(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

No. 14–1375. Argued March 28, 2016—Decided May 19, 2016 

Petitioner CRST, a trucking company using a system under which two

employees share driving duties on a single truck, requires its drivers 

to graduate from the company’s training program before becoming a 

certified driver. In 2005, new driver Monika Starke filed a charge

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Commission),

alleging that she was sexually harassed by two male trainers during

the road-trip portion of her training. Following the procedures set 

out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U. S. C. 

§2000e–5(b), the Commission informed CRST about the charge and 

investigated the allegation, ultimately informing CRST that it had

found reasonable cause to believe that CRST subjected Starke and “a

class of employees and prospective employees to sexual harassment” 

and offering to conciliate. In 2007, having determined that conciliation had failed, the Commission, in its own name, filed suit against

CRST under §706 of Title VII. During discovery, the Commission

identified over 250 allegedly aggrieved women. The District Court, 

however, dismissed all of the claims, including those on behalf of 67 

women, which, the court found, were barred on the ground that the

Commission had not adequately investigated or attempted to conciliate its claims on their behalf before filing suit. The District Court 

then dismissed the suit, held that CRST is a prevailing party, and invited CRST to apply for attorney’s fees. CRST filed a motion for attorney’s fees. The District Court awarded the company over $4 million in fees. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of only two

claims—on behalf of Starke and one other employee—but that led it

to vacate, without prejudice, the attorney’s fees award. On remand, 

the Commission settled the claim on behalf of Starke and withdrew 
 

 

2 CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EEOC 

Syllabus 

the other. CRST again sought attorney’s fees, and the District Court 

again awarded it more than $4 million, finding that CRST had prevailed on the claims for over 150 of the allegedly aggrieved women,

including the 67 claims dismissed because of the Commission’s failure to satisfy its presuit requirements. The Eighth Circuit reversed 

and remanded once more. It held that a Title VII defendant can be a 

“prevailing party” only by obtaining a “ruling on the merits,” and that

the District Court’s dismissal of the claims was not a ruling on the 

merits. 

Held: A favorable ruling on the merits is not a necessary predicate to 

find that a defendant is a prevailing party. Pp. 11–16.

(a) Common sense undermines the notion that a defendant cannot 

“prevail” unless the relevant disposition is on the merits. A plaintiff

seeks a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties. But a defendant seeks to prevent an alteration in the plaintiff ’s 

favor, and that objective is fulfilled whenever the plaintiff ’s challenge

is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the court’s decision, 

i.e., even if the court’s final judgment rejects the plaintiff’s claim for a

nonmerits reason. There is no indication that Congress intended

that defendants should be eligible to recover attorney’s fees only

when courts dispose of claims on the merits. Title VII’s fee-shifting

statute allows prevailing defendants to recover whenever the plaintiff ’s “claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 422. Congress thus must

have intended that a defendant could recover fees expended in frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless litigation when the case is resolved

in the defendant’s favor, whether on the merits or not. Christiansburg itself involved a defendant’s request for attorney’s fees in a case

where the District Court had rejected the plaintiff ’s claim for a nonmerits reason. Various Courts of Appeals likewise have applied the 

Christiansburg standard when claims were dismissed for nonmerits 

reasons. Pp. 11–14. 

(b) The Court declines to decide the argument, raised by the Commission for the first time during the merits stage of this case, whether a defendant must obtain a preclusive judgment in order to prevail. 

The Commission’s failure to articulate its preclusion theory earlier

has resulted in inadequate briefing on the issue, and the parties dispute whether the District Court’s judgment was in fact preclusive.

The Commission also submits that the Court should affirm on the alternative ground that, even if CRST is a prevailing party, the Commission’s position that it had satisfied its presuit obligations was not 

frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. These matters are left for the 

Eighth Circuit to consider in the first instance. It is not this Court’s 

usual practice to adjudicate either legal or predicate factual questions 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

Syllabus 

in the first instance, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 

U. S. 103, 110, and that is the proper course here, given the extensive 

record in this case and the Commission’s change of position between 

the certiorari and merits stages. Pp. 14–16.

774 F. 3d 1169, vacated and remanded. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, 

J., filed a concurring opinion. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 14–1375 

CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC., PETITIONER v. EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

[May 19, 2016] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case involves the interpretation of a statutory

provision allowing district courts to award attorney’s fees

to defendants in employment discrimination actions.

