a valuable tool of contractual bonding. Williamson warns that once a 

partisan constituent of the firm has obtained a board seat, they can use that position act 

40. See Benjamin Klein et al., l'erticallntegration, Appropriable Rents. and the Compelitire Contracting 

Process, 21 J.L & ECON. 297 (1978), excerpted in LOUIS PUTTERMAN & RANDALL KROSZNER, THE ECONOMIC 

NATIJREOFTHEFIRM 107 (2nd cd. 1996). 

4l Ohver E. Williamson. Stralegi::.ing, Economi::.ing and Economic Organi:ation, 12 STRAT. MGMT. J 

75.86 (199!) 
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114 The Journal ofCmporation Law [Vol.41:4 

opportunistically or log roll their votes with other members of the board. 42 lftwo firms 

have members on each other's boards, however, it could serve a hostage taking function 

that could facilitate contractual enforcement for each side. 

In the general case if a single long-term supplier is the only constituent serving on 

the board the log rolling problem is limited, and in any event Williamson's critical 

analysis of constituent board members responds to a suggestion that constituent board 

membership should be mandated to serve some social democracy objective, not to board 

memberships contracted for by counterparties of startups. A member joining a board to 

serve a monitoring role would notably have an interest in significantly limiting their 

exposure to liability for disruptive action under whatever corporate governance duties 

they owe to the firm and its shareholders (which is as yet up for debate). Also note that 

Williamson assumes the standard board of directors, not one in which innovative changes 

in board structure and powers have been implemented. 

This may provide some value to the provision of board seats that have some 

permanency, as joint monitoring mechanisms to limit hold up on firm specific contracts. 

If a contractual counterparty has a seat on the board, the firm's ability to engage in 

opportunistic behavior would be quite limited. For that to work, however, the ability of 

owners to select board members would need to be significantly limited. It also suggests 

that director independence requirements mandated by federal law would be 

counterproductive for these firms. Even if it isn't a question of board seats, but some 

other contractual control right, perhaps one that only kicks in upon a firm's inability to 

make good on a contractual commitment to a significant supplier, it is nevertheless 

another reason for potential demand for governance flexibility. 

This Section has thus demonstrated that early stage crowdfunded firms will require 

significant flexibility in their ability to choose the makeup of the boards of directors that 

run the firm, or indeed will require flexibility for some alternative novel mechanism to 

oversee the firm. 

3. Expected Demandfor Novel Shareholder Participation for Some Crowdfimded Firms, 

Particularly Public I lybrid Firms with Constraints (Endurinf( or Limited) on the Profit 

Maximization Objective 

Spulber notes that non-profit firms are defined as firms in which objectives cannot 

be separated from those of owners, and thus free transferability of ownership is not a 

function of non-profit structure. 43 Crowdfunded non-profit firms are likely to challenge 

this conventional wisdom, as the information efficiencies created by crowdfunding 

platforms economize on the costs of search and can better match funders with similar 

objectives. Thus, part of what makes crowdfunding unique is that reductions in the cost 

of search can actually make publicly traded non-profit firms a possibility. 

A unique feature of crowd funded firms, that otherwise share some characteristics of 

non-profit firm objectives, is that the group of owners may be so large (and search costs 

of owners finding each other who share the same objective are reduced by the 

crowdfunding platform innovation) that transferability of interests among that group may 

42. Oliver E. Williamson, Cmporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J 1197, 1206 ( !984) 

43. SPULBER, supra note 39. 
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be possible. This could allow for both market-based valuation of the firm and provide 

liquidity benefits to the individual funders. In order to enforce objectives, those finns 

may be designed to provide unique control rights to those owners. In the purely nonprofit publicly traded firm, the market value of the share would be the right to control the 

non-profit. In a mixed-motive crowdfunded firm, the value would include a profit 

distribution contingency. 

For example, with respect to the Kickstarter financed fan film the "Veronica Mars 

Film Project" explored above, the entrepreneur financing the project was the director of 

the original TV series. 44 If, after crowdfunding goes online, such a project were 

organized as a for-profit firm operating over a crowdfunding platform, it is unlikely 

shareholder participation in governance would fit. The relationships and creative capital 

are all unique to the project's originator. 

For other publicly traded, non-profit projects operating on crowdfunding platforms, 

the identity of the initial entrepreneur may not be as finn specific, and funders may 

highly value the ability to participate in the selection of managers or board members to 

maintain the character of the firm. Kuaan models non-profit firms as an example of 

consumers integrating into the production process of the firm. 45 This appears to 

characterize many projects funded on Kickstarter. Thus, a part of what is being traded is 

the right to proportionate shareholder control of the non-profit finn (and also, for some 

firms, the right to profits for value created by the non-profit if it subsequently "converts" 

to a for-profit finn). 

This suggests a departure from the board-centric model of Bainbridge, 46 which 

would otherwise typically be associated with the contractarian analysis utilized in this 

Article. The Bainbridge model is one centered in the neoclassical finn with a wealth 

maximization objective.47 This as we have seen is likely to be modified should the type 

of projects seen on Kickstarter also transition over to crowd funded platforms. 

Bainbridge's director primacy model provides tremendous descriptive power for 

large publicly traded firms. 48 He notes one of the primary reasons why his board centric 

model describes many public firms is that it "provides a hierarchical decision-making 

structure well suited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise."49 This 

function of the director primacy model may have limited application to crowdfunded 

firms as they may simply be too small and operate by horizontal consensus. Then again, 

some firms seeking to grow and move to large securities exchanges may adopt 

governance models based on the Bainbridge director primacy model out of recognition 

that path dependencies could develop making transition to another governance structure 

costly down the line. 

Bainbridge also focuses on conflicts of interest among groups of shareholders like 

union pension funds, 50 which may justify limits on shareholder control rights for some 

firms. While some of the shareholders he observes in the large public company context 

44 The Veronica Mars Aforie Prop!ct, supra note 9 

45 SPULRER. supra note 39 

46 Bainbridge, supra note I, at 583. 

47. !d. at 558 

48. !d. 

49. !d. at 572 

50. Id. 583. 
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may be restricted from investing in crowdfunding ventures, there are still other conflicts 

we might expect that would cause the same problem. For example, if there is asymmetry 

of information between shareholders and competitors about the value of a new 

innovation, then competing firms may obtain control of crowd funded startups in order to 

vote to replace the managing entrepreneur and stifle the competitive innovation that 

might threaten their competitive advantage in the market. 

Bainbridge's argument is at heart a contractarian one, and therefore, the general 

arguments in favor of director primacy for large public companies does not preclude the 

utility of alternative arrangements for firms with different unique needs who contract for 

alternative arrangements. In particular, those smaller and early stage firms likely to trade 

on crowdfunded exchanges may have unique requirements such that shareholders and 

boards will demand more shareholder empowering methodologies. Fama describes 

reasons why security holders may want to abdicate their control rights to managers, 

including their ability to diversifY risk, and that manager's opportunity wages may 

depend on the success of the firm-suggesting there may be many situations in which 

managerial control and the separation of shareholder ownership from control could be 

optimal. 51 Some crowd funded firms may reflect this description. Others in which 

shareholder interests are firm specific and Jess diversifiable like fan-financed 

entertainment projects may be better paired with voting control depending on whether 

there are substantial firm specific quality to the entrepreneur. 

In sum, we can expect some instances in which the Bainbridge director primacy 

model will continue to have force in the crowdfunding context. But even in those 

instances, the types of shareholder conflicts necessitating limits on shareholder control 

rights is likely to be unique, and innovation inhibited by the federal overlay will prove a 

challenge. For other finns more shareholder participation will likely be demanded, but 

rigid shareholder participation approaches favored by the federal overlay-like voting for 

directors and voting for shareholder proposals-may also prove to be a poor fit. Either 

way, flexibility in corporate governance will be essential in the crowd funding world. 

4. Expected Demand to Facilitate Adaptive Funding Methods 

Delaware corporate law and Delaware alternative entity law both stand for the 

proposition that, even though a board or manager may be permitted to take an action by 

the state's code, they may be found to have violated either their fiduciary duties (or in the 

case of an LLC that has opted out of fiduciary duties, their still enduring "duty of good 

faith and fair dealing")52 in so doing. Further, the SEC has pressured the large national 

exchanges to limit the ability of listed firms to issue dual class shares with unique control 

rights once a firm has gone public. This Section will show how those constraints 

contained in the federal overlay, and within the Delaware dominant business entity 

model, will ill serve crowdfunding firms. 

Prior literature on the economics of entrepreneurship considers the agency costs that 

51. KROSZNER & PuHER!;1AN, supra note 40, at 305; Eugene f. Fama, Agenq Problems and the The01y 

o,(the Firm, 88 J POL ECON. 288 (!980) 

52 Larry E. Ribstein. The Uncorporation and Corporate Tndeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 158 

(2009) 
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arise when performance is unobservable. 53 Some have observed venture capital firms 

have developed mechanisms to address these costs, as in the allocation of control rights 

or in the form of unique combinations of convertible securities. 54 In addition to 

specialized monitoring, venture capital firms can also provide human capital to new 

entrepreneurs in the form of un-conflicted consulting advice. 55 

Fama and Jensen, in "Separation of Ownership from Control," argue one mitigating 

factor in larger organizations, in which decision management and decision control are 

disaggregated, is agency costs are lower because of monitoring among and between 

cmployees--<:reating internal systems of checks and balances. 56 For a crowdfunded 

entity mirrored on the Pebble model, that would not be the case, suggesting another 

reason why the joint VC funding and crowdfunding model is likely to be replicated on 

many crowdfunded firms, particularly those like Pebble which rely on a small number of 

employees for large scale and outsourced production. Utilizing a finn structure for 

venture capital investments in projects allows use of the signal provided by a venture 

capital investment to provide information to much smaller investors who can minimize 

their risk through diversification but also arc a result of their greater diversification not 

interested in expending much monitoring costs. Crowdfunding investors also minimize 

their risk through fractionalized investments. The crowdfunding participants may have 

different risk preferences and/or different budget constraints from the VC firms, but the 

signal of an initial VC investment provides value to them. The VC can minimize its upfront investment to a little less than the amount required by the firm. 

One of the benefits of publicly traded securities identified by Fama as a means to 

minimizing agency costs is the signal that publicly traded equity serves in evaluation of 

managerial performance.57 For a venture funded enterprise, adding a layer of 

crowdfunded equity provides venture capital firms with such a signal to evaluate their 

investment, determine whether to exercise any contractual control rights they possess or 

exercise conversion rights in their securities, and allows them to assess the viability of 

future investments. This dynamic was exactly how the most successful venture on 

Kick starter operated in the story of the Pebble watch previously described in this article. 

This suggests that corporate governance needs unique options for crowdfunding firms 

that make use of this dynamic which may include dealing with transition problems as 

firms obtain small initial investments from VC firms with high specialized monitoring: 

then firms obtain rounds of capital from crowdfunded finance and then perhaps obtain 

additional rounds of funding from a VC. Negotiations expected to take place with VC 

firms during these transitions should be expected to include changes in control rights that 

may be restricted by Delaware's residual obligation of good faith and fair dealing and by 

the federal overlay. 

As one example, the ability to issue multi-class shares after initial shareholders are 

issued with specified rights, without fear of fiduciary duty litigation or "duty of good 

faith and fair dealing'' litigation-which are risks inherent in Delaware corps and LLCs53. SPUUlER, supra note 39, at 172. 

54. /d.atl73. 

55. !d. 

56. See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note 33, at 11 (discussing how management decisions are 

impacted by ownership and control). 

57. See generally Fama, supra note 51. 
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118 The Journal of Corporation Lmv [Vol. 41:4 

could present a problem. And the listing requirements of exchanges that limit your ability 

to do so should not be replicated as an SEC-mandated element of crowdfunding 

platforms, though it is unclear whether that will be the case. Preferred stock has been one 

way to traditionally limit conflicts between different classes of investors. 58 But in this 

instance, multiple rounds of financing that move between VC block investors and public 

funding may require highly contingent residual control rights for crowd investors, which 

is not favored by the equitable principles in the Delaware code. 

Fama and Jensen describe capital market financing in publicly traded companies as 

uniquely designed for "activities optimally carried out with large quantities of long-term 

assets that are difficult to value and that are more efficiently purchased by residual 

claimants rather than rented." 59 They contrast that description of publicly financed 

projects against those financed through proprietorships or partnerships with restrictions 

on withdrawal rights for residual claimants as "when the important asset in an activity is 

the human capital of existing decision agents." 60 They also note: 

[A Jt various stages in the life of a venture it may be best carried out under 

different organizational forms. For example, it may be first organized as a 

proprietorship and then, with increasing demands for financing risk 

investments, converted to a partnership or a closed corporation, and then to an 

open corporation. 61 

The transition they describe is not costlcss, however, and there may be path 

dependencies that limit the freedom to convert entity form. Members of the partnership, 

which potentially have what Fama and Jensen describe as widely different consumption 

preferences, may not be predisposed to support the conversion, for instance as a form of 

holdout problem. Therefore, it is possible that what crowdfunding will do is create a 

transition space for firms that may be otherwise constituted as partnerships, but which are 

facing increasingly intense capital financing needs. This change may also characterize 

some of the smaller firms trading on pink sheets. 

This further suggests a need for contractual flexibility in crowdfunded firm 

governance, as there may be a wide heterogeneity in the relative mix of capital intensive 

versus human capital elements of the firm's investments, and therefore a wide range of 

optimal levels of restrictions on the rights of residual owners. Some theorize that firms 

can create managerial tournaments to incentivize managers within firms.62 Fama 

describes this function as a means of limiting agency costs that flow from the separation 

of ownership and control63 To the extent that crowd funded enterprises will be relatively 

small startups with a relatively flat management structure, this is not likely to have as 

much significance as it does for large publicly traded firms. 

However, if the crowdfunded startup's best alternative is instead a proprietary owner 

fully funded with debt, the possibility of obtaining future equity interest in the finn may 

serve to provide a cost -effective means of financing, despite the presence of residual 

58 SPULBER, supra note 39, at 173. 

59. KROSZNER & PLnTERMAN, supra note 40. at 342 

60. fd 

61. !d. at 344. 

62. SPULBER. supra note 39. at 273. 

63. Fama. supra note 51, at 295. 
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agency losses. Jensen and Meckling note that a market for managerial talent and a market 

in the company's stock both serve as constraints on agency costs. 64 Crowdfunding for 

many smaller startups will be characterized by a relatively higher level of firm-specific 

executive talent and by a relatively illiquid secondary market for the firm's securities 

relative to larger firms on public markets. This suggests that the traditional importance 

that Delaware law and the federal overlay place on shareholder voting rights as agency 

cost-monitoring mechanisms is misplaced for many firms in the crowd funding context. 

5. Expected Demand to Facilitate Their Organic Growth 

Agrawal describes the shift from non-equity crowdfunding to equity crowdfunding 

as associated with the question of whether investors want to merely pre-order a single, 

specific product, or instead want to invest in future projects due to "the creator's ability to 

generate equity value by building a company rather than just delivering a product."65 For 

some entrepreneurial projects, crowdfunding could be thought of as a form of purely preorder contracting through which a group of entrepreneurial consumers could seek 

financing for production of an item they wish to see invented and which they hope to 

purchase in the future. That partial bundle could grow on a crowdfunding platform into 

the type of bundle of contracts that characterize a firm. In this instance, as well, the firm 

may need to substantially limit the control rights of residual claimants. Otherwise, the 

pre-order customers could strategically vote to vitiate their contracts through voting to 

dissolve the firm once production has begun, and then later renegotiate the price once the 

product-specific investments have been made. 

To limit that sort of strategic behavior, the control rights of owners would need to be 

limited by the firm's organizational structure. However, if production is never achieved, 

such a firm may require some means of dissolution, which may then require arbitration of 

whether dissolution is appropriate. Or it may involve set time limits on the life of the 

firm, subject to production quotas. We should expect corporate govemance innovations 

demanded for this subset of crowdfunded firms to reflect the fact that what is being 

traded initially on crowdfunding platforms is not ownership in a firm, but ownership in a 

set of multilateral contracts, which could eventually become a firm. 

The nexus of contracts that firms represent have historically been a bundle of 

contracts that have an entrepreneur as its center establishing, relationships with 

employees, suppliers, customers, and capital. But crowdfunded projects can begin as a 

collection of promises by consumers to pay for a particular good and agglomerate, such 

that they can catch the attention of entrepreneurs and providers of additional capital, and 

then grow from a bundle of customer pre-orders to an entrepreneurial project, and then 

finally to a full fledged firm. Just as Coase talks about the boundaries of the firm being 

grounded in the utility of the price system, 66 we can think of some crowd funding entities 

and projects as a more organic method of growth around the boundaries of the 

effectiveness of the price system. This type of growth can be viewed as a means of 

64 M1chael C. Jensen & Wilham II. Meckling, Themy '!{the l·lrm: Managerial Beharior. Agency Costs 

and Ownership SII?Jcture, 3 J FIN. EcoN. 305. 338 ( 1976) 

65. Agrawal ct aL supra note 8, at 68 

66. R H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, RASMUSEN. http//W\vw.rasmusen.org/g751/06b-readings/3-

coase 1937 pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
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delineating firm boundaries more efficiently than large initial investments to 

entrepreneurs, who are making educated guesses about whether the scope of their 

production represents the efficient frontier of their firm based on educated guesses about 

the operation of the price system. For example, a crowdfunding project could also be 

structured as a form of research tournament, 67 with control of the firm acceding to 

whomever fulfills the contractual requirements as defined in the contract and interpreted 

by a designated arbitrator. 

The "Penrose Effect" explains that managers learn through the strategic deployment 

of resources and can redeploy their attention as they master the strategic needs of existing 

projects, but the boundaries of multi-project firms are a function of diminishing returns to 

the rate of redeployment of additional managers. 68 Crowdfunding might be viewed as a 

more organic means of growth for Penrose Effect problems in young firms whose only 

alternative means of financing is solely VC investment. Consider a fan-based Star Trek 

film being developed on Kickstarter. The development of such a project may create a 

firm that is good at doing those types of projects, and the initial funders of the project 

may want to capture some of the subsequent agglomeration benefits of the project as a 

full fledged, multi-project firm develops out of it. 

