J-A08011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

ROBERT GENE REGA 

Appellant

v.

U.P.M.C. COMMUNITY HEALTH 

CHOICES; MELODEE HURSEY; 

SOUTHWESTERN PENNSYLVANIA 

AREA AGENCY ON AGING; HELENA 

SNYDER; COMPATI HOME 

HEALTHCARE; JAY CINCINNATI; 

RUTHI HOOPER; KIMMEY MILLER; 

AND MARY-ANN (L.N.U.)

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 194 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 19, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County 

Civil Division at No: No. 05 CV 2020

ROBERT GENE REGA 

Appellant

v.

U.P.M.C. COMMUNITY HEALTH 

CHOICES, MELODEE HURSEY, 

SOUTHWESTERN PENNSYLVANIA 

AREA AGENCY ON AGING, HELENA 

SNYDER, COMPATI HOME 

HEALTHCARE, JAY CINCINATTI, 

RUTHI HOOPER, KIMMEY MILLER, 

AND MARY-ANN (L.N.U.)

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 354 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County 

Civil Division at No: No. 05 CV 2020
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BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JUNE 22, 2023

In these consolidated appeals, Appellant, Robert Gene Rega (“Appellant” 

or “Rega”), appeals pro se from orders entered in the Court of Common Pleas 

of Greene County dismissing Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint after the 

court sustained preliminary objections filed by Appellees, Southwestern 

Pennsylvania Area Agency on Aging (“SWPAAA”) and Helena Snyder 

(collectively “SWPAAA Appellees”) (“January 19, 2022 Order”), and by 

Appellees Compati Home Health Care, Jay Cincinnati, Ruthi Hooper, Kimmey 

Miller, and Mary-Ann (L.N.U.) (collectively “Compati Appellees”) (“January 20, 

2022 Order”).

1

 Following review, we affirm.

In the opinion issued in conjunction with each order, the trial court 

explained:

[Appellant] is the Plaintiff. Joan Mary Rega is his mother. Rega 

indicated that he has a valid power of attorney for his mother. He 

is incarcerated in the Department of Corrections and is currently 

housed at SCI-Phoenix. Although incarcerated, Rega claims his 

residence as 408 Mountainview Drive, Waynesburg, PA 15370. He 

is serving a life sentence concurrent with a sentence of death that 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 By separate order entered January 19, 2022, the trial court sustained 

preliminary objections and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint in favor 

of named Appellees, U.P.M.C. Community Health Plan and Melodee Hursey 

(collectively “UPMC Appellees”). Appellant did not file an appeal from that 

order. 
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has been imposed [in a separate federal criminal proceeding].[2] 

The court now determines that the preliminary objections will turn 

on agency law and also whether Rega has a valid power of 

attorney.

The court previously ruled at a separate docket number and term 

[] that the power of attorney Rega possesses is invalid. That 

opinion has been affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court and 

certiorari was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.[3] [] 

We note also that Rega is bringing his claim on his own behalf and 

not on behalf of his mother. The court determines that this 

generally violates the basic principles of agency law.

[The trial court proceeded to identify each of the parties named in 

Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint. For our purposes, it is 

sufficient to note that Helena Snyder was employed by SWPAAA

as a caseworker and that the remaining individually-named 

Compati Appellees were employees of that entity, a provider of 

home health services to Medicare/Medicaid participants, including 

Appellant’s mother.]

Rega brought this cause of action claiming violations of the United 

States and Pennsylvania Constitutions[.] In each count Rega 

requests $1,000,000 jointly and severally, court costs, costs of 

litigation, attorney fees, prejudgment and post-judgment interest. 

Rega’s Complaint is over 100 pages and includes 10 separate 

counts. . . . Rega’s Second Amended Complaint is generally 

complaining of allegations surrounding, his mother, Ms. Rega’s 

home care. 

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2

In an unreported decision dated February 15, 2018, the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania determined that Appellant was 

entitled to a new capital sentencing hearing. Rega v. Wetzel, 2018 WL 

897126 (W.D.Pa. 2018). Appellant has not directed our attention to anything 

in the record that reflects the outcome of a new hearing. There is no 

suggestion, however, that he is serving anything short of a life sentence. 