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.

253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., which prohibits discrimination in employment, a district court may

award attorney’s fees to “the prevailing party.” §2000e– 

5(k). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held

that a Title VII defendant prevails only by obtaining a

“ruling on the merits.” 774 F. 3d 1169, 1179 (2014); Marquart v. Lodge 837, Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 26 

F. 3d 842, 851–852 (1994). This Court disagrees with that 

conclusion. The Court now holds that a favorable ruling 

on the merits is not a necessary predicate to find that a 

defendant has prevailed. 

I 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes an 

award of attorney’s fees in certain circumstances. The 

statute provides that 

“[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter 
 

 

2 CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission or the United States, a reasonable 

attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the

costs, and the Commission and the United States 

shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” 

§2000e–5(k). 

Before deciding whether an award of attorney’s fees is 

appropriate in a given case, then, a court must determine 

whether the party seeking fees has prevailed in the litigation. Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent 

School Dist., 489 U. S. 782, 789 (1989); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Congress has included the term “prevailing party” in 

various fee-shifting statutes, and it has been the Court’s

approach to interpret the term in a consistent manner. 

See Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 

Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 

602-603, and n. 4 (2001). The Court has said that the 

“touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the 

material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” 

Texas State Teachers Assn., supra, at 792–793. This 

change must be marked by “judicial imprimatur.” Buckhannon, 532 U. S., at 605. The Court has explained that,

when a plaintiff secures an “enforceable judgmen[t] on the 

merits” or a “court-ordered consent decre[e],” that plaintiff

is the prevailing party because he has received a “judicially 

sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id., at 604–605. The Court, however, has not set 

forth in detail how courts should determine whether a 

defendant has prevailed.

Although the Court has not articulated a precise test for

when a defendant is a prevailing party, in the Title VII 

context it has addressed how defendants should be treated 

under the second part of the inquiry—whether the district 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

court should exercise its discretion to award fees to the 

prevailing party. When a defendant is the prevailing 

party on a civil rights claim, the Court has held, district

courts may award attorney’s fees if the plaintiff ’s “claim 

was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless,” or if “the 

plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” 

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 422 

(1978); see also id., at 421. 

The Court of Appeals’ determination of the first part of

the fee-shifting inquiry—whether petitioner is a prevailing 

party—presents the central issue in this case. Before 

addressing this question, however, a discussion of the

facts and complex procedural history is warranted. 

II 

Petitioner CRST is a trucking company that employs a

team driving system under which two employees share

driving duties on a single truck. CRST requires its drivers

to graduate from the company’s training program before 

becoming a certified driver. Part of that training is a 28-

day over-the-road trip with a veteran driver. In 2005, a 

new driver named Monika Starke filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (Commission) alleging that two male trainers

sexually harassed her during her over-the-road training 

trip.

The Commission’s receipt of a charge of an unlawful

workplace practice starts Title VII’s “detailed, multi-step 

procedure through which the Commission enforces the

statute’s prohibition on employment discrimination.” 

Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip 

op., at 1). Under §706 of Title VII, the Commission first 

must inform the employer about the charge and the details of the allegations. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(b). The 

Commission next must investigate the allegation. Ibid. If 

the agency “determines after such investigation that there 
 

 

4 CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,”

it shall dismiss the charge and notify the parties. Ibid. At 

that point, the Commission is no longer involved, and the 

aggrieved individual may sue the employer in his or her 

own name. §2000e–5(f)(1). If, on the other hand, the 

Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to 

believe that a Title VII violation did occur, it “shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” §2000e–5(b). Only if the agency’s

attempt at conciliation fails may it file a court action in its 

own name on behalf of the aggrieved person who brought 

the charge. §2000e–5(f)(1). 

Following these procedures, the Commission notified 

CRST of Starke’s charge and requested information regarding Starke’s allegations. In response CRST denied 

any wrongdoing. During the investigation, the Commission discovered that four other women had filed formal 

charges against the company with the Commission. The 

Commission then sent CRST several followup requests. It 

asked if CRST had received other allegations of harassment, demanded contact information for any women who 

were instructed by the trainers Starke accused of harassment, and sought “detailed contact information for”

CRST’s dispatchers and female drivers. EEOC v. CRST 

Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F. 3d 657, 667 (CA8 2012).