As the crowdfunding industry integrates a for-profit character to some projects on 

crowdfunding platforms, it may be that the collective input of the firm, and the 

governance of the individual project, develop spillover value that crowd funding entities 

want to capture. Blair noted that a distinct attribute of firms facilitated by corporate 

organizational law is a firm's ability to facilitate firm-specific investments of capital by 

firm contractual counterparties. 69 The independent life of the firm allows free entry and 

exit of investors and managers without threatening the independent existence of the firm, 

and thereby facilitates longer-term contracts between the firm and contractual 

counterparties. As a current project-based model of funding projects on Kickstarter 

morphs into ownership, unique corporate governance innovations geared toward crowdfunded firms will likely take this into account. 

Demsetz saw economization of specialized information in the production of goods 

as defining the contours of firms, and described how: 

continuing association of the same persons makes it easier for firm-specific and 

person-specific information to be accumulated . . . . Knowledge about the 

objectives and organization of the firm is learned 'cheaply' through continuing 

association, and so is knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of the 

persons involved in this association. 70 

But for small novel projects at the earliest stage, it is unclear whether this is the case, 

and therefore whether a firm will arise from the specialized knowledge acquired via the 

initial project. Crowdfunding ownership tor such projects can help a crowdfunded 

projected obtain a premium for the possibility that this will be the case by proving 

funders of the project an equity claim on a potential future firm. Thus, crowdfunding has 

the potential to allow large scale, diversified equity funding of innovation at a stage so 

67. S!'ULBER, supra note 39, at 184 

68. KROSZNER & 1'\DTERMAN, supra note 40, at 180 

69. SPl!LBER. supra note 39, at69. 

70. Harold Demsetz, The Them}' of the Firm Rnisited, 4 JL EcoN. & ORG. 141. 157 (1988). 
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early that it is not yet clear whether a fully fledged firm will develop from a single team 

project. There may be an in between where equity crowdfunding projects could include 

purchase of rights to a succession of projects, with some mechanism for return of the 

investment in the event of failure and/or a contingent claim on the firm that results from 

the individual project. In the spectrum between the crowdfunded project as merely a form 

of "pre-order" and a fully functioning crowdfunded firm as a "nexus of contracts" 71 in 

the traditional sense, some crowdfunded equity could be thought of as a "bundle of 

projects" in succession. The rights of shareholders could be variable based on how the 

succession of projects proceeds, and could be highly contingent based on subsequent 

rounds of equity financing. 

Equity claims could be contingent and become debt upon failure to meet a delivery 

date, for example. If funding is that tightly tied to rounds of projects, then shareholder 

duty litigation in state and federal court could risk destroying the ability of the firm to 

finish the bundle of projects. This suggests a heightened need for limited and predictable 

arbitration based remedies. This comports with how Williamson elaborates on the 

boundaries of firms as alternatives to private exchange and to account for evolving 

bilateral exchange conditions as "the degree to which the transaction in question is 

supported by durable investments transaction-specific assets-by which I mean assets 

that can only be redeployed to alternative uses and users only at a loss of productive 

value." 72 

The initial investors in projects funded on Kickstarter or on new crowdfunding 

exchanges may eventually evolve into firms with these transaction specific assets, or not, 

at the initial startup stage for a small firm with a speculative plan for growth it may be 

unclear, and investors may simply want an ownership structure that allows them to 

capitalize on value in the eventuality that the one-time project evolves into a firm with 

indefinite life. Cookie-cutter application of governance structures applied to larger, 

established firms, or mandated by the federal overlay, could risk destroying these projects 

through bureaucratic management or abusive litigation. In essence, the transition from 

individual projects funded on Kickstarter as a form of consumption expenditure to 

crowdfunded projects can allow packaging of consumption of an individual project with 

speculative investment in the potential that a firm will arise out of the project. Thus, we 

see that the organic growth character to crowd funded firms ties into all of the particular 

needs recognized for crowdfunded entities explored in this Section. 

6. Expected Demandfor Unique Dissolution Procedures 

Coase describes the organization of activities within firms as a function of the cost 

of using the pricing mechanism to allocate goods and services in production. 73 The 

managers of individual projects on a crowdfunded platform will be uniquely situated to 

determine the value of whether project specific contracts and assets can be utilized 

repeatedly in additional projects. As crowdfunded firms are able to provide ownership 

interest to dispersed owners, they will be better able to agglomerate projects that share a 

similar objective into the same firm and economize on the costs of production through 

71. Fama, supra note 51, at 290 

72. Williamson, supra note 37, at 8 

73 SPULBER. supra note 39, at 92. 
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centralized management of activities for which managerial coordination is more efficient 

than market allocation. If the evolution of the Kickstarter platform is any guide, the 

boundaries of these firms will likely develop through a fairly fluid evolutionary process 

that managers may be tempted to abuse. As such, particularized innovations in methods 

for dissolution of projects that have lost their ongoing value are likely to be needed in the 

crowdfunding context. This unique means of dissolution may also require an off-the-rack 

option for third party appraisal of the value of the firm or project. In a later Part, this 

Article explores how the mandatory appraisal process utilized in Delaware is flawed. 

The goal of this Section is not to accurately predict all of the unique corporate 

governance attributes that investors and entrepreneurs will require in the crowdfunding 

space. It is merely to demonstrate that a simple economic analysis of crowdfunding 

suggests it will require a highly heterogeneous set of options, some of which will need to 

be newly designed. When combined with the ne:x1 Section of this Article, analyzing the 

current state of competitive corporate federalism, the analysis will demonstrate that 

without significant limitation on the federal overlay in corporate govemance, it is 

unlikely the corporate governance will evolve and innovate sufficiently to make the most 

of crowdfunding's potential. 

C. One Perspective on Uberization: An Interest Group St01y Suggesting Crowdfunding 

Can Make Corporate Federalism Stick 

There is reason to believe that, should competitive, state-based incorporation receive 

a new jolt of energy from the reforms suggested in this Article, they may just have 

staying power to survive any future attempts toward federalization. Raueh and Schleicher 

describe how a key determinant of "sharing economy" firms is that they have been able 

to rally local citizens to their support because of highly popular services. 74 The 

chamcteristics of crowd funding seem to share some of these attributes that have helped 

Uber and AirBnB become successful despite the powerful interest groups interested in 

maintaining the current system. The fact that there is a federalism aspeet to the reforms 

offered here also offers hope; Greve argues that the American citizenry is uniquely 

comfortable with the key attributes of federalism, particularly as compared to Europe, 

and so he expresses hope for the future of competitive federalism in the United States. 75 

Weingast notes that in order for a federalist system to survive it must be selfenforcing, meaning that the architecture of the underlying interest group coalitions must 

ultimately support maintaining a federalist structure. 76 In light of the Weingast thesis, 

there is reason to doubt that Delaware, the dominant domicile of incorporation for half of 

all public firms, alone will sufficiently discourage an inet1icient federal overlay. lt is 

instead more likely that a balance incorporating challengers to Delaware will more 

effectively preserve a federal system. If a federal overlay serves to inhibit other states 

from challenging Delaware's dominance, Delaware would not have an incentive to 

74 Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber. but for Local Government Policy: The Future of 

Local Regulmion of the ·'Shared Economy·· 3 (Geo Mason L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 15-01, 2015). 

http://ssm.com/abstract~25499!9. 

75 MichaelS. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557.604 (2000). 

76. Barry R. Weingast. The Econom1c Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and 

Economic Derelopment, II J.L ECON. & ORG. I, 3 (1995). 
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reduce federal preemption but would instead appreciate how federal preemption 

preserves its dominant position in the market. But if instead federalism reforms actually 

make the system more competitive, then it may be more likely to stick. Parts II and Ill of 

this Article make precisely that argument. 

One mechanism Weingast describes to preserve federalism is citizen consensus; he 

presents a historical anecdote in the use of citizen consensus to maintain local power 

during England's Glorious Revolution. 77 If crowdfunding manages to obtain a critical 

mass of retail popularity, then that retail popularity might be expected to serve the 

market-preserving mechanism similar to the context that Weingast describes (as retail 

popularity has helped Uber at all levels of government). Weingast also suggests a balance 

between coalitions can serve as a mechanism of market-preserving federalism as well. 78 

He notes that during conflicts between the North and South during an era of Jacksonian 

democracy, the conflict resulted in a balanced respect for federalism, as "each worried 

that the other might come to dominate the national government, allowing it to use 

national power for its own regional purposes. Because the problem was symmetric, both 

sides agreed to limits on national authority as a means of limiting the ability of the other 

to dominate." 79 

Weingast credits federalism and decentralized government authority in China as a 

key institutional condition for its unprecedented growth in recent times. 80 Weingast 

notes, consistent with Macey's public choice analysis of federalism, that as China's 

regional governments became increasingly successful, and as the rents provided to 

federal officials were maximized by merely restraining their urge to federalize, the 

regional governments were increasingly able to maintain their autonomy. 81 Weingast 

notes that major economic upheaval can upend the institutional dynamics that support 

federalism. 82 

One example of such a broad delegation of power to the states, which endured for a 

long time and has only come under fire relatively recently, was the McCarran-Ferguson 

Act delegating the regulation of insurance companies to states83 As evidence that 

codification protecting state corporate law is possible at the federal level, consider the 

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, which preempted state litigation of 

shareholder claims under the Securities Exchange Act. It explicitly carved out state 

litigation of shareholder claims under state corporate law and preserved those actions 

from federal pre-emption in order "to preserve the expertise and efficiency of Delaware 

courts and case law." 84 This suggests that federal laws preserving aspects of state 

business entity law can at times endure if the interest group calculus is just right. 

Macey theorizes federalism can endure because the federal government can obtain 

rents solely by virtue of "permitting independent or concomitant state regulation at little 

77. !d. at 18 

78. !d. at 21. 

79. Jd 

80. !d. at 22 

81. Weingast. supra note 76. at 23. 

82. Jd. at 27. 

83. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Ecorromic Theory of 

Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice hplanation of Federalism. 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 280 ( 1990). 

84. Ribstein, supra note 52. at 158. 
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or no political cost to itself," and he predicts that "Congress will delegate to local 

regulators only when the political support it obtains from deferring to the states is greater 

than the political support it obtains from regulating itself."85 According to Macey's 

theory, any federalism legislation will endure only so long as it is able to create a 

sutTicient number of interest groups before the next major impetus for federal regulation, 

such as a future financial crisis or scandal. 86 Interest group pressure from delegated state 

and local formation entities can limit the impetus to develop a federal response. 

This inquiry is analogous to Uber's challenge to the established rent-seeking 

networks created and supported by Uber's competitors. Uber is essentially a selfregulator of the relationship between drivers and riders, and in most jurisdictions it has 

been able to endure only because the outpouring of support from dedicated users is more 

significant than the rents obtained by taxi regulators. Macey describes this support as 

either coming from regulated entities directly, or indirectly by way of the regulators 

themselves. 87 

One can imagine that if banks, entertainers, and non-profit charities, all of whom 

have a right to residual interests in their future revenue, traded as part of crowd funded 

firms, organizing a "save crowdfunding" campaign similar to the Uber campaigns at the 

grassroots level would be more likely than a "save Delaware corporate law" campaign 

targeted to all shareholders of Delaware companies. Perhaps the Olsonian interest group 

dynamics of crowdfunding will allow for a more cogent defense against future federal 

overreach. An illustrative hypothetical is the repeal of an explicit federal law protecting 

the internal affairs doctrine advocated by this Article. Such a repeal may be more difficult 

to get past interest groups than piecemeal, creeping, or implicit preemption of individual 

slices of the doctrine and state corporate codes by indirect agency action. 

Macey notes that the fact that the federal government has not already created federal 

corporation law and fully preempted the states is evidence that there are already interest 

group pressures that insulate state corporate law from complete federal prcemptionS8 

And yet, the analysis in the next Section of this Article demonstrates that those interest 

group pressures are not always successful, and have allowed federal law to inhibit some 

of the available field of innovation. This future partial preemption presents a risk that the 

return to any new innovation may be subsequently dissipated by federal intervention. 

D. A Second Perspective on Uberi::ation: App-Based interaction Changes the 

Information Cost. Conventional Wisdom of the Collective Action Stm:v of Corporate Lmv 

Rauch and Schleicher attribute to "sharing economy" firms the general attribute of 

"a stark reduction in transaction costs that allows for radically disaggregated 

consumption" with that reduction in costs often resulting from a combination of new 

85 Macey, supra note 83, at267 

86. Id 

87. !d. at268. Macey's explanation may demonstrate the differences between the initial ''Schumer bill of 

rights" introduced prior to Dodd-Frank and the subsequent legislation that was adopted, in which some 

provisions were shifted from mandatory to permissive opt·in approaches (such as an independent chainnan for 

public company boards). The changes explored in this Article may enhance these existing interest group 

pressures and add new interest groups, such that the reforms may stick. 

88. Id at 279 
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digital means of information transmission and app-based interaction. 89 Bainbridge notes 

that one of the principal attributes of a corporation is a collective action problem because 

shareholders are rationally apathetic. 90 Indeed, much of corporate law scholarship in 

some way references the Berle-Means vision of corporations as characterized by 

overwhelming collective action problems that many corporate commenters either requires 

a strong federal hand in governance, deference to manager-centric governance models 

like the Bainbridge director-primacy model, shareholder empowering regimes, or 

particular mandatory provisions in state corporate laws. Scholars on all sides of these 

debates tend to reference the Berle-Means hypothesis as a starting point. And yet, the 

Berle-Means collective action hypothesis is likely to lose much of its explanatory power 

in the crowdfunding world. 

Although this Article observes that crowdfunding will decrease the costs of 

shareholder participation, it is nevertheless neutral on the question of shareholder 

primacy versus board primacy. If Bainbridge's observation about boards as necessary 

intermediaries between shareholder participation and executive action endures in this 

technology, then we would expect those fim1s in which shareholders have chosen 

defaults to delegate authority to be more successful, and crowdfund portals to strongly 

recommend board-centric defaults via their app. 

Agrawal points to three elements of internet-based interaction that explain the rise in 

crowdtimding. As search costs for projects and communications costs decrease, greater 

funding in much smaller increments is possible. That has a follow on effect of allowing 

for greater funding in much smaller increments_91 That has a further follow on effect, 

which reduces risk exposure through diversification. 

We might expect that crowdfunding could link well with app-based user 

experiences. Indeed, the crowdfunding pre-cursor Kickstarter utilizes app-based 

interaction that is popular among its users. Konsynski and Bush explore the platformbased development model that has evolved in software development in the last decade for 

new web browsers and iPhone applications.92 

Mollick notes that: 

The innovative ability of online communities has been of increasing interest to 

scholars (Baldwin et aL, 2006; David and Shapiro, 2008; Von Hippe!, 2005), 

and crowd funding represents a concrete way in which online communities can 

influence the creation of new ventures. Crowdfunding also suggests a path by 

which user innovators, who are often the sources of radical innovations, might 

transition to entrepreneurship (Franke and Shah, 2003; Shah and Tripsas, 

2007). 93 

This suggests that for a subset of firms in which donors tend to get highly involved 

in projects via some crowdsourced method, as was the case with development of the 

89 Rauch & Schleicher. supra note 74. at I I 

90 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shureholder D1sempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV 

1735. 1745 (2006) 

91. Agrawal et aL. supra note 8. at 7. 

92. Amrit Trwani et aL. Platform Evolution: Coerolution of Pla(jimn Architecture, Governance. and 

Environmental Dynamics, 21 INFO. SYS. RES. 675 (2010) 

93. Mallick, supra note 7, at 14 
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Pebble watch on Kickstarter, investors will want a high level of interaction with 

entrepreneurs. This may be best achieved through traditional corporate governance like 

shareholder voting or shareholder referendums, but for many firms those traditional 

methods may likely be outdated for this purpose, which again suggests that the more 

flexible and adaptive means of corporate governance innovation will be required than the 

federal overlay in corporate governance presently permit 

Kobayashi and Ribstein note how limits on intellectual property protection for 

corporate governance innovations can inhibit private production of law. 94 Open source 

production can serve as a solution to the problem of insufficient intellectual property 

protection, explored under certain conditions.95 In this instance we might expect, for 

example, corporate attorneys to participate in the creation of new governance 

arrangements via an open source platform in order to establish or maintain their 

reputation with potential advisory clients. Or crowdfunding exchanges and their 

participants may collaborate to solve problems in crowdfund governance. Rauch and 

Schleicher note the benefits of digital ratings systems as a substitute for reputation, and 

we should also expect that technology will have important implications for minimizing 

agency costs in the crowd funding environment, including by facilitating the development 

of informational intermediaries. 96 

E. Analogue to Crowdfimding?: The US. Over-the-Counter Pink Sheets Market 

An examination of the American Over the Counter (OTC) Market shows that, for 

the most part, the persistence of various elements of the federal overlay ultimately makes 

study of this market of limited value for understanding crowd funding. One exception is 

that, in the absence of some of the federal overlay in this space, exchanges are observed 

to take an interest in limiting agency costs for investors on their exchange consistent with 

Mahoney's argument in "Exchange as Regulator." 97 Otherwise there appears at present, 

in the absence of additional empirical work, little to suggest that corporate governance 

attributes present on OTC exchanges can inform expectations for crowdfunding. 

Mahoney argues that private exchanges can have incentives to develop governance 

arrangements suitable for the firms that trade over its platform, and thereby internalize 

the benefits of increased comparability between products by shareholders. 98 This stands 

in contrast to the Easterbrook/Fischel argument that national securities regulation is 

required to facilitate optimal disclosure rules because of comparability externalities. In 

the same way, we could expect exchanges to also share an incentive to develop corporate 

governance rules for firms listed on the exchange, and indeed exchanges have a history of 

doing so. 99 Thus, under the right circumstances crowd funding exchanges may end up 

playing a role in the creation of corporate governance arrangements. 1 oo 

94. Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstcin, Choiu 1>[ Form and Network Externalities. 43 WM. & MARY L 

REV. 79 (200 I). 

95 Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Softv>'are and the "Private-Collective" Innovation 

Model: Issues for Organi=ation Science, 14 ORG. Set 208, 209 (2003) 

96. Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 74, at 9. 

97. Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997). 

98. Jd. 

99 !d. at 1461-{)2. 

100 A majority of OTC finns are incorporated in Delaware and Nevada. Ulf Bruggemann et a!.. The 
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Mahoney notes that exchanges face a challenge in capturing the return to their 

innovations insofar as information like public price discovery over the exchange is nonexcludable, but he argues that exchanges have restrictive rules that substitute for 

intellectual property rights to accommodate that challenge. lOl 

However, since the dual class share litigation and since Sarbanes-Oxley, it has 

become clear that, at least with respect to large national exchanges regulated by the SEC, 

it may be the case that the SEC views the exchanges as a tool through which to expand 

the reach of its regulatory authority into state corporate law. Trading regulations like the 

"trade through" rule adopted by the SEC further limit the incentives of national 

exchanges to compete on quality of productions of services like listing standards; thus, 

for large national exchanges like the NYSE, listing standards are developed by regulatory 

fiat from the SEC and the Congress rather than as a quality signaling mechanism for 

exchange customers. 