3 Rega v. A Bridge to Independence, No. 151 WDA 2021, unpublished 

memorandum (Pa. Super. filed July 2, 2021), appeal denied, 270 A.3d 1105 

(Pa. 2022). 
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January 19, 2022 Opinion and Order at 2-4; January 20, 2022 Opinion and 

Order at 2-5 (references to Second Amended Complaint and some 

capitalization omitted).

In each opinion and order, the trial court addressed Appellees’ respective 

preliminary objections to the counts in Appellant’s Second Amended 

Complaint. The court prefaced its analysis by noting that Appellant claimed 

that his mother, who suffered from Alzheimer’s and dementia, was the victim 

of theft by her care providers, prompting Appellant to have security cameras 

installed in her apartment. Essentially, he claimed that various care providers 

interfered with his ability to monitor and contact his mother by, inter alia, 

removing the surveillance cameras and restricting her access to her telephone. 

He also contended that providers stole his mother’s identification and social 

security information and changed her debit card account and corresponding 

PIN number. 

The court summarized each of the ten counts in Appellant’s 282-

paragraph complaint, identifying them as follows: Count 1: Fourth 

Amendment Search and Seizure; Count 2: First Amendment Free Speech; 

Count 3: Intentional Interference with a Contract; Count 4: Intentional 

Infliction of Emotional Distress; Count 5: Negligence/Gross Negligence; Count 

6: Policy, Custom, Practice or Culture; Count 7: Conspiracy; Count 8: Failure 

to Comply with Directives; Count 9: Trespass; and Count 10: Punitive 
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Damages. January 19, 2022 Opinion and Order at 6-8; January 20, 2022 

Opinion and Order at 6-9. 

Appellant filed timely appeals from the trial court’s orders. Both 

Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. This Court 

consolidated the appeals by order entered April 28, 2022.

Appellant presents four issues for our consideration:

A. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion by issuing a boilerplate decision/opinion 

which failed to provide any legal basis or cite any authorities in 

support of granting [Appellant’s] motion(s) for preliminary 

objections.

B. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion by failing to decide whether Appellant had 

legal standing to claim the residence in [question] as his 

personal residence, so that the court could deny relief on 

Appellant’s cause(s) of action(s).

C. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion by concluding Appellant failed to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted for all cause(s) of 

action(s) against [the SWPAAA Appellees] despite Appellant’s 

right as a resident to assert such a claim on his own behalf 

nothwithstanding (sic) the validity of Appellant’s power of 

attorney.

D. Whether the trial court committed an error or law or abused its 

discretion by concluding Appellant failed to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted for all cause(s) of action(s) against 

[the Compati Appellees] despite Appellant’s right as a resident 

to assert such a claim on his own behalf nothwithstanding (sic) 

the validity of Appellant’s power of attorney.

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 
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We begin by setting forth our standard and scope of review. In 

Caltagirone v. Cephalon, Inc., 190 A.3d 596 (Pa. Super. 2018), this Court 

reiterated:

Our standard of review of an order granting preliminary objections 

in the nature of a demurrer is well-settled: 

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer should be 

granted where the contested pleading is legally 

insufficient. Cardenas v. Schober, 783 A.2d 317, 321 (Pa. 

Super. 2001) (citing Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4)). “Preliminary 

objections in the nature of a demurrer require the court to 

resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings; no 

testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may 

be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by 

the demurrer.” Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 

798, 805 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Cardenas, 783 A.2d 

317 at 321). All material facts set forth in the pleading and 

all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be 

admitted as true. Id.

Cooper v. Church of St. Benedict, 954 A.2d 1216, 1218 (Pa. 

Super. 2008). In reviewing a trial court’s grant of preliminary 

objection, the standard of review is de novo and the scope of 

review is plenary. Martin v. Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., 80 

A.3d 813, 814 (Pa. Super. 2013). Moreover, we review the trial 

court’s decision for an abuse of discretion or an error of 

law. Lovelace ex rel. Lovelace v. Pennsylvania Prop. & Cas. 

Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 874 A.2d 661, 664 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Id. at 599 (quoting Kilmer v. Sposito, 146 A.3d 1275, 1278 (Pa. Super. 

2016)).

With respect to both the SWPAAA and Compati Appellees, in his first 

issue (Issue A), Appellant contends that the trial court committed error of law 

or abused its discretion “by issuing a boilerplate decision/opinion which failed 

to provide any legal basis or cite any authorities” in support of its orders 

granting both Appellees’ preliminary objections. Appellant’s Brief at 11. 
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Appellant cites certain canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct in support of his 

argument that the trial court failed to make an independent review of the facts 

and law.4 He claims that the trial court merely adopted the Appellees’ 

arguments and thereby denied Appellant a fair and impartial review. 

We find no merit to Appellant’s bald assertion of error of law or abuse 

of discretion in the disposition of Appellant’s claims and the grant of Appellees’ 

preliminary objections. In each of its opinions and orders, the trial court set 

forth the applicable standard of review when addressing preliminary 

objections. January 19, 2022 Opinion and Order at 9 and January 20, 2022 

Opinion and Order at 9-10 (both citing Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)). The court proceeded to address each of the preliminary 

objections raised by each Appellee in accordance with the standard of review 

and then stated its basis for sustaining the objections. Appellant’s first issue 

fails. 

In his second issue (Issue B), Appellant complains that the trial court 

failed to address Appellant’s contention that he—a prisoner serving a life 

sentence in a state correctional institution—somehow “resides” in his mother’s 

apartment. The trial court found it unnecessary to address the issue of 

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4 Specifically, Appellant contends the court violated Canon 1 (relating to the 

independence of the judiciary and avoiding appearance of impropriety), Canon 

2.1 (calling for judicial duties to take precedence over a judge’s personal and 

extrajudicial activities), Canon 2.1 (requiring performance of judicial duties 

without bias or prejudice) and Canon 2.6 (according all persons the right to 

be heard).
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residency in light of the fact that it was “convinced that Rega as agent can 

make no claim on his own benefit.” January 19, 2022 Opinion and Order at 

10. As the SWPAAA Appellees correctly recognize, analysis of the legal 

residence issue was not required because Appellant’s claims “are clearly based 

on his purported rights to act on behalf of his mother.” SWPAAA Appellees 

Brief at 21. Again, “the issue was adequately resolved by the invalidity of the 

power of attorney at issue.” Id. We find no error on the part of the trial court 

for declining to address an issue that was not necessary to the disposition of 

Appellant’s claims. 

Regardless, we find no merit to Appellant’s assertion that he was a 

resident of his mother’s apartment. As the SWPAAA Appellees observe, 

Appellant alleged in his Second Amended Complaint that he “resides at 1200 

Mokychic Drive, Collegeville, PA, 19426.” SWPAAA Appellees Brief at 21 

(quoting Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint, 1/21/21, at 2).5 

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5 Appellant cites three Commonwealth Court cases and two cases from courts 

of common pleas in support of his contention that he is a resident of his 

mother’s apartment despite being incarcerated and serving a life sentence. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 16. The cases are not binding on this Court and, more 

importantly, are inapposite, as is the U.S. Supreme Court case he cited. This 

Court has recognized that “residence” is “a factual place of abode evidenced 

by a person’s physical presence in a particular place.” Wall Rose Mutual 

Ins. Co. v. Manross, 939 A.2d 958, 965 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation and 

internal quotation omitted). Because residence is a question of physical 

presence, “intention is not a relevant consideration.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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This Court may take judicial notice of the fact the stated address is the 

address of State Correctional Institute-Phoenix. Pa.R.E. 201(b) (“a court may 

take judicial notice of fact[s] that [are] not subject to reasonable dispute.”). 

By virtue of Appellant’s admission and judicial notice, there is no unresolved 

issue relating to Appellant’s residence. Therefore, we agree with the trial court 

that analysis of Appellant’s “residence” was unnecessary. Appellant is not 

entitled to relief on his second issue. 