Over a year and a half after Starke filed her charge, the

Commission sent CRST a letter of determination informing the company that the Commission had found reasonable cause to believe that CRST subjected Starke and “a

class of employees and prospective employees to sexual 

harassment” and offering to conciliate. App. 811. Counsel 

for the Commission and for CRST discussed conciliation, 

but were unable to reach an agreement, and the Commission promptly notified the company that, in the agency’s

view, the conciliation efforts had failed. 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

In September 2007 the Commission, in its own name, 

filed suit against CRST under §706 of Title VII. It alleged

that CRST subjected Starke and “[o]ther similarly situated . . . employees of CRST . . . to sexual harassment and a

sexually hostile and offensive work environment” in violation of §§703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. 

§§2000e–2 and 2000e–3. App. 794–795. The Commission 

is allowed to “seek specific relief for a group of aggrieved 

individuals [under §706] without first obtaining class 

certification pursuant to” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23, because that rule “is not applicable to” a §706 enforcement action. General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. 

EEOC, 446 U. S. 318, 323, 333–334 (1980). The Commission sought to enjoin CRST from engaging in discriminatory employment practices and to obtain an order requiring CRST to take proactive steps to remedy and prevent

sex-based discrimination in the workplace. The Commission also sought damages and costs. 

During discovery, the Commission identified over 250

allegedly aggrieved women—far more than the Commission had forecast. CRST filed a motion for an order to 

show cause, alleging that the Commission “did not have a 

good-faith basis” for seeking relief on behalf of all the 

women. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 2009 WL 

2524402, *10 (ND Iowa, Aug. 13, 2009). The District 

Court did not strike any allegedly aggrieved persons at

that time, although it did note its concern “that CRST still

might unfairly face a ‘moving target’ of prospective plaintiffs as discovery winds down and trial approaches.” Ibid. 

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The District Court proceeded to dispose of the Commission’s claims in a series of orders responsive to various 

motions filed by CRST. Section 707 of Title VII authorizes 

the Commission to bring a claim “that any person or group 

of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice” of illegal 

sex-based discrimination. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e–6. In 
 

6 CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

the early stage of this litigation the Commission “made

clear to the [district] court and CRST that it believe[d]

CRST had engaged in ‘a pattern or practice’ of tolerating

sexual harassment.” Order in No. 07–CV–95 (ND Iowa), 

Doc. 197, p. 25. CRST sought summary judgment on the 

Commission’s perceived pattern-or-practice claim. The 

District Court granted the motion. The court explained

that, although courts have allowed the Commission to use 

a pattern-or-practice theory when litigating a §706 claim,

the Commission did not plead a violation of §707 or use 

the phrase “pattern or practice” in its complaint. Id., at 

24–25. Instead, the “[Commission’s] Complaint reads as 

if the [Commission] were asserting a prototypical §706 

action.” Ibid. But, the court noted, CRST did not argue 

that the Commission failed to state a pattern-or-practice

claim in the complaint; and the court presumed that CRST

would not have sought summary judgment on a claim “it 

does not believe to exist.” Id., at 26. Because both parties 

accepted that the claim was live, “the court assume[d]

without deciding that this is a sexual harassment pattern

or practice case.” Ibid. After reviewing the parties’ 

arguments, the court held that the Commission had “not 

established a pattern or practice of tolerating sexual

harassment” and dismissed with prejudice the assumed 

pattern-or-practice claim. Id., at 67. The court, as a final 

matter, advised that “[n]othing in this opinion . . . should 

be construed as a final ruling on the individual claims of 

sexual harassment that the [Commission] presses in this

action.” Ibid. 

Next, the District Court ruled in several orders that the 

Commission’s claims on behalf of all but 67 of the women 

were barred on a variety of grounds. The court had previously dismissed claims on behalf of nearly 100 women as a

discovery sanction due to the Commission’s failure to 

produce the women for deposition. In rejecting the Commission’s other claims, the court relied on (1) the expira-
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

tion of the statute of limitations; (2) judicial estoppel; (3) 

the employee’s failure to report the alleged harassment in 

a timely fashion; (4) CRST’s prompt and effective response

to reports of harassment; and (5) the lack of severity or 

pervasiveness of the alleged harassment. 