The OTC facilitates quotes for shares on a "Bulletin Board" that are registered and 

regularly file with the SEC, and though the OTC doesn't have its own corporate 

governance requirements, 102 Bulletin Board firn1s are nevertheless subject to the 

constraints of Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank and the Williams Act.I03 Thus, the 

traditional bulletin boards are more like national exchanges like the NYSE than how we 

expected crowdfunding platforms to operate. 

'·Pink Sheet" shares traded over-the-counter, however, operate with some of the 

same freedoms from the federal overlay that we might expect to occur on a crowdfunding 

Twilight /.one: OTC Regulat01y Regimes and Market Quality 9 (ECGI. Workmg Paper No. 22412013, 2013), 

http://papers.ssm.com/sol31papers.cfm?abstract)d=2290492. To date there has been no comprehensive study in 

the literature examining corporate- governance attributes among pink sheet firms, suggesting an impmtant 

avenue for further empirical study If Pink Sheet and grey market firms make use of heterogeneity, how do they 

do it'' Jf not, why? Could it be because of path dependencies for those finns that were previously listed on 

NYSE or N/\SD/\Q and were dehsted. that have trouble subsequently reorganizing their lirms into an LLC 

structure with more freedom') Could it be because you hope to get back onto NYSE or NASDAQ, and you 

expect that changing your corporate governance choices to non-c-ompliant \VOuld he a bad signal to investors or 

to those exchanges? Bruggemann's Tab!e 2, Panel D suggests an avenue for possihle future empirical work, as 

it suggests Nevada might be challenging Dcla\vare as a domicile for some publicly traded OTC finns. Notably, 

the Bruggemann study finds that a majority of new firms operating on OTC exchanges, who remain on the 

exchange over the sample period, are fom1cd in Nevada. !d. at 23. Future data collection should further break 

down their chart into out-of-state vs. in-state_ corporate vs. LLC_ and further hrcakdm.\11 into choices fOr LLC 

charter_ presence of a control shareholder, industry. size, etc. "fbose breakdm\11S should occur by exchange. You 

have one exchange with no exchange listing requirements, another \Vith no exchange listing requirements but 

with SEC registration, and a third with both corporate governance listing requirements and SEC regulation. Jf 

there are d1fferences in out-of-state formation or entity choice that are solely attnbutable to which platfonn you 

use, then you may have ( J) ev1dcnce of federal overlay inhibiting cntily formation competition, or (2) attomcy 

Dr undervmter bias, if they markedly ditfer for platfonns, or you may have evidence of Situations in \Vhich 

Delawure 's network efrects are not insurmountable tOr smaller publicly traded firms. 

101 Mahoney. supra note 97, at 1456. 

102 Bruggemann et al., supra note 100, at 15 

103 A new NASDAQ exchange, called BX Venture Market, would seem to be another useful analogue, 

but that exchange will be subject to the full panoply of the federal overlay (with the one exception from 

NASDAQ's corporate governance listing standards being firms will not be required to have a majority 

independent board) See Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L REv. 532, 532 (2012) 

(proposing a lilecycle model in whtch regulations would adapt to firms as they age). 
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128 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol.41:4 

platform. 104 In 2010 the OTC markets traded 8000 securities, of which 4500 were not 

registered with the SEC. lOS Those not registered with the SEC are nevertheless subject to 

state blue sky regulation. 1

06 The Bulletin Board firms are all required to register with the 

SEC, but Pink Sheet firms are only required to register in certain circumstances.I07 For 

those Pink Sheet firms which are not required to register with the SEC, and therefore 

required to comply with state Blue Sky laws, Bruggemann describes blue sky regulation 

in this context as fairly light touch. 1 OX 

Consistent with the Mahoney hypothesis of exchange regulation, the OTC 

exchanges provide transparency rules for even Pink Sheet and grey market firms, 

including through a rough classification system that rates them as "current information 

available, limited infonnation available, no information available" and a fourth warning 

signal for firms labeled "caveat emptor" which have both failed to provide information to 

investors and which engage in unusually high levels of unsolicited communication to 

potential investors.109 The Jiang study found that the introduction of the OTC categories 

resulted in a shift of liquidity away from firms in the lower tiers and toward firms in the 

higher tiers, and they argue that indicates exchanges can provide useful governance 

innovations despite cost constraints. Schwartz argues that the Pink Sheets are dogged by 

their reputation as a haven for fim1s that have been delisted from other exchanges for 

poor performance.llO Even if Pink Sheet finn governance were more readily available, it 

may be that the exchange's reputation as a haven for troubled, delisted stocks drives 

potential emerging firms to other forms of financing, such as private placements, and 

therefore the Pink Sheets do not serve as an infonnative model for crowd funding. 

But a majority of firms on the Pink Sheets are not delisted. The Bruggemann study 

found that over a ten year sample, only 17% of them were previously delisted from an 

exchange requiring SEC registration, and roughly 10% eventually rise to the traditional 

exchanges. Ill OTC exchanges can include firms incorporated outside of the United 

104. Bruggemann et al, supra note 100, at 6. 

105. !d. 

!06 !d. 

107. !d. at 7. Bollen and Christie describe four distinct types of firms trading exclusively on the Pink 

Sheets, including highly distressed firms or finn equity Iecentlyr Jssued after a bankruptcy proceeding, microcap 

stocks too small for larger exchanges and trading in very small increments (or ''penny stocks''). large foreign 

issuers who want to access lJ S liquidity but want to hvpass more heavily regulated exchanges (Nestle or 

Nintendo) and companies that are closely held and trade mfrequcntly. Nicolas P.B Bollen & William G 

Christre. Market MicrostruCiure ofthe Pink Sheets, 33 J BANKDOG & FtN. 1326, 1327 (2009) 

I 08 ''In 42 states, issuers are exempt from registration and 'blue-sky compliant' if they are published in 'a 

nationally recognized securities manual' such as Mergent's (fonnerly Moody's) Manuals, Standard & Poor's 

Corporation Records, and others. ll1e providers of manuals perform a (basic) review of documents supplied by 

the issuer~ e.g., examine business descnption, corporate history and financial statements." Bruggemann et al., 

supra note I 00. at 8 

109. Jd. at8-9 

110. Schwartz, supra note 103. at47. 

I 11. Most OTC firms are below $20 million market cap, a quarter of them are below $5 million, they tend 

to be much more volatile and have much lower liquidity relative to other exchanges, average annual returns of27%. and individuals finns have outsized annual rctums ranging from +100% to -95%. Bruggemann et al. find 

that OTC firms filing disclosures with the SEC have higher liquidity and more efficient price discovery than 

firms that do not, and they find the same with respect to non-listed finns that publish in Moody's or Standard & 

Poor's, which they suggest indicates that shareholders in OTC finns are efficiently taking into account 
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2016] Uber-ized Corporate Law 129 

States, as they find that roughly 10% of new firms incorporate outside of the United 

States or Canada.ll2 Schwartz's argument also does not explain why large firms 

disclosing a wealth of information choose to list their American Depository Receipts on 

the Pink Sheets. 

Pink Sheet issuers are still subject to the general prohibition against fraud. 113 Thus 

the Securities Exchange Act overlay described in the next Section may still be present on 

these markets in part to the extent they provide voluntary disclosures that open up 

potential corporate governance litigation, though certainly not to the same degree given 

how little they end up disclosing merely to achieve compliance by being listed in the 

S&P or Moody's book. Also the fact that the Securities Exchange Act prohibition against 

fraud applies to the Pink Sheets, and therefore the SEC's reluctance to permit shareholder 

arbitration for corporate governance claims still applies, suggests that the OTC markets 

provide at best a very limited window into the possibilities available for small publicly 

traded firms free from the federal overlay. 

F. Analogue to Crowdfunding: The London AIM Market 

The London AIM Market provides evidence that a new era of chartering competition 

on crowdfunding platforms freed from the federal overlay might then also evolve 

symbiotically with new crowdfunding platforms that serve a gatekeeper rule to 

crowdfunded firms and which may play a role in entity formation as well, and possibly 

thereby involve private entities more directly in the business entity formation and code 

production process in some way. The London AIM market was created in 1995 and was 

designed to attract listings from smaller companies in the U.K. and overseas by offering 

less stringent listing requirements for particular corporate governance arrangements than 

those required for larger companies on U.K. exchanges. I 14 3610 companies have listed 

on AIM since its inception and have raised 92.6 billion euro in the process. liS 

On London's AIM Market, corporate governance is a much more flexible and firmspecific affair. It includes a significant role for a company's nominated advisor (or 

"Nomad") in determining which provisions otherwise required for larger companies 

should be adopted by the AIM listing. 1 16 Notably, the London AIM market has very few 

infonnation provision by OTC fim1s in their pricing Bruggemann et aL, supra note 100, at 9. 

112. !d. at 23 

113. S'ee Joseph l Goldstein ct al., An lnrestment Afasquerade: A Descriplil'e Dl'en·ietr of Penny S'tock 

Fraud and the Federal Securities La\l's, 47 Bus. Ll. 773, 810 n.l84 (1992) (citmg cases where Pink Sheet 

Issuers were still subject to the general antifraud provisions of federal securit1es laws). 

114. AIM Factsheet, LONDON STOCK ExCHANGE (2015), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/ 

historic/aim/aim-statistics-archivc-2015/junc-15.pdf 

115. !d. at 3. 

116. The London Stock Exchange describes the process for becoming a "Nomad." Approval as a Nomad 

demonstrates that a finn has fulfilled the stnct cligrbility requirements set by the London Stock Exchange. A 

Nomad is the primary regulator of an AIM company, making the role demanding yet rewarding. An applicant 

seeking approval as a Nomad must: be a 1irm or company, not an individuaL have practiced corporate finance 

for at least the last two years; have acted on at least three relevant transactions during that two year period; and 

employ at least four "qualified executives." 'l11e AfM Rules for Nominated Advisers also detail the ongoing 

responsibilities of a Nomad and set out the review and disciplinary procedures. Becoming a Nomad, LONDON 

STOC~ EXCHANGE (20 15 ), httpi/\\ww londonsiockexchange.com/companiesandadvisors/aimfadvisers/ 

becommg/nomadhtm. 
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mandatory corporate govemance requirements, but each listing on the AIM market has a 

Nomad, most of whom also serve as a broker in the issuer's securities, which advise the 

new issuer about its corporate govemance choices. That dynamic suggests the possibility 

for useful vertical integration in the provision of unique corporate governance 

arrangements for operators of exchanges or brokers on lightly regulated exchanges if 

freed from a strong federal overlay. 

A firrn serving as a Nomad for an AIM-listed company may also serve as a broker 

for the company's securities. 117 Most Nomads serve both roles on the AIM exchange. liS 

Most of the companies listed on the AIM exchange are less than $25 million market cap, 

and only a handful have a market cap of greater than $!00 million.119 Thus, the AIM 

market is roughly characterized as hosting firms somewhat larger than expected 

crowdfunding firrns, but somewhat smaller than the expected size of the Regulation A 

market under the newly enhanced JOBS Act. 

This indicates that, generally speaking, the benefits that Mahoney ascribes to 

exchanges may also apply to active brokers on crowdfunding exchanges. They may 

thereby afford a role to private parties in the corporate govemance innovation process. 

The limited availability of data about the corporate govemance choices that AIM fim1s 

actually make otherwise does not currently help with understanding the expected needs of 

crowdfunding firms, but nevertheless it might afford a ripe area for future empirical 

inquiry. 

Ill. THE STATE OF CORPORATE FEDERALISM 

Business entity law has been around for some time and has been an important 

contributing factor to the economic systems that develop and utilize them. Corporate law 

was key to building the Roman aqueducts, and critical to the industrial revolution; now a 

newly competitive and innovative model for the production of corporate law will be 

critical to make the most of technological advances that are reducing the cost of 

individual interaction seen in crowdfunding platforms that will soon go online after the 

SEC's final rule on federal crowdfunding is finalized. 

The mere fact that the economics of crowdfunded firms---explored in Part TIsuggests a demand for more flexible innovation in corporate govemance does not mean 

the states will be in a position to make that innovation available to firms and investors. 

For example, Bainbridge and Henderson recently designed a novel approach to the 

structure of boards of directors in which other business entities can themselves serve as 

members of the board. This would allow board member companies to economize on scale 

and scope, have more directed compensation and liability incentives than the current 

model, better expose the market for board membership to market forces, and provide 

reputational constraints for repeat player board member firms. 120 Bainbridge and 

Henderson note that federal rules which would prevent their idea were not necessarily 

even designed to prevent entity membership on the board, but the effective consequence 

117 AiM Factsheet, supra note 114, at II. 

118. !d.atl8. 

119. ld. at 18-32. 

120. Stephen M Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson. Boards-R-Us: Reconceptua/i=ing C01porate Boards. 

66STAN.LREv.I051, 1077(2014) 
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to references to natural persons in the federal rules effectively precludes their innovation 

from being implemented.121 

This Part considers a natural experiment. The federal overlay for public firms was 

peeled back just a little, in the case of a few marginal exemptions from NYSE listing 

requirements regarding board structure for publicly traded, master limited partnerships. 

The findings were a wealth of innovation and heterogeneity. 

A. When The Federal Overlay Is Rolled Back, Innovation S].Jrouts: The Case of Public~v 

It·aded Master Limited Partnerships 

Though the overwhelming majority of publicly traded firms utilize the corporate 

form, with its mandatory fiduciary duty regime, a small minority of public firms operate 

as either LLCs or LLPs. 122 Most of those are operated as some variation of a type of 

public firm that was provided some limited relief from exchange listing requirements by 

the NYSE and NASDAQ. 123 There is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in the 

organization choices made by the firms. All of those LLCs opted out of appraisal rights 

entirely.l24 Some of them held annual meetings, some did not, and some members 

(shareholders) held voting rights without making financial contributions.l25 Some opted 

out of fiduciary duties completely, some did not, and most had some hybrid formulation 

of obligations owed by members of the LLC to each other.l26 

The governance of publicly traded, master limited partnerships (MLPs) provide a 

small-scale case study in the adaptability and heterogeneity of business organizational 

form. Master limited partnerships forn1 a small subset of publicly traded companies in 

which the federal overlay has been moderately lifted by the exchanges. They were 

created pursuant to a tax exemption for energy companies that allows them to avoid 

entity level taxation if they make regular distributions of earnings to investors. Under 

exchange listing rules, MLPs are not required to have a majority of independent directors, 

a nominating committee, or a compensation committee. 127 MLPs and other public 

companies are otherwise subject to the same set of federal securities laws.128 Thus, with 

121 /d.atllOO. 

122. Looking more broadly to the master limited partnerships that continue to operate using a· limited 

partnership fonn, Goodgame notes that, as of 2012, there were 87 energy-related MLPs traded on public 

markets. John Goodgame, New Developments in Master Limited Partnership Governance, 68 Bus. LAW. 81,83 

(2012). While they have traditionally been organized as limited partnerships, more recently some of them have 

organized as LLCs. See id at 88-91 (discussing the "public LLC model"). "Jhese energy llrm MLPs make up 

the vast maJority of publicly traded alternative entities on United States exchanges. !d. at 83. 

123. Gomtsian notes that there were 20 publicly traded LLCs, all of which were formed in Delaware, as of 

September 2013. Suren Gomtsian, The Goremance of Publicly Traded Limited Liability Companies, 40 DEL J 

CORP. L 207,222 (2015). Most of those were energy companies that had previously been energy master limited 

partnerships. and a handful of others were private equity tunds and hedge funds that obtained most of their 

capital through private oftCrings under Regulation D but created entities to supplement their capital by raising 

money in the public markets. !d. The number of members in these 20 LLCs ranged from 2000 to 9KOOO. ld at 

224. 

124. !d. at231. 

125. Id at 234. 

126. Gomtsian, supra note 123, at 234. 

127. !d. at 264. 

128. !d. at 271. 
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this relatively minor exception from the federal overlay, a wide diversity of governance 

arrangement has evolved. 

Goodgame considers one of the dominant organizational features of the master 

limited partnership its contractual provisions providing for the regular allocation of 

distribution payments to equity holders acts as an effective substitute for equity 

participation in governance. 129 Goodgame notes that some MLPs have equity holder 

participation in governance as features, but those MLPs generally do not provide for the 

same regular distribution mechanisms as MLPs that do not provide for direct 

participation in the selection of directors.l30 

Goodgame generally describes a great deal of heterogeneity in organizational form, 

as some MLPs provide for annual elections; some have staggered boards. Some MLPs 

have poison pills; others do not. Some choose default fiduciary duties; some opt out of 

fiduciary duties. But, they generally choose to opt out of rules favored in the public 

context, as they have stronger contractual requirements to distribute all their earnings on 

a quarterly basis. 1 3! 

Structural heterogeneity in governance tends to adapt to the particular needs of 

individual firms. Those firms with more dependable and steady streams of cash flow tend 

to substitute earnings distribution and regular fundraising from capital markets with 

agency monitoring measures for traditional governance arrangements. 132 One can readily 

think of other governance arrangements which could be useful, such as a different 

appraisal process tailored to handle the unique needs of biotech firms-which lack cash 

flow for long periods. 

This limited innovation leads one to wonder what level of innovation may have been 

possible in the absence of the full federal overlay. As these public firms were all formed 

in Delaware, note that even in the publicly traded alternative entity context, there is one 

clear item that you cannot contract out of, namely "the implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing." 133 One then further wonders that if that binding constraint in the 

Delaware alternative entity code had not been present, and if another state were operating 

an alternative arbitration based mode of corporate law, what additional adaptive 

governance modes would have been developed for the MLP and MLP LLC space. 

IV. ARBI1RA TION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS AND BOARDS, AND A CODE 

ADAPTED FOR TIIA T PURPOSE TO COMPETE WITH DELAWARE 

A. Arbitration is Key to Challenging Delaware 

Bainbridge notes that North Dakota's recent attempt to compete with Delaware was 

doomed to fail because it was not actually innovative. Rather, it merely adopted 

129. Goodgame. supra note 122, at 88. 

J 30. !d. at R3. 