In his third and fourth issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s grant 

of preliminary objections of the SWPAAA Appellees (Issue C) and those of the 

Compati Appellees (Issue D). We shall consider Appellant’s issues with 

respect to the SWPAAA Appellees and the Compati Appellees separately.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF SWPAAA APPELLEES

The SWPAAA Appellees filed four preliminary objections to Appellant’s 

Second Amended Complaint. Specifically, the SWPAAA Appellees demurred 

to Counts I and II, asserting that the allegations regarding constitutional 

violations set forth in those counts were legally insufficient. They also 

demurred to Counts III through IX, contending that the state law claims 

alleged in those counts were “not in compliance with the Power of Attorney 

statute and [are] not enforceable,” and that the SWPAAA Appellees “did not 

owe any duty to [Appellant], and [Appellant] does not set forth factual 

allegations to support a prima facie case of the claims advanced in those 

counts.” SWPAAA Appellees’ Preliminary Objections at 1. In addition, the 
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SWPAAA Appellees asserted that Appellant’s Count X request for punitive 

damages does not constitute a separate cause of action and his request for 

attorney fees and costs “fail[ed] to conform to law and rules of court.” Id. at 

1-2.

The trial court sustained all the SWPAAA Appellees’ Preliminary 

Objections and dismissed Appellant’s Complaint. January 19, 2022 Opinion 

and Order. Appellant purports to challenge the trial court’s ruling “for all 

cause(s) of action(s) against the SWPAAA Appellees[.] Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

However, in his brief, he challenges the trial court’s rulings only with respect 

to Counts I and II, involving constitutional challenges, and Counts V and IX, 

involving negligence and trespass, respectively. We confine our discussion to 

those counts.

In Counts I and II of Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint, Appellant 

alleged violations of the Fourth and First Amendments. In rejecting 

Appellant’s constitutional claims, the trial court was convinced that “Rega has 

failed to support a cause of action based on constitutional claims. . . . [W]e 

again determine that Rega does not have a valid power of attorney over his 

mother.” January 19, 2022 Opinion and Order at 10. 

We find no error in the court’s determination. As the SWPAAA Appellees 

observe, Appellant “has at no point identified the legal basis or mechanism by 

which he was entitled to assert claims for money damages for these alleged 

constitutional violations.” SWPAAA Appellees Brief at 16. However, Appellant 
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has failed to demonstrate that the SWPAAA Appellees were state actors so as 

to entitle him to a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

In terms of Fourth Amendment violations, Appellant claimed that the 

Appellees entered his mother’s apartment without his permission as her power 

of attorney. As such, Appellant’s “actual claim is not that his own rights were 

violated, but that his mother’s rights were violated because Appellees did not 

seek his consent in his purported role as power of attorney.” Id. at 19. Again, 

that power of attorney was determined to be invalid. 

In terms of claimed First Amendment violations, “such claim was again 

couched as an agency claim brought on behalf of his mother, without the 

authority of a valid power of attorney, and while improperly seeking recovery 

of damages in his own right.” Id. We agree that the trial court properly found 

that Appellant failed to state a valid First Amendment claim “because he did 

not possess legal authority to raise such claim on behalf of his mother, and 

regardless, could not raise such claim as her agent but seeking damages for 

himself alone.” Id. at 20. 

Regarding Appellant’s state law claims raised in Counts V and IX, the 

trial court noted they were “premised on his assertion that he is Power of 

Attorney for his mother, Ms. Rega, and [] the instant court [] has already 

determined that Rega’s alleged Power of Attorney was not valid for events on 
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or before May 11, 2020.” January 19, 2022 Opinion and Order at 11.6 The 

court announced that it again determined that Appellant “does not have a valid 

power of attorney over his mother. Also, even if valid, Rega, as agent, can 

make no claims on his own behalf.” Id. at 12. 

Regarding the claims of negligence and gross negligence in Count V, the 

SWPAAA Appellees recognize that to establish negligence, a defendant must 

owe a duty of care to a plaintiff. “Duty, in any given situation, is predicated 

on the relationship existing between the parties at the relevant time.” Charlie 

v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 100 A.3d 244, 252 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). 