The District Court then barred the Commission from 

seeking relief for the remaining 67 women on the ground 

that the Commission had not satisfied its §706 presuit 

requirements before filing the lawsuit. The court concluded 

that the suit was “one of those exceptionally rare” cases 

where the Commission “wholly abandoned its statutory 

duties” to investigate and conciliate. CRST Van Expedited, 

Inc., 2009 WL 2524402, at *16. The court noted, however, that it “expresse[d] no view as to whether the [Commission’s] investigation, determination and conciliation of

Starke’s Charge would be sufficient to support a pattern[-] 

or-practice lawsuit.” Ibid., n. 21. The District Court then 

dismissed the suit, held that CRST is a prevailing party, 

and invited CRST to apply for attorney’s fees. 

CRST filed a motion for attorney’s fees. After describing

how it disposed of the Commission’s claims piece by piece,

the District Court held that the Commission’s failure to 

satisfy its presuit obligations for its claims on behalf of the

final 67 women was “unreasonable,” and that an award of 

attorney’s fees was therefore appropriate. App. 140. The 

court awarded CRST over $4 million in attorney’s fees. 

Id., at 173–174. 

The Commission appealed the District Court’s order

dismissing the claims on behalf of the 67 women that the

District Court rejected for failure to satisfy Title VII’s 

presuit requirements as well as the District Court’s dismissal of some of the Commission’s other claims. As 

relevant here, the Court of Appeals held that the District

Court’s dismissal of the 67 claims for a lack of investigation and conciliation was proper. The Commission, according to the Court of Appeals, “did not reasonably investi-
 

 

8 CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

gate the class allegations of sexual harassment during a 

reasonable investigation of the charge,” but rather used

“discovery in the resulting lawsuit as a fishing expedition

to uncover more violations.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 

679 F. 3d, at 676 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

Commission in fact “did not investigate the specific allegations of any of the 67 allegedly aggrieved persons . . . until 

after the Complaint was filed.” Ibid. (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s

dismissal of almost all of the other claims on which the 

Commission had appealed, reversing only the claims on 

behalf of Starke and one other employee—Tillie Jones—

for reasons not material to the question at issue here.

Like the District Court before it, the Court of Appeals 

declined to comment on whether the presuit investigation

and attempted conciliation would have been sufficient to

support a pattern-or-practice claim. The Court of Appeals

also vacated, without prejudice, the attorney’s fees award. 

“In light of our reversals” of the District Court’s summaryjudgment orders with respect to Starke and Jones, the 

court reasoned, “CRST is no longer a ‘prevailing’ defendant because the [Commission] still asserts live claims 

against it.” Id., at 694–695. Judge Murphy dissented 

from the court’s holding that the Commission had failed to 

satisfy its obligation to investigate and conciliate the final

67 claims, arguing that the Commission did not need to 

“complete its presuit duties for each individual alleged 

victim of discrimination when pursuing a class claim.” Id., 

at 695. 

After the case was remanded, the Commission withdrew 

its claim on behalf of Jones and settled its claim on behalf 

of Starke. The Commission thus had no claims left. The 

company again moved for attorney’s fees, and the District 

Court again awarded CRST more than $4 million in fees. 

The court first concluded “that this case contained multi-
 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

ple and distinct claims for relief,” thereby rejecting the 

Commission’s contention that it had brought a single

claim on which it had prevailed. 2013 WL 3984478, *9 

(ND Iowa, Aug. 1, 2013). Noting that the defendant does

not have to prevail on every claim in a suit to obtain attorney’s fees, see Fox v. Vice, 563 U. S. 826 (2011), the 

court then determined the claims on which CRST had 

prevailed. Applying Circuit precedent requiring a ruling 

on the merits of a claim before a defendant can be considered a prevailing party, the court found that CRST did not

prevail on the claims that were dismissed because of the

Commission’s failure to produce many of the allegedly 

aggrieved women for deposition. The court also found that 

CRST had not prevailed on the merits with respect to a 

handful of the Commission’s other claims. The court 

found that CRST did prevail, however, on the Commission’s pattern-or-practice claim and on the claims on behalf of over 150 of the allegedly aggrieved women, including the 67 claims dismissed because of the Commission’s

failure to satisfy its presuit requirements. The court held 

that its dismissal of those 67 claims was a ruling on the 

merits because the Commission’s obligation to investigate

and conciliate “is not a jurisdictional prerequisite; rather,

it is an ingredient of the [Commission’s] claim.” 2013 WL 

3984478, at *10. The court further concluded that an 

award of attorney’s fees was appropriate because the

Commission’s failure to investigate and conciliate those 67

claims was unreasonable, as were the pattern-or-practice 

claim and the other claims on which it prevailed.