131. 'll1ey also have an innovative governance style similar in many ways to the organization board 

member proposal advanced by Bainbridge and Henderson and referenced above. Bainbridge & Henderson, 

supra note 120, at 1097. MLPs arc typically controlled by a sponsoring general partnership, which reserves 

contractual control of the board of directors for the sponsoring general partnership by reserving a majority of 

board seats for individuals selected by the general partnership 

132. John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Gorernance. 60 Bus. LAW 471.488 (2005). 

133. !d. at 488 
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provisions already allowed by the Delaware code that shareholders and managers had 

declined to choose for their organizational structures. 134 North Dakota also failed 

because it sought to compete with Delaware through a litigation-driven code despite 

Delaware's clear advantage in providing consistent, predictable business litigation. 

Roe notes that one reason states have difficulty competing with l)elaware is·--in 

attempting to create the specialty business courts necessary to compete with the Delaware 

litigation model~states find that a coalition of local triaJ lawyers and interest groups 

push back for fear of lacking competitive advantage in a pro-business forum for local 

cases.135 This may be a challenge unique to replication of the Delaware model, as 

replicating a new court of equity to compete with Delaware would entail creating a forum 

that not only adjudicated state corporate code cases, but that also obtained jurisdiction 

over contract disputes. An arbitration alternative may not bring the same baggage with it 

from a local interest group perspective and so may be more likely to succeed. 

Kahan and Klausner argue that a lack of heterogeneity in firm organizational 

contracts can be traced to a combination of learning and network externalities. l36 Despite 

the presence of these network effects, however, they do not account for how the 

economics of innovation in corporate law would change if the presence of potential 

federal pre-emption of new innovations were reduced or if the dominance of Delaware's 

state-based forum were sidestepped with an arbitration alternative. Perhaps those 

paradigm shifts would be enough to promote more innovation in contractual terms. 

Indeed, the case of Master Limited Partnerships is instructive for the possibilities in 

innovation when the federal overhang is lifted. 

Furthermore, the speed and ease with which investors can obtain infonnation and 

third party assessments about governance arrangements should shift when crowdfunded 

shares are traded through app-based platforms, making things like attorney familiarity 

with corporate codes less important. Kahan and Klausner note that switching costs may 

prevent firms from changing their governance choices after going public.137 Nevertheless 

innovation at the crowdfunded firm level may support innovation in large public firms, as 

it could mean that innovative governance modes developed at a smaller scale, may stick 

with firms as firms grow and become a part of the large publicly traded landscape. 138 

Kahan and Klausner argue that underwriters can serve to coordinate innovations in 

governance and resolve the challenges posed by network effects. For instance, they can 

commit to subsequently recommend new innovations in future offerings to create 

134, See generally Stephen M, Bainbridge, Why The Nol"/h Dakota Publicly Traded Cmporations Act Will 

Fail, 84 N D. L. REV, 1043 (2008) (predicting and explaining why North Dakotas publicly Traded 

Corporations Act will not be successful) 

135 Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Cmporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL, J. CORP, L I, 6 (2009) 

136 See )ienera!ly Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standanboation and Innovallon m Cmporate 

Conrracring (Or The Economics of Boiloplate"), 83 VA, L. REV, 713 (1997) (presenting "a theoretical, 

institutional, and empirical analysts of how increasing returns-specifically, learning externalities and network 

externalities-influence standardization, customization, and innovation in corporate contracts"). 

137 See id. at 727-29 (explaining sttuations in which S\\~tching costs occur: switching costs happen 

·'[ w]hen internal learning or network bene tits are present"') 

138. As a critical mass of smaller firms develops with more innovative governance models. and as t.hcy 

grow to become larger public finns. governance innovations that begin on smaller crowdfunded exchanges 

could develop some of the network effects of their 0\\11 that lower switching costs for existing finns and tor 

new entrants to larger exchanges 
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134 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 41:4 

network benefits for early adopters. 139 Exchanges and crowdfunding platforms can 

provide a similar form of commitment if they participate in advising new issuers and if 

they can operate free from pressure by the SEC. 

Kobayashi and Ribstein show that the existence of network effects does not 

necessarily preclude innovation in corporate law. 140 They challenge Kahan and 

Klausner's network externality hypothesis. They define the network hypothesis in this 

context as that "[ a]n example might be large corporations' long-term use of Delaware law 

in order to take advantage of judicial and legal expertise and other benefits they expect 

the Delaware legal 'network' to continue to producc:' 141 

They show that once the federal tax law overlay changed to permit entity 

competition for firms, then network effects did little to impede the move to LLCs. 142 In 

much the same way, removal of the federal overlay will be key to overcoming the 

Delaware effect in the public company context. Perhaps what is going on is that network 

effects for large public companies only matter because the federal overlay is the source of 

the "lock in." Without the federal overlay, network externalities do not matter any more, 

as they did not with the switch to LLCs for smaller or non-public businesses once tax 

code constraints were lifted. Kobayashi and Ribstein describe a number of solutions to 

network externality limitations, including bundling the law of the new entity form with 

aspects of the old from during the transition. 143 The use of bundling to aid the transition 

may be more difficult in this context as the old and new products are mueh more distinct. 

It is difficult to say bow much of the Jaw of Delaware corps will apply in the arbitrated 

LLC context, for example.l 44 They describe a number of other sources of lock-in, 

including conflicts of interest from interest lawyers who prefer standardization.l 45 The 

large public company context may exhibit this conflict as underwriters who prefer 

Delaware because they get advisory opinion business later on. 

Kobayashi and Ribstein find that competition for out of state LLC formation is 

chiefly a function of court quality. Furthermore, any competition through innovation of 

organizational arrangements is not a reliable predictor of firm choices of where to 

139. Kahan & Klausner. supra note 136. at 737-39. 

140. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 94, at 82 ("'The data indrcate that the mherent characteristics of 

the business forms, such as their state tax implications, are much more significant factors in choice of 

organizational form than network externalities."). 

141 !d. at 110. Kobayashi and Ribstein note that one recent and unanticipated innovation in organization 

stnJcturc was the series LLC, which allowed great subdivision of asset<; and liabilities within an umbrella 

holding structure. Bruce l-1. Kobayashi & Larry E Ribstein, De/{[JI'are for Small Fry: .Jurisdictional 

Competition ji>r Limited Liability Companies. 2011 U. ILL L REV. 91, 105 (2011). This is the type of 

unanticipated innovation in organizational structure thls Article seeks to encourage through elimination of the 

federal overlay in corporate governance. 

142. See Ribstein & Kobayashi. supra note 94. at 84-·86 (describing the tax code and LLCs in relationship 

to the business t(mn selected) 

143. See id. at 113 (explaining "the move to a new standard can be facilitated by linking or bundling it with 

an ex1sting standard fonn in order to utilize case law and other interpretive materials'') 

144. But in some limited senses it could work-for instance-class arbitration methods might draw on 

some, hut not all, procedures present in common law class actions to facilitate the new litigation approaches 

But generally the basic obligations and duties of directors, officers, and the corporate governance stnrctures of 

new crowdfunding !Inns may morph so distinctly that bundling would not be particularly useful 

145. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 94. at 1 J 5 
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organize.1 46 This provides powerful evidence that the Delaware effect, or the high 

preference firms place on Delaware as a choice of forum, out measures all other variables 

in chartering competition for alternative entities. This observation supports the argument 

of this paper that in order to enhance chartering competition, a clear route must be 

established for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms other than court adjudication 

based on the Delaware model. While the Delaware effect does not make innovation 

completely impossible, as for instance in the series LLC innovation which began outside 

of Delaware, it does suggest that if other states were able to compete on adjudication 

forum as well as code flexibility the level of innovation in corporate codes might be 

substantially increased. 

B. Does Ribstein 's Uncorporation Thesis Fill the Gap in Demand? 

Ribstein describes how "uncorporations" or LLCs, LLPs, and other alternative entity 

forms allow for more flexible private contracting to develop contractual devices that can 

substitute for what firms might see as flaws in Delaware's code and adjudication model 

for the standard corporation. 147 Ribstein ascribes some general features to uncorporate 

firms and others to corporate firms, including a different approach to lock-in of capital 

and to the free transferability of shares, and argues different approaches to corporate 

governance needs in the more adaptive alternative entity space can achieve some of the 

ends of corporation law without the indeterminate code that Carney and Shepherd ascribe 

to Delaware corporation Jaw.1 48 

Ribstcin notes however a number of dubious cases in which Delaware courts 

struggle to implement the legislature's intent to promote freedom of contract in 

alternative entity law. 149 Ribstein notes Delaware has recognized the right of LLC's to 

force arbitration, 150 but any doctrine creep of the duty of good faith and fair dealing or 

legislative change could risk that right. In any event it is not likely to do much good for 

public companies until a right to arbitrate federal securities act claims is recognized. 

The Delaware Court of Chancery has interpreted the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing as requiring the court to examine the "spirit of the agreement" and apply to 

doctrine on that basis, indicating room for expansion of the doctrine in the future to 

substantially limit freedom of contract.151 Thus, though Ribstein may well have been 

right that problems inherent to the corporation form will be resolved by migration away 

to alternative entities like LLCs, it is unlikely that will occur within the Delaware LLC 

form. This structural limit on contractual freedom within the Delaware LLC code will 

match with the interest group politics within Delaware explored by Macey and Miller to 

significantly limit innovation within the Delaware LLC code. I 52 As we have further seen, 

146. Kobayash1 & Ribstcin. supra note 141, at 135-36 (stating "'most movement that can be explained by 

court quality and series provisions is movement to Delaware"). 

147. Ribstein, supra note 52, at 133. 

148. !d. at 140-45 

149. !d. at 153-<J5 

150. /d. at 161 

151. Mohsen Mancsh, Express Comracl Terms and The Implied Contractual Co\'enant of Delaware Law, 

38 DEL J CORP. L 1 (2013), http://W\!I;w.djcl.orglwp-content/uploads/2014/06/EXPRESS-CONTRACTTERMS-A ND· THE-JMPLIED-CONTRACTUAL-COVENANT-OF-DELA WARE-LA W.pdf. 

152. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P Miller, Toward an Interest Group Themy of Delaware Coq;orate 
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136 The Journal of Corporation Vnv [Vol. 41:4 

the federal overlay does not support a fully adaptive model for publicly traded firms. 

Much like model codes, federal corporate governance provisions tend to be uniform and 

do not facilitate adaptive selective by organizers. 

Kobayashi and Ribstein argue, for example, that fiduciary duty opt-outs are efficient 

for many firms because of the specter of Type l errors, in which judges inaccurately deem 

management decisions to violate fiduciary duties, may exceed any benefits that 

shareholders obtain through the possibility of fiduciary duty litigation. 153 Kobayashi and 

Ribstein argue that as Delaware and Nevada compete for LLC formation, Nevada's 

competitive advantage is that it can bond to maintain a bright line, low liability rule, 

while Delaware's competitive advantage is its ability to administer a regime with less 

clear rules but more predictable courts. Therefore, Nevada can compete in a space which 

Delaware may not wish to enter, as doing so would devalue the institutional investments 

it has made with its current system. 154 

Kobayashi and Ribstein note one advantage which allows Nevada to uniquely 

compete with Delaware is its small population. which generates greater assurance that 

Nevada will not arbitrarily change its corporate code because it is more dependent on 

chartering revenues than states with larger populations. 155 Kobayashi and Ribstein also 

note Nevada's reputation as a gaming center reduces its sensitivity to any reputational 

effects derived from being a lax jurisdiction state. 156 The dynamic between Delaware and 

Nevada which Kobayashi and Ribstein describe could play out even stronger in an 

arbitration regime, and it could occur over a greater number of participants in the race to 

charter firms. 157 

Ribstein and Kobayashi remind readers a lack of diversity in corporate governance 

items may not necessarily reflect lack of competition but instead may suggest demand for 

uniformity in rules for which uniformity is efficient-such as rules regarding the 

relationship with the organi7~tion and third parties such as the law of veil piercing. 158 

Thus, it would be a mistake to suggest that any instance of uniformity in corporate 

governance is necessarily value reducing. Given the first part of this Article's 

consideration of likely demanded heterogeneity and the second half of this Article's 

{.aw. 65 lEX. L REV. 469,471 (1987) 

153. Bruce IL Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein. Nevada and the Market for Cmporate Law, 35 SEATrLE U 

L Rtv 1165, 1175 (2012) 

154. /d.atll77. 

155. ld.atll78. 

156. !d. 

157. Kobayashi and Ribstcin note legal system quality is a key factor in choice of entity fonnation for 

LLCs favoring Delaware. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 94, atl27. Kobayashi and Ribstein note there may 

be reasons why smaller firms will be less interested in tailoring unique organizational fonns bL-cause they are 

less likely to be involved in litigation. Jd at 97. However the decrease in search costs for organizational 

tmloring associated with app-based governance may result in renewed tailoring of organizational fonn for 

smaller fim1s. furthennore, intermediaries and gatekeepers to small firm exchanges may have an interest in 

facilitating organizational tailoring for smaller firms particularly if they have a role in designing that 

organizational form in managing the arbitration forum. ·n1ey note local lawyers may use their participation in 

drafting organizational statutes to develop reputations that can help them obtain clients to compete with other 

lawyers In-slate. Jd. at 98. If the mode of innovation in t.:orporate law assumes an open-source character, in 

which local attorneys can take credit for particular adaptations of the corporate code, then they can establish 

nat10nal reputations as organizational lawyers in competition for clients on a much larger scale 

158. !d. at 100. 
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exploration of federal constraints on adaptability, there is reason to believe a substantial 

amount of uniformity for publicly traded firm governance is artificial and crowd funding 

offers an initial opportunity to test that hypothesis. 

The new era of chartering competition may elevate the public LLC to eclipse the 

corporate form for public firms according to the Ribstein Uncorporation thesis. 

Alternatively, it may substantially hybridize our existing understanding of the boundaries 

between corporations, LLCs, and other entity forms. In any event, no matter where the 

innovation happens, whether in some new type of business entity or by way of 

modifications of the LLC code, it is not likely to happen in Delaware and therefore will 

not happen until network effects inherent in the Delaware code---and magnified by the 

federal overlay~are alleviated through an arbitration-based business entity code 

framework is possible. 

C. The Federal Government and Delaware Both Discourage Arbitration for Public 

Company Shareholders 

Note that, although Delaware has innovative arbitration provisions for contracts, 

conducted by Delaware judges, the current Delaware statute prohibits use for 

corporations and effectively does so for publicly traded LLCs because it requires all 

parties bound by arbitration to actually sign the LLC agreement. 159 This requirement is 

effectively prohibitive in an environment of highly disbursed and traded securities. This 

Section will explore how Delaware discourages arbitration, but first it should be noted 

that until the SEC permits arbitration for federal securities claims by shareholders, 

arbitration of state corporate law claims will likely be useless. This is because of the ever 

increasing overlap between securities actions under the federal laws and state law 

corporate governance claims. Even if Delaware's code explicitly permitted arbitration of 

state corporate governance claims, we should expect nearly all those claims would find a 

new home as they morph into Securities Exchange Act claims. 

Thompson and Sale describe private rights of action under the Securities Exchange 

Act as being interpreted by federal courts in such a way that they could "annex" 

corporate governance; this observation is not withstanding the internal affairs doctrine 

itself. 160 Thompson and Sale describe state corporate governance as essentially relegated 

to the contacts of corporate acquisitions and self-dealing transactions. They also observe 

that otherwise the fundamental regulation of company behavior has been preempted by 

the federal government by way of private shareholder litigation under Rule 10b-5.16l 

Thompson and Sale describe that most private litigation under the Securities Exchange 

Act is brought after a public company corrects a prior earnings misstatement, and 

!59 GREGORY V. YARALLO ET AL, PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE DELAWARE RAPID ARBfi"RATION ACT 

17 (20 15 ), http://v.ww rlfcom/FIIeslli206 _ _DRAA%20Book%20FmaLpdf 

160. Robert !3. Thompson & Hillary Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Go.-ernance: Reflections Upon 

Federalism. 56 V A.ND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003). 

161. Jd at 861. Thompson and Sale argue SEC rulemakings under Item 303 ofRegu1ation SK functionally 

displace the state law duty of care and that a requirement rn lhe Sarbanes-Oxley Act that CEOs must certify 

financial statements pre-empts part of the state law duty of care. They list a number of further functional items 

which preempt state corporation law in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act !d. at 873. Thomson and Sale cite no federal 

restrictions under Sarbancs~Oxlcy limiting the ability of firms to provide loans executives effectively replace a 

piece of the duty ofloyalty. /d. at 877. 
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combines elements of loyalty and care claims, and might have been made pursuant to 

state law. 162 Thompson and Sale also note that securities fraud claims often charge that 

misstatements are made for the purposes of benefiting insiders which clearly overlap with 

state duty of care claims.l63 

The mechanisms of state and federal shareholder claims are also quite similar, with 

typical use of class action mechanisms being largely driven by attorneys. 164 This analysis 

suggests that any attempt to arbitrate shareholder claims at the state level will be largely 

ineffectual without a concomitant recognition of the shareholder's right to arbitrate 

federal securities claims as well, as any arbitration of the former may simply result in the 

migration of shareholder claims to the latter. If, on the other hand, firms and shareholders 

choose to maintain shareholder litigation in a judicial forum, but select arbitration of 

federal securities claims, the extent of federal preemption of state internal affairs through 

private litigation under the '34 Act may be reduced. 

Kobayashi and Ribstein note that: 

[m]ass production and sale of litigation or arbitration kits, perhaps 

supplemented by low-cost assistance as to how to use the kits, might allay these 

concerns by better enabling consumers to arbitrate individual claims. This 

would provide a compromise between the duplication of effort involved in 

thousands of individual claims and the agency costs inherent in class 

actions. 165 

This idea becomes even more helpful, and cheaper, in the context of app-based 

govemance. It is unlikely however that Delaware will ever permit shareholders in public 

companies to fully arbitrate all claims against companies and their directors outside of the 

Delaware court system. The Macey/Miller interest group analysis of Delaware corporate 

law, which explores how the development of Delaware law reflects in part the 

preferences of the bar in Delaware, presents a powerful argument for why the interest 

groups represented in the Delaware bar would quickly press a solution in the legislature 

to any effort to diminish the rents they obtain in the system.l66 

Recent events provide a concrete example of the Macey/Miller Delaware interest 

group theory. In response to a Delaware Supreme Court opinion finding that companies 

had the right to adopt bylaws imposing the English fee-shifting rule on plaintiff 

shareholders who failed to win on any claims, the Delaware legislature quickly responded 

with an amendment to the DCGL prohibiting fee-shifting bylaws for any "intemal 

corporate claim," which is to say any claim brought pursuant to Delaware corporate 

law.167 This result was clearly motivated by a fear that plaintiffs would migrate out of 

Delaware and bring claims in other jurisdictions that are less likely to enforce the feeshifting bylaw, or otherwise bring fewer claims. ln recent work, Bainbridge, who has 

162. Td. at 889 

163. Thompson & Sale, supra note 160, at 90!. 

164 Td. at 904. 

165. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. R1hstein, Law ·s information Re>·olution, 53 ARIZ. L REV. 1169, 1199 

(2011). 

