United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 1, 2017 Decided August 10, 2018

No. 16-1320

CAPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 21,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 16-1369

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order

of the National Labor Relations Board

Charles P. Roberts III argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for petitioner. 

Kellie J. Isbell, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 

argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Richard F. 

Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate 

General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General 
2

Counsel, Elizabeth A. Heaney, Supervisory Attorney, and

Heather S. Beard, Attorney.

Matthew J. Ginsburg argued the cause for intervenor. 

With him on the brief was James B. Coppess.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and 

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: In this case, a small number 

of off-duty hospital employees, seeking to inform visitors to 

the facility about an ongoing labor dispute, peacefully 

distributed leaflets and held picket signs on hospital property 

next to an entrance. It is undisputed that the employees’ 

distribution of leaflets was protected under the National Labor 

Relations Act. The question we face is whether the employees’ 

holding of picket signs—without any chanting, marching, or 

obstructing of passage—necessarily took their conduct beyond 

the NLRA’s protections. The hospital tried to stop the 

employees’ stationary display of picket signs, believing that the 

employees had no right to engage in that conduct on the 

facility’s premises.

The National Labor Relations Board disagreed. The Board 

examined the employees’ form of picketing under a framework 

traditionally applied to assess off-duty employees’ distribution 

of union literature on hospital property. That framework asks 

whether prohibiting the employees’ conduct is necessary to 

avoid disrupting patient care. The Board concluded that, here, 

the hospital failed to make that showing with regard to the 

employees’ holding of picket signs. As a result, the Board 

determined, the hospital had violated the employees’ rights 

under the NLRA by attempting to bar their protected conduct.
3

We sustain the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA as 

reasonable. In our view, the Board’s approach permissibly 

balances employees’ rights to organize against an employer’s 

interests in controlling its property. And the Board was not 

compelled to adopt a categorical rule that picketing of any 

kind—including the stationary, nonobstructive holding of a 

picket sign at issue here—is necessarily more disruptive, and 

less entitled to the NLRA’s protections, than distribution of 

union literature. We thus deny the hospital’s petition for 

review and grant the Board’s cross-application for 

enforcement.

I. 

A. 

Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 

employees “have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 

assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 

representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 

concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 

other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 7’s 

protections encompass the “rights to discuss organization and 

the terms and conditions of their employment, to criticize or 

complain about their employer or their conditions of 

employment, and to enlist the assistance of others in addressing 

employment matters.” Quicken Loans, Inc. v. NLRB, 830 F.3d 

542, 545 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Those rights include soliciting 

support not only from fellow employees but also from 

nonemployees such as customers and the general public. E.g.,

Stanford Hosp. & Clinics v. NLRB, 325 F.3d 334, 343 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003). Employers commit an “unfair labor practice” in 

violation of the Act when they “interfere with, restrain, or 

coerce employees in the exercise of” their Section 7 rights. 29 

U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
4

When employees seek to exercise Section 7 rights on their

employer’s property, the employees’ rights are balanced 

against the employer’s property interests and management 

prerogatives. In administering that balance, the Board has 

adopted various presumptions. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. 

NLRB, the Supreme Court approved the Board’s application of 

a presumption that an employer cannot prohibit off-duty 

employees’ solicitation of union support on company property. 

324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945). To overcome the presumption, an 

employer must present “evidence that special circumstances 

make” a prohibition on solicitation “necessary in order to 

maintain production or discipline.” Id. at 803 n.10 (citation 

omitted); see id. at 803-04. The Board later applied the 

Republic Aviation presumption to the distribution of union 

literature on company property by off-duty employees. Eastex, 

Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 572-74 & n.23 (1978).

The Board has also recognized that employer interests can 

vary based on the nature of the workplace. Of particular 

relevance, the Board has modified the Republic Aviation

presumption in the hospital context to account for the 

importance of administering patient care without disturbance. 