The Commission appealed, and the Court of Appeals

again reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeals first

agreed with the District Court that the Commission 

brought many individual claims, not just a single claim.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, however, with the District

Court’s conclusion that CRST could recover attorney’s fees

for the pattern-or-practice claim. The Commission did not 
 

10 CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

allege a pattern-or-practice claim in its complaint, the 

Court of Appeals noted, and the District Court had “merely 

assumed without deciding that the [Commission]

brought a pattern-or-practice claim.” 774 F. 3d, at 1179. 

The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court

erred by awarding fees “based on a purported” claim. Ibid. 

The Court of Appeals, bound by its own precedent in 

Marquart, then held that before a defendant can be 

deemed to have prevailed and to be eligible for fees there 

must have been a favorable “‘judicial determination . . . on 

the merits.’” 774 F. 3d, at 1179 (quoting Marquart, 26 

F. 3d, at 852). A merits-based disposition is necessary, the

court reasoned, because “‘[p]roof that a plaintiff ’s case is 

frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless is not possible 

without a judicial determination of the plaintiff ’s case on 

the merits.’” 774 F. 3d, at 1179 (quoting Marquart, supra, 

at 852). A case has not been decided on the merits, according to the Court of Appeals, if the defendant secured a

“dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on res

judicata grounds, . . . on statute-of-limitations grounds,” or

for something similar. 774 F. 3d, at 1179. The Court of 

Appeals distinguished “claim elements,” on the one hand,

from “jurisdictional prerequisites or nonjurisdictional 

prerequisites to filing suit,” on the other. Id., at 1180. As 

relevant here, the court held that because Title VII’s 

presuit requirements are not elements of a Title VII claim, 

the dismissal of the claims regarding the 67 women on the

ground that the Commission failed to investigate or conciliate was not a ruling on the merits, and CRST did not 

prevail on those claims. Id., at 1181. As a result, the 

court concluded, CRST was “not entitled to an award of 

attorneys’ fees on such claims.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals also criticized the District Court for “mak[ing] a

universal finding that all of the [Commission’s] claims

were without foundation,” instead of laying out “particularized findings . . . as to each individual claim upon which 
 

 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

it granted summary judgment on the merits to CRST.” 

Id., at 1183. Such findings are necessary, the court reasoned, to avoid providing the defendant with “‘compensation for any fees that he would have paid in the absence of

the frivolous claims.’” Ibid. (quoting Fox, supra, at 841). 

In particular, the court found it “problematic” that the

District Court’s blanket finding included “(1) the purported

pattern-or-practice claim and (2) the claims dismissed

for the [Commission’s] failure to satisfy its presuit obligations.” 774 F. 3d, at 1183. The District Court was ordered 

to undertake a proper, particularized inquiry on remand.

By precluding the defendant from recovering attorney’s

fees when the claims in question have been dismissed 

because the Commission failed to satisfy its presuit obligations, the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with

the decisions of three other Courts of Appeals. See EEOC 

v. Propak Logistics, Inc., 746 F. 3d 145, 152–154 (CA4 

2014); EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F. 3d 1256, 

1261 (CA11 2003); EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F. 2d 

605, 608–609 (CA9 1982). This Court granted certiorari. 

577 U. S. ___ (2015). 

III
 

A 

The Court of Appeals held that CRST did not prevail on 

the claims brought on behalf of 67 women because the 

District Court’s disposition of these claims for failure to

investigate and conciliate was not a ruling on the merits. 

In this Court the Commission now takes the position that 

the court erred by applying an on-the-merits requirement.

Brief for Respondent 29 (“[A]sking whether a judgment is

‘on the merits’ in some abstract sense risks confusion”); Tr.

of Oral Arg. 30 (“We have abandoned the Eighth Circuit’s

view that you need a disposition on the merits”). This 

Court agrees and now holds that a defendant need not 

obtain a favorable judgment on the merits in order to be a 
 

12 CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

“prevailing party.”