166 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toll'ard an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Cmporale 

Law, 65 TEX. L REV. 469, 471 (1987) 

167 ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del 2014). 
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often defended the Delaware courts and code, cites this incident as Delaware's "selfinflicted wound." 168 

Allen argues that from a purely doctrinal standpoint, there is no reason Delaware 

law should not be willing to accommodate mandatory arbitration for corporate claims. 169 

She cites American Express Co. v. Tlalian Colors Restaurant, finding that the Federal 

Arbitration Act (FAA) authorizes mandatory arbitration provisions in commercial 

contracts that prevent class actions, and Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. 

Chevron Corp., in which the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a board bylaw 

requiring that Delaware corporate claims be litigated exclusively in Delaware courts, as 

demonstrating sufficient doctrinal basis for Delaware courts to uphold mandatory 

arbitration provisions for corporate claims arising under Delaware law. 170 After that 

litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of a board bylaw imposing the 

English fee-shifting, loser pays rule on shareholder plaintiffs bringing corporate 

litigation. 171 

As previously mentioned, the Delaware legislature quickly responded by 

invalidating board action imposing fee-shifting, but accepting the validity of forum 

selection bylaws. The Delaware legislature's rapid overturning of a holding which 

threatened the litigation bar's rents suggests one should not rely on Delaware doctrine 

alone in this analysis, but instead should keep a keen eye on the interest group calculus of 

the Delaware bar. !72 

Even if Delaware law were to expressly recognize a company's right to adopt 

arbitration, Delaware courts may still review the decision to adopt an arbitration 

provision or the decision to exercise it. The unique equity jurisdiction of Delaware courts 

has a shared trait with the "Hotel California" in that one can "check out any time you 

like, but you can never leave." 173 For instance, in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries the 

Delaware Supreme Court held that "inequitable action does not become permissible 

simply because it is legally possible."174 

Allen notes the general assumption that arbitration must necessarily obviate class 

168 Stephen M Bainhridge, Fee Shifting: lJeleware 's Self-Jnflic!ed Wowul (UCLA Sch. L, Law-Econ 

Res. Paper No. 15·10. June 29, 20 15), http://papcrs.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id=2624750. 

169 See generally Claudia H. Allen. By/Gl1·s Manda!ing Arbilration <if Stockholder Disputes?. 39 DEL. J 

CORP. L. 751 (2015) 

170. /d. at 753 

171 Jd. at 765; ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tenms Bund, 91 A 3d 554 (Del. 2014). 

172 Allen argues that tf Delaware law found that firms were not pennitted under Delaware law to adopt 

mandatory arbitration, the FAA would preempt Delaware law. Allen, supra note 169, at 770-71. That 

presume-s, however, that a court wouldn't find that the lntemal affairs doctrine requires a reading of the FAA 

that, since Congress did not directly express an intent to preempt state law, the matter should be left to the 

states. And m any event, this Article argues in another part that arbitration is not likely to take off until 

roadblocks to mandatory arbitration at the SEC are lifted. and until the legislative recommendations described 

in this Article are passed mto law (which includes a strong codification of the mlernal affairs doctrine.) 

173 Eagles. Hotel California (Asylum Records J 977) 

174 Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus .• Inc, 285 A 2d 437. 439 (Del. 1971) While Delaware's alternative 

entity statutes permit arbitration. Delaware law still maintains the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing 

requirement that presents a risk you cannot fully contract away. Allen. supra note 169, at 772. And in any event. 

it is unlikely the interest groups in Delaware would ever pem1it a full arbitration regime to replace fiduciary 

litigation for large public companies in Delaware courts 
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140 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol.41:4 

action procedures. I 75 This would represent a substantial change to the process of 

corporate adjudication, as a significant percentage of both direct and derivative claims are 

brought as class actions. If that is what shareholders and firms value, it may be utilized. 

If, however, many particularly large institutional shareholders were reluctant to give up a 

class based approach, then some hybrid form of class arbitration could be developed. But 

a new hybrid class arbitration procedure could be designed to accommodate some of the 

procedures used to certify and prosecute class actions, but in a much faster, more 

predictable way than that seen in the Delaware courts in a Jess indeterminate manner. The 

first bylaw proposed for a company listed with the SEC, which sought arbitration in 1990 

and was denied, provided for a form of class arbitration. 176 Allen notes how Delaware 

courts attempted to provide for arbitration by Delaware judges in that spirit for private 

contracts (an arbitration procedure that would expressly not apply to disputes in 

corporations or for publicly held alternative entities).l77 

Though that innovation was subsequently challenged as violating open government 

rules, it may be the case that Delaware would respond to a renewed federalism race in 

which it was losing substantial market share with some kind of arbitration forum, likely 

composed of Delaware judges. While such an innovation may present useful choices for 

new firms, it would likely always be constrained by the gravitational forces of 

Delaware's interest group politics and would therefore likely lose a renewed entity 

formation race. The SEC staff strongly disfavors arbitration for private claims under the 

securities laws, despite the fact that they should be perfectly legal. 178 When previous 

large corporate IPOs have included in their organizational documents a provision 

requiring mandatory arbitration of all shareholder claims, the SEC staff have refused to 

accelerate the registration statements of those companies on the grounds that a provision 

in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which forbids waivers of provisions contained in 

the Securities Exchange Act, forbids mandatory arbitration. 179 SEC Staff has similarly 

disallowed shareholder proposals for mandatory arbitration on the same basis. lSO 

Therefore, we see that in order for arbitration to work, it must be expressly permitted at 

both the state and federal level simultaneously. In this area federal preemption actually 

supports Delaware's dominance of the state entity formation race and inhibits state 

175. Allen, supra note !69. at 754. 

l 76 !d. at 802-03. 177. !d. at 771--72. 

178. 'Ihls is a rather incredible position, since private rights of action were never actualJy intended by the 

drafters of the Securities Exchange Act, but were instead created by courts decades later. Chief Just1cc 

Rchnquist described the private right of action under the Act as a ·~judicial oak'' grov.n from a "legislative 

acorn·· Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 421 US. 723.737 (1975). Thus, one reason why arbitration 

will be vital to reinvigorating charter competition is that private Act !Jtigation will continue to creep into issues 

covered by the internal affairs doctrine, and indeed 1f state law claims become sub1ect to an arbitration process. 

and are coupled with codes that reduce the range of litigation pcnnitted. migratlon of otherwise state law claims 

to federal claims would rapidly mcrease. Note that for cmwdfunded tlnns on a federal platfonn, an express 

right to sue is statutorily detlned and linked to 12(a)(2) damages for securities offerings See Secunties Act of 

I 933, ~ 12(a)(2). "Jhus. a crowd fund issuer could still opt-out of Act liability_ and state crowdfunding platforms 

should be able to opt-out of Act liability if the SEC were properly applying the law. and possibly also 

completely opt-out of securities liability. 

179. Allen, supra note 169, at 776. 

l 80. !d. at 779. 
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2016] Uber-ized Corporate Law 141 

challengers who might develop an entirely new mode of corporate governance with a 

host of possible governance innovations. 

D. Arbitration Will Require a Novel Code Design. and (Initially) an Advismy Opinion 

Mechanism 

Kobayashi and Ribstein note a tradeoff in that lawmaking by arbitration reduces 

incentives to produce law, and thereby inhibits positive externalities to non-litigants. 181 If 

the arbitration body and the producer of the corporate code are the same entity, then it 

may internalize that effect and thereby have incentives itself to create law through 

opinions that deal with unanticipated situations-as for example in the form of advisory 

opinions. 182 Innovations in the use of concrete advisory opinions will likely also form a 

part of a new code. Delaware judges dance with this approach through use of dicta and 

extensive speeches and articles to telegraph expected changes in the law. Indeed, they 

permit other federal courts and the SEC to request what is effectively an advisory opinion 

from the Delaware Supreme Court. A more direct advisory opinion mechanism could 

offer a clearer picture for business entity formers by way of advisory opinions-as 

perhaps a collective vote of arbitrators on annual interpretations of the corporate code 

that have precedential value or otherwise respond to requests for clarification. In order to 

compete with Delaware's initial advantage in its extensive precedential authority, 

providing determinate corporate codes might require an advisory based means of 

interpretation to supplement case law precedent, particular in the early years of a new 

competitor jurisdiction with a new non-judicial forum just getting off the ground. Indeed, 

Kamar discusses no-action letters by the SEC, issued in response to requests for guidance 

from private parties, at the federal level that minimize indeterminacy in the securities 

laws. 183 

Allen notes arbitration provisions can include substantial flexibility in design by 

contract, incorporating modified versions of nearly any concept seen in common law 

181. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 165, at 1207. Another way in which a more streamlined arbitration 

process is likely to be helpful is in the process whereby the value of minority shareholders' interest is appraised. 

This could take place when an entity is dissolved or when a frcezeout merger is accomplished and a controlling 

shareholder with a mimmum percentage of O\vnership "'freezes ouf' hy statutory right the remaining holdout 

shareholders. Delaware· s own Chief Justice Strine bemoans the state of Delaware· s appraisal process: ""The 

concept of fair value under Delaware law is not equivalent to the economic concept of fair market value." 

William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd., J11e Jvfystery of Delaware Law's Continuing Success, lL ILL L REV., 

at *28, http://Vl\VW.illinoisla,vreview.org/wp-contcnt/ilr-content/artlcle3/2009/l/Camcy 

pdf. Carney and Shepherd identify four Delaware merger fairness and appmisal actions that took an average of 

8.7 years to resolve. Jd. at 45. Carney and Shepherd note that what could otherwise be a simple process of 

appraising company value has been made unnecessarily difficult by Delaware's indeterminate approach to 

company evaluation, which utilizes, rather than a market based mea..;;ure, u judicial fairness opinion which is 

guided by a nebulous concept of a fair pro-rata apportionment of the pre-merger value for the shareholders. /d. 

at 25 

182. One other way in which a different corporate code could be uniquely dilferent from Delaware would 

be a different means to sift through derivative cases (assuming derivative actions are a concept used in the new 

code) such that some outside panel of experts in the field, like VC or techies, determine whether a funded 

business was a good f3.ith venture or in fact a fraudulent sham enterprise, in much the same way that med mal 

cases in many states use a panel ofMDs to sift tl1rough eases before they go to trial 

183 Ehud Kamar, A Regulatmy Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Cmporate Law, 98 COLUM I. 

REv. 1908,1922 n56(1998) 
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142 The Journal (if Corporation Lm11 [Vol. 41:4 

litigation, including a process for the creation of case law.1 84 Black notes among the 

benefits of arbitration over litigation are "faster and less expensive proceedings," 

"decreased risk of aberrational jury verdicts," "more accurate outcomes because of 

arbitrator expertise or the application of trade rules, and "better protection of confidential 

infom1ation." 185 She also notes one typically referenced drawback is limitations on 

appeals, 186 though the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority's (FINRA) process for 

arbitration appeals to an appeals board is a notable exception. 187 

E. Blending the loconomics ofCrowdfimding Firms with a )Vew Corporate Lm11 System 

Free f:!lthe Federal Overlay 

Some crowdfunded firms currently operating on Kick starter mix profit motives with 

non-profit social objectives. Many states, including the Delaware corporate code, 

recognize some form of public benefit corporation that merges for-profit and non-profit 

goals. The federal overlay becomes quite awkward if one of these chooses to issue public 

shares in these types of entities. 

This Article further explores how crowdfunded firms are likely to require a level of 

flexibility that has thus far been impossible in state charter competition under the federal 

overlay, particularly the overlay of private litigation pursuant to the Securities Exchange 

Act. 188 Until crowdfunding goes online, the prospect of non-profit business entities being 

"publicly traded" and the unique issues posed by publicly traded firms of this nature will 

not be faced. The federal overlay represented by SEC rules promulgated under the 

auspices of the Securities Exchange Act, with its investor profit focus, will significantly 

limit freedom of innovation in corporate governance for these types of entity fom1s, and 

thereby upend the typical interest group politics of federal preemption in corporate 

governance in the area of what this Article explores as "publicly traded non-profits" or 

"publicly traded charities." 

Agrawal notes philanthropic entities are increasingly asking for defined benchmarks 

184. Allen, supra note 169, at 796. 798, 800. 

185. Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors· Claims Against Issuers: An Idea whose Time has Come, 75 

L &CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 119 (2012). 

186 !d. at 120. 

187. Black cites as evidence that arbitration can work effectively even in the context of shareholder claims 

against large companies. One example in which it was pennitted, and in which a class based arbitration 

mechanism was acknowledged as the appropriate mechanism, involved a dispute over dividend payments for 

Surgut shares traded in the U.S. but subject to Russian Federation Laws, provided for class arbitration of 

shareholder claims in an intemational forum, and was upheld. /d. at 117 

188. Many of the tlnns currently funded on a crowdfund pre-cursor called Kickstartcr (which allows 

dispersed retail funding of projects, hut does not permit distribution of profits, and instead features distribution 

of in-kind benefits; i e., fans funding their favorite hund via the online platform do not obtain a share of future 

profits, hut may obtain prcfCrcntial access to discounted (.:Oncc.rt tickets) operate under a norm that one would 

characterize as a strange mixture of profit motiVe and chantable donation. That strange brew is llkely to explode 

m publicly traded entities as crowdfw1ding comes online, and despite well-supported fmn theory evidence that 

such a mixed motlve firm will he poorly run. nevertheless is expected to represent a strong consumer preference 

on these platforms going forward. Many states, including Delaware_ have attempted to innovate to meet their 

consumer demands with some version of ''public benefiC corporations. Indeed, the Cato Institute is orgamzed 

through such an entity form as a non-profit corpomtion organized under the laws of Kansas 
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2016] Uber-ized Corporate Lmv 143 

of success from grantees. 189 It could be that review of activity by a board or by an 

external reviewing entity such as an arbitration body or the crowdfunding platform itself 

could simply involve verification that the entity has achieved its benchmark. It may be 

the case that shareholders could commit themselves to subsequent rounds of funding in 

advance, premised on the entity's meeting a series of benchmarks. 

For some types of crowdfunded firms, the market for corporate control could prove 

useful, but for others in which the leadership of the entity has some firm specific attribute 

the market for corporate control could be unworkable. Shareholder preferences may 

significantly discount high residual agency losses resulting from these organizational 

fonns. For example, an investor preference may reflect high utility in the ability to say 

one is a shareholder in their favorite band. A potential investor could exhibit a strong 

investor preference in the ability to share in any profits through the development of a 

drug targeting a very small population of patients but nevertheless be willing to see the 

investment as a donation if development costs dissipate all profits. 

Part III has demonstrated arbitration will be an essential component of a 

reinvigorated corporate federalism. Even if many firms do not necessarily select an 

arbitration-based alternative, successfully challenging Delaware's dominance may 

require development of at least one successful arbitration based alternative regime. That 

will require federal recognition of arbitration rights for firms and their shareholders. 

Part I of this Article demonstrated that crowdfunding opens up an event window for 

recharging corporate federalism and entity formation competition and also demonstrated 

how crowdfunded firms will have unique and heterogeneous needs outside the range of 

what is presently available. Part II demonstrated how and why the federal overlay 

restricts that available range of innovation. Part III demonstrated that an arbitration-based 

means of adjudication and a corporate code designed to be arbitrated will be key 

components to challenging Delaware's network effects. The final Part of this Article 

develops some predictive analysis for the various means by which these new innovations 

might evolve-first over the crowdfunding platform and then possibly spilling over into 

renewed innovation for larger public firms. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Even if not all of the innovations evolve in the new world I am suggesting, some of 

them might, and they might create things like a functioning arbitration system that could 

fundamentally alter the current state of corporate federalism. Even if only some of them 

crossover into the large public company space, it could substantially alter state chartering 

competition in that sphere as well-particularly as smaller sized firms grow and 

transition from being crowd funded to being large public firms. This Article suggests an 

initial incursion into the federal overlay in corporate governance that could, initially, 

enhance the incredible benefits of crowdfunding and ultimately may completely reshape 

corporation law itself. 

189. Agrawal eta!., supra note 8, at 6 
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Source: Hester Pelfce and Ben)amm Klutsey, eds, Refrarrnng FmanCial Regulation Enhancmg Stabtlity 

and Protecting Consumers. Arlrngton. VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason Un1versrty, 2016. 

CHAPTER 16 

Ending the Specter of a Federal 

Corporate Law 

J. W. VERRET* 

Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University 

F

or most of US history, corporation law, or the law governing the interaction between investors and the companies in which they invest, was a 

function of state law. State corporate law governed the duties that company directors owed to their investors, established the powers of investors to 

select new directors and managers, and maintained authority for fundamental 

business decisions in the board of directors. State corporate codes have evolved 

in the intervening years, increasingly allowing investors and companies to 

design alternative arrangements to the default provisions contained in these 

old codes. Steady incursions by federal law into discrete pieces of state corporate law have begun to slowly erode this system, however, and threaten to 

inhibit innovation in corporate governance at the state level. 

In 1933 and 1934, the US Congress passed laws requiring disclosure of financial information to investors in widely traded firms, but left the working parts of 

state corporate law largely intact. For the first thirty years after the US Securities 

and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established, it was clearly understood that 

state law governed traditionally state corporate law matters, such as the duties 

that boards owed to shareholders or the permitted structural makeup of a 

*1his chapter is based in part on J. W. Verret, "Uber-ized Corporate Law: Toward a 21st Century 

Corporate Governance for Crowdfunding and App-Based Investor Communications," journal of 

Corporation Law41 (Summer 2016): 927-69. 