In immediate patient-care areas, the Board does not consider a 

ban on employee solicitation of union support to be

presumptively invalid. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 

U.S. 483, 495 (1978); NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 

773, 778 & n.8 (1979). But outside of immediate patient-care 

areas, such as in hospital lounges and cafeterias, a prohibition

on employee solicitation of union support is presumptively 

invalid unless the hospital can demonstrate the need for the 

restriction “to avoid disruption of health-care operations or 

disturbance of patients.” Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 507.

The Republic Aviation presumption, including its tailored

application to hospitals, has been applied predominantly in the 
5

contexts of oral solicitation of union support or distribution of 

union-related literature. In 2004, however, the Board applied 

the Republic Aviation presumption in a case involving both 

distribution of handbills and picketing on company property. 

Town & Country Supermarkets, 340 N.L.R.B. 1410 (2004). 

Because the employer had failed to demonstrate special 

circumstances justifying its ban on that activity, the Board held 

that the employer committed an unfair labor practice by 

attempting to bar the “employees from engaging in picketing

and handbilling.” Id. at 1414.

B. 

With that backdrop in mind, we turn to the dispute in this 

case. Petitioner Capital Medical Center is an acute-care 

hospital in Olympia, Washington. United Food and 

Commercial Workers (the Union) represents a unit of Capital’s 

technical employees. Their collective bargaining agreement

expired in September 2012. As of May 2013, the parties had 

yet to reach a new agreement. 

On May 9, 2013, the Union notified Capital that it intended 

to engage in picketing and handbilling outside the hospital on 

May 20, to advocate for a new agreement before the next 

bargaining session. At 6:00 a.m. on May 20, 2013, twenty to 

twenty-five employees began picketing and chanting on the

public sidewalks around the hospital. The picketing and 

handbilling activities continued throughout the day, with fifty 

to sixty employees picketing and handbilling on the public 

sidewalks in the afternoon. A few employees, with Capital’s 

permission, went onto the hospital’s property to hand out 

leaflets alongside two nonemergency entrances. 

Around 4:00 p.m., two to four employees took leaflets and

picket signs from the sidewalk and walked onto hospital 
6

property. They stood next to a nonemergency entrance to the 

building while holding the signs, with some also handing out 

leaflets while holding the signs. The signs contained the 

messages “Respect Our Care” and “Fair Contract Now.” 

Multiple hospital personnel told the employees that they could 

continue distributing leaflets but could not stand on hospital 

property with their picket signs. The employees, though,

declined to leave. 

Union representatives then met with Capital’s labor 

relations counsel and human resources manager. The 

company’s counsel informed the Union representatives that the 

picketing employees would face discipline if they remained on 

hospital property. The representatives maintained that the 

employees had a right to remain on hospital property with their 

picket signs. Capital’s counsel then called the Union’s attorney 

and threatened to discipline the employees or call the police. 

One picketing employee, concerned about potential discipline 

or arrest, returned to the sidewalk. Another employee took his 

picket sign and replaced him near the entrance. 

At around 5:00 p.m., roughly an hour after the employees 

began holding picket signs on hospital property, a hospital 

security officer called the police. A police officer arrived, and 

informed Capital personnel that he could not remove the 

employees because they were not being disruptive or blocking 

the entry doors. The picketers opted to leave a short time later 

because their picketing was scheduled to end soon in any event 

(at 6:00 p.m.). Few people entered or exited the hospital during 

the time the employees held picket signs near the entrance, and 

there were no confrontations between the employees and 

anyone who came into or out of the hospital. 

The Union filed a charge with the NLRB’s regional 

director, alleging that Capital’s reaction to the employees’ 
7

holding picket signs on hospital property unlawfully interfered 

with employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights. The Board 

issued a complaint, alleging that Capital’s interference in the 

picketing violated the Act. In July 2014, an administrative law 

judge found that Capital had committed an unfair labor practice

by telling employees they could not picket by the entrances, 

threatening disciplinary action, and calling the police. 