Common sense undermines the notion that a defendant 

cannot “prevail” unless the relevant disposition is on the 

merits. Plaintiffs and defendants come to court with 

different objectives. A plaintiff seeks a material alteration

in the legal relationship between the parties. A defendant 

seeks to prevent this alteration to the extent it is in the 

plaintiff ’s favor. The defendant, of course, might prefer a 

judgment vindicating its position regarding the substantive merits of the plaintiff ’s allegations. The defendant 

has, however, fulfilled its primary objective whenever the

plaintiff ’s challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise

reason for the court’s decision. The defendant may prevail 

even if the court’s final judgment rejects the plaintiff ’s 

claim for a nonmerits reason. 

There is no indication that Congress intended that

defendants should be eligible to recover attorney’s fees

only when courts dispose of claims on the merits. The 

congressional policy regarding the exercise of district court

discretion in the ultimate decision whether to award fees 

does not distinguish between merits-based and nonmerits-based judgments. Rather, as the Court explained

in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, one purpose of

the fee-shifting provision is “to deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation.” 434 U. S., at 420 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Fox, 563 U. S., at 836 

(noting, in the context of 42 U. S. C. §1988’s closely related 

provision, that Congress wanted “to relieve defendants of 

the burdens associated with fending off frivolous litigation”). The Court, therefore, has interpreted the statute to 

allow prevailing defendants to recover whenever the plaintiff ’s “claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” 

Christiansburg, supra, at 422. It would make little sense 

if Congress’ policy of “sparing defendants from the costs of 

frivolous litigation,” Fox, supra, at 840, depended on the

distinction between merits-based and non-merits-based 
 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

frivolity. Congress must have intended that a defendant 

could recover fees expended in frivolous, unreasonable, or 

groundless litigation when the case is resolved in the 

defendant’s favor, whether on the merits or not. Imposing

an on-the-merits requirement for a defendant to obtain 

prevailing party status would undermine that congressional policy by blocking a whole category of defendants 

for whom Congress wished to make fee awards available. 

Christiansburg itself involved a defendant’s request for 

attorney’s fees in a case where the District Court had

rejected the plaintiff ’s claim for a nonmerits reason. That 

case involved a claim under Title VII, as originally enacted, 

which did not give the Commission the authority to sue

in its own name on behalf of an aggrieved person. Rosa 

Helm had filed a charge of discrimination against Christiansburg Garment Co. with the Commission in 1968. A 

few years later, the Commission determined that its conciliation efforts had failed and told Helm of her right to 

sue Christiansburg, which she did not exercise. Then in 

1972, Congress amended Title VII to allow the Commission to sue in its own name on behalf of an aggrieved 

person, including where the employee’s charge was “pending with the Commission” when the amendments took

effect. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, §14, 

86 Stat. 103. The Commission sued Christiansburg based 

on Helm’s charge, but the District Court granted summary

judgment to the defendant on the ground that the charge 

was not pending on the amendments’ effective date. 

EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 

1073–1074 (WD Va. 1974). This Court was asked “what 

standard should inform a district court’s discretion in 

deciding whether to award attorney’s fees to a successful

defendant in a Title VII action.” Christiansburg, 434 

U. S., at 417 (emphasis deleted). If a ruling on the merits

were necessary for the defendant to prevail and be eligible

for attorney’s fees, the lack of a ruling on the merits would 
 

14 CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

have been dispositive to this Court’s analysis. But the 

Court said nothing to suggest that the fact that the ruling

was not on the merits ended the inquiry. Its reasoning 

was to the contrary. This Court noted with approval that

the District Court had applied the correct standard and

found that the “Commission’s statutory interpretation of 

§14 of the 1972 amendments was not frivolous.” Id., at 

424 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Various Courts of Appeals likewise have applied the 

Christiansburg standard when claims were dismissed for 

nonmerits reasons. A plaintiff ’s claim may be frivolous,

unreasonable, or groundless if the claim is barred by state

sovereign immunity, C. W. v. Capistrano Unified School 

Dist., 784 F. 3d 1237, 1247–1248 (CA9 2015), or is moot, 

Propak Logistics, 746 F. 3d, at 152. See also Brief for 

Petitioner 33–34 (collecting Courts of Appeals cases in 

which the defendant received attorney’s fees and the 

District Court’s judgment was not on the merits). In cases 

like these, significant attorney time and expenditure may 

have gone into contesting the claim. Congress could not

have intended to bar defendants from obtaining attorney’s

fees in these cases on the basis that, although the litigation was resolved in their favor, they were nonetheless

not prevailing parties. Neither the text of the feeshifting statute nor the policy which underpins it counsels

in favor of adopting the Court of Appeals’ on-the-merits 

requirement. 