437 
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ENDING THE SPECTER OF A fEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

company and the way its directors and officers were selected. In 1945, for example, the SEC made clear that the propriety of shareholder proposals at annual 

company meetings would be determined pursuant to state law.1 

The detente began to change in 1968 when the Williams Act gave the 

SEC authority to go beyond merely disclosure-based regulation and actually 

empowered the SEC to regulate the process whereby public companies were 

taken over by new buyers. In the 1970s, then SEC Chairman William Cary proposed an express federal corporate law that entirely preempted state corporate 

Jaw when he urged that "a pygmy among the 50 states prescribes, interprets, 

and indeed denigrates national corporate policy."2 

Bill Cary's express suggestion never happened, but a slow advance offederal incursions into state corporate law continued, culminating with an explosive enlargement of the federal footprint in state corporate law in financial 

reform legislation in 2002 and 2010. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), for example, included a variety of 

corporate governance reforms that were in large part entirely unrelated to the 

financial crisis of 2008. For example, one of them required companies to 

disclose their use of minerals mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Another required a nonbinding vote by shareholders, which carries no practical consequences, on CEO pay. Still another required companies to disclose 

the ratio of their CEO's pay to that of the average worker, a suggestion made 

some ten years earlier by a labor-funded group as a way to increase union 

leverage in negotiations. 3 Many of the suggested reforms had been proposed 

long before 2008, yet were included in what was perceived as must-pass financial reform legislation in order to cater to the powerful special interest groups 

that had long supported those proposals. 

As much as the corporate governance reforms of 2008 were misguided, 

they were the result of many years of regulation by the federal government 

that has slowly eroded the role of states in creating corporate law. That process 

began with rules adopted in response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals in 

200 l and 2002, embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that now determines the 

qualifications for service on company boards of directors. Oddly, the corporate 

governance rules regarding independence that were codified in 2002 and 2003 

largely reflected attributes of the Enron board of directors. 4 

Much of existing corporate law scholarship has been divided into two competing camps. One urges that states "race to the top" and seek to balance the 

438 
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J. W. VERRET 

rights of shareholders and the obligations of directors by adopting laws that 

maximize shareholder value. That side of the discussion tends to argue that the 

market for publicly traded stock will discipline any excesses by the state that 

cater to corporate insiders at shareholders' expense. The opposing camp urges 

that corporate insiders will distort the race into a "race to the bottom" in which 

the state that designs corporate governance codes that allow insiders to exploit 

shareholders and destroy firm value will attract the most new incorporators. 

The latter camp typically urges as an alternative a federal incorporation regime 

broadly, and also urges discrete preemptions of state law by a more enlightened 

federal regulator. 

This chapter urges that over the last five decades, the race has been distorted 

by the presence of federal preemption. The supposed race is not much of a 

race at all. Federal incursions into state law have themselves garnered significant market power to the currently dominant state for public incorporations, 

Delaware. Proponents of the "race to the bottom" theory have the causal link 

backwards. Federal preemption of discrete areas of corporate law is not the 

answer to market failures in the market for corporate law, federal preemption is in fact causing market failures. Federal incursions do this in part by 

inhibiting innovations, like an arbitration-based corporate code, which could 

challenge Delaware's dominance in corporate law by challenging one of the 

principal competitive attributes of Delaware in its predictable court system. 

As such, a rollback of the federal footprint is the best way to reinvigorate the 

chartering race in corporate law. 

1bis chapter argues that flrst and foremost, this federal overlay in corporate governance must be stripped away. Alternately, at a minimum the existing federal corporate governance rule book should at least become part of an 

optional opt-in regime and thereby allow a firm's shareholders to determine 

whether the federal arrangement is best for their particular firm. But arguing 

for removal of current federal encroachments on state corporate law contained 

in Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank is just the beginning. This chapter goes 

on to explore how other existing federal laws can be molded to empower the 

states to compete with each other in corporate law. A number of institutional 

changes will be needed to develop the foundations necessary to facilitate innovation and economic growth in state corporate law. 

Dodd-Frank, legislation built on an improper understanding of the factors 

leading to the 2008 financial crisis, ultimately threatens the competition and 

439 
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ENDING THE SPECTER OF A FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

flexibility required for consumer benefits created via innovation. Specifically, 

Title IX, Subsection G, of Dodd-Frank continues the trend of centralizing 

corporate law by consolidating regulatory power over corporate governance in 

the federal government, thus preempting the ability of states to be competitive 

in chartering. State chartering may be competitive within the modes of governance permitted by the federal overlay.5 This chapter's examination of a range 

of innovations that would be clearly helpful in experimental environments, 

like crowdfunding, will demonstrate that the federal footprint in corporate 

law stifles the chartering race by inhibiting innovation. 

Business entity law has been around since the establishment of the firm and 

has remained an important contributing factor to the economic systems that 

develop and utilize them. Corporate law was key to building the Roman aqueducts and critical to the Industrial Revolution. The advent and public embrace 

of innovative business models like Kickstarter's crowdfunding approach and 

Uber's sharing-economy structure demonstrate demand for a more flexible 

approach toward corporate governance. With each unique business model 

comes the necessitation of an equally unique corporate structure. However, the 

mere fact that the economics of new-age firms suggest a demand for flexible 

innovation in corporate governance does not mean that states are in a position 

to make that innovation available. 

For example, Stephen Bainbridge at the UCLA School of Law and M. Todd 

Henderson of the University of Chicago Law School recently designed a novel 

approach to the structure of boards of directors in which other business entities can themselves serve as members of the board, which would allow board 

member companies to economize on scale and scope, have more directed 

compensation and liability incentives than the current model, better expose 

the market for board membership to market forces, and provide reputational 

constraints for repeat player board member firms. 6 Bainbridge and Henderson 

note that federal rules that would prevent their idea were not necessarily even 

designed to prevent entity membership on the board, but the references to 

natural persons in the federal rules effectively preclude their innovation from 

being implemented.7 Moving forward, a competitive model for the production 

of corporate law will be critical to make the most of technological advances 

that are reducing the cost of individual interaction. In this chapter I suggest 

that the reinvigoration of state law federalism can serve to support such a 

competitive model. 
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J W, VERRET 

CORPORATE FEDERALISM UNDER THE THREAT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION 

The corporate codes that govern business entities have been the lynch pin of 

America's economic development since the start of the industrial age. Business 

entities with separate existence, able to protect their shareholders from liability 

for corporate actions, were essential to facilitate the first large-scale industrial 

investments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. States competed to offer increasingly accommodative corporate codes, and eventually 

Delaware became a dominant player in that race by allowing companies to 

own stock in other companies-something its chief competitor, New Jersey, 

prohibited until the middle of the twentieth century. 

This competitive state system, in which states compete to attract out-ofstate entrepreneurs to form corporations in their state, has also been beneficial 

to shareholders. A study found that firms incorporated in Delaware, the current winner of the incorporation race, experience an increase in shareholder 

value at the initial public offering (IPO) stage over other firms solely by virtue 

of being incorporated in Delaware.8 

Roberta Romano of Yale Law School has described this state system as 

allowing states to serve as laboratories in which new corporate governance 

arrangements can be invented and measured against offerings from competing 

states. While not every state actively competes in this arena, smaller-population states like Delaware have been eager to compete for incorporation fees 

from newly formed companies. 

A more recent innovation in business entity law has been the widespread 

use oflimited liability companies, or LLCs, which have a greater degree of flexibility in designing the range of fiduciary obligations that boards and CEOs 

owe to their shareholders. While that degree of flexibility is greater than the 

flexibility afforded CEOs and boards of corporations, it remains somewhat 

limited. Delaware still maintains an obligation of"good faith and fair dealing" that shareholders are not permitted to opt out of in favor of contractually 

specified obligations. The late Professor Larry Ribstein also notes a number of 

cases in which Delaware courts have struggled to uphold the Delaware legislature's intent to promote freedom of contract in LLC agreements. 

While Delaware competes to maintain its advantage in new business entity 

formation, Jonathan Macey of the Yale Law School and Geoffrey Miller of the 

New York University School of Law suggest that the state may enjoy an extent 

of market power that allows it to also maximize the litigation fees enjoyed 

441 
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teNDING THE SPECTFR OF A FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

by Delaware law firms that help to craft Delaware's code. 9 That would certainly explain Delaware's reaction in 2015 to a court ruling that companies are 

allowed to adopt bylaws that force losing plaintiffs to pay a company's legal 

fees in shareholder actions. The Delaware bar, fearing a loss in litigation business, immediately moved to change the Delaware code to reverse the Delaware 

Supreme Court's ruling and prohibit such "loser pays" bylaws.10 

Many of Delaware's critics suggest that it does not actually actively compete 

for business entity formation any longer, and that the idea of state competition 

in business entity formation is largely a myth at this point. They argue that 

Delaware has a hundred years of precedent behind it, and as such its advantage is insurmountable for new states that might attempt to compete with 

Delaware by improving on its code. For example, if another state wanted to 

take Delaware's code, improve on it, and thereby compete with Delaware, it 

would find the Delaware code filled with nebulous concepts like "good faith" 

obligations and a "duty of care" and "duty of loyalty" that have slowly been 

defined over a hundred years and thousands of pages of precedent. States may 

feel Delaware's body of precedent is an insurmountable obstacle in trying to 

make their own codes work. 

Supporters of Dodd-Frank's corporate governance reforms latched on 

to that argument and urged that Delaware failed investors by not adopting 

corporate governance reforms they favored. Ann Yerger of the Council of 

Institutional Investors testified with respect to the proxy access rule included 

in Dodd-Frank that "the States have failed investors too long, Delaware in 

particular, and it really only acted when it had to. And I think it is important 

that the SEC take action on this important reform."ll Relative to other states 

in the incorporation race, it is not clear that Delaware is failing shareholders. 

For example, as noted earlier, companies incorporated in Delaware enjoy a 

premium in their average market value compared to non-Delaware companies 

at the time they go public. Relative to the range of options for shareholders 

that could be observed in a more competitive chartering environment free of 

a federal footprint, which stamps out more competitive innovations, Yerger 

may well be right. But relaxing federal incursions into state law is the answer 

to the problem. 

Delaware's critics may certainly have a point that Delaware imperfectly 

competes in the race to charter new businesses and to innovate in corporate 

governance. 'Those critics, however, have made the wrong diagnosis. Federal 

~42 
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J. W. Vi=RRET 

preemption of state corporate law, and the specter offuture federal preemption, discourages other states from challenging Delaware. 'The state laboratories described by Romano do not really work if the innovators must 

work under the threat that their innovations may be destroyed by federal 

action. Indeed, Professor Mark Roe argues that Delaware is uniquely adept 

among the states at responding to the specter of federal preemption with 

narrowly tailored changes that outmaneuver some of the goals of blunt 

federallegislation. 12 

'Ihe threat of federal action has important consequences for arbitration as a 

means to invigorate state competition. The market power that Delaware enjoys 

in the chartering race could be sidestepped with an entirely new corporate 

governance system designed to be enforced in an entirely different way. Rather 

than litigating nebulous "fiduciary duties" in court, like the current model 

most states use and which was inspired by Delaware, an arbitration-based 

system could design duties through contract, and rather than relying on judges 

in states without Delaware's judicial expertise, it could rely on industry veterans 

specializing in arbitration of complaints. Such an approach would allow other 

states to break Delaware's market power and shake the very foundations of 

American corporate law. 

And yet, the SEC has strongly discouraged firms going public from requiring that investors arbitrate claims against the company. This restriction should 

be expected to apply to crowdfunded firms as well. The SEC has refused to 

approve the offering documents of firms including arbitration in their offering 

documents, despite the fact that the Federal Arbitration Act provides investors with such a right. 'This is but one example of how federal preemption of 

state corporate law actually impedes state competition and thereby provides 

an advantage to the currently dominant state of Delaware. 

Some protection of federalism, and therefore the states' ability to compete 

via governance innovation, is supposed to be offered via the internal affairs 

doctrine, a rule of construction created by judges that applies both in interpretation of federal statutes and an interstate choice oflaw rule. The doctrine 

holds that the "internal affairs" of corporations, or the contractual relationship between shareholders, directors, and officers of corporations, should be 

determined pursuant to the laws of the state of incorporation.13 While many 

states respect the doctrine, New York and California abandon it in the context 

of companies not traded on a national securities exchange.14 And while some 

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ENDING THE SPECTER OF A f'EDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

federal court interpretations of the securities laws demonstrate respect for the 

internal affairs doctrine, 15 others do not. At times, Congress will either explicitly preempt matters covered by the internal affairs doctrine through statute 

or the SEC will infringe on the matters within the internal affairs doctrine 

through administrative action. 

The internal affairs doctrine has been a vital component in sustaining 

interstate chartering competition. This doctrine has been one by which federal judges, in interpreting the federal securities laws, have tended to read 

the securities laws as not intending to preempt state law unless such intent is 

clear from the statute. This doctrine also has been used by state judges to give 

mutual respect to each other's corporate law (e.g., a shareholder in a Delaware 

corporation, suing in California, has traditionally seen the claim determined 

pursuant to Delaware law). And yet the internal affairs doctrine has begun to 

come apart at the seams, further threatening to limit competition in the state 

system. This is true both insofar as discrete incursions into state law are occurring at the federal level, and also with respect to states that have refused to fully 

give deference to the laws of a company's state of incorporation when suits or 

administrative action are brought in other states. 

While the internal affairs doctrine has at some points limited the SEC from 

undertaking to preempt state law, it has not always served as a binding constraint on the SEC's use of discretionary power to preempt state corporate 

law. Further, California and New York have adopted statutes that ignore the 

internal affairs doctrine for companies with a large number of shareholders 

in their states. 

'I he mere existence of a threat of federal preemption can dissuade states 

from pursuing corporate innovation. This chilling effect on innovation is not 

new. Delaware judges William Chandler and Leo Strine previously expressed 

the frustration of state corporate innovators regarding the prospect of federal 

preemption when they noted in response to Sarbanes-Oxley, "What's next? 

A ban on going private transactions? Or on options-based compensation of 

executives? Or on interested transactions?"16 '!his manifestation of concern is 

not contained to existing innovations, either. The incompatibility and lack of 

clarity inherent to one-size-fits-all regulation results in a restriction on competition, as it discourages states from deviating from the status quo. 

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example, set mandatory requirements 

for independence of certain committees, mandatory CEO certification of 

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J. W VfcRRU 

financial systems, and a prohibition on loans to corporate officers. 1be footprint of preemption is probably wider than originally intended by the drafters 

of the statute: if, for example, some method of governing firms is stricter than 

the board-centric model that was in vogue during the passage of SarbanesOxley, states would be precluded from developing it because Sarbanes-Oxley 

entrenches a board-centric approach. 

To this point, Professors Kobayashi and Ribstein note that one prerequisite for a quality sorting model, or interstate competition, to be effective is that 

"jurisdictions are free to select any set oflaws they desire." 17 However, Roe's 

extensive analysis of the extent to which federal law preempts state corporate 

law demonstrates the constraints on a full Tie bout model in the corporate federalism context. Roe defines the problem of the federal overhang succinctly: 

Federal authorities can, and do, confine state competition. 

'lbey have made rules-such as vast parts of the securities 

laws-that are functionally part of America's corporate law. 

1hey could do more, were they so inclined. In nearly every 

decade of the twentieth century; the decade's major corporate 

law issue either went federal or federal authorities threatened 

to take it over-from early twentieth century merger policy, to 

the 1930s securities laws, to the 1950s proxy fights, to the 1960s 

Williams Act, to the 1970s going-private transactions. Even if 

the states never adjust to the federal presence, Washington is a 

player in American corporate governance.18 

Roe's conclusion: "Because Delaware players can never be oblivious to the 

possibility ofbeing displaced, we have never had, and we never could have, a full 

state-to-state race in corporate law."19 While Roe is correct that the federal 

overhang inhibits competition, he overstates the case, particularly with respect 

to the prospect of significantly enhancing interstate competition through selfenforcing limits on the federal overhang. 

Roe notes that federal preemption breaching the internal affairs doctrine 

frequently occurs both through statute and through the SEC's discretionary authority. 20 Roe generally points to sources of federal preemption such 

as the SEC, the Congress, federal courts interpreting securities law cases 

(the existing internal affairs doctrine notwithstanding), and the national 

44b 
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~ND!NG TH~ SPECTER OF A f-EDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

exchanges. 21 Romano notes that the SEC typically strongly pressures the 

national exchanges to adopt uniform corporate governance provisions. 22 

Roe goes on to state that "Presidents Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson each 

sought mandatory federal incorporation."23 Each of those attempts failed, 

however, suggesting that full-scale nationalization of corporate law is constrained by interest group dynamics. Macey described in 1990 that dynamic 

as one in which "Congress can amass significant political support by refraining 

from preempting state Jaw in this area. The fact that Congress has not enacted 

a national corporate law indicates that deference to the states is in fact its 

political-support-maximizing solution."24 Though large-scale incursion into 

state law did not occur, Congress did find discrete incursions helpful, as for 

instance with the Williams Act's regulation of takeovers. And at times the 

SEC used authority delegated to it to undertake preemptive actions under its 

own initiative. Furthermore, since the time of Macey's exploration, a number 

oflarge-scale federal incursions into discrete pieces of state corporate law have 

occurred, usually during times of national attention to corporate governance 

scandals or crisis. 

But even the larger-scale incursions do not preempt completely. For 

example, proposals to mandate an independent board chairman and impose 

constraints on executive compensation were pared back in favor of optional 

approaches for public companies in Dodd-Frank. So while bulwarks against 

federal incursion can be sustained in part, they must also be built in advance 

of crisis-induced legislation. Reforms to strengthen additional states' interest 

in preventing future preemption, and making it difficult for the federal government to selectively preempt and instead leaving full-scale preemption as 

its only option, may fortify the bulwark against federal incursions into state 

corporate law. 

Roe concludes that one of the earliest forms of preemption in the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934 was preemption of shareholder voting disclosure and 

voting processes, stating, "The wide SEC regulation of proxies determines 

what goes into the proxy request to shareholders, what gets onto the ballot, 

who gets access to shareholder lists, and how a proxy fight ... is waged .... 

Voting is probably the single most important internal corporate affair." 25 

Similarly, Michael Greve of the Anton in Scalia Law School at George 

Mason University and his co-author Ashley Parrish point out an increasing 

level of agency delegation by Congress and cite Dodd-Frank as an example. 26 

!J46 
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J. W VERRET 

This delegation provides the SEC with an opportunity to expand the reach of 

its authority into traditionally state areas. If the internal affairs doctrine were 

codified and a procedure for states to challenge its violation were adopted, it 

would be harder for the SEC to unilaterally expand its reach through purely 

administrative preemption, even if Congress continues to practice excessive 

agency delegation. 