Although Appellant asserted that the SWPAAA Appellees owed a duty of 

care, he based that contention on an invalid power of attorney. However, he 

cannot premise a negligence claim on an invalid power of attorney. Absent 

any relationship between Appellant and the SWPAAA, he cannot establish that 

the SWPAAA Appellees owed him any duty. Because he has not established a 

duty, the trial court properly determined that his negligence claims were 

legally insufficient. Similarly, Appellant has not pled facts to establish a 

trespass claim, a claim based on entering and disconnecting a camera system 

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6 We note that all events upon which Appellant bases his claims occurred 

before the end of February 2020. See Appellant’s Second Amended 

Complaint.
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in his mother’s apartment. As the SWPAAA Appellees recognize, Appellant 

does not maintain his legal residence in that apartment and otherwise holds 

no ownership interest in the property. Because Appellant was not the 

possessor of his mother’s apartment, Appellant cannot succeed on a claim of 

trespass against the SWPAAA Appellees. 

We find no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusions 

regarding Appellant’s constitutional claims alleged in Counts I and II or 

regarding the negligence and trespass claims alleged in Counts V and IX of his 

Second Amended Complaint. Appellant is not entitled to relief on his third 

issue.7 

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF COMPATI APPELLEES

The Compati Appellees also filed preliminary objections to Appellant’s 

Second Amended Complaint. They demurred to the allegations of Counts I 

through IX, and asserted a motion to strike Count X (punitive damages) as 

well as claims of entitlement to attorney fees, and Paragraphs 113 through 

117 of the Second Amended Complaint. Compati Preliminary Objections, 

3/25/21.

The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and addressed each 

of the demurrers and the motions to strike. Again, we review the court’s 

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7 Because Appellant’s fourth issue (Issue D) deals with the Compati Appellees 

only, we do not consider it here.
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ruling for error of law or abuse of discretion, accepting all well-pleaded 

material facts as true. Caltagirone, 190 A.3d at 599.

In his brief, Appellant challenges the court’s rulings only with respect to 

Counts I (Unlawful Search and Seizure), II (Free Speech), V 

(Negligence/Gross Negligence), VI (Policy, Custom, Practice or Culture), VII 

(Conspiracy), and IX (Trespass). Because he has abandoned the remaining 

counts and claims, we shall confine our discussion to the trial court’s 

disposition of those counts addressed in Appellant’s brief. 

In their first two demurrers, the Compati Appellees assert that Counts I 

and II are legally insufficient because there is no private cause of action for 

constitutional violations under the United States or Pennsylvania 

Constitutions, and in particular, for Appellant’s claims that the Compati 

Appellees violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful searches and 

seizures and First Amendment free speech rights. The trial court agreed, 

finding that the Compati Appellees are private actors, not acting under color 

of state law, that Appellant is not a real party in interest, that Compati as an 

employer cannot be vicariously liable for constitutional violations, that 

Appellant failed to allege facts demonstrating constitutional violations, and, 

importantly, that there is no private cause of action for constitutional 

violations. January 20, 2022 Opinion and Order at 10-11. 

With respect to Count I, the Compati Appellees provide analysis 

supporting the trial court’s dismissal of that count. In particular, they offer 
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analysis, with citation to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and relevant case law, establishing 

that the Compati Appellees were private actors who are not liable for 

constitutional violations. Further, they scrutinize Appellant’s complaint to 

demonstrate that Appellant failed to allege an unlawful search or seizure or 

that he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his mother’s 

apartment. In addition, they recognize that Appellant was not a real party in 

interest, in light of the invalid power of attorney upon which Appellant relies 

and note that he is foreclosed from asserting claims on his mother’s behalf. 

Compati Appellees Brief at 13-18. 

Regarding Count II, the Compati Appellees address Appellant’s First 

Amendment claims, concentrating on the United States Constitution in light of 

the fact there is no recognized private cause of action for monetary damages 

for alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Compati Appellees 

Brief at 18 n. 2 (citing Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (en banc), appeal denied, 909 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 2006)). 

Reiterating that the Compati Appellees were not state actors so as to be 

potentially liable under Section 1983, they also note that Appellant cannot 

assert his mother’s claims as his own. Further, to the extent Appellant 

attempted to establish Compati’s vicarious liability for acts of omissions of its 

employees, that attempt must fail because an employer cannot be found liable 

for constitutional violations of Section 1983 based on respondeat superior. 