B 

Having abandoned its defense of the Court of Appeals’ 

reasoning, the Commission now urges this Court to hold

that a defendant must obtain a preclusive judgment in

order to prevail. The Court declines to decide this issue, 

however. The Commission changed its argument between 

the certiorari and merits stages. As a result, the Commission may have forfeited the preclusion argument by not 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

raising it earlier. The Commission’s failure to articulate 

its preclusion theory before the eleventh hour has resulted

in inadequate briefing on the issue. The Commission and 

CRST dispute, moreover, whether the District Court’s 

judgment was in fact preclusive. Compare Brief for Respondent 38–45 with Reply Brief 8–13. The Court leaves 

these legal and factual issues for the Court of Appeals to 

consider in the first instance. 

The Commission submits the Court should affirm on the 

alternative ground that, even if CRST is a prevailing 

party, the Commission’s position that it had satisfied its

presuit obligations was not frivolous, unreasonable, or

groundless. The Commission acknowledges that the Court 

of Appeals has not decided this issue, but nevertheless

invokes the Court’s authority to affirm “on any ground

properly raised below.” Washington v. Confederated 

Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 476, 

n. 20 (1979); see Brief for Respondent 49-50. In light of

this case’s intricate procedural history, see supra, at 3–11, 

this is not an appropriate case to reach and settle this

fact-sensitive issue. 

It has been over 10 years since Starke first filed her 

charge and close to 9 years since the Commission filed its 

complaint. The dispute over the award of attorney’s fees

has continued over much of that period and is still unresolved. When it appeared the litigation was coming to a 

close in the District Court, the trial judge considered this a 

case in which attorney’s fees should be assessed against 

the Commission. The Court of Appeals then made the 

rulings it considered proper in response, and there were 

further proceedings in the trial court and once again on 

appeal. Against this background of protracted and expensive litigation on the fee issue, the Court is aware of the 

need to resolve the outstanding issues without unnecessary delay. As the Court has noted in earlier cases, “the 

determination of fees ‘should not result in a second major 
 

16 CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

litigation.’” Fox, 563 U. S., at 838 (quoting Hensley, 461 

U. S., at 437). 

It is not prudent, however, for the Court to attempt to

resolve all the pending issues under the circumstances

here. It is not the Court’s usual practice to adjudicate

either legal or predicate factual questions in the first 

instance. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 

U. S. 103, 110 (2001) (per curiam) (noting “that this is a 

court of final review and not first view” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). That precept is applicable here, especially in light of the extensive record in the case and the 

Commission’s change in its position. This Court is confident that the Court of Appeals, and, if necessary, the 

District Court, will resolve the case by taking any proper 

steps to expedite its resolution in a manner consistent 

with their own procedures and their responsibilities in

other pending cases.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 14–1375 

CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC., PETITIONER v. EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

[May 19, 2016] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a district

court may award attorney’s fees to “the prevailing party.” 

42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(k). In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 

EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), this Court concluded that a

prevailing plaintiff “ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s

fees in all but special circumstances,” but a prevailing 

defendant is to be awarded fees only “upon a finding that

the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id., at 417, 421. That holding “mistakenly cast aside the statutory language” in interpreting the

phrase “prevailing party.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 

U. S. 517, 538 (1994) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the 

Court of Appeals compounded Christiansburg’s error by 

requiring a district court to make yet another finding 

before a Title VII defendant may be considered a “prevailing party”: The defendant must also obtain a “ruling on 

the merits.” 774 F. 3d 1169, 1181 (2014). Today, the 

Court correctly vacates that ruling and holds that “a

favorable ruling on the merits is not a necessary predicate 

to find that a defendant has prevailed.” Ante, at 1. I 

therefore join the Court’s opinion in full. Nevertheless, I 

continue to adhere to my view that Christiansburg is a 

“dubious precedent” that I will “decline to extend” any 

further. Fogerty, supra, at 539 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).