This practice is no longer limited to the SEC, however, as other federal agencies are increasingly seeing preemption of state corporate law as a means to 

enhance their authority over the entities they regulate. Federal Reserve Board 

Governor Daniel Tarullo recently proposed the notion of a massive expansion 

of fiduciary duties for banks regulated by the Federal Reserve, arguing for a 

change in which: 

the fiduciary duties of the boards of regulated financial 

firms ... reflect what I have characterized as regulatory 

objectives. Doing so might make the boards of financial 

firms responsive to the broader interests implicated by their 

risk-taking decisions even where regulatory and supervisory measures had not anticipated or addressed a particular 

issue. And, of course, the courts would thereby be available as 

another route for managing the divergence between private 

and social interests in risk taking. 27 

It was not clear whether Governor Tarullo was suggesting a change to 

state Jaw or instead was suggesting a federal preemption of state fiduciary 

duties. At present, the fiduciary duties owed by banks to their shareholders 

with respect to chartered banks are a function of federal law that itself references state corporate law. It may have represented both: pressure on states 

to reform their fiduciary duty jurisprudence backed up by an implicit threat 

of federal preemption. The Roe thesis suggests Delaware may respond to 

that threat. Certainly this proposal was highly provocative and has not been 

directly adopted by the Federal Reserve. But it presents an extreme case of the 

threat of federal preemption. Governor Tarullo additionally suggested federal 

rules concerning executive compensation, management reporting systems, 

and board structure as additional corporate governance avenues that federal 

regulators might regulate.28 

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ENDING THE SPECTER OF A FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NEEDS OF CROWDFUNDED FIRMS: A MICROCOSM 

OF THE DAMAGE FEDERAL PREEMPTION CAN DO TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 

One development in the capital markets world that promises to renew innovation in methods of business financing is a new regime of crowdfunding 

that has been facilitated by regulations at the SEC, adopted pursuant to the 

Jumps tart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of2012, to allow very small and 

early-stage companies and investment projects to access public markets. 29 This 

new innovation will of necessity require a new corporate governance system 

designed for the unique needs of crowdfunding, but unfortunately the existing 

federal overhang in corporate law threatens to impede the promise of crowdfunding. 

'I he regulatory regime for crowdfunding is relatively new. It remains to be 

seen whether crowdfunding will reshape startup financing. And if it does not, 

it also remains to be seen whether crowdfunding will be primarily held up 

by regulatory constraints that remain despite the JOBS Act. Crowdfunding is 

nevertheless a helpful microcosm for the experiment. 

The questions at the heart of this chapter are simple: In the absence of federal preemption in corporate law, what range of alternative innovations would 

be possible? And in the absence of federal preemption, how much more competitive would the state system for creating corporate law become?30 

Answering these questions also calls for a difficult thought experiment, 

because one must consider a world in which a range of institutional constraints 

in corporate law and financial markets that presently exist are eliminated, and 

consider a world in which the path dependencies in the law and the institutional 

design of the industry itself would disappear. 

The environment best suited for this thought experiment is crowdfunding. It is presently at a nascent stage with respect to the regulatory regime that 

governs it. The financing mechanism also was allowed to grow, in a limited 

capacity, before the federal regulatory regime went online.31 The institutional 

dynamics seen in that early precursor to crowdfunding afford sufficient data 

to begin the necessary thought experiment. 

Crowdfunded firms are expected to be designed around a number of"quasi 

for-profit" models that will require legal duties and structures very different 

from those popular in previous models. Some crowdfunded firms, for example, are expected to specialize in funding drug research to find cures for ailments with small patient populations. Such a firm could face difficult choices 

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in the tradeoff between searching out the most profitable drugs and maximizing the odds of finding a cure. 

Indeed, one would expect that funders would go into the investment expecting the possibility that the firm might stretch the boundaries of traditional 

fiduciary obligations, or the residual obligation of good faith and fair dealing, 

in the initial search for a cure if necessary, but would subsequently seek to 

maximize profits obtained by successful research. Such a mixed-motive firm 

will of necessity require a corporate code that maximizes freedom of contract 

to define the obligations owed by a board to shareholders and one that permits 

use of arbitration rather than litigation to enforce any contractual duties. 

It is already clear that crowdfunded firms, much like master limited partnerships (MLPs ), are likely to utilize nontraditional monitoring to protect against 

fraud. A study by Wharton Professor Ethan Mollick on a platform similar to 

crowdfunding found that funders of most projects were highly involved and 

provided ideas from the design of consumer products to the development of 

business strategyY That study also found that fraud detection was essentially 

"crowdsourced" with rapid detection of fraudulent projects through user commentary on platform blogs and comment sites. 

A large community of users can maximize on the low costs of communication in the era of social networking to better police fraudY This new model 

of corporate governance is vastly different from the current model, which is 

based on a theory developed by Berle and Means and premised on an assumption that small shareholders face insurmountable costs in communicating with 

each other and with directors of the firms they own.34 

Some crowdfunded firms may find that shareholder participation is useful, 

although not necessarily through the rigid mandates established by federal 

law. Other firms may find shareholder participation harmful. Entertainment 

projects, like fan-based movie funding, have been particularly successful 

on crowdfunded platforms that predated the new crowdfunding regulatory 

regime. Those projects tend to center on a specific director or actor as a necessary element in the project and may therefore seek to limit the ability of 

shareholders to interfere in decisions by that individual. Thus old models of 

the fiduciary duties that companies owe to their shareholders will be largely 

outdated for this new model. 

An explicit recognition of the right of investors and firms to choose arbitration 

to resolve claims against public companies, whether through SEC guidance or 

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~NDiNG THE SPECTER OF A FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

statutory reform of the Securities Act of 1933, is vital to assist the development 

of new publicly traded small businesses like those expected to evolve under 

crowdfunding. One reason arbitration is so important is that firms funded 

under crowdfunding will have unique designs vastly different from those seen 

in the publicly traded space thus far. Crowd funded firms will be much smaller, 

will be publicly traded much earlier in the innovation life cycle than any firms 

previously seeking public capital, and will go public with the assumption that 

multiple rounds of future funding will be required. 

The fact that the suggestions in this chapter are designed to facilitate crowdfunding will also serve to generate retail support from individual investors, in 

much the same way the ride-sharing app Uber has managed to generate strong 

retail support that has allowed it to successfully challenge the powerful lobby 

of incumbent taxi cabs. Crowdfunding, like Uber, is a service that directly 

challenges the incumbent methods of financing and whose most cogent threat 

is the regulatory barriers to entry supported by incumbent firms. And crowdfunding, like Uber, is poised to utilize technological improvements in the cost 

of communication that are popular among millennia! consumers. 35 

While crowdfunding platforms may escape most of the requirements put 

into place by Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley, those crowdfunded firms that 

hope to evolve and grow into larger public companies listed on exchanges 

may nonetheless feel compelled to abide by securities laws' strictures anyway. Furthermore, while crowdfunding is used as an example for how the federal government encroaches on the states, that is merely a microcosm for the 

broader damage to innovation in the state-based corporate law system caused 

by federal preemption. 

WHEN THE FEDERAL OVERLAY IS ROLLED BACK, INNOVATION SPROUTS: 

THE CASE OF PUBLICLY TRADED MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 

The governance of publicly traded master limited partnerships provides a 

small-scale case study in the adaptability and heterogeneity of businesses' 

organizational form. MLPs form a small subset of publicly traded companies 

in which the federal overlay has been moderately lifted by the exchanges. They 

were created pursuant to a tax exemption for energy companies that allows 

them to avoid entity-level taxation if they make regular distributions of earnings to investors. Looking more broadly to the MLPs that continue to operate 

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using a limited partnership form, John Goodgame notes that as of2012, there 

were eighty-seven energy-related MLPs traded on public markets.36 While 

they have traditionally been organized as limited partnerships, more recently 

some of them have organized as LLCsY These energy firm MLPs make up the 

vast majority of publicly traded alternative entities on US exchanges. 

Under exchange listing rules, MLPs are not required to have a majority of independent directors, a nominating committee, or a compensation 

committee.38 MLPs and other public companies are otherwise subject to the 

same set of federal securities laws. 39 Thus, with this relatively minor exception from the federal overlay, a wide diversity of governance arrangements 

has evolved. 

Goodgame generally describes a great deal of heterogeneity in organizational form, as some MLPs provide for annual elections and some have 

staggered boards. Some MLPs have poison pills, others do not. Some choose 

default fiduciary duties, and some opt out of fiduciary duties. But they generally choose to opt out of rules favored in the public context as they have stronger contractual requirements to distribute all their earnings on a quarterly 

basis. That mandatory quarterly earnings disbursement in the partnership or 

LLC agreement essentially substitutes for the traditional monitoring mechanisms of corporate law, like fiduciary duty litigation or board committee oversight. And it is structurally a much stronger means of policing against fraud, 

as equity owners see hard cash flow every quarter (and the firm does not regularly take in large amounts of new capital such that a Ponzi scheme-type fraud 

would be possible). It is very difficult for these companies to mask losses. 

MLPs further have a governance innovation similar in many ways to the 

organization board member proposal advanced by Bainbridge and Henderson 

(and referenced earlier in this chapter). 40 MLPs are typically controlled by 

a sponsoring general partnership, which reserves contractual control of the 

board of directors for itself by reserving a majority of board seats for individuals selected by the general partnership. Structural heterogeneity in governance 

tends to adapt to the particular needs of individual firms; those with more 

dependable and steady streams of cash flow tend to substitute for traditional 

governance arrangements earnings distribution and regular fundraising from 

capital markets as agency monitoring measures.41 

One can readily think of other governance arrangements that could be 

useful for other types of firms, from crowdfunding to unique industries, which 

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ENDING THE SPeCTER OF A IEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

states could develop if freed from the overbroad federal footprint. One could 

imagine a different appraisal process tailored uniquely to handle the needs of 

biotech firms that lack cash flow for long periods. This limited innovation leads 

one to wonder what level of innovation may have been possible in the absence 

of the full federal overlay. At this point one can only guess the possibilities. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Repeal Federal Corporate Governance Mandates 

The struggle of meshing the needs of new business models with rigid federal 

regulation prompts a larger consideration of the current state of interaction 

between states and the federal government in corporate law. This leads to the 

claim of this chapter that state competition is currently not robust enough to 

support novel corporate structures because states are hindered by an everexpanding federal overlay of blanket regulation. Title IX of Dodd-Frank perpetuates this federalization of corporate law in the face of the internal affairs 

doctrine. As noted in the MLP case study, reducing regulation that results in 

the allowance of innovation can have an immediate beneficial effect in the 

form of firms' willingness to innovate. Revitalizing state federalism in pursuit 

of genuine competition, as opposed to the centralization purposes of Title IX's 

corporate governance provisions, would serve to incentivize states to create and 

promote innovative and more effective corporate law. 

Codify the Internal Affairs Doctrine as a Binding Constraint on Federal Regulatory 

Agencies. with Express Standing for States to Challenge Federal Action 

The internal affairs doctrine has helped to maintain a vibrant competition 

between the states in the development of corporation law. This has helped to 

develop a rich body of law that has made it possible for large-scale industrial 

development through the twentieth century. But the internal affairs doctrine is 

under siege from regulators who have preempted large swaths of corporate law, 

and other regulators who continually look to sidestep it A clear and binding 

constraint on federal regulators will be necessary in order to allow corporation 

law to undergo a renaissance for a new and vibrant century of capital markets. 

For a federalist system to survive, it must be self-enforcing. In other words, 

it must be able to survive future attempts to slowly erode the federalist system 

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J. W. VEcRRU 

in corporate governance. The explicit standing of individual states to challenge 

violations of the internal affairs doctrine helps to create that self-enforcing 

character. 

Give Statutory Recognition to Publicly Traded Companies· Right to Require Investor 

Arbitration 

1bis chapter has demonstrated that permitting arbitration for shareholder 

claims against companies, whether under the federal securities laws or pursuant to state corporate law, is a vital component to reinvigorating interstate 

competition. It is also clear that many crowdfunded firms would benefit from 

an alternative corporate law model grounded in a more flexible and adaptable arbitration-based approach to adjudicating corporate disputes. The SEC 

should not prohibit arbitration for investor claims in any instance in which a 

state's corporate law permits it. Delaware appears to presently discourage an 

arbitration alternative, but under a more competitive system some state would 

likely design an alternative that more directly used arbitration as a means of 

resolving shareholder complaints. 

Preempt Authority of State Attorneys General to Bring Investor Claims against 

Out-of-State Firms 

Yet another threat to state chartering competition is in the form of state attorneys general who bring claims on behalf of investors in companies outside 

of their state. In particular, New York attorneys general have brought many 

claims under New York's overly broad Martin Act against companies incorporated outside of New York for claims between investors and companies that 

should be resolved pursuant to the other state's corporate code. 

An analyst writing for Legal Affairs described former New York Attorney 

General Eliot Spitzer's use of the Martin Act as follows: 

To win a case, the AG doesn't have to prove that the defendant intended to defraud anyone, that a transaction took 

place, or that anyone actually was defrauded. Plus, when 

the prosecution is over, trial lawyers can gain access to the 

hoards of documents that the act has churned up and use 

them as the basis for civil suits. 42 

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ENDING THE SPI'CTFR Or' A FFDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

Limiting the authority of state attorneys general for investor fraud actions 

to companies incorporated in their home state will more faithfully respect the 

internal affairs doctrine and provide those attorneys general with an incentive 

to balance any desire to bring meritless litigation against out-of-state firms for 

political motivations.43 

In the event state competition for corporate chartering becomes markedly 

more competitive as a result of the suggestions in this chapter, states may then 

be tempted to use the power of state attorneys general to engage in unfair competition with other states. Corporate governance practices that give other states 

a competitive advantage in the chartering race may be deemed "unfair" under 

a nebulous statute like the Martin Act. 

Out-of-state attorneys general could then threaten innovations in other 

jurisdictions that are otherwise beneficial to shareholders. If instead state 

attorneys general are limited in their authority to bring investor fraud claims 

against entities incorporated in their own states, then they will be better incentivized to consider the collateral consequences of any abuse of their authority. 

Out-of-state attorneys general have no incentive to consider the collateral 

consequences of their actions on the broader investing public. One might 

imagine, for example, the New York attorney general forcing companies as 

part of settlement agreements to regularly require that all members of the 

board be independent of the company, thereby discouraging other states from 

beneficial innovations in the design of boards of directors to leverage the 

expertise of nonindependent directors. 

This is a critical distinction to appreciate in discussions about federal preemption. When states create law, as through the creation of a corporate code, 

and when states internalize much of the impact of their lawmaking, as through 

chartering fees, a competitive race is possible and principles of federalism apply. 

But in the use of state attorney general power, states create law in the use of 

enforcement actions. 'I hey craft new law through enforcement settlements, and 

the institutional actors with the power to craft that law have no balancing force 

to discourage abuse of their power. 

If a New York attorney general oversteps and presses initiatives that 

destroy shareholder value, his influence and political standing will be unaffected. Shareholders and incorporators cannot choose to avoid the law effectively 

created by New York in this way; they cannot choose corporate law created by 

enforcement action the way they can choose statutory corporate law by select45;1 
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J. W V~RR~l 

ing a particular state of incorporation. All publicly traded companies have 

many of their trades routed through the various exchanges that operate in the 

jurisdiction of the New York attorney general. 

The recommendation offered here will encourage a more federalismbased approach to the use of this executive authority. State attorneys general 

would be more sensitive to the impact of their decisions if the rate ofincorporation in their home state were linked to the enforcement environment they 

provide. Furthermore, any under-enforcement by an attorney general that left 

shareholders exposed to fraud would result in a discount to the traded value 

of firms incorporated in that state. 

"lhus this suggestion creates an institutional environment in which state 

enforcement actions premised on investor claims are more balanced and 

responsive to the costs of over- or under-enforcement relative to legitimate 

shareholder fraud claims. 

CONCLUSION 

When the SEC was created in the 1930s, the state-based system of corporate 

law was kept in place. 1hat system had helped to facilitate the accumulation of 

wealth necessary for large-scale capital investments during the Industrial 

Revolution. When SEC Chairman William Cary suggested in 1970 that a federal corporate law be adopted, the suggestion was largely ignored. Even in 

the wake of the Enron scandal and, later, the 2008 financial crisis, the federal 

response did not include a wholesale preemption of state corporation law. This 

indicates an enduring, centuries-long respect at the federal level for the vital 

role of the states as sources of corporation law. 

"!he slow preemption of discrete pieces of state corporate law has, however, 

taken its toll on the state-based corporate law system. The discrete preemptions 

have a much larger impact on the state system than the sum of their parts, as 

they discourage innovation in corporate governance and impede state competition to create new legal and contractual regimes to govern the relationships 

between investors of capital and managers of capital. 

At each major turn in human history, corporate law has served as a foundation for mankind's forward progress. In ancient Babylonia, a version of partnership law helped farmers band together for mutual investments in farming 

infrastructure. A more sophisticated form of corporate law developed to 

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ENDING THE SPECTFR Of'/\ FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 

facilitate Roman-era investments in large capital projects like the aqueducts. 

America's first major evolution in corporate law facilitated the Industrial 

Revolution, and the next spurt of ingenious innovations helped America's 

post-WWII economic boom. 

Looking forward, an entirely new era in which investors are likely to interact 

with their investments in an increasingly low-cost, app-based environment is 

possible. Crowdfunding in particular promises to allow small-dollar investors to 

invest in very early stage ventures like never before. Innovation's promise will be 

lost, however, if the federal overlay in corporate law does not stand aside to allow 

renewed competition and innovation in the state-based corporate law system. 

NOTES 

1. See Gallagher and Cook, "Shareholder Proposals." 

2. "Triumph of the Pygmy State." 

3. Piwowar, "Dissenting Statement." 

4. See generally Romano, "Sarbanes-Oxley Act." 

5. Roughly half of all publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware. Romano 

describes Delaware's dominance of the corporate chartering market as a feature, not a bug, 

of a successful race to the top. Bilateral investments by both users of corporate law and by 

Delaware in the production of corporate law may make it difficult for another small state to 

compete with Delaware, but at the same time those bilateral investments serve to enhance 

the quality of Delaware's code. She describes it as "development of transaction-specific 

human capital f which] establishes what Oliver Williamson terms a 'mutual reliance relation' creating a reciprocal vulnerability on both sides of the charter market that joins the 

parties together in a cooperative long-term relationship." See Romano, "Law as a Product," 

225-26. 

6. Bainbridge and Henderson, "Boards-R-Us." 

7. Ibid., 1100. 

8. Daines, "Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?" 

9. See Macey and Miller, "Toward an Interest Group Theory." 

10. Verret, "Uber-ized Corporate Law," 964. 

11. Yerger, Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee. 

12. Roe, "Corporate Shareholder's Vote," 9. 

13. For a possible definition of the internal affairs doctrine from the Restatement (Second) 

Conflict of Laws, see "Internal Affairs Doctrine." 

14. "Internal Affairs Doctrine." 

15. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 ( 1981 ). 