On August 12, 2016, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s 

findings and conclusions. Capital Med. Ctr. & UFCW Local 

21, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 2016 WL 4362367, at *1 (Aug. 12, 

2016). The Board “assume[d] arguendo” that the employees’ 

stationary holding of picket signs amounted to “picketing 

within the meaning of the Act.” Id. at *1 n.4. The Board then 

assessed whether the presumption recognized in Republic 

Aviation, 324 U.S. 793, as tailored to the hospital context, Beth 

Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. 483, applies to employee picketing just 

as it applies to employee handbilling and other protected 

Section 7 activity. 

The Board decided that the Republic Aviation framework 

should govern in cases involving picketing on company 

property. That conclusion, the Board noted, found support in 

its prior decision in Town & Country, 340 N.L.R.B. at 1414, 

which had applied the Republic Aviation presumption to 

off-duty employee picketing on the employer’s premises. The 

Board rejected the notion that picketing is inherently more 

disruptive than the other Section 7 activity covered by Republic 

Aviation, such that the presumption should be categorically 

inapplicable in the context of picketing. 

Applying the modified Republic Aviation presumption that 

governs in the hospital context, the Board examined the 

employees’ conduct at issue, which the Board described as 

“holding signs near a nonemergency entrance without any 
8

patrolling, chanting or obstruction of the entrance.” Capital 

Med. Ctr., 2016 WL 4362367, at *3 n.9. The Board agreed 

with the ALJ’s finding that the employees’ stationary, peaceful 

picketing was unlikely to interfere with patient care. Capital 

thus failed to meet its burden to show that it needed to bar the 

picketing to “prevent patient disturbance or disruption of health 

care operations.” Id. at *5. One Board member dissented, 

disagreeing with the Board’s conclusion that the Republic 

Aviation presumption should apply to off-duty picketing on 

employer property. 

Capital now petitions this court for review, and the Board 

cross-applies for enforcement of its order. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 160(e)-(f). The Union has intervened in support of the 

Board’s decision.

 

II. 

Capital principally challenges the Board’s decision on the 

ground that the Republic Aviation framework should be 

inapplicable in the context of employee picketing on company 

property. We disagree. The Board permissibly declined to 

conclude that picketing inherently is so disruptive as to be 

categorically ineligible for protection under the Republic 

Aviation presumption. We also reject Capital’s contention that, 

in applying the Republic Aviation framework, the Board should 

have found the picketing in this case sufficiently likely to 

disrupt patient care such that Capital could validly bar it.

A. 

We first address whether the Board could apply the 

Republic Area framework to employee picketing on company 

premises, or whether the Board instead was obligated to 

confine that framework to the exercise of Section 7 rights in 
9

other ways such as orally soliciting support or distributing 

leaflets. In deciding to apply Republic Aviation to employee 

picketing, the Board construed the scope of Section 7’s 

protections. We defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation 

of ambiguous NLRA provisions, as we generally do when an 

agency construes a statute it administers. E.g., ITT Indus., Inc. 

v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see 

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 

842-43 (1984). We sustain the Board’s application of the 

Republic Aviation framework here on that basis.

At the outset, it is undisputed that Section 7 does not 

directly resolve the rights of off-duty employees to picket on 

company property. See ITT Indus., 251 F.3d at 1000 (“Section 

7 does not itself speak of access rights[.]”). The Board’s 

interpretation of those rights, then, would ordinarily call for our 

deference if reasonable. But Capital contends that the Board’s 

interpretation nonetheless is ineligible for deference because, 

Capital argues, the Board failed to balance the hospital’s 

property rights against the employees’ Section 7 rights, as it 

was required to do. See id. at 1005; NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox 

Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). 

Capital’s argument is misconceived. The Board accounted 

for (and balanced) the employer’s property rights and 

management prerogatives by invoking the Republic Aviation 

framework. See DHL Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 813 F.3d 365, 

376 (D.C. Cir. 2016). As the Board explained, “Republic 

Aviation itself explicitly required a balance between protection 

of employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’ property rights 

and business interests”; and the Republic Aviation framework 

gives effect to an employer’s interests in the hospital setting on 

a case-by-case basis by enabling a hospital to “prohibit Section 

7 activities in non-patient care areas if it shows that the 

prohibition is needed to prevent patient disturbance or 
10

disruption of health care operations.” Capital Med. Ctr., 2016 

WL 4362367, at *4; see also id. at *4 nn.10-11. 

We therefore must sustain the Board’s interpretation if it 

is reasonable. Capital advances two strands of arguments in 

contending that the Board could not permissibly apply the 

Republic Aviation presumption to employee picketing on 

company property. First, Capital asserts that picketing of any 

kind is inherently more disruptive than other forms of Section 

7 activity. Second, Capital submits the Board did not 

adequately explain its departure from agency precedents under 

which an employer could bar picketing on its property if there 

were reasonable alternative means of communication available 

to the employees. We find Capital’s arguments unpersuasive, 

and we sustain the Board’s approach as reasonable.

1.

There is no dispute that the tailored Republic Aviation 

presumption protects off-duty employees’ distribution of union 

literature on hospital property in non-patient care areas (unless 

the hospital can show it needs to bar the conduct to avoid 

disrupting health care operations). Capital therefore did not 

attempt to stop its employees from handing out leaflets outside 

the entrance to its facility. Is employee picketing categorically 

different, such that the Republic Aviation framework should 

have no application to picketing as a blanket matter?

The Board permissibly answered that question no. The 

Board explained that “[t]here is nothing in the nature of 

picketing per se that would support a conclusion that Republic 

Aviation is inapplicable to that activity.” Capital Med. Ctr., 

2016 WL 4362367, at *3 n.9. “In fact,” the Board determined, 

“picketing is often neither coercive nor disruptive.” Id. The 

Board said that it needed to “look no further for an example 
11

than the peaceful display of picket signs . . . that occurred in 

this case.” Id. “Indeed,” the Board reasoned, “the quiet, 

stationary” picketing at issue “was even less confrontational 

than the permitted handbilling in an important respect: it 

involved no direct contact with the recipient of the handbill.” 

Id. at *5 n.14. And whereas the employees “stationed 

themselves outside the main pathways to the doors,” they “only 

stepped into the entryway . . . when handbilling,” not when 

they merely held picket signs. Id. at *4 n.13.

The Board’s interpretation of Section 7, so as to apply the 

same framework to picketing as to other protected employee 

conduct, is reasonable. In contending otherwise, Capital relies 

on the Supreme Court’s observation that “picketing is 

qualitatively different from other forms of communication.” 

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. 

Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988). The Board, though, 

addressed that observation directly, explaining that the Court 

“did not state that [picketing] is necessarily or inherently 

‘coercive’ or ‘disruptive.’” Capital Med. Ctr., 2016 WL 

4362367, at *3 n.9. And the Court in DeBartolo, when 

referring to “picketing,” appeared to have in mind “those 

patrolling a picket line,” 485 U.S. at 580, as opposed to the 

stationary holding of picket signs by two to four employees 

without any patrolling (or even chanting), at issue here.

The Board, moreover, specifically rejected any notion that 

it was “holding that on-premises picketing must be permitted 

to the same degree as on-premises solicitation and 

handbilling.” Capital Med. Ctr., 2016 WL 4362367, at *3 n.9

(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the Board could 

“easily envision circumstances, not present here, where 

picketing on hospital property would disrupt operations or 

interfere with patient care while solicitation and distribution 

would not.” Id. The Republic Aviation framework would 
12

enable a hospital to bar picketing in those situations. Id. And 

the Board presumably will develop principles on a 

case-by-case basis that will guide employers about the 

circumstances in which they can prohibit picketing on 

company premises. It also bears recalling that the Republic 

Aviation framework’s presumption applies only in 

“non-patient care areas.” Id. at *4. In patient-care areas, a 

hospital is generally free to prohibit Section 7 activity 

including any holding of picket signs. See Stanford Hosp., 325 

F.3d at 338-39.

Capital argues that the Board erred in relying on its 

previous decision in Town & Country Supermarkets, which, in 

Capital’s view, was inadequately reasoned and materially 

distinguishable in its treatment of picketing. The Board, 

though, invoked Town & Country Supermarkets here primarily 

(and correctly) to show that it had previously applied the 

Republic Aviation framework to picketing by off-duty 

employees on company property. Id. at *3. The Board hardly 

relied solely on Town & Country Supermarket to justify its 

decision to apply Republic Aviation in the context of this case. 

Rather, as discussed, the Board separately set out why it would 

be appropriate to bring employee picketing within that 

framework—including by reasoning that picketing can be 

noncoercive and nondisruptive, as the Board found was true of

the peaceful, stationary holding of picket signs in this case.

Finally, Capital argues that the Board erred in relying on 

Section 8(g) of the NLRA. That provision requires employees 

of health care facilities to provide 10-days’ advance notice 

before engaging in picketing or striking. 29 U.S.C. § 158(g). 

The Board invoked Section 8(g) to demonstrate that Congress 

contemplated the picketing of health care facilities by 

employees, and Congress allowed for picketing of hospitals 

without excluding picketing on hospital property. Capital 
13

Med. Ctr., 2016 WL 4362367, at *3 n.9. Capital emphasizes 

that Section 8(g) does not speak to whether picketing of 

hospitals necessarily would occur on a hospital’s private 

grounds. The Board understood as much, but permissibly 

relied on Section 8(g) to support the general idea that picketing 

of hospitals need not be subjected to different standards than 

other Section 7 activity.

In short, the Board reasonably interpreted Section 7 in 

concluding that the Republic Aviation presumption could 

encompass not only solicitation and distribution on employer 

property, but also picketing. 

2.

Capital next contends that the Board applied the Republic 

Aviation framework without accounting for and sufficiently 

explaining its departure from its prior precedents. “[A]n 

unexplained divergence from its precedent would render a 

Board decision arbitrary and capricious.” Fort Dearborn Co. 

v. NLRB, 827 F.3d 1067, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The Board, 

though, gave an adequate explanation here.

Capital points primarily to the Board’s decision in 

Providence Hospital, 285 N.L.R.B. 320 (1987). There, a 

hospital prohibited off-duty employees from engaging in 

informational picketing on hospital property. In administering

the balance “between property rights and Section 7 rights,” the 

Board applied its then-applicable Fairmont Hotel test. Id. at 

321 (citing Fairmont Hotel, 282 N.L.R.B. 139 (1986)). That 

test addressed whether an employer must allow access to its 

property for the exercise of Section 7 rights by off-duty 

employees or nonemployee union organizers. Under the test, 

if the employer’s property interests and the off-duty 

employees’ (or nonemployee organizers’) Section 7 interests 
14

were relatively equal in weight, the Board considered whether 

there was a “reasonable alternative means for communicating 

with [the] intended audience.” Id. at 322. Applying that 

inquiry in Providence Hospital, the Board upheld the hospital’s 

ban on picketing on its property, concluding that the employees 

could effectively communicate with the public by engaging in 

informational picketing on adjacent public property. Id.

The Board subsequently determined that the availability of 

“reasonable alternative means” would be relevant in every case 

involving access to company property for exercising Section 7

rights, not just cases in which the competing interests were 

roughly equal in strength. See Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 

11 (1988). The Supreme Court then invalidated the Jean 

Country framework’s balancing of interests, “[a]t least as 

applied to nonemployees.” Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 

527, 538 (1992). The Court held that, under its precedents, 

nonemployee union organizers had no cognizable interest in 

accessing the employer’s premises as long as they had 

reasonable access to employees elsewhere. Id. at 537-38. The 

Court did not directly speak to whether the Jean Country 

framework—including the consideration of “reasonable 

alternative means”—continued to govern in cases involving 

off-duty employees. 

Capital argues that the Board was obligated by its 

precedents to continue considering the availability of 

reasonable alternative means in cases involving off-duty 

employees, unless it adequately explained why it would no 

longer do so. The Board, however, adequately accounted for 

its precedents in its decision. It specifically referenced 

Providence Hospital, explaining that the decision no longer 

governed “[f]or the reasons set forth by the [administrative 

law] judge.” Capital Med. Ctr., 2016 WL 4362367, at *4 n.12. 

And the ALJ in turn thoroughly explained her decision not to 
15

apply the Providence Hospital/Jean Country line of 

decisions—and instead to apply the Republic Aviation 

framework—in the circumstances of this case.

The ALJ acknowledged that the “case that weighs most 

strongly in [Capital’s] favor is Providence Hospital.” Capital 

Med. Ctr. & UFCW Local 21, ALJ Decision, 2014 WL 

3548159, at 10 (July 17, 2014) (J.A. 359). But the Providence 

Hospital/Jean Country line of decisions, the ALJ observed, had 

been rejected by the Supreme Court as applied to 

nonemployees. Id. at 8, 10-11 (J.A. 357, 359-60). And the 

Board had since “declined to apply the Jean Country test to 

cases involving off-duty employee access to the work 

premises.” Id. at 8 (J.A. 357). Rather, the Board’s decisions 

had evolved to draw distinctions based on certain “primary 

considerations,” one of which the ALJ found especially salient

here: whether the circumstances involved a blanket prohibition 

against off-duty employees accessing company property, or 

instead involved selective permission for off-duty employees 

to come onto the premises for some purposes but not to engage 

in certain forms of Section 7 activity. Id. at 8, 10-11 (J.A. 357, 

359-60).

This case falls into the latter category, the ALJ explained. 

It “does not involve a no-access rule or policy.” Id. at 8 (J.A. 

357). Instead, “off-duty employees were permitted to be on the 

Hospital’s premises . . . so long as they did not carry picket 

signs.” Id.; see id. at 11 (J.A. 360). In that setting, the ALJ 

determined, the Republic Aviation framework, rather than the 

Providence Hospital/Jean Country line of decisions, was 

controlling. Id. at 8, 11 (J.A. 357, 360). 

The Board expressly incorporated the ALJ’s reasoning. 

Capital Med. Ctr., 2016 WL 4362367, at *4 n.12. The Board 

thus determined that, “consistent with . . . [its] treatment of 
16

other Sec. 7 activity in a hospital setting, it is appropriate to 

place on the employer the burden of showing a likelihood of 

disturbance or disruption in a particular case.” Id. The Board 

adequately explained why it adopted that approach rather than 

the one set out in Providence Hospital/Jean Country, including 

by adopting the ALJ’s reasoning on the issue.

B. 

Capital briefly challenges the Board’s finding that, under 

the Republic Aviation framework, the informational picketing 

at issue here was unlikely to disrupt health operations or cause 

patient disturbance. We assess whether the Board’s finding in 

that regard is supported by substantial evidence, Brockton 

Hosp. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 100, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and 

conclude that it is.

In order to overcome the Republic Aviation presumption, 

“the Hospital had to show only a likelihood of, not actual, 

disruption or disturbance.” Id. Capital asserts that the Board 

impermissibly required it to show an actual disruption rather 

than the likelihood of a disruption. The Board, however,

examined whether Capital had adduced evidence of “any 

potential disruption” and the “likely impact” of the picketing. 

Capital Med. Ctr., 2016 WL 4362367, at *4 (emphases added). 

Capital failed to rebut the presumption, not because it was 

made to prove an actual disruption, but because its allegation

of a “potential disruption” was based on “speculative and 

exaggerated contentions” that were “not supported by the 

record.” Id. at *4-5.

The Board’s finding that Capital had failed to demonstrate

a likelihood of patient disturbance or disruption of health care 

operations is supported by substantial evidence. Undisputed 

record evidence establishes that there were only two to four 
17

employees who held picket signs on the hospital’s property, 

standing stationary by a nonemergency entrance. They did not 

chant, march, or obstruct visitors from entering or leaving the 

hospital, and Capital offered no evidence demonstrating that 

the peaceful holding of picket signs nonetheless could disrupt 

patient care. We therefore uphold the Board’s finding that the 

picketing at issue here presented no likelihood of disruption or 

disturbance, and we sustain the Board’s resulting conclusion 

that Capital violated the NLRA by attempting to stop the 

employees from holding picket signs.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review 

and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its 

order.

So ordered.