Because Appellant failed to allege any policy or custom behind a purported 
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free speech violation, Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted. Finally, Appellant failed to aver facts to support a claim that 

Compati employees infringed upon Appellant’s freedom of speech. Compati 

Appellees Brief at 18-21. 

Appellant has failed to establish any error of law or abuse of discretion 

with respect to the trial court’s dismissal of the constitutional claims asserted 

in Counts I or II of Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint. 

The Compati Appellees next address Appellant’s claims of negligence, 

gross negligence, and trespass set forth in Counts V and IX of the Second 

Amended Complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer to each count, 

noting legal insufficiency. January 20, 2022 Opinion and Order at 18, 20-21. 

With respect to the negligence and gross negligence allegations, the trial court 

noted that Appellant’s power of attorney was unenforceable and that Appellant 

failed to establish that the Compati Appellees owed any duty of care to 

Appellant. Id. at 18. 

Appellant recognizes the requirements for stating a cause of action for 

negligence, including a duty or obligation recognized by law. However, he fails 

to explain the duty allegedly owed to him by the Compati Appellees. In a 

hybrid argument addressing negligence and trespass, he suggests that 

“Appellees had a legal obligation/duty to conform their conduct to comply with 

the laws of this Commonwealth which apply to every citizan (sic). It’s called 

negligence pro se’ (sic).” Appellant’s Brief at 21. He contends the Compati 
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Appellees were aware that Appellant did not authorize them to disconnect or 

destroy the wireless camera system. “That is Trespass under common law.” 

Id. at 22. He argues that the Compati Appellees had a “legal (criminal) duty 

of care not to destroy Appellant’s personal property” within his mother’s 

apartment. Id. (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304-Criminal Mischief). 

The Compati Appellees counter that a trespass claim is contingent upon 

an assertion that a defendant entered upon the plaintiff’s land. Here, there is 

no allegation that the Compati Appellees entered onto Appellant’s land, nor 

could there be, “since [Appellant] does not own, occupy, control, or reside in 

the residence in question.” Compati Appellees Brief at 38. 

We find no error of law or abuse of discretion with respect to the trial 

court’s grant of preliminary objections relating to Counts V and IX. 

Finally, Appellant challenges the trial court’s grant of preliminary 

objections to Count VII of the Second Amended Complaint in which he claims 

that the Compati Appellees conspired to seize his surveillance cameras and 

unplug his mother’s phones. The Compati Appellees note that Appellant again 

bases his entitlement to relief on the invalid power of attorney and his 

disproven claim of residency in his mother’s apartment. Compati Appellees 

Brief at 34. 

In order to establish civil conspiracy, it must be shown that two or more 

persons combined or agreed with the intent to do an unlawful act or to do an 

otherwise lawful act by unlawful means. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal 
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Co., 412 A.2d 466, 472 (Pa. 1979). Proof of malice, or an intent to injure, is 

an essential element to prove conspiracy. Id. 

 The trial court explained that Appellant could not recover on a cause 

of action based on conspiracy because, inter alia, he “fails to aver any facts 

necessary to state a viable claim of conspiracy, rather he makes a general 

conclusion and unsubstantiated suspicions that are legally insufficient.” 

January 20, 2022 Opinion and Order at 19. Basically, Appellant “repeatedly 

aver[red] that the Compati [Appellees] were acting as agents of the 

Department of Aging and agents of a single entity cannot conspire among 

themselves.” Id. 

We find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

determination that Appellant failed to state a legally sufficient cause of action 

for conspiracy among the Compati Appellees, either alone or in conjunction 

with the SWPAAA Appellees. 

Finding no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s grant of 

preliminary objections filed by the SWPAAA Appellees, we affirm the trial 

court’s January 19, 2022 order dismissing Appellant’s Second Amended 

Complaint. Further, finding no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s grant of preliminary objections filed by the Compati Appellees, we also 

affirm the trial court’s January 20, 2022 order dismissing Appellant’s Second 

Amended Complaint. 

Orders affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/2023