16. Chandler and Strine, "New Federalism," 953, 974. 

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J,WVmRn 

17. Ribstein and Kobayashi, "Economics of Federalism," 3. 

18. Roe, "Delaware's Politics;' 2498. While Roe overstates the case by describing Delaware as 

thus a "monopoly," he nevertheless accurately sketches Delaware's relationship to the federal 

government. See Roe, "Delaware's Politics." In "Delaware and Washington as Corporate 

Lawmakers," 1 0-ll, Roe goes on to describe the ways in which the federal government 

can and has preempted state corporate law: 

"Washington makes corporate law. From 1933 to 2002, that is, from the passage of the 

securities laws to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, Washington has made rules governing 

the voting of stock and the solicitation of proxies to elect directors. It has made the main 

rules governing insider trading, stock buybacks, how institutional investors can interact 

in corporate governance, the structure of key board committees, board composition 

(how independent some board members must be), how far states could go in making 

merger law, how attentive institutional investors must be in voting their proxies, what 

business issues and transactional information public firms must disclose (which often 

affect the structure and duties of insiders and managers to shareholders in a myriad of 

transactions), the rules on dual class common stock recapitalizations, the duties and 

liabilities of gatekeepers like accountants and lawyers, and more. Even when the SEC 

cannot, or does not, make the substantive rule, its capacity to force disclosure of numbers and transactions can turn a spotlight onto those transactions and numbers, thereby 

affecting whether or not they happen." 

19. Roe, "Delaware's Competition," 592, 

20. Ibid., 597. 

21. Ibid., 598-99. 

22. Romano, "States as a Laboratory," 209, 220. 

23. Roe, "Delaware's Competition," 601. 

24. Macey, "Federal Deference to Local Regulators," 279. 

25. Roe, "Delaware's Competition," 611. 

26. Greve and Parrish, "Administrative Law without Congress," 501,505. 

27, Tarullo, Speech at the Association of American Law Schools. 

28. Ibid., 7. 

29. A corollary regime of state-based crowdfunding has also sprung up (though the state version 

requires that investors be circumsnibed within a particular state or geographic area). 

30. Note that this chapter considers the damaging effects of preemption of corporate governance 

rules. Preemption of state securities regulations of out-of-state offerings, as was necessary 

in the crowdfunding context, is subject to a different set of institutional incentives in which 

states do not internalize the effect of their regulations on out-of-state offerings. This costly 

effect at the state level is similar to that analyzed below in the attorney general context. 

31. Crowdfunders were allowed to raise money by offering benefits like advanced purchases or 

participation in the project, but prohibited from selling actual stock. For more detail on this 

question, see Verret, "Uber-ized Corporate Law." 

32. Mollick, "Dynamics of Crowdfunding." 

33, Agrawal, Ajay K., Christian Catalini, and A vi Goldfarb. "Some Simple Economics of 

Crowdfunding." NBER Working Paper 19133, National Bureau of Economic Research, 

Cambridge, MA, june 2013. 

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ENDING THE SPECl ER OF A FEDERAl_ CORPORATE LAW 

34. See Berle and Means, Modern Corporation and Private Property. 

35. For additional discussion about how crowdfunding bears similarity to Uber, see Verret, 

"Uber-ized Corporate Law." 

36. Goodgame, "New Developments," 81, 83. 

37. Ibid., 84. 

38. Ibid., 98. 

39. Ibid. 

40. Bainbridge and Henderson, "Boards-R- Us." 

41. Goodgame, "Master Limited Partnership Governance," 471, 480. 

42. 1bompson, "Sword of Spitzer." 

43. For an extended argument about how many of Eliot Spitzer's prosecutions under the Martin 

Act were based on questionable assertions of fact and politically motivated, see Greve, 

"Federalism's Frontier," 93. See also Greve, "Business, the States," 895. 

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Bainbridge, Stephen M., and M. Todd Henderson. "Boards-R· Us: Rcconceptualizing Corporate 

Boards." Stanford Law Review 66, no. 5 (May2014): 1051-120. 

Berle, Adolph, and Gardiner Means. The Modem Corporation and Private Property. New York: 

MacMillan, 1933. 

Chandler, William B., and Leo E. Strine )r. "1be New Federalism of the American Corporate 

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Daines, Robert. "Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?" journal of Financial Economics 62, 

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Gallagher, Daniel M., and john C. Cook. "Shareholder Proposals: An Exit Strategy for the SEC." 

Critical Legal Issues Working Paper 193, Washington Legal Foundation, Washington, DC, 

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471-506. 

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Greve, MichaelS. "Business, the States, and Federalism's Political Economy." Harvard Journal of 

Law and Public Policy 25, no. 3 (2002): 895-929. 

--."Federalism's Frontier." 1exas Review of Law and Policy 7, no. I (2002): 93-126. 

Greve, MichaelS., and Ashley C. Parrish. 'Administrative Law without Congress." George Mason 

Law Review22, no. 3 (2015): 501-47. 

"111e Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical justifications and Tentative Explanations for lts 

Continued Primacy." Harvard Law Review 115, no. 5 (2002): 1480-501. 

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Macey, jonathan R. "Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 

Regulation: Toward a Public Choice Explanation of Federalism." \firginia Law Review 76, 

(I 990): 279-91. 

Macey, jonathan, and Geoffrey Miller. "Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate 

Law." Texas Law Review 65, no. 3 (1987): 469-524. 

Mollick, Ethan. "The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study," Journal of Business 

Venturing29,no.l (2014): 1-16. 

Piwowar, MichaelS. "Dissenting Statement at Open Meeting on Pay Ratio Disclosure." Public 

Statement, US Securities and Exchange Commission, August 5, 2015. 

Ribstein, Larry E., and Bruce H. Kobayashi. "The Economics of Federalism." George Mason Law 

and Economics Research Paper No. 06-15, 2006. 

Roe, Mark J. "Delaware's Competition." Harvard Law Review 117, no. 2 (2003 ): 588-644. 

--."Delaware's Politics," Harvard Law Review 118, no. 8 (2005): 2491-543. 

"Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers." Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 

34,no. 1 (2009): 1-33. 

"'The Corporate Shareholder's Vote and Its Political Economy, in Delaware and in 

Washington." Harvard Business Law Review 2, no. 1 (2012): 1-38. 

Romano, Roberta. "Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle." journal of Law, 

Economics, and Organization I, no. 2 (1985): 225-83. 

--. '"!be Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance." Faculty 

Scholarship Series Paper 1919, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT. 2005. 

--. "The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate 

Charters." Yale Journal on Regulation 23, no. 2 (2006): 209-47. 

Taru!lo, Daniel K. Speech at the Association of American Law Schools 2014 Midyear Meeting, fune 

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Thompson, Nicholas. "'The Sword of Spitzer." Legal Affairs, May-june 2004. http://www.legalaf 

fairs. org/ issues/ May-)un e· 2004/ featu re_thom pson_mayjun04. msp. 

"Triumph of the Pygmy State." Economist, October 23,2003. http://www.economist.com 

/node/2155765. 

Verret, f. W. "Uber-ized Corporate Law: Toward a 21st Century Corporate Governance for 

Crowdfunding and App-Bascd Investor Communications." ]ormzal of Corporation Law 41, 

no. 4 (2016): 927-69. 

Yerger, Ann. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of 

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Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving Corporate Governance," 

)uly 29, 2009. 

459 
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July 27,2017 

The Honorable Bill Huizenga 

Chainnan 

Subcomrnitee on Capital Markets, Securities and lnvestment 

Committee on Financial Services 

United States House of Representatives 

2129 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney 

Ranking Member 

Subcommitee on Capital Markets} Securities and Investment 

Committee on Financial Services 

United States House of Representatives 

2129 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. 

702 King Farm Boulevard Suite 400 

Rockville, MD 20850 

T: + 1. 301556.0500 I F: + 1.301.556.0491 

Re: July 18. 2017, hearing entitled "The Cost of Being a Public Company in Light ofSarbanes- Oxley and t~ 

Federalization of Corporate Governance" 

Dear Chainnan Huizenga and Representative Maloney, 

On behalf of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), I am writing in follow-up to the hearing held last week by the 

Subcommitee on Capital Markets, Securities and Investment entitled "The Cost of Being a Public Company in Light of 

Sarbanes-Oxley and the Federalization of Corporate Governance." 

The purpose of this letter is twofold: (1) to reiterate ISS' opposition to the provisions in Subtitle Q of Title IV of the 

Financial CHOICE Act (which provisions were referred to generally during the hearing as the "Corporate Governance 

Reform and Transparency Act"); and (2) to provide you with ISS' perspective on, and clarification of, some of the 

assertions that were made during the hearing about the proxy advisory industry generally and ISS in particular. 

We respectfully request that this letter be included in the hearing record. 

Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act 

ISS reiterates its opposition to the Corporation Governance Reform and Transparency Act. If enacted into law, this would 

establish a costly new regulatory regime for proxy advisory firms, destroy the fiduciary responsibility that proxy advisory 

firms have to the institutional investors who hire them, and make it more difficult for shareholders to cast informed proxy 

votes, thereby decreasing the transparency of corporate boardroom decisions. 

This new regulatory regime is not needed, and- given the strong public opposition to these provisions from major 

pension funds and other institutional investors~it is clearly not wanted by those that the provisions are intended to 

protect. 

ISS is currently regulated a'> an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and has been for over 20 

years. Under that Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated a strong, investor-centric regulatory 

regime that governs all investment advisers, including those whose advice pertains only to proxy votes and other matters 

of corporate governance. ISS is supportive of clarifYing guidance from the SEC and/or an adjustment to the Investment 

Advisers Act making it clear that all proxy advisory firrns must be registered under that Act. 

The Global Leader In Corporate Governance 
180 


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ISS Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. 

702 King Farm Boulevard Suite 400 

Rockville, MD 20850 

T: +1. 301.556.0500 IF: +1.301.556.0491 

In short, the requirements in the bill would destroy the ability of proxy advisory firms, such as ISS, to provide timely, 

independent and impartial research and recommendations to those who have hired them. This and other concerns with the 

legislation, along with a detailed description of ISS, how we operate and how our clients use our services, are provided in 

my statement for the record which was submitted to the Financial Services Committee's Subcommittee on Capital 

Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises on May 17, 2016. 

Assertions at the Hearing 

Regarding last week's hearing, we believe it is important to provide you with ISS' perspective on, and clarification of, 

some of the assertions that were made by some of the witnesses during the hearing. 

"Proxv advisorv firms generallv refuse to engage in a prq_rjuctive or transparent dialogue with smaller issuers." (John 

Blake. Senior Vice President of Finance, aTyr Pharma, Inc., speaking on behalf of the Biotechnology Innovation 

Organization) 

Robust engagement with corporate issuers is an integral part of!SS' day-to-day operations. Each proxy season, ISS engages 

with thousands of corporate executives, board members, institutional investors and other constituents via in-person meetings, 

conference calls and participation in industry events. The purpose of such engagement is for ISS to obtain, or communicate, 

perspectives about governance and voting issues, in order to ensure that its research and policy-driven recommendations are 

based on the most comprehensive and accurate infonnation available. Notably, ISS' engagement activities with corporations 

are not limited to companies that fit any particular size or other formulaic criteria. ISS' engagement process is explained in 

great detail on our public website. 1 

-~·.f.!:s2E!. adyisorv firms relv on one-si:::e-fits-all recommendations that do not take into account a companv 's or its 

shareholders' unique circumstances." (John Blake, Senior Vice President of Finance, aTyr Phanna, Inc., speaking on 

behalf of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization) 

All proxy analysis at ISS is undertaken in accordance with a publicly disclosed analytical framework comprised of voting 

policy guidelines chosen by ISS' clients. ISS offers a wide range of proxy voting policy options. In addition to customized 

client policies as described below, ISS provides to its clients both a standard benchmark policy focused solely on maximizing 

shareholder value and mitigating governance risk, and a wide array of specialty policies that evaluate governance issues from 

the perspective of sustainability, socially responsible investing, public pension funds, labor unions or mission and faith-based 

investing. Case-by-case analytical frameworks, which take into account company size, financial perfonnancc and industry 

practices, drive the vast majority of ISS' vote recommendations, such as those pertaining to the election of corporate directors 

and compensation matters. 

ISS also makes and implements proxy voting recommendations based on clients' spccitic customized voting guidelines, and 

may assist client<; in developing such custom guidelines as well. ln fact. ISS currently implements over 400 custom voting 

policies on behalf of close to 400institutiona1 investors. 

"Proxy advisorv firms should he transparent ahaut how thev go ahoul evaluating coml2Q!Jies.'' 

We agree. ISS provides a high level of transparency regarding the policy frameworks it uses to evaluate companies. The 

proxy voting policy options which I've outlined in the previous section are described in explicit detail on our public website, 

including guideline summaries and FAQs and methodology documents on issues that tend to be more compJex.2 

1 https://v.rww.issgovemance.com/contact/faqs~engagement-on-proxy-research/ 

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ISS Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. 

702 King Farm Boulevard Suite 400 

Rockville, MD 20850 

T: -1.301.556.0500 IF: +1.301.556.{}191 

Proxy advisory firms should be tram parent about how thev manage their conflh:ts ofinterest. 

As a registered investment adviser, ISS is obligated to design, maintain and periodically update a program designed to 

eliminate, or manage and disclose conflicts of interest. ISS addresses conflicts, first and foremost, by being a transparent, 

policy-based organization. Its use of a series of published voting policies provides a very practical check and balance that 

ensures the integrity and independence of ISS' analyses and vote recorrunendations. While these policies allow analysts to 

consider company- and market-specific factors in generating vote recommendations, the existence of a published analytical 

framework. coupled with the fact that vote recommendations are based on publicly-available information, allows ISS clients to 

continuously monitor the integrity and consistency of ISS advice. 

In the hearing, it was suggested that lSS may have an internal conflict of interest in its ownership of ISS Corporate Solutions, 

Inc. ('"ICS"). In fact. we have taken great care to prevent this. ICS provides governance tools and services to clients that may be 

corporate issuers. ISS and ICS are two independent businesses that function in full transparency to our clients, competitors and 

regulators. Further, ISS and !CS arc separated by a rigorously maintained "firewall" that includes a physical and functional 

separation, with a particular focus on the separation of!CS from the ISS Global Research team. A key goal ofthe firewall is to 

keep the ISS Global Research team from learning the identity of !CS' clients, thereby helping to ensure the objectivity and 

independence of ISS' research process and vote recommendations. 

In parallel with the internal limitations on infonnation about the ICS clients, Investors subscribing to ISS' research and 

recommendations do have access to this information and it is provided to them in a way that is designed to protect and 

preserve the firewall described above. Specifically, ISS' institutional clients are entitled to receive infonnation about the 

identity of all ICS clients, the products/services purchased by those clients and the fees paid for those products/services. In 

support of the key objective of preventing members of!SS' Global Research team from learning the identity offCS' clients, 

the information about ICS' clients is made available to ISS' investor clients in a confidential manner through ISS' 

Compliance department and also through an access-limited section of ProxyExchange, the client-facing platform used by 

ISS' investor clients. 

'' Tt has been estimated that ISS and Glass Lewis eff'ecth,elr .. conlrol" 38% oft he shareholder vote.'" 

ISS clients control both their voting policies and their vote decisions. ISS is generally not a discretionary proxy voting 

manager, except in rare situations where a client has an actual conflict of interest (for example, a financial institution that holds 

and must votes the shares of its parent company). and ask_o;; ISS to make a proxy voting decision on the client's behalf, 

In fact, ISS is charged by its clients in the vast majority of cases to work with institutional investors to take their fiduciary 

responsibilities regarding proxy voting very seriously, and they understand their duty to vote proxies in their clients' or 

beneficiaries' best interests. Many proxy advisers' research and vote recommendations are just one source of information 

used in arriving at an institutions' voting decisions. Many investors have internal research teams that conduct proprietary 

research and use proxy advisory research to supplement their own work. Some investors use third-party proxy research as 

a screening tool to identifY non-routine meetings or proposals. A number of institutional investors use the services of two 

or more proxy advisory services. These views are consistent with the results of a recent survey of asset managers by 

Tapestry Networks that found proxy advisory firms' "'role as data aggregators" has become increasingly important to a<;set 

managers, and that even if smaller managers are more reliant on such advisory firms, they still acknowledge that 

responsibility for voting outcomes lies with investors.' 

3 Bew, Robyn and Fields, Richard, Voting Decisions at US Mutual Funds: How Investors Really Use Proxy Advisers (June 2012) at2. 

Available at SSRN: hJ.!P.JL~~!Jl .. fQ.!Jl..l~J:Ls!r.g£t~2..Q1H .fJ.l. ('"Across the board, participants in our research said they value proxy firms' 

ability to collect, organize. and present vast amounts of data, and they believe smaller asset managers are more reliant on those services. 

Nonetheless, participants emphasized that responsibility for voting outcomes lies with investors"). 

The Global Leader In Corporate Governance 
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ISS Instdut10na are o er erv1ces nc. 

702 King Farm Boulevard Suite 400 

Rockville, MD 20850 

T: 11. 301.556 0500 j F: + 1.301.556.0491 

Moreover, in their paper, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 4 University ofPermsylvania Law School Protesso 

Jill Fisch, along with colleagues from New York University, analyzed the effect of proxy adviser recommendations o 

voting outcomes in uncontested director elections. The authors estimate that, after controlling for underlying company 

specific factors that influence voting outcomes, an ISS recommendation appears to shift 6 to 10 percent of shareholder votes, 

but that this influence may stem from ISS' role as information agent 

[W}ejind evidence that ISS's power is partially due to the fact that ISS (io a greater extent than other advisors) 

bases its recommendations on factors that shareholders consider important. ThisfGct and competition among prox; 

advisors place upper hounds on ISS's power. Institutional Shareholder Services cannot issue recommendations 

arbitrarily ?fit wants to retain its market position. Doing so would lead institutional investors to seek the services 

of other proxy advisory firms. Thus, ISS is not so much a Pied Piper followed blindly by institutional investors as it 

is an information agent and guide, helping investors to ident(fy voting decisions that are consistent with thei 

existing preferences. 5 

Thank you for considering our views, and we arc happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Sincerely, 

lnstitutlonal Shareholder Services Inc. 

Gary Retelny, President and Chief Executive Officer 

0 

4 Choi, Stephen J., Fisch, Jill E. and Kahan, Marcel, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality? 59 Emory L. J. 869 (2010); 

University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-24. Available at SSRN: 

htt ://ssm.com/abstract-1694535. 

5 Jd at 906. 

The Global leader In Corporate